then there's the fourth amendment and metadata. so the fisa court held that the bulk collection of americans telephone records did not constitute a search under the fourth amendment because information about who we call, when we call them, how long we talk to them, is information that we have shared with a third party. that's the telephone company. and as we all know by now the something called the third-party doctrine which says that any information that you voluntarily disclosed to a third party, you do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information. this doctrine which came about in the late 1970s has come under attack recently and is unlikely to survive. it simply does not square with the realities of life in the digital era. each one of us leaves a trail of digital exhaust about a mile wide. the e-mails that we share with our internet service providers, the text messages we share with our mobile phone companies, the financial data that we share with atms, the location data we are sharing with cell towers that

what guidance do you need for setting metadata standards? all those questions, some of them have been asked by omb and i don't want to short count the administration's willingness to do some of this, but you're right about one thing, it is typical for an agency to say, oh, another mandate from congress, it's unfunded because in their mind that -- whatever money they got wasn't for that. and i don't expect movement unless this process goes forward where agencies are directed to produce plans, they're given guidance, and in my estimation, when you look at the security exchange commission, who in many ways is ahead of it, but in many ways -- i can't say reconstitute -- i can never pronounce the word that says they don't want to do it -- but, you know, quite frankly some of the agencies, the fdic and others, are actually very far along toward having their data in the right format and very far along toward not providing it in some cases. so this is where the president's leadership is important. you need to both shed light on the agencies that are

but you're talking about 30 to 100 billion metadata records of phone calls and e-mails every single day, so vast, vast quantities of information they're sweeping up. and they're talking by 2030 having in place the world's largest surveillance system,

it is just he metadata it is not your personal phone call and it might stop terrorism. [booing] educate me. >> the government's collection of metadata is just as dangerous as its collection of content. if the government were collecting content i would think that that's a bad thing but metadata is actually bad. people need to understand with metadata they can figure out what you're doing throughout your life. they can figure out who you're calling. figure out whether you have a medical condition. think about all the phone records that you have and all of the ways in which the government can decipher based on who you're calling, when you're calling them and how long you're talking to them, what you're doing each day. john: fellow republican, former house intelligence committee chairman, said, this program is used to stop a terrorist attack in the last few years. people do want to kill us. >> there are people on the intelligence committee who will say just the opposite. who say that this program hasn't been effective. it is not useful. even setting all that aside, even if

those are considered metadata. someone has to write up -- the investigator writes up an affidavit that shows they've done all these things or they are too dangerous to do for whatever reason. those things sometimes run hundreds of pages. huge, huge affidavits. then there is an application by the prosecutor that has to be reviewed by the supervisor, that goes to the office of enforcement operations in the criminal division that's then signed off by high-level criminal division official. at that point it goes to a gerl judge, district court judge who does his own independent analysis that the information satisfies is the statutory requirements. only then do we get the court order that says you can get the content of the communication. it is not the first thing we do. in many times it is called the investigative technique of last resort. we've already had enormous amount of internal review by the time we have that order. we have a federal judge who reviews it as well. only then do we go to the company and say can we h

metadata is very informative. and the quote, unquote, metad a metadata, indicating all of the people you contacted, all of the people you contacted at a given time, how long you spoke to them, et cetera, et cetera, reveal your associations, reveal your behavior. and the argument goes that knowing that this stuff lacks fourth amendment protection, you will self edit and self sensor. so i think that is a strong argument. there are plenty of cases, though, where the same kinds of -- what we think of as privacy invasions, the same kind of invasions don't have any communication first amendment relevance so i think the first amendment also should stand on its own. that is your argument shouldn't rely on the fact there is a first management value at stake in order to get protection for information. the information should be protected as such, independent of its communicative substance or meaning under the fourth. in fact, there was a section -- an article i published with the american university law review that subsectio

program and the broader communications metadata program and the solution that has been offered is to require that the government use a specific selection term. part of the usa freedom act, and part of the ongoing discussions around surveillance reform legislation. i think there's been a lot of discussion about how to get that to the point where it doesn't permit bulk collection, where it doesn't open the door to the types of surveillance that we've seen in recent years. and at the same time, gives the government the flexibility, particularly in some of these cases and the hypothetical that can raise, so that where they can't, for example, use a very specific identifier, whether that be an e-mail address or a phone number, that they're able to obtain records, that enable them to identify and/or thwart a terrorist attack. at the same time, to greg's point, the more the debate focuses on the use of that data, i think that heightens the importance of making sure that minimization procedures protect the data for subsequent use. with the usa freedom act, what we saw last year, industry, pr

what guidance do you need for setting metadata standards? all those questions, some of them have been asked by omb and i don't want to short count the administration's willingness to do some of this, but you're right about one thing, it is typical for an agency to say, oh, another mandate from congress, it's unfunded because in their mind that -- whatever money they got wasn't for that. and i don't expect movement unless this process goes forward where agencies are directed to produce plans, they're given guidance, and in my estimation, when you look at the security exchange commission, who in many ways is ahead of it, but in many ways -- i can't say reconstitute -- i can never pronounce the word that says they don't want to do it -- but, you know, quite frankly some of the agencies, the fdic and others, are actually very far along toward having their data in the right format and very far along toward not providing it in some cases. so this is where the president's leadership is important. you need to both shed light on the agencies that are

executive order 12333, we've seen the collection of e-mail metadata, collection of internet metadata and underlying these arguments is the principal that it's necessary to collect all the information and then to analyze it. this gives us the possibility of heading off threats to the united states. why is this problem mat snick it's problematic at the point where there's convergence between national security and criminal law. this is not a new question in many ways in this country. lord cook discussed this in detail in his institutes when he was worried about the crown in the 17th century collecting a lot of information, looking for potential evidence of criminal activity and using it as a way to go after potential enemies of the crown. later hawkins wrote about this, we saw this in "hale" and "blackstone" and james otis in his famous oration in paxton's case railed against the con sthaept the government should be allowed to collect this information on victims and then look for evidence of criminal activity. the fourth amendment was introduced as a prohibition on general warrants and

under the data act, we act, wenvis en metadata will be so easily searched that when you're looking for, you won't even have to ask because the vast majority of information will already be available online, with appropriate identifiable information and other fields that have been predetermined. it will be limited to, i looked at the data, it indicates something more and i believe i have a right to some portion of what is redacted. knowing what you're asking for and cutting down the number of requester magically because the majority of what you want is already there, available, online and searchable and to be developed is a good start to making government open and transparent. i think one of the most important things i can do at my age is to tell the young people in the room how we got here. why we shouldn't be here but why it was logical some how to get here. nearly 40 years ago, i ran my first computer program. well i ran part of it until the card popped up saying i had a flaw in my program. yeah, giggles in the back, you haven't held a stack of cards with three failures in it and only

thereby keeping from the government all the metadata that the government was entitled to. >> right. >> had she given them the digital verse. but the -- version. most serious thing she probably did was send classified materials to people who did not have national security clearances?. that exposes her to a near-certain indictment. >> before we open this up i have to ask this question, i constantly get on twitter, constantly stopped on the street, will she be indicted? what is taking the fbi so long and will it happen? >> well, because of who she is and because of the controversy around all of this, the fbi is not going to recommend an indictment until every i is dotted and every t is crossed. they don't have all that information yet. but the way it works is, the team that is investigating her, which same team that investigated and asked for and got the prosecution and conviction of general petraeus will make a recommendation to their superiors in the justice department. what do you think the justice department will do? call the west wing of the white house. if the west wing says we don

the former head of the cia said we kill people based on metadata. what's the difference if law enforcement's needs -- that they need greater access to content if the intelligence community can make life or death decisions based on meta data alone? >> anyone want to take that? >> yes, so amy talked a little bit about the need for content. let me -- i think it's helpful to explain a little bit about -- when we say wiretap order what that actually means because i'm not sure a lot of folks know. what it means not only we affectionately call it probable cause, not only do we have to show probable cause that the person under surveillance and the facility that we want to target is being used as part of a crime, but we also have to show necessity. and so that means we have done -- we've either tried to do other techniques, less intrusive techniques, and they've failed. some of the techniques are physical surveillance, using an informant, using an undercover, pen registers, records that are considered meta data and someone has to write up -- the investigator

we have also a few years ago published a spec for metadata and images to explain when they are panoramic and we find that some users already are apturing very high frame rates . this will r time develop. i think one of the pillars is world travel. i think with streetview we are -- we are ahead of the game. we can make it friendly. already we have some content and we are interested in getting more. emily: now, that was all shot with a sata-s and i want to take a closer look at that right now. this is a third generation by the way. this model has significant improvements. joining me now rico imaging america's president jim malcolm the company behind this camera. you've got all the products with you, the new cameras, the third generation of the camera. records full video all for $349. how does it work? >> let me give you the quick, easiest way to do it. basically we've ballot camera with two lenses. each looks in an opposite direction. with that we can see a full spherical world. everything above and below you. i have the camera on now. we can look around and see easily how we can pan aroun

you lose the metadata. the metadata tells you when any mail was prepare, whether there were changes or redactions. it gives you more information. when you turn it over in written form like this, you don't get the metadata. the clintons then backed up and says david kendall, their attorney has all of the e-mails on a famous thumb drive and he's willing to turn that over if there's any discrepancy, however, the thumb drive information is in what we call pdf format, no met da data on that either. they took the written stuff and put it on a thumb drive. >> intentionally or unintentionally, they covered their tracks. this would be extraordinary to have about a high government official but she's a presidential candidate. this all comes down to the verdict of the american people. what impact is it going to have? >> well, the fascinating thing about this is, not only is she a former secretary of state, a former first lady, she's also a pretty darn good lawyer. so hillary clinton knows what's going on here. she know

. >> analyzing metadata. >> no one is listening to your telephone calls. john: both are true. they are just gathering, looking for patterns, and may be able find a will find a terrorist that way. >> but that reveals a lot about you. >> maybe they will find someone who wants to kill us >> but this program has been wholly ineffective at doing that. it does not keep us safe. john: congress has kind of taking your side at least saying that the phone companies have to hold the data. >> exactly true, and and i was on the right side of history here. john: why is it less problematic? >> the phone company has records of certain customers they don't have everyone's record in one database. they are not going to look up her records, but someone who may be on their radar, and the political party not favor by the government, they can learn a lot. it is who has the information that matters, and the government is powerful. john: this is expensive. good for you for fighting what you believe in. coming up, where you work? are there notices like these posted? they are not they're because workers

but you're talking about 30 to 100 billion metadata records of phone calls and e-mails every single day, so vast, vast quantities of information they're sweeping up. and they're talking by 2030 having in place the world's largest surveillance system, surpassing what the n.s.a. and u.s. has built. >> sreenivasan: when somebody hears that there's millions and billions and possibly trillions of pieces of data they'll say, you know, what, how do you actually identify this is specifically me that's doing this, or going to the site, or saying this thing in a chat room? >> well, i mean, we have-- we don't actually-- one of the interesting parts of the story is that we had a bunch of specific cases where, for example, we had monitored something like 200,000 people from something like 185 different countries, so almost every country in the world. in one case they decided to pick out just one of these people. it seems like at randop, what web site he had been viewing. it's kind of an all-seeing system. when you're gathering that amount of information, that's something that does have an impact or

european union is holding an emergency summit next wednesday to discuss how to better manage their borders metadata demonstration of urgency to wait until all next week. politics and a capacity of our media establishment the candidates of both parties to summon sanctimonious outrageous as they attack the front runner their assaults of donald trump had nothing to do this time with anything that he said but it is about what he did not say. to call president obama of muslim trump did not correct him on either count to trump's regret to all of those that are piling on froebel sides of the aisle. >> he has to decide how serious of a candidate he wants to be and how he handles problems like this. somebody brought that up in the town hall meeting a mistake clear things up he has an obligation as a leader to do that. >> he knew or should have known what that man was asking was not only way out of bounds but not true bin from the beginning he should have repudiated that type of rhetoric or the level of hateful message is prejudicing and discriminatory comes out of the same unfortunate reservoir of hateful r

and the bulk metadata collection and has this made this case harder for companies and the american public? >> it has, and in fact, it's one of the things we ride to stress, that going dark debate is different from sort of 215 and metadata debates. for a number of reasons. number one, we can all agree that reasonable minds made the decision for what is lawful surveillance. that is not this issue. we have the surveillance authorities. congress and the american people have given us that power. so the issue here, is when we have that law. we have the court order for a wire tap order, example, and then this we go to the provider and the provider said, we cannot comply a lot of the nsa debate was a question of what authority should government have. it's a very different debate from that perspective. and i think, the important things, when we talk about capabilities, what it means in practice, no matter how serious the crime is. the fact that the judge has made a he a determination that there's a crime in progress or will be in progress, and we cannot get the information. that is a different tha

we were able to see this photo, and we got the gps metadata location information off of that particular photo. based on that information we were then able to research that further. identify where that person was from. where they had actually taken that photo, and then that investigation led us to eventually identify additional victims that that person had -- had -- had -- and all of these individuals, these children, were under the age of 8 years old. the investigation continues, but without that information that we were able to get from that e. pho iphone, if he had had an upgraded operating system, we might not have been able to do that. i'll give you another example where we have a homicide investigation where an individual is shot and killed after answering the door. this particular victim actually had the upgraded system. and when the police and, of course, there's now no one to serve the warrant on in order to get access to the device, that victim had not disclosed her pass code to anybody else including her family members and so as a result the police were unable to access that p

the supreme court overturned a decision, there's metadata lightly violating the constitution. >> there's been a little bit too much give-and-take for my life and where are we at? >> well, what the court of appeals did today is reversed the trial judge's decision which allow them to run the program. the judges were unanimous, the only thing they disagree about is whether to reverse the trial judge in the one thing or whether they should throw the case out entirely. the reason why is because there's not sufficient evidence to show that the plaintiffs in this case have their data collected, which means that they have the right to sue under the standard doctrine. kennedy: the standard doctrine, the splintered judges here in the circuit court. and this is headed for the supreme court, they keep contradicting each other in striking things down. one judge said that what they are doing is illegal and another says it's illegal under the patriot act and congress amends the patriot act. where do we stand now? >> i think that ultimately the issue is going to be the supreme court. but i would eat sur

and the bulk metadata collection and has this made this case harder for companies and the american public? >> it has, and in fact, it's one of the things we ride to stress, that going dark debate is different from sort of 215 and metadata debates. for a number of reasons. number one, we can all agree that reasonable minds made the decision for what is lawful surveillance. that is not this issue. we have the surveillance authorities. congress and the american people have given us that power. so the issue here, is when we have that law. we have the court order for a wire tap order, example, and then this we go to the provider and the provider said, we cannot comply a lot of the nsa debate was a question of what authority should government have. it's a very different debate from that perspective. and i think, the important things, when we talk about capabilities, what it means in practice, no matter how serious the crime is. the fact that the judge has made a he a determination that there's a crime in progress or will be in progress, and we cannot get the information. that is a different tha

there will no longer collect phone metadata and conduct its own queries a and instead to a for mayor will have to obtain a court order for communications providers to query their own records do have responsive information and it is important for the public as well as us to know if this transition will be complete at the end of a 180 days period and if you assess of the system in place at that time will read your operational needs. of a bite to know if this system was fully in place can achieve that goal to provide nsa with responsive information from a broader set of records bin of what had before the u.s.a. freedom act passed or if there is a relatively small percentage that was available before the change for perot you briefed the committee recently on the reorganization you are putting into place it would be appropriate at this hearing for you to describe that organization to the extent of the u.k. and, why it is needed in which changes are being made. thank you for the work your agency does. think he for your leadership >> we will skip the one question on this open hearing in goi

under the new law the nsa will no longer collect phone metadata directly from phone companies. it will conduct its own tailored query of the state. instead they will have to obtain a court order to gather from communication advisors. it is important, i think for the public as well as for us to know whether this transition will be complete at the end of 100 and 80 day. -- 180 day time span. if you assess it will meet your operation i would also like to know whether this system, once fully in place, will achieve the goal of providing the nsa with responsive information from a broader set of records. or whether there will still be a relatively small percentage of phone records that were available to you before the change. finally, you briefed the committee recently on the reorganization they are putting into place in the nsa. it would be appropriate at this hearing for you to describe that reorganization today said that you can. why is is needed, and what changes are being made. thank you very much for the worker agency does. i am very proud of it. thank you for your leadership. >

the amount you have on people based not just on their cell phone usage but all of the metadata we generate is significantly different than the type of information at stake in 1976 or 1978 when the case was decided. the second point is on global communications and digital storage. since the 1970s,

under the new law, the nsa will no longer collect phone metadata collectly from phone companies and conduct its own tailored queries of those data. instead of government will have to obtain a court order in order to ask telecommunications providers to query their own records and produce the responsive information. it's important i think for the public swellings for us to know whether this transition will be complete at the end of 180 day period. and whether you assess that the system is in place at that time, if you assess it will meet your operational needs. i'd also like to know whether this system once fully in place will achieve the goal of providing nsa with responsive information from a broader set of records than it had before the usa freedom act passed. or whether there will still be the relatively small percentage of phone records that were available to you before the change. finally, you briefed the committee recently on the reorganization you're putting in to place in the nsa. it would be appropriate at this hearing for you to describe that reorganization to the extent that you c

other losses and metadata some 6000 americans and koreans. so, korea's climate and terrain, as much an enemy an obstacle as the forces -- the human forces. so i do not want to talk about how nature is an agent in the war. certainly, humans act as agents in the war, as well. and at times, here in the i will show you, they are actually attacking you enemies as well as the landscape itself. and to the landscape becomes part of the strategy, part of the operational tactics they have to obliterate the cover from behind which their enemies can hide and launch attacks. so if korea as a physical entity poses challenges and was as much an enemy as the north korean and chinese forces, along with fellow u.n. troops, u.s. forces left a lasting mark on the landscape. and here is how they do this. they have these modern technologies, right? they have chemical agents, tanks, artillery, airplanes with massive capacities for carpet bombing. the landscape becomes part of the strategy, part of the operational tactics they have to obliterate the cover from behin

with metadata, but he raised the issues about collection against foreigners overseas. and the current administration talked about an initiative to provide non-u.s. persons with the kind of privacy protections u.s. persons have. now the implication of that would be that just as we're rather restricted in collecting against u.s. persons, those kinds of restrictions in collection and retention would apply to foreigners and even when we collect overseas. i mean, imagine how ecstatic putin would be if he thinks he has privacy rights against the united states. so considering these issues, the development of lone wolves the u.s. and this impulse to extend u.s. person restrictions overseas, how does this effect or how do you see this affecting your collection jobs and your protection jobs going forward? again, i will just throw it open there. >> yeah, that's great. one of the flagships of successes that we have all done together, actually, fbi, doj, dhs, is suspicious activity reporting. see something, say something is the public awareness component of that. and we essentially