the weakness of the afghan national army is one thing. the afghan special forces do have some capacity but i would also look at the chic militias, who's back militias. these guys fought the brutal civil war and they fought the taliban. they are ready to do it again. instead of taliban taking over the entire country what we have condemned afghanistan to is a nasty civil war that makes the present conflict look like a croquet match. we may have to intervene again. we did it in iraq because event in afghanistan have a way of not staying there, and for a country that is relatively insignificant, it's blatant outside role in american kind of foreign policy whether the defeat of the soviet union for the 9/11 attacks. >> when you're going through the documents that were collected in abbottabad, and i want to visit ask you about the rape itself and the development of that rate and abuse government understood the rise of binin laden and ultimately hunt for him. by skipping ahead a, little bit what was the relationship between al-qaeda and the tali

national army, the idea of his being this would put both expertise and authority in the afghan national army training mission that wasn't really there otherwise. in addition to providing an overlap of knowledge between the outgoing and incoming units. but the tension in all of these models is the tension between the help of the army and the importance of succeeding in the war, whatever that may mean. the route, you can tell for the u.s. army the help of the army was always, was going to be a very, very big consideration. you did not want to break the army over the war in afghanistan. >> we have question i think for you both. what are the scalable lessons of the particular ballot is why think the war in afghanistan more broadly but also for america's other counterterrorism war and the broader sort of practice of the portions of the military that are most tasked with these types of wars? >> i'm going to give a very unsatisfying answer to that one. there's a guy named david capps who appears in the book was an officer spent time working up in on the provincial reconstruction team in nurist

to be had in 2018 and 2019 there was a series of fires between the afghan national army but coordinated with the police chief and so on those in kunar at the time who clearly were terrible man saying can you help rthis guy, he's our scout, without acknowledging. why that was possible is the islamic state at the time. i think there was kind of this emergency that the two sides could set aside some differences around and even a couple of years ago they provided security way out for the government. you read that and think okay there may be something there that is possible. but the ingredient there is everybody was united against isis in that moment. and that'ss not an ingredient that exists in the rest of the country. >> congratulations again. i recommend anybody that's read it it is very well researched and addresses the big questions. david, over to you. >> thank you both. we have a bunch of questions already coming in so we will jump right into them. the first question is do you think it is inevitable? over to you. >> that is a hard one. it's tempting to say no that it wasn't inevitable

national army. the idea being that would put expertise and authority into the afghan army training mission that wasn't really there otherwise, in addition to providing an overlap of knowledge between the outgoing and incoming units. >> and in all of these models, potential help of the army and importance of succeeding into war, whatever that may mean and i think throughout, you can tell that for the u.s. army, the help of the army was always a big consideration. the army over the war in afghanistan. >> there's a question, i think for you both, about what the scaleable lessons of the particular valley is for, i think, the war in afghanistan more probably, or also for america's other counterterrorism wars and the broader sort of track of the militaries that are tasked with these types of wars. >> i'm going to give a very unsatisfying answer to that one. there's a guy who appears in the book who is a foreign service officer who has been working up on instruction during the peak period of the war. but h

national army in this would and authority in the afghan national ssarmy training mission. and i think in addition to providing overlap of knowledge for the outgoing and incoming units, between the help of the army and the businesses in the work whatever o the means and throughout, you can say that the army, the help of the army was always a very very good consideration. that over the war in afghanistan. >> we have a question i think for you both, i think that the war in afghanistan more broadly, and also for america's wars and the broader says that the forces of military that are most. >> i'm going to give you an unsatisfying answer that one, in the book, these officers spentoo time looking at on the reconstruction team and during peak period of the work but he also had been. [inaudible]. and the enemy and people who i really leaned w on for their perspective about this and the effects of the u.s. military out of the place. and the military does not have time to deliberate ten deliberate and deliberate of the decisions it makes, needs d to t for from their perspective, i'm

that tended afghan national armies not break the afghan special store forces the militias are ready to fight. they're going to be fighting for their home territory. we see them coming back my wife said he didn't know he was still alive. these guys are seriousf fighters and they spend their entire life doing it. he would say hey i got that he would be reveling in this moment. >> i want to come back to this this is obviously a critical question and is contemporary. i want toic stay focused. what is the future of al qaeda? once you lose it bin laden there a lot who have experience. how do you see that organization being able to function in ten years they are still out there, we still hear from them occasionally they still conduct attacks. do they have a future? does al qaeda have legs without osama binin laden? it's a black hole it would've appealed to someone like yourself and the extent people overestimated how important it was. turns out it had against the united states and 911. he had no real bigotry of attacking the united states i think egypt is number 29 on the list at something th

national army uniforms. plumlee moved toward the attack, armed at first only with a pistol. he withdrew only to advance again and again to stop the attack. >> i, you know, read about medal of honor stories throughout my career. >> reporter: you are one of those stories now. >> yeah and i don't know. i haven't wrapped my head around it. >> reporter: it was an incredible opportunity to speak with master sergeant earl plumlee and the families of the other two honorees. perhaps one of the most impressive parts of plumlee's story he came off deployment for the ceremony and will go back in just a few weeks. because he is special forces when i asked him where are you deploying to he said i can't tell you that. jake? >> where do we get such men and women. thank you so much. >>> coming up, everyone from the white house to one of the world's largest banks warning about what one person described as, quote, the most dangerous weapon in the world. stay with us. # ♪ yes, show a little kindness ♪ ♪ just shine your li

he reformed the army. he promoted afghan national independence day, known as thejeshn. it's hard to imagine now, but then kabul had money in the bank. $100 million. zahir shah decided to place his investment strategically into the south of afghanistan, where the river helmand cuts through an immense desert. dr farouq azam was adviser in the afghan ministry for power and energy. zahir shah hired the best foreign engineers with state—of—the—art equipment from a company called morrison knudsen. everyone called it mk. explosion. and that's how our film—maker, glen foster, came to be there. he was an engineer with morrison knudsen. mk drove roads through the desert and canals through the sand. it built three collossal dams at lightning speed. foster and mehtabuddin went out to film each stage of the project in detail, from the grand opening of the dams to the narrowest canals spreading across the desert. not many americans still remember the old days in helmand, but there are a very few. went to afghanistan in, er... my daughter was about a year old. i went ahead of

in order to do that with the national army, the afghan special forces are competent but relatively small. : : : my wife said i didn't know he was still alive, these guys are serious fighters and they spend their entire life, bin laden of course he was a got what i wanted it took 20 years and i'm speculating that he would be reveling in this moment. >> i want to come back to this because this is obviously a critical question in contemporary but i want to stay focused on al-qaeda a little bit first, what is the future of al-qaeda once you lose bin laden, there are other leaders often that experience and how do you see the organization being able to function, it's been ten years there still out there we hear from them occasionally and they conduct attacks, do they have a future, does al-qaeda have legs without osama bin laden. >> he turned sp terrible leader in the black hole of charisma and one of the things in the book which appealed to their self and some detail is the extent and i include myself in this people overestimated how important he was with his organization, turns out he had no