robert mcnamara did not report this captains doubts to the president. so, the president and others believed that there had been a second attack, and it was after the second attack that the gulf of tonkin resolution was passed, which gave president johnson almost unlimited war power. >> your exhibit has the actual document, the gulf of tonkin resolution as introduced in the senate august 5, 1964, was this unanimously accepted by congress , was that unanimously passed? >> it was accepted almost unanimously. there were two who voted against it, senator wayne morris, and senator grooming. we have the tally sheet that you can see as well. >> the u.s. senate still uses a very similar tally sheet. it is the actual tally sheet from the vote on the resolution. in the center, a picture of president johnson signing a resolution in the east room on august 10 1964, in assembling the exhibit, any reason why the president made such a prominent display of signing that resolution? >> i don't really know the answer to that question. i imagine that when you are putting th

you can't go and spit on robert mcnamara, or yell at lbj, but here's a soldier in uniform and so they became sort of -- not literally targets but psychically targets. and that was very wrong. i think we are beginning to acknowledge that and as a country move forward. it's very, very important. >> let's get that call from nancy in franklin, north carolina. thank you for waiting. >> caller: thank you, very much, ms. novick, you won my heart, you brought up something very important to me. it brings almost tears to my eyes. growing up, request i'm one of the original baby boomers of that era growing up watching the war. the first war that was ever televised on television. we'd watch it every evening with walter cronkite, mostly, narrating the war, being embedded there many times. my father was a world war ii veteran who i love more than life itself. he was all pro-vietnam, et cetera, in the very beginning. but as the war kept going and escalating for four, five years, and our own senator, allan cranston said enough is enough, and he came home and said, we got to pull out now. i graduated

so friendly with robert mcnamara and cabinet secretaries. when you fry to internalize it. you do a great job of looking and sound like her. what were you aiming for? >> i was aiming, really, to, to portray a woman of, of my mother's generation. who -- confronted a moment in the 70s. when everything changed for women. it was sort of of a breakout moment. at the time this film takes place. 1971. just a week and a half in, in that time. ken kent state was happening. social upupheavals. on the fulcrom of a change there were no female cs of any industry. companies at that time. very, very hair. she was in the position she inherited it. her father owned the paper. passed tight her husband. she was basically 45 years old. her husband died. the mantel of "the post" and 3,000 employees and everything. fell to her. the clip we will play. katherine graham at breakfast with you. tom hangs. benjamin bradley. the editor of "the washington post". are you sure we are striking the right tone here, ben. oh, we are going to do this a again. stiletto party coverage. you are losing female lead

stanton, when robert mcnamara, who wrote his book 15 years ago, in which he said that they all knew that it was an untenable, unwinnable tragedy. how did that make you feel? did that vindicate your feelings of doubt as a soldier, or do you think he should have taken it to his grave? >> lynn novick, i thought i saw you nodding your head. did you want to respond? >> i think a number of voters we spoke with, in particular a marine who gave up a rhodes scholarship to go to vietnam and fight, to lead a platoon in 1968, he was recalling what was revealed in the pentagon papers, which is mcnamara's memo to johnson in 1965, saying the chances for victory are no better than one in three. we are probably not going to win, but recommending escalation, and johnson going along with it. and the subsequent revelations from mcnamara that they knew the war was not winnable and kept on escalating anyway. looking back, the marines said, i can understand if our leaders make mistakes with good intentions. with a noble heart, people make mistakes and policies can be wrong and we all understand that. but when

he went to the pentagon and set himself on fire outside robert mcnamara's window. i don't think he is well remembered as he should be for an extraordinary and insane back active civil disobedience. there are a few other examples. it does speak to the kind of fervor with which some people felt that the war was wrong and had to be stopped. he does represent a tiny minority of the public. lots conversation with our two guests. host: we went to the phone numbers on the screen. we want for separate phone lines . if you live in the eastern and central time zone, (202) 748-8000. if you live at west, it's (202) 784-8001. we have a line for vietnam veterans, (202) 748-8002. ,or vietnam war protesters (202) 748-8003. we will start getting to your calls. we want to put another name in front of you. his name is tom hayden. early he was one of the founders of the protest movement. michigan, theof students for a democratic said, thes lynn protest movement when it begins be a theitical mass draft, people start to pay attention. as i sitwrote about here and listen, joined earlier.

specifically in early 1965 he will meet with robert mcnamara during lunch and the secretary of state. mcnamara will have a list. the targets have been moved up from first 2nd air division that is running the show. we always hear about seventh air force. that will go down to honolulu moved to the pentagon and to to the state and go back to the jcs and that will be in mcnamara's hands and take this list of this is what we want and this is why and they will have a discussion. that discussion starts expanding. those discussions have missing the advisor. this is a later period of time when they general is sitting on it. where are these attacks coming from? it is a combined effort. it is not a joint event. we have yankee station, the carrier group sitting of the coast that usually has three carriers that are doing the proposal -- reprisal of peers arrow. we've got bases in thailand. those are the main areas where the fighters and tankers are coming out of. that is where they were coming into the north. i say it is not really joint, it is joint. you have the navy and air force doing attacks

in early 1965, he'll start meeting with robert mcnamara during lunch. he'll have a list. this list of targets has been moved up from first second air division that's running the show. it's going to be in his hands. now they're going to take this list of this is what we want to do. this is why we want to do these targets. they're going to have a discussion among the three of them. pretty soon that starts expanding. usually what's missing any kind of military advisement. this is from later time when general wheeler is sitting on it and invited later. it's a combined effort. we have the group sitting off the coast that's usually got three carriers there. the navy portion of it and the bases in thailand. that's where these guys are come i ing. i say it's not really -- it's joint. you have the navy joint attacks. you have air force attacks. one that we're not familiar with today. you can see one, two, three, four, five. the air force and some the south enemy's air force will get this routes are going into one. the navy gets two, three, four and air force gets five and 6a. i th

when robert mcnamara wrote his book about 15 years ago, in which he said that they all knew that it was an unwinnable, untenable tragedy. how did you -- how did that make you feel? did that vindicate your feelings of doubt as a soldier or do you think he should have taken it to his grave? >> lynn novick, i thought i saw you nodding your head for a second. did you want to respond? >> oh, i mean, i think a number of soldiers that we spoke with, in particular, carl marlantis who was a marine, who gave up a rhodes scholarship to go to vietnam and fight, to lead a platoon in '68. he was recalling what is revealed in "the pentagon papers," which is mcnamara's memo to johnson in '65 saying the chances of victory are no better than 1 in 3. we're probably not going to win but recommending escalation and johnson going along with it. subsequent revelations from mcnamara that they knew the war was not winnable, that it couldn't be won, and they just escalated anyway. he said i can understand if people make mistakes with pure intentions. but when you are lying to protect your own ego, that's what he

specifically in 1965, early 1965, he'll start meeting with robert mcnamara during lunch and also the secretary of state dean rusk. mcthat nara will have a list, this list of targets has been moved up from 1st 2nd air division, later 7th air force. that's going to go through the sharp down in honolulu. it's going to move up to the pentagon. it will move over to state. it's going to kind of go back to the jcs and that's in mcnamara's hands. now they're going to take this list of, this is what we want to do, this is why we want to do these targets and they'll have discussion among the three of them. pretty soon that discussion starts expanding. initially at those discussions what's missing, any kind of military adviser. this picture is from a later period of time where general wheeler is actually sitting on it and he's invited later. this is probably from '67 as we get into '68. where are these attacks coming from? well, it's a combined effort. it is a joint effort but it's not really a joint event. we have yankee station, the carrier group sitting right off the coast of danang that's u

>> the president and robert mcnamara look very anguished and they look like they're just in devastation. >> they look like they are anguished and in devastation. >> the picture speaks very loudly. mcnamara is on the verge of a nervous breakdown. and the transition has started did not you find it surprising that mcnamara was crying when they are discussing this. he breaks down. he is moving out of the white house to the world bank to be president of the world bank. i think this store -- sums it up. johnson is tired. here is the problem. you've got to answer. answer, an asked the joint chiefs and he asked wheeler in particular, if i give you 206,000 more, can you guarantee me a much better situation? their answer was what? do you remember? did they guarantee victory? what did they guarantee? do you remember? they guaranteed that we would be able to hold on to a few more provinces a little longer, and if we didn't send these troops over, those province we just as well walk away from. is that what the president wants to hear with 206,000? where is he going to get these people? call up your

>> the president and robert mcnamara look very anguished and they look like they're just in devastation. >> this is from february 8th, 1968. think about that. that picture, i think, speaks very loudly. mcnamara is on the verge of a nervous breakdown. he's about to be replaced by clark clifford. transition has already started. didn't you find it surprising at one point in one of the meetings, mcnamara just starts crying when they start transit started. didn't you find it surprising that mcnamara just starts crying at one of their meetings? if we would only do more bombing and he just breaks down. again, he's on the verge, and he's on the verge of a nervous breakdown, he's moving out of the white house to be president of the world bank. but i think this sort of sums it up quite well. johnson's tired. exhausted. but here's the problem. you've got to answer, and he asked the joint chiefs and he asked wheeler in particular, if i give you 206,000 more, can you guarantee me a much better situation? their answer was what? do you remember? did they guarantee victory? what did they guarantee? do

>> the president and robert mcnamara look very anguished and they look like they're just in devastation. >> this is from february 8th, 1968. think about that. that picture, i think, speaks very loudly. mcnamara is on the verge of a nervous breakdown. he's about to be replaced by clark clifford. transition has already started. didn't you find it surprising at one point in one of the meetings, mcnamara just starts crying when they start transit started. didn't you find it surprising that mcnamara just starts crying at one of their meetings? if we would only do more bombing and he just breaks down. again, he's on the verge, and he's on the verge of a nervous breakdown, he's moving out of the white house to be president of the world bank. but i think this sort of sums it up quite well. johnson's tired. exhausted. but here's the problem. you've got to answer, and he asked the joint chiefs and he asked wheeler in particular, if i give you 206,000 more, can you guarantee me a much better situation? their answer was what? do you remember? did they guarantee victory? what did they guarantee? do

. >> the connection between westmoreland's affinity for the kill counts and robert mcnamara, he's always obsessed with numbers. is there a big connection with that? >> yeah, that's one of the ways, that's one of the reasons that westmoreland gets the job, right? he's a numbers guy, mcnamara is a numbers guy. the whole body count then -- we feed the body count and mcnamara in d.c. can look at all of this and look at the numbers from that side and that side and then the american numbers and then he can reach like a magic formula, at one point where you'll be able to declare, victory. and that's also by the way the problem with body counts. if you're an american combat unit, you get steak one night, if you have a good body count. right? so maybe you'll be tempted to inflate the body count. or else, if you happen to have killed accidentally someone who was a civilian, to avoid the repercussions, you might say well that was actually an enemy combatant. that's the problem with all of this right? when you rely on numbers, they can be easily manipulated for whatever reasons and give you a comple

mcnamara will have a list pick this list of targets has been moved up from first and second air division that is running the show. later, second air force base we always hear about seventh air force base that will go through the sink pack, shark, dan in honolulu. it will move up to the pentagon, it will move over to state. it will kind of go back to the jcf. and, that will be in mcnamara's hands. and now they will take this list of, this is what we want to do, this is why we want to do these targets, and now, we will have a discussion among the three of them. and pretty soon, that discussion starts expanding. >> initially, those discussions were missing any type of military advisor pick this is from a laser period of time, with general wheeler, who is actually sitting on it. he has decided later, it is probably from 67, as we get into 68. okay? all right. where are these attacks coming from? it is a combined effort pickett is a joint effort. but it is not really a joint event. we have yankee station, the carrier group, sitting right off the coast of danang, that has usually got three car