the entire village youth becomes taliban. they are searching for the taliban to recruit them and give them weapons. >> narrator: general mcchrystal knew that night raids could turn the afghan population against american soldiers. he restricted conventional troops from conducting them, and instead ordered the elite forces of jsoc to take the lead. now they are doing six times as many night raids as they were two years ago. >> get over here, an open area. >> where? >> an open area, right over here, right behind him. >> narrator: jsoc has taken measures to reduce the offence these operations cause by involving locals. this military video shows afghan soldiers being trained by special forces to conduct a night raid. >> afghans accompany our forces on every one of these. they do the callout-- in other words, "come out, we've surrounded the house." they do it, obviously, in the native tongue that's appropriate to that area. >> they do the entry operations. they do the searches, if it's required, and so on. we make mistakes. what we

and they support the taliban. and they certainly support and maintain very extensive links with the haqqani network, which is one of the most deadly insurgent groups operating in afghanistan. >> smith: the haqqani network is a major branch of the taliban, with close links to al qaeda. pakistan's military intelligence agency, the isi, has a history of supporting them. >> without their protection, without them tolerating the presence of these operatives-- to do planning, training and using pakistan ( unintelligible ) they won't be able to do these operations. so, isi knows they are doing it, and isi is happy they are doing it because, through them, pakistan promotes her policy of afghanistan. and the policy is "taliban are ours, and they are to dominate afghanistan." >> smith: and we're going to help those who help them? >> yes. >> smith: by protecting them? >> yes. >> smith: and not arresting them? for example, one militant alleged to be close to the isi is a known leader in the haqqani network. according to us int

some taliban appear to be willing to negotiate. there are different tiers of taliban. so the united states needs to send a strong and consistent message that we support a political solution led by afghans. it will be difficult as it was in iraq. but afghans themselves have to make the hard choices to bring stability to their own country. so as we debate the end state, it is inevitable that we need to factor in also what can we afford to do in light of our budget constraints and reality in the country. we will spend $120 billion in afghanistan this fiscal year. and our decisions on resource allocations there affect our global posture elsewhere as we see today in the middle east with the crying challenge of egypt, tunisia, and other countries. we have to ask at every turn if our strategy in afghanistan is stainable. our military strategying need to support afghanistan as we draw down our forces. we have to consider the regional concepts. and what the presence there says about the vie license -- alliance and perspectives for peace. pang -- sanctuaries continue to threaten

some taliban appear to be willing to negotiate. there are different tiers of taliban. so the united states needs to send a strong and consistent message that we support a political solution led by afghans. it will be difficult as it was in iraq. but afghans themselves have to make the hard choices to bring stability to their own country. so as we debate the end state, it is inevitable that we need to factor in also what can we afford to do in light of our budget constraints and reality in the country. we will spend $120 billion in afghanistan this fiscal year. and our decisions on resource allocations there affect our global posture elsewhere as we see today in the middle east with the crying challenge of egypt, tunisia, and other countries. we have to ask at every turn if our strategy in afghanistan is stainable. our military strategying need to support afghanistan as we draw down our forces. we have to consider the regional concepts. and what the presence there says about the vie license -- alliance and perspectives for peace. pang -- sanctuaries continue to threaten

you say we shouldn't fight the taliban, and he says we should be fighting the taliban. it's very confusing to me with two of you are saying. >> so we fought the taliban initially because the taliban and afghanistan and they were -- the hosted al qaeda. >> the taliban today. >> that's right, taliban today have a major resurgence is once again and we are degrading and now but it was once again in the position to either rule a large part of afghanistan or take back over the government. we pushed them back to the extent they should not ruled afghanistan and in that sense i agree with ambassador neumann they shouldn't rule afghanistan. how we are going to get there we can continue to fight them loom. i don't think that is a strategy to be successful, or we can get there by negotiating with them in such a way to allow a political settlement there part of the government and as richard said there are many different types of television. if they will no longer host al qaeda. to senator kerry's question, i think the death of osama bin laden gives us an open to try again to see how

the taliban. when the u.s. invaded pakistan in 2001, we shook our heads at the iran yi as the -- irony as the u.s. followed the same way to envelope its enemy. with the obama's administration to cross over the duran line and expand war into pakistan, we knew the process we speculated about 30 years ago was completed. there were two main reasons for naming the new book crossing discoer row. one is it's the name given to the duran line separating afghanistan from pakistan by the military intelligence community and also a line that the u.s. fought on both sides of since the 1980s. the other is given its history, the zero line is an inescapable metaphor for the turning point in which the united states finds itself at at the beginning of the second decade in the 21st century, figging a war that's not defined yet cannot afford to lose. from the outset, the problems were three-fold. first, the inadequate understanding of the people, its needs, and how to provide for them. prior to the soviet invasion of

. >> i is kernel assume that the 8,000 taliban in that situation were not very important taliban because at the end of the u.s. war in afghanistan when it was obvious that the taliban were losing, there was something called the air lift of evil, okay? this is when basically the pakistani military was allowed by the united states military to basically air lift out taliban and other assorted al-qaeda fighters out of afghanistan to a safe hatch in pakistan. it was called the air lift of evil by the american military who witnessed it. it's obvious, you know, this is one of the problems when you use words like taliban. it's kind of this uniformed word, and everybody assumes it means the same thing. it doesn't. there are obviously those part of the power structure with possibly working directly with the pakistani intelligence or in some way empowered, and then you probably have the average, you know, afghans or even, you know, other people from other countries or men from other countries who have no particular power at all, so, you know, they're a hierarchy within that structure that i think n

let me take to the taliban. if in fact the taliban continue to be around and as dr. slaughter has said, a three or four-year period of time, they came back and they were a problem, if this is certainly unsaving to us, we'd like to see people in a democratic society without all this, but at the same time the history of the country has been one with the past unis and others which hasn't -- pasthums and others which hasn't been peaceful. isn't it a fact that the taliban will always be around? and as a result our strategy is based on eradicating the country of the taliban, that really is far-fetched in terms of imagination, if not the taliban some other group that said we'll provide order, we'll provide justice, so forth, as opposed of weighs going on presenty. and in absent of the central government that can get out and administer the situation, isn't it likely there's likely to be a great deal of local government around afghanistan for a long time? so one of the interesting things about your strategy is given the fact this is going to be very unsaving governmental situ

some taliban appear to be willing to negotiate. there are different tiers of taliban. so the united states needs to send a strong and consistent message that we support a political solution led by afghans. it will be difficult as it was in iraq. but afghans themselves have to make the hard choices to bring stability to their own country. so as we debate the end state, it is inevitable that we need to factor in also what can we afford to do in light of our budget constraints and reality in the country. we will spend $120 billion in afghanistan this fiscal year. and our decisions on resource allocations there affect our global posture elsewhere as we see today in the middle east with the crying challenge of egypt, tunisia, and other countries. we have to ask at every turn if our strategy in afghanistan is stainable. our military strategying need to support afghanistan as we draw down our forces. we have to consider the regional concepts. and what the presence there says about the vie license -- alliance and perspectives for peace. pang -- sanctuaries continue to threaten

now, remember, the taliban once ruled afghanistan. the taliban is a hire hi hierarchical structure. it shielded bin laden and refused to give him up. osama bin laden didn't make a home here. he found a home here with the taliban. and to the extent the taliban is still a force, that battle continues. people i've spoken to on the street and also in government here are saying, look, the united states should not look at pulling out too soon. this isn't all for nothing. ultimately this is not just about securing afghanistan but it's also about securing the united states and limiting any possibility of a further attack there if they, in fact, did pull out sooner and gave the militants an opportunity. >> and, stan, u.s. troop withdrawals scheduled for july of this year. any rumblings there on the ground about whether people are that much more nervous about that taking place, if they're anxious or feel like the withdrawal should take place that much sooner now that osama bin laden has been killed? >> reporter: there's really a mixed message when you speak to people here, depending on who yo

a country where the taliban game ground every day. this morning in a secured zone an american convoy was attacked by a suicide bomber ah the marines have lost one man they're panicking. and. they seem afraid of being attacked by someone in the crowd for passers by were killed by the blast. one time eighty percent of the victims of the taliban are innocent civilians her. war is becoming more intense and poverty is at an all time high afghanistan remains one of the four poorest countries in the world and people in the streets cannot believe the billions of international aid will change their fate. that couldn't is even that good that money what money the money does not reach the people who pulled out it stays up there. it's in the pockets of the government fired up for you where is the money that good now maybe not. starving out of work people meet every morning on this crossroads they wait here for days hoping to earn three dollars for a day's work. to do work yesterday and the day before. i haven't worked in a week so money john's tim

but the taliban had struck first. they were hunting and killing us. >> i won't forget anything on that day, the rest of my life. i'll question every piece, the rest of my life. >> reporter: the roar of thousands of flying bullets was deafening. every u.s. position was being attacked at once from all sides. >> [ bleep ] enemy situation right now. they're shooting from a bunch of different places. >> reporter: caftan kevin moss' platoon was penned down 50 yards to the right of us. >> hey, tell them we want a gun run from [ bleep ] running up the spur here. >> reporter: the no slack battalion was assigned perhaps the toughest area of afghanistan. kunar province, known as the heart of darkness. for several months, our cameras were with them as they fought on snow-covered mountaintops and in treacherous mountain valleys. >> he's still too low! >> reporter: they fought hard. and played hard. ♪ >> reporter: this little escapade was orchestrated by one of 3rd platoons most popular leaders. the younger men adored him. the ol

i talked about the taliban for years. they would talk about the purpose and say, we have to get rid of the taliban. no one said the less we pass legislation never to recognize the country of afghanistan as long as it was led by the taliban. and i was proud to be involved with that in a bipartisan way. so we went in there because of the horrific attacks on september 11. you remember exactly why we went in there. we said we're going to get osama bin laden and al qaeda. that was the reason we went there. so all of this expansion, i think, of our role there, i like to take a back to that. thanks to our president and the great military forces, we know that justice was served on bin laden and we did not do it with boots on the ground. we did it with counter- terrorism, a lot of what senator kerrey talked about during his presidential campaign, that is how we did it. did -- justice. but it is also a turning point that because of the intelligence we gathered during the raid, a sawmill was planning a significant role in the day-to

in that there is al qaeda and taliban and -- taliban spreading talibanization into -- and then there's extremist in our society. and then there are mujahadin involved. the situation is more complicated in pakistan. >> is it -- but there is obvious frustration and concern in america, not least because it was pakistan has a reputed -- at least 100 nuclear weapons. if the country continues to deteriorate in terms of stability it becomes a very dangerous situation for the world. >> if pakistan disintegrates, then it can be dangerous. otherwise if pakistan's integrity is there and which i'm sure it will be there, the armed forces of pakistan are there, there is no danger of the nuclear strategic assets falling in any. >> we talked about disintegration. it is all relative. 35,000 pakistani people have been killed in terror related incidents since 9/11. there are suicide bombings every week now in pakistan. and to -- a neutral observer, it does appear that you part -- country, pakistan is going through a form of disintegration. >> i wouldn't call it disintegration. the armed forces of pakista

they have rebelled against the taliban. that is part of a transition period in that case, it is not a central government presence. it is a local present as well. that is what we missed in the nine years from their strategy in afghanistan. the central government does not like that trend. they see that as a threat. having militias and locally armed operations, i think he is very well she washy on that. >> i think the concern in my discussions with the palace has been if these forces are operating against the central government, that is the most significant concern. if they are large and defensive and that has not been in the case. these are village level small tribal community levels. these are not militias. >> i think it's fair to say that it is a general matter that the karzei government has not been as enthusiastic as we have then. it brings us to the point that the relative priority we place on a security efforts is opposed to the government reform efforts. the political strategy and the approach that we will take to indu

troops as focal points and targets for taliban attacks. attacks that end up alienating the very villagers that our soldiers seek to protect and win over. it assumes that if we protect and serve the population of a village, they have incentives to give the information that we need to protect ourselves and drive out the enemy. in some cases for some periods of time, it's proved true. but it's a strategy that assumes the troops providing protection are there to stay for as long as it takes to erase the possibility of retaliation by the enemy that's been informed against. as long as villagers know we are going to leave some day as they will, and as long as they lack faith in our own government to protect themselves, the instincts will tell them to keep quiet. their incentives are to go with the winner, not to make us the winner. moreover, the only real long term security flows from competent and honest government. whether in a village in afghanistan or city neighborhoods in the united states. real security in afghanistan can come only if the c

pulls out for the taliban or gain control you mentioned strategically this is just getting worse and worse they were going control the country are you ok with that. well i think the problem in afghanistan is that there's this idea that the taliban will just overrun the entire territory of afghanistan retake kabul it'll be just like it was the day before nine eleven what's what's lacking in afghanistan is a process that will bring the taliban into the political process so there could be a true representative government in afghanistan so it will need us as role to do that. well it's clear this is really to get out of the way the u.s. has been demanding that the taliban give up weapons give up by linsky vote here any of the tools at their disposal to wage the war before they'll increase in the peace talks and that frankly is calling for surrender before peace talks can ensue real negotiations take place while the conflict is ongoing and frankly the taliban's got no reason to lay down arms and join the peace process if their demands to surrender when they've been able to ramp up attacks

now the taliban are in charge. but the people who had me and everybody i talked to along the afghan/pakistani border all those many years i worked there said that there's really no difference at a fundamental level between the views of the pakistani taliban, and al qaeda. they will both will continue to fight. >> all right. cbs news consultant jerry van dyke. thanks so much for being with us. and his book "captive: my time as a prisoner of the taliban" is available in stores and online. >>> when we return, more of our special coverage on the death of osama bin laden. this is the "cbs morning news." moms love tulips. any second now, they are going to place me at the center of the table. edible arrangements bouquets beautiful like flowers, but unforgettably delicious, any second now... visit, call or go to ediblearrangements.com now you can brew over ice for delicious iced coffee or tea. hot or cold, keurig is the way to brew everyone's favorite cup in under a minute. choose. brew. enjoy. keurig. >>> on the "cbs morn

>> begging the taliban. >> reporter: begging the taliban, if that's what it is, hasn't worked. "talks will never happen," mulah bilal says, "while foreign armies are still in the country." the american troop draw-down to presurge levels is scheduled to begin this summer with the unproven afghan army taking on a larger role. bin laden or no bin laden, more fighting, not talking, seems to be in afghanistan's future. mark phillips, cbs news, kabul. >> mason: and still ahead on tonight's cbs evening news, thousand get ready to move as the mighty mississippi swells to historic levels. [ male announcer ] try gas-x. powerful relief from pressure and bloating in a fast-acting chewable. gas-x. pressure's off. >> mason: thousands of people are being warned to prepare for the worst tonight as the mississippi river swells to historic flood levels. heavy rain poured over the last four weeks has pushed the river to its limits, forcing water back into already swollen tributaries. mark strassmann is in memphis tonight where the city is preparing for the surge. good evening, mark. >> reporter:

running afghan taliban in afghanistan we're not fighting al qaeda you have a new generation of young radicals who have grown up watching these wars over the past ten years that are far more radical than their predecessors osama bin ladin claimed responsibility for the nine eleven attacks that killed nearly three thousand people in devastated new york city nearly ten years later with his death is being reported as a victory for the u.s. while the war that america waged to get him still struggles to find a conclusion. r.t. new york. and earlier i spoke with political director at brave new foundation and i asked him what the death of bin laden will and should really need to u.s. war strategy in the country in afghanistan here's his response. the last reasonable sounding rationale for the war in afghanistan is now evaporated i mean president obama said that his job one is for security goes was attacking al qaeda and al qaida is largely driven out of afghanistan almost completely and bin laden is dead there's no reasonable rationale left for the afghanistan war and what matthew hoh said i

the taliban ny ung cldre abombs. but is ought shehas already blown herself up. [guire] oma b len's death has t change theility strategy in afghanistan. that remains to train men like tse, ahan sldiers who will ke or from no. the america hopthe tiban, orpart of it anyway, can be ma to split u from qaeda. a peace dl might then be possible and thealib could turn to afghanista witht bringing al qaedalso for many afghans and inrnationalselie thenly wato e thear is with a negoated settlement. but many worr about the st o such aeal. th is rally to oose lks with t talan. >> we would raer/the exience whic would by name be peace t in reality wou be thdeath of pluralistic afghanista >> so far, the taliban showe no gns of coming in. they have sued statement saying that osama bin den's blooouldourish their jihad. post-bin lad, there will be no pid d to the war in afghanistan. >> for mre on where the conflict gs fr he, i joined by the reason that special sateepartment adviser onfghastan and paktan. are clled byhose pictures of thechilen being used as suide bbers. what isour a

. >> they created the taliban and after 9/11, after the taliban were driven out, they provided a safe haven. all these years. the taliban still have a safe haven in pakistan. and by the way, where do they get their supplies to fight us? from the pakistanis, letting them resupply their efforts. >> and no doubt after the past couple of days, you would add on top of this litany of things we either care about, you would say no doubt they've been shielding bin laden through their intelligence agencies? >> that's correct. >> here's the question, though, you want to eliminate this financial aid, i understand, at a visceral level, of course you want to do that. but if we do that, does that not eliminate whatever leverage we might have to bring them towards us -- >> just the opposite. >> explain. >> they think we're fools, and we are fools! we're fools for giving somebody who hates our way of life and has been doing so many things to put us in jeopardy and to give them money. they won't respect anybody like that. and we will be in worse danger by having a lack of respect from these people, tha

be a support for the taliban because they will see that the taliban. future of afghanistan so what it's needed now for russia to do is to show an enduring commitment to afghanistan because to succeed in afghanistan means that pakistan also will change its calculus from supporting the taliban instead of that. later timid ways to have the strategic good tell also influence in the country ok if i go back to islam and so i guess it's all about who controls afghanistan not the afghans themselves are never mentioned in all this it's going to come from islamabad where it's going to be washington ok and they have their topic there is karzai they do want to support so i mean what what is the vision from the pakistani establishment what how do they want to see the americans leave destabilizing the country even more. when you know the pakistani establishment. has clearly shown his preference for the establishment of a trade corridor or through afghanistan connecting to pakistan connection to the arabian sea and they want it done in an atmosphere of peace and tran

. >> saleh: the senior taliban leaders, we... we would learn about their locations every day. we would have their telephone numbers. >> logan: you had their telephone numbers? >> saleh: absolutely. >> logan: and you passed those to the u.s.? >> saleh: sure. >> logan: saleh says many of those numbers were traced here to quetta, pakistan, where the taliban's senior leaders, known as the quetta shura, are based. was any action ever taken against them? >> saleh: not against quetta shura, never. >> logan: the u.s. could have taken action against senior taliban leadership? >> saleh: they can take action tomorrow against... >> logan: they still can? >> saleh: of course. >> logan: and they don't? >> saleh: they don't. that's why i say the surge is not addressing the fundamental question: what do you do with sanctuaries in pakistan? >> congressman mike rogers: amrullah is actually a friend of mine. >> logan: congressman mike rogers is chairman of the house intelligence committee that helps oversee all of america's intelligence agencies. h

caller: that there should not be stress on taliban, because the word taliban does support muslims, only muslims. we're not fighting the muslims, and we're not fighting the taliban. but we are fighting al qaeda. but if we talk about taliban, we muslimsall the against us. and he stresses this. host: a comment from twitter. thanks for all of your calls and comments so far today. coming up, we will continue to talk about afghanistan and also pakistan, the strategy there with congressman robert andrews of new jersey. we will be right back. ♪ >> this weekend on c-span3, michael dukakis on the master politician calvin coolidge and how he involved into a popular political figure. all look back at jimmy carter and his handling of the energy crisis of the 1970's. the long-term restoration of the treasury building. and american history tv will be live from mississippi for the 50th anniversary of the freedom riders. get the complete schedule at our website. >> this weekend on c-span [applause] the fall patrick talks about his life. last year's deepwater horizon oil rig explosion which killed 11 a

>> there were people whoa never talked about what thehe taliban years were like for them. i may to great pains to do everything i could do not let anyone at risk. bl headscarf and now make up and i think i was incredibly disappointing because they said the american journalist whoom come to interview you they would think pamela anderson would show up. not add dowdy version of ourselves. [laughter] which was true and done on purpose. but surely this is just a snapshot of this is not a book thaat takes a political stand by just to show evenome incredible times a managed to find a way for so manyer other people in their neighborhood. thatod is why they were willing to talk to me because i just wanted tost w know what your daily life was like because so few people knew they were breadwinners not even supposed to be on the street. >> host: oregonnt is our next caller. >> caller: thank you. i would like sues then don't wiggle the book.n t we don't get the title.if y we watched the earlier programs about the kabul beauty school and you have any connection with at at all while you

the pakistan taliban are not really the same as the afghan taliban. there are similarities and lot of support, but they do liaison, but there are different factions within the waziristan area, and the northwestern frontier and other tribal areas, but the main target is the pakistan government because of the alliance with the united states. >> so what are the pakistan taliban fighting for if it is different? >> well, the post 9/11 support for the pakistan government, they don't agree with that at all. they are angry about that, and they want revenge there, and they are anti-government and oppose any alliance with the united states, and the other thing that is interesting about this is that you look back at a lot of the groups, the radical groups in pakistan, and a lot of of them including the pakistan taliban were fostered by the isi, the pakistan intelligence services to become, i don't know, part of the bulwark against india, and they fostered many of the various groups and many of them islamic extremist groups which are now starting to turn against

people say there are moderate taliban and more extreme taliban. we allow the taliban to comeback, be prepared for many more afghans committing reprisal killings. host: michigan, good morning. caller: good morning. i spent some time in saudi arabia and bahrain years ago i was once asked by a rare admiral 9 quist -- nyquist my personal thoughts. i stated that i thought we would be at war in that region within 15 years and this is going back to the 1980's. he asked why. i said until the women are allowed to raise their sons as they see fit, these tensions will always be there. to that end, if i concentrate on saudi arabia and most of the moslems in the world look to saudi arabia for guidance, your thoughts on that. how would we be dealing with saudi arabia if it wasn't for their sweet crude oil? that seems to be what we cannot do without. guest: when the founder of modern day saudi arabia took over and many millions of americans -- many millions of moslems do the haj and that affected what constituted islam. many of these ideas of the whabas has spre

we still have to fight the taliban. bin laden is a combination of a sent-century theologian and a c.e.o., spent the last half dozen years dispersing his organization to yemen, iraq, south africa, to gaza and palestine. so his organization as a whole was pretty well prepared for his death, although it will be a major blow to it. and so there's very many targets out there to work at this present time. >> and professor, after 9/11, the c.i.a. was criticized a great deal, and in fact, it was reformed partly as a consequence of the failure to stop the 9/11 attacks. do you think this is evidence of those reforms at work? >> no, i don't. well, i don't know. they certainly were -- i don't think the reforms had anything to do with it. i think they had the hard work of the men and women on the ground is what did it. and i have to say that anyone who wants to know why we went to iraq, why we had to go to afghanistan, why 9/11 occurred, simply read the 9/11 commission report, which points out that mr. clique had those 10 chances to

if the taliban can return to afghanisn witho briing al qaed. for many, the onl way to e this w is with a negotiated settlement. manyorry aut the cost of such a deal. is is a rally to oppose tks witthe liban. >> we would prefer dnifi restance than disgraceful piece, which will inamee peac, t in reaty, it will be and and and death. >> so r, t taban swn no gnsf cong in. they have issued a statement yinghat ama bin lad's bld haurgedn at their jid. post-bin ladentherwill be no rad end to the war in afghanistan. forore onwherthe colict goes now, i spoke t a seniordviser and u.s. state department speci reesentative to afghanistan w chilled byhe ptures of chdreneingsed as suicide bombers. what i yourssessment? do the killing of osama bin ladin change theynam in afanisn? doest make things like that more or les lely? >> the tibanre likely to coinue to use violence unt such time as there isa settlement and aease-fire. t dea o binaden might lee man- lead to many in theovernment tothink that now that t unid stes has closure with 91, it is me lily to nt to l