secrecy at the iaea, that's traditionally a left view, iaea needs to be more open. large centrifuge programs, hundreds of thousands of centrifuges in iran in 15 to 20 years. i mean, most of them are anti-nuclear power or at least don't buy into large sensitive enrichment programs in dangerous regions of the world. and yet they did. and have. so i think there is a need to pull back from this kind of polarization, to have a more honest discussion. and in that i would say that the implementation of this deal does matter and that the united states and others, the public, should be pushing that the iaea do a rigorous job, they recover from this iran-iaea or this parchin deal and that they push hard to get access to bolster their credibility. and make sure, with the support of the member states, that they march into this, you know, postimplementation day agreement as strong as possible. and then i would say, what do we do? this is a town that works with congress. i would hope that congress does create legislation that puts in conditions to make sure that the deal is imple

you're not going to change this iaea parchin deal or iaea-iran parchin deal. it's in place. they can try to make the best of it. they can then try to get access to other sites. they can do a rigorous job on the verification of the possible military dimensions issue. and try to come out of this with the strongest report possible in december and that can withstand criticism. lee: omri, i think you wanted to follow up. omri: this issue of what the white house was telling -- you know, most of the think tanks in this city have attempted to work with the administration in order to point out flaws over the previous two years and so on. that's happened both on the nuclear side, the stuff that david works on, but also in the context of the sanctions regime and so on. and there really was, the dynamic really did develop where the white house would be telling its validaters, these n.g.o.'s, one thing, and would be telling these experts that were trying to contribute a different thing. experts would show up with concerns like p.m.d.'s, with concerns like, you know, the iranians will pus

iaea. -- of the iaea. some critics have also suggested that the iaea has outsourced iran its inspection of parchin the most.i have been briefed extensively on this matter in a class fight setting and those briefings are consistent with the conclusion of iaea director general ukia amano. he has stated that the agreement is technically sound and does not compromise the iaea's safeguard standards in any way. secretary moniz has further assured me of this fact. we know the iranians have repeatedly attempted to eradicate any sign of their activities at the parchin site. thus, it is likely that any significant p.m.d. activities have occurred there in the last four years. we do not know what signs of past activities will remain at the site. importantly, the iaea will be able to confirm whether there is any ongoing nuclear activity at that location. critics of the arrangement to inspect parchin have also suggested that the iaea has entered into a secret side deal with iran. in fact, the united states and all of th

iaea. -- of the iaea. some critics have also suggested that the iaea has outsourced iran its inspection of parchin, the mos.i have been briefed exty on this matter in a class fight setting and those briefings are consistent with the conclusion of iaea director general ukia amano. he has stated that the agreement is technically sound and does not compromise the iaea's safeguard standards in any way. secretary moniz has further assured me of this fact. we know the iranians have repeatedly attempted to eradicate any sign of their activities at the parchin site. thus, it is likely that any significant p.m.d. activities have occurred there in the last four years. we do not know what signs of past activities will remain at the site. importantly, the iaea will be able to confirm whether there is any ongoing nuclear activity at that location. critics of the arrangement to inspect parchin have also suggested that the iaea has entered into a secret side deal with iran. in fact, the united states and all of the other

the iaea has committed to keeping them confidential. and so therefore, they are committed to keeping these protocols under csa confidential as well. sen. cotton: i'm aware that is the statement you also gave to senator corker. i assume you're not implying any kind of moral equivalence. undersec. sherman: i indeed said, that i understood that this was a very different circumstance in the sense that we are trying to keep iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and that this was an international understanding negotiated amongst 6 parties and iran. so yes, i understand this is a different circumstance. which is why i believe the iaea at an expert level shared the protocol arrangements, understanding they would be classified. and i made clear to the iaea under our system, i would be required to share, in a classified cover initial setting, with members of the u.s. congress what i had seen. and i will do so this afternoon. sen. cotton: did you make clear to iran that these laws required congress to receive all of the texts? undersec. sherman: ou

secrecy at the iaea, that's traditionally a left view, iaea needs to be more open. large centrifuge programs, millions, hundreds hundreds of thousands of centrifuges in iran in 15 to 20 years. i mean, most of them are anti-nuclear power or at least don't buy into large sensitive enrichment programs in dangerous regions of the world. and yet they did. and have. so i think there is a need to pull back from this kind of polarization, to have a more honest discussion. and in that i would say that the implementation of this deal does matter and that the united states and others, the public, should be pushing that the iaea do a rigorous job, they recover from this iran-iaea or this parchin deal and that they push hard to get access to bolster their credibility. and make sure, with the support of the member states, that they march into this, you know, postimplementation day agreement as strong as possible. and then i would say, what do we do? this is a town that works with congress. i would hope that congress does create legislation that puts in conditions to make sure tha

they require iaea access to all of the declared nuclear plants for 15te years.r the iaea will use its most advanced monitoring equipment to make sure iran cannot tamper with the devices or even a nuclear reporting. it guarantees guarantees iaea access to any suspected nuclear site within 2t days including military facilities and providing access to all of irans nuclear site. most notably it has a prohibition against iran seeking or developing a nuclear weapon. the terms of this agreement are on parallel. the iaea has never had this kind of access to any country. i can say we have looked at this issue very carefully. r as you know, mr. pres., as late as this morning, i can say that if a iran doesn't comply with b its obligations, we will know about it and we will be able to snap back the sections that are suspended under this agreement. the administration has provided congress the documents detailing the varick vacation measures this agreement. i at an unclassified level,t the executive branch has written, and i quote, the united states is confident that iran is complying with its comm

and whereas article 6 of the statute of the iaea authorizes the board of governors of the iaea to direct the work of the iaea including and safeguarding nuclear materials and ensuring the peaceful end of a nuclear participating member states nuclear program, and whereas rule 18 of the rules of the board of governors of the iaea entitled circulation of documents in particular importance establishes procedures by which member states of the iaea board of governors may access relevant documents and re-- related to their duties. whereas the united states serves on the board of governors of the iaea and has both the need and the authority to access the actual text of the two side agreements between the iaea and iran, whereas on july 30, 2015, white house press secretary josh ernest speaking on behalf of the president of the united states stated i will acknowledge that i don't know exactly what the requirements are of the iran review act. so i'm not sure exactly what that means congress is acting for. whereas on april 6, 2015, white house press secretary josh ernest stated, we do believe that c

does the iaea have access? >> they must have access granted to resolve the issues that they need to resolve. they must have integrity. >> this is different moving forward than in the past. >> yes, it is different. even under the additional protocols with north korea, the lessons -- there is the additional protocol and the modified code. >> what are their proposals that have been put forward to say no to this deal and to tell the other countries who are involved in regards to sanctions that a viable alternative -- france, germany, britain, and others -- jews us are them as you move forward economically? if you're going to continue to do business with iran, you cannot do business with us? do see that is viable moving forward? >> we do have powerful tools that make it very dangerous for a foreign business to violate u.s. laws. if they do business environment are sanctions -- whether we could do that again the whole world effectively without doing damage to our own economy is something we have to have series consid

the united states and the iaea. i know you will say this is a different situation. i grant you that this is an international understanding to try to stop iran from having a nuclear weapon, and that is a different circumstance. in the development of where the iaea was going, they did come to us for technical expertise as they came to every other member, and in a classified briefing this afternoon, i will share everything i know about this. i am also grateful that the director general on his own cognizance is meeting with the senate foreign relations committee in an informal setting. it is extreme he on usual, because every other country wonders why he is. >> you did not see the final document? >> i was shown documents, but whether there were other discussions -- you know, what this is about is about the technical modalities that the iaea uses, and i will share with you this afternoon in a classified setting every single thing i know about that, and i think it will give you great confidence that the iaea is doing what

iaea has beenhe building up for many years. identified labels for iran as having a structured in the past. it is a threshold straight. the deal will walk them back from that deal. anyas more insight into weapons program that they might pursue. they are a nuclear threshold state and they have denied all -- i think senator mccaskill might be onto something with regards of all of the options in front of us. with abetter off negotiated supplement? those are not the only alternatives. western allies had not been so eager to leave the sanctions regime, but they were. out, weecretary pointed do have unilateral tools that would be an effect. making people choose between banking with america and i wrong . service, and iur appreciate the many times that you have come before this committee. we have disagreed and agreed. does the opening statement -- you mentioned that there are six areas in which iran is a actor. they give us a real concern. -- ultimately, i romney and behavior will determine whether it is affected. that does not give me

a standard procedure of the iaea . we have relied on the iaea for years and years. historically the iaea creates what is called a comprehensive safeguards agreement which they negotiate with a country. we don't get that. it is not shared with the world could the reason is it is confidential is it has to do with what you can get out of the country. we do get briefed on it. we are aware of it. there are some recommendations made to the iaea. they tighten it up a bit. there is certainly confidence in it. >> my time has expired. we didn't have full access to that. i think the people would agree with that. i time has expired. >> -- my time has expired. >> thank you for the public service. i want to go down a different road. we have heard different commentaries. the german speaking of 50 or 60. -- chairman is speaking of 50 or 60. basically sanctions relief of what has been withheld is about 100 billion. in that 100 billion, there are some contracts role -- contractual obligations of iran to pay some 50 billion. therefore the net that would approximately come to iran woul

their iaea access to future suspicious sites. in other words, you do not get access to this site, you will not get access to other military sites where there is evidence that the same type of thing has occurred. iran will not let international expect there's do these inspecting today, what makes us think that they will to theserusive terms agreements in the future, after sanctions have been lifted. i have little doubt

a standard procedure of the iaea . we have relied on the iaea for years and years. historically the iaea creates what is called a comprehensive safeguards agreement which they negotiate with a country. we don't get that. it is not shared with the world could the reason is it is confidential is it has to do with what you can get out of the country. we do get briefed on it. we are aware of it. there are some recommendations made to the iaea. they tighten it up a bit. there is certainly confidence in it. >> my time has expired. we didn't have full access to that. i think the people would agree with that. i time has expired. >> -- my time has expired. >> thank you for the public service. i want to go down a different road. we have heard different commentaries. the german speaking of 50 or 60. -- chairman is speaking of 50 or 60. basically sanctions relief of what has been withheld is about 100 billion. in that 100 billion, there are some contracts role -- contractual obligations of iran to pay some 50 billion. therefore the net that would approximately come to iran woul

and whereas article 6 of the statute of the iaea authorizes the board of governors of the iaea to direct the work of the iaea including and safeguarding nuclear materials and ensuring the peaceful end of a nuclear participating member states nuclear program, and whereas rule 18 of the rules of the board of governors of the iaea entitled circulation of documents in particular importance establishes procedures by which member states of the iaea board of governors may access relevant documents and re-- related to their duties. whereas the united states serves on the board of governors of the iaea and has both the need and the authority to access the actual text of the two side agreements between the iaea and iran, whereas on july 30, 2015, white house press secretary josh ernest speaking on behalf of the president of the united states stated i will acknowledge that i don't know exactly what the requirements are of the iran review act. so i'm not sure exactly what that means congress is acting for. whereas on april 6, 2015, white house press secretary josh ernest stated, we do believe that c

and the iaea. i know that you will see this as a different situation. and i grant you that this is an international understanding to try to stop iran from having a nuclear weapon, and that is a different circumstance. so in the development of where the iaea was going, they did come to us for technical expertise as they came to every other member of the p5 plus one and in a classified briefing this afternoon, i will share with you everything i know about this. i'm also very grateful that the director general on his own cognizance is meeting with the senate foreign relations committee in an informal setting which is extremely unusual because they wonder why it is. did i understand you to say that you personally did not see the final document? >> what i said as i was shown documents that i believe to be the final document. but whether there are any further discussions, what this is about are the modalities, the technical modalities that the iaea uses. and i will share with you this afternoon in a clas

does the iaea have access? >> they must have access granted to resolve the issues that they need to resolve. they must have integrity. >> this is different moving forward than in the past. >> yes, it is different. even under the additional protocols with north korea, the lessons -- there is the additional protocol and the modified code. >> what are their proposals that have been put forward to say no to this deal and to tell the other countries who are involved in regards to sanctions that a viable alternative -- france, germany, britain, and others -- jews us are them as you move forward economically? if you're going to continue to do business with iran, you cannot do business with us? do see that is viable moving forward? >> we do have powerful tools that make it very dangerous for a foreign business to violate u.s. laws. if they do business environment are sanctions -- whether we could do that again the whole world effectively without doing damage to our own economy is something we have to have series consid

requests, irand has still not granted the iaea access to the sites. satellite imagery shows that extensive activities including the removal and replacement of considerable amounts of earth have taken place at this location. i am concerned these efforts will have seriously undermine the iaea ability to have verification. i reiterate my west that iran without delay provide access to that location and substantive questions the iaea regarding that site. whereas on august 20, 2015, the report by the associated press includes a draft of the separate agreement which details a process by which iran will provide photographs, videos, soil samples, and other materials in new of getting the iaea access to that right, and whereas a 27-year-old veteran of the iaea and the former deputy directory general stated much of fromurrent concerns arise the report and arrangements worked out between the iaea and i ran in the side documents to which the possible military issues are, and if the reporting is accurate, these procedures appear to be risky, departing safewell-esta

it' provides for a range of iaea inspections. they have to verify the identity, location, and composition. it requires the board of governors to take action without delay. in a situation when it is essential and urgent and provides consequences for finding of noncompliance. that is just on the side of the declared facilities. there is a whole set of requirements on the undeclared facilities. congressman, they are forever under enormous constraints here, with respect to inspections and accountability. they have to provide accountability for all the nuclear research and development activities not involving nuclear mattila t material. the senate floor which is usually an issue reserved for the most important issues. but if they can overcome a filibuster led by democrats, then it will go to the house. if it passes through their it will go to the president's desk where he will likely veto it and back down to congress. he really wants to see this deal go through, and he has promised to veto legislation. >> we started with negotiations

if lawmakers from iran ask the iaea to see the safeguards agreement with the united states, the iaea director general amano would say no, and he did the same when he told our lawmakers that he could not show them iran's agreement. >> reclaiming my time. >> thank you for yielding. >> absolutely. >> i would just point out there is a big difference between the united states which hasn't violated the nonproliferation agreement and iran that has repeatedly violated. that's why there was a negotiation. because they had been in violation repeatedly on this. so the idea that they should have the same treatment as people who have kept their immigrant and kept their word is suspect to me. regardless, at the end of the day, you know, i think it has to be made available, because this is all about a country that has repeatedly broken its word and not kept its commitments. so that would suggest you need to have a little extra insurance on our side. >> have it unilaterally. >> i didn't say unilaterally. i think the iranian government frankly ought to disclose it. i think the iaea in this case, it's

it's the iaea. what if iran says we don't want to enter into this agreement because we don't know what the iaea has entered into with the united states? so some trashing the process. trust this organization. we've been proud of it for 48 -- 58 years. it's the top cop on nuclear inspections. all the 1,100 facilities around the world, nuclear power plants, military bases with nuclear equipment, weapons. they're the inspectors. they're the ones that trust and verify. give them a chance. everybody in the world thinks this is the toughest agreement ever negotiated. why would we not be celebrating it? this is diplomatic history. we have done great things here. and you want to trash it. and you want to trash the administration. that's not america. give peace a chance. ote no on this awful bill. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from california yields back the balance of his time. the gentleman from maryland reserves. the gentleman from california is recognized. mr. royce: mr. speaker, i yield myself t

the iaea will be monitoring their centrifuge production. they cannot be diverted to a covert facility. for the next 25 years, the iaea will be monitoring uranium from the point it is produced, all the way through production so it cannot be diverted to another facility. for the life of this agreement, however long i ran remains in the npt and is living up to their obligations, they must live up to the additional protocol. that additional protocol greatly expands the iaea's capacity. this gives us a far stronger detection and capability with more time to respond to any attempt to break out with a bomb and much more international support in stopping it than we would have without. i had a one should present voting record -- i had a 100% voting record for israel. i understand the fear. i understand the concerns that our friends have. we believe that what we have laid out here is a way of making israel, and the region in fact, safer. i emphasize, we do not lose any option in 15 years, 10 years, five years that we have available to us today. we wi

the iaea will catch iran after 24 days. now it is true there are some activities related to weapons design, for example, that don't use nuclear materials and they are much easier to hide. that is a genuine challenge thae inspectors and our intelligences efforts will face but the fact is that you can move a computer that you're doing design work on in 20 four seconds, or -- 24 seconds or erase stuff in 244 milliseconds. i'm sure it is actually a lot faster than that but iran is still not allowed to conductt those activities under the agreement and will face severese consequences if they get caught. so, the bottom line is that iaea's guaranteed access tocces suspicious sites will help support the verification of the agreement. perhaps more importantly we will also have ongoing surveilance of iran's nuclear supply chain. that means in order to make a nuclear weapon in the next 15 years and even beyond iran woula have to reconstruct every individual piece of the chain. the mining, the milling, the production of centrifuges and

with the iaea's relationship and deals with iran concerning inspections. do you have information that you're going to be able to provide us in the closed session concerning the secret agreement that we've not seen? >> i'm willing to discuss what we know about that particular issue in the closed session. >> do you have details? >> i have information which we can discuss -- >> have you seen that agreement. >> i have not seen that agreement. >> that is consistent with everyone else but yet people are willing to vote yes for secret provisions that no one has seen and neither have you. i yield back. >> i think chairman, we can't get into the skiff for ten more minutes so i'm let mr. lamborn ask one more question and i'll ask one more. >> thank you chairman for allowing me to ask one more question. and i'll start with admiral searing and general shep row. and my purpose isn't to put you on the spot, my purpose is to get your best judgment. because this is such an important issue that we're voting on. it's historic. were you -- either of you, consulted before the

the iaea will be continuously monitoring your centrifuge production. for the next 25 years the iaea will be continuously monitoring the uranium so that i cannot be diverted to another facility. for the life of this agreement however long iran stays in the npt and is living up to its obligations they must live up to the additional protocol which greatly expands capacity to have accountability. this agreement gives us a far stronger detection ability, more time to respond to any attempt to break out and much more international support in stopping it than we would have without the deal. if we walk away from the steel we will not have the united nations or the other five nations that negotiated with us because they will feel we walked away. make no mistake, pres. obama has committed to stopping us. so in the 28 years or more that i was privileged to represent i had a 100% voting record on every issue for israel. i understand the fear and concerns, but we believe what we have laid out as a way of making laid out is a way of making the region safer. we do no

did you make clear to iran and iaea, however? >> they follow what you do every single day. >> the staff made a new interview today from secretary kerry, it would be screwing the iatola. if congress rejects the deal, america is not going to negotiate in good faith, it didn't negotiate in good faith now and that would be the point. congress had to vote on this deal before it could go forward and therefore they should not be operating under such perception. >> of course, congress was going to vote on this. everything was very public. everything that happens here is transparent, democratic and public and we are very proud of that fact. >> are you concerned about congress screwed the iatola? >> i will not comment on that, senator. what i will comment on that secretary kerry, secretary moniz, myself, the negotiating team has been working on this for over two years, having briefed the united states senate and the congress countless times, hundreds of times quite frankly. did everything they did to ensure the safety and security of the u

before they start building any facility. -- notify the iaea. this eliminates a loophole where one can do something covertly and then say, we were planning to notify. they must do this in the planning stage. it is another thing we have the armed 25 years. -- beyond 25 years. the iaea will be prohibited from using advanced technologies. including real-time enrichment monitoring. if the international community suspects iran is trying to cheat, they can request access to any suspicious location. much has been made about a 24 day process for ensuring iaea inspectors can get access. --ill say that i would like unlike secretary kerry, i did say the words anytime, anywhere and i am cleaved that yesterday and member of your caucus acknowledged that the full anytime, anywhere, in the sense of a well-designed process with a well-defined and time. -- end time. i'm pleased we establish that. to iaea can request access any suspicious location with 24 hours notice under the additional protocol, which iran will implement. the deal does not change that baseline

iaea isn't even talking to us about what they agreed to on the side -- >> the iaea is going to be able to verify this. if we get any inkling, our intelligence gets any inkling that the iranians are cheating, we claw it back, the provisions o let me address something ben said. >> then what? >> then maybe we bomb them like you said. big difference between bombing the iraq nuclear site, the israelis did in 1981 or 1982 than bombing this. the french had built the nuclear development. the french have not built anything in iraq. you can't bomb scientists' knowledge out of existence. you bomb it, they'll rebuild it. >> you can't bomb it out of existence but you can blow up the reactors. >> then they'll rebuild them. >> and then we'll bomb it again. >> and they'll rebuild them again. >> you know, $150 billion. that's their frozen money. unfrozen for this. and the immediate worry is there's really no immediate sort of carrot and stick treatment of that money. >> almost no carrot and stick. >> they have that money and the fear is they'll do a lot of bad stuff. >> the only thing we can do i guess

with this agreement, the iaea can go wherever the evidence leads. no facility, declared or undeclared, will be off-limits and there is a time certain for assuring access. there is no other country to which such a requirement applies. this arrangement is both unprecedented and unique. in addition, the iaea will have more inspectors working in iran, using modern technology, such as real-time enrichment monitoring, high-tech electronic seals, and cameras that are always watching, 24/7, 365. further, iran has agreed never to pursue key technologies that would be necessary to develop a nuclear explosive device. so the agreement deals not only with the production of fissile material, but also with the critical issue of weaponization. because of all of these limitations and guarantees, we can sum up by saying that without this agreement the iranians would have several potential pathways to a bomb. with it, they won't have any. iran's plutonium pathway will be blocked because it won't have a reactor producing plutonium for a weapon. and it won't build any n

nuclear facility in iran today, oli hynenen, a former iaea deputy director has said it would be the first time in 20 years. so one of the important issues that i believe for any of us in reviewing this agreement is what is the inspection regime that will be put in place to asure not only that we're doing a full inspection at the declared facilities of iran but also the undeclared facilities. and the reality is that under this agreement, the process for seeking inspection by the iaea for undeclared facilities is a process that only a lawyer could love. and i happen to be one. because if you look at the language of the actual agreement, you will see that if the iaea, in paragraph 75, has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities or activities inconsistent with the jcpoa or locations that have not been declared under the comprehensive safeguards agreement, the iaea first has to provide iran with the basis for such concerns and request clarification. so that's the first step. then if iran's explanations do not resolve the iaea's concerns, the agency may request access to s

the agreement blocks iran's culvert pathway by requiring 47 iaea access -- 24/7 iaea access to sites for 25 years. empowering the iaea to use its most advanced monitoring techniques and equipment to ensure iran cannot tamper with its devices or evade nuclear monitoring. it guarantees the iaea access to any suspected -- suspected nuclear site within 24 days, including military facilities and providing access to all of iran's nuclear sites under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty permanently. most notably, it imposes a perpetual prohibition against iran ever seeking, developing, or acquiring a nuclear weapon. the terms of this agreement are unparalleled. the iaea has never had this kind of access to any country. as device chairman of the committee, i have looked at this issue carefully. as you know, mr. president, as late as this morning. i can say that if iran doesn't comply with its obligations, we will know about it and we will be rabel to snap back the sanctions that -- be able to snap back the sanctions. the administration has provided with documents to verify the measures in thi

procedures of the iaea with him at length. mr. hanen is a director of experience and had been able to tell me keeping side agreements secret is not normal for the iaea, it is an exception that has periodically been used to protect proprietary things for commercial reasons. i repeat, in spite of what secretary kerry is claiming, refusing to disclose these side agreements is not the cow's, it is unique. and it is not at risk, iaea's practice is to make the details public. so why is the iaea keeping its side agreements with iran a secret? so far as we know, no pro prior taxpayer concerns consist which leads to the inevitable conclusion that these are kept a secret because of the weak inspections regimes which won't stand to scrutiny. according to the leaked documents, the agreements with the iaea allowed iran to detect its own -- conduct its own samples with cameras recording the process. iran will then deliver these to the iaea to be tested for radioactive material. if that's true, mr. president, there's a reason to be deeply co

between the iaea and the countries they are expecting. this is different it is a public deal in dealing with a broken tree i cannot understand how we would approve a deal to explain to their constituents now what makes sense for the safety of their children and grandchildren when we don't know. i would argue what i hear the number one goal from this administration is the legacy for this bill president. that is the only real benefit that i can see. i promise to be a good actor. really? that is what we get? just a day to say israel will not exist in 25 years. and you will change their behavior. why do we believe a word of a nation that is a revolutionary pariah since 1979? have we forgotten that 52 united states american citizens over 444 days, were held hostage in tehran. members of the embassy. these of the same regime and clerics in the same mentality that created that situation, we just entered into the most devastating form policy agreement in my lifetime with a history of the united states. more than this nuclear deal with iran. it wi

and whereas article 6 of the statute of the iaea authorizes the board of governors of the iaea to direct the work of the iaea including and safeguarding nuclear materials and ensuring the peaceful end of a nuclear participating member states nuclear program, and whereas rule 18 of the rules of the board of governors of the iaea entitled circulation of documents in particular importance establishes procedures by which member states of the iaea board of governors may access relevant documents and re-- related to their duties. whereas the united states serves on the board of governors of the iaea and has both the need and the authority to access the actual text of the two side agreements between the iaea and iran, whereas on july 30, 2015, white house press secretary josh ernest speaking on behalf of the president of the united states stated i will acknowledge that i don't know exactly what the requirements are of the iran review act. so i'm not sure exactly what that means congress is acting for. whereas on april 6, 2015, white house press secretary josh ernest stated, we do believe that c

and the iaea. i know that you will see this as a different situation. and i grant you that this is an international understanding to try to stop iran from having a nuclear weapon, and that is a different circumstance. so in the development of where the iaea was going, they did come to us for technical expertise as they came to every other member of the p5 plus one and in a classified briefing this afternoon, i will share with you everything i know about this. i'm also very grateful that the director general on his own cognizance is meeting with the senate foreign relations committee in an informal setting which is extremely unusual because they wonder why it is. did i understand you to say that you personally did not see the final document? >> what i said as i was shown documents that i believe to be the final document. but whether there are any further discussions, what this is about are the modalities, the technical modalities that the iaea uses. and i will share with you this afternoon in a clas

with this agreement, the iaea can go wherever the evidence leads. no facility, declared or undeclared, will be off-limits and there is a time certain for assuring access. there is no other country to which such a requirement applies. this arrangement is both unprecedented and unique. in addition, the iaea will have more inspectors working in iran, using modern technology, such as real-time enrichment monitoring, high-tech electronic seals, and cameras that are always watching, 24/7, 365. further, iran has agreed never to pursue key technologies that would be necessary to develop a nuclear explosive device. so the agreement deals not only with the production of fissile material, but also with the critical issue of weaponization. because of all of these limitations and guarantees, we can sum up by saying that without this agreement the iranians would have several potential pathways to a bomb. with it, they won't have any. iran's plutonium pathway will be blocked because it won't have a reactor producing plutonium for a weapon. and it won't build any n

the iaea is an independent entity under the u.n. i don't even know this point what the law says about the united states requiring something of which another entity's laws prohibit. we'll have to see. >> they have to cement to congress. to the extent that the iaea says it is unprecedented. i would like to move on to a second topic, specifically iran's support for terrorism. can i have chart one, please? this is a roadside bomb. are you familiar with what -- >> i am. >> could you explain what the bottom diagram shows? >> the cone is super high temperatures and burns its way through armored plate. >> the distro's at about 6000 -- it travels at about 6000 feet per second. let's see what happens to a humvee when it travels at 6000 feet per second. is that familiar to you? >> yes, it is. >> do you know how many american troops were killed by such devices? >> several hundred. >> was iran the supplier of these explosives? >> yes. >> secretary kerry, those entities will ultimately received sanctions relief from this deal from the united nati

their iaea access to future suspicious sites. in other words, you do not get access to this site, you will not get access to other military sites where there is evidence that the same type of thing has occurred. iran will not let international expect there's do these inspecting today, what makes us think that they will to theserusive terms agreements in the future, after sanctions have been lifted. that thettle doubt side deals of today will become central to the provisions of tomorrow. this makes it imperative that these agreements are made available to congress. of thisker, 350 members house, democrats and republicans think we have a majority of the democrats. over republican. a ron's a ron's willingness to resolve concerns over its bomb work as we said in that letter is a fundamental task of their intention to uphold a conference agreement. that is why we all wrote that letter together, to make that point. the administration once took the same position that we are making right now as well. it gave that position away negotiatio

before they start building any facility. -- notify the iaea. this eliminates a loophole where one can do something covertly and then say, we were planning to notify. they must do this in the planning stage. it is another thing we have the armed 25 years. -- beyond 25 years. the iaea will be prohibited from using advanced technologies. including real-time enrichment monitoring. if the international community suspects iran is trying to cheat, they can request access to any suspicious location. much has been made about a 24 day process for ensuring iaea inspectors can get access. --ill say that i would like unlike secretary kerry, i did say the words anytime, anywhere and i am cleaved that yesterday and member of your caucus acknowledged that the full anytime, anywhere, in the sense of a well-designed process with a well-defined and time. -- end time. i'm pleased we establish that. to iaea can request access any suspicious location with 24 hours notice under the additional protocol, which iran will implement. the deal does not change that baseline

at any time that the iaea sounds the alarm. i supported the tough sanctions that brought iran to the negotiating table in the 1st place, and there are mechanisms in this agreement to snapback sanctions quickly and prevent a chinese or russian veto. even with nuear weapons -- even without nuclear weapons iran poses real risks, particularly to israel from our closest friend in the region, andregion, and to our partners in the arabian peninsula. the administration has assured us that it is working closely with regional partners to enhance security. congress must be an active, insistent, and bipartisan partner in this effort with this pres. and his successors, increase security assistance to israel to unprecedented levels. i have always been a strong supporter of israel. when saddam hussein was developing nuclear weapons in 1981, i supported the israeli decision to bomb the reactor. when israeli more funding for missile defense system in 2010, i voted to accelerate the development of the iron dome system. i supported israel's right

what iran did was they did not inform the iaea about their plans. that is why we think they violated the npt. the problem today is they now have 20,000 centrifuge machines. they are halfway to building a reactor that could produce enough plutonium for two bombs a year. so what do we do -- in my view, we have no chance but to engage with them and find a way to establish a limit that prevents them from getting nuclear bomb material they would make on a nuclear weapon. this agreement provides the eyes and ears on the ground, the monitoring system, that would give us ample time to respond to any violation promptly and decisively. i do not trust them, but this is not about trust. trust would be to walk away from this agreement and hope a do not expand their nuclear capacity and actually build nuclear weapons. some policy situations, you are not presented with very good options. we have been in a situation here for over a decade, in which the options are not ideal. this is clearly the best possible outcome, i think, we can pursue now. host: our guest in t

iaea and inspectors are doing. credibility, but we want to know whether they have the capacity to do what we are asking them to do need to know about the prior military dimension in order to go forward and make sure we can contain any opportunity they may use for pervert opportunity. will we discover it and be able ? we have read the agreement and still have questions, and we hope he will get answers as to whether we're prevent -- effectively prevented iran from using covert virginity is to develop a nuclear weapon. will this agreement provide us with sufficient access to the people, places and document so that we know the prior military dimension? are this not back provisions for re-imposing sanctions adequate if they violate the agreement? willis an issue i hope we have a chance to talk about. at the end of the time limits in the agreement iran will have the capacity to ask and. nasa german, i rightly pointed out to an industrial capacity eerie and they could get to nuclear enrichment and uranium enrichment. that

the iaea is chronically short of money. one of the pieces of legislation that some of us have seen that i think should be supported by all of congress is to increase the donation to the international atomic energy agency. they will be applying state-of-the-art technologies. if your idea of inspections is what happened in iraq in 1991 where you shut inspectors out in the parking lot for days, our friend sat they're looking for water. you don't understand what modern inspections like. this is, we will have cameras and sensors and seals everywhere, not game of thrown seals on parchment, fiber-optic seals with radio links to headquarters. if they are broken we will know instantly and have inspectors with 247 access. the entire sprawling complex , that whole thing is covered by the iaea. this agreement doubles the amount of inspectors now. we are setting up a special procurement channel so that everything iran buys they have to buy through the special procurement channel. if you see a company in northern iran buying which is a,