shuster and a treasury team to help constitutionalists get control of the budget and get control of the country's finances. because they knew without doubt, they were nothing and they had no chance. that was also frustrating. the u.s. was seen as playing a positive role. in 1953 what that at cost to happen, but basically the u.s. had changed its role from being a friend and supporter of iranian nationalism to being something of the new great britain. >> host: and negotiating with iran, you talk about misjudgments on both sides when it comes to the 1979 hostage crisis. what are some of those misjudgments? >> guest: well, there were several. one perhaps on our side was the idea that the united states and iran could, in fact, after this revolution, they could rebuild them kind of a relationship. on our side, anti-communist and anti-soviet imperatives. iran's traditional dislike of communism and a russian expansion would create a set of interests, allowing for a least a certain degree of cooperation. not while the clock was on the shah. we misread what in fact was going on within the re