THE CONTAINMENT OF IDEAS

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH EDITOR
ROBERT LASCH'S PULITZER PRIZE
EDITORIALS

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, one
of the most respected editorial paces in
the Nation is edited by Mr. Robert Lasch
• of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Mr.
Lasch has recently won the Pulitzer Prize
for distinguished editorial writing. His
profound editorials on U.S. foreign pol-
icy and' especially the Vietnam crisis
have attracted nationwide attention.
The Pulitzer Prize judges cited' three
editorials in particular by Mr. Lasch
which appeared in the Post-Dispatch on
January 17, 1965, November 26. 1965, and
December 19. 1965. The first two edi-
torials dealt with the U.S. involvement
in Vietnam and the third one centered
on United States-China relations.

I ask unanimous consent that these
three editorials be printed at this point
in the Record.

Z ' There being no objection, the editorials
were ordered to be printed in the Record,
as follows:

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch,
May 9, 1966)

The Containment or Ideas

(Note. — T he three leading editorials on tills
page were cited by the Advisory Board on the
Pulitzer Prizes, Columbia University, In
awarding the Pulitzer Prize for distinguished
editorial writing in 1966 to Robert Lasch,
Editor of the Editorial Page of the Post-
Dispatch.)

In the meantime, however, American policy
increasingly liaa tended to confute the con-
talmr.cutof Russian (and later Chinese) na-
tion!! power with the containment of Com-
munism. We undertook to apply the mctlv
out. appropriate to a national power struggle—
flic methods of diplomatic maneuver, armed
confrontation and in some cates war itself—
In a realm where they are totally ineffective
Communism as an idea cannot be contained
by such methods, but only by a better Idea.

It is not the American function to combat
revolution everywhere — to stand as the uni-
versal, all-embracing guardian of the status
quo. Tills is an odd role, by the way, to be
thrust upon a nation that was Itself born of
revolution less than two ccntures ago. More
Important, it is a role that lies beyond the
capabilities of any nation. Change Is the law
of life. Social change will sometimes take
revolutionary forms in some countries, no
.matter what the United States or any other
nation thinks about it. A wise foreign policy
begins with recognition of this fact.

American foreign policy Is in deep trouble
in Africa, in Asia, in Latin America precisely
because wo have let ourselves be pushed into
a counter-revolutionary posture. Wherever,
oppressed masse? struggle toward a better
llfo millions of persons look upon the United
States as their natural enemy, which means
: that they inevitably look elsewhero for
friends.

Ours is not a revolutionary society, and
we should not try to behave as if it were.
But we can behave like a mature nation

Coming events in South Viet Nam promise
for many Americans a profound psychological
shock, which a foreslghted Administration
would be preparing to offset. When the day
comes for American forces to leave Viet Nam
after 10 years of vain effort to build an anti-
communist bastion there, not only will our
national pride be hurt, but some basic as-
sumptions of our postwar foreign policy will
be called Into question. As fresh thinking is
always more painful than mouthing shibbo-
leths, this Is going to cause a certain degree
of anguish.

Unpleasant os it may be, the time for re-
appraisal has come, and thoughtful Ameri-
cans should resolve to be realistic about it.
The first step is to cast off the illusion of
omnipotence, under the spell of which many
of us have for years assumed that our mis-
sion In the world is to contain, roll back,
destroy or otherwise combat Communism.

After World Wax II, the Soviet Union
sought to expand Its national power wherever
possible. The United States, as the leader of
the free world, was thoroughly Justified in u n - H
dertaking to contain that thrust, and it was
contained. Only where the Red Army stood
on land taken from the Nazis— which is to
cay, only In Eastern Europe — were the Rus-
sians able to impose their national will on
other peoples; and the passage of time has
indicated that even thcro, subjugation is
most likely temporary, National identities
havo survived and are persistently asserting
themselves. There could be no better evi-
dence that the Communists are not going to
rule the world, and neither are we. Aspira-
tions for Independence, self-respect And self-
government are too universal and too power-
ful to be subdued by any ideology.

which knows that it has no right and no’
power to riocldo for the people of Cuba, Viet
Kara or central Africa what form of revolu-
tion they should have. We can behave like a
nation which is prepared to accept change,
even in forms unpalatable to It, and Is ready
to work with peoples of any political faith
for a peaceful world of diversity.

It Is often said that we must hang on In
Viet Nam, even to the point of an escalated
war, because the effects of defeat there would
be so damaging elsewhero In Asia and Africa.

Unfortunately it is true that if wo got'
thrown out of Viet Nam, millions of pooplo
would be delighted. That is ouc reason why
our Government would be wise to cncourago
a political settlement through negotiation
before we are thrown out — unless It is nl-
read too late. Whatever happens in Saigon,
however, the American cause will not be dam-
aged thereby half so much as it is already
being damaged by the growing conviction
that our power and Influence are dedicated
to the suppression of social revolution and
political change wherever they occur.

We shall improve our position with the
developing nations and the world at largo not
by proving that we can wage endless war In
Viet Nam, but by showing, through actual
conduct, that the CL^ls not enfranchised to.
swagger around UiTworld setting up govern-
ments and knocking them down; that we do
: not undertake to dictate the form and paco
of political chango anywhere; that wo are
prepared to accept revolutions even when wo
do not approve of tbepi: and that wo have
enough faith in the ideas of freedom to en-
trust to them, rather than to arms, tho task
of containing the ideas of Communism ^

January 17 , 1965 . • .

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