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Who Won the Cold War? A Learning Packet for Secondary Level
Study.
Kansas Univ. , Lawrence. Center for Russian and East European
Studies .
2000 - 00-00
73p .
Center for Russian and East European Studies, 320 Bailey
Hall, 1440 Jayhawk Blvd. , Lawrence, KS 66045-7574. Tel:
785-864-4236; Fax: 785-864-3800; e-mail: crees@ku.edu; Web
site : http : / /www.ukans . edu/~crees/ .
Guides - Classroom - Teacher (052)
MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.
Curriculum Enrichment; Foreign Countries; High Schools;
* International Relations; Korean War; ^Models; *Modern
History; Primary Sources; *World Affairs; *World History
Cold War; United States; USSR
ABSTRACT
Realizing that the Cold War is a topic that often is
neglected as time runs short at the end of a school year, a group of
University of Kansas (Lawrence) educators sought to create effective
classroom materials for secondary/community college instructors to teach
about the Cold War. The group's main goal was to create a flexible model that
encouraged study of the topic for the amount of time available. This Cold War
learning packet provides materials and directions to guide students through a
research and decision-making activity. Following a brief review of the Cold
War period, the materials in the packet lead students to analyze a key Cold
War event from both a Soviet and U.S. point of view, using a variety of
primary sources. The key event is analyzed using the packet's Cold War Def
Con model. The students decide to what level of conflict the event brought
the superpowers. The final analysis phase uses this understanding and places
the key event into the context of the entire time period, through a series of
questions, including, "Who Won?" Included in the learning packet is one event
example about the Korean War and copies of primary source documents for the
appropriate categories . The packet includes a suggested performance
assessment; extension ideas; the Def Con Model; an overview of the Cold War;
a timeline of key Cold War events; a Cold War glossary; an extensive Cold War
bibliography; instructions to students; various activities; and primary
sources (reading materials) , (BT)
Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made
from the original document.
oo
oo
'O
$
A learning packet for
secondary level study
Compiled and written through the cooperative effort of the following:
Kansas Teachers
Sara Harris, Social Studies, Neosho County Community College in Chanute, Kansas
Larry Lonard, Russian Language, Topeka High School in Topeka, Kansas
Mike McClellan, Social Studies, Tonganoxie High School in Tonganoxie, Kansas
Mike Ortmann, Social Studies, Lawrence High School in Lawrence, Kansas
Presidential Library education directors
Mark Adams, Education Director, Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri
Kim Barbieri, Educational Specialist, Eisenhower Foundation in Abilene, Kansas
■ : T itle VI National Resource Center Outreach Coordinators
Denise Gardiner, Russian and East European Institute, Indiana University in Bloomington
\J Donna Parmelee, Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Michigan in Ann Arbor
00 Lyne Tumlinson, Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Kansas in Lawrence
coj
co; Thanks also to Dr. Joe O'Brien f University of Kansas Center for Teaching and Leadership, for the
j amazing conversations that resulted in the original concept for this Learning Packet , and helping the
| group develop their ideas towards the final model
OO i © 2000 University of Kansas
Center for Russian and East European Studies
.1 <crees@ku.edu>
http://www.ukans.edu/~-crees
PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND
DISSEMINATE THIS MATERIAL HAS
BEEN GRANTED BY
— sL
ERiC
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES
INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
2
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION
/ CENTER (ERIC)
Dr This document has been reproduced as
v received from the person or organization
originating it.
1 □ Minor changes have been made to
improve reproduction quality.
• Points of view or opinions stated in this
document do not necessarily represent
official OERI position or policy.
V y
ABOUT THE LEARNING PACKET
Introduction to “Who Won the Cold War?”
The Purpose of the Learning Packet
In June 2000, an exceptional group of educators gathered at the University of Kansas to create classroom
materials for secondary/community college instructors to effectively present the Cold War. Our group
represented strategic sectors of the educational community — teachers, presidential library education directors, and
Title VI National Resource Center Outreach Coordinators. Realizing that the Cold War is one of those topics that
usually gets clipped short at the end of the school (if it’s handled at all), the group’s top goal was to create a
flexible model, to encourage making the study as long or short as the time allows.
The resulting Cold War Learning Packet provides materials and directions to guide students through a
research and decision-making activity. Following a brief review of the Cold War period, the materials lead
students to analyze a key Cold War event through both Soviet and US points of view, using primary sources in a
variety of categories. This key event is then plugged into our Cold War “Def Con” model, in order to decide to
what conflict level the event brought the superpowers. The final analysis places this understanding of that key
event into the context of the entire time period, through a series of questions, including, “Who Won?”
Included in the learning packet will be one event example — the Korean War — with copies of primary source
documents in the appropriate categories. From this, the teacher can teach the Korean War as a representative key
event of the Cold War, or choose another key event and do the research to find appropriate primary source
documents for the Soviet and US points of view.
“Who Won the Cold War?” takes seemingly isolated events and ties them into the flow and continuity of
history. It also dares to ask the question: Is the Cold War really over?
Why Teach About the Cold War?
> It was one of the most important conflicts in world history, lasting over 50 years, costing untold amounts of
money, and affecting every person’s life.
> Its effects reach from the past into the future and encompasses
> power
> foreign and domestic policy
> science and technology
> arts and popular culture
> world and national security
> economies
> education
> opportunities gained and lost
Why use “Who Won the Cold War 99 Learning Packet?
This easy-to-use package provides the teacher with a grade 9-12 curriculum that:
o Is aligned with Kansas standards and National History and Social Studies standards
o Is a ready-to-use local performance assessment for individuals and groups
o Affords flexible user-friendly lesson plans that can be easily adapted for short lessons, longer units, block
scheduling, and assessment needs
o Fits curriculum needs for World History, US History, Government, and Geography courses, with extension
suggestions for integrating creative writing, literature, science, and technology
o Focuses on critical thinking skills
o Can be easily applied to reading comprehension, writing, problem solving, and integrated curriculums
o Lends itself to use in inclusive classrooms
o Provides opportunity for thematic units
o Provides a structure for student-directed research
o And makes accessible a hopelessly complicated era in a clear and manageable format
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Instructions to the Teacher for “Who Won the Cold War?”
Learning Packet Contents: information, Resources, teaching Model
• Cold War overview
• Timeline
• Glossary
• Chillin’ Chart
Learning Packet key event example: The Korean War
• Primary Resources — from the Soviet and US points of view:
• Popular Culture
• Military Industrial Complex (includes Technology, Economics, Military Action)
• Politics / Ideology
• International / Decolonization
• Environment
• Extension ideas and materials
To Use as a Comprehensive Unit
1 . Cold War Overview
A bulleted synopsis of the Cold War, Timeline, and Glossary are included to refresh your knowledge of
the time period and enable you to pursue this learning packet. You may wish to use the overview with
your advanced students as well, for a review of the big picture.
2. Choose one or more key events for your study.
Use the Timeline resource for ideas.
3. Examine the “Chillin’ Chart” to decide which categories are appropriate
The Chillin’ Chart is designed as a comprehensive list of Cold War study categories. Decide which
categories you will use for the key event(s) you have chosen. This list may change as you look for
primary sources! The vital factor for determining categories is POV (point of view) — you need primary
sources to look at the key events from the point of view both of the US and the Soviet sides.
4. Find primary source documents for your key event. Where?
• Start with the resources in this packet, such as the bibliography and Cold War Web Sites lists.
• For help with locating primary source documents representing the Soviet POV, we suggest you
contact the Title VI National Resource Center Outreach Coordinators involved in this project, or
those in the Russia / East Europe area nearest to your location.
5. Student-directed research
Students may work in groups or individually to examine the primary source documents in a given
category. They should summarize the POV of each side, answer any questions included with the primary
documents.
6. Complete the Chillin’ Chart.
Students present findings and fill in all categories of the Chillin’ Chart used for the key Cold War event.
7. Determine the Def Con Level of the Key Event
Using the Def Con definitions (page 5), students should rate how close to a “hot” war this key event
brought the Cold War.
8. Conclusions
Have the students hypothesize about the entire Cold War period: How close to a “hot” war did it ever
get? Was there a winner in this war? Is the Cold War over?
9. Interdisciplinary extensions
Further explore the effects of the Cold War on films, literature, art, music, science and technology,
economics, sports, etc., using the ideas included. What is the difference in the post-Cold War period?
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Suggested performance assessment
] . Choose a Cold War Key Event.
2. Will the assessment be performed in groups or by individuals?
3. Assign the Chillin’ Chart Category (or more than one) with corresponding points of view.
Suggestion: use one category, with both sides of the story.
4. The students should individually decide the Def Con level of the situation, which may be different,
based on the category they are analyzing. The performance is based on their assessment choice and
defense of their position.
5. Possible assessment forms: writing an in-class essay or a play, creating an advertisement for the
event and Def Con level they have decided on, etc.
Extension Ideas: taking the Cold War into new directions
Oral histories
Everyone knows people who have lived through the key events of the Cold War. Interview several who
took part in the Korean War or Vietnam conflict, or who remember the Cuban Missile Crisis. Talk to
parents or other adults about growing up in the 50s or 60s — did they practice Civil Defense Drills, were
they afraid of the Soviets using a nuclear weapon, did they have different amounts of fear at different
times? How did they feel about Russian or Chinese people? Were they paranoid about nuclear
annihilation? Ask an adult who has traveled abroad if they know what is in their CIA file (it is available
to anyone through the Freedom of Information Act).
“What If”
Imagine what would have happened if one situation had changed in the Cold War. For example, what if
Truman had not fired MacArthur and he had decided to drop bombs on China in order to win the war in
Korea?
Local Effects
How has the Cold War, past and present, affected your local community? What industries, activities, and
attitudes prevail because of the influence of the conflict among nations?
• Use the Personal Interview Form included in the packet for collecting anecdotal data
Language Arts Enrichment
• Study the literature of the Cold War:
• Study the media, propaganda, and films of the Cold War: James Bond)
Science Enrichment
• Examine the Cold War’s effects on the environment:
• In “BRAVO tests,” we used US soldiers as guinea pigs in the Southwest US.
• Study nuclear plants — how do they work, how are they constructed, where is the danger?
Thermonuclear jeopard y
• Use Jeopardy-style questions regarding the Cold War categories used in this packet.
5
O
ERIC
The Def Con Model
As students examine Cold War incidents or events they will be asked to evaluate each event according to the
Defense Readiness Condition [DEF CON] scale of the US military. Students will determine which state of'
readiness they would require of US forces if they were Commander-in-Chief. In this game of brinksmanship,
students must remember that the USSR also has defense readiness levels and will most likely respond
accordingly. A teacher might want to divide the class into groups, one US and one Soviet, to evaluate each Cold
War event. After careful evaluation, each side could determine its own DEF CON level, but they must be aware
that moving to DEF CON 1 means thermonuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union.
Defense readiness conditions [DEF CONs] describe the stages of alert or readiness between the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the commanders of unified commands. The DEF CONs are graduated to match various military events
by degree of severity. The five conditions are as follows:
DEF CON 5 = Normal peacetime readiness
DEF CON 4 = Normal, increased intelligence and strengthened security measures
DEF CON 3 = Increase in force readiness above normal readiness
DEF CON 2 = Further increase in force readiness, but less than the maximum readiness
DEF CON 1 = Maximum force readiness
After the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs] additional levels, Emergency Conditions
[EMERGCONs], were added for response to a missile attack. In the event of an EMERGCON all other forces
would automatically go to DEF CON 1 .
During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the US Strategic Air Command was placed on DEF CON 2. B-52's
armed with nuclear weapons were on airborne alert and ready to strike targets inside the USSR. In October 1973,
when Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a surprise attack on Israel, US forces went to DEF CON 3 alert status,
because of possible intervention by the Soviet Union was feared. US forces went back to DEF CON 1 in mid-
November 1973.
The Five Def Con levels For This Exercise
DEF CON 5 = lowest level of conflict, involving culture, sport, other civilian acts only
DEF CON 4 = propaganda battles carried out by governments
DEF CON 3 = conflicts involving new technologies, military preparedness, space exploration
DEF CON 2 = actual military conflict through “proxy wars” (“low intensity conflict”/ LIC)
DEF CON 1 = thermonuclear war
Example of the Def Con Model:
Event
Def Con 5
Def Con 4
Def Con 3
Def Con 2
Def Con 1
Korean War
X
Sputnik launched
X
US stops wheat sales to USSR 1 980
X
Boycott of the LA Olympics
X
O
ERIC
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INFORMATION: Overview of the Cold War
What does the Term “Cold War” Mean?
• Where did the term come from? The term "Cold War" originated in the title of a book by Walter
Lippmann, published in 1947. Source: Historical Dictionary of the Cold War .**
• This clash of ideologies was not a “war” in the strict military sense. It was a “war” of ideas between the
US and USSR, with the actual intermittent “low-intensity conflicts” fought indirectly through proxy allies
with an enduring state of tension.
• The terminology included a division of countries into: First World (Western democratic nations, led by
US) vs. Second World (Communist Bloc, led by USSR).
• The global ramifications of this clash were felt by many Third World (underdeveloped/emerging) nations,
who often became the proxy nations for the Cold Warriors.
When Was the Cold War?
• The roots of the Cold War go as far back as the end of WWI, with the Bolshevik Revolution and Wilson’s
Fourteen Points. This clash of ideologies put the two emerging 20 th century powers at loggerheads as
they grew into their positions of power.
• Cold War events began immediately following WWII, with the spheres of influence that arose in Europe.
• The “end” of the Cold War is pegged at the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, which
followed the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe. There are events after 1991 where the US and
Russia collaborate (the MIR space station), as well as those which continue conflict (NATO action in the
Balkans).
Who Were the Pla yers?
• US = representative capitalism (ideals of freedom + free enterprise)
“Allies”: Western Europe and NATO, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Canada
• USSR = authoritarian socialism (ideals of egalitarianism + state ownership of the means of production)
“Allies”: Warsaw Pact nations, China (to mid-60s), Cuba (from early 60s)
• Assorted Third World players (ex. Chile, Zaire, Angola, Egypt), non-aligned countries (ex. India, Indonesia,
Yugoslavia, Egypt), and countries who chose not to participate (ex. Finland, Austria, Switzerland)
• US/USSR leaders:
• US: Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton
• USSR/Russia: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko (the gerentocracy),
Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin
Why Study the Cold War?
• The “continuing” Cold War shapes our world today.
• The legacy of the major Cold War events shapes our future.
• The Cold War permeates every aspect of human existence, including popular culture, technology, politics,
military, environment, economics, and more.
• Worldwide phenomenon: all nations have been influenced by the Cold War, either through alignment or
non-alignment. It encompasses global history in the last half of the 20 lh century (and beyond).
Is It Over?
• Did it really end with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989???
• Did it really end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union???
• Are current world conflicts part of a continuing Cold War???
• If the Cold War is over, who won??? Are you sure?
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RESOURCES:
Timeline of Key Cold War Events
PRE-COLD WAR PERIOD
1917 US involvement in WWI in Europe
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia
1918 Wilson’s Fourteen Points
1919 Treaty of Versailles ends WWI.
“Red Scare” in US
The Communist International (Comintern) established
1920 US Congress rejects the League of Nations, ushering in a period of isolationism in the US
1929 Beginning of global economic depression, providing Soviet propaganda regarding the dangers of
capitalism
1933 FDR recognizes the Soviet government in USSR
1939-41 Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland, Baltic States, and Romania (aka Bessarabia); Soviet attack on
Finland; Soviet economic support of German war effort.
1941 Germany attacks the Soviet Union
1942 Tehran Summit of the Grand Alliance (US, USSR, GB)
TRANSITIONAL YEAR
1945 Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt meet at Yalta
V-E Day (end of WWII)
UN Charter signed in San Francisco
Stalin, Churchill/Attlee meet in Potsdam
US drops Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
V-J Day
COLD WAR PERIOD
1946 ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Interpreter and Computer) dedicated (revealed to the public)
Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri
1947 Truman Doctrine announced to Congress
Marshall Plan initiated
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) established
1948 Berlin Blockade and airlift
Truman recognizes the state of Israel
Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia
Tito-Stalin split leads to expulsion Yugoslavia from Cominform
Division of Germany
Chinese Communists come to power
Formation of NATO and formation of CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance)
1949 Soviets detonate their first Atomic Bomb in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan
1950 Korean War begins
195 1 Ethel and Julius Rosenberg convicted of selling spy secrets to the USSR
1952 US explodes first hydrogen bomb in the Marshall Islands
First British Atomic Bomb test
Eisenhower elected President
1953 Stalin’s death
Korean War armistice
Labor unrest in East Berlin
Khrushchev comes to power in USSR
1 955 Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) formed
1956 Khrushchev gives his “Secret Speech” to the Twentieth Party Congress, leading to “destalinization” in the
Soviet Union
Cominform dissolved
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Poznan workers revolt demanding “Bread and Freedom” (June) which led to change of Polish party
leadership and liberalization of communist system in Poland (Oct. 1956).
Hungarian uprising, followed by Soviet army entering Budapest
1957 US underground nuclear test near Las Vegas
Soviets launch the first artificial satellite: Sputnik
1958 NASA created
1 959 Castro comes to power in Cuba
Khrushchev visits US
1960 French Atomic Bomb test
US U2 plane shot down over USSR
Kennedy wins US Presidential election
1961 Soviets launch the first man in space (Yuri Gargarin)
Bay of Pigs conflict
Alan Shepard launched into space
Berlin Wall erected
JFK recommends that Americans build fallout shelters
Soviet’s detonate megabomb (circa 58 megatons)
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
1 963 US and USSR establish “hotline” connection
Kennedy visits Berlin (“Ich bin ein Berliner”)
US, GB, and USSR sign nuclear test ban treaty
Kennedy killed; Johnson assumes US Presidency
1 964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution approved by US Congress granting President Johnson authority to send US
troops to South Vietnam
China explodes first Atomic Bomb
Khrushchev expelled from office; Brezhnev becomes CPSU General Secretary
1967 Six Day War
1968 Viet Cong start Tet Offensive
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty signed by US, GB, and USSR (agreed not to transfer nuclear
technologies to other nations)
“Prague Spring,” followed by Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops entering Czechoslovakia (August)
Nixon elected President
Brezhnev assumes sole power in USSR
1969 Paris Peace Talks (four party)
First stage of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
First man on the moon (Apollo 1 1)
Soviet-Chinese border conflict on the Ussuri River
Member states of the Warsaw Pact conference on European security
Lin Piao succeeds Mao Zedong
Biggest anti-war demonstration in DC
1970 US ping-pong team arrives in China (“Ping-Pong Diplomacy”)
Polish workers revolt against price increases in Polish port cities (Dec.), leading to a change in Polish
party leadership, a root of the Solidarity movement 1980-8 1 .
1971 Nixon visits China
US and USSR sign biologial weapons treaty
1972 SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) between US and USSR
1 973 Vietnam peace treaty / US troops withdraw from Vietnam
Oil producers raise prices
1974 India detonates first nuclear bomb
Nixon resigns; replaced by Ford
1975 End of the Vietnam War
Khmer Rouge comes to power in Cambodia (until 1979)
US-Apollo and USSR-Soyuz link up in orbit
Helsinki Accords signed by leaders of 35 countries, including US and USSR
O
ERLC
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1 976 Carter wins election
Polish workers revolt against another price increase (June), another root of Solidarity
1 979 US and China begin establishment of diplomatic ties
“Weapons for hostages” US Embassy in Iran
Three Mile Island nuclear plant meltdown
Soviets invade Afghanistan
SALT II treaty signed (but not ratified by US Senate)
1980 US stops wheat sales to USSR
US and allies boycott the Moscow Olympics
Lech Walesa leads strikes in Gdansk Shipyard, government concedes establishment of Solidarity
independent trade union (Aug)
Yugoslav leader Tito dies; replaced by collective leadership
Reagan elected President
1 98 1 Space shuttle Columbia launched (first re-usable space vehicle)
Martial law declared in Poland (December 13), Solidarity banned
US imposes sanctions on USSR and Poland
1982 Brezhnev dies; replaced by Andropov
1983 Reagan outlines Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”)
“The Day After” airs on US television
Martial law formally lifted in Poland
1984 Andropov dies; replaced by Chernenko
LA Olympics boycotted by all Eastern bloc except for Romania
1985 Chernenko dies; replaced by Gorbachev (March)
USSR announces moratorium on nuclear testing
1986 Meltdown and fire occur at Chernobyl nuclear plant, Ukraine
Challenger space shuttle goes down
Soviets begin construction of MIR space station
1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by Reagan and Gorbachev (first arms accord
calling for elimination of entire class of weapons)
Gorbachev announces several reforms of Soviet economy (plus the social reforms in glasnost 1 and
perestroika)
1988 Ten thousand demonstrate in Prague on the 20 th anniversary of the WTO invasion (August)
Bush wins election
1989 Full retreat of Soviet forces from Afghanistan
Polish roundtable negotiations (February- April)
Solidarity sweeps first free elections for Polish Parliament (June)
First majority non-communist government in Poland (September)
Collapses of communist regimes follow in Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Romania
Fall of the Berlin Wall (November)
Romanian Communist Party leader Nicolae Ceausesu and his wife are arrested, tried, and executed
(December)
Vaclav Havel elected president of Czechoslovakia (December)
1990 First free elections in Hungary and East Germany (March)
Free election in Bulgaria (June)
Reunification of Germany (October 3)
Delegates from NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization meet and sign treaty on Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE)
Delegates from 34 European and North American states meet in Paris to sign “Charter for a New Europe 7
1991 START treaty — US and USSR sign Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (July)
Warsaw Treaty Organization officially dissolved (July)
Failed coup against Gorbachev leads to his being ousted (August 19); official resignation (December 25)
Dissolution of the Soviet Union (December 25)
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RESOURCES:
Cold War Glossary
This is a sampling of the glossary at the CNN Cold War site. The complete listing can be found at
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/kbank/glossary/am.index.html
Sources: Cold War, Jeremy Isaacs Productions; Encyclopedia of the Cold War, Thomas S. Arms; The Cold War,
1945-1991, Benjamin Frankel, editor; The Cold War: A History, Martin Walker; Cold War Chronology. Soviet-
American Relations 1945-1991, Kenneth L. Hill; Encyclopedia Britannica.
-A-
ABM
Antiballistic missiles, designed to detect and intercept incoming nuclear missiles.
Arms race
Competitive buildup of nuclear weapons between the United States and Soviet Union that began after the Soviets
exploded their first atomic weapon on August 29, 1949 — ending the US nuclear monopoly.
Atlas
Developed in the 1960s, these intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were housed in deep underground
concrete silos built to withstand a nuclear attack.
Atomic bomb
First nuclear weapon used in wartime, by the United States on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945; an A-bomb
explosion is created by the splitting of atomic nuclei and results in a huge release of energy.
-B-
B-52
Strategic US heavy bomber with nuclear capacity, powered by eight turbojet engines; its range is extended by in-
flight refueling. B-52s were the mainstay of US nuclear forces in the 1950s.
Baghdad Pact
Middle Eastern defense pact established in 1955 by Great Britain, Turkey and Iraq; would later include the United
States, Iran and Pakistan.
Baikonur Cosmodrome
Soviet missile-testing facility where rockets, spacecraft and satellites are launched; located in current-day
Kazakhstan.
Bay of Pigs
Landing area on Cuba's south coast where an American-organized invasion by Cuban exiles was defeated by
Fidel Castro’s government forces April 17-20, 1961.
Beatlemania
Frenzy over the 1964 US arrival of the British pop group The Beatles, whose music and style loosened American
culture from the constraints of the 1950s.
Berlin airlift
Successful effort by the United States and Britain to ship by air 2.3 million tons of supplies to the residents of the -
Western-controlled sectors of Berlin from June 1948 to May 1949, in response to a Soviet blockade of all land
and canal routes to the divided city.
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Bolsheviks
Precursor to the Russian Communist Party, they seized power in Russia in October 1918 under Lenin's leadership.
Bomber gap
In the 1950s a number of US military officials warned about a "bomber gap," alleging the Soviet Union had more
planes than the United States that were capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
Broken arrow
Any incident that includes the seizure, theft, loss or accidental destruction of a nuclear device.
-c-
Checkpoint Charlie
Border site between East and West Berlin where US and Soviet tanks faced each other in a tense standoff in
October 1961 before both sides withdrew.
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency, established in 1947 by Truman; conducts US intelligence and counterintelligence
missions overseas.
Civil rights movement
Mass movement for political, social and economic equality by African Americans during the 1960s, mostly in the
segregated cities of the Southern United States.
COMECON
Council for Mutual and Economic Cooperation, formed in 1949 as a Soviet version of an economic community.
Moscow's answer to the Marshall Plan.
COMINFORM
International communist information bureau established by Stalin in 1947; dissolved by Khrushchev in 1956.
Containment
Policy established by the Truman administration in 1947 to contain Soviet influence to what it was at the end of
World War II.
Cruise
US missiles that use wings, a turbofan and computerized maps to fly like an airplane to its target; can fly at
altitudes of 50 feet.
-D-
DEFCON
System of defense conditions used by the US military, ranging from DEFCON 5, the lowest state of alert, to
DEFCON 1, indicating war.
Detente
A thaw in Cold War relations between the United States and Soviet Union from 1969-1975, highlighted by the
signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) treaty and the Helsinki Accords.
DMZ
Demilitarized zone between North and South Korea since 1953, when the Korean War ended. It is one of the most
heavily fortified borders in the world, often described as the last frontier of the Cold War.
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o
-E-
Eisenhower Doctrine
Pledge by Eisenhower in 1957 to provide military and economic aid to any Middle Eastern country fighting
communism.
-F-
Fallout shelter
Underground concrete structures, often stocked with food and water supplies, designed to withstand fallout from a
nuclear attack; popular in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s.
First strike capability
The capacity to launch a nuclear strike without fear of a nuclear counterattack from the enemy; the United States
enjoyed first strike capability over the Soviet Union until the late 1950s.
Flexible response
The US policy of maintaining both conventional and nuclear forces to have flexibility in dealing with communist
threats.
-G-
GDR
German Democratic Republic, or East Germany; it was proclaimed in October 1949 and encompassed the Soviet
occupation zone in postwar Germany.
-H-
Hollywood Ten
Members of the Screen Actors Guild who refused to answer questions before the House Un-American Activities
Committee in 1947, during the height of US anti-communist hysteria.
Hot line
Direct phone line between Washington and Moscow established after the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Hydrogen bomb
First tested in 1952 by the United States and in 1953 by the Soviets; a nuclear weapon hundreds of times more
powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
-I-
IRBM
Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; can reach targets between 600 and 3,500 miles away.
Iron Curtain
Term used by Churchill in 1946 to describe the growing East-West divide in postwar Europe between communist
and democratic nations.
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-J-
Jupitcr
Class of US intermediate-range ballistic missiles developed in the 1950s by a team led by Werner Von Braun,
who developed V-land V-2 rockets for Nazi Germany.
-K-
KOMSOMOL
Communist organization for Soviet youths aged 14 to 28; patterned after the Communist Party, its goals were to
indoctrinate and train future members.
-L-
Limited Test Ban Treaty
1963 agreement signed by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union that prohibited the testing of
nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, space and underwater.
Los Alamos
US nuclear research and testing facility in the New Mexico desert where the world’s first atomic bomb was
developed during World War II.
-M-
MAD
Mutual assured destruction, a Cold War theory in which the United States and Soviet Union each used its ability
to launch a nuclear counterattack to deter a first strike from the other side.
Manhattan Project
Code name for US and British development of the first atomic bomb; it began in 1944 at Los Alamos, New
Mexico.
Marshall Plan
Postwar European recovery plan organized by US Secretary of State George Marshall that was also intended to
bolster Western democracy; nearly $13 billion was spent from 1948-1952.
Massive retaliation
Eisenhower administration policy that pledged US attacks in response to Soviet expansion; relied heavily on
nuclear, rather than conventional, military forces.
McCarthyism
US campaign to root out communists in government and society during the late 1940s and 1950s led by Sen.
Joseph McCarthy; accusations were often based on rumors and half-truths.
MIRV
Multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle; first deployed in the 1960s, MIRV technology enabled missiles
to carry a number of warheads aimed at separate targets.
Missile gap
Charges by critics of the Eisenhower administration that the United States had fallen behind the Soviet Union in
the production of nuclear missiles, especially intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
13 14
MX
US intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a range of 5,000 miles and 1 0 warheads, each with an
explosive yield of 500 kilotons.
-N-
National Defense Education Act
After the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the United States began spending $2 billion a year on higher education
in an effort to win the "brain race" with the Soviets.
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, begun in 1949 as a military and political alliance of European nations and the
United States and Canada designed to protect Western Europe from a Soviet attack.
NORAD
Formed in 1958 by the United States and Canada and based in Colorado, the North American Aerospace Defense
Command monitors the skies for an attack on the continent.
NSC-68
Written in 1950 by the US State Department's Paul Nitze, National Security Council Report 68 predicted the
Soviets could launch a nuclear attack on the United States by 1954 and recommended an increase in US spending
for nuclear and conventional arms.
Nuclear winter
Theory that, immediately following a major nuclear war, radioactive smoke and dust would fill the atmosphere,
blocking sunlight, lowering temperatures and destroying agriculture.
-o-
Open Skies
Proposal by Eisenhower to let the superpowers see each other's military blueprints and installations and place
reconnaissance units in each other's territory. Khrushchev's rejection led to the US deployment of the U-2 spy
plane.
Operation Ivy
On November 1, 1952, the world entered the thermonuclear era with the US detonation of the first hydrogen
bomb; its force was equivalent to more than 10 million tons of TNT — 1,000 times the power of the Hiroshima
bomb.
-P-
Peaceful coexistence
Term used by Khrushchev in 1963 to describe a situation in which the United States and Soviet Union would
continue to compete economically and politically without launching a thermonuclear war.
People's Liberation Army
Welcomed in Beijing as heroes in 1949 after the revolution in China, the country's armed forces were reorganized
in the 1960s — a move that led to the Cultural Revolution.
Ping-Pong diplomacy
After the United States lifted travel restrictions to China in 1971, Beijing invited a US table-tennis team to play in
China. The visit helped improve ties between the two countries and led in part to Nixon's historic 1972 visit to
China.
14 15
Polaris
The first submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), they were developed by the United States and were
soon replaced by the more advanced Poseidon missiles. Britain, though, chose to rely on upgraded Polaris
missiles.
Politburo
Executive committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Potsdam
Third wartime meeting of the Big Three Alliance leaders, Churchill, Truman and Stalin; the conference
highlighted East-West differences on Poland, the occupation of Germany and German reparations as the war drew
to a close.
Prague Spring
Brief period of political reform and freedom in Czechoslovakia in 1968 under the leadership of Alexander
Dubcek; it ended in August 1968 with Dubcek's arrest and the massing of 650,000 Soviet-backed troops in the
country.
-R-
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Started by the United States in the early 1950s in an effort to reach the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, the service moved its headquarters from Munich to Prague in 1995 and now transmits 700 hours of
programming weekly in 23 languages.
RB-47
US warplane shot down in 1960 after it allegedly entered Soviet airspace. A year later, after Kennedy's election,
Khrushchev released the plane's pilots.
Red Army
Armed forces of the Soviet Union, formed after the Bolshevik revolution from the rebel Red Guards and the ruins
of the Imperial Army.
Redstone
Surface-to-surface ballistic missile developed by Werner Von Braun's team and tested successfully in August
1953; with a range of 500 miles, it was used to lift the first US astronaut into space.
-s-
SALT
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in the late 1960s and '70s that led to the signing of the SALT accords in 1972 by
Nixon and Brezhnev; SALT I limited each country's ballistic missile defense and froze the deployment of
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.
SDI
Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (1983), also known as "Star Wars," called for a land- or space-
based shield against a nuclear attack. Although SDI was criticized as unfeasible and in violation of the
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Congress approved billions of dollars for development.
O
ERIC
15
16
SEATO
Created after the Korean War to contain communism, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization lacked British and
French support and proved ineffective during the Vietnam War. It was disbanded after the victory of communist
North Vietnam over the US-backed South.
Second strike capability
A country's ability to launch a nuclear counterattack if it survives a first strike; it was believed to be a key to
deterrence.
Silent majority
Term used by Nixon in a 1969 address, referring to the 70 to 75 percent of the US population that polls showed
had confidence in him despite highly visible protests against US involvement in the Vietnam War.
Solidarity
A free Trade Union formed mid- August 1980, which turned into a national movement to democratize the
communist system; crushed by imposition of martial law, mid-December 1981, surviving underground to take
power in Poland, fall 1989.
Space race
Battle between the United States and the Soviet Union for dominance in outer space.
Sputnik
First artificial Earth satellite, it was launched by Moscow in 1957 and sparked US fears of Soviet dominance in
technology and outer space. It led to the creation of NASA and the space race.
SS-4
Type of Soviet ballistic missile positioned in Cuba that set off the Cuban Missile Crisis.
SS-20
Soviet missile with a limited range of 5,000 miles, it was capable of attacking China, the Mideast, South Asia and
Western Europe. It was eliminated by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed by President
Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev at a Washington Summit on December 8, 1987.
Stasi
East German secret police; it kept files on 5 million East Germans —a third of the population — and infiltrated the
West German military and government.
-T-
Tehran Conference
November 1943 meeting between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, where the Allies agreed to open a Western
front against Nazi Germany to take pressure off the Soviets.
Thermonuclear device
Also known as a hydrogen bomb, or H-bomb, it can be hundreds of thousands of times more powerful than an
atomic bomb and can cause death and destruction for miles around. Radioactive contamination could last for
years and be carried around the world.
38th parallel
Dividing line between North and South Korea first established to separate Soviet and US occupation zones after
Japan's defeat in 1945; the Korean War began in 1950 after North Korean communists crossed the parallel into
South Korea.
16
17
Truman Doctrine
First established in 1947 after Britain no longer could afford to provide anti-communist aid to Greece and Turkey,
it pledged to provide US military and economic aid to any nation threatened by communism.
TU-95
Soviet jet bomber capable of delivering a nuclear device to the United States; 10 of the bombers were displayed
for the West at the 1955 Moscow Air Show.
-u-
U-2
Spy plane capable of taking pictures from as high as 80,000 feet; it was heavily used for US intelligence gathering
before the development of satellite reconnaissance in the 1970s.
-V-
Virgin Lands
Campaign launched by Khrushchev to cultivate Soviet grasslands in central Asia; Khrushchev boasted the Soviets
would overtake the Americans in wheat production.
Vladivostok
Signed by Ford and Brezhnev in 1974, the Vladivostok accords set a limit of 2,400 for the total offensive nuclear
weapons each side could possess.
-W-
War of the Trousers
Influence of Western fashion on the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early '60s was evident in the popularity of
"narrow trousers." Special patrols were organized to root out such influences.
Warsaw Pact
Soviet-led Eastern European defense organization established in Warsaw, Poland, on May 14, 1955; the alliance
countered the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
White guards
Anti-Bolshevik forces who lost the Russian Civil War to the Reds; they included monarchists, constitutional
democrats and socialists.
-Y-
Yalta
Second meeting of the Big Three leaders, Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt; they met in the southern Russian town
of Yalta February 4-11, 1945, to discuss the occupation of postwar Germany and Eastern Europe.
-z-
Zero Option
Western German peace movement proposal — later adopted by the Reagan administration — that called for the ban
of all European intermediate-range nuclear forces.
18
17
RESOURCES:
Cold War Bibliography
Bold items in list are highly recommended! For a great overall view, start with the John L. Gaddis
book and go from there.
Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: the revolution of ’89 witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin,
and Prague (1990). “On the spot” reporting makes for fascinating reading, suitable for both teachers and
high school students.
Barton J. Bernstein, “The Truman Administration and the Korean War,” in Michael Lacey, ed.. The Truman
Presidency ( 1 989), pp. 4 1 0-444.
, “The Pawn as Rook: The Struggle to End the Korean War,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. 10:1
(1978).
William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle, Black Soldier. White Army: The 24' 1 '
Infantry Regiment in Korea ( 1 996).
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea. 1950-1953 (1998).
William B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea (1996).
Ronald J. Caridi, The Korean War and American Politics ( 1 969).
Richard M. Caute. The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Puree under Truman and Eisenhower Cl 978).
James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World Cl 998).
William Chafe, The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic and Political Roles. 1920-1970 Cl 972).
, The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II (1982).
Jian Chen, “China’s Changing Aims During the Korean War, 1950-1951 Journal of East Asian- American
Relations, 1(1992), 8-41.
, China’s Road to the Korean War ( 1 994).
Cold War International History Project Bulletin (beg. 1991).
Mike Dennis. The Rise and Fall of the Greman Democratic Republic 1945-1990 (2000). Recommended for
teachers.
Alexander Dubcek, Hope Dies Last, The Autobiography of Alexander Dubcek (1993). Recommended for
teachers and good high school students.
Rosemary J. Foot, “Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last
Decade,” Diplomatic History . 15 (1991), 41 1-431.
, A Substitute for Victory ( 1 990).
, The Wrong War ( 1 985).
Francis Fukuyama, Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995). (Fukuyama is the
author of The End of History.)
John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (1997).
Sergei N. Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (1993).
Karunaker Gupta, “How Did the Korean War Begin?” China Quarterly. 52 (1972), 699-716; Critics’ Comments
in 54 (1973), 354-368.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996).
Donald Knox. The Korean War: An Oral History. 2 Vol. (1985. 1988).
Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War (1988).
Susan M. Hartmann, The Home Front and Beyond, American Women in the 1940s (1982).
Francis H. Heller, ed.. The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (1977).
Hoa Yufan and Zhai Zliihai, “China’s Decision to the Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” China Quarterly .
121 (1990), 94-114.
Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State. 1945-1 954
(1998).
Michael H. Hunt, “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June, 1950 - June, 1951.” Political Science Quarterly, 107
(1992), 457-474.
D. Clayton James, Refighting the Last War ( 1 992).
, The Years of MacArthur ( 1 985).
Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis. Credibility, and Command (1997).
John Keane, Vaclav Havel, A Political Tragedy in Six Acts , (2000). Mostly for teachers, but reads well,
maybe also for some high school students.
Edward C. Keefer, “President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War,” Diplomatic History. 10
(1986), 267-289.
Nam G. Kim, From Enemies to Allies (1997) (Japan).
Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (1992).
Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power (1972).
Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (2 nd ed., 1997).
Callum A. MacDonald, Korea (1987).
Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography (1986).
David McLellan, Dean Acheson (1976).
Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (1996).
James I. Matray, ed., Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (1991).
, and Kim Chull Baum, eds., Korea and the Cold War: Division. Destruction. Disarmament (1993).
. The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea. 1941-1950 (1985).
, “Truman’s Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in
Korea,” Journal of American History. 66 (1979), 3 14-33.
Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (1988).
Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., “The Korean War,” in Major Problems in American Foreign
Relations. Volume II: Since 1914. (2000).
John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (1989) .
Yonosuke Nagai and Aira Iriye, eds., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (1977).
Organization of American Historians. Magazine of History (entire issue devoted to the Korean War), 14:3
(Spring 2000).
Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (1968).
, ed., 1950: Truman’s Decision (1970).
Sun-yup Paik, From Pusan to Panmuniom: Wartime Memoirs of the Republic of Korea’s First Four Star General
(1992).
O
ERLC
19
20
Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr., Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War ( 1999).
/’Mobilizing for the Cold War: The Korean Conflict and the Birth of the National Security State, June -
December 1950.” Essays in Economic and Business History 12 (June 1994): 106-17.
Hua Qingzhao, From Yalta to Panumniom: Truman’s Diplomacy and the Four Posers. 1945-1953 ( 1 993).
David Rees, Korea. The Limited War (1 964).
William Roskev. Muffled Shots: A Year on the DMZ (1986).
Mark A. Ryan, Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States During the Korean War
(1989).
Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General (1989).
James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and
National Policy 1951-1953. Vol. 3, The Korean War. Part Two (1996).
Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (1972).
John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy (1959).
Russell Spurr. Enter the Dragon: China’s Involvement in the Korean War (1988).
I.F. Stone. The Hidden History of the Korean War (1951).
William Stueck, “The Korean War as International History.” Diplomatic History . 10 (1986), 291-309.
, The Korean War: An International History ( 1 995).
. The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea. 1947-1950 (19811.
Rudolf L. Tokes, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution. (1996). Detailed political science study of Hungary from
1956 - 1990, for teachers.
John Tolland, In Mortal Combat (1991 1.
Rudy Tomedi. No Bugle. No Drums (1993).
Spencer Tucker, ed., Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political. Social, and Military History (2000).
Kathryn Weathersby, “To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim II Sung, and the Prelude to War,” Cold
War International History Bulletin . 5 (1995), 1-9.
, “The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence,” The Journal
of American-East Asian Relations. 2 (1993), 425-458.
Philip West, “Confronting the West,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations . 2(1993), 5-28.
/’Interpreting the Korean War,” American Historical Review. 94 (1989), 80-96.
Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line (1990).
Stephen J. Whitfield. The Culture of the Cold War (1991).
Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (I960).
John E. Wiltz, “Truman and MacArthur, The Wake Island Meeting.” Military Affairs. 42 (1978), 169-176.
Zhang Shu Guang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War. 1950-1953 (1996).
Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshkov, Inside the Kremlim’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev
(1996).
20 2 1
RESOURCES:
Cold War Web Sites
Korean War- [hltp://www. wliistleslop.org/stiidy_collectioiis/korea/laige/index. him) - Project Whistlestop’s
complete collection of President Truman’s papers and archives from the Truman Presidential Library.
Korean War Commemoration - [http://korea50.army.mil] - lists many scheduled events, goals and purposes of
the 50 lh anniversary of the Korean War. Informative “Just for Teachers” section included.
CNN - Cold War - [http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/] - Special pages on Cold War themes (culture,
technology, espionage, the bomb); a “Knowledge Bank” of people profiles, chronologies, maps and historical
documents; games; an "Educator's Guide." An extensive site. Produced by CNN.
Educator Guide to the CNN materials: [http://turnerlearning.com/cnn/coldwar/cw_thmes.html]
Cold War International History Project - [http://cwihp.si.edu/default.htm] - News, events, Virtual Library, and
discussion groups. A project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.
The Cold War - [http://members.xoom.com/ChadMading/coldwar/home.htm] - Cold War facts, articles, events
and Web links. An independent site edited by Mark Vogl.
Conelrad.com’s Mutated Television - [http://www.conelrad.com/mutatedtelevision/index.html] - providing
evidence of the Bomb's corrosive effect on mid-20th century popular culture.
The Harvard Project on Cold War Studies - [http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/] - The Journal of Cold War
Studies, a Cold War book series, events, Harvard and Web Cold War resources. Encourages and underwrites Cold
War research and scholarly communication. Hosted by Harvard's Davis Center for Russian Studies.
The Diefenbunker, Canada's Cold War Museum - [http://www.diefenbunker.ca] - A bunker built in 1959-1961
to house Canada's leaders in a nuclear attack.
Cold War Museum - [http://www.coldwar.org/] - dedicated to education, preservation, and research on the
global, ideological, and political confrontations between East and West from the end of World War II to the
disolution of the Soviet Union.
Cold War Documents and Resources - [http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/coldwar.htm] - collection of
primary and secondary sources on the Cold War. Maintained by Vincent Ferraro of Mount Holyoke College.
Cold War Policies 1945-1991 - [http://ac.acusd.edu/History/20th/coldwar0.html] - includes information on all
aspects of the Cold War from Yalta to glasnost’ and beyond. Includes a collection of maps. Hosted by the
Department of History at the University of San Diego and maintained by Steve Schoenherr.
Open Society Archives - [http://www.osa.ceu. hu/a] - research institution focusing on Communism and the Cold
War, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, in the period after World War II. Maintained at the Central
European University in Budapest.
The Cold War Texts and Archives - [http://history.hanover.edu/20th/coldwar.htm] - Primary and secondary
texts from and on US and Soviet leaders. Hosted by the Department of History at Hanover College.
Senator Joe McCarthy - A Multimedia Celebration - [http://webcorp.com/mccarthy/] - Audio and video of Joe
McCarthy's famous moments.
Overseas Brats' Stories from the Cold War - [http://www.vni.net/~mcl/osb/brstor.htm] - from Overseas Brats
Online ("A Resource for Children of the Cold War").
The Cold War and the Social Sciences: An Annotated Bibliography -
[http://www.lib.odu.edu/anss/cold_war.htm] - From the Anthropology and Sociology Section of the American
Library Association's Association of College and Research Libraries.
The American 1950s - [http://www.english.upenn.edu/~afilreis/50s/home.html] - The literature and culture of the
American 1950s. From Alan Filreis of the University of Pennsylvania.
21
22
Conflict Seems Vaguely Un-American: Teaching the Conflicts and the Legacy of Cold War -
[http://www.english.upenn.edu/-afilreis/graff.html] - written by Alan Filreis.
George Orwell and the Last Man in Europe - [http://www.pagesz.net/-stevek/europe/lecturel3.html] - from
Steven Kreis', The History Guide.
Cold War: Postwar Estrangement - [http://sunsite.unc.edu/expo/soviet.exhibit/coldwar.html] - Images of
primary documents from the Soviet Archives Exhibit of the University of North Carolina's WWW EXPO.
YahooPs Cold War Pages - [http://dir.yahoo.com/Arts/Humanities/History/20th_Century/Cold_War/]
Hot Links on the Cold War - [http://www.stmartin.edu/-dprice/cold.war.htm].
Early Warning Connection - [http://www.creativexposure.com/earlywng/index.htm] - attempt to make it easier
for everyone interested in Early Warning history to find the resources that are available.
The Moosylvania Page - [http://www.speakeasy.org/-ohh/moose.htm] Explores the “incredible combination of
political commentary, silly animation, rapid-fire delivery and horrible puns” of Rocky and Bullwinkle cartoons.
INSTRUCTIONS TO STUDENTS:
Who Won the Cold War?
PART I: Participate in a research / decision making activity
• You will be given the Chillin’ Chart, a blank form with the following
headings: Popular Culture, Politics / Ideology, International, Environment,
and Military Industrial Complex.
• Your teacher will assign you one of these listed categories to research. You
will analyze primary sources from both the Soviet and the US points of view.
• Your mission is to analyze and to share both perspectives and points of view on your category with the class.
Remember that you will be called upon to justify your positions.
• You can complete the entire form as others share from their assigned categories.
PART II: Use the Def Con model
• Now you must make an important decision about this key Cold War event, based on the category information
on the Chillin’ Chart.
• Choose the Def Con rating and write a justification essay to your teacher’s specifications defending your
choice.
— OR—
• Choose the Def Con rating and defend your choice in a five- minute speech. Clearly justify your evaluation
of this key event position.
PART III: Closure
• Did this round of the Cold War have a clear winner? If so, who won, and why? If not, why was there not a
clear winner?
• What are some of the long-term effects of this Cold War event? Check the different categories on your
Chillin’ Chart to draw your conclusions.
• Does this Cold War event have remaining effects today?
• How has current international popular culture been influenced by this Cold War event? Examples:
• Korean War — presence of 38,000 US troops in Korea today, US refusal to sign the international ban on
land mines because of US land mines there;
• Sputnik — higher education federal funding to study technology and Russian culture;
• Cuban Missile Crisis — the Elian Gonzales incident in 2000;
• Czechoslovakia 1968 — anti-Russian sentiment in Central Europe, abandoned military bases, problems
with housing for remaining Russian military after the break-up of the Warsaw Pact;
• Nicaragua — cheaper bananas.
erJc
24
23
The Chillin’ Chart
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ERIC
Let’s Play Cold War Jeopardy!
Here are some sample Cold War Jeopardy questions. There is room at the end to add some of your own.
And the answer is...
I was the Russian spy who was exchanged for G. Francis
Powers.
This river was the dividing line between North Korea and the
People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.).
I was the Russian leader who was called the “Butcher of
Budapest.”
My organization and I helped bring an end to communism in
Poland in 1989.
These are the two Russian words used to define the Gorbachev
era.
I made “Redbook” more than a magazine.
My political manipulation of the US and USSR allowed me to
dam my country
I was the first woman in space.
I was the first US president to visit the USSR.
I was a Russian leader, still known for “the period of
stagnation.”
I was a Soviet Foreign Minister, but now I have Georgia on my
mind,
These islands are a point of contention between Russia and
Japan.
I heightened the Cold War by landing my plane on Red Square
in May 1987.
I bombed as a defense expert so I turned to peace work.
This Beatles Song was especially popular for Soviets.
This hamburger chain used a mock Russian beauty pageant to
sell its burgers.
This is the dividing line between North and South Korea.
This was the border/dividing line between East and West Berlin.
This was the political divide between the East and the West
during the Cold War.
I was the leader of North Korea during the time of the Korean
“War.”
I have been the leader of Cuba since 1959.
I was the leader of Egypt who nationalized the Suez Canal in
1956, sparking a world crisis.
I was the leader of Yugoslavia who clashed with Stalin.
What is the question?
Who was Abel?
What is the Yalu?
Who was Andropov?
What was Solidarity and who was
Lech Walesa?
What are glasnost’ and perestroika?
Who was Mao?
Who was Nassar?
Who was Tereshkova?
Who was Nixon?
Who was Brezhnev?
Who is Schevardnadze?
What are the Kurile Islands?
Who is Matthew Rust?
Who was Andrei Sakharov?
What is “Back in the USSR?”
What is Wendy’s?
What is the 38 th parallel?
What was the Berlin Wall?
What was the “Iron Curtain?”
Who was Kim Il-Sung?
Who is Fidel Castro?
Who was Gamul Abdul Nasser?
Who was Josip Broz , or “Tito?”
29
This was the year of both the Hungarian uprising and the Suez
Crisis.
This was the year of both Stalin’s death and the Korean
Armistice.
This was the year of the Bay of Pigs crisis and the construction
of the Berlin Wall.
I starred as the bad guy in the classic Cold War film, “Dr
Strangelove, or How I learned to love the bomb”
I starred as the hero submarine captain in the 1990 film, “Hunt
for Red October.”
Russia fought this country in what is considered their parallel to
the US’ Vietnam.
This military status is abbreviated Def Con.
This was the name of the first dog in space.
This is the name of the film in which Patrick Swayze leads his
high school classmates to resist the Russian invasion of the US.
This is the name of the Richard Burton film where he played a
spy who wished to retire.
I was the famous U2 pilot who was shot down while spying on
the USSR.
This was the site of the first official Soviet nuclear test in 1949.
This was the name of the cathedral blown up by Stalin in order
to build the Palace of Soviets in central Moscow.
In 1947, this mainframe computer, used to plot trajectories and
distances for artillery, was a precursor to the concept of the
Internet.
When was 1956?
When was 1953?
What was 1961?
Who was Peter Sellers?
Who is Sean Connery?
What is Afghanistan?
What is “Defensive Condition?”
Who was “Laika?”
What is “Red Dawn?”
What is “The Spy Who Came in from
the Cold?”
Who was Francis Gary Powers?
Where is Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan?
What was/is the Church of the
Savior?
What is ENIAC?
30
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Personal Interview Guide
Subject of Interview:
Person (s) Interviewed:
Date:
1 . Before conducting the interview make sure you have researched the topic of the interview. If the
person (s) to be interviewed appear to be mistaken on public facts, such as specific dates/times, do
not dwell on it. After decades of time items such as specific time and day may not be completely
accurate. Remember, the purpose of the interview is to expose the personal experience of the person
(s) interviewed.
2. Prior to the interview it would be considered common courtesy to send a brief note reminding the
persons (s) to be interviewed of your appointment and subject to be discussed. This will give them
the time to recall experiences of the past and perhaps primary documents.
3. At the time of the interview make sure you have a clear idea of what you wish to find out. Specific
questions are good but there are times during the course of an interview when information
completely off the subject could arise. Stay on the subject! Be polite and redirect the person (s) on
to the subject. One of the best ways to achieve this is by asking a new question.
4. If you find yourself in an interview that is out of your control (i.e., the person interviewed will not
cooperate, or appears to be incompetent) politely rap up the questioning and excuse yourself from
the interview.
5. After the interview has been completed it would be advised to send a “Thank You” to the person (s)
you have interviewed. You may need to talk with them again. Leave the door open.
31
29
Who Won the Cold War?
DOCUMENTS FOR CHILLIN’ CHART CATEGORIES: KOREAN WAR
as of November 13, 2001
INTRODUCTION TO THE KOREAN WAR
From the Truman Presidential Library Archives with map inserts
Chillin’ Chart Categories:
Culture
. History Textbook readings about the Korean War: US and USSR textbooks
. Guided looking at a painting: gaining perspective (USSR)
. Popular Culture: Films about the Cold War and other examples (US)
. Press: The New York Times on June 27, 1950 front page and article (US)
• Pravda, Soviet newspaper, article from June 27, 1950 (USSR)
te Drivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang and the Allegations of Bacteriological
tJt ,0 V.M, Molotov on lune I, ,953
(USSR)
Military industrial Complex:
Technology
Economics
• Truman request for appropriations to Congress (US)
• Kim II Sung requests aid from Stalin (USSR)
Military
• Truman message to Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)
• Kim II Sung requests military support from Stalin (USSR)
Politics/Ideology/Propaganda
Excerpt from Molotov’s Memoirs and Inside the Kremlin’s Cold W ar (USSR)
Excerpts from Truman address (US) . , n ic\
Cartoons from HE News, the newspaper of the United Electrical Workers
Soviet political poster (USSR) . . . ,, IC ,
Laws ofthe State of Washington, 1951: Subversive Activities Act (US)
International . ]Q , A
. US State Department Central Files on India’s Internal and Foreign Affairs 1 945- 95
^ P ctaiin (\ iqqr'i and Nehru (India) — US Dept, of State summary (US)
• Connection between Stalin (USSR) ana rsenru u nu1 ^ r r c talin i niSSRI
. Ciphered telegram from Roshchin (USSR Ambassador-China) to F.l.pov [Stalin] (USS )
Introduction to the Korean War
from the Truman Presidential Library compilation of Truman's Papers
On June 25, 1950, 75,000 Soviet-armed North Korean troops dashed across the 38 lh parallel of the
divided Korean peninsula. As news of the Communist attack on the US-backed Republic of Korea
(ROK) trickled into Washington, DC, members of the Truman administration assembled to formulate a
response. Everyone assumed that the Kremlin has masterminded the offensive. “Korea,” President
Truman told White House aide George M. Elsey, “is the Greece of Far East Asia. If we are tough enough
now, if we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won’t take any next steps. But if
we just stand by... There is no telling what they’ll do.”
This volume of the White House records affords an opportunity to recreate and analyze one of the
most dramatic and important crises of the Cold War. The papers of George Elsey, Dean Acheson,
Charles S. Murphy, and others provide insight into the thinking of the White House, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and key members of Congress on the origins of the Korean conflict from June through November
1950. They help explain the administration’s decision to defend South Korea, its reading of Soviet and
Communist Chinese intentions, its policies toward the United Nations (UN), and its decision to cross the
38 lh parallel and attempt to reunite the war-tom nation. Finally, the documents show how the president
opted against asking Congress for a declaration of war, an exercise of authority that contributed to an
ongoing redefinition of America’s constitutional system of checks and balances.
US intervention in Korea actually began in 1945, during the closing days of the Second World War,
when Washington and Moscow drew a line at the 38 ,h parallel and jointly occupied the peninsula. From
1945 through 1950 the former Japanese colony became a pawn of Cold War politics. During this critical
stage, US officials threw their support behind the conservative leadership of the South Korean Syngman
Rhee, blessing his regime with diplomatic recognition and economic and military aid. At the same time
the Communist leader Kim II Sung fastened his authoritarian grip over North Korea. As American and
Soviet forces withdrew in 1949 and 1950, the two Korean leaders — each a devout nationalist — claimed
exclusive legitimacy, vowed to reunify their homeland, and sanctioned a routine exchange of cross border
skirmishes.
Although the Korean War can be viewed as having been originally a civil war, the North Korean
invasion of June 1950 provoked a major international crisis. It took place in the context of the growing
Soviet-American antagonism generated by an array of issues, including Soviet expansionism in Eastern
Europe, US reconstruction policies in Western Europe, and a flurry of crises in Iran, Greece, Turkey,
Berlin, China and elsewhere. On the Korean peninsula, Kim II Sung’s troops fought with Soviet tanks
and arms. And in public forums both Moscow and Beijing accused the ROK of provoking the conflict
and openly cheered the North Korean cause.
White House officials, including the president, hurried back from the weekend to Washington on
Sunday, June 25 to be briefed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and other State and Defense
Department officials. Huddled together at Blair House, Truman’s quarters as the White House underwent
renovation, they laid plans for assisting South Korean forces. At a second Blair House meeting the
following evening, as news of the ROK’s political and military collapse filtered in, the president agreed to
the deployment of US air and naval power in Korea, to order the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to seal
off possible conflict with the People’s Republic of China, and to increase military aid to the Philippines
and French Indochina. Although Truman consulted with congressional leaders the following day, and
continued to do so throughout the conflict, he chose not to seek a declaration of war, an initiative that
would be criticized most harshly in the wake of later military setbacks.
As the administration escalated American military intervention, the White House and other
government spokespersons avoided direct accusations of Soviet aggression. Directives to the
33
Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), General Douglas MacArthur, specifically warned against
provoking the Soviets and Chinese, and limited military action above the 38 lh parallel. Still, US military
involvement deepened, and on June 30 President Truman deployed the first American ground forces. The
administration also developed plans to seek supplemental defense appropriations and to substantially
increase military aid to anti-Communist allies around the globe. Soviet denunciations of US actions
intensified, but since the USSR had boycotted the United Nations in protest of its refusal to seat the
People’s Republic of China, it could not veto UN resolutions passed on June 25 and June 27 that
condemned North Korea’s aggressions and asked members to assist the ROK.
Flistorians debate the degree of Soviet and Chinese involvement in the initial stages of the war. In
recent years, the availability of official sources in the former Soviet Union, and to a greater extent in the
People’s Republic of China, has increased. The new materials, by no means a complete record, appear to
confirm the previously published memoirs of former Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev that stated that Stalin
had given Kim II Sung advance approval for the invasion, but had considered the project to be primarily a
North Korean undertaking. Surprised by Washington’s strong response, and wishing to avoid a great
power confrontation, Stalin lost enthusiasm for the adventure. On the other hand, Mao Zedong’s (Mao
Tse-tung’s) recently released cables to Stalin, Kim II Sung, and his Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (Chou
En-lai) suggest that Moscow’s on-again, off-again policies embittered the Chinese Communist leader.
The redispatch of US forces to neighboring Korea most likely raised security concerns in Beijing, where
support for Asian revolutionaries was already considered a noble cause.
In the tense, crisis-filled atmosphere of the summer and fall of 1950 it may be fair to say that none of
the participants accurately predicted the outcome of their decisions. By mid-July the American-led UN
forces had stabilized their hold at Pusan at the southern tip of the peninsula and began to slowly push
back the assault. Then on September 15 General MacArthur executed a brilliant amphibious landing at
Inchon, along South Korea’s northwest coast, and trapped invading forces. As confidence grew through
the summer and fall the administration rethought its strategy of restoring the prewar status quo. Although
General MacArthur acted as a forceful advocate of a border war, he ultimately acted in strict accordance
with the president’s directives. In early September, President Truman signed the top secret NSC 8 1 ,
reprinted in this collection, which called for UN troops to continue their march above the 38 th parallel.
After the UN General Assembly passed a supportive resolution on October 7, MacArthur launched his
forward offensive.
As MacArthur’s troops punched north, Mao implemented plans to intervene on North Korea’s behalf.
Zhou Enlai notified the government of India, which since July had been advocating a negotiated
settlement of the war, that further UN advances would provoke a Chinese military response. Summaries
of the famous MacArthur-Truman conference at Wake Island in mid-October, also included in this
volume, demonstrate that the general nonetheless remained supremely confident of US military power
and discounted the chances of Chinese intervention. The fighting would be over by Thanksgiving, he told
Truman, and then the work toward postwar rehabilitation could begin.
MacArthur arrived at the North Korean capital of Pyong Yang on October 19 brimming with
confidence, and bantered with newsmen about the disintegration of the enemy’s forces. Then, at the
battle of Unsan during the first week of November, two Chinese divisions inflicted major casualties on
ROK and US troops. Mysteriously, the Chinese quickly withdrew, leaving MacArthur unshaken in his
belief that the war’s end was at hand. Two weeks later the People’s Republic unleashed the full fury of
its military might, and UN and US troops retreated chaotically down the peninsula. Both sides suffered
massive casualties.
In analyzing the Korean War, historians have grappled with a number of complex questions. One set
of questions centers on the origins of the war. Did the Korean War spring from global, Soviet-engineered
Communist aggression? Or did its sources lie in a Korean civil war? Did Soviet leaders plan and order
the North Korean attack? Did they give the “green light”? Or did their North Korean allies initiate the
O
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34
conflict? What exactly was China’s role and why did it intervene in the fall of 1950? Why did the United
Nations take action? Was the military operation to stop the North Korean invasion truly an international
undertaking — or primarily a US effort?
A second set of questions focuses on decision making in Washington. Why did the Truman
administration intervene? Should the United States have intervened? What US interests were at stake?
Who made key decisions in the Truman administration during the height of the crises? Did President
Truman maintain control of policy making? Or did subordinates such as General MacArthur and
Secretary of State Acheson lead the process?
What role did Congress and public opinion play? Did the administration carefully study the
ramifications of US intervention? Or did they rush to simplistic conclusions and make hurried, ill-
considered decisions? Why did Truman change war goals— that is, why did he order American troops
above the 38 th parallel? Why did US officials so badly misread Chinese intentions?
Over 38,000 Americans lost their lives in the Korean War between 1950 and 1953, and over two
million Koreans perished. The conflict escalated Soviet- American tensions and made irrelevant, after
Chinese intervention, any talk of US accommodation with the People’s Republic of China. It extended
US political and military around the world, including French Indochina and Southeast Asia. In the United
States, it generated an expensive military build-up and helped fuel the anti-Communist hysteria and
McCarthyism of the early 1950s. In domestic politics, the long, agonizing war proved disastrous to
President Truman and was probably critical to the Republican capture of the White House in the 1952
elections.
Still in today’s post-cold war world, the divided Korean peninsula remains a political tinderbox and a
destabilizing factor in international affairs. Often referred to as “the forgotten war, the Korean War has
cast an immense shadow over the second half of the twentieth century.
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MAP l
MAP 2
From; Bfcfe And Flow, Vovwt£»«x 1950- July 1951
Oonta* or Military Hlatory, 1990
By BlXly C. Ifamin
The above maps are from the Korean War Commemoration web site: http://korea 50 .army.mil/maps
SEST COPY AVAILABLE
CULTURE: Comparison of History Textbooks
US Text
Excerpt from: A College History of the United States (Vol. 2: 1865 to the present), Jennings B.
Sanders (Row, Peterson & Co., 1962), pg. 480-482.
The Korean War
In Korea, UN and American policy was put to the test. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, Roosevelt,
Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek had agreed that Korea should be “free and independent.” At the Potsdam
Conference in 1945 the 38 th parallel of latitude had been designated as the dividing line in Korea between
Russian occupation forces on the north and American occupation forces on the south. This arrangement
continued until 1948-1949 when occupation forces of both powers were withdrawn, and the affairs of the
country were left to the Republic of Korea in the south and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea in
the north. The governmental division of the country resulted from UN inability to bring about the
unification of North and South Korea during the occupation period, on terms satisfactory to the occupying
powers.
On June 25, 1 950, the North Korean army invaded South Korea. On June 27 as a result of a special
session of the UN Security Council, boycotted by Russia, UN members were called upon to resist this
aggression, and President Truman, with the overwhelming support of the country on the issue, promptly
responded. To keep a dangerous situation from becoming worse, the President had already ordered the
seventh fleet to prevent hostilities between Chinese Nationalists and communist forces. Thus began a
three-years’ conflict between the UN, chiefly supported by the United States, on the one side, and the
Communists of Korea, assisted actively after November, 1950 by Communist China, and less directly
from the beginning by Russia, on the other. The intervention of Red Chinese troops in the war prevented
a complete UN victory, and finally produced a costly see-saw war in the vicinity of the 38 lh parallel.
As losses mounted and victory seemed no nearer, complaints arose in the United States that the UN
forces were not allowed to win. In a sense this was true. The Truman administration, as well as the
British government and other UN participants in the war, believed that an attack across the Yalu River
into Manchuria — the Red Chinese “sanctuary” — would lead to an all-out war with Red China and
probably to a general world war. Because he did not agree with the decision to stay south of the Yalu
River, and because he voiced his dissent publicly, General MacArthur, in charge of UN operations in
Korean, was removed from his command by President Truman. This action, in the spring of 195 1, caused
a memorable emotional outburst on the part of MacArthur’ s defenders in the United States, an outburst
which reached a climax when the general delivered an eloquent address before a joint session of
Congress.
During the election campaign of 1952, Republicans made much of “bungling” in Korea, and Dwight
D. Eisenhower, the Republican presidential candidate, promised that, if elected, he would go immediately
to Korea. Elected, he made the trip. Early in his administration (July 27, 1953), the long-drawn-out
armistice negotiations were brought to a close and the war was halted at the 38 th parallel. This result was
far from satisfactory. Korea was divided as before, and President Syngman Rhee of South Korea looked
impatiently toward a resumption of hostilities as that all Korea might come under his government.
However unsatisfactory the results may have been, the UN at least had shown it could and would
resist aggression. It seemed clear that, but for the action that had been taken, the Communists would have
gained control of all Korea. The Eisenhower, like the Truman administration, did not question the basic
soundness of the course the United States has taken; nevertheless, with 157,530 American casualties,
including 54,246 dead, as a result of the war, it was obvious that the UN had no painless remedies for the
evils and ailments of the world.
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37
CULTURE: Comparison of History Textbooks
Soviet Text
From The History of the USSR: The Epoch of Socialism (1917- 1961) textbook (Printing House of
Political Literature, Moscow, 1964), pp. 315, 516. Translated by Lyne Tumlinson, Outreach Coordinator
for the University of Kansas Center for Russian and East European Studies.
The Korean War
Creation of Anti-Soviet War Blocs / Transition of American Imperialism to Open Acts of Aggression
In the summer of 1950, American imperialism shifted from preparation of force to direct acts of
aggression. In June 1950, the American imperialists and the puppet regime of South Korea
unleashed war on the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (KNR). The USA simultaneously
occupied the territory of the KNR and the island of Taiwan.
In July 1950, the USA succeeded in passing an illegal resolution in the UN Security Council, in
which those governments agreed to recommend to members of the UN to send troops to Korea.
In this manner, the USA used the flag of the UN to pursue its own hostile acts. The aggression of
the USA against Korea raised indignation and protest from the side of the world’s democratic
forces. The Soviet Union and a myriad of other countries demanded the immediate cessation of
war in Korea and the exit of foreign troops from Korean soil.
Nuclear Arms
The USSR ’s Fight for Reduction and Prohibition of Atomic Bombs /Movement of Supporters of Peace
The Soviet administration more than once brought a proposal to the UN about general reduction
of weapons and prohibition of using atomic energy for the goals of war. Regardless of the
resistance of international reactionary circles to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries,
represented at the UN, this proposal was accepted in the resolution of December 1946 about the
principles of universal regulation and reduction of arms and weapon capability. In November
1947, a resolution directed against propagating new war was also accepted by the UN General
Assembly. However, the practical fulfillment of these resolutions was foiled by the western
powers. Nonetheless the USSR continued a stubborn fight for arms reduction and the ban of
atomic weapons. The Soviet delegation to the UN took with them a series of vital proposals,
including the suggestion to conclude a pact for the strengthening of peace among the countries of
the USSR, the USA, China, England, and France.
The Soviet Union and the socialist camps’ policy of peace and friendship among peoples met
active support from a wide span of people in various countries. On the other side, the aggressive
politics of the USA and those governments connected with it by military and political pacts,
pushed more and more serious opposition every year against everyone.
In the post-war period, a mass movement in defense of peace gradually developed based on
intensifying international relations and threats of new war. This movement encircled hundreds of
millions of people, from various views and beliefs.
The elevation and development of movements of peace movements became an important factor in
the fight against the aggressive plans of imperialist circles.
Massacre in Korea ( 1951 )
Massacre in Korea ( 1951 )
What’s Your Perception?
1 . What do you see?
2 . What do you feel about what you see?
3. What do you know about what you see?
4. Do you know who is the artist? What is the artist’s message?
5. Whose point of view does this painting represent? Why do you think so?
6. List other questions you might have your students answer from looking at this painting:
Others’ Perceptions:
1 . From the Online Picasso Project <http://www.tamu.edu/mocl/picasso/tour/t5 1 ,html>
by Dr. Enrique Mallen, Texas A&M University
January 18, 1951: Picasso paints Massacre en Coree, a political statement about American
intervention in Korea. The painting represents a deliberate effort, in its subject matter and realistic
treatment, to meet the demands made on him by the Communist Party.
"On the right a group of anonymous, modem, visored, armored figures under the command of an
officer with a sword are about to shoot a captive group of naked women over on the left, some of
them pregnant, some of them with small children. The picture is almost monochromatic as
Guernica." (O'Brian, Patrick. Pablo Picasso. A Biography . (1994). New York: W.W. Norton &
Company. 402.)
2. Art critics have called it “low-grade Stalinist propaganda” and “one of the worst Picassos ever
painted.”
3. Hugh Eakin “ARTnews L.L.C.” wrote in a review of Gertje Utley’s Pablo Picasso: The Communist
Years (2000):
His art expanded to include ... such “overtly political paintings as Massacre in Korea (1951), an
atypical, propagandistic piece denouncing American involvement in the Korean War.
“Picasso went on, in early 1951, to produce what Utley calls his ‘first openly didactic painting in
support of a Soviet political position.’
“In fact, Massacre in Korea, depicting soldiers firing on a group of naked women, is considered of
marginal artistic value due to its overwrought ideological message.”
4. In 1 993, Nirvana organized a benefit show to raise awareness about the rapes and other human
rights violations that were being perpetrated against women and girls in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, and Serbia. The t-shirts that were created for the benefit were limited to a 2000 unit
press based upon an agreement made with the estate of Pablo Picasso. The front features a
reproduction of Picasso's Massacre in Korea 18 January/1951 and the back features the names
■ of all the bands who participated in the concert, which include Nirvana, L7, Disposable Heroes
of Hiphoprisy, and the Breeders. The t-shirt may be seen at:
http://www.homealive.org/auction/auction.html
41
Picasso's Party Line
A new book suggests that Picasso's commitment to the Communist Party — and the Soviet cause — was much greater
than previously thought
By Hugh Eakin
W hen Pablo Picasso applied for a visa to the United States in 1950, it threw State Department and FBI officials
into full alert The purpose of the artist's visit — his first ever to the United States — was to lead 12 delegates from
the Congres Mondial des Partisans de la Paix (World Congress of Peace Partisans) to Washington in an effort to
persuade President Truman to ban the atomic bomb. The peace congress, which had been founded a year earlier in
Paris and Prague, had already been identified as a powerful Communist front. More important, Picasso himself was
considered a leading member of the French Communist Party and had been monitored by the FBI since 1944. After
consulting the American embassies in Moscow and Paris, as well as members of Congress and the FBI, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee denied visas for the entire delegation.
Picasso's dove was the ubiquitous symbol of the peace movement, appearing on postage stamps in the Soviet Union
(above) as well as on posters, T-shirts, scarves, and mugs.
Collection of Gertje Utley
Picasso as a Cold Warrior for the Evil Empire?
Although the artist's membership in the Communist Party in the late 1940s and early '50s is well known, it has been
largely ignored by scholars as a casual flirtation, with slight, if any, bearing on his art. Picasso's work did not
adhere to the dictates of Socialist Realist esthetics and was for the most part not even considered appropriate for
exhibition in the Soviet Union. Besides, his market and his most important admirers were in the bourgeois West.
How could he have become a weapon in the anti-American arsenal assembled by Stalin's ruthless culture czar
Andrei Zhdanov?
The little-known visa incident is only one of many striking examples of Picasso's political activism recorded in
Gertje Utley's Pablo Picasso: The Communist Years, published this month by Yale University Press. Picasso joined
the French Communists in 1944, at the age of 63, and remained an unwavering party member for the rest-of his
life — through the exposure of the evils of Stalinism, the brutal Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956,
and the subsequent desertion of many other French intellectuals with whom he had become politically active.
At the height of his involvement, his activities included debriefings by top party apparatchiks, trips around Europe
to promote the international peace movement, and donations of large sums of money — often in the form of
artworks — to dozens of Communist-supported causes. (Picasso supported numerous party and party-affiliated
initiatives through his dealer Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler, including, for example, gifts of 2.5 million and 3 million
francs in 1955 and 1956, respectively, for an annual party event.) His art expanded to include numerous party
posters, on-demand sketches for the party newspaper, L'Humanite;, and such overtly political paintings as
Massacre in Korea (1951), an atypical, propagandists piece denouncing American involvement in the
Korean War. He even gave his daughter the name Paloma, Spanish for dove, after the Communist peace crusade
adopted his drawing of the bird as its international symbol.
"For students of Picasso, the decade right after World War II has often been considered less interesting," says
Utley, an independent art historian who stumbled on the subject a decade ago as a Ph.D. student at New York
University's Institute of Fine Arts. "People generally look at his paintings first, and that period, simply in terms of
painting, isn't that exciting." Spurred on by William Rubin, the distinguished Picasso scholar and director emeritus
of painting and sculpture at the Museum of Modem Art in New York, she found there was much more to the story.
"It was precisely the period of his most active commitment to the Communist Party," says Utley, who was bom in
Berlin and had a successful career in public relations in Paris before going on to pursue art history in London and
New York. "Quite a bit of time went into traveling for the party and filling the constant demands placed on him.
And when you see the variety of his creative work at the time — ceramics, lithographs, and party posters — it fits
very well with his political preoccupations."
With the help of her dissertation advisers — Kirk Vamedoe, chief curator at the Museum of Modem Art, and Robert
Rosenblum, New York University professor and curator at the Guggenheim Museum — and the guidance of Tony
Judt, a New York University historian and expert on French Communism, Utley turned the topic into a doctoral
thesis of more than 700 pages in 1997.
Poring over the voluminous boxes of uncatalogued correspondence in the archives of Paris's Musee Picasso, as well
as many other sources, she discovered extensive evidence of Picasso's political activities and friendships. She
interviewed more than 20 of his friends, including leading French Communist writers and painters, who had known
the artist in the early postwar period. She also obtained Picasso's 187-page FBI file through the Freedom of
Information Act. Finally, she examined the circumstances surrounding thousands of Picasso's works, from the
simplest peace dove to Guernica, to consider how and to what extent the artist's political engagement affected his
muse. This research effort was distilled into the 260 pages of the new book, which traces Picasso's Communist
engagement from his youthful encounters with radical social movements to his twilight years as an inactive but still
loyal party member.
Picasso joined the Communist Party just as it was entering the period of its greatest influence on French cultural
life. The Communist leader Maurice Thorez had been allowed to return from exile in the Soviet Union, and from
1945 to '47, Communists participated in the French government. The excesses of Stalinism had been obscured by
the wartime suffering of the Soviet people and their heroic victory over the Nazis, while the G.I. Bill and later the
Marshall Plan had resulted in what to some in France seemed a new kind of "occupation" by an imperialist United
States. Among the adherents and fellow travelers who were drawn to the antifascist and anti-American party line
were such cultural luminaries as the writers Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir and the artists Fernand
Leger, Henri Matisse, and Tristan Tzara.
Picasso biographer John Richardson, who knew the artist well and was in Paris just after the war, says, "Intellec-
tuals espoused Communism because it was the respectable thing to do. It was, as it were, politically correct."
For Picasso, Utley observes, there were also strong personal motives. The artist considered his acceptance into the
party the logical conclusion of everything his life had stood for. Bom in Malaga in 1881, he was exposed to
anarchist and pacifist movements as a teenager in Barcelona, well before he settled in Paris in 1904. While the
extent of these encounters is still debated by scholars, by the start of World War I, Picasso had developed the
lifelong antipathy to armed conflict that would play out in his energetic efforts for the Communist-sponsored peace
movement. The Spanish Civil War turned him into a Franco hater and antifascist, a stance that as early as 1936
earned him the title of pintor marxista (Marxist painter) in the Spanish press. Although Picasso never read Marx
and had very little knowledge of what was actually happening in the Soviet Union, Utley says, his membership in
the party reflected a deep-rooted commitment to Communist ideals. "He was a real believer in the basic tenets," she
notes, "even if he was convinced he could be a Communist without following everything."
Picasso's 1944 entrance into the party was an epochal event that the Communists put to immediate use. Embraced
by the leadership, Picasso was soon being instructed in party matters by Thorez himself and guided into cultural
militancy by his friends Louis Aragon and Paul Eluard. Although he was not expected to perform daily party
functions or attend routine cell meetings, Picasso was given a prominent place in such Communist initiatives as the
Nationale Front des Arts and the France-U.S.S.R. Committee. From 1947, when he settled in the Communist-ruled
town of Vallauris with his companion Franfoise Gilot, he became host to, among others, the Soviet writer Ilya
Ehrenburg and Georges Tabaraud, the editor of the party newspaper Patriote de Nice, which Picasso himself
supported financially. He was also enlisted in international efforts, like signing a letter to President Truman
protesting the NATO pact, supporting the American Communist Party, and according to one account, denouncing
the 1J.S. government's arrest of the Hollywood Ten in 1950.
Most important, Utley argues, Picasso quickly became one of the leading figures in the Communist-led peace
movement. This activity is significant in light of the role played by the movement in the early years of the Cold
War. Although ostensibly created independently by intellectuals to combat nuclear armaments, the international
initiative was, in fact, an orchestrated effort by Soviet commissar Zhdanov to create what Utley calls "an actively
political organ in support of Soviet foreign policy, the most powerful nonmilitary weapon that the Soviet Union set
up to confront NATO." Involved from the beginning, Picasso agreed to attend the inaugural conference of the
movement in 1948 in Wroclaw, Poland, despite his hatred of travel and fear of flying (it was his first ride in an
airplane). In 1949 he attended a similar congress in Rome, and after his delegation was denied entry to the United
States in 1950, he traveled to another congress in Sheffield, England, where he gave a speech. In November of that
year Picasso received the Stalin Peace Prize from the Soviet government in recognition of his efforts.
Picasso churned out numerous sketches and posters for party causes, including portraits of Thorez and Ehrenburg, a
controversial newspaper drawing of Stalin at the time of the Soviet leader's death, in 1953, and idealized sketches
of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg a year after their execution in the United States for divulging nuclear secrets to the
Soviet Union. Picasso's iconic dove, reworked countless times by the artist, became ubiquitous in the peace
movement and even appeared on postage stamps in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. So
popular was the dove image in the 1950s that the CIA-backed Paix et Liberte movement targeted it for caricature in
anti -Communist propaganda campaigns.
In the United States, where Picasso's reputation had reached new heights shortly before the war, the artist's political
activities were taken seriously by the government. As early as 1945, shortly after the bureau opened its file on the
artist, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover personally contacted the American embassy in Paris to request further
information on Picasso, and the United States Office of Cable and Radio Censorship was instructed to report to the
bureau cables to and from the artist. Among the jumble of information and rumors collected in the FBI file is a
1950 entry that goes so far as to accuse the artist of spying for the Soviet Union, a charge that was never
substantiated.
The American press, Utley shows, responded to Picasso's politics with a combination of bemusement and dismay.
Initially, his opinions were dismissed as those of a political naif. But as the Cold War alignment hardened in the
late 1940s and early 1950s, the artist was increasingly criticized for his party work. In 1949 an article in ARTnews
attacked Picasso as a "staunch poster-designer and part-time propagandist." A year later, the New York Times
derided his "fat little pigeons." By 1954 the New York Sunday Mirror had stated that "before the red bug bit him
Picasso was the greatest artist of our time." According to Utley, Picasso's Communism may have encouraged the
general decline of his reputation in America in the 1950s and turned off some of his American buyers.
Still, even during the years of his greatest political involvement, Picasso never followed the party-endorsed
Socialist Realist style in his art. Although they were admired by some of the party intellectuals, his paintings, with
their deformed figures, were generally considered inappropriate for digestion by the Communist rank and file and
were not reproduced in Communist newspapers. At the Wroclaw conference, Picasso was even attacked for his
decadent style by Alexander Fadeyev, president of the Union of Soviet Writers. But Picasso resisted making
esthetic accommodations to Communist orthodoxy. "In Russia, they hated his work but liked his politics," Gilot
recalls. "In America, they hated his politics but liked his work. When he came back from the Wroclaw conference,
he said, Tm hated everywhere, I like it that way!"'
Nonetheless, Utley says, Picasso took the party criticisms seriously, and a good deal of his work during this period
embraced — in its own way — the social ideas and themes of the Communist cause. The artist's preoccupation in the
1940s and '50s with the simple handcraft of ceramics and the multiple-production possibilities of lithography, she
suggests, related to his conscious desire to close the gap between high art and the masses. His party posters were
designed to be cheaply copied, and he even considered ways to have his paintings reproduced, to increase their
accessibility. Although many of these efforts were ultimately fruitless — collectors were always the first to snap up
any Picasso works, including the posters — they gave the partisan press an opportunity to cast the famous artist as a
man of the people. "Picasso's work and life among the potters," Utley writes, "was also a goldmine for Communist
writers. It allowed them to counter the adverse image of Picasso the Communist millionaire with that of the
simplicity of his life in Vallauris."
But perhaps the greatest testaments to Picasso's political loyalty, Utley argues, were his unwillingness to criticize
the French party and his continued support even after Soviet politics had become distasteful to many former
Communist intellectuals. For example, despite his own reservations about the party's increasingly rigid Socialist
Realist orthodoxy, Picasso refused to sign a 1948 letter by a group of leading Communist writers asking the party to
loosen its cultural stance. The party's dogmatic approach to culture became more severe in 1950, when Thorez left
the leadership and the most hard-line factions took over. Instead of curtailing his party activities, Picasso went on,
in early 1951, to produce what Utley calls his "first openly didactic painting in support of a Soviet political
position."
In fact, Massacre in Korea, depicting soldiers firing on a group of naked women, is considered of marginal
artistic value due to its overwrought ideological message. (Richardson calls it "one of the worst Picassos ever
painted.") The artist was widely attacked in the party for his portrait of a young and unheroic Stalin in Les Lettres
Franfaises after the leader's death, yet he did not sever his Communist ties. Even after the Soviet invasion of
Picasso refused to join many other French Communist intellectuals in denouncing the aggression, for which he was
harshly criticized in an open letter by the great Polish writer Czeslaw Milosz. But the artist — following the example
of such party stalwarts as his close friend, the Communist writer Helene Parmelin — was unmoved.
"If he had entered the party out of any kind of opportunism, he would have had so many opportunities to leave,"
says Utley. "When Thorez left for the Soviet Union, or when Stalin was exposed, he could have easily said, 'That's
enough!' If he had had no more interest attached to it, why didn't he quit in '56? That would have been the most
propitious moment. The fact that he remained in the party must have been for a very personal commitment."
Utley's portrayal of Picasso as a loyal partisan, carefully guided by party leaders, has raised provocative questions
for scholars of the artist, who have been more attuned to his protean artistic output and unbridled individualism.
According to Richardson, Utley "has made sense of a very murky period — difficult and mysterious — in Picasso's
life. Her conclusion that Picasso was committed to Communism, although he had no idea what Communism really
was about, is compelling. Here is this man who hated any form of discipline or orthodoxy yet was surprisingly loyal
and, in so far as he could, toed the party line."
Patricia Leighten, professor of art history at Duke University and a scholar of Picasso's political life before World
War I, says that this kind of study is invaluable in "revisiting certain issues and seeing the artist as a historical
figure. There has been a desire on the part of critics to examine his work in isolation, a reluctance to put Picasso in
the broader European social and cultural context of his times." For Leighten, the artist's adherence to Communism
is a natural extension of his embrace of anarchist and pacifist ideas in the first decades of the century. "My feeling
is that his early anarchism informs his whole engagement with leftism," she says. "It does not mean that every work
he did was political, much less anarchist, but it does add crucial information to our understanding."
Some who knew Picasso during the postwar period are skeptical about giving fresh scrutiny to his political
activities. In an interview from Paris with ARTnews, the artist's close friend Pierre Daix, an art critic and historian
who was a leading party member in the 1940s and '50s and the editor of Les Lettres Franfaises, questions whether
there is much to add to what is already known. "I don't think there are new things here," says Daix, who wrote
about the artist's Communist years in his 1977 biography, La Vie de peintre de Pablo Picasso. "All of his activities
with the party, all of that was already clear. Picasso joined the Communist Party under circumstances that are well
known, and we know the rest of the story. There is no mystery, no secrets." Daix does note, however, that scholars
are beginning to devote more attention to Picasso's drawings and posters for the party, as in the exhibition "Picasso
and the Press," which was assembled by the Musee Picasso in Antibes last year and recently traveled to Paris for a
festival celebrating the 70th anniversary of the newspaper L'Humanite.
Gilot, who lived with Picasso during his most active years in the party and is now based in New York, cautions not
to read too much into the artist's Communist ties. "To make a big thing out of it is wrong," she says. "In his mind,
he wanted not to be simply a privileged person, a very well known painter. He wanted to be with the people. But I
don't think it went much further than that." She acknowledges that Picasso's prestige was enormously important to
the Communist leadership — "It was a nice name to drop" — but doubts that the party ever really attempted to
indoctrinate the artist. "It was difficult to influence or manipulate a man like him. He never followed exactly the
party line."
But as Utley's book suggests, it was precisely Picasso's unique position — that he was so popular in the West and
rarely doctrinaire in his own work — that gave him such a powerful role in the cultural dimension of the Cold War.
"Thorez realized this best," Utley says. "Let him alone, he serves us best when he is seen in Europe and America as
happy among us, and paints as a man."
Years later, Picasso's friend Ehrenburg would come to his own conclusions about the aging artist, who, apres tout,
remained as devoted to the Communist Party as ever. In his 1966 memoirs (in a passage Utley does not cite),
Ehrenburg writes: "Hundreds of millions of people know and love Picasso only through the doves. The snobs sneer
at those people. Picasso's detractors accuse him of having sought an easy success. Yet the peace doves are closely
connected with all the rest of his work, the minotaurs and the goats, the old men and the girls. ... Of course it is
impossible to know Picasso by the dove alone, but one has to be a Picasso to make such a dove."
Hugh Eakin is a senior editor of ARTnews.
©2000 ARTnews L.L.C.
Popular Culture
Information from:
<http://arts.adelaide.edu.au/person/DHart/ResponsesToWar/Seminar/ReadingGuides/1997-
98/HistoryAndFilm/ColdWar.html>
<http://www.facets.org>
1. Films about the Cold War:
The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
Nuclear weapons quickly became part of the arsenal of the cold war. The Americans’ monopoly was broken by
the Russians (the Americans blamed Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for selling their atomic secrets to the Russians
and promptly executed them — an event well covered in the documentary Atomic Cafe) thus beginning the nuclear
arms race and with it the theory of nuclear deterrence. According to this theory the possession of nuclear
weapons deterred the enemy from attacking because enough weapons could be protected from an enemy to
guarantee a retaliation of such destructiveness that the enemy would not contemplate it to begin with. The
ultimate reductio ad absurdum of nuclear deterrence theory was the strategy of "M.A.D." or mutual assured
destruction which meant that not only could one inflict great damage on an attacking enemy but even totally
destroy the enemy as a functioning society. To allay public fears about nuclear weapons and the sanity of
deterrence theory the United States government during the 1950s and 1960s made army training and public
propaganda films, which served to misinform and confuse rather than enlighten the public as to the true dangers
they faced. The recent documentary film Atomic Cafe (1983) presents extracts from these official films to give a
good idea of the spirit of the times during the height of the cold war.
Kubrick's classic satire about the insanity of nuclear deterrence is Dr. Strangelove, or How I learned to stop
worrying and love the bomb (1964) in which Kubrick brilliantly and wittily links sex, the extreme right wing fear
of flouridation of the water supply and communist conspiracies, and the danger of technology getting out of
control to the problem of the arms race and nuclear deterrence. Kubrick's fanciful "Doomsday Machine" has
become the nuclear winter described by Carl Sagan and others.
The fear of nuclear attack or invasion by communists became part of American popular culture in the form of
many science fiction and horror movies of the 1950s. The fear of invasion or attack by the Russians was
transferred to an attack by aliens from outerspace. A classic low-budget example of this is Don Siegel's The ^
Invasion of the Body Snatchers ( 1 956).
Cold War Films
• Martin Ritt, The Spy Who Came in From the Cold (1965)
• The fear of Russian attack of invasion is transferred to outerspace: Don Siegel, The Invasion of the Body
Snatchers (1956)
• American propaganda and misinformation about nuclear weapons: The Archives Project/Rafferty, The
Atomic Cafe (1982) 1 hr 25 (LD). The Atomic Cafe dir. and prod. Kevin Rafferty, Jayne Loader, and Pierce
Rafferty, (The Archives Project, Inc. 1982).
• Ritt, The Spy Who Came in From the Cold{ 1 965) 1 hr 48 min.
• John Frankenheimer, The Manchurian Candidate ( 1 962).
Cold War Westerns
• Ford, Rio Grande (1950)
• Fred Zinneman, High Noon ( 1 952)
• Steinbeck/Kazan, Viva Zapata! ( 1 952)
• George Englund, The Ugly American (1958)
• John Sturges, The Magnificient Seven ( 1 960)
The "M.A.D.ncss" of Nuclear Deterrence:
(from Facets’ online catalog description)
Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Slrangelove or: How I learned lo stop worrying and love the bomb. Hawk Films,
1963, 102 mins.
This great black comedy stars Peter Sellers as the wheelchair-bound nuclear scientist
plotting a scheme to attack Russia’s nuclear targets with nuclear bombs. Very funny and very
frightening, Dr Slrangelove also stars Sterling Hayden as US Air Force Commander Jack D.
Ripper, and George C. Scott as Joint Chief of Staff “Buck” Turgidson.
Veljko Bulajic’s Atomic War Bride, 1966, 84 min.
This Cold War curiosity follows a couple whose plans for marriage are greatly
inconvenienced by an impending nuclear war. Darkly satirical, the film takes some surprisingly
strong (for a production made behind the Iron Curtain) jabs at the ineptitude of government and
military authorities. Somewhat in the vein of Dr. Strangelove, this unusual feature captures the fear
of its era. Also known as War and Rat. Dubbed in English.
Films about the Fear of Communism (invaders from outer space, horror films)
• Robert Wise, The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951)
• William Cameron Menzies, Invaders from Mars( 1953)
• Don S iegel, The Invasion of the Body Snatchers ( 1 956)
Christian Cold War Movies
• Cecil B. De Mille, The Ten Commandments (1956)
• Mervyn LeRoy, Quo Vadis (1951)
The Korean War
Robert Altman's film about conscripted American doctors during the Korean War uses black comedy and
innovative camera work to show the bloody but boring routine of army hospital life and to criticize the mindless
and irritating discipline of the military. M*A*S*H* (1970, 1 hr 56 min.) is set in the Korean War but it was made
in 1970 during the Vietnam War, so in some respects it is a film just as much about the latter as the former war.
Other Korean War Films
• Sam Fuller, The Steel Helmet (1951) 1 hr 26
• Lewis Milestone, Pork Chop Hill( 1959) 1 hr 37
• Mark Robson, The Bridges at Toko-Ri ( 1 954)
2. Other Media
Music
Jazz
• Bill Evan's "Peace Peace" (1958)
• Charles Mingus, "Prayer for Passive Resistance" (1960)
Political Satire
• Tom Lehrer, "That Was the Year that Was" ( 1 965)
O
ERJC
47
Art
Picasso “War and Peace” (1951) and “Massacre in Korea” (1951)
War Correspondents
• Marguerite Higgins (1920-1966), War in Korea: The Report of a Woman Combat Correspondent (195 1 ).
• Jean Larteguy ( 1 920-), The Face of War: Reflections on Men and Combat ( 1 979).
• Denis Warner (191 7-), Wake Me If There's Trouble (Penguin Books Australia, 1 995).
Oral History
• Donald Knox, The Korean War - Pusan to Chosin: An Oral History and Uncertain Victory (San Diego:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988).
Literature
Spy Novels
• Ian Fleming and James Bond
• John Le Carre and Smiley
War Novels
• Richard Hooker, M*A *S*H( 1 968) (Sphere 1970).
Cold War Dystopia
• George Orwell's vision of a society in perpetual war:
George Orwell. Nineteen Eighty-Four: A Novel (1949) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966).
48
Gt* {bur fiwfc
on the we a
On r...' Day
■> This event took place on June 27, 1950, and was reported in the The New
York Times the following day.
Popular
Culture
The Press
US Report:
“On this
Day”
As reported
in the New
York Times
June 27,
1 950 at the
outbreak of
the Korean
conflict.
Read the l ull text of The l imes article or < il hi' i I k; ; u lliii i s from the day.
IWfttttoMi'r
Utje. ^tojhrrk SEtmejs.
unon wt»i
TRUMAN ORDERS U. S. AIR , NA VY UNITS TO FIGHT
IN AID OF KOREA; U. N. COUNCIL SUPPORTS HIM;
OUR FLIERS IN ACTION; FLEET GUARDS FORMOSA
Truman Orders U.S. Air, Navy Units To Fight In
Aid Of Korea; U.N. Council Supports Him; Our
Fliers In Action; Fleet Guards Formosa
ERIC
49
10/2/01 2:25 I
i ms uay. juiic z /
w w iv. i ly in i ic.s.cui 11/ learning genet ui/uimusuuy/oij’/uo^ t
Bid Made to Russia
President Asks Moscow to Act to Terminate Fighting in Korea
Chiang Told To Halt
U.S. Directs Him to Stop Blows at Reds— Will Reinforce Manila
President Orders War Aid to Korea
By ANTHONY LEVIERO
Special to The New York Times
ERJC 6
W ashington, June 27— President Truman
announced today that he had ordered
United States air and naval forces to Fight
with South Korea's Army. He said this country
took the action, as a member of the United
Nations, to enforce the cease-fire order issued by
the Security Council Sunday night.
Then acting independently of the United Nations,
in a move to assure this country's security, the
Chief Executive ordered Vice Admiral Arthur D.
Struble to form a protective cordon around
Formosa to prevent its invasion by Communist
Chinese forces.
Along with these fateful decisions, Mr. Truman
also ordered an increase of our forces based in the
Philippine Republic, as well as more speedy
military assistance to that country and to the
French and Vietnam forces that are fighting
Communist armies in Indo-China.
After he had started these moves that might mean a
decided turn toward peace or a general war, the
President sent Ambassador Alan G. Kirk to the
Russian Foreign Office in Moscow to request the
Soviet Union to use its good offices to end the
hostilities. This was an obvious proffer of an
opportunity for Russia to end the crisis before her
own forces might get involved.
Door Opened for Russia
In the capital this was regarded as being at once a
possible face-saving device for Russia in a
showdown crisis and a feeler to determine her
intentions.
The decisions amounted to a showdown in the
"cold war" with Russia, in which this country has
at last decided to begin shooting in a limited area.
Yet all the decisions followed a carefully worked
out formula of action within the framework of the
United Nations, as well as unilateral moves that
avoided any direct provocation of the Soviet
Union.
Mr. Truman based the decision to fight for the
00
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10/2/01 2:25 F
• "J -
‘C> c
•& wv '~
Mr. Truman based the decision to fight for the
South Koreans entirely on the Security Council
resolution which called upon all members of the
United Nations to help carry it out. And at the
Pentagon it was explained that our air and naval
forces would fight only below the Thirty-eighth
Parallel line that divides South Korea from the
Russian- sponsored North Korea.
"The Security Council called upon all members of
the United Nations to render every assistance to
the United Nations in the execution of this
resolution," Mr. Truman stated. "In these
circumstances I have ordered United States air and
Korean Government troops cover and support."
Russia Is Not Mentioned
Mr. Truman carefully avoided mentioning Russia in his statement. He pivoted
today's great shift in United States foreign policy on a conclusion that the
"cold war" had passed from an uneasy passive stage to "armed invasion and
war." He blamed "communism."
"The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has
passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will
now use armed invasion and war," he said. "It has defied the orders of the
Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace
and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist
forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United
States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.
President Truman took the unusual action of virtually ordering the Chinese
National Government to cease its air and sea operations against the Chinese
mainland. He tersely stated that the Seventh Fleet will see that this is done,
adding that the future status of Formosa would have to await peace in the
Pacific or a peace settlement with Japan, or United Nations action.
In many major speeches Mr. Truman has not hesitated to name Russia as the
country that had obstructed peace efforts in the United Nations through her use
of the veto or the boycotting of its meetings.
In military parlance, the term "cover and support" used by Mr. Truman as
missions for our forces means that they would seek to destroy any North Korea
air, ground or sea forces, as well as their installations, that are encountered
below the Thirty-eighth Parallel. They would do the same in support of any
counter-offensive that the South Korea forces might be able to mount.
Thus the complexion of the Korean situation was changed overnight.
Yesterday officials were inclined to see South Korea, with her small, poorly
equipped forces, as good as lost. It was acknowledged, as President Syngman
Rhee of South Korea had complained, that aid in the form of munitions and
supplies was "too little and too late."
Victory Is Seen for South
Today the view was that American air and naval forces could assure
overwhelming superiority to South Korea and bring victory, unless, of course,
Russia similarly aided North Korea.
The decisions were made last night in Blair House and before the night was
over the coded action orders were being radioed to Gen. Douglas MacArthur
in Tokyo and to other pertinent places. The formula encompassing all the
action, it was learned authoritatively, began to take shape Sunday night in the
House Votes 315-4 To
Prolong Draft: Korea Crisis \
Breaks Deadlock— Bill
Expected to Be Sent to White j
House Tonight
Stocks Rally After Big New I
Losses In War Scare; Sales j
Near 5 Million
City, T.W.U. in 2- Year
Peace Pact; Mayor Signs
Fare Rise Resolution
World News Summarized
forces to give the
-i
4
51
10/2/01 2:25
On I 'll is IJKiy: June 11
imp:// www.iiyiimes.cum/iciiriuiig/genci ai. omm.suiiy/Dig/uoj ,
first Blair House conference and it was custom-tailored for the resolution that
the United States representative was directed to introduce in the Security
Council meeting that night.
The correlated diplomatic action in Moscow was announced this afternoon by
the State Department. Ambassador Kirk delivered a note, the text of which
was not published.
Lincoln White, State Department press officer said:
"The Embassy asked that the Soviet Government use its influence with the
North Korean authorities for the withdrawal of the invading forces and the
cessation of hostilities."
President Truman was gratified with markedly good reaction that followed
news of his decisions. There was typical bipartisan support as in other great
emergencies that have faced the country, and Mr. Truman was particularly
pleased with the message he received from Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New
York, his opponent in the Presidential race of 1948. He promptly sent a
grateful reply. As one White House official expressed it, "there was a
wonderful closing of ranks."
The unity on the political front was more than matched among the high
civilian and military leaders of the nation who made the recommendations for
action. Mr. Truman, before he even left his home in Independence, Mo., on
Sunday to cope with the crisis, had formed a determination to do something
drastic, something that would be neither appeasement nor merely passive.
Both Defense and State Department officials, it was learned, worked with
great harmony and easy agreement on the recommendations that were drawn
up to meet his basic requirements.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson was said to have been a strong hand in
working out the diplomatic requirements, both as to Moscow and the Security
Council, and in urging the use of force. Those at the fateful council with the
President in his home at Blair House last night were the same that met with
him Sunday, after his hurried return from Independence.
They were Mr. Acheson, Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, John D.
Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, and Dean
Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State; Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense;
Gen. Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. J. Lawton
Collins, Army Chief of Staff; Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the
Air Force; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations; Frank C.
Pace Jr., Secretary of the Army; Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air
Force; and Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy.
The proposed actions-air and naval support for South Korea to enforce the
United Nations resolution and the decision on Formosa establishing
unilaterally a line of United States defense in the Western Pacific— were
already familiar. Mr. Truman canvassed the situation once again from every
possible angle and then made his decisions. That, in brief, was the story of the
meeting as told by one familiar with it.
This morning Secretary Johnson, Stephen T. Early, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, and General Bradley and Collins went to the President's office before
10 A.M., and apparently reported that the orders had gone out.
Then in mid-morning, before the announcement was made to the world, Mr.
Truman summoned Congressional leaders and members of the committees
dealing with foreign affairs in the Senate and the House. There were
Republicans and Democrats, including Speaker Sam Rayburn, Senator W.
Scott Lucas, the Senate Majority Leader, and Senator Tom Connally, chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and John Kee, his opposite
ERIP
10 / 2/01 2:25 1
number in the House.
Secretary Johnson said, as the President's statement indicated, that none of our
ground troops would be committee in the Korean conflict.
President Truman, as if to inspire confidence and calm in public, walked
instead of drove to Blair House.
He lunched with his Cabinet. Eight were present, Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary
of Labor, being out of town.
Statement on Korea
Washington f June 27— The text of President Truman's statement today on
Korea:
In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids
and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North
Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading
troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the Thirty-eighth Parallel. This
they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security
Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every
assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution.
In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give
the Korean Government troops cover and support.
The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has
passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will
now use armed invasion and war.
It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to
preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the
occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the
security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful
and necessary functions in that area.
Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on
Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese
Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the
mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of
the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the
Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.
I have also directed that United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened
and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.
I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to
the forces of France and the associated states in Indo-China and the dispatch of
a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.
I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the
consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of
the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would
have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of
law.
I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the United States
to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council.
Mack h) (lie lliis nay c.
Mack lo imlav's pace.
( in iu another da\ .
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ERIC
53
10/2/01 2:25
The Press
Soviet Report: Pravda Article
Popular Culture
Pravda, 27 June 1 950
ARTICLE: Report from the Headquarters of the People's Army of the Korean People's Democratic Republic
Peking, 27 June. (TASS) According to the report from headquarters of the People’s Army of the Korean
People’s Democratic Republic, the troops of the People’s army and security detachments of the republic
proceeded 10-15 kilometers into the territory of South Korea at 1500 hours (3:00 p.m.) on 25 June. Towards
morning of 26 June, a section moved 20-25 kilometers to the south of the 38 th parallel.
In these battles, the troops of the People’s army and security detachments of the republic liberated fully the South
Yenbek district with cities Kaeson, Deyangan, and the adjoining region of Ongin, Kavven, Rikhang, and
Surentkhan.
“Our troops on the peninsula of Ongin,” the report said, “are concluding the annihilation of the remaining forces
of the beaten adversaries and they are capitulating.”
Other parts of our forces liberated Donduchen and continue to attack in the region of Idenpu.
In the region of the southern province of Kavven, our forces liberated the towns of Pkhevhan, Hongch’on and
Chumunjin. Our units approached within one kilometer of Ch’unch’on and, having surrounded the Ch’unch’on
adversarial forces, they are destroying them and forcing the capitulization.
The naval forces of the republic sank one ship of the adversary, which had invaded the territorial waters of North
Korea.
Now the military of the People’s army and the security detachments of the republic are entering a fierce battle to
destroy the strong resistance of the enemy and move forward at a rapid pace. Everywhere in the freed cities and
villages, the local population greet the troops of the People’s army and security detachments, who are liberating
the people from the reactionary police regime. Temporary people’s committees, which were dissolved from
reactions, were established.
Other headlines on the same page in Pravda include:
The Announcement of the Government of the Korean People ’s Democratic Republic
The Population of South Korea Greets the People 's Army Warriors
Makartur on the Situation in Korea (from the United Press in Tokyo, byline New York), with a subtitle,
Announcement of Truman
To the Session of the Members of the (UN) Security Council (translation forthcoming)
ERiC
54
Environment
Soviet Information
For more information, check the Cold War International History Project web site:
<http://www.cwihp.si.edu> and do a search for “Biological Warfare”
Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological
Weapons Use in Korea
by Kathryn Weathersby
In January 1998 the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun published excerpts from a collection of documents
purportedly obtained from the Russian Presidential Archive (known formally as the Archive of the President,
Russian Federation, or APRF) by its Moscow-based reporter, Yasuo Naito. These remarkable documents provide
the first Soviet evidence yet to emerge regarding the longstanding allegations that the United States employed
bacteriological weapons during the Korean War. Sankei Shimbun subsequently agreed to make the documents
available to scholars, and the Cold War International History Project has translated for their first-time publication
in English. (Click on the document links for the full documents.)
The circumstances under which these documents were obtained are unusual. Because the Presidential Archive
does not allow researchers to make photocopies, the texts were copied by hand and subsequently re-typed. We
therefore do not have such tell-tale signs of authenticity as seals, stamps or signatures that a photocopy can
provide. Furthermore, since the documents have not been formally released, we do not have their archival
citations. Nor do we know the selection criteria of the person who collected them.
In these regrettable circumstances, how do we evaluate the authenticity of the new evidence? Until the
Presidential Archive begins granting access to its important holdings through regular channels rather than through
the ad hoc arrangements it has used thus far, we must rely on textual analysis and our experience working in other
Russian archives. Are the contents of the documents persuasive enough to overcome the skepticism raised by their
irregular provenance? Their style and form do not raise suspicion. The specifics of persons, dates and events are
consistent with evidence available from a wide array of other sources. 1 As is apparent from the documents, their
contents are so complex and interwoven that it would have been extremely difficult to forge them. In short, the
sources are credible.
They are, however, fragmentary. The contents address — and appear to answer — the key question of the veracity
of the allegations, but far more documentation, particularly from China, is needed to give a full account of this
massive propaganda campaign. In a related article, Milton Leitenberg discusses the history of the allegations and
analyzes the disclosures made in these new sources. This commentary examines the context in which these
documents originated, discussing not only what they reveal about the Soviet/Chinese/North Korean campaign
falsely to accuse the U.S. of using bacteriological weapons in Korea, but also about the power struggle within the
Soviet leadership after Stalin's death, the determination of the new leadership to distance itself from Stalin's
foreign policy, and the impact of these developments on Moscow's relations with China and North Korea.
ERIC
55
Iclegram irom me U55K Charge u /\i...uaiev, U) v.M. Molotov iim|)://cwinp.si.euu/c\vmpm>.nM/ 1 ...aoiuciooo / /cuu /-oajn.'wpcnuocumc
Cold War International History Project
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Telegram from the USSR Charge d'Affaires in the DPRK, S.P.
Suzdalev, to V.M. Molotov 1 June 1953
Copies to:
Malenkov Kaganovich
Khrushchev Mikoyan
Bulganin Saburov
Beria Pervukhin
Molotov Gromyko
Voroshilov
In connection with the illness of Kim II Sung, I was received by the Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Labor Party of Korea, Pak Chang-ok. After listening to the recommendation of
the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the CPSU for Kim II Sung about the
desirability of curtailing the campaign for unmasking the Americans' use of bacteriological
weapons in Korea and China, Pak Chang-ok expressed great surprise at the actions and positions
of [Soviet ambassador] V.N. Razuvaev. Pak Chang-ok stated the following: "We were
convinced that everything was known in Moscow. We thought that setting off this campaign
would give great assistance to the cause of the struggle against American imperialism." In his
turn, Pak Chang-ok did not exclude the possibility that the bombs and containers were thrown
from Chinese planes, and [that] there were no infections.
At the end of the conversation, Pak Chang-ok expressed gratitude for the information presented
and assured [me] that as soon as Kim II Sung's health situation improves, he will inform him of
the recommendation of the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the CPSU.
Suzdalev
10/5/01 10:37 AM
Press release, dated July 24 , 1950 . House Central Files-Official File, http://www.whistlcstop.org/study_c. ,.tions/korea/large/sec3/kwl21 1 .
Vis'
NSNS£K££
Official Oocs
iWi:
Press release, dated July 24, 1950, announcing the President’s official request to Congress
for a supplemental appropriation to the defense budget of almost 10.5 billion dollars as
outlined in the President’s message of July 19, 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman: White
House Central Files-Official File.
Page 1 of 2
Next Pa tte
ECONOMICS
US INFO
•• B
iA .Jgtfv *■ * 1
4/1 1/01 I 1 :28 Af
Economics
Soviet Side
For more information, check the Cold War International History Project web site:
<http://www.cwihp.si.edu> and do a search for “Kim II Sung”
From “To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim II Sung, and the Prelude to War”
by Kathryn Weathersby
Stalin suggests that they proceed to business and asks what will be the questions.
Kim II Sung says that after the liberation of Korea by Soviet troops, the Soviet Government and the Soviet Army
rendered aid to Korea in the matter of economic development, in the matter of the development of Korea along
the democratic path, and that the Korean government understands that without further economic and cultural aid
from the Soviet Union it will be difficult for the DPRK to restore and develop its national economy and culture.
The assistance of the Soviet Union is required for the further development of the Korean economy and culture.
Stalin asks what kind of aid.
Kim II Sung answers— economic and cultural.
Stalin asks what precisely is needed.
Kim II Sung says that they have confirmed a two year plan for the restoration and development of the national
economy. They need economic assistance to fulfill this plan and to strengthen the foundation of the economy.
They need machines, equipment and spare parts for industry, communications, transport and also for other
branches of the national economy. They also need technical assistance: sending Soviet specialists to Korea,
drafting plans for the construction of new objects (factories and plants), conducting geological exploratory work.
Stalin asks what kind of objects?
Kim answers, e.g., irrigation structures [at] Anju, the construction of which they have now moved toward, but
they do not have enough specialists, and also the restoration and completion of the Seisin metallurgical plant,
repair of the Sufun hydroelectric plant and others.
Stalin asks if there is iron ore in Korea.
Kim answers that there is very much iron ore in Korea.
Stalin says that it is possible to render this assistance, and it is also possible to provide specialists.
Kim indicates that until now trade between the two countries has been conducted successfully, but in the future,
for the fulfillment of the two year plan, they need to import from the Soviet Union equipment, steam engines,
electric locomotives, spare parts and equipment for the textile industry. But exports from Korea will not cover the
imports, therefore they need credit from the Soviet government.
Stalin says "Fine" and asks in what amount they need credit.
Kim answers from 40 to 50 million American dollars.
Stalin— fine, what else?
Kim II Sung answers that for convenient transport and for strengthening the economic ties between our countries
it is necessary to build a railroad from Aoji to Kraskino.
Stalin asks where this is and how many kilometers is the distance of this railroad.
Shtykov reports that this railroad should be built from the station at Kraskino (Soviet territory) to the station at
Aoji (Korean territory) for a total distance of 58 km, of which 10 km is on the territory of Korea and 48 km is on
the territory of the USSR.
Stalin says that we will think about it and asks if there are some more questions.
Kim II Sung indicates the necessity of establishing air communications between Korea and USSR and says that
they do not yet have their own transport planes and no pilots, but an air link is needed.
Stalin asks aren't there Russian planes in Korea.
ERIC
58
Kim answers that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops Soviet aviation units and planes were not left in Korea. He
indicates that they now have begun the preparation of their own pilots.
Stalin asks if they have their own planes.
Shtykov reports that they have their own training aviation regiment and they have training and military planes, but
they do not have transport planes.
Stalin asks how many planes they have.
Shtykov answers that they have 48 military and 19 training planes.
Stalin indicates that we now have fewer planes in a regiment, that we have lowered the number of planes in a
regiment and asks what other questions they have.
(FUR THER ON IN THE DOCUMENT)
Kim says that it is necessary to conclude an agreement on all the above- indicated questions, specifically about
economic cooperation and the broadening of trade, a trade agreement, an agreement about technical assistance
from the Soviet Union and about cultural ties.
Stalin asks if Kim has thought about credit or a loan.
Kim answers that he has thought about it and that they want to receive credit.
Stalin answers that it is possible to do that and asks for what period they wish to receive credit.
Kim answers that if credit will be given in the amount of 50 million dollars, then it will be paid back from 195 1
until 1954.
Stalin asks when will credit be paid.
Kim answers that [it will be paid] beginning with 1 95 1 to 1 954.
Stalin asks how they want to receive credit, at one time or in installments over the course of 1949, 1950, 1951.
Kim answers that they wish to receive credit in 1949. If this is not possible for some reason, then in the course of
1949 and the first half of 1950.
Stalin indicates that we cannot do this. You need machines, but machines must be ordered and manufactured. This
requires time.
Kim indicates that they need automobiles, steam engines, equipment for the textile industry, and oil, and that it is
hoped that they would receive this during this year.
Stalin answers that in one year it is not possible to do this and asks in what currency they wish to receive credit.
Kim answers in American dollars.
Stalin answers that we do not now calculate in dollars but we calculate in rubles and indicated that soon one dollar
will equal 5 rubles. Stalin proposed to present equipment and machines in credit in the course of three years in
equal portions and indicated that during these three years they will not pay credit, but in the course of the
following three years they must produce payment, also in equal portions. For example: credit is given in 1949,
1 950, 1951, and perhaps 1 952, and payment of credit will begin from the fourth year in equal portions. In such a
way, credit will be given out over 6 years. We render assistance to the countries of the peoples' democracies
according to these principles. We take the following percentages for the credit received: 2 % yearly, if the state has
recovered [from the war], and 1% if the state has still not recovered. Moreover, close trade in goods between the
countries will be continued without credit. This order will be established by agreement.
Stalin asked if they have any people who can begin work on drafting these agreements.
Kim answers that they have such people.
Stalin indicates that we can give credit in the sum of 200 million rubles, i.e. 40 million dollars. We would give
more, but now we are not able.
Kim says that they agree.
59
Personal message from the Joint Ch... Harry S. Truman: Naval Aide Fhttp://www.whistlestop.org/study_c...tions/korca/largc/scc3/k\v 1 33 f .h
StudentGulde ygCaitopn's
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Official Docs
.'I'lettore 1 :
GaarchSite
Personal message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated July 31, 1950, to Douglas
MacArthur outlining placement of atomic bomb components on Guam according to
previously approved plans. Papers of Harry S. Truman: Naval Aide Files.
Page 1 of 1
Military
US SIDE
4/1 1/01 1 1:31 AN
Military
Soviet Side
For more information, check the Cold War International History Project web site:
<http://www.cwihp.si.edu> and do a search for “Kim II Sung”
From “To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim II Sung, and the Prelude to War”
by Kathryn Weathersby
Kim says that in the south of Korea there are still American troops and that intrigues against North Korea by the
reactionaries are increasing, that they have infantry troops but sea defense almost does not exist. The help of the
Soviet Union is needed in this.
Stalin asks how many American troops are in South Korea.
Kim answers that there are up to 20,000 men.
Shtykov — approximately 1 5-20 thousand men.
Stalin asks if there is a national Korean army in the south.
Kim answers that there is, the number is around 60,000 men.
Stalin asks if this number includes only regular army or also police.
Kim answers that it includes only regular army.
Stalin asks which army is stronger — north or south.
Pak Hon-yong answers that the northern army is stronger.
Stalin says that it is possible to render assistance in this, and that Korea needs to have military planes.
Stalin asks are they penetrating into the South Korean army, do they have their own people there?
Pak Hon-yong answers that they are penetrating, but so far they are not revealing themselves there.
Stalin says that this is correct, that it is not necessary to reveal themselves now and indicates that the southerners
also, apparently, are sending their people into the army of the north and that they need [to exercise] caution.
Stalin asks what has happened along the 38th parallel. Is it true that several points have fallen to the southerners
and have been seized, and then these points were taken back?
Kim answers that they are taking into account that the southerners can send their own people into the [North
Korean] army, and that they are taking the necessary measures. Kim reported that there was a clash with the
southerners in Kangwon province at the 38 lh parallel. Their police were not sufficiently armed at that time. When
regular units approached, the southerners retreated.
Stalin asks — did they drive away the southerners or did they leave themselves.
Kim answers that as a result of the battle they drove away the southerners, threw them across the border of the
country.
Stalin asks if they have a military school.
Kim answers that they do.
Kim says that they have a military school, but no military academy and that among the officer corps of the Korean
army there is no one who has completed a military academy. He asks permission to send Korean officers to the
Military Academy of the USSR for training.
Stalin asks wasn't there such permission.
Kim answers that there was not.
Stalin says that it is possible to permit it.
61
Politics/Ideology
US Text
Excerpts from Harry Truman 's Radio and Television Address to the American People on the situation in
Korea, July 19, 1950.
This attack has made it clear, beyond all doubt, that the international Communist movement is willing to use
armed invasion to conquer independent nations. An act of aggression such as this creates a very real danger to the
security of all free nations.
The attack upon Korea was an outright breach of the peace and a violation of the Charter of the United
Nations. By their actions in Korea, Communist leaders have demonstrated their contempt for the basic moral
principles on which the United Nations is founded. This is a direct challenge to the efforts of the free nations to
build the kind of world in which men can live in freedom and peace.
This challenge has been presented squarely. We must meet is squarely.
It is important for all of us to understand the essential facts as to how the situation in Korea came about.
Before and during World War II, Korea was subject to Japanese rule. When the fighting stopped, it was
agreed that troops of the Soviet Union would accept the surrender of the Japanese soldiers in the northern part of
Korea, and that American forces would accept the surrender of the Japanese in the southern part. For this
purpose, the 38 th parallel was used as the dividing line.
Later, the United Nations sought to establish Korea as a free and independent nation. A commission was sent
out to supervise a free election in the whole of Korea. However, this election was held only in the southern part
of the country, because the Soviet Union refused to permit an election for this purpose to be held in the northern
part. Indeed, the Soviet authorities even refused to permit the United Nations Commission to visit northern
Korea.
Nevertheless, the United Nations decided to go ahead where it could. In August 1948 the Republic of Korea
was established as a free and independent nation in that part of Korea south of the 38 th parallel.
In December 1949, the Soviet Union stated that it had withdrawn its troops from northern Korea and that a
local government had been established there. However, the Communist authorities never have permitted the
United Nations observers to visit northern Korea to see what was going on behind that part of the Iron Curtain.
It was from that area, where the Communist authorities have been unwilling to let the outside world see what
was going on, that the attack was launched against the Republic of Korea on June 25 th . That attack came without
provocation and without warning. It was an act of raw aggression, without a shadow of justification.
I repeat that it was an act of raw aggression. It had no justification whatever.
The Communist invasion was launched in great force, with planes, tanks, and artillery. The size of the attack,
and the speed with which it was followed up, make it perfectly plain that it had been plotted long in advance.
The principal effort to help the Koreans preserve their independence, and to help the United Nations restore
peace, has been made by the United States. We have sent land, sea, and air forces to assist in these operations.
We have done this because we know that what is at stake here is nothing less than our own national security and
the peace of the world.
Our country stands before the world and example of how free men, under God can build a community of
neighbors, working together for the good of all.
That is the goal we seek not only for ourselves, but for all people. We believe that freedom and peace are
essential if men are to live as our Creator intended us to live. It is this faith that has guided us in the past and it is
this faith that will fortify us in the stern days ahead.
• WHAT was the ideology of the US circa 1 950?
• LIST three key points to support your analysis.
ERJC
62
Politics / Ideology
Soviet Text
Excerpts from Molotov Remembers (1941)
I was sent back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after Stalin’s death. In the first year we decided to
work out a proposal to stop the Korean War. The situation was developing in a way not in our interest. It
was pressed on us by the Koreans themselves. Stalin said it was impossible to avoid the question of a
united Korea.
We prepared a draft proposal on the German question, and besides that 1 raised the Korean question.
From Vladimir Zubok and Constantine Pleshkov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War (1996)
It was Asia, with its simmering revolutionary nationalism, that taught Stalin a lesson: you can make
the revolutionary process serve your foreign policy, but only at your own risk and with serious,
unintended consequences. Soon dramatic developments in the Far East forced Stalin in a way he perhaps
had never expected or planned.
On Sunday, June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded South Korea in an attempt to reunify the
country by force. “The North Koreans wanted to prod South Korea with the point of a bayonet,”
Khrushchev recalled. Molotov remembered that the Korean War “was pressed on us by the Koreans
themselves. Stalin said it was impossible to avoid the national question of a united Korea.” The most
dangerous conflict of the Cold War, which the West interpreted as blatant, Soviet-made aggression, a
possible prelude to invasion in Europe, was not Stalin’s brainchild. Yet the Kremlin leader supported
North Korea’s aggression, since he decided it would advance the geopolitical position of the Soviet Union
in the Far East and strengthen the prestige of the USSR as a revolutionary vanguard.
Since the spring of 1 949 Kim II Sung, the leader of the North Korean revolutionary puppet regime,
had begged Stalin for this blessing in initiating a “reunification of Korea,” after the example set by the
Chinese Communists in their civil war against the Guomindang. Stalin argued against this, but gradually
he conceded. On January 30, 1950, after one particularly emotional plea from the impatient Kim, Stalin
signaled to the Soviet representative in Pyongyang, Terenty Shtykov, his agreement to see the North
Korean Communist and look upon his proposal favorably. “Such big business regarding South Korea,”
he wrote to Shtykov, “requires serious preparation.” According to this classified Soviet account, Stalin
still had “reservations” about the North Korean invasion, but “did not object in principle.” Kim arrived in
Moscow at the end of March and stayed until April, arguing to Stalin that the regime of South Korea was
weak militarily and politically, and that the “revolutionary situation” in South Korea was ripe. Massive
discontent with the government of Syngman Rhee, supported by the United States, the ever-present “fifth
column,” and the low combat readiness of the Southern army all seemed to guarantee a quick and painless
success.
After the meeting Stalin ordered the immediate fulfillment of all North Korean demands
for arms and ammunition.
The main roots of Kim’s aggression lay in the artificial division of the country and the simmering
civil war on the Korean peninsula. Yet Kim could not start the war without Stalin’s agreement and Soviet
supplies, training, and planning. Stalin’s calculations, as well as Kim’s, were responsible for this tragedy.
• WHAT was the ideology of the USSR circa 1950?
• LIST three key points to support your analysis.
' i
63
Politics/Ideology
US Example
These cartoons appeared in the newspaper of the United Electrical Workers union, the UE News.
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64
Politics/Ideology
Soviet Example
The Soviet art of propaganda posters was marked by a return to Social Realism in the Post- World War II
period, with Stalin once again becoming the focus. The High Stalinist Period (1946-53) revealed images
of utopian harmony. Revolutionary fervor returned in the 60s, fanned by the Cold War and the Space
Race, and this was reflected in more heroic and satirical images.
“The goal of capitalism is always singular — exploitation, oppression, war — that the
poverty and ruin of the populous bring him maximum profit!
65
ERIC
G
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EHTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 1
5
curriculum materials -► packet index -► other packets
Document #40
Laws of the State of Washington, 1951
CHAPTER 254.
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES ACT
AN ACT to be known as the "Subversive Activities Act," defining the crime of sedition and of being a
subversive person or organization and prescribing the punishment and penalties thereof; relating to the
loyalty of candidates for public office and prescribing procedures of filing for election to public office;
relating to the loyalty of officers and employees of the state or of any political subdivision thereof;
prescribing procedures and providing for employment and discharge thereof; providing for the appointment
of a special assistant attorney general, prescribing the duties thereof; making an appropriation; and
declaring an emergency.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington:
SECTION 1 . For the purpose of this act: . . .
"Subversive organization" means any organization which engages in or advocates, abets, advises, or
teaches . . . activities intended to overthrow, destroy, or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or
alteration of, the constitutional form of government of the United States, or of the State of Washington, or
of any political subdivision of either of them, by revolution, force, or violence. . . .
"Subversive person" means any person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission ... of
any act intended to overthrow, destroy, or alter the constitutional form of government of the United States,
or of the State of Washington, or of any political subdivision of either of them, by revolution, force, or
violence; or who is a member of a subversive organization.. . .
SEC. 2. It shall be a felony for any person knowingly and willfully to . . . assist in the formation or
participate in the management or to contribute to the support of any subversive organization . . . knowing
said organization to be a subversive organization. . . . Any person upon a plea of guilty or upon conviction
of violating any provisions of this section shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned
for not more than ten years, or both, at the discretion of the court.
SEC. 3. It shall be a felony for any person after June 1, 1951 to become or . . . remain a member of a
subversive organization . . . knowing said organization to be a subversive organization. . . . Any person
upon a plea of guilty or upon conviction. of violating any of the provisions of this section shall be fined not
more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, at the discretion of the
66
10/3/00 3:38 P
court.
SEC. 4. Any person who shall be convicted or shall plead guilty of violating any of the provisions of
sections two and three of this act, in addition to all other penalties, shall ... be barred from
(a) holding any office, elective or appointive, ... or employment by the government of the state of
Washington or of any agency thereof. . . ;
(b) filing or standing for election to any public office in the state of Washington; or
(c) voting in any election held in this state.
SEC. 5. It shall be unlawful for any subversive organization ... to exist or function in the state of
Washington and any organization which by a court ... is found to have violated the provisions of this
section shall be dissolved. ... All funds, books, records and files and all other property of any organization
found to have violated the provisions of this section shall be seized by the state of Washington, the funds to
be deposited in the state treasury and the books, records, files and other property to be turned over to the
attorney general of Washington. . . .
SEC. 12. Every person and every . . . agency of the state of Washington or any political subdivision
thereof, who or which appoints or employs . . . public officials or employees shall establish . . . procedures
designed to ascertain whether 'any [state employee] is a subversive person. In securing any facts necessary
to ascertain the information herein required, the applicant shall be required to sign a written statement
containing answers to such inquiries as may be material. . . .
SEC. 14. Every person who, on June 1, 1951, shall be in the employ of the state of Washington or of any
political subdivision thereof . . . shall be required ... to make a written statement . . . that he or she is not a
subversive person as defined in this act. . . . Such statements shall be prepared ... by every person and
every board, commission, council, department, court or other agency of the state of Washington or any
subdivision thereof. . . . Any such person failing or refusing to [sign] such a statement or who admits he is a
subversive person as defined in this act shall immediately be discharged.
SEC. 15. Reasonable grounds on all the evidence to believe that any person is a subversive person, as
defined in this act, shall be cause for discharge from any appointive office or other position ... in the
government of . . . this state, or of any county, municipality or other political subdivision of this state. . . .
Any person discharged under the provisions of this act shall have the right within thirty days thereafter to
appeal to the superior court ... as to whether or not the discharge was justified under the provisions of this
act. . . . Any person appealing to the superior court may be entitled to trial by jury if he or she so elects.
SEC. 16. No person shall become a candidate for election under the laws of the state of Washington to any
public office whatsoever in this state, unless he or she shall file an affidavit that he or she is not a
subversive person as defined in this act. ...
SEC. 21. There is hereby appropriated from the general fund to the attorney general the sum of fifty
thousand dollars ... for the purposes of carrying out this act. [This section was vetoed by Governor Arthur
Langlie, who wished to minimize public spending and taxes.]
SEC. 22. This act is vitally necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety,
ERIC
67
10 / 3/00 3:381
and shall take effect immediately.
Passed the Senate [by a vote of 39-6] March 8, 1951.
Passed the House [by a vote of 86- 1 1 ] March 6, 1951.
Approved by the Governor March 19, 1951, with the exception of the sections . . . which are vetoed.
Laws of the State of Washington, 1955
CHAPTER 377.
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES-OATH.
AN ACT relating to subversive activities; requiring state, county and municipal employers to ask employees under oath
concerning memberships in the communist party or other subversive groups; and amending . . . chapter 254, Laws of
1951....
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington :
SECTION 1. Section 12, chapter 254, Laws of 195 1 [is] amended to read as follows:
Every person and every . . . agency of the state of Washington or any political subdivision thereof, who or
which appoints or employs . . . public officials or employees shall establish . . . procedures designed to
ascertain whether any [state employee] is a subversive person. In securing any facts necessary to ascertain
the information herein required, the applicant shall be required to sign a written statement containing
answers to such inquiries as may be material. . . . Every such [state agency] shall require every employee or
applicant for employment to state under oath whether or not he or she is a member of the communist party
or other subversive organization, and refusal to answer on any grounds shall be cause for immediate
termination of such employee's employment or for refusal to accept his or her application for employment. .
SEC. 4. The communist party is a subversive organization . . . and membership in the communist party is a
subversive activity thereunder.
Passed the House [by a vote of 86-3] March 9, 1955.
Passed the Senate [by a vote of 42-0] March 8, 1955.
Approved by the Governor March 21, 1955.
Back to full index
68
<er|c
10/3/00 3:38 PM
Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files — India: Internal Affairs and
INDIA: Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1954
1950-1954
"... provides a rich and detailed account of India in the crucial decade following the Second World War. With
reports on virtually every aspect of Indian internal and foreign affairs and candid \ often incisive , portraits of
Indian leaders , the records are an essential source for any serious scholar working on South Asia for the period.
And ' given India 's key role in the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement during this period , it will be an
invaluable source to those working on global conflict in the early years of the cold war . "
— Robert L. Hardgrave Jr., Temple Professor of the Humanities in Government and Asian Studies, University of
Texas at Austin
From 1947 until 1964, India was led by Jawaharlal Nehru, a charismatic prime minister from a nationally
prominent family. As much as anyone could, Nehru bridged centuries-old divisions of religion, language, and
caste to pursue his vision of a land free from poverty and the international hostilities that gripped most developed
nations. Complementing Nehru, other able but more pragmatic Congress Party leaders took tough measures to
enforce the nation’s political unity. With this strong leadership, the Congress Party made an unusually successful
transition from revolutionary force to stable political institution. For anyone interested in political science,
international relations, Third World studies, South Asian affairs, or the history of India, the Confidential U.S.
State Department Central Files authoritatively document the Nehru era through 1954.
The State Department watched vigilantly as the world’s largest democracy evolved politically. The constitution of
January 26, 1950, guaranteed the right to vote to more than 173 million adult citizens. In the first parliamentary
elections in 1952, the Congress Party won 45 percent of the popular vote to gain 362 of 489 seats in the powerful
lower house.
At the national level, the Congress Party under Nehru’s guidance was secular and centrist. But at the state level,
the party incorporated divergent viewpoints. State Department observers reported intra-party disagreements on
unrest in Bengal and elsewhere that caused the prime minister and other party leaders to labor hard to maintain
national party unity and party dominance in the states. Traditional religious, language, and caste differences tore
the social fabric, and the Communist Party was growing stronger. The Central Files reveal how the Preventive
Detention Act legalized harsh responses to Communist advances in Madras and other localities.
Eighty percent of the electorate was illiterate and impoverished when India’s National Planning Commission
initiated its first Five-Year Plan for economic development in 1950. Rural development was a priority. Despite
the expenditure of $3.7 billion of public funds from 1951 to 1955 and a substantial increase in food-grain
production, food shortages continued. Rapid population growth of five to six million a year, compounded by
monsoon failures in 1952 and 1953, led to a doubling of food imports. Requests for U.S. food, economic, and
technical aid are amply documented in the Central Files.
India resisted U.S. efforts to persuade it to join the bloc of nations that opposed communism. Inspired by Nehru,
India became a model for other Third World nations in Asia and Africa who were determined to maintain their
neutrality in the cold war. Materials in the Central Files cover Nehru’s plea for other Asian nations to stay neutral
in any war, Nehru’s appraisals of Soviet and Chinese attitudes toward peace, and views of U.S. officials on
relations between China and India. Nonaligned India played a useful intermediary role in U.S. relations with
Korea during the Korean War and with China during the 1950-1954 period.
Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files is the definitive source of American diplomatic reporting on
political, economic, and social developments throughout the world. For a full description of the series, see
SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & AREA STUDIES.
69
International - Nehru's Summer of 1 950 U S
Korean War Mediation Attempt
Excerpts from Sec. of State, Dean Acheson and State Dept. Daily Opinion
Summaries.
fp£ v Mr. Bonnet then referred to th« exchange of notes between Nehru
and Stella and *oked whether wo Intended to «Or* a reply to thonoto,
|||;V I »*id that wo woro preparing a ropljr but that, of oourao, wo wished
to aoo tho Koroaa ease decided on ita merits In tho United Natlona or
Sifti;-- tho Security Oounoll rathor than bo tiod In with extraneous laauoa such
0 %. *a tho adnlaalon of tho Chinese Communists to tho Security Council,
IP I added that wo woro final/ convinced that tho Korean affair should bo
handled by tho United Natlona and that tho iaaua ahould bo kopt
looaliaod,
fyc r\ € &Ot*' i, C P*\ SH-f*/ 4* t W
fin ;<nc.k Bpn + J*U ty '7, \<iS 0
HOo 1417
zsm
July 21, 1950
Attention remains cegtorad on AmQrl.can_rgj.qqtlpn ,pf ' motUaMp fl
by India on soviet "terms", w ith strong support for the _uq ppam pn
continuing . Some other discussionls accorded the diplomat la
aspects of the war, chiefly Formosa.
Host commentators believe that Ushru was motivated by "good
intentions" and "good faith" In seeking to mediate tho
Korean eonfllot, but It is generally agreed that to negotiate
on the roported Soviet terms would bo "appeasement in its
most despicable form"
Herald . “ “
Haves that Nenru°s gc
indicates that Indians sympathies "are with us".
Peter Llsaeor (Ohio. News), moannhile, aontends that the State
Dept . "has found itself In the position of having to 'explain 0 to
the world— and particularly to Asiatics*—' why peace in Korea on
Soviet terms is unacceptable". ^ Isagor suggests that th9 DS should
have tried to "head off" Hehru before he made his move and enabled
the Soviet Union to appear "peace«*ao eking".
Philips Talbot (Ohio. News) cautions that the US does not have
wholehearted^ support from Aslans for resisting Communism in
aroas other than Korea. 7'any Aslan leaders, he says, believe
the US la "backing horses that oan't run". James Heston
(H.Y. ?ioo8), discussing the "outburst" of diplomatic activity
occasioned by the need to "looallze" the Korean war, observes,
"The degree of snpport for the Korean policy of the US within
the non-Communist world has been large, but there has been no
suoh support for ffash.'s Formosa policy, its Indochina polioy
or Its Communist China policy".
70
No. 1418 July 24, 1950
KOREA /U'tr / t/ft L I
While tho US position on l T ohru*s mediation effort con/lnuea
to draw sVrong 's\wp XTi^ Ttrjuti tlnw nr
N'Qh¥u J F“6rm inbiF^W^']Tdl l TG eTjTTcWo'h' mnmflinfrTOMf ~ '
WurgT ' WaTW WTlglft* agaTnsT TOFSTOoBTWTWes s od
In ooiintorpropaganda. There is increased talk of the need for a
"genuine" UN foroo, though most commontatora accept the faot tho
US will have to boar the "brunt" of the fighting.
The Star finds it "unfortunate" that Nehru has been
unable to agroo with tho US view on mediation, warning that
because of TTohru # a groat influence in Aoia, tne propaganda
results may be "harmful to us". A similar view is presonted
by the St.. Louis Post-Plppntqh and the the latter
emphasising a general themej "There was not one word in tho
Stalln-Nehru oxohange to alter the fundamental faot that the
Soviet Union is tho author of an act of inexcusable
aggression".
What is the International outlook of the US circa 1950?
List three key points to support your analysis.
71
International: USSR
From the Cold War International History Project
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 1 6-Oct. 15, 1 950: New
Evidence from Russian Archives, article and translations by Alexandre Y. Mansourov
Document 12: Ciphered telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov [Stalin|, 3 October 1950, conveying
2 October 1950 message from Mao to Stalin
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25199
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin
From BEIJING Received 12:15 3.10.1950
TOP PRIORITY T
TO FILIPPOV [STALIN]
I report the answer of MAO ZEDONG to your [telegram] No. 4581 :
"I received your telegram of 1 .10.50 [1 October 1950]. We originally planned to move several volunteer divisions
to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel.
However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely serious
consequences.
- In the first place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (our troops are extremely
poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the success of military operations against American troops), the enemy
can force us to retreat. v‘. "
•’ “At..
Tn the second place, it is most likely that this will provokfe atfopen conflict between the USA and China, as a
consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be draggedrlnto war, and the question would thus become
extremely large [kraine bol'shim\. \ ]"■
Many comrades in the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] judge that it is necessary
to show caution here. - <-
Of course, not to send out troops to render assistance is very bad for the Korean comrades, who are presently in
such difficulty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but ifVwe advance several divisions and the enemy forces us to
retreat; and this moreover provokes an open conflict between the USA and China, then our entire plan for
peaceful construction will be completely ruined, and many'people in the country will be dissatisfied (the wounds
inflicted on the people by the war have not yet healed, we need peace).
Therefore it is better to show patience now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] actively prepare our forces,
which will be more advantageous at the time of war with the enemy. Korea, while temporarily suffering defeat,
will change the form of the struggle to partisan war. We will convene a meeting of the CC, at which will be
present the main comrades of various bureaus of the CC. A final decision has not been taken on this question.
This is our preliminary telegram, we wish to consult with you. If you agree, then we are ready immediately to
send by plane Comrades ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to your vacation place, to talk over this matter with you
and to report the situation in China and Korea.
We await your reply.
MAO ZEDONG 2.10.50"
1 . In our view MAO ZEDONG’s answer is indicative of a change in the original position of the Chinese
leadership on the Korean question. It contradicts the earlier appraisal, which was repeatedly expressed in
conversations of MAO ZEDONG with YUDIN, KOTOV and KONNOV; [and] LIU SHAOQI with me, which
O
ERIC
72
were reported at the time. In these conversations, it was noted by them that the people and the PLA [People’s
Liberation Army] are ready to help the Korean people, the fighting spirit of the PLA is high and it is able, if
necessary, to defeat the American troops, regarding them as weaker than the Japanese.
2. The Chinese government undoubtedly could send to Korea not only five-six battle ready divisions, but even
more. It goes without saying that these Chinese troops are in need of some technical equipping in antitank
weapons and to some extent in artillery. The reasons for the changes in the position of the Chinese are not yet
clear to us. It is possible to suppose that it has been influenced by the international situation, the worsening of the
position in Korea, [and] the intrigues of the Anglo-American bloc through [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal]
NEHRU, who has urged the Chinese toward patience and abstention [from intervention] in order to avoid
catastrophe.
ROSHCHIN
No. 2270 3.10
Deciphered by] Araushkin 12.50 3.10 [12.50 p.m. 3 October]
Typ[ed by] Doronchenkova 13.20 3.10 [1.20 p.m. 3 October]
Typ[ed in] 10 copies [copies no.] 9-10 -(to file)
[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 334, listy 105-106; translation by Kathryn Weathersby and Alexandre
Mansourov.]
O
ERIC
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