WEBVTT 00:00:00.510 --> 00:00:04.110 Andrew Howell: Good morning, everyone. Thank you all very much for being here today. It's great 00:00:04.110 --> 00:00:08.640 to see so many people live in person. I think this is the first time I've seen this large of a 00:00:08.640 --> 00:00:16.230 group. in about two and a half years, you see this large of group more regularly. But, welcome 00:00:16.260 --> 00:00:20.250 everybody who's here in person, and welcome to everybody who's watching online. Great to have 00:00:20.250 --> 00:00:25.080 you all with us here today, and thanks to the State of the Net team for giving me this 00:00:25.080 --> 00:00:29.370 opportunity to be here this morning with all of you, and for this Fireside Chat with 00:00:29.370 --> 00:00:30.690 Representative Michael McCaul. 00:00:31.680 --> 00:00:35.760 Congressman McCaul, who's the Chair of the Congressional Internet Caucus is very familiar 00:00:35.760 --> 00:00:40.980 to all of you in tech policy circles. Since he came to Congress, he's been working on these 00:00:40.980 --> 00:00:47.160 issues very, very actively from Internet policy to cybersecurity policy. He is a force to be 00:00:47.160 --> 00:00:52.260 reckoned with on a regular basis, representing the 10th Congressional District, which stretches 00:00:52.260 --> 00:00:58.350 from Austin to the Houston suburbs. At the start of the 116th Congress, Congressman McCaul became 00:00:58.350 --> 00:01:02.520 the Republican Leader of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, after leading the House 00:01:02.520 --> 00:01:06.450 Homeland Security Committee. That's where we got to know each other. We do a lot of homeland 00:01:06.450 --> 00:01:11.460 security work at my firm and, and him being such a leading voice on cyber is kind of a natural 00:01:11.460 --> 00:01:12.270 affinity for us. 00:01:12.960 --> 00:01:18.300 In his capacity as the committee's Republican leader, Representative McCaul demonstrates an 00:01:18.300 --> 00:01:22.980 unwavering commitment to international engagement with our allies, countering the 00:01:22.980 --> 00:01:28.530 aggressive policies of our adversaries, and advancing stability and democracy around the 00:01:28.530 --> 00:01:28.860 world. 00:01:28.860 --> 00:01:30.030 Michael McCaul: I'm doing a great job... 00:01:30.000 --> 00:01:34.533 Andrew Howell: Doing a great job of it today. (laughter) It's a super exciting time. So very 00:01:34.591 --> 00:01:39.831 timely to have him here with us today on all those issues. Additionally, all of us in the 00:01:39.890 --> 00:01:45.188 tech community know him for his leadership as co-founder and co-chair of the Congressional 00:01:45.247 --> 00:01:50.898 High Tech Caucus, and the Cybersecurity Caucus, both of which provide him the ability to enhance 00:01:50.957 --> 00:01:56.373 Texas's role as a global leader on technology. So, let's get right into it. I have questions 00:01:56.432 --> 00:01:58.140 for you, we'll go from there. 00:01:58.320 --> 00:02:02.100 So Congressman McCaul, you've been around technology issues, particularly cybersecurity, 00:02:02.100 --> 00:02:05.880 throughout your tenure in Congress, and you're clearly a thought leader in this space. One of 00:02:05.880 --> 00:02:10.650 the issues you've consistently talked about is the need to adopt international cybersecurity 00:02:10.650 --> 00:02:14.880 norms that would govern behavior by nations around the world. Can you talk a little bit 00:02:14.880 --> 00:02:18.630 about why you think this is such an important issue, and how you're working with your 00:02:18.630 --> 00:02:23.010 colleagues in Congress and folks in the Biden administration to advance global cyber norms? 00:02:23.400 --> 00:02:27.180 Michael McCaul: Yeah, thanks, Andrew, and thanks, everybody, for having me. It's great to 00:02:27.180 --> 00:02:27.660 be here. 00:02:28.770 --> 00:02:36.180 If I could just maybe step back in why I think this is the last piece of the puzzle. About 15 00:02:36.960 --> 00:02:41.520 or so years ago, we looked at the federal government, we thought, okay, who's gonna have 00:02:41.520 --> 00:02:45.990 what role? Who's going to defend the nation? Who's going to be offensive? Who's going to 00:02:45.990 --> 00:02:54.540 share information with the private sector? And there were debates. You had the DIB, you know 00:02:54.540 --> 00:03:02.820 the industrial base pilot program at NSA. And there were some thinking that maybe NSA was the 00:03:02.820 --> 00:03:10.020 perfect place to warehouse the intersection with the private sector to share threat information, 00:03:10.110 --> 00:03:16.050 and to the civilian side, and the private sector. And then a guy named Snowden came 00:03:16.050 --> 00:03:22.260 around, kind of messed that idea a little bit. We really thought the Department of Homeland 00:03:22.260 --> 00:03:28.590 Security seemed to be the best place, because it was a civilian agency, to interface with the 00:03:28.590 --> 00:03:36.390 private sector, share threat information, and protect the systems. The problem wasn't at that 00:03:36.390 --> 00:03:43.140 time, it was not -- the capability was the issue. And, I know we'll get into CISA later, 00:03:43.140 --> 00:03:51.150 but to stand up CISA authorized into law, and see where it's come since back in the day when 00:03:51.150 --> 00:03:58.350 it wasn't as capable, I think you would agree, but I think now it's at a much better place. So 00:03:58.350 --> 00:04:05.340 offensive, obviously, Department of Defense, NSA, stands up domestically in a time of war, 00:04:06.390 --> 00:04:12.780 have great offensive capability, defense has always been the challenge, the struggle, but the 00:04:12.780 --> 00:04:16.710 missing piece that we have yet to really tackle. 00:04:17.380 --> 00:04:23.590 And I have my Cyber Diplomacy act within the State Department, and State is actually standing 00:04:23.590 --> 00:04:29.260 this up as my bill languishes in the Senate, which, unfortunately that happens a lot in 00:04:29.260 --> 00:04:34.090 Congress, everything languishes in the Senate, and they don't really do a whole lot. So, it's 00:04:34.090 --> 00:04:41.080 sitting over there. But, this is where we really have, and I think what's happening right now 00:04:41.740 --> 00:04:46.600 demonstrates a need for this, international norms and standards. 00:04:48.370 --> 00:04:56.530 I co-chaired the CSIS report back in the day, and it was, at that time, the most downloaded 00:04:56.530 --> 00:05:04.960 report, but there's our definition cyber warfare, no norms, standards, we could be 00:05:05.680 --> 00:05:13.900 working with our allies on this piece. And I just throw out as a question to the audience, as 00:05:13.900 --> 00:05:19.900 we look at the current conflict, and we know Russia has great cyber capabilities offensively, 00:05:20.410 --> 00:05:26.860 and they've been attacking, particularly the Baltics. Estonia gets, you know, and I've been 00:05:26.860 --> 00:05:35.140 there many times. As we look at what's happening right now with NATO and Article 5, if tanks 00:05:35.140 --> 00:05:42.580 rolled into Poland, or into Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, we would certainly throw the red flag 00:05:42.580 --> 00:05:51.370 down and say that's a violation of Article 5, and therefore triggers a NATO full retaliation, 00:05:51.910 --> 00:05:58.330 attack against one, attack against all. And then we would be in a world war three, which we're 00:05:58.330 --> 00:05:59.560 trying to avoid. 00:06:01.820 --> 00:06:08.210 He talks about his nuclear weapons, right? Clearly. But if you get into the cyber element, 00:06:09.020 --> 00:06:17.840 what if today he had a very destructive attack, not just in Ukraine, but in a NATO country? What 00:06:17.840 --> 00:06:24.350 is the proportionate response? Does that trigger Article 5? It raises all sorts of issues that 00:06:24.350 --> 00:06:31.970 we, to this day, are still ill prepared for. And so I guess, to your - - this long winded answer 00:06:31.970 --> 00:06:37.550 -- but that's why this last piece, which we still haven't finished yet -- it's kind of 00:06:37.550 --> 00:06:42.620 exciting, we did the other stuff -- but this is really the last piece of the puzzle that we're 00:06:42.620 --> 00:06:48.350 trying to put together as it impacts international norms and standards. Private 00:06:48.350 --> 00:06:52.220 sector cannot hack back, that's illegal, although I talked to a lot of companies that 00:06:52.220 --> 00:06:56.840 would love to do that. That is a role -- we don't want to Wild West, everybody's shooting 00:06:56.840 --> 00:07:04.970 their guns off, so we need rules of the road, but we need to know what is a proportionate 00:07:04.970 --> 00:07:13.250 response back. Once you do the attribution, and you know where it's coming from, then I would 00:07:13.250 --> 00:07:19.790 say we've crossed -- had too many red lines, the ransomware attack on colonial, you know, and 00:07:19.790 --> 00:07:25.250 then we put some red lines up, and they get crossed again. It's just like the father of 00:07:25.250 --> 00:07:30.710 five, if you don't have consequences of bad behavior, guess what? Bad behavior continues, 00:07:30.740 --> 00:07:39.260 it's a very simple concept. We don't have that. And they hit with impunity. Russia, China, Iran, 00:07:39.260 --> 00:07:45.740 North Korea, and I would argue that our response to this day has not been adequate, and the 00:07:45.740 --> 00:07:52.790 consequences have not had certainty to stop the bad behavior. So, therefore, the bad behavior 00:07:52.790 --> 00:07:57.800 continues, and that's precisely, Andrew, where we find ourselves today. 00:07:58.440 --> 00:08:06.480 Andrew Howell: As you look across your time here in Congress, and the time where you came here 00:08:06.480 --> 00:08:11.520 and the time we are now, your tenure here coincides with tremendous advancements in 00:08:11.520 --> 00:08:19.170 technology. A lot of that is kind of what you're reflecting on now. It's like we've had new and 00:08:19.170 --> 00:08:27.090 different things, kinetic versus cyber, or combinations of kinetic and cyber. And we also 00:08:27.090 --> 00:08:31.950 have kind of evolutions in technology. When you first came here, we lived largely in an on 00:08:31.950 --> 00:08:37.920 premises software world, now we live in a cloud first world, and companies are transitioning to 00:08:37.950 --> 00:08:48.690 cloud applications. How do you see that policy evolving as well to one where our cybersecurity 00:08:48.690 --> 00:08:54.630 policy is keeping up with the transition to the cloud? Are our cybersecurity policies still 00:08:54.630 --> 00:08:59.100 based more on a kind of on premise software world? How do you think about this, and look 00:08:59.100 --> 00:09:01.950 across your time here in Congress? 00:09:02.410 --> 00:09:08.950 Michael McCaul: It's just like when the Internet came out, really a lot of people didn't 00:09:08.950 --> 00:09:17.050 understand it. Technology's neutral, but it can be used by good, or for good or bad purposes. 00:09:17.560 --> 00:09:27.580 And the cloud has a very good security feature to it. We are worried, the EU has a law, it's 00:09:27.580 --> 00:09:34.150 very parochial, that would stop our -- basically it's punitive to our companies, while at the 00:09:34.150 --> 00:09:39.670 same time very friendly to China and Russia. So, we sent a letter to the President, bipartisan, 00:09:40.540 --> 00:09:46.120 that we need to address this legislation that the EU is looking at. I think, given the current 00:09:46.120 --> 00:09:51.520 events, they are going to walk back that legislation. Least I would hope so. 00:09:52.230 --> 00:09:59.820 But the cloud is here, it's now, just like crypto currency. I know we were going to talk a 00:09:59.820 --> 00:10:06.930 little bit about that. I was on a panel with the Treasury Secretary Mnuchin at the Milken 00:10:06.930 --> 00:10:12.660 Institute, I know just about enough to be dangerous on cryptocurrency. Milk is like the 00:10:12.660 --> 00:10:18.840 wizard expert. But, one thing is clear, and it's the same thing, like crypto can be used for good 00:10:18.840 --> 00:10:28.260 or bad purposes. Blockchain is really the stability. But imagine right now, if Russia had 00:10:28.260 --> 00:10:37.890 its own digital currency, would these sanctions have any impact? No. China, in the future, China 00:10:37.890 --> 00:10:48.150 is working on its own digital yuan. And Iran, another good example. But I think the Russian 00:10:48.150 --> 00:10:54.570 example is the most pertinent, if they had their own digital currency, talking about SWIFT -- it 00:10:54.570 --> 00:11:02.430 really makes SWIFT outdated. But yeah, it's gonna happen just like the Internet happened. 00:11:02.430 --> 00:11:08.460 And we got to be prepared for this, and what are the ramifications of digital currency, and what 00:11:08.460 --> 00:11:14.280 would be the ramifications of countries having their own digital currency, because I think that 00:11:14.280 --> 00:11:19.650 is going to be the wave of the future. I argue, and Mnuchin, as well, that the United States has 00:11:19.650 --> 00:11:28.050 to lead. We need to set the rules of the road on this, and we need to start working on our own 00:11:28.080 --> 00:11:29.790 digital currency. 00:11:29.870 --> 00:11:38.540 Everyone's saying how much the pandemic sped along the transition to cloud technologies, and 00:11:38.540 --> 00:11:43.640 the new technologies so that people could work remotely. As you look at what's happening right 00:11:43.640 --> 00:11:49.820 now, in terms of Russia and Ukraine, and European reaction and the United States 00:11:49.820 --> 00:11:56.600 reaction, you could see a world in which countries who see themselves as adversaries to 00:11:56.600 --> 00:12:02.030 Western countries, look at things like SWIFT and cutting off other financial tools, and say, 00:12:02.030 --> 00:12:07.700 Okay, what do we need to start doing now to modernize our systems, our technologies, in 00:12:07.700 --> 00:12:14.870 order to take that off the table for Western countries? That is a significant challenge, 00:12:15.020 --> 00:12:21.950 because it does take a long held traditional tool for the United States and western 00:12:21.950 --> 00:12:26.570 governments off the table, and it's going to require, we're going to have to think more 00:12:26.570 --> 00:12:31.820 interestingly, what are the next set of tools that you use if bad actors do things, but 00:12:31.820 --> 00:12:33.020 they've moved to... 00:12:33.710 --> 00:12:41.030 What sanctions would be effective with digital currency, because it's basically a movement away 00:12:41.030 --> 00:12:48.440 from central banks and financial institutions to more digital? Of course all the sanctions right 00:12:48.440 --> 00:12:56.900 now are on the banks, oligarchs, Putin himself, and we have some export controls, which I think 00:12:56.900 --> 00:12:57.950 we're going to talk about in a minute. 00:12:58.140 --> 00:13:05.880 Andrew Howell: Yeah. Let's talk a little bit about this move to the cloud. As more and more 00:13:05.880 --> 00:13:11.490 companies and countries have moved to the cloud, you've seen lots of countries, China, Russia, 00:13:11.520 --> 00:13:18.360 the European Union, push data localization, keep data here, requirements that data be housed 00:13:18.360 --> 00:13:23.970 locally, but companies that provide cloud services rely on the free movement of data 00:13:23.970 --> 00:13:31.200 around the world, which is obviously very contrary to that. How do you think about kind of 00:13:31.440 --> 00:13:36.840 what we should do, from a policy perspective, to fight back against this move to data 00:13:36.840 --> 00:13:41.010 localization? And how does this impact cybersecurity, knowing that obviously the free 00:13:41.010 --> 00:13:47.790 flow of information in a cybersecurity world requires data to move too, and that's the only 00:13:47.790 --> 00:13:53.040 way you know what's happening from a signals perspective, and you can detect things? How do 00:13:53.040 --> 00:13:57.090 you see the data localization impacting cybersecurity? 00:13:57.720 --> 00:14:01.710 Michael McCaul: Well, I think the cloud can provide actually more security, if it's done 00:14:01.710 --> 00:14:08.790 right. It was designed to share the free flow of information, as you said, but yet we're seeing 00:14:09.210 --> 00:14:16.500 countries, like I mentioned this bill in the EU, that we sent this letter to the president urging 00:14:16.500 --> 00:14:23.910 him to take action, that would localize the cloud to only the EU, and you couldn't have this 00:14:23.910 --> 00:14:28.560 free flow of information, which really kind of defeats the purpose in large part for why the 00:14:28.560 --> 00:14:34.770 cloud was invented in the first place. That's the danger, right? We don't want countries 00:14:35.160 --> 00:14:40.920 starting having their own cloud that has no interconnectivity to the international world. 00:14:41.920 --> 00:14:48.190 Andrew Howell: I'm going to shift gears a little bit to an issue that has been top of mind for a 00:14:48.190 --> 00:14:55.120 lot of folks until, I guess, the last few days, semiconductors. You've been an outspoken voice 00:14:55.120 --> 00:15:01.480 on the need to do more from a US government perspective to enhance our ability to 00:15:01.630 --> 00:15:08.020 manufacture, design, and produce semiconductor chips here. Obviously your congressional 00:15:08.020 --> 00:15:14.890 district is one that houses lots of technology companies. As you look at the semiconductor 00:15:14.920 --> 00:15:20.950 environment, and what's happening congressionally, how do you see this issue 00:15:20.950 --> 00:15:27.190 resolving itself? How do you how do you see the House and the Senate coming together to resolve 00:15:27.190 --> 00:15:34.480 differences in their bills around funding for semiconductors? And how are how are constituents 00:15:34.480 --> 00:15:38.710 of yours, companies in your district, talking to you about the need for the United States to lead 00:15:38.710 --> 00:16:57.010 in the semiconductor space? 00:15:40.080 --> 00:15:46.830 Michael McCaul: Before COVID, if you said supply chain, nobody would know what you're talking 00:15:46.918 --> 00:15:54.897 about, nor would they care, until they held up their medical. They corner 85% of rare earth 00:15:54.984 --> 00:16:03.050 minerals that they get through Belt and Road, and when I say they, I'm talking about China, 00:16:03.138 --> 00:16:11.117 out of Africa, Latin America. But then the semiconductor piece, to me, is the most critical 00:16:11.204 --> 00:16:19.095 right now. 90% of the advanced semiconductor chips are manufactured in Taiwan. I talked to 00:16:19.183 --> 00:16:27.161 the then Secretary Pompeo, and Wilbur Ross, and then the National Security Adviser O'Brien, 00:16:27.249 --> 00:16:34.350 about how can we protect -- how can we manufacture more of this here, or with our 00:16:34.438 --> 00:16:42.504 allied countries? We have to get it away from communist China where it's vulnerable, because 00:16:42.592 --> 00:16:50.132 we know that the Chinese are trying to infiltrate in Taiwan, and infiltrate TSMC. That 00:16:50.220 --> 00:16:58.286 is what led to the expansion, if you will -- TSMC in Arizona, was based on that premise, but 00:16:58.373 --> 00:17:02.670 we had to provide incentives for them to do this. 00:17:02.660 --> 00:17:09.388 So, we took that idea, and I introduced the Chips for America Act. Senator Cornyn introduced 00:17:09.461 --> 00:17:15.751 the companion Doris Matsui, my Democrat colleague. I found after nine terms, if you're 00:17:15.824 --> 00:17:22.918 not willing to work across the aisle, you're not going to get anything done, because legislation, 00:17:22.991 --> 00:17:29.792 that's just the way it works. And then, we've garnered a lot of bipartisan support, everybody 00:17:29.865 --> 00:17:36.667 from Schumer to McCarthy and Pelosi. Everyone likes the idea of, Well, hey, if we incentivize 00:17:36.740 --> 00:17:42.591 manufacturers to relocate into the United States, that not only creates jobs and 00:17:42.664 --> 00:17:49.319 opportunities and investment in the United States, but it's also a national security piece. 00:17:49.392 --> 00:17:56.267 Chips are in everything, as you all know, from your phone to our most advanced weapon systems, 00:17:56.340 --> 00:18:02.995 and if they're compromised, and we know there are foreign adversaries who would like to, or 00:18:03.068 --> 00:18:09.797 stolen, then we have a real problem. Since that, we got this bill authorized on the National 00:18:09.870 --> 00:18:17.330 Defense Authorization bill, and since that time, you've seen enormous investment in the United States. 00:18:17.660 --> 00:18:25.790 Now, we're not finished yet, but Samsung in my district expanded $17 billion, Intel $20 00:18:25.820 --> 00:18:34.850 billion, Micron's looking at $100-$250 billion investment here in the United States. There 00:18:34.970 --> 00:18:40.970 aren't very many of these companies, but where they are they're looking at -- but they're 00:18:41.030 --> 00:18:46.010 CEOs, they have shareholders, they need certainty that this idea is gonna actually work. 00:18:48.110 --> 00:18:53.930 I could maybe talk too long on this, but I got a call from the Secretary of Commerce saying, Hey, 00:18:53.930 --> 00:19:01.910 I really like your chips bill, can we just pass that thing on its own, a clean bill? I said, 00:19:01.910 --> 00:19:08.570 that would be great. It'd be great for the country in America, not just Republicans, great 00:19:08.570 --> 00:19:15.680 for the administration to get a victory. Then, like Congress does best, we screwed it up. They 00:19:15.680 --> 00:19:23.030 put all this other poison pill stuff in, like 8 billion to UN Climate Fund, that could go to 00:19:23.030 --> 00:19:27.770 China where they manufacture batteries and solar panels in the Xinjiang province, where they 00:19:27.770 --> 00:19:32.660 commit genocide. So, didn't seem like that was very good policy to me to muck up the chips 00:19:32.660 --> 00:19:34.760 bill with all this other stuff. 00:19:35.240 --> 00:19:40.370 So, here's where we are now. We're doing what's called a Conference Committee. We haven't done 00:19:40.370 --> 00:19:41.150 one of these in a while. 00:19:42.380 --> 00:19:42.410 Andrew Howell: (Laughs) 00:19:44.660 --> 00:19:45.980 Michael McCaul: You must have worked on the hill. 00:19:48.750 --> 00:19:54.167 Michael McCaul: Tthe Senate actually -- I don't normally applaud the Senate -- they did a pretty 00:19:49.760 --> 00:19:50.030 Andrew Howell: (Laughs more) 00:19:54.234 --> 00:20:00.532 good job. They passed my chips bill, and then what's called the Endless Frontiers, which is a 00:20:00.599 --> 00:20:06.964 heavy investment in research and development, and everything from National Science Foundation, 00:20:07.032 --> 00:20:13.329 to DARPA. If we're gonna compete with China, that's putting a trillion dollars in its digital 00:20:13.397 --> 00:20:18.814 economy, it's everything from AI to 5G to quantum, you name it, they just shut a 00:20:18.882 --> 00:20:25.111 hypersonic off that we didn't think they had, but they do, circled the world and landed with 00:20:25.179 --> 00:20:31.680 precision with a nuclear payload. We don't have that, and we can't stop it because it maneuvers. 00:20:31.690 --> 00:20:39.370 So, we're behind. We have to compete is the point, and that's the point of this bill. My 00:20:39.370 --> 00:20:44.650 bill on the semiconductor manufacturing side, and then a heavy investment in research and 00:20:44.650 --> 00:20:54.520 development to catch up -- not catch up, but just compete primarily, globally, with the great 00:20:54.520 --> 00:20:59.770 competition of our generation, that is against Communist China. Long term they are the greatest 00:20:59.770 --> 00:21:04.270 national security threat to the United States. So, that's why this bill is so important. I'll 00:21:04.270 --> 00:21:11.290 be on a conference committee, and we're going to try to strip all this stuff, poison pills, out 00:21:12.460 --> 00:21:17.350 from the House side, merge it with the Senate, and then it goes House, Senate, to the 00:21:17.350 --> 00:21:23.110 President. The White House likes it -- I mean, I was in the Oval Office with President Biden, and 00:21:23.110 --> 00:21:28.480 there were eight of us, half of us tech, half auto manufacturer members, and he said, This is 00:21:28.480 --> 00:21:35.350 great. I wish every meeting I have is like this, because everyone supports it. That's why I'm 00:21:35.350 --> 00:21:41.380 optimistic it will get over the finish line, because there is so much support for it, from 00:21:41.380 --> 00:21:50.410 Schumer to the President, from Pelosi to McCarthy. When we do, you're already seeing the 00:21:50.410 --> 00:21:57.130 investment, but you're gonna see an explosion of investment. We also have a multinational piece 00:21:57.130 --> 00:22:03.220 to it for our allies, as well. I don't care, as long as we're manufacturing this in places where 00:22:03.460 --> 00:22:09.550 it's not vulnerable to the IP theft being stolen, which they know how to do very well. 00:22:10.180 --> 00:22:14.740 I think the multinational piece of that has garnered great attention, particularly in 00:22:14.740 --> 00:22:19.180 Europe. It's something that something that the United States wants to do in collaboration with 00:22:19.180 --> 00:22:23.950 allied countries, and makes good sense and is something that we should push forward. 00:22:24.320 --> 00:22:31.460 Since the introduction of our bill, we're seeing European countries introducing the same thing. 00:22:31.460 --> 00:22:39.290 So, in a way, it's a global competition all way around, but if it's with our allies, that's 00:22:39.290 --> 00:22:40.010 where it needs to be. 00:22:40.700 --> 00:22:45.260 Let's stay on this China theme for a minute, because you've been spending a lot of time for 00:22:45.260 --> 00:22:51.260 the last year, year and a half, as part of the China task force, that you've got with a bunch 00:22:51.260 --> 00:22:58.910 of your colleagues in the House, looking at these issues of US technological superiority, US 00:22:58.910 --> 00:23:06.290 technological challenges, vis-a-vis China, US industrial policy vis-a-vis China. How do you 00:23:06.290 --> 00:23:15.200 see this kind of great power competition shaping up with the US and China? What should Congress's 00:23:15.200 --> 00:23:22.190 role be in order to advance policies that help the United States stay on, or maintain, or get a 00:23:22.190 --> 00:23:26.390 better footing, when it comes to competing with China and other countries like that? 00:23:26.840 --> 00:23:34.430 Yeah, great question. I chaired this China task force, we came out with, over 400 00:23:34.430 --> 00:23:42.740 recommendations, mostly bipartisan, many of which have passed, but the chips for America was 00:23:42.740 --> 00:23:53.720 the number one recommendation. There's a panoply of issues, but the overarching goal is to be 00:23:53.720 --> 00:24:00.170 more competitive, because we're not. We're not in Africa, we're losing in South America, 00:24:00.680 --> 00:24:06.680 Indo-Pacific, we need economic alliances, with trade. 00:24:08.580 --> 00:24:16.560 When it comes to competing with China, they invest huge amounts of capital in research and 00:24:16.560 --> 00:24:23.190 development. This is why, I think, this bill that I was talking about, it's imperative that 00:24:23.190 --> 00:24:27.480 we pass it to be more competitive, or they're going to start going ahead, just like with the 00:24:27.480 --> 00:24:34.710 hypersonic weapon, that now we're trying to catch up to them. Huawei, they're installing 00:24:34.710 --> 00:24:44.070 that all over. The Belt and Road initiative is brilliant. They are very clever. Under the UN, 00:24:44.070 --> 00:24:49.200 they're a developing nation, so what does that mean? They qualify for almost interest free 00:24:49.200 --> 00:24:54.330 loans from the World Bank, that they can then turn around and loan to truly developing 00:24:54.330 --> 00:25:01.350 nations, at a usurious interest rate, get them into a debt trap, take the rare earth minerals, 00:25:01.350 --> 00:25:09.450 put their own workers and, and then, Hey, we want that port, or that military base. This is 00:25:09.450 --> 00:25:18.510 happening throughout the Indo-Pacific, Africa, Latin America. We're finally waking up, and I 00:25:18.510 --> 00:25:21.420 think COVID, we woke up to some extent. 00:25:22.470 --> 00:25:28.920 Not to digress, I'll make this really fast. In 1997, I was federal prosecutor here, and I 00:25:28.920 --> 00:25:35.910 prosecuted this guy, Johnny Chang. He led us to the director of Chinese intelligence, China 00:25:35.910 --> 00:25:40.890 aerospace, putting money in his Hong Kong bank account to put in the Presidential election, and 00:25:40.890 --> 00:25:48.900 why? Two things, they wanted the dual use technology, and the satellites, and they wanted 00:25:48.900 --> 00:25:58.980 to get in the WTO. They got both of those. Since that time, they have progressed tremendously in 00:25:58.980 --> 00:26:04.050 that space. They're in space, by the way, that's why we created the Space Force. 00:26:06.970 --> 00:26:13.930 Their technology capabilities, and this will get to the heart of your question, we gave them a 00:26:13.930 --> 00:26:19.150 lot back in the day, and we tried to bring them in the family of nations. I talked to Secretary 00:26:19.150 --> 00:26:26.800 Baker, he goes: We tried, we wanted them to be more of a democracy, and capitalism, and bring 00:26:26.800 --> 00:26:33.880 them in the family of nations, and, you know, he said, it just didn't work. We gave them a lot -- 00:26:33.910 --> 00:26:38.950 what we didn't give them, they stole. There's a reason why the Houston consulate was shut down, 00:26:38.950 --> 00:26:44.890 because they were stealing all this IP from our universities, our Texas Medical Center, NASA. 00:26:45.800 --> 00:26:54.080 And then, I would say, what they haven't stolen, we sell to them. If you look at the hypersonic, 00:26:54.080 --> 00:27:00.200 a lot of that's built on the backbone of American technology. This gets me into what we 00:27:00.200 --> 00:27:05.450 call the Export Control Act, which is under foreign affairs jurisdiction. In fact, we're 00:27:05.450 --> 00:27:12.680 doing some of these sanctions against Russia, right now, on semiconductors. There are these 00:27:12.770 --> 00:27:18.590 entities, Department of Commerce has one, Department of Defense has one, but they're not 00:27:18.590 --> 00:27:28.820 the same. DoD is is more security, Commerce is more industry. So you look at this Bureau of 00:27:28.820 --> 00:27:34.040 Industry and Security within Commerce, we got this information, and I was able to make it 00:27:34.040 --> 00:27:40.640 public, that just in the last year alone, only 1% of the export licenses were denied, and that 00:27:40.640 --> 00:27:48.710 $60 billion was going into China from the United States to invest in Huawei, $40 billion into 00:27:48.710 --> 00:27:53.720 China to invest in SMIC, which is their semiconductor company. 00:27:55.790 --> 00:28:02.360 Why are we doing this? We want to marry the list. These are entities that would go straight 00:28:02.360 --> 00:28:11.990 to the PLA, straight into their military apparatus. Not sort of civil military fusion, 00:28:11.990 --> 00:28:18.710 but these are companies that if you invest in there, and you're investing in China's military 00:28:18.710 --> 00:28:25.790 program, that's going to turn right back at us. We have to, in my judgment, and this is not 00:28:25.790 --> 00:28:32.750 gonna be an easy thing to do, navigating through all this, but we have to stop exporting this 00:28:32.750 --> 00:28:38.660 technology to our adversary that uses it to build its war machine that they're turning 00:28:38.780 --> 00:28:44.780 against us. You don't think President Xi is looking at Taiwan right now, with Putin, and 00:28:44.780 --> 00:28:50.480 what he's doing in Ukraine. I'm worried that the next year is going to be Xi, because he's always 00:28:50.480 --> 00:28:58.010 wanted Taiwan, he sees weakness. If he goes into Taiwan, and the South China Sea, it's very 00:28:58.010 --> 00:29:04.490 strategic, but what else, as I mentioned before, 90% of our advanced semiconductor chip 00:29:05.150 --> 00:29:10.850 manufacturing. So, this is going tol be really interesting. 00:29:11.450 --> 00:29:17.870 The next Congress, stay tuned, because we're going to get -- hopefully do some big things 00:29:17.870 --> 00:29:23.180 that are going to, at the end of day, protect American companies, and our technology and our 00:29:23.180 --> 00:29:24.410 national security. 00:29:25.260 --> 00:29:31.560 Andrew Howell: Alright, so I'd like to end this session on a little bit of a different note, by 00:29:31.560 --> 00:29:35.910 having you talk about one of your colleagues, a member that you worked a lot with over the 00:29:35.910 --> 00:29:41.760 years, Jim Langevin, who's announced he won't be seeking reelection this fall. You and he have 00:29:41.760 --> 00:29:48.630 worked together on countless cybersecurity issues over the years, you and he had formed a 00:29:48.630 --> 00:29:54.150 great bipartisan duo on a lot of these matters as it relates to DHS, and security issues and 00:29:54.150 --> 00:30:01.920 technology issues. Talk a little bit about kind of your work with him over the years, and what 00:30:01.920 --> 00:30:06.990 you think his departure is going to mean for congressional cybersecurity policy leadership, 00:30:07.410 --> 00:30:14.940 and who maybe you see, as the next generation on the Democratic side where you can team up with 00:30:14.940 --> 00:30:15.540 some folks? 00:30:17.190 --> 00:30:20.970 Michael McCaul: Well, first, you're making me feel kind of old. 00:30:23.220 --> 00:30:23.250 Andrew Howell: (laughs) 00:30:23.570 --> 00:30:30.266 Michael McCaul: I wake up and I'm like, Mike, this is my ninth term and I never thought -- but 00:30:30.351 --> 00:30:38.421 it kind of symbolizes the passing of an era. We wrote that CSIS report 15 years ago, before it 00:30:38.507 --> 00:30:46.662 was cool to be in cyber -- now everybody talks about cyber -- with some really talented people. 00:30:46.748 --> 00:30:54.990 There's something missing today, that is wrong, that I think, hopefully, we'll be able to fix it 00:30:55.075 --> 00:31:03.145 through the American people. It's this intense political division that goes beyond a debate on 00:31:03.231 --> 00:31:11.300 policy, but rather, you're an enemy and you're an evil bad person, if you're on the other side 00:31:11.386 --> 00:31:18.941 of the aisle. It's on both sides, you have extremities on both my side of the aisle, and 00:31:19.027 --> 00:31:27.010 from the left and the right. It hurts the body politic. The way the Founding Fathers set this 00:31:27.096 --> 00:31:35.252 up was, compromise was necessary to get anything done. Today, it's a dirty word. If I went back 00:31:35.338 --> 00:31:43.493 home to my district and said, You know what I'm most proud of was I got ranked by the from from 00:31:43.579 --> 00:31:51.477 as most effective Republican. You know why? Because I'm bipartisan. But, you know what? If I 00:31:51.563 --> 00:31:59.804 went home to my base and told them that, they'd probably throw me on Office. We didn't elect you 00:31:59.890 --> 00:32:07.616 to get along with the Democrats, you need to fight. Okay, we have plenty of fights, but we 00:32:07.702 --> 00:32:15.514 also have to get things done, and the only way to get things done is, Hey, I've got a great 00:32:15.600 --> 00:32:23.669 idea on breach notification, who am I going to go to? I can go to one of my side of the aisle 00:32:23.755 --> 00:32:32.082 but, if I really want it to pass, it's got to be bipartisan, and so I go to Jim. He's a fantastic 00:32:32.168 --> 00:32:39.980 guy, he's not an ideologue, he's very policy driven. He loves cybersecurity, the issue. I'm 00:32:40.066 --> 00:32:44.960 gonna miss him a lot, because I think he's irreplaceable. 00:32:44.000 --> 00:32:50.793 To answer your question, I think there there are a lot of younger members now. They understand 00:32:50.865 --> 00:32:57.659 this stuff a lot better than when I first got elected. But, beyond the issue of cyber, I think 00:32:57.731 --> 00:33:04.236 it's just a damage to the institution. I hope now we can repair some of that damage in the 00:33:04.308 --> 00:33:10.885 years to come and get back to some decency. Chairman Meeks and I don't agree on everything, 00:33:10.957 --> 00:33:17.317 but we're pragmatic. We basically have an understanding, like, Look, you're not going to 00:33:17.390 --> 00:33:23.966 agree with everything I want to do, and vice versa. But it's like where I just came out of, 00:33:24.039 --> 00:33:30.543 Israel. They put 10 parties together in the Knesset, can you imagine that? I said, How did 00:33:30.615 --> 00:33:37.554 you do that? They said, Well, we realize that we agree, actually, on 70% of the issues, it's the 00:33:37.626 --> 00:33:44.420 30% that we fight over, and so they have this bond between all these different parties. We'll 00:33:44.492 --> 00:33:50.780 see how that goes. But that's probably reflective. The Congress would probably agree on 00:33:50.852 --> 00:33:57.501 cyber, that's almost a 100% issue. We probably agree on 70%, it's that 30% that you probably 00:33:57.573 --> 00:34:04.295 see on television or being debated in public. But anyway, the Chairman and I, we can agree to 00:34:04.367 --> 00:34:11.016 disagree, but we can do so with civility. We don't have to be disrespectful of each other. I 00:34:11.088 --> 00:34:17.810 disagree with their views, but I respect that. I think they're misguided, but I respect that. 00:34:17.810 --> 00:34:17.840 Andrew Howell: (Laughs) 00:34:19.100 --> 00:34:24.920 Michael McCaul: I'm not gonna throw a temper tantrum and start yelling, screaming, which I 00:34:24.920 --> 00:34:31.190 think is very amateurish. You see a lot of members do that now, or they go on TV to get 00:34:31.190 --> 00:34:38.630 attention. Social media has changed politics forever. They'll go on YouTube and rant and 00:34:38.630 --> 00:34:43.280 rave, and, you know what, they get a lot of clicks, and they raise a lot of money off it, 00:34:43.850 --> 00:34:49.610 but they don't give a darn about getting anything done in the Congress. I don't care. I 00:34:49.610 --> 00:34:57.710 didn't get a like to go on social media, or YouTube, and rant and rave, I like to get things 00:34:57.710 --> 00:35:03.170 done, and I hope we start to get some of that back. 00:35:03.860 --> 00:35:06.980 Andrew Howell: Well, that's a great way to great way to end this session. Thank you very much for 00:35:06.980 --> 00:35:11.510 doing it. I've asked everyone to please join me in thanking the congressman for being here 00:35:11.510 --> 00:35:13.280 today. Thank you, sir for doing it, appreciate it.