the navy. -- states navy. this program is about 75 minutes. >> welcome to the washington navy yard. i'm the director of education here at the national museum of the u.s. navy, and this tour will take us throughout the history of the washington navy yard, which is a very extensive one. the art itself has seen a lot of -- yard itself has seen a lot of different historical events. some happy, some sad some every , day events. the yard itself has changed dramatically over the many years. it was first founded in 1798 and it was around that time that the united states realized we needed a standing military force. it was after the american revolution that all the military was basically disbanded because of the sentiments from before the american revolution, who had a standing army at that time that was stationed in the united states. the british, with that idea still fresh in their mind, they realize they didn't want a standing military. we started having problems overseas. american merchant ships were being attacked

the way to rise in the navy. code breakers, reputation of cryptoanalysis, wasn't helped by the attack on pearl harbor. a lot of the skeptics in the officer ranks wondered why this new science hadn't provided a better warning. so cryptoanalysis entered world war ii under a cloud. code breakers had problems besides their reputation. their big problem was there wasn't enough of them. both services had two trained analysts. the navy did have around 50 in its washington office, but a lot of them were detailed to work on various codes, diplomatic codes, the german enigma code. only a handful worked on the imperial navy operational codes. this small group was supplemented by 21 crypt to analysts scattered across the pacific in the navy's two field stations in pearl harbor and manila. this small band was charged with shadowing the entire japanese navy. it must be said they did an amazing job. they did catch a few bureaucracy. walter was talking about the early raised in the gilbert and marshall islands, solomons, owens s

." >>> next, a 2018 budget request for the navy. the deputy assistant navy secretary took reporters questions as congress makes its way through the budget process. this is about 40 minutes. >> good afternoon, everybody. welcome to the next brief. we are admiral brian luther is the director of the department of the navy's fiscal management branch. he is going to deliver his presentation, roll out the navy's budget and then we'll go over some ground rules and take some questions. >> good afternoon. as he mentioned i'm brian lute luther and i want to thank you ft. opportunity to brief the fiscal year 2018 president budget submission in which i will address our portion of the second step of the department of defense's multi-year effort to restore readiness. the brief will be broken into four parts. the first will briefly review the current and evolving strategic guidance. the second, provides the operational context in which the naval forces operate in today's world. the third i'll review historical challenges that underlie the requirem

with the the law cited navy. the property clause followed by the abandoned shipwreck act lays the ownership of the vessel firmly in the navy's grip. however self was their intent, legally, he and his team of underwater archaeologists were no different than the looters who had them lettering -- had been plundering the wreck. cussler believed the navy no longer own the wreck and in his navy hadargued the sold the rights to cumberland in 1862 when the navy first hired them. he believed no confederate ship could be owned by the government. his argument held no legal standing but underscored a larger problem. most virginia waterman believed the navy did not own the >> and they were free to be looted. once the cap was out of the bag and location became public, a frantic feeding frenzy occurred as they tried to seize as many artifacts as they could. the next 10 years, the cumberland and florida >> possessed no protection from looters who went after the ship with a vengeance. fishermenbbers and began looting the artifact

way to rise in the navy. codebreakers, the reputation of cryptanalysis was not helped by the attack on pearl harbor on the cymer 7, 1941. a lot of the skeptics in the officer ranks wondered why this new science had not provided a better warning. entered world war ii very much under a cloud. codebreakers had staggering problems of their own besides the reputation. their big problem was that there was not enough of them. around 50 inhave it watching an office, but a lot of them were detailed to work on various diplomatic codes, the german evening with code -- german enigma code. only a handful worked on the german navy operational codes, and this small group was helped by 20 when crypto analysts in the navy's field station at pearl harbor and manila, and this small band was charged with shadowing the entire japanese navy. said, they did an amazing job. they did catch a few breaks. walter boardman was talking in thehe early raids gilbert and marshall islands and the solomons. codebreakers cannot break codes unle

nominal navy with the ready-to-fight navy. do you get what i'm driving at? >> clearly tracked that and i'll get on your calendar and walk you through that. >> i would very much appreciate that. i think that's important. and then i just think we need to fully understand that, and i commend you for focusing in this budget on these issues of getting a higher level of maintenance and repair. admiral neller, one final question. you have 85,000 as your end strength, but that's at a one to two dwell to deployment. that seems to be a high stress level on your people. talk to me about the deployment-dwell ratio. >> senator, at 185,000, in the aggregate, it's about 1-2. there are some communities that are below that, harder than that. there are some that are better. when i came in the marine corps in the '80s, we were one to three force. >> that's better. >> that's the long-term, sustainability, and i think not just for the maintenance of of our gear and the training of our force, but also for our families. so, we've been at one to two.

last year i raised the question of the navy submitting a budget that would leave the navy in program. a this year they're asking for a seven-year approval for the same b-22 program. i would like to hear why we should depart from the normal five-year regimen as established in title 10 in the united states count on hy we should the navy of pay manager attention to live up to the terms of a multiyear program than last year. the guidance issued announced a renewed strategy for orientation on the asia pacific. consistent with that, they have been working to realign u.s. forces in south korea and okinawa and plans to position forces in australia, singapore and elsewhere. i'm interested in hearing how the navy is implemented these strategic decisions. the administration is asking for an increase of roughly $54 billion for fiscal year 2018 prescribed in the budget control act. othat total would constitute abincrease of roughly $12 billion. however i must point out that unless congress can achieve a wrod and bipartisan agreement, any approval of the $12 billion increase for the department of t

navy, the request for the gerald r. ford exceeds the cost cap by $20 million. in addition, the navy wants to award the contract -- the construction contract for the third ship, the enterprise or cvn 80 in march, 2018, at a cost of $13 billion which is $1.6 billion more than the previous ship. this is unacceptable for a ship certified to be a repeat design that will deliver just three years later. secretary stackley and admiral richardson, i would like an explanation. similarly given the importance of replacing our aging magazine rine corpse amphibious vehicle and aircraft fleets, the marine corpse must learn the lesson of past favors. expedition nary fighting vehicle and drifr these needed capabilities on time, at cost and up to expectations. some of the greatest threats and challenges of the future will be in the maritime domain. it's important for this committee 10 to sure that our navy and marine corpse are n, t budget request is a start but i'm afraid it's not enough. we should not ask our military to choose between

i read the 2014 roadmap put out by the navy. the navy's arctic roadmap. as we pursue a fleet of 350 ships, and the strategy talked about the importance of looking at ice hardening some of the ships. what ships would we need to look at ice hardening. to believe this arctic strategy needs to be updated now that the secretary of defense has put out a much more robust strategy directed by this committee? >> i think the answer is precisely the effort were undertaking the summer as we refresh our strategy in light of the national defense strategy are doing. >> are you going to update that? >> we will. >> in terms of ice are need ships we have a 355 ship a fleet we are looking at, what kind of ships would you believe we need to ice hard so we can conduct with what the current strategy lays out but we don't have the capability to do it. >> that's true. i only of those answers as an output of the strategic review. i don't want to give you a guess right now. it be the types of ships that would have decisive impacts. >> during her confirmation hearing you mention th

the navy. slide where i'm going to come back to this point, but i will just make it now to start with. pentagon where we have and things like dust this just .lows my students' minds the assistant secretary of the navy -- famously theodore roosevelt, but there were others . that was the operational staff of the united states navy. trust me -- i have seen all these letters. a, you wille shift go from point a to point b, and your people will pick up a load go tol at point c and point d. it is not a very efficient way to do business, certainly not if you're fleet is growing. the navy goes through a lot of growing pains at the turn-of-the-century as we grapple with how you balance the civilian control of the military, which we are kind of into in the united states, with having military officers that can make decisions and make the trains run on time, right? this continues to be an issue for the u.s. navy we're going to get to it in a slide here in a minute, but this is kind of the state of the u.s.

affect the navy. the arctic ice is disappearing, there's strategic changes that are being implicated here. and it's important for the department of defense to report to congress on this. we're talking about a report here. and i would just like to associate myself with mr. bishop on this issue, it's just a report, and there are strategic implications that we need to be aware of. >> ms. shayporter? >> thank you. i have to say that i live in a coastal state, and i think it's a very nonpartisan issue in new hampshire, that people recognize the impact that it's having, we do have streets that have water in them in the middle of the sunshine days. and we also have some installations, military installations that are looking at this. this is a very real threat. and it isn't just congress, although it is congress's responsibility to do something about this. and i appreciate the fact that we're talking about a report. but vice admiral lee gunn, u.s. navy retired said the national security community is rightly w

not necessarily what is the navy we need in the 2040s but what is the navy we need in the 2020s? we are trying to figure out, what is the navy that we need in the mid-20's. and go make some decisions based on kind of that navy we need in the 2020s. there have been a number of recent studies some done by the navy, and some by independent groups about what is the navy and what should it look like? they have various mixes of ships and stuff but in the end they all came to the same conclusion we need a bigger navy than we have today and they are all around the 340 to 350 ships. clearly the size of the fleet matters and the capability of the fleet matters as well. how do we get there? when we talk about the size of fleet and i know i'll get questions about how the '18 budget didn't add a bunch of new ships, what happened? we were never going to be able to turn that around overnight. i think what you're going to see and i'll get to it later in my remarks is the '18 budget holds what we have on the new construction side but makes a significant investment on the ready new zealand side of

and not necessarily what is the navy we need in the 2040s, but what is the navy we need in the 2020s. and we in figuring out, what is the navy we need probably in the mid 20s and go make some decisions based on kind of that navy that we need in the 2020s. there's been a number of recent studies, some done by the navy, some done by indepen department groups, about what is it the navy you need, what should it look like? and they all have kind of varying mixes of ships and stuff. but at the end, they all came to the same conclusion is that we need a bigger navy than we have today, they are all around the 340 to 350 ships. clearly, the size of the fleet does matter and the capability of that fleet is also going to matter importantly, as well. so, you know, how do we get there from here? so, one of the things, when we talk about the size of the fleet and i know i'll get questions about, hey, the '18 budget didn't add ships, what happened? well were never going to be able to turn that around overnight. i think what you're going to see, and i'll get into it a little bit more in -- later in m

the report has not been amended by the navy. the navy clearly has stated to that report it needs these ships. in fact, admiral harris of pacom which was before the subcommittee back in april and talked about how he is presently using those ships in the south china sea where if a visitor important part of the mission. why produce these at three, number three per euro? we at the advil before the subcommittee a couple of months ago and he said funding three lcs ships a year is critical to maintaining cost and schedule efficiency. those were his words. lcs is on budget and below the cost gap. both shipyards artificially producing the ships, the two shipyards cannot continue without funding three ships a yupik that's also the navy's conclusion. three ships that only maintains a healthy industrial base, because without three ships the skilled workforce will suffer a ten-40% layoff resulting in extended production timelines and unit costs increases of ten-15% which comes out to be about 50-$7 50-$70 million annun future ships. the labo

what is the navy we need in the 20 20's. we are trying to figure out, what is the navy that we need in the mid-20's. ? there have been a number of recent studies, some to the navy, some by independent groups about what is the navy and what should it look like? they have various mixes of ships they all came to the same conclusion that we need a bigger navy. all around 340-350 ships. the size matters and the apability matters. how do we get there? when we talk about the size of the fletet, i get questions about how the budget did not add new ships. what happened? we were never going to be able to turn that around overnight. the 18 budget holds the new construction side, but make a significant advancement n the readiness side. if you listen to the vice chief's testimony, he says the first dollar we get should go to readiness. we spent a lot of time talking about the strategy, the future navy white paper, it all goes to the avy's strategy going forward.s since 1985, i tell people, i am a my 18th palm. if i had a dollar for every

last night was a ignite for the navy. band played on the waterfront. the forward tod the navy. it was a big night for us having worked on ford for most of the past 10 years. the navy accepted delivery last night. you heard it here first. the theme that i was given was the maintenance challenge and how to reset the fleet. context of talking about headed.e c-note is more importantly, to talk about how the maintenance side of that equation fits in. it is not either. you have to do both. we tend to forget about that. forng been a ship loader most of the last three years, but having spent most of the readiness, i am well aware that you have to do both. if you have not read the sea notes white paper, it is a good read. a short, it has pictures in it. it is great for command master chief's. their lips do not get tired when they read it. key points.ree applicable whether you are talking construction or maintenance. it is some of the things we're getting after today. it applies across the board. figuring out how to design these ships quicker and build them quicker. the pace today is exp

and not necessarily what is the navy we need, necessarily in the 2040s but what's the navy we need in the 2020s and we tend to talk a lot about what's the navy we need today, and we're trying to take a little bit of a lead angle and figuring out what is it the navy we need, you know, probably in the mid '20s and go make some decisions based on kind of that navy that we need in the 2020s. there's been a number of recent studies, some done by the navy, some done by independent groups, about what is it that navy need, what should it look like and they all have kind of varying mixes of ships and stuff. but at the end, they all came to the same conclusion, is that we need a bigger navy than we had today and they're all around the 340 to 350 ships so clearly the size of the fleet does matter going forward. and the capability of that fleet a 's also going to matter importantly as well. so how do we get there from so one of the things, when we talk about the size of the fleet and i know i'll get questions about, hey, the '18 budget didn't add a bunch of new ships, what happened? well were nev

the navy that was spotless. had suc he succeeded at every command he ever had and now watching from his house he saw destruction and smoke and one of his battleshipsg to t already beginning to turned over because it had taken soin many torpedoes and was filling up so rapidly the noise was tremendous it is hard to appreciate how noisy it must have been. - everything he thought he knew about military tactics and the capability of the japanese was blown up right before his eyes all the decisions he was making about the threats that he faced were nullified and in a matter of minutes he went from a perfect record to blemish from the best job of the navy to national disgrace. whenever i think of him standing there i cannot helpth but think this is one of the saddest moments of american history and he was never the same and never recovered he never recovered from the emotional trauma a neighbor came out tuesday and with him on the one and would recall he seemed incredulous his face was as white as the uniform he wore.

became ensins or joined the navy reserve. whatever their pathway, cadets pass through months of flight training. at 40, 60, 70th areas, they were checked. the last flight check was most difficult called shooting the circle. at 800 feet the flight instructor cut his engine forcing the plane to land on a 200 foot circle on an auxiliary field. some students would almost crash their plane to do it rather than drop out. in 1980, 40% failed the check or killed themselves in the process. aviation cadets were doing flight training, the fighter base or tricks. and an advanced carrier training quads from veteran instructors. when all was said and done the pilots had logged more than 600 hours in the air before going to the front. their combat experience was little. all the enterprise squadrons had fought several times before. research of the air group in march resulted in a group of brand new ensigns, fresh from the u.s. carrier group. >> only one of us from the war and they were replaced from the squadrons of uss saratoga and had yet

it shattered the reputation of the navy is unmatched and unbeatable as the best navy in the world, the navy was a bigger presence in the public's eyes than it is now. newspapers routinely covered the changes of naval command, big stories when admiral x was replaced by admiral why. even in peacetime reporters went out to see to file long, detailed reports about the complex exercises of atlantic and pacific fleet. the navy was the newspaper that landed on the front steps of homes in honolulu on sunday morning, december 7th, it was sitting there when the plane showed up overhead. the newspaper had a front-page announcement that santa claus would be in the newspaper bobby starting at noon like he was every year. ready to hear christmas wishes of the children of honolulu. i never did find out whether santa claus showed up that day, i suspect not. we also need to remember this was the age before spy satellites. there were no cameras in the stratosphere up there snapping photos as you would have today as 30 japanese warships silently sailed out of an obscure bay in the farthest most remote re

last night was a big night for the navy. we played at the waterfront for most of the past ten years accepted it last night. given the challenge how to reset the fleet, i would like to talk about this in the context of where it is headed with the size of the fleet and what we are giving on the new construction e side and the maintenance side of the equation how it fits in. we were talking before hand. it's not either.t you've got to do both. sometimes we forget about that most of the last 15 years also having spent three years on the readiness i am well aware that you have to maintain and continue to build going forward. it has some pictures so it isuri great to not get tired when they read it. it talks about with the current security environment is and he makes three key points that are applicable whether you are talking the maintenance of keytn points are the time matters and there has to be a sense of urgency that we are getting after today. i think that applies across thee board to figure out how you can get them built qu

does not represent the view of the u.s. navy. let us look at what the navy has actually said and what it is written. and the claim laid on the table that the navy doesn't want the ship is patently false. as the deputy secretary of defense who authorized the account of the program included, it is getting the ship it asked for and a better ship than expected. we spent months asking the navy this very question in the subcommittee. the program executive officer told chairman whit man and myself and everyone else that the navy needs three ships per year and they need it to keep the production line hot. let's also recognize the administration was forced to defend a top line number of 603 that was sent to them without doing a strategic e vaguation. the lcs program is of critical importance to our navy. the designs are stable. facilities are in place with a right size quality workforce and both shipyards are in full production in order to ensure each can deliver two ships per year. today the program is on budget and below congressional c

navy we need in 2040 but in the 2020s but we tab what's the navy we need today. and we're trying to take a little bit of a lead angle and figuring out what is it that navy we need probably in the mid-20s and go make decisions based on kind of that navy that we need in the 2020s. and there's been a number of recent studies some done by the navy some done by independent groups about what is it and what should it look like and they have kind of varying concern knickses of ships and stuff, but at the end they all came to the same conclusion that we need a bigger navy than we had today and all around the 340, 350 ships so clearly size of the fleet does matter going forwards and capable that have fleet is going to importantly as well. so how do we get there from here? so -- one of the things when we talk about the sizes of the fleet and i'll get questions often about hey you know 18 budget dpght add a bunch of new ships. what happened? and we were never going to be able to turn that around overnight, i think what you're going to see and a little bit more in the the --

across the navy. and this small band was charged with shadowing the entire japanese navy. and it must be said that they did an amazing job. they did catch a few breaks. walter bordman was talking about the early raids in the gilbert and marshal islands, and code breakers can't break codes unless they have intercepts, lots of messages to work with, and those raids generated kau zillions of imperial navy messages, so suddenly our code breakers had more intercepts than they knew what to do with than they could possibly break and that showed in the results that came later when a japanese squadron was spotted heading toward the southern coast of new guinea, and it was tracked by analysts at pearl harbor and malborn, australia. so admiral nimitz had information, and he sent some to thwart that advance, and the action known as the coral of the sea was the first major set back for the imperial navy. it's been called a draw. i would say it's a tactical draw for the japanese but a strategic defeat for the japan

aviation wing of the navy. he had a really fiery temper. like some folks we could mention there's no middle ground with admiral king. he either had his supporters and detractors. he had five daughters and a son. one of his daughters famously said, daddy, daddy, he's the most even tempered person i know, he's always in a rage. i check that probably was admiral king. n nimitz is a very different personality, puts his arm around you, let's get this done together. he grew up in texas, west of austin. german family. story told he went off to westpoint, he wanted to go to westpoint very definitely but he went to annapolis because there were so many cavalry officers who had sons they wanted to send to westpoint, he was told you will never get into westpoint but i have an opening to annapolis, what if you go there. he agreed to go to annapolis, wrote back to his parents german immigrants, i'm supposed to take a foreign language, what do you recommend? his german speaking folks said, take english, thick that will put yo

the navy expected pilots to figure out the battle on their own. if they failed come it would be no great loss. it would be another wave of flyers and planes to replace them. the surface ships needed to survive the engagement at all costs. in essence, the pilots were figuratively and sometimes literally on their own. today this mode of thinking seems heartless, reckless, and costly. to send pilotsle on a suicide mission. worldly do we live in a of leave no man behind, at a cost $6 million per year to train one navy pilot. but this specific aviator was different to our own. it was a dark epoch. .he looming cloud of defeat the truly amazing thing is that the u.s. pilots understood this world for what it was and expected the grim reality, taking no notice they were considered expendable. another enterprise dive bomber wrote to his girlfriend, hinting at the necessity of living in this heartless world, were only two intangibles were what the pilots needed. he wrote, i wonder if my letters are not too cold, formal and unreal? that is only because i'm li

code breaking and navy at the battle and new information at the state of japanese navy. all of that is tieonight starti at 8:00 eastern. >>> each week, american history tv brings a archival film that helps tell a story of the 208th century. >> hollywood directors making films for the u.s. government during world war ii. we featured john ford. he made for the u.s. navy about the june 1942 battle of mid way. the film presented a victory and vivid color to an american public eager for some good news. first, we speak with author mark harris about john ford. >> author harris focused on the five books. heart atta mark harris, thank you for being with us. >> thank you for having me. >> what can you tell us about the work of ford? >> he's the most respected before the war. between 939 and 941, he went on an unmatched terror in hollywood making the grapes of wrath and how green was my valley and drums along the mohawks. just a set of movies that gave him the reputation as one of the most intelligent and serious minded directors. he was also the most precious of the five directors

the chief's run the navy. he was right. this chief served a former boss of mine e was my football coach. bill brockman, a great man. okay, chief. take it away. >> yeah, please. my name is hank kudzig. >> chief. >> and i come from bethlehem, pennsylvania. during world war ii, i spent all my time on two submarines. we fwhoe thknow that midway was conflict. so what was a submarine doing there? december 17 completely changed my life. i was 16-year-old kid. dinlt know what to do with my life coming up. so when the nap knees bombed pearl harbor, two days after christmas in 1941, i went to the recruiting office. i didn't lie. i didn't lie. i told them i was 16. but i had a birthday coming up. i had a recruiter, he said we'll go through the preliminaries and you put up your hand and say i do or what it takes to -- he said, son, you're in the navy. no mention of a submarine. i didn't know what a submarine looked like. i couldn't tell the difference between a baby stroller and a submarine. i want to go to war but submarine wasn't in

's been going on the bottom line is that the navy still cannot say when the t45, the navy only jet trainer will start flying again. a six to five page review said finding a solution to the problem has pthere is not one y. the issue with was systems with the trainer and the f-18 hornets. the systems are supposed to provide clean breathable air to air crew and when they don't, pilots may become dizzy, euphoric, or even pass out off-line. reports of these kinds of incidents have been on the rise. it's is the navy has been taking a quote unrestrained resource approach print listen. >> we are putting everything we've gotten to this. we've got a lot of people converging and swarming on a problem. were going to find ways to mitigate that risk and ultimately fix it. >> the f-18 is still flying while the navy works on on the problem and as for the t45, he tells me that if they are not able to get training flights going again by the summer, it will impact operational readiness. so the navy's close. >> what are the changes expected from this review? >> the navy plans to establish a dedicated new orga

like hopskins, most aviator felt attach into the navy. as a young boy, -- fisher's revelation came in at age four while playing at his front yard. he heard a distant noise and looking up, it looked like a monster. the noise frighten him and he ran panic stricken into his front door. eventually, his father came to his rescue. the army pilot landed in a near by pastor and showing him that planes are of no danger and voicing his son over his shoulders and taken him to see the monsters. fisher touched the propellant. i was hooked and i wanted to be an aviator. >> whatever hooked them in their youth. the navy pilot followed at mid kay followed three pathways. they went to the naval academy and joined the naval reserve and rose up the ranks. whatever their pathway could pass through 11 months of training at the air station at pensacola. flight checks are meant to push them onto the flight way or flush them out. the last check was difficult. it was called shooting a circle. the cadets and -- some students would craft their planes to do it rather

the navy now calling the crash and the fight to save the ship traumatic. this morning, the navy revealing the hellish collision almost sank "the uss fitzgerald." the damage to the mangled midsection relatively minimal compared to what happened beneath the water line. >> the water flow was tremendous. there wasn't a lot of time in those spaces that were opened to the sea. and as you can see now, the ship is still listing. >> reporter: the collision with the 30,000 on the "acx chris call" friday night occurred in one of the busiest shipping lanes. gutted the middle compartments. the container ship's bulbous bow plunging right into the living quarters. >> three compartments were severely damaged. one machinery room and two berthing areas, berthing areas for 116 of the crew. and also, the ship's skipper's cabin, as well. >> reporter: the ship's commander survived. but had to be medevaced. there were other injuries treated on board. this morning, the navy is calling off the search and rescue. revealing that divers went through the sealed-off sections of the shi

the commander of the navy's 7th fleet said today divers found a number of sailors' bodies inside the flooded, damaged sections and sleeping quarters on the uss fitzgerald. the publication "navy times" later confirmed all seven bodies were recovered aboard the guided missile destroyer. a navy spokesman said the sailors either drowned or were killed by the impact of the pre- dawn collision yesterday with a filipino-flagged container ship

is what's the navy we need. i think we are trying to work pretty hard to optimize the resources we need. i'm satisfied the process sz we have today. it is pretty good and pretty robust. the navy leadership we have over on the side is doing a terrific job of managing that. i think everyone gets a voice in the process. i think we have a better o outcome. >> i have to ask this question. you know, there was some concern that especially the had not received the love and attention they need. we talked abiliout the surface navy. we have those assets which are very large and complex and important. can you talk about are you satisfied and between the navy and marines on that? >> well, i have a marine on my staff who manages ships for me. the c-21 staff was talking to the marine corp. all of the time. and where there may have been a to place it on the nuclear side of the house today i think we have robust maintenance plans across the board and by understand they are being well maintained today. they are about ready to --

now the captain of the other ship-- says the navy crew is at fault. the container ship captain says the navy destroyer did not respond to warning signals or take evasive action in the early hours of june 17th. seven sleeping sailors died and three others were hurt. the navy is not commenting on the crash, as the investigation continues. it's unclear if the container ship, which made several course changes before impact, was on auto-pilot at the time of the crash. after 82 games in the nba season-- only one player could be the league mvp. and this year-- that honor goes to russell westbrook. this was not a surprise. the oklahoma city point guard made history this season-- becoming the first player since oscar robinson to average a triple double for the entire season. he also broke robertson's record for most triple-doubles in a season with 42. afterwards-- the famously "intense" nba star, became emotional as he it was westbrook's first mvp award. houston's james harden came in second place in voting. coming up-- an abc-7 exclusive. we sat down with the

but i think at the end of the day the friction, the traditional army, navy rivalries, i think they've been overstated. i think there were people on both sides, macarthur's staff and nimtz's staff. who really just kind of hated one another. and the chief of staff or macarthur, sutherland, was one of those. but i think that nimitz and macarthur once they got together macarthure halsey and , they really got along and embraced the bigger picture. so thank you very much. [applause] >> you are watching american history tv, all weekend, every weekend on c-span3. to join the conversation, like us on facebook. coming up on american history tv, purdue university professor caroline e. janney looks at the process of disbanding the remnants of the army of northern virginia, following the april 1865 surrender to union general ulysses s. grant at appomattox. she focuses on the confederates that avoided or escaped, and retreated into the shenandoah valley. she discusses general grant's concerns that some confederate would fight aguerrilla war. it is part of a conference hosted by the university of vi

navy divers recovering the bodies of seven sailors. here at home, flags were lowered and tears fell. the oldest sailor, 37-year-old gary rehm jr. was three months from retiring. the youngest, 19-year-old dakota rigsby, volunteered at this virginia firehouse. >> he had a great life ahead of him, but he served our country and he did what he loved so i'm proud of him. >> reporter: the navy says the collision happened in clear weather at 2:20 a.m. saturday, but japan's coast guard says the accident took place an hour earlier. this marine tracker shows the cargo ship making a hard turn at 1:30 a.m. and a u-turn, backtracking at 2:20 a.m. >> for a u.s. navy destroyer to be involved in a collision with loss of life at sea is extremely rare, once every decade or two. >> reporter: the navy says the crew of the "fitzgerald" fought heroically to keep it afloat. commander bryce benson among the injured, but seven of his sailors including carlos sibayan, who followed his father into the navy, won't be coming home. >> my son is a survivor. he knows

now, let's talk about the size of our navy's fleet. the current fleet has 276 ships, but the navy's requirement is now for 355 ships, a figure supported by congressionally mandated future fleet architecture studies. last week i spoke on the floor about the national imperative to build a larger navy. i outlined the critical missions our navy performs every day to help secure the country's vital interests. i also described an intense naval competition with our real and potential adversaries. this is a competition that america cannot afford to lose, mr. president. america needs a bigger navy. how do we get there? related to that question is when we get to a 355-fleet ship. according to the chief of naval operation, admiral john richardson, we should reach our 355-ship objective in the mid-2020's. to do that we should have started yesterday, building and sustaining technologically advanced ships as a long-term national project. it cannot happen overnight. it takes years. as chairman of the seapower subcommittee, i intend to lay a firm foun