as in the case of iraq. often their limits put on the numbers of diplomatic staff that may be present in a foreign country. private security firms is a necessity in order to comply with the agreements the united states government has in place with foreign governments. are rigid determination that security is an inherently governmental function would likely limit the ability of united states government to carry out its diplomatic and military effectiveness. a more effective approach is to identify best methods for contracting security forces and the best tools for maintaining adequate oversight, control, and accountability. i believe that there have been improvements in oversight within iraq. but in my opinion, not enough has been done to manage the future and to establish a framework for success. all are for a few suggestions. the first suggestion is to emphasize -- emphasize the need for following the federal acquisition regulations and to provide better guidance on how private security procurements should

forces, iraq. on behalf of the committee, lee me thank you both for devotion, your commitment to the service of our country, your willingness to continue to be in positions of extreme responsibility. we know that the nominees are not alone in making these sacrifices. in advance, we thank your family members for the support which they will need to continue to provide to you. we have a longstanding tradition of asking our nominees to introduce family members who are present. let me do that at this time. general odierno, if you have family members,,we would be delighted for you to introduce them. >> thank you. my wife linda is with me today. she is my wife of 34 years. she has been with me my entire army career, supported our families and our soldiers, and continues to do that on a volunteer basis. as you all know, we could not do it without the great support they give us. i thank her for her support and sacrifices that she is given these last several years. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you so mu

in iraq... >> couric: pulling... >> woodruff: pulling it together? >> pulling it together, synthesizing it and seeing to it that securing the people is but one element of a larger strategy to see to it that the afghan government gets built in a way that endures over time rather than collapsing again and again into civil war. >> woodruff: colonel peter mansoor, ely elaborate on that. you did work closely with him in iraq. >> well, what i would too old what greg had to say, besides a relationship that i'm injury general petraeus will attempt to forge with president karzai is he will attempt to forge a better relationship with ambassador eikenberry. he had a very successful team relationship with ambassador crocker in iraq and it was one of the reasons why we had unity of effort during the surge in 2007, 2008. so far we haven't had that kind of unity in afghanistan and i think that will be a job number one when he gets there, to form the team both with ambassador eikenberry and with president karzai. and one of the things he did in iraq, for instance, w

everything we do in iraq today is approved by the government of iraq. we do know independent operations in iraq. no have not -- we do m independent operations in iraq. we have not for a long time. we are helping them to develop between now and the end of 2011 a way to go after networks, understanding and network, targeting a network, and having a way to go after them. they are very good at establishing human intelligence. what we are helping them to do is use some of the technical intelligence available to them and use that to go after this and network. the government will go to a process of developing targets and target approval. execution is not the issue. it is really about target development and approval. that is what we are with -- that is what we are working with them on over time. they're getting better, and i feel confident we will be able to transition this in the next 16 months or so. >> you said you captured 34 of the top 42 al-qaeda leaders in the last 90 days. that is pretty dramatic. did something happen? >> we have been nibbling away at t

they did that in iraq periodically. we had people in iraq literally pushing through crowds shooting at us. this happened in this happened in a number of other cases in recent decades as well in these kinds of situations. but, you know, we are about living our values. and every time we have taken expedient measures, not only has it been wrong, we have also paid a price for it in terms of it biting us in the back side in the long run. and so that's, again, we have to be aware that they will use our reluctance to kill innocent civilians or to risk the lives of innocent civilians in the course of these operations. having said that, frankly, they generally are not engaging us directly as much as they are coming at us indirectly. they realize some years ago, certainly last year, that if they engage our troopers in a rect firefight that they will lose. and so they are using ieds and much larger numbers than they have in the past. and that's where we see the increase in the violence incidents. >> it's my understanding that b-1

everything we in iraq today is approved by the government of iraq. we do know independent operations in iraq. no have not -- we d m independent operations in iraq. we have not for a long time. we are helping them to develop between now and the end of 2011 a way to g after networks, understandinand network, targeting a network, and having a way to go after them. they are ver good at establishing human intelligence. what we are helping them to do is use some of the technical intelligence available to them and use that to go after this and network. the government will go to a process of developing targe and target approval. execution is not the issue. it is really about target development and approv. that is what we are with -- that is what we a working with them on over time. they're getting better, and i feel confident we will be le to transition this in the next 16 months or so. >> you said you captured 34 of the top 42 al-qaeda leaders in the last 90 days. that is pretty dramatic. did something happen? >> we have been nibbling away at this for a vy

in both iraq and afghanistan. adequate oversight was not created until adequate operations were under way. in afghanistan's case, seven years after it was und way. the dam has broken. the disaster was unfolding. it's difficult to make as significant difference as we were able to make in iraq. the fits within the gist of this hearing the need for greater accountability together with more transparency. >> mr. fontaine, can you compare for us the competencies involved when the military oversees its own personnel versus how well they do in overseeing the conduct of contractors? >> well, this is an ongoing problem related to the laws, regulations, internal command structures that the military has versus what the contractors have. the contractors at the end of the day are responsible for the terms of their contract. nonfulfillment of the contract has certain penalties, but not the same penalties that, for example, military personnel have if they don't obey an order where they can be court-martialed. the discipline and t

nor was it in any way shape or form easy in iraq. it was very hard in iraq. we have very tough losses. there were significant uptick in dens. i still remember, for example, way past the september hearings well into the end of that year, for example as various government leaders came to a senior u.s. officials and called for a very significant change in governmental leadership there. this is way beyond the point that anyone was stating. this is a tough, tough business. as i described earlier, ittis a roller coaster experience. those who are living this need to keep their eye on the horizon to ensure that the trajectory is generally upward. i agree with the undersecretary that it is. >> to talk about the state department. you talk about their contribution which is very valuable. you also pointed out that the ngo's do not carry security and it is difficult for them to fulfil their responsibility in an insurgency situation. i will say in this way and let you comment. in my opinion, the people who are in these prt's are most the military and we need to understand

iraq. and the huge mission that state is going to assume at the end of 2011 assuming this continues. a big part of that mission involves diplomatic security and related activities. in today -- today, the estimate from the state department is that it will take 2200 movement personnel in iraq to take -- in st iraq to take over this mission. you know what the size of ds is today? do you know how many agents are overseas today? the total ds force is about 1,800 personnel. about 800 of those are overseas. we're talking 2,200 movement personnel in just iraq. now, my question is the following -- and we'll start with dr. burman. based on your knowledge of today's budget and projected budget and force structure, i'd like to know if you honestly believe we will see those kind of increases insourced into state and dod. dr. burman? >> i think it would be very difficult to do that. that would argue for again having as much management control as possible. >> fine. we all agree. dr. stanger. >> it would b

>> i served in iraq in 2003. it gave me an idea of where the country was back then and where we are right now. >> mr. rogers? what's i served in iraq for little over nine months for the department of defense and a bully but it was invaluable. >> which you agree that if you have not served there that there would be things that you would not be doing now towards the entire mission? in other words, did that mission alert you to a different course of action because you had been there? >> i am asking each of you. >> clearly, my experience in standing up the iraqi police and understanding how the odepartmet of defense responded clearly helped me. my experience running the protective service detail for the secretary of defense and the deputy secretary of defense certainly helped. >> in valuable -- it was valuable in in pressing upon me on working with the local culture and understanding as a recipient of the services of private security officers what worked and what did not. >> i understood the threat and the cultural d

forces from iraq by the end of december 2011. that decision helped focus the iraqi government and military on the need to take principal responsibility for the security of their own country. the afghan success and ours depends on that happening in afghanistan as well. we have already seen a positive effect of setting the july 2011 date to begin reductions of our troops. lieutenant-general caldwell, who commands our training efforts in afghanistan, told us that when president obama announced the date, the afghan leadership made a greater effort to reach out to the local leaders and elders, resulting in a surge in recruits for the afghan army. general petreaus has said he agrees with the president's policy setting that july 2011 date, and indeed has told me that if he ceases to agree, he will so advise his commander in chief, which of course he has a responsibility to do as a military commander. it is my hope and i believe that senator mccain and other members think so, that we can vote on general petreaus nomination by the end of

we are stuck in iraq. the bulk of your officers are air force personnel because they were the only deployable personnel that we had and we are now just beginning to see the fruits of the army's push to rapidly increase their contracting officer capability and some deployable capability. when you have a contract in officer turning every four to six months instead of spending a year or 18 months or two years on that job, we have a challenge. that is one of the lessons learned that we got from this operation. >> thank you both. we had a contractor that was performing well that was asked to stay on for half a month for 16 days in order to assure that there was adequate security. it is easy for people to say that if it was me, i am going to say that i might not make the decision that you can never work for the united states government again. i would say that is the performance consideration. realizing that all of these approvals are contractually required, if there was ever a case for the termination for defaul

forces from iraq by the end of december 2011. that decision helped focus the ira government and military on the need to take principal responsibility for the security of their own country. the afghan success and ours depends on that happeni in afghanistan as well. we have already seen a positive effect of setting the july 2011 date to begin reductions of our troops. lieutenant-general caldwell, who commands our training efforts in afghanistan, told us th when president obama announced the date, the afghan leadership made a greater effort to reach out to the local leaders and elders, resulting in a sge in recruits for the afghan army. general petreaus has said he agrees with the president's policy setting that july 2011 date, and indeed has told me that if he ceases to agree, he will so advise his commander in chief, which of course he has a responsibility to do as a military commander. it is my hope and i believe that senar mccain and other members think so, that we can vote on general petreaus nomination by the end of even possi

nor was it in any way shape or form easy in iraq. it was very, very hard in iraq. we took very tough losses in iraq, as you well know. from visiting many different times, and there were significant ups and downs. i still remember, for example, way past the september hearings, well at the end of that year, for example, as various government leaders came to very senior u.s. officials and called for a very significant change in governmental leadership there. this is way beyond the point that anyone was disputing that there were significant security gains. this is a tough, tough business. and it is, as i've described earlier, very much a roller coaster ride. a roller coaster experience. and those who are living it have to try to keep their eye on the horizon to ensure that the trajectory is generally upward and i agree with the undersecretary that it is. >> you talk about the state department and their contributions which are very valuable, but you also pointed out that the ngos don't carry security with them and it's difficult for them to full film their responsibilit

iraq. a member of the parliament of iraq will talk about his country's future -- of afghanistan will talk about his country's future. tomorrow on "washington journal" -- a retired general talks about bp's and the government response to the gulf coast oil spill. a reporter looks at the federal reserve's new credit card roles and what they mean for consumers. i transportation reporter for the associated press gives details about a defense of our request to the faa to open up u.s. airspace to unmanned drones. that is live at 7:00 a.m. eastern here on c-span. >> he was a volatile, emotional, very complicated, kind of a depressive young man. he was very adventurists. when he was in america, he was 25 and having adventures. >> take a new look at alexis de tocqueville and his tour of america. there's a new book about it. we will discuss it sunday on c- span's "q&a." >> admiral thad allen says there is a major push to acquire more ships for skimming and additional protective booms. admiral allen is

i asked him, how do you think history ll judge the iraq war? and he takes his hands out and shrubs like only bush can and says, history? we will not know. we will all be dead. [lauger >> and for it -- and with that we want thank you for having us. [applause] >> i rely knew that we wer't done. >> real quick -- that was the tension. we goto get you home to your war newspaper. [laughter] and so i go home and my wife asked me how was the interview, and i said he answered all the question but they'reeally good news is that i have the ending to the book. ending to books are hard to find. about a year later, 2005, high was giving a talk in washington and the subject of your great biography, hillary clinton, was the other speaker. she came up to me and said, i quote from your book all the time. in fact i "it's so often i should give you royalties. i stupidly said no and should have said how much. she sa, i "the end of the book were you asked about history and bush says, history we will not know. i said, why you quit that? hillary can get excited. she s

been a tremendous ally both in iraq and afghanistan. i served with polish forces in iraq. their courage, commitment, and achievements are a great credit to poland and our bilateral relationship. in afghanistan, i think we are pursuing a complex multi- faceted policy that is focused not just on security nd military operations, but also trying to help afghanistan build a viable and sustainable infrastructure. this is not new. when i reopen the embassy in -pafghanistan in 2002, i made te case that in addition to our traditional assistance programs in areas like agriculture and education we need to make a difference in infrastructure because the devastation was so total that improvements in agriculture, for eeample, were not going to count for much if farmers could not get produce to market. that led to american products like our involvement in the kanduhar-kabul highway. we cannot do it all. i am pleased to see efforts underway to try to coordinate afghanistan across the board. this will require a huge international effort. we will not prevail. the afghan government will not

been a tremendous ally both in iraq and afghanistan. i served with polish forces in iraq. their courage, commitment, and achievements are a great credit to poland and our bilateral relationship. in afghanistan, i think we are pursuing a complex multi- faceted policy that is focused not just on security nd military operations, but also trying to help afghanistan build a viable and sustainable infrastructure. this is not new. when i reopen the embassy in -pafghanistan in 2002, i made te case that in addition to our traditional assistance programs in areas like agriculture and education we need to make a difference in infrastructure because the devastation was so total that improvements in agriculture, for eeample, were not going to count for much if farmers could not get produce to market. that led to american products like our involvement in the kanduhar-kabul highway. we cannot do it all. i am pleased to see efforts underway to try to coordinate afghanistan across the board. this will require a huge international effort. we will not prevail. the afghan government will not

in june of 2011, when we had just barely gotten the surge forces into iraq at that point. this is not-- this is not some kind of production program or something, where you have, you are going to meet these particular objectives this week and next week. the chairman is saying this is a process. we think we have the right assets, we have the right strategy, we have the right leadership and most of our allies and partners share our view that things are heading in the right direction and that b. will be able to show clear progress and that we are on the right track by the end of this year. but, this is not something where we do ourselves any favors by tearing ourselves up by the roots every week to see if we are growing. this is a process and it is going to be long and hard but we are headed in the right direction. >> mr. secretary i was actually quoting general mcchrystal when he said this would happen more slowly than we original thought. >> what he is talking about is the time as we have shaped-- would general mcchrystal has also tried to make clear is this is not going to

iraq is a mitropoulos compared to afghanistan. changing the hearts and minds of people in iraq was a lot different. they will basically do what they need to survive. i think that is the problem. i just do not see what the actual end -- i do not think we will ever be able to leave. will we build bases there? permanent basis? the thing about afghanistan as we spend so much money over there, and if you want to raise my taxes to make sure our troops have the best equipment available, then raise them. i do not want to see another american life lost to poor technology or lack of proper equipment, but the fact that the chinese won the copper beeid, tt could have been done without the bid. afghanistan should start to pay the u.s. to help support our troops effort there. maybe the minerals would have been a good start. and if the american people knew we were not pumping so much money into this, then maybe we could stomach it a little bit more. guest: thanks for your comments. you are right on the money on a lot of what you said. regarding

fwe look at iraq, what turned things around. putting in david petraeus was critical, and resource were critical. he has done both things in afghanistan. the other part that was critical which people don't pay allegation much attention to was the quality of civilian leadership. ambassador croaker was absolutely critical to the success, and the president's own personal commitment-- that's commitment of time, commitment of energy, and commitment of will. and that is part of what he has to do. >> ifill: you can respond to that. >> i was just going to say i think he has made the commitment. he shaved the goal down to a manageable, potentially achieveable level from a while -- a fanneddacy of democratic afghanistan, and he's tripled the forces which is huge commitment. i certainly don't disagree there's dysfunction , also. but i think his commitment to is-- can't--. >> ifill: david, let's talk about this deadline, the july 11 beginning to pull outta date. i don't think he exactly called it a pull-out date. but there is still some disc

iraq is a proud arab state. iraqi arabs, rather sunni or shiite, have a very little affinity towards iran and they fought in a better ground war from 1980 to 1988. the longer that he is in iran, the less political influence he has in iraq. host: from long island, michaal, on our independent line. caller: my quustton for ambassador crocker, it is about your work in paaistan when you were under george bush. at the timm, we needed a sharp government crackdown on the taliban. i am curious, whaa has been the town of dialogue with governments that rose to power, you could say, and in general is our relation with pakistan aimed solely at fighting terrorism or are we trying to open the door to broader discussions on hypocrisy, nuccear non- proliferation, etc. democratic reform and the things we want to see in the region. guest: great question. i believe wwen i was there and i believe today that the relationship does have to be a+ broad one. ittcannot only be about fighting terror. it has to be about economics, social, e

it happened in iraq. in my unit. we put a lot of ground power on the ground to free up our logistics lines. as soon as we put troops on the ground, we push the enemy somewhere else. we can put hundreds of thousands of troops in afghanistan, push people around, but in the end the problems still exist. we need a slim down strategy. it's not about time lines. maybe we need 20,000 on the ground in afghanistan, 15,000 on the ground. but hundreds of thousands of troops for tens of years is what will really be required for counterinsurgency. that is the big debate that many looms here. because i do think general petraeus and mcchrystal are more biased towards this "let's prove i'm right on coin strategy." the vice president is still in the corner of we need a trimmed down mission that's global. >> larry: ari, you disagree? >> i'm not a military strategist, so i invest in those who are. in this case, it's general petraeus and general mcchrystal. in fact, it's president obama. he's the one who is commander in chief who accept

of iraq today. the terrorist attacks that you mentioned, and the convening of the parliament to begin the process of government formation. this is the yen and the gang. the backdrop of terrorist violence, at the same time that the people of iraq did along with their unique political process. these bombings have been part of the landscape for some time. they are tragic, they are evil, but i do not believe that they will affect the political process. they will get on with their business in a unique way. >> how have you looked at the approach to the rack and a drawdown of soldiers, and the wrapping up of the efforts in canada are -- in khandahar. >> the administration is engaged in iraq. he has made numerous trips out there, and the leaders are regularly in washington. there is no question that the administration is being very serious about them. there is a very long way to go and it will take a lot more engagement going forward. we negotiated the agreement with iraq before i left in 2008, calling for

they will get invaded just like iraq. american soldiers will never leave iraq. if they do not want that to happen to them, they will get the bomb. they will get blackwater coming in killing people at will. iran should get the bomb. guest: it is a fair point that is widelyyshared by many including many of the iranian leadership as they look back to 2003. one lesson they grew was that a country like north korea is immune to a u.s. invasion because they have a nuclear weapon and the country like iraq was not immune. there are several ways of looking at this. by continuing to pursue this path of nuclear weapons capabilities, they are inviting more pressure on them. it is the chicken and the egg. as the pressure on iran because of nuclear ambitions or because the powers want to keep iran down? i think that the concern, which many people now have, is one lesson that thee may drop. it is the lesson of pakistan. that as a country which after in achieve a nuclear weapon, tested a nuclear weapon, after one week of outrage the world was so concerned that they engaged pakis

but some very, very big transactions that iraq needed. in fact, this is a a time when prime minister maliki specifically was asking me as a military commander if i could get a certain corporation to re-engage after their earlier disappointing experience there. and get another one, in the electrical sector, the oil sector, gas and so forth. again deputy undersecretary brinkley did great work there. so, in fact, i encouraged, and we had help to get him in to afghanistan, we might even look a bit more broadly than that, but, in fact, it was during his process of getting acquainted with the situation on the ground in afghanistan that these geological surveys and other documents were all pulled together, and i think people realize the magnitude of the mental resources that exist in afghanistan. recognizing the enormous challenges to actually turning those in to wealth and income and so forth for the people, revenue. but nonetheless, recognizing extraordinary potential that is there. it has some of the world's last remaining superdeposits or so

but some very, very big transactions that iraq needed. in fact, this is at a time when prime minister maliki specifically was asking me as a military commander if i could get a certain corporation to re-engage after their earlier disappointing exrience there. and get another one, in the electrical sector, the oil sector, gas and so forth. again deputy undersecretary brinkley did great work there. so, in fact, i encouraged, and we had help to get him in to afghanistan, we might even look a bit more broadly than that, but, in fact, it was during his process of getting acquainted with the situation on the ground in afghanistan that these geological surveys and other documents were all pulled together, and i think people realize the magnitude of the mental resources that exist in afghanistan. recognizing the ermous challenges to actually turning those in to wealth and income and so forth for the people, revenue. but nonetheless, recognizing extraordinary potential that is there. it has some of the world's last remaining superdeposits or se ot

i think we should out of iraq very soon. we did not want to get into that debate as to whether or not because nothing in here undercuts what will be provided for the troops currently in the field. havergument is let's not any more iraq or afghanistan. you have the air power and sea power to g to the defense of people in trouble because they are threatened bsomebody else. the answer to that is let's not get into those things in the future unnecessarily. but nothing in what we're talking about would undercut iraq and afghanistan. ihink that makes it possible to getupport. >> in response to two of those questions, we are doing sothing very different here. we are moving outde of the process. the deficit reduction commission in a sse is outside of the process. when we look at what is happening in this country today, some of

it's not just iraq and afghanistan. even in iraq and afghanistan, we have thousands of development projects, small to large, ngos, we we've had ngos been assault and lost people. we've had companies who have lost people. diplomat security bureau does not necessarily have the expertise or providing that security. in fact, their principal security role is inside the land not outside the line. so the current structure where you have private security or others providing that capability in the field is probably not one that is easily or simplistically change and and may not be realistic to even do that at this point. >> did you weren't to -- >> point of clarification, i'm speaking of moving security. those numbers are much smaller. okay. >> either the smaller set or the larger set i think is something that i'm interested in. dr. avant, i'm going to ask you next. >> i do think that there are issues when you're thinking about the management of security that usaid has a more difficult time with and not just usaid as a governmen

it was given to the government of iraq. it talked about the need for air defense, and the need to develop air capability moving forward. they have submitted to us a letter saying that they're interested in purchasing f-16's. we are going through our own process. this will be evolving. >> will there be something to be there by the time u.s. combat troops complete their withdrawal? are you saying that the u.s. will not be able to meet that request at this akes years? >> they will have some air force capability. they continue to build some capability, not fighter aircraft. that will come sometime after 2011, likely do in many other countries as we sell them aircraft. >> will they be new ones? >> we are working on that, but i think they will be nil. we have to go through congress. there are many states that have to be gone through yet before we come to a final decision. >> the 50,000, but does that include troops that will be in the process of redeploying as of september 1? >> my goal is that we will be at 50,000 in side of ira

cr>> what the differences in the field in iraq and can stand? >> i would give you two or three reasons. general petraeus no counterinsurgency strategy better than anybody. he wrote the book on it. it is a counterinsurgency strategy that has been put into effect in afghanistan. secondly, he has proven that he can successfully carried out a strategy in a different situation than afghanistan. it is still a counter insurgency strategy which depends less on force and less on so-called kinetic force than it does on winning the support of the people and protecting the people and to do that not just with security forces but by winning their support through governments, as well he is a proven enter state -- -- through governance, as well he ha. he is a proven entity. you don't want one general to leave without the next one ready to take over. >> republicans were very complimentary of the president's decision. they continue to say that the date certain for withdrawal will undermine the entire effort. the taliban will simply wait it out. >> they took that

it was ingrained there are wmd's in iraq. people asserted i had some clues about it. i agree with that. that does not mean the cia and white house did not screw up. >> there is a larger point here. once the war started to go badly, i believe that the reporting on the bush presidency by a good number of reporters, partly by bob but reporting by the "new york times" and other news organizations, the reporting on the bush presidency, which was a highly secretive presidency, was an awful lot of mendacity. a real dislike for the press. it is almost everything we know for about the bush presidency is we know from the press. we do not note from congressional hearings. we do not know from anything candid that the bush white house ever put out. we know it from the press. i think the reporting on the bush presidency after the first six months of the war is a pretty hon. history of washington reporting. >> you mentioned there needs to be an adjusted business model. i am wondering what your thoughts are on what that might be. " how old are you? >> 22. >> i am 67. you figure it ou

whenever a view we took about the iraq conflict -- whatever we took about the iraq conflict, iraq does have some chance of stability and democracy. where there is progress -- i had a meeting this morning with general petraeus. one of the reasons and that our- brave servicemen and women have fought and died in iraq was to try to make that a more stable country and a country that people who have fled it would be able to rettrn to. of course, i will look at the particular issue he raises. if we help to make their country save, they should be able to go home. -- country safe, they should be able to go home. >> could he give me his personal assurance that he will do everything in his power to support the people of cumbria >> i can certainly give the hon. gentleman that assurance. working in coverage to bring people together after this appalling tragedy. -- working in cumbria to bring people together after this appalling trageey. they have a very compassionate and caring and strong community. they have shown that in the wake of these terribbe events. we will need after question time to discu

i had known him in combat in iraq. i knew his background and his focus. that is the reason i recommended him strongly. certainly, as i said earlier, i have responsibility in that regard as well. there is also part of this that once elected, when put in a position, there is an expectation in terms of execution along the times and it every area of your responsibility. i think general mcchrystal certainly understood that and understand that. again, it is back to a significant error in judgment. as far as i'm concerned it was the appropriate outcome. >> for both of you, what does this say about the strength of the general officer corps now that you could only turn to general petraeus and essentially demote him because he was the only one really capable of doing this job? you have two generals now, mcchrystal and petraeus, who have been out in the field for years continuously for more than anyone else. are they being kept out there too long? do you need to strengthen your bench? in terms of general petraeus, does he have any flexibility to make any changes wit

so there will be 50,000 troops left in iraq. . . james, are you still with us? are you still on active duty? c-span2 caller: yes, i am. i have not currently rotated over to afghanistan, no. host: are you in some sort of rotation? will you eventually go over there? caller: yes, probably within the next 12 to 18 months. host: thanks for your call. guest: the idea that this is some grand plan of mcchrystal, i do not buy it. i've heard that before. everybody tries to be behind the motives of everybody, that somehow things are too hot for him and he wanted to get out and this is the way to do it -- boy, it is a heck of a way to do it. i, unfortunately, never met general mcchrystal. i traveled to kabul, and he was in washington. by all accounts, this is a guy who never in a million years would try something like that to save face. he just a couple of weeks ago met with pentagon employers to travel to a nato meeting in brussels and sat down with them a long time and gave full accounting. he was the first person to say that it might not have been progressing as they wou

that happened in iraq. "well, we cannot win, so we have to leave," and then six months later we win, basically. these counterinsurgency situations are very difficult, and this one is made difficult not to because of what is on the ground but overall in terms of the command climate, it has been very difficult. you had the troops on the ground in afghanistan, already in the longest war we have ever fought. the president comes in and says i want to review the strategy. that takes 10 months. it almost appeared like dithering around. certainly the troops on the ground are waiting to be given orders, for somebody to take control and say here's what we're going to do, come up with a plan, so you take 10 months to get that going and that creates a sense of tension and frustration in the troops, which you see boiling over in this incident. on top of that, the ill-advised policy of revealing do not ask, do not tell, when all of the military draft gives us time to work through this and we have a couple of wars going o

it has been my honor over the past two decades to visit our troops from bosnia to xhosa vote, to iraq to the afghanistan, from six young warriors are bring high in the announced of afghanistan -- in the mountains of afghanistan to a mess hall in iraq. d every time i can say without fear or contradiction i come away impressed with the intelligence, the grit, they resolved and the patriotism of these young women and men. this is the finest mitary the world has ever produced, period. [applause] if anyone ever had any doubt about that, they should have been with me three days ago when that conviction was reinforced when i have the great privilege and honor of addressing this year's graduating class at the naval academy. as part of that service, there was an award given to some young marine showing the qualities that will make him a future leader of the marine corps. the award was named for marine named doug tock zembick. he was a captain in 2004 and because of his heroism in the early ground assault he became known as the line of fallujah -- lion of fallujah. three years ago, this month,

look at what he did in iraq. look at what he accomplished in terms of finding jobs and believing in industry. this is the guy who worked with these bureaucracies. all these minerals were discovered. i believe he had something to do with that. there is hope and we have to look to those folks who can make this change and we need to support them. it might not be the most bureaucratic way to go about doing things. there are people making it happen. i hope history gives him a place in our history books because it tells you what one man can do. host: what is your background? guest: i work on capitol hill for lynn woolsey and i spent time at west point teaching. i was a research fellow at the combating terrorism department. it was a great place. it was a pleasure and honor for me as a civilian to be in that environment you cannot help but fall in love with the place and fall in love with cadets who are great and crazy and the ways you want them to be. they made this choice when they were 17 or 18 years old of not going

i did ask to set a time line ultimately in iraq. testifying in 2007, i said we would start the drawdown of the surge forces in december, based on a projection of conditions that would be established. we are assuming that we will have those kinds of conditions that will enable us by that time in july of 2011 -- that is the projection. that is what we have supported. >> do i take that to be a qualified yes, no, or non- answer? >> is a qualified yes, mr. chairman. i think there was a nuance to what the president said that was very important that did not imply a race for the exits, a search for the light to turn off, or anything like that. it did imply the need for greater urgency. that was aimed at a number of targets. it included the leaders in afghanistan. it undoubtedly included some of our partners around the world. it may have included some of us in uniform. >thank you. senator mccain? >> there is a great deal of confusion about this. you just said beginning the withdrawals would be conditions- based and contingent upon certain fa

we went through this with iraq, as you recall, and i did ask to set a time line ultimately in iraq. testifying before this body, i said we would start the drawdown of our search forces in december. based on a prediction of projections that we will establish. we are assuming that we will have those kinds of conditions that will enable that by that time in july 2011, that is the projection, and that is what we have supported. >> do i take that to be a qualified yes, a qualified no, and not answer? >> a qualified yes. there is a nuance to what the president said that was very important that did not imply a race for the exit, a search for the light to turn off, or it did imply the need for greater urgency, and that target was, i think, and number of targets that included the leaders in afghanistan, it included some of our partners around the world, it may have >> general, just to follow upm. here, there is a great deal of confusion about this. you just said that beginning with a droll, there were deconditions based, contingent upon certain factors. there is a recent work by jonathan alt

i asked him, how do you think history will judge the iraq war? and he takes his hands out and shrubs like only bush can and says, history? we will not know. we will all be dead. [laughter] >> and for it -- and with that we want thank you for having us. [applause] >> i really knew that we weren't done. >> real quick -- that was the tension. we got to get you home to your war newspaper. [laughter] and so i go home and my wife asked me how was the interview, and i said he answered all the question but they're really good news is that i have the ending to the book. ending to books are hard to find. about a year later, 2005high was giving a talk in washington and the subject of your great biography, hillary clinton, was the other speaker. she came up to me and said, i quote from your book all the time. in fact i "it's so often i should give you royalties. i stupidly said no and should have said how much. she said, i "the end of the book were you asked about history and bush says, history we will not know. i said, why you quit that? hillary can get exc

it worked in iraq. 95% reduction of violence in iraq. anbar province it is safe today. is it perfect in iraq? absolutely not. but it does qualify as a free- market democracy with free elections. i believe the same thing can be a reality in afghanistan. this is stopping terrorism where it originates. >> so your bottom line message is to stay the course? >> trust in general petraeus, stanley mcchrystal. we need to be trusting the military leaders. >host: thank you for being here. we appreciate it. you mentioned the south carolina governor's runoff. we will be back to talk about that and with kathy castor as well as the oil spill and its affect on the tampa area. >> one week before south carolina voters will choose their governor. tonight, the two will square off in a debate at 8:00 eastern time. joining me on the phone is a reporter for "politico." ms. hunt, the republicans in south carolina are breaking ranks with nikki haley, even though she came in ahead of her opponent. >> they are concerned that she will follow in the footsteps of the current governor mark sanford. i

>> you mentioned it several times shifting troops from iraq to afghanistan. we have been in iraq for seven years and spends trillions of dollars and many american lives lost. we seem to be back to square one. this shift to afghanistan -- can you give us your assessment for what it means for iraq? >> back to square one in iraq? i do not agree with you specifically. . we've also responded and prevented attacks at a level with the iraqi security forces who lead in so many operations, who lead now in all operations, in ways that have actually been very, very encouraging. there doesn't mean there aren't challenges, but i see a country committed to standing up this government, having elected it, and the internal feedback i get from the country is, you know, a free and fair election, recertified one. they challenge themselves, and someone said the other day, which i thought was very encouraging, this wasn't a challenge from the outside of the country about a free and fair election, it was a challenge internally, and it was recertified as free and fair. so i'm actual

turkish-american diplomacy on issues, the kurds democracy, greece, cyprus and iraq, although iraq they change the policy now, used to be very, very hard and difficult set of issues on which we had to negotiate and butt heads. but the difference is that previous turkish foreign policy was in many ways very now, very i would say -- they didn't care about the rest of the world. they only cared about those specific issues that affected of an effective domestically. now that you have a government has iternational ambitions, the clashes are much more evident. but it isn't because the turks are standing up to the united states. it's because they've shifted their foreign policy. their ambitions have changed. this can create problems. it will create problems because when you look at the reaction in turkey with the flotilla crisis against the united states, the mood in turkey is i have rarely seen it to be so foul a minute respect. in many ways, i think there is a danger that the tur are going to lose control over the narrative. and that will make u.s. turkish relations even worse. but remove th

troops are serving in afghanistan than iraq. this month marks one year since general stanley mcchrystal took command of the naked-let international security assistance force. the news from afghanistan recent weeks has been largely negative. the increase in casualties among u.s., coalition, and afghan security forces.

she worked in iraq during the most violent period of the insurgency. armed with an assault rifle, she went on raids with u.s. special forces. she interrogated suspected terrorists, and she was part of the team that developed the intelligence on the whereabouts of saddam hussein. her cia boss at the time said, "many officers in the cia were unwilling to serve in this deteriorating, high-risk and thankless environment. mrs. prouty did not waver." while in iraq, prouty's bulletproof vest had to be altered for an extraordinary reason. you were pregnant at the time? >> prouty: correct. >> pelley: people watching this interview right now are asking themselves, "why would she do that?" >> prouty: yes, and i ask myself now, looking at my child, "how could i put her life in danger?" but that's what i wanted to do. i couldn't look at our marines that are standing outside guarding us and tell them, "hey, i'm pregnant, i'm shipping out." i knew what my contributions were. and i wanted to protect the lives of our soldiers. >> pelley: nada prouty was born into war,

serving as ambassador in five countries in the mide east includg lebanon a syria and also iraq. that's where we -- one of the first times i had a chance to meet him he's a dn and executive professorf the george bush school of government and pli rvice at texas a&m university. second, dr. augustus ricrd norton, professor of internationalelations in anthropology at bosn university is re with us as well. an expert onlebanon'shi community and as well hezbolh. filly, daniell pletka. she's a ve presidt of foreign and defense policy studies at the amerin enterprise instute. and is an alyst on the region'smplex politics and al a former senate foreign relas staffer. am i corrt? that's correct. okay. lcome back. we thank our witnessesnd w look forward to their insights. ani -- at thi time i would like to turn to senatororker if he has any opening comments. >> i'm far more iereste in our witnesses and thank you for being here thank yor your service, too. >> i want to thank senator corker for being wit us. 'll have oths joining us as th hearing proceeds. we'lturn to the oning stat from our w