no role for gorbachev anymore. interestingly, right up to a few days before that, gorbachev still felt that he could maintain the soviet union in some form. they would all see sense. he wrote them a long letter, which they totally ignored. but they agreed he should stay in the kremlin in charge for foreign policy for the republic. >> give him standing. >> absolutely. >> delusional. >> james baker, the secretary of state at the time, went to see him, and other foreign visitors, and they would -- this is two weeks before the end. they they saw gorbachev expounding on the possibility of the soviet 'union maintaining some role in the world, and an aide -- raising his eyes to the heaven saying, this guy doesn't get it. >> extraordinary. here you're describing a process where in addition to the yeltsin-gorbachev real tension, you have a group of what were really communist party function areas in the republican. of the whole bunch, yeltsin was the only one who had democratic legitimacy. could we say that about the republi

but they advanced so far that gorbachev -- this reflects gorbachev's democratic post as well. he was not of the mind to punch a further so he gave a desk job as deputy head of the construction ministry which meant very little [talking over each other] wikipedia and member of the central committee which made it possible to attempt meetings. yeltsin claimed gorbachev meted him to show the reactionary comrades, there are people who think like yeltsin. [talking over each other] >> guest: for whatever reason they prefer to think it was gorbachev. gave them a job that allowed them to stay in moscow and didn't expelled problems but also to bills on his political reform as elections came apart, yeltsin was given the decision to flourish as he did in those elections. >> host: the moment you were commenting on gorbachev's reticence to use the old method where you quote one of the deputies in the congress's supreme soviet, people's deputies after the election of march of '89. something about gorbachev that you didn't have the political scene. it was interesting. he never wanted blood on

went so far as to say gorbachev, the tragedy of gorbachev, and laughing at him. really petty. but that is an indication of how deep the feeling swept, how much the state these people up for each other. gorbachev did not like yeltsin. yeltsin did not like trying to grab part. and they had seen in threatening their communism. of course never the soviet union was disbanded their rig to make the jump and reinvent themselves as capitalists. >> and nationalists. >> extraordinary. when he set out . . eighty-seven, 8289, 90 in moscow you said earlier he had scored a lot of sympathy like so many journalists seeing him as a courageous person trying to do the right thing representing a democratic surge. but your book, when a reader comes to the end of your book one has an impression of the enormous erratic and impulsive and make it up as you go along quality to so much of his governance. the houston to attack. but direct. people who started when back. a rubber going to one of his parties. to get back to what u.s., i went to the book with all these, about yeltsin and a lot of criticism an

been gorbachev got cold feet. he came under a lot of pressure because this would mean that there subsidies would end. and yeltsin was furious. yeltsin was absolutely furious when gorbachev decided, gorbachev is a bit of a social engineer. he liked to see it, and his wisdom was superior to others. he decided to adopt a plan wrestled out by another bureaucrat. this wasn't going to work, it wasn't going to please anybody. that was one of the basic tensions between gorbachev and yeltsin took one of the reasons why they diverge so radically in the last year post that because yeltsin became a real -- you describe yeltsin's visit to america is seen at shopping malls and grocery stores for thousands, and suddenly he comes back, we've got to do that here. >> guest: the visit to america was an eye-opener for yeltsin. what he describes in his own memoirs, he was being driven through texas and he said stop here, i want to look at this grocery store, the supermarket. he was still of the old soviet the tally that foreigners wer

then gorbachev got cold feet. he came under pressure from the military-industrial complex because this would mean their subsidies within. yeltsin was furious. yeltsin was absolutely furious when gorbachev decided -- gorbachev is a bit of a social engineer. he liked to see that his wisdom was superior to others. he decided to adopt the plan by the former prime minister who was a bureaucratic type. this obvious he wasn't going to work and wasn't going to appease anybody. that was one of the tensions between gorbachev and yeltsin and one of the reasons why they differ so radically in their last the last year. >> host: yeltsin, you describe yeltsin's visit to america seeing the shopping malls and grocery stores full of tauzin's of -- and suddenly he comes back, we have to do that here. >> guest: this visit to america was just an eye-opener. this was true to what he describes in his own memoirs. he was being driven through texas and he said stop here i want to look at this grocery store, the supermarket. he was still a

this is the time when gorbachev need you. he put it away for a week. he believed in gorbachev. he believed gorbachev was not the old soviet leaders -- didn't want to affect democratic change. >> host: that line in your book, that gorbachev when pressed to get rid of those hard-liners in the old communist party and repressive apparatus like i got to keep that allow the rabid dog on a leash otherwise it will turn on us and the reforms. what do you make of that? >> when gorbachev was confronted with rebellion in the communist party and he said i am quitting. it was a ploy. he wasn't quitting. he was just saying to them i am not president. if i quit as leader of the communist party can't do anything about that. you see a connection with day. [talking over each other] >> guest: he was pretty aware of the caliber of these people and that is when he made his remarks. got to keep them on a leash. if one was to take a positive view of gorbachev's actions that complain the law. he allowed hard-liners to stay close to bring them forward to the point when they couldn't succeed in stage a c

no role for gorbachev anymore. but interestingly, right up to a few days before that gorbachev still felt that he could maintain the soviet union in some form, that they would all see sense. he wrote them a long letter which they totally ignored, that they would all see sense and agree that he should stay in the kremlin as a figurehead in charge of foreign policy for the republics -- >> host: because of his standing. >> guest: absolutely. >> host: delusional. >> guest: george baker, or james baker who was secretary of the state at the time went to see him and other foreign ministers, and they would -- they saw, this was two days before, two weeks before the end. they saw gorbachev expounding on the possibilities of the soviet union maintaining its, some role in the world, and the prime minister with a dead pan space of obviously, you know, maybe not literally but figuratively raising his eyes to heaven and saying, you know, this guy doesn't get it. >> host: extraordinary. here you're describing a process where in a

just ahead people discuss the legacy of the last soviet leader mikhail gorbachev in crosstalk. and you can. follow in well no cross-talk i'm peter lavelle as he turns eighty male got a bunch of salacious each season loved abroad in a loath to honk as glasnost and perestroika become distant memories we ask how will history judge the man who seemingly ended history. and you can. discuss the legacy of the last soviet leader i'm joined by stephen cohen here in the studio he's a professor of russian studies and history at new york university and his latest book is the victims return survivors of the gulag after stalin in london we go to geoffrey hosking he is an emeritus professor of russian history at university college london and his latest book is rulers in victims the russians in the soviet union and also in london we have lad sobel he's an analyst at yale and securities and another member of our crosstalk team on the hunger all right gentlemen this is crosstalk that means you can jump in anytime you want stephen i want to go to you first here as got a bunch off is eighty years

where gorbachev was planning to go. true he had put some new diet is out we had met him. after he became general secretary and he seemed to be he was obviously younger more competent than his predecessors but he was a communist we hope yes he was and we understood that and. my attitude was let's test him and we had put forward before he came. into office a program for cooperation and we called it four different areas we had said this is our agenda and when we put that together reagan said several things we're not going to seek superiority. we. we're not looking for military superiority we want parity we want to get the weapons as low as possible but we're also interested in things like human rights and. activities abroad by the military so. and yet everything we can ask at that point was we must cooperate to achieve an end now at that point. the soviet leadership gave very little attention to this i've been told by people who were in the central committee then they did not even give them a copy of that speech gromyko was in foreign ministry. cited there's not a change her

my sense of it i'm and i'm a gorbachev skeptic i'll be open about it. i have my one of my biggest problems with him is historical figures that i never really got to grasp it he had a grasp on really what he wanted to do it was basically. a make shift decision going from crisis to crisis to crisis like i never understood any kind of broad plan it was forced upon him well in many ways now i don't entirely agree with that i think when he came to power he did have a vision about how to revive soviet communism and make it a real force in the world and he hoped at the same time to revive the soviet economy and to make it a country less hated in the world he had grasped that the soviet union was hated by most european peoples so i think it was a humane vision and an ambitious vision and when he started to implement it have really kept on running up against difficulties as stephen said i think in fact the economic decisions were mainly economic ones but in order to carry in the through it was necessary to carry out political reform as well and that further dest

democracy flourishes in russia one day and stabilizes russia will go down gorbachev will go down as the greatest reformer in russian history if democracy falters and fails in russia and he'll go down in history as another tragic russian former he knows that and that's why his blood pressure about what's going on in russia is rising on his eightieth birthday already maybe he's just protecting his legacy here ok i was going to go to you anyway go ahead life the thing is here is that maybe some people attribute democracy to one leader or another but most russians don't attribute democracy to either yeltsin or got a bunch of go ahead. i would just like to make one point i think that gorbachev was actually responsible for peaceful disintegration of the soviet union and i think this is a very important point especially when we see what's happening in the middle east so that would be my first ball and secondly i would argue that russian democracy is proceeding on course i don't think that little bit of authoritarianism and in the meantime to stabilize the political system to stabilize the econ

gorbachev afterwards. made made it impossible so i would say though it was clear to us if they continued at loggerheads it was going to tear the country apart we still hope that they would find a way to cooperate this would look you more than once in the interview as you said that the united states and you personally are not chilly favored trying to keep the u.s. to stop together we are straight because many especially in this country the thought that that washington the cia were the people who tried to make it even said i quote we would have much preferred that we won so two reasons one we didn't want to have nuclear proliferation you know twelve republics with nuclear twelve or eleven new countries with nuclear weapons as it turned out only four at it when we broke up but they had to be moved you know that was the first thing but the second thing was those of us here could see that the democratization of the country was being led by gorbachev in moscow i mean i talked to leaders in opposition and all the

well our sophie shevardnadze interviewed mr gorbachev and this is what he said to her about what he thinks his legacy is. i think it is a united world. pursues a world where. the world free of ideological struggle. has to put this is perhaps the most important creating necessary prerequisites in conditions to move them. ok stephen you heard that ok you know and you know got a bunch of extremely well and i would say you know get you both are friends. do you think he's being fair to himself you think fair to reality when his seventy fifth birthday five years ago he had a conference and i gave i gave a paper called there is a new cold war and he became very angry at me because he considers his great achievement certain achievement the ending of the last cold war so if there's a new cold war something went wrong the fact is something went wrong after nine hundred ninety one now we could have a whole separate program remember the soviet union into twenty years ago and yet obama said we have to have a reset which suggests something has gone badly wrong for relational you and i disagree on

would i would suggest that gorbachev was a peacemaker but unfortunately the west has not responded in a like manner and the expansion of nato overseen is an aggressive and rightly so and as you as you mentioned the events in georgia have a really terrific really very very dangerous very concerning and i can understand why your ideas russian population sees this as a retreat as giving up concessions to the west but we have to understand that you know through europe eastern europe to be free that we. are now imposing post-imperial face and i think that's one of the major major achievements of a bunch of the also understood that this need to be done and so here's restored the balance of power in europe again and these are great peacemaker still. we just go back to his project of democratizing. the soviet union at the time again you know him very well how did he understand that without the dissolving the communist party because you are of the you have the thesis that the communist party could have been reformed it could have been democratized and i think that's a minority opinion in the w

gorbachev general secretary of the central committee. mr gorbachev was elected head of state a spirit of change was in the air perestroika was proclaimed to the country. became the first soviet leader to meet people and talk to them directly without speeches prepared beforehand. please be closer to the people who can be closer. however after the so-called stagnation era. efforts were in vain in one thousand nine hundred eighty six after the oil prices plummeted us all revenues fell abruptly at the same time the bulk of the budget was being developed by the defense industry. but this did skew forked within days of gets a statistical fact of callbacks for me true bill eighty eight to be exact was spent on elements but the kountry failed to keep up with the arms race and the economy collapsed and simplest way to exert pressure was was their attempt to economically isolate the soviet union that was was carried out in numerous ways there were many items that could not be sold to the soviet union there were restriction less. the seventh of may

gorbachev," despite the open, friendly relationship. gorbachev reacted in a friendly way. no wonder he was suspected at some point. he was too friendly to the united states. he was called sometimes a trailer. no one knows. well, that was the thing that happened, but when i spoke for reforms inside the kgb, and my experience that the united states was not a waste of time, i learned that a free country would have several organizations dealing with intelligence and security. the other way is the road to dictatorship, and that is exactly what happened in russia. kgb, no one else. the military intelligence was all infested with kgb. and the defense department as well. in the united states, these five different organizations, and that was my idea, well, i'm very happy to say that it did happen. the russian intelligence service, a russian domestic equivalent to the fbi, half a million altogether now, a small organization. well, of course, the equivalent of the national security agency, i mean all of these people decoding foreign intelligence, all sorts of diplomatic traffic. pres

it seems they gorbachev is still holding on to that he could have renewed the u.s.s.r. somehow given it a new lease of life if he had. given the opportunity do you believe in that partial or. maybe generally i have always thought of him as somewhat kook sati. often told us that the one party system was hampering the soviet union and we had seventeen million communists only a fraction of whom were truly committed to the cause so we had to do something about is. all the things he's sands and the things i listen to because i was invited to these meetings by protocol i still think of lack decisiveness his idea was to create a second party is similar to the labor party or on the basis of labor unions or some other organisations encourage competition in the parliaments but you never got around to making any actual steps towards this i think the conflict started when he dismissed and appointed yeltsin or the yeltsin was hardly fit for the position since you get in bork is very different from moscow. let's be frank put in any good you are also unhappy about the single party sys

the most important event is clearer gorbachev's introduction of democratizing reforms in the late one nine hundred eighty s. if that had not happened the soviet union would still exist today ok so jeffrey here in the studio reform collapse the soviet union. i'm not so sure about that i think the important as far as to collapse the soviet union was deal was coup or the attempted coup which we can go back to your position and strength and since power gave us in the opportunity to precipitate the breakup i don't think global political from is necessarily. have to lead to the breakup of the solving i think those reforms necessarily or very likely to lead to the end of the soviet common system by don't think that society has to break up with so richard where do you come in on that ok because i mean to this day in in the new russia there is an argument in who is responsible for the breakup of the soviet union was it boris yeltsin looking for power at any cost and he chose the russian federation or got a bunch of it and got a bunch of fending off a a political rival and that was. well i thin

gorbachev could've actually succeeded in at least one of these goals which was to to keep the soviet union to together it will be on the different but let me make let me make an observation here this is you know when we talk about these things of course they're very complex subjects in there so you can say very much in terms of these sound bites that were shooting at each other but the reality is that the soviet elite came to two conclusions one is they did not have a solution to their societies problems and two they no longer had the right to rule and the people in history so for protests they were relatively small number but i would venture to say that a large percentage of those people were their kids and they weren't prepared to kill their kids fortunately steven already coming out of that because what are the other alternatives ok mr alternatives what was magic. well what was missed as the as someone has said is the possibility of preserving the soviet union on a voluntary basis which would have been considerably fewer republics but let's introduce some facts into the analysis a

gorbachev. she's a great philosopher herself. she read philosophy and i think dennis took her around and showed her treasures of the library. she did seem at that time she was a hardline communist, more so than mr. gorbachev. as i wrote in the book, it was much later that i learned that she had reason not to be a hardline communist because her grandfather was a farmer, which is known as a coolack, not enormous farmers, but they'd board other farms and were farming very well. and he had quite a good-sized farm. and starling came, as he went -- his officials went to other people would lend to dispossess them of it at gunpoint. and mrs. gorbachev's grandfather refused. he said no, i have a wife and four children. i employ many people on this farm. we've farmed this farm well. and i'm going to continue to do that. and in accordance with stalin's communism, he was therefore shot. so, mrs. gorbachev's mother was one of the poor children, so she knew the awfulness of communism. >> either one of them sp

sixth of december so it is on these dates that the soviet union's first and last president mikhail gorbachev announced his resignation and the supreme council officially recognized the u.s. decides dissolution the end of the soviet union had devastating says. your comic effects set of ethnic conflict and to this day stirs debate over whether it could have been averted or carried out at lesser costs yes it was illegal but there would have been no legal way to do it. it was deeply traumatic for a lot of people not only in russia there was lots of turmoil almost of the sort that would have occurred in a war. today many see the process of disintegration as spending over a much longer period of time and involving a range of factors including corruption detrimental reliance on energy resources stagnating khana me and the disillusionment with the socialist ideology. there are several events that constitute the breakup was in my view the most harmful go to the framework of god is this or was dealt in the course of those political and economic reforms then there was the oldest coup and then the final