DTIC ADA504839: Stabilization and Reconstruction: The Need to Improve Department of State's Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization

United States Marine Corps
School of Advanced Warfighting
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

FUTURE WAR PAPER

TITLE: STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: THE NEED TO
IMPROVE DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S COORDINATOR OF
RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTERS OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

MAJOR MICHAEL E. MCWILLIAMS
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

AY 07-08

Mentor: Dr Gordon Rudd

Approved:_

Date:

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Stabilization and Reconstruction: The Need to Improve Department of
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United States Marine Corps,School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine
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Command, Quantico,VA,22134-5068

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

Table of Contents

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS.2

DISCLAIMER.3

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.4

PREFACE.5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.6

INTRODUCTION.8

CREATION OF S/CRS.10

THE NEED FOR S/CRS.18

PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS WITH S/CRS.19

CONCLUSION.24

ENDNOTES.25

BIBLIOGRAPHY.27

2

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT
THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF
COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO
THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR
ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

3

Illustrations

Page

Figure 1: S/CRS Organizational Chart.12

Figure 2: Civilian Corps Employment Flow.15

Figure 3: Integrated Management System for Policy, Planning, and Operations.14

Table 1: Civilian Corps Composition and Deployment.17

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Preface

My original topic for this future war paper was post-conflict reconstruction. I
gained interest in this topic during USMC Command and Staff College when I was
enrolled in the elective “Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction.” I also had interest
because of the ongoing situation in Iraq and the continuous debate amongst my
classmates about who was responsible for this “post-conflict” part of operations.

Once my first draft was completed, my faculty advisor suggested the topic was
broad and needed to be more focused. We discussed several options for ensuring the
paper would have more focus and substance. After much debate, I chose S/CRS. The
thrust of the research and writing was to first gain and understanding of what S/CRS was
and why it was created. I detennined that this organization was important to the United
States Government, but it faced several challenges. Through further reading, I explored
the challenges facing S/CRS; I certainly did not address every challenge, and provided
some a few recommendations for the improvement of this organization. S/CRS has to
potential to be a huge force multiplier on the future battlefields and the United States
Military and Government should embrace its concept and continue to support to fulfill its
potential.

Writing a future warfare paper on an organization outside the my comfort zone,
United States Military, broadened my understanding and appreciation on why war and
future war in particular, must be a holistic government approach.

I would like to acknowledge and thank Dr. Gordon Rudd for assisting in crafting
this project, guiding me along the way, and reading several drafts and ensuring this
project was up to standard and ready to be defended.

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Executive Summary

Title: Stabilization and Reconstruction: The need to improve Department of State’s
Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization.

Author: Major Michael E. McWilliams, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The concept and utility of S/CRS can be a valuable asset to the United States
Government, but in order for S/CRS to provide the leadership and direction for the
United States Government, it must address and fix a few problem areas.

Discussion:

The creation of S/CRS is of great importance to the United States Military as it
identifies an organization that anticipates being capable of executing reconstruction and
stabilization operations. As an organization that is trying to gain a foothold within the
United States Government S/CRS still has many obstacles to overcome.

S/CRS lacks full United States Government representation. DOS was tasked to
coordinate across all United States Government agencies as Stability and Reconstruction
will require a “total government” effort. If this is the case, S/CRS must be staffed with
representatives from all executive branch departments of the United States Government.
There is still a need to coordinate with each department; however, assigning experienced
staffers from each department will ensure the synchronization and integration required
for Stabilization and Reconstruction planning.

Department of State S/CRS is not fully integrated with Department of Defense.
NSPD-44 directs the DOS to work with DOD in ensuring reconstruction and stabilization
operations are integrated with United States Military plans. To that end, the DOS has
made an effort. However, the DOS needs to take their concept to the next level of
development to ensure full integration. The two departments can no longer operate
independently; they are inextricably linked by the strategy of reconstruction and
stabilization.

S/CRS lacks the ability to provide life support (e.g. shelter, food, water, shower,
and laundry), sustainment, transportation, or communication architecture to support
operations. In its current structure, S/CRS does have an “operations support” section
under the Office of Civilian Readiness and Response however, this office is not similar to
a logistics section in United States Military organization. Currently, if the ACT or FACT
deploy, they rely on United States Military for all of their life support basic needs. If the
United States Military is going to hand over operations during the transition phase to
DOS, which will continue supporting reconstruction and stabilization, they will need this
capability.

DOS does not have adequate programs (courses of instruction), facilities, or
instructors to meet the training demand for reconstruction and stabilization operations.
Nor does DOS have an educational institution to study and discuss historical
reconstruction and stabilization operations. DOS does have training efforts in place to
train personnel for Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT), but is falling short of
meeting the growing demand to train other employees. DOS does not have an
educational institution. The type of institution needed would be a hub of all historical

6

reconstruction and stabilization operations, designed for United States government
employees to study historical reconstruction and stabilization operations as well as work
case studies or planning problems. This institution would allow DOS to create true
reconstruction and stabilization professionals and enhance future operations.

There is a critical funding shortage for non-humanitarian responses to crises. The
current United States Government structure and laws governing funding constrains DOS
ability to respond, deploy, and effectively allocate resources for reconstruction and
stabilization. Current available emergency response funding accounts cover
humanitarian and disaster assistance. Other accounts that can be used for governance,
rule of law, or security assistance have not been sufficiently funded to meet anticipated
requirements. Reprogramming existing resources requires tradeoffs and negotiations
within or between the Executive and Legislative branches, which takes too long for rapid
response. An emergency response fund managed by DOS will allow for rapid and
funded response.

Conclusion: The S/CRS is the key link to a holistic government approach to stabilization
and reconstruction. As S/CRS reaches its fourth anniversary it seems that the momentum
generated from NSPD-44 has started to slow. This is evident from the issues discussed in
this paper. These issues and the success of S/CRS are extremely important to DOD and
the United States Military. The success not only will ensure reconstruction and
stabilization operations are “harmonized and synchronized” but will decrease, the use of
United States Military forces conducting these types of operations. During both the
engagement or pre-conflict phase (not addressed in this paper) or in the post-conflict
phases. If S/CRS fails, these operations and the United States commitment will not
disappear but fall on the shoulders of the United States Military as it has in the past.

With the current and anticipated future unrest around the world and the United States
Government’s commitment to support failed or failing states this will likely mean an
increase in the operations tempo on an already strained force.

7

Introduction

Failing and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national and international
security challenges of our day, threatening the United States’ vulnerable populations,
their neighbors, and their allies. Struggling states can provide breeding grounds for
terrorism, crime, drug trafficking, and humanitarian catastrophes, and can destabilize an
entire region. Experience shows that managing conflict, particularly internal conflict, is
not a passing phenomenon. It has become a mainstream part of United States foreign
policy. Until now, the international community and the United States have undertaken
stabilization and reconstruction operations in an ad hoc fashion, recreating the tools and
relationships each time a crisis arises. If the United States is going to ensure that
countries are set on a sustainable path towards peace, democracy, and a market economy,
they need new, institutionalized foreign policy tools. These tools will influence the
choices countries and people make about the nature of their economies, their political
systems, their security, indeed, in some cases the very social fabric of a nation.

The United States has participated in several post-conflict reconstruction
operations over the years. Since 1989, the frequency, scale, scope, and duration of these
“nation building” missions have increased steadily. Over the past 15 years, the U.S. has
been involved in seven major post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations and
contributed significant resources to more than ten. 1 During the Cold War, the United
States mounted a military intervention about once a decade. Since 1989, United States-
led interventions are close to one every two years. During the same period, the United
Nations (U.N.) has engaged in peacekeeping missions about every six months. It is clear

8

that over the past two decades there has been no shortage of post-conflict reconstruction
opportunities. With the current “Long War”, there will be no shortage of opportunity in
the future.

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 states, “The United
States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing
and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, or in
transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable
path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies. The
United States should work with other countries and organizations to
anticipate state failure, avoid whenever possible, and respond quickly and
effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security,
development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.

Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty
over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a
base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime
groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or
economic interest.” 3

Current studies of the future environment suggest the next fifteen to twenty-five years
will have more failing or failed states that will affect global security. 4 This will be
significant if not of “vital” interest to United States economic and physical security.

The concept of “post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction” is broad; its
purpose is to promote security and economic growth following major hostilities.
Stabilization, often defined as “peacekeeping” or “nation-building operations,” includes
humanitarian relief, maintaining/enforcing a cease-fire, monitoring elections, and
establishing police or civil defense forces. Reconstruction also involves repairing or
creating infrastructure necessary to support long-term economic growth and
development. Hard reconstruction incorporates building or repairing infrastructure (e.g.
roads, schools), and soft reconstruction incorporates creating or improving governmental
systems (e.g. legal and tax systems). 5

9

The Post-Cold War experience suggests that an ad hoc approach, with little or no
coordination between government agencies, is not enough. The United States
Government must work with the world community to anticipate state failure, avert it
when possible, and help post-conflict states lay a foundation for lasting peace, good
governance, and sustainable development. Successful stabilization and reconstruction are
essential to an achievable and sustainable exit strategy for military and peacekeeping
forces. 6 In order to meet the global security threat of the future, the United States
Government must take a holistic approach to stabilization and reconstruction. Toward
that end, the Department of State has created the Coordinator of Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS). The concept and utility of S/CRS can be a valuable asset to the
United States Government, but in order for S/CRS to provide the leadership and direction
for the United States Government, it must address and fix a few problem areas. Only then
will the United States be prepared to deal appropriately with failing or failed states.
Creation of S/CRS

“We must also improve the responsiveness of our government to help nations
emerging from tyranny and war... and that means our government must be
able to move quickly to provide needed assistance. ”—President Bush

On August 5, 2004, Secretary Powell announced the creation of the Office
of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to enhance the United
States’ capacity to respond to crises involving failing or failed and post-conflict states.
DOS was empowered by the President with the signing of National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD) 44 in 2005. It has been nearly four years since S/CRS was created and
there still is much work to be completed in order to meet the intent of NSPD-44.

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44) tasks the Department of State (DOS)

10

to be the lead agency for Stability and Reconstruction. Prior to this directive, DOS
created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in
July 2004. S/CRS’s official mission from NSPD-44 is straightforward: “To lead,
coordinate, and institutionalize United States Government civilian capacity to prevent or
prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in
transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path towards peace,
democracy, and a market economy.” 7 NSPD-44 was written in part to clear up the chain
of command issues between the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOS that seemed to
have clouded early efforts in Iraq.

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 also directs that “the
Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure
hannonization with any planned or ongoing United States Military operations across the

o

spectrum of conflict.” The idea here was to integrate and rationalize the United States
Governments stabilization and reconstruction programs and synchronize military and
civilian programs. S/CRS is a relatively small organization designed to coordinate across
all United States Government agencies without necessarily assuming command and
control responsibilities.

The Coordinator for S/CRS reports to the Secretary of State and has five sections
under its control; Office of Strategic Communication, Office of Conflict Prevention,
Office of Civilian Readiness and Response, Office of Planning, and Office of Resource
Management, as outlined in the organizational chart below. 9

11

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
United States Department of State

Proposed Organizational Structure Pending Approval of Department of State HR/RMA

Office of Strategic
Communications

Office of Conflict
Prevention

Legislative

Strategy

Early Warning

Diplomatic

Strategy

F Assistance
Liaison

Public Affairs

DOD Assistance
Liaison

Academic

Outreach

Coordinator
Amb. John Herbst

Deputy

Principal Deputy

Coordinator for Conflict

Coordinator for Civilian Response,

Prevention and Outreach

r

-►

Planning and Management

Office of Civilian

Office of

Readiness

Office of Planning

Resource

and Response

Management

ARC/SRC

Operations Support

Training

U.S. Civilian
Reserve Home
Office

Planning and
Operations
Management

Civilian — Military
Affairs

General Services

Sectoral Expertise
And Best Practices

Financial

Management

Human Resources

Information

Technology

AUGUST 2007

Figure 1: S/CRS Organizational Chart

S/CRS works across the United States Government and with the world
community to anticipate state failure, avert it when possible, and help post-conflict states
lay a foundation for lasting peace, good governance and sustainable development. Its
core objectives include Monitor and Plan, Mobilize and Deploy, Prepare Skills and
Resources, and Prepare Skills and Resources. Monitor and Plan refers to developing
clear policy options concerning states and regions of greatest risk and importance and
lead United States planning focused on these priorities to avert crises, when possible.
Mobilize and Deploy is the coordination the deployment of United States resources and
implementation of programs in cooperation with international and local partners to
accelerate transitions from conflict to peace. Prepare Skills and Resources establishes
and manages an interagency capability to deploy personnel and resources in an
immediate surge response and the capacity to sustain assistance until traditional support

12

mechanisms can operate effectively. Leam from Experience incorporates best practices
and lessons learned into functional changes in training, planning, exercises, and
operational capabilities that support improved performance. Coordinate with
International Partners works with international and multilateral organizations, individual
states, and NGOs to plan, accelerate deployment, and increase interoperability of
personnel and equipment in multilateral operations.

The core organizational functions include Early Warning and Prevention,
Planning, Best Practices and Sectoral Coordination, and Response Strategy and Resource
Management. The Early Warning Branch oversees a broad-based global monitoring
program to identify states at risk of instability. The Conflict Prevention Branch
coordinates conflict prevention and mitigation efforts within the U.S. Government, and
actively consults with NGOs and international partners on best practices and new policy
tools to help define policies to strengthen fragile states. 10 The Planning Office is
developing a process to bring together all elements of a United States conflict response in
crisis. The planning framework will facilitate coordination between civilian agencies,
peacekeeping forces, and the United States military, when necessary. It will lead S/CRS
planning and implementation efforts, in cases where S/CRS is tasked to support or
undertake planning for a conflict response. The planning office will continually draw
upon sectoral experts in S/CRS and throughout the Government to inject lessons learned
and technical expertise into the planning process. 11 The Best Practices and Sectoral
Coordination Office is the home in S/CRS for technical expertise, monitoring, evaluation,
and lessons learned. This office supports planning and conflict prevention efforts and
maintains strong relationships with the United States Government community, academia,

13

think tanks, NGOs, private sector, and international partners. The office will draw on its
sectoral expertise and relationships with other Government and outside experts to publish
thematic guides, host lessons-learned roundtables and expert groups, and develop
monitoring and evaluation systems to better gauge the effectiveness of United States
efforts in conflict countries. 12 The Response Strategy and Resource Management Office
is responsible for developing and deploying United States resources in support of
reconstruction and stabilization operations. Its goal is to build capacity to provide an
immediate surge response, allowing time for the more traditional support mechanisms to
address longer-tenn needs. The office coordinates efforts within the United States
Government community to provide the best use of current capabilities while moving to
fill gaps where existing financial, personnel, training information and management
systems need strengthening. 13

In order to meet NSPD-44 requirements for establishing a strong civilian response
capability, State and other United States agencies are developing three corps of civilians
to support stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Active Response Corps
(ARC) is comprised of full-time Federal employees from departments and agencies
available to deploy in twenty-four to forty-eight hours. The Standby Response Corps
(SRC) are full-time Federal employees in regular positions available to deploy within
thirty days. The SRC could face challenges in implementation as it could deplete
executive departments of key personnel. The Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) consists of
state and local government and private sector specialists with skills that are either absent
or are insufficient within the Federal government. The civilian reserve corps is drawn into

14

government service as required. Table 1 summarizes the three civilian corps and Figure
2 shows the employment flow.

Unit

Composition of
volunteers

Deployment

Responsibilities

Personnel, as of
2007

Government-
wide personnel
goal, for FY 2009

Active Response
Corps (ARC)

Current State employees
serving 1-year rotations as
first responders

Within 24-48
hours for 3-6
months

Deploy to unstable
environments to
support a U.S.
mission, engage
with a host
country

government, and
conduct

assessments in the
field

• 11 filled
positions;

• 15 approved
temporary
positions

265

Standby

Response Corps
(SRC)

Current and retired State
employees available as
second responders

Within 30-60 days
for up to 6 months

Deploy to unstable
environments to
assist ARC when
additional or
specialized
personnel are
needed

• 91 current State
employees ready
to deploy;

• 209 retirees on
roster

2,000

Civilian Reserve
Corps (CRC)

Non-U.S. government
employees with expertise
in critical areas serving 4-
year terms

Within 30-60 days
for up to 1 year

Rapidly deploy to
a country in crisis
to conduct
assessments;
design, implement
and evaluate
programs; manage
contractors, etc.

None

2,000

Table 1: Three Civilian Corps under Development

15

ACTIVE RESPONSE CORPS
(ARC)

• USG staff trained
and ready to go in 48
hours to one week.
■Standing agency
capacity for rapid
response.

■Will assess situation,
design response and
begin S&R
implementation

• USG employees

• Civilian agency
employees who have
ongoing job
responsibilities but are
trained and available
for deployments.
•Deployable in 30 days
for up to 180 days

L

• USG employees when mobilized

• Have regular jobs outside the
USG

• Deployable in 30-60 days

■ Provide sector-specific civilian
response expertise

Figure 2: Civilian Corps Employment Flow

With the additional requirement to work with DOD to “harmonize and
synchronize with United States Military operations across the spectrum of conflict,”
S/CRS is in the process of preparing capabilities to mobilize and deploy. The DOS has
created the Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization.
This will assist Washington-Policymakers, Chiefs of Mission, and Military Commanders
in managing complex engagements by ensuring coordination among all United States
Government stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is intended to
facilitate and support integrated planning for United States Government, joint interagency
field deployments, and joint civilian operations. When a significant crisis occurs, the
Secretary of State may decide to activate the IMS based on a senior-level policy decision
with the National Security Council. Figure 3 show Interagency Management System for
Planning, Policy, and Operations. The central components of IMS consist of:

16

The Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CSRG), which is a crisis-specific,
Washington-based decision-making body with a planning and operations staff, is based
on regional areas. The Integrated Planning Cell (IPC) is a civilian planning cell, formed
upon crises, which will deploy and integrate with relevant Regional Combatant
Commanders (RCC) or equivalent multinational headquarters. The Advanced Civilian
Teams (ACT), formed upon crises, consists of one or more interagency field
management, planning, and coordination teams to support commanders in the field.
These teams are intended to integrate with existing Embassy and USAID mission
structures and personnel, and to work with the Joint Task Force Commander. The Field
Advanced Civilian Teams (F-ACT), fonned upon crises, provide the commander the
maximum capacity to implement Reconstruction and Stabilization programs at the
provincial or local level. These teams are intended to work with field units or division
and brigade forces.

Country Reconstruction
& Stabilization Group
(CRSG)

• Washington-based, decision-making body

Planning and Operations Staff
• Co Chaired by:
Regional A/S
S/CRS Coordinator
NSC Director

Advance Civilian Team (ACT)

Interagency field management coordination team(s
• Support Chief of Mission in the field
to coordinate and execute plans

Integration Planning Cell (IPC)

Integrates with relevant Geographic
Combatant Command or with equivalent
multinational headquarters

Assists in harmonizing the civilian and military
planning processes and operations
• Consists of interagency planners, regional
and sectoral experts

Figure 3: Interagency Management System for Planning, Policy, and Operations.

17

The need for S/CRS

The last two United States Administrations have explicitly identified failing or
failed states as United States’ national security concerns since 1998. The past three
National Security Strategy documents all identify threats from states that are described as
failing or failed. 14 These threats include providing safe havens for terrorists; causing
conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian crisis; undermining efforts to promote
democracy; and, good governance. President George W. Bush, in his 2005 National
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, states, “the United States should work...to
anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively
when necessary and appropriate.. .” 15

There are two competing visions for addressing failing or failed states. One vision
questions the appropriateness of using failing or failed states as a lens through which to
identify national security threats. The policy makers with this vision, instead, want to
develop a strategy to combat threats such as international terrorism, transnational crime,
and nuclear proliferation, regardless of how strong a state is. These critics discourage
institutionalizing potentially costly United States’ reconstitution and stabilization
capabilities. Furthermore, the critics believe that strengthening states is an inherently
Western idea or model and may not be appropriate in all situations.

The other side of the spectrum is those who advocate a holistic government
approach to strengthen failing or failed states. These policy advocates perceive failing or
failed states as presenting multiple challenges to political stability, military and security
capabilities, and developing and humanitarian needs. They recommend planning to
coordinate all aspects of United States policy toward failing or failed states. The current

18

administration is in this camp and has set out to transform the United States’ National
Security institution “to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21 st century,” which
includes strengthening failing or failed states. 16 Thus, the United States has created the
State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS).

The creation of S/CRS is of great importance to the United States Military as it
identifies an organization that anticipates being capable of executing reconstruction and
stabilization operations. This will allow a large portion of the deployed United States
Military forces to re-deploy once operations enter the transition phase. This certainly
does not mean the United States Military does not have a responsibility in reconstruction
and stabilization operations. DOD directive 3000.05 indicates reconstruction and
stability operations are important enough to be a core capability on par with combat
operations. This simply means that an organization has been identified that can provide
relief to a strained operational tempo by leading the effort in regards to reconstruction
and stabilization. As an organization that is trying to gain a foothold within the United
States Government S/CRS still has many obstacles to overcome.

Problems and Recommended Solutions with S/CRS

Problem 1. S/CRS lacks full United States Government representation.

Discussion to Problem 1, DOS was tasked to coordinate across all United States
Government agencies as Stability and Reconstruction will require a “total government”
effort. If this is the case, S/CRS must be staffed with representatives from all executive
branch departments of the United States Government. There is still a need to coordinate
with each department; however, assigning experienced staffers from each department will

19

ensure the synchronization and integration required for Stabilization and Reconstruction
planning. Only when each department of the executive branch has full-time
representation in S/CRS, and that representation is their primary obligation, will S/CRS
be fully prepared in the area of integration and planning for future Stability and
Reconstruction. Currently, S/CRS staff comes from the State Department, USAID,

Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JFCOM, Army Corps of Engineers,
and the Department of Justice. The most notable executive department missing from
S/CRS is the Department of Treasury. Not until there is complete full-time
representation from each executive branch department will S/CRS truly be able to put
forward a “total government” effort.

Recommended Solution to Problem 1. Each department of the executive branch
must provide an individual or individuals to S/CRS as their primary duty. This
partnership will enable a total govermnent approach.

Problem 2. Department of State S/CRS is not fully integrated with Department
of Defense.

Discussion to Problem 2. NSPD-44 directs the DOS to work with DOD in
ensuring reconstruction and stabilization operations are integrated with United States
Military plans. To that end, the DOS has made an effort. However, the DOS needs to
take their concept to the next level of development to ensure full integration. The two
departments can no longer operate independently; they are inextricably linked by the
strategy of reconstruction and stabilization. While it makes sense to look at the world
through regional focus, the DOS has six bureaus and DOD has five Regional Combatant

20

Commanders (RCC). Aligning these regions would be a logical step toward more
effective collaboration.

The Integrated Planning Cell (IPC) will, during crises, deploy to Regional
Combatant Commander to integrate and synchronize the planning effort. This current
concept will only deploy the IPC during crises and exercises, when plans are about to be
finalized or executed. Planning efforts for each of the RCCs occurs year-round and to
think S/CRS can fully integrate and synchronize as plans are finalized is falling short of
their purpose. Locating and permanently assigning the IPCs to each RCC will allow for
total emersion in the RCCs planning efforts. This emersion will ensure S/CRS is
“harmonizing and synchronizing” all efforts with DOD. This coordination and everyday
integration will ensure the IPC influences conditions for reconstruction and stabilization.
Surging the IPC during crises does not mitigate the need for them to be part of everyday
planning with the RCC.

Recommended Solution to Problem 2. DOD and DOS must align their regions
to synchronize planning and execution efforts. DOS’ six bureaus and DOD’s five RCCs
should be completely aligned. Neither arrangement is judged superior, but the current
disparity is not conducive to effective interagency cooperation. Aligning the regions is a
logical step toward more effective collaboration.

The two departments must be fully joined during the deliberate planning process.
The collocation and pennanent assignment of the IPCs to each RCC will ensure DOD
and DOS are fully integrated during deliberate planning, not just during crises planning
and execution. This integration will ensure synchronization.

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Problem 3. S/CRS lacks the ability to provide life support (e.g. shelter, food,
water, shower, and laundry), sustainment, transportation, or communication architecture
to support operations.

Discussion to Problem 3. In its current structure, S/CRS does have an
“operations support” section under the Office of Civilian Readiness and Response
however, this office is not similar to a logistics section in United States Military
organization. Currently, if the ACT or FACT deploy, they rely on United States Military
for all of their life support basic needs. If the United States Military is going to hand over
operations during the transition phase to DOS, which will continue supporting
reconstruction and stabilization, they will need this capability. Without an adequate
support and sustainment capability, it will be impossible to support reconstruction and
stabilization. Without transportation assets or communication equipment the ACTs and
FACTs will not be able to move around the battlespace or effectively command and
control their efforts. The ability to contract life support and transportation is certainly
possible, but in many third world countries the ACT or FACT will find themselves that
this may not be feasible. For DOS to ensure its ACT and FACT are fully capable of
accomplishing their mission they must possess a life support, transportation, and
communication capability. This will require additional funding and additional force
structure within S/CRS.

Recommended Solution to Problem 3. S/CRS develops a logistics or support
section comparable to that of the United State Military, which will enable the ACT and
FACT to sustain themselves during deployed operations. Only when S/CRS posses this
capability will it be truly operational.

22

Problem 4. DOS does not have adequate programs (courses of instruction),
facilities, or instructors to meet the training demand for reconstruction and stabilization
operations. Nor does DOS have an educational institution to study and discuss historical
reconstruction and stabilization operations.

Discussion to Problem 4. DOS does have training efforts in place to train
personnel for Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT), but is falling short of meeting the
growing demand to train other employees. The Active Response Corps (ARC), Standby
Response Corps (SRC), and Civilian Response Corps (CRC) are all to be trained in order
to meet their mission and deploy. This civilian corps will be a heavy training burden on
DOS as its membership is anticipated to be close to 5,000 members by 2009.

DOS does not have an educational institution. The type of institution needed
would be a hub of all historical reconstruction and stabilization operations, designed for
United States government employees to study historical reconstruction and stabilization
operations as well as work case studies or planning problems. This institution would
allow DOS to create true reconstruction and stabilization professionals and enhance
future operations.

Recommended Solution to Problem 4. DOS should create a reconstruction and
stabilization training center staffed to meet the growing needs. DOS should create a
Reconstruction and Stabilization Institute or Center. This institute or center could be
similar to the Asia-Pacific Center or the United States Marshal Center. The Institute or
Center will enable the ongoing study and education of United State Government
employees to study and analyze past reconstruction and stabilization operations, which
will enhance preparations for future operations.

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Problem 5. There is a critical funding shortage for non-humanitarian responses to

crises.

Discussion to Problem 5. The current United States Government structure and
laws governing funding constrains DOS ability to respond, deploy, and effectively
allocate resources for reconstruction and stabilization. Current available emergency
response funding accounts cover humanitarian and disaster assistance. Other accounts
that can be used for governance, rule of law, or security assistance have not been
sufficiently funded to meet anticipated requirements. Reprogramming existing resources
requires tradeoffs and negotiations within or between the Executive and Legislative
branches, which takes too long for rapid response. An emergency response fund
managed by DOS will allow for rapid and funded response.

Recommended Solution to Problem 5. Congress must fund an emergency
response fund for reconstruction and stabilization that is managed by DOS.

Conclusion

The S/CRS is the key link to a holistic government approach to stabilization and
reconstruction. As S/CRS reaches its fourth anniversary it seems that the momentum
generated from NSPD-44 has started to slow. This is evident from the problems
discussed in this paper, many of which have been around since S/CRS inception.

These issues and the success of S/CRS are extremely important to DOD and the
United States Military. The last two Chainnan of Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers
and Pace, and Defense Secretary Gates have publicly voiced support for S/CRS and have
asked the United States Congress during testimony to increase funding to ensure its
success. The success not only will ensure reconstruction and stabilization operations are

24

“harmonized and synchronized” but will decrease, the use of United States Military
forces conducting these types of operations. During both the engagement or pre-conflict
phase (not addressed in this paper) or in the post-conflict phases. If S/CRS fails, these
operations and the United States commitment will not disappear but fall on the shoulders
of the United States Military as it has in the past. With the current and anticipated future
unrest around the world and the United States Government’s commitment to support
failed or failing states this will likely mean an increase in the operations tempo on an
already strained force.

There are certainly additional ideas for S/CRS to better prepare itself to address
future threats. The recommendations provided in this paper will make great strides in
ensuring the United States no longer takes an ad hoc approach to stability and
reconstruction operations in failing or failed countries.

I The seven are Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. During this period the U.S.
Government also devoted significant capabilities and resources to a variety of other post-conflict
stabilization and reconstruction efforts, including in Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Guatemala, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Colombia, and East Timor, among other places. (Source: RAND;
Center on International Cooperation).

2 Dobbins, Shaping Policy Priorities of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: NATO Role in Nation Building

3 George Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44,” 7 December 2005.

4 MCTAG, Diagnosing the Future: Patterns, Trends, and Implications, Brief August 2007.

5 CRS Report to Congress, “Peacekeeping and Post Conflict Capabilities: The State Department’s Office
of Reconstruction and Stabilization,” 19 January 2005.

6 GAO Report, “Stabilization and Reconstruction,” 30 October 2007.

7 George Bush, “NSPD-44,” 7 December, 2005

8 George Bush, “NSPD-44,” 7 December, 2005

9 United States Department of State, “S/CRS,” State Department Website, www. state, gov/s/crs , accessed
on 20 February 2008.

10 United States Department of State, “S/CRS,” State Department Website, www.state.gov/s/crs , accessed
on 20 February 2008.

II United States Department of State, “S/CRS,” State Department Website, www.state.gov/s/crs , accessed
on 20 February 2008.

12 United States Department of State, “S/CRS,” State Department Website, www.state.gov/s/crs , accessed
on 20 February 2008.

13 United States Department of State, “S/CRS,” State Department Website, www.state.gov/s/crs , accessed
on 20 February 2008.

14 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) (Washington, DC: White House,
1998,2002,2006).

25

15 George Bush, “NSPD-44,” 7 December, 2005

16 White House, NSS, 1998, 2002, 2006

26

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