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Motor vehicles were the top 1967 December 
Killer - 5077 deaths Falls - 1917 & 

Fires (Burns) 619 were 2nd & 3rd 


Average traffic deaths for five 
holidays, 1966 • 1968 was 21% 
higher than for non-holidays. 


Three out of four fatal Christmas accidents involve driving too fast for 
conditions or in excess of a stated speed limit. Normal average is 35 per 
cent. Most fixed object collisions, nearly all non-collision accidents and 
most collisions with other vehicles involve excess speed. 

Drinking drivers are involved in more than half the fatal 
Christmas time accidents. During the balance of the year, 
they are involved in one out of three. 

Fatal accidents occur early in the holiday period. During the last six hours 
of Christmas Eve, the hourly rate for fatal accidents is approximately five times 
greater than it is for the remainder of the holiday. 

Most common accident is the two car collision. It accounts for nearly 1/3 of 
all holiday accidents, more than 1/3 of the fatalities. Next in rank are non- 
collision accidents, and fixed object collisions. 


Holiday time is danger time for walkers,too. One out of four Christmas accidents involve pedestrians. 
Forty per cent occur between 4:00 P« m. and midnight Christmas Eve, and nearly 75 percent during the first 
30 hours of the holiday. 







Number 385-92 


The Safety Digest is an AMC Pamphlet prepared by the Safety Division, 
Headquarters, U. S. Army Materiel Command. Its purpose is to disseminate 
information which can materially influence and improve safety programs at 
all Command establishments. 

Articles are included to supplement technical knowledge as well as practical 
knowledge gained through experience. They provide a basis for the further 
refinement of safety measures already incorporated in operating procedures 
and process layout. To achieve maximum effectiveness, the Safety Digest 
should be given widespread circulation at each AMC establishment. 

Articles appearing in the Safety Digest are unclassified and are not copy- 
righted. They may be reproduced as desired in order to bring pertinent 
accident prevention information to the attention of all employees. The Army 
Materiel Command Safety Digest should be given a credit line when articles 
are extracted. 

Unclassified material believed to be of interest or benefit to other establish- 
ments is welcome for publication in the Safety Digest. Please send articles 
for review to: U. S. Army Materiel Command Field Safety Agency, Charles- 
town, Indiana. If possible, include pictures, charts, drawings, and illustrations 
that clarify and heighten interest in your presentation. 



Major General, USA 
Chief of Staff 

Colonel, GS 

Chief, Administrative Office 

Special Distribution 














ON GUARD ---- 16 












AMC LABS - 29 











WELL, DSD YOU KNOW? ------- 46 





Major Subordinate Commands 

Award of Honor 

US Army Electronics Command 
Awards of Merit 

US Army Tank - Automotive Command 
US Army Weapons Command 


AMC Installations and Activities Reporting Directly to 

US Army Materiel Command 
(other than those indicated 5n Group 3) 

Award of Honor 

US AMC, Aberdeen RED Center 
Awards of Merit 

Joint Military Packaging Training Center 
Army Materials £ Mechanics Research Center 
US Army Logistics Management Center 
Natick Laboratories 

Commendations for Safety 

US Army Cincinnati Procurement Agency 
US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center 
US Army Management Engineering Training Agency 
US Army Satellite Communications Agency 
US Army Materiel Command Installations and Services 
US Army Production Equipment Agency 





Depots Reporting Directly to Headquarters, US Army Materiel Command 

Award of Honor 

Tobyhanna Army Depot 

Awards of Merit 

Sacramento Army Depot 
Pueblo Army Depot 
Anniston Army Depot 
Savanna Army Depot 

Commendations for Safety 

Fort Wingate Army Depot 
New Cumberland Army Depot 
Letterkenny Army Depot 
Charleston Army Depot 
US Army Equip Auth Review Ctr 
US Army Petroleum Center 
US Army Maintenance Board 
US Army Area Support Comd , Chicago 
US Army International Logistics Center 


Installations and Activities of the US Army Munitions Command 

Award of Honor 

Lake City Army Ammunition Plant 
Awards of Merit 

Fort Detrick 

Milan Army Ammunition Plant 
Twin Cities Army Ammunition Plant 
Picatinny Arsenal 
Sunflower Army Ammunition Plant 
Frankford Arsenal 

Commendations for Safety 

Joliet Army Ammunition Plant 
Radford Army Ammunition Plant 
Hays Army Ammunition Plant 



Installations and Activities of the US Army Weapons Command 

Award of Honor 

Cleveland Army Tank-Automotive Plant 
Award of Merit 
pNOck Island Arsenal 


Installations and Activities of the US Army Missile Command 

Award of Honor 

Headquarters Staff, US Army Missile Command 
Awards of Merit 
Lawndale Army Missile Plant 

Rohm and Haas Company, Redstone Arsenal Research Division 


Installations and Activities of the US Army Test and Evaluati 

Award of Honor 
Jefferson Proving Ground 
Awards of Merit 

US Army Field Artillery Board 
White Sands Missile Range 
US Army General Equipment Test Activity 

Commendation for Safety 

US Army Electronic Proving Ground 


Installations and Activities of the US Army Aviation 
Systems Command, US Army Mobility Equipment Command, 
and US Army Tank - Automotive Command 

Awards of Merit 

Lima Army Modification Center 
US Army Aeronautical Depot Maintenance Center 




Installations and Activities of the US Army Electronics Command 

Award of Honor 

Procurement and Production Directorate 
Award of Merit 

Research and Development Directorate and Laboratories 

Commendations for Safety 

Director of Materiel Management 
US Army Electronics Support Command 

* * * s’c 


Mr. Kirk, ambulance driver from the Fire Prevention 
Section, New Cumberland Army Depot, poses for picture to 
promote safe w»ork habits. 

Through the suggestion of a depot employee, the Safety 
Office came up with the idea to use the photograph as a 
safety promotion poster. The photograph is posted on 
bulletin boards throughout the depot. By using a Depot 
employee in the picture it was ascertained that a human 
interest would be stimulated and the message would be 
recognized by more employees . 



The attitude toward accident prevention on the part 
of the Commander is almost invariably reflected in 
the attitude of the personnel under his leadership. 

Unless the Commander is really interested in preventing 
accidents and injuries, his personnel may neglect safety. 

When the Commander is personally interested in safety, 
his whole organization is aware of it, and notable success 
in accident prevention follows. The worker's attitude 
toward safety tends to be the same as his supervisor's. 

Since this basic fact applies to every level of 
supervision and management, an accident control program 
must result from the Commander's announced and demon- 
strated interest if complete employee cooperation and 
participation are to be obtained. 

A definite guiding policy from the Commander, one 
which is well planned, extensively publicized, and 
consistently promoted, is of utmost importance. The 
details for carrying out an accident prevention program 
may be assigned, but the responsibility for establishing 
the basic policy cannot be delegated. 

The Commander should establish safety objectives that 
are realistic, acceptable and attainable. The overall 
policy should state clearly the objectives to be 
achieved. The safety director should develop and 
suggest the policy. However, it is essential that the 
Commander give his personal touch, his endorsement and 
his stamp of approval to the policy. The Commander's 
position with regard to safety and interest in it is 
shown by : 

1. Demanding prompt action to eliminate unsafe 
acts and conditions. 

2. Providing a clean, safe, healthful working 
environment . 

3. Providing personal protective clothing and 
equipment as required. 

4. Requiring full compliance with all applicable 
laws, standards, codes and directives as his minimum 
requirements for safety. 

5. Delineating of safety responsibilities for 
management, employees and safety personnel. 

6. Recognizing the need for trained safety personnel. 


7. Motivating employee interest in the safety program. 

The Commander should start the safety program by 
letting people under his command know his policy regarding 
safety. This should be publicized so that everyone 
becomes familiar with his policy. The Commander, by 
giving his support, will inspire his entire organization 
with a continuing zeal for safety. 

The Commander is indispensible to his own safety 
program and likewise indispensible to his safety director. 
The Commander is the leader of the program. His 
approval and assistance is invaluable to the accident 
prevention program. He must supply the motivation and 
the safety director must provide the necessary managerial 
and technical know-how to administer the safety program 
successfully . 

The Commander's responsibility does not end with 
the establishment of the safety organization and approval 
of its activities. He must take the lead in keeping 
interest alive by: 

1. Review of and executive action upon safety 

2. Support and approval of recommendations for 
necessary safeguards, training, and research and tests. 

3. Express his feelings frequently regarding the 

safety program in conversations with his personnel and 
in such written media as letters, memoranda, circulars, 
regul ations and bulletins. 

The safety director has the staff function and 
responsibility to serve all management with matters 
regarding safety. He is the consultant and advisor 
to the Commander, and it is here that a good foundation 
can be provided upon which to build the framework of an 
effective safety program. In working together, the 
Commander and the safety director must each have the 
support of the other. 

The safety director must maintain an important 
staff status by giving the Commander well thought out 
and solid advice. He must have the ability to plan within 
the framework of policies and utilize proper proce- 
dures for the attainment of program objectives. The 
Commander must rely on his safety director to maintain 
effective program liaison with other staff members, 
technical and other groups , and to coordinate where nec- 
essary so as to insure maximum program effect and to 


determine weaknesses which may be corrected by liaison 
or coordination. 

AR 1-24 gives this description of management: 
"Management consists of those continuing actions of 
planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and con- 
trolling use of men, money, materials, and facilities 
to accomplish missions and tasks." Safety must be care- 
fully considered in all command actions. The same 
tools must be utilized in the management of safety 
as in other areas and activities. 

The Commander should require that safety be inte- 
grated successfully in the best fashion; i.e., where 
it is included as a standard of performance. 

Basically the Commander is interested in safety 
in order to arrive at his objective - completing the 
assigned mission safely. This, when accomplished, should: 

1. Reduce costs. 

2. Reduce accident frequencies, 

3. Raise quality of end product. 

4. Raise quality of services. 

5. Develop good public relations. 

The answers to a few questions will go a long way 
toward measuring the quality of a Commander’s interest 
and leadership in the field of safety. 

1. Does the senior officer demonstrate an active 
interest in the accident prevention program? 

2. Does the Commander recognize the importance of 
accident prevention in the accomplishment of the assigned 

3. Is this recognition shared by members of his staff? 

4. Is the Commander and staff kept informed of 
accident trends? 

5. Does the Commander’s staff actively support 
the safety program? 

6 . Is the program adequately covered by local 
regulations and directives? 


The Commander’s leadership is vital to the success 
of the safety program. The way he directs, guides 
and influences the people under his command toward 
safety will determine the success and attainment of 
safety objectives. Accident prevention is closely 
related to the control of other functions. The causes 
of failure with regard to both are identical. 

Accident prevention, therefore, requires no more and no 
less management and supervisory attention than problems 
of equal importance. Accident prevention is a function 
of management and contributes to efficient production. 
Since safety and efficient operation go hand in hand, 
similar methods of control are applicable to accident 
prevention as are those used to maintain quality and 
service . 

There is no substitute for the interest and active 
participation of the Commander in his own safety 
program. Without them the program will deteriorate. 
With them the program will improve and attain a much 
higher measure of success. 

A good safety record is clear evidence of good 
management . 


Colonel Mahone, Commanding 
Officer, New Cumberland Army 
Depot, presented National Safety 
Council Safe Driver Awards to 7 
depot employees. Left to right: 
John J. Moore, Wayne H. Yinger, 
Ronald L. Bettinger, Charles E. 
Wire, Norman Smith, Safety 
Director, Colonel Thomas B. 
Mahone, Jr, Merle E. Stoner, 
Louis J. Langerio. Drivers not 
available for the photograph 
were: Rudolph J. Annibali , 

Roland 0. Bissonnette, Harry L. 
Brandt, Ernest M. Clay, Allen E. 
Kepner, Mervin Reber, Joseph M. 
Straley, Donald C. Weirich. 

These employees have accumulated 
193 years of driving without a 
preventable accident. 

k m 

1 n 


! 1 v 




M. Haeberle Safety Officer 4WW44444444444 
Joliet Army Ammunition Plant 

Training and safety are words which are being 
uttered ever increasingly in the same breath. The 
separate, unique qualities of these two elements 
were put to use long ago. Only in recent years have 
the two been utilized together. 

In modern industrial situations a great deal of care 
must be taken to insure that workers are actually aware 
of the dangers they face. With the increasing use of 
complex machines , more complex accident situations are 
being created. Common sense and experience alone can 
no longer be counted on to provide the worker with 
safety awareness. One need only mention "radiation" 
or "high frequency noise" to drive this point home. 
Technology has raised the power levels of equipment 
and processes far beyond man's ability to comprehend 
them or to evaluate their hazards on sight. Plowever, 
hazards of these potentially harmful industrial 
processes can be controlled through the thoughtful, 
concentrated efforts of a training program. 

Formal initial training is a necessary step 
toward developing an individual in the performance of 
specialized tasks associated with complex technological 
production. Management must take the responsibility for 
training employees from the start in order to insure 
that the worker will produce and perform in a manner 
his employer will find advantageous. Many companies with 
an eye to the future have realized the advantage of 
instilling safety awareness during the initial 
training process since changes in work habits necessitate 
a relearning process. Psychological studies conclusively 
reveal that relearning is always harder and more 
disagreeable than the initial learning. From this 
comes the oft-repeated phrase, "Teach them to do it 
right the first time." 

Industrial training should be such that the worker 
will not seek dangerous, unsafe, or unproven alternative 
methods in his work or shortcuts. Man has a tendency 
to shortcut and these shortcuts become habit. Habit in 
itself is not harmful. It assures that the job will 
be performed in the same manner each time. This is 
desirable if the habit is safe and efficient. Let the 
wrong habit be established and correction will be difficult. 


During initial training the worker must be led 
into the safest and most efficient way of doing his job. 
He must be shown the results of doing things the wrong 
way as well as the right way. By showing him. the 
wrong way and the undesirable consequences associated 
with that method, substitution for the all important 
trial-and-error process is achieved. 

Management owes the worker a hazard-free environment 
whether the operation presents sophisticated or visible 
dangers. By making safety awareness an integral part 
of training and combining this with inspection, pro- 
motion, and design engineering, the worker will be pro- 
vided a safe environment. Management will gain an 
efficient, best-trained employee who will produce the 
best-made products under the safest conditions possible 
in these modern times. 

Editor's Note: Mr. Haeberle was a member of the FY 

1969 Safety Career Management Intern Training Class at 


Barry L. Bumbaugh, a machin- 
ist at the Letterkenny Army 
Depot, has a keen awareness 
of the protection provided by 
safety shoes. He was using 
a sling and hoist to move a 
recoil cylinder and cradle 
assembly. It weighed about 
300 pounds and it rested on 
the floor close to a wall, 
out of line with the hoist. 
When it was lifted, the 
assembly swung forward and the 
end of a cylinder struck the 
end of the worker's left 
shoe. The leather was cut 
from the shoe, but the steel 
toe cap prevented a serious 
injury to the great toe. 

The re-enactment in the photo above shows the 
approximate position of Mr. Bumbaugn's foot when the 
heavy cylinder struck his shoe. He earned a Golden 
Shoe Club Award. 

the AMC Field Safety Agency. 



In any serious discussion of accidents and safety 
somebody will remark, "You must teach your personnel to 
be safe." The comment is often followed by general 
agreement and a complete lack of further action. 

Safety personnel and supervisors often fail to 
recognize the remark for what it is -- a challenge to 
meet a very real need. The accidents experienced by 
the employees of their organizations may reveal they 
have not been taught how to be safe. If they were 
exposed to any instruction, it failed to be as effective 
as it should have been. 

How long has it been since you have taken an ob- 
jective look at safety training given the workers at 
your installation? Perhaps it’s time to look again 
and to do some planning to make it more effective. Here 
are some questions that may help you review your 
safety training and to make plans to improve it. 

1. Who actually teaches your personnel to work 
safely? The senior supervisor or director may call 
an occasional meeting in which "the word" on safety 
is given out. The chief will not call many of these, 
because they are expensive. Staff organizations are 
likely to have too few people to meet all training 
needs. Like most work involved in getting the mission 
done, the task of teaching how to work safely is given 
to the immediate supervisor. 

2. Does the immediate supervisor actually teach 
safety? The answer may be revealed by first-aid 
cases and material spoilage. If the record in these 
areas is excellent, it is likely that he and his 
workers are systematically doing something right to get 
the desired results. If there are many of these little 
accidents, something needs to be done before a more 
serious and recordable accident occurs. Training may 
be needed. 

3. Must the immediate supervisor do the safety 
teaching himself? He will probably do some of it but 
not necessarily all. He becomes a successful supervisor 
through his skill in getting other people to do the work 
assigned -to them. He may discover somebody in his 
organization who can surpass him at teaching safety. 

This person is then likely to become his safety instructor. 


4. How well is safety being taught to the workers? 

If observation reveals frequent unsafe practices, it 
should be clear that the teaching of safe practices has 
been unsuccessful. 

5. What is being taught as safety? The answer can 
be learned by listening. Are employees being told in 
general terms to "work safely" or in specific terms and 
by example "how to work safely?" Effective teaching 
will often require demonstration of the correct method. 

6. Is the individual who teaches safety to the 
worker actually prepared to teach it? The professional 
teacher or speaker makes ready before he faces his audience. 
Then he usually brings an outline or copy of his remarks 
with him to the platform. The foreman teaching a 

safe procedure to a worker may not need an elaborate 
lesson plan. It is necessary for him to have thought 
through what he is going to teach. Published safety 
materials may help him do a better teaching job. 

7. What have you provided the immediate supervisor 
to help him with his teaching? You have become a 
safety professional through acquisition of special 
knowledge and experience . This knowledge and experience 
are wasted unless they are applied to prevent accidents. 

The people with whom you share your knowledge can 

help you apply it. The best person to share and use 
your safety knowledge is the supervisor who gives 
safety instructions to workers. 

8. Do you observe variety in the safety training 
methods used at your installation? Rigid uniformity is 
likely to be a dangerous practice. Your supervisors 
are dealing with individuals and with a wide range of 
situations, procedures, and problems. Unless they 

are flexible in devising ways to get their safety 
instructions understood and practiced, they will be 
inefficient teachers. 

There are sets of rules or simple procedures that 
will guarantee complete success in teaching on-the-job 
safety. Imagination, ingenuity and industry are 
constant requirements. The needed training will be 
accomplished only when it is given regular attention 
and a sincere effort toward an effective job. 

How well have you been doing? 



E. W. Wolfe, Safety Officer 
Scranton Army Ammunition Plant 

An electric box type furnace overheated while in 
operation several years ago in the heat treat section 
of the machine shop at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant. 
Overheating of the furnace was found to be caused by 
"creeping” due to the lack of positive control of 
heating elements. The elements continued to become 
progressively hotter during an extended heat treat 
operation and surpassed the rated heat capacity of 
1850°F. , because of the lack of positive temperature 
control . 

Additional controls were installed at the time the 
furnace was repaired to provide positive shut-off in 
case of overheating. Five electric furnaces nearby 
were also recommended for similar modification because 
these furnaces were manifolded to a gas generator which 
provided a processed gas and air mixture to the furnaces. 
This mixture burns off moisture and impurities in the 
furnaces to assure a dry atmosphere that will prevent 
scale accumulations on furnace work loads due to 
oxidation . 

Overheating of furnaces rated at 2400°F., plus the 
gas flow could cause explosions and damage, injury or 
both. Gas flow until this time could not be controlled 
except manually. 

Corrective action was taken to control the flow 
of the explosive and flammable gas mixture to the 
furnaces. A pyrometer recorder controller, a thermo- 
couple and a space plug controller were installed in the 
gas generator control panel. A pilot light was also 
installed to show gas generator operation. 

This action has been successful during the intervening 
years in preventing overheating and explosion of these 
furnaces . 

(NOTE: The author was paid by the Incentive Awards 

Board for suggesting corrective measures.) 



At the Lake City Army Ammunition Plant interest 
in safety is maintained by the practice of a variety 
of promotional methods. This is illustrated by some 
of the approaches used for a recent Topic of the Month, 
"Your Shield of Safety" . 

The purpose of the theme was to remind employees 
to use machine and personal protective equipment. The 
strength of safety glasses was dramatized in the display 
shown in Photo 1. It was arranged to permit a two- 
ounce steel ball to drop a distance of 40 inches before 
striking a safety lens. The display was equiped with 
a counter to show how many times the ball dropped without 
breaking the lens. The display provided a convincing 
demonstration of the strength of safety lens , and it 
attracted keen employee interest. 




Another approach to the "Shield of Safety" was an article 
in the employee newspaper, the Lake City Tracer , which 
showed pictures of three nurses from the medical staff. 
The nurses were photographed caring for injured employees 
who supposedly were hurt because they did not use their 
protective equipment. Each nurse's comments about the 
foolishness of the injured employee, used as a cutline 
for her picture, carried a safety message. (See Photos 
2, 3 and 4, accompanied by quotations from the plant 
newspaper.) 14 

The committee which developed the monthly topic 
provided a safety talk to be used in departmental 
safety meetings. The talk was based on the history of 
shields as safety devices. 

Slogans on bulletin boards and a special seat 
belt survey at the plant's main gate rounded out the 
program of the month. 


Morton E. Milliken, Technical Publications Editor 
U, S, Army Electronic Proving Ground 

History doesn't tell us whether the axe George 
Washington used as a boy was dangerous. But had it 
slipped off the handle while he was cutting down the 
cherry tree it might have gotten him into even worse 
trouble . 

Until recently not much 
could be done for a loose 
axe or sledge hammer except 
to drive it back firmly onto 
the handle and add another 
wedge to keep it from coming 
loose again. Now any axe, 
sledge hammer or other tool 
with a wooden handle can be 
made safer by using a spring 
pin or roll-pin driven into 
a hole drilled into the axe 
head and through the handle. 

(See drawing) 

Drill a hole slightly smaller than the diameter of 
the spring-pin you have selected, and select one big 
enough and long enough to do the job. Tap or use a vise 
to press the pin into the hole until both ends are even 
with the sides of the axe head. File down the ends of 
the pin if they protrude too much. 

Now you have an axe or a hammer which cannot slip 
off and injure someone or bread something. Should the 
wooden handle need replacing, the pin can be tapped 
out with a nail-set, a hole bored through the new handle, 
and the pin replaced. 




Every try to drive a truck without a steering wheel? 

An impossible task .... not to mention ridiculous. 

Then, let’s suppose the steering wheel is there but the 
rest of the steering system is being held together with 
bailing wire and chewing gum. How safe would the vehicle 
be? Absurd as these statements may appear, there are trucks 
being operated on the highway today with steering mechan- 
isms in such deplorable condition they should be clas- 
sified as ’’dangerous weapons." 

During 1968, the Safety Investigators of the Bureau 
of Motor Carrier Safety found 586 vehicles being operated 
with defective steering systems. A total of 203 of these 
vehicles, or 34.6 percent had such defective steering 
systems that the vehicles were ordered "Out of Service" 
until repairs could be made. 

It is fine that these 203 vehicles could be stopped 
before an accident occurred . . . but what about the 
thousands of other vehicles operating on the highway that 
our limited field staff were not able to stop before an 
accident resulted? This question can be partially an- 
swered by an examination of the accident reports filed 
by motor carriers to this Department. During 1968, reports 
were received on 90 accidents involving vehicles with 
defective steering systems. These accidents resulted in 
three people being killed, 51 injured, and $458,687 
property damage. A closer study of these reports shows 
that 30 resulted from defective linkage rod, drag-link, 
etc., 20 from steering wheel and steering shaft defects, 
and three from power steering defects, and two resulted 
from steering gear failure. 

Because accidents caused by steering system failures 
are usually more serious than other mechanical defect 
accidents , motor carrier shop personnel should spend 
sufficient time to check the entire steering system as 
a part of routine maintenance - ! You can never tell when 
excessive play at the steering wheel is caused by the 
need for a simple steering gear adjustment, or a de- 
fective ball joint, or perhaps loose steering gear mount- 
ing bolts which could bail at any moment. It is easier 
to check the system and make minor adjustments or re- 
pairs before a trip than have a careless oversight result 
in a serious and costly accident. 

*■ — — 

Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety Bulletin 



A train crew was switching cars at an Army in- 
stallation. Two boxcars were switched on Track 9, 
as shown in the sketch. The remaining cars were 
moved back on to Track 10. The engineer then started 
to move the locomotive forward past Track 9. 

Track 9 had a slight grade that led down toward 
the switch intersection. The two cars that had been 
left on it did not have their brakes set properly and 
they had not been chocked to prevent them from moving. 

This combination of circumstances permitted them to 
roll down grade . 

The loose cars came to the switch point at the moment 
the locomotive was passing it. The engineer and the 
conductor were on the blind side of the switch engine, 
and they did not see the boxcars approaching. The 
locomotive and the leading car collided, as shown in 
the photo. 


None of the train crew was injured. Damage to 
the boxcar was estimated at $1,000. The brake cylinder, 
steps and handrail of the locomotive were damaged 
and the repair costs were estimated to be $4,000. 

The installation’s safety and operating rules for 
its railroad required the brakes of spotted cars to 
be set and the wheels to be blocked. For their fail- 
ure to obey the rules the conductor and the brakemen 
were suspended without pay for four days. 

The accident and appropriate rules were discussed 
at safety meetings that were held with all train crews 
and their foremen. 

Editor’s Note: There are many points of similarity 

between this accident and one that 
occurred at another AMC installation 
in 1967. In the earlier accident box- 
cars also moved down a grade and struck 
a locomotive that was passing a switch 
point. The engineer was killed. AMC 
Abstract Report No. IS 28 described the 
accident . 

* * * * 


At an Army Materiel Command manufacturing install- 
ation, a furnace was used to demilitarize No. 34 scrap 
primers . The procedure was to soak the primers in a 
desensitizing solution for a minimum of 12 hours. 

They were then mixed with burned primers at a ratio of 
20 per cent live scrap to 80 per cent demilitarized 
primer cups. This mixing was done immediately prior 
to the burning. The demilitarized primers served as 
a cushion for explosions and aided in segregating live 
components during a continuous flow of material through 
the core of the furnace. The furnace was lined with 
auger-type flutes which moved the material to the 
highly heated center of the core before the explosive 
mixture in the primer was detonated. 

The furnace had been operating satisfactorily. 

Its mechanical operation and the temperature had been 
checked by the operator. A sub-lot of primers manu- 
factured on a Friday had been held in a drying area 
until a decision was reached on Monday morning to scrap 


them. The scrapping of dry complete primers happened 
very infrequently. In most instances when this type 
of material was involved, the work was performed by 
other explosives area personnel. This usually assured 
that several hours of soaking had taken place before 
the material was moved to the scrap disposal area. 

Several hours of soaking is required for the 
desensitizing solution to effectively penetrate the 
lacquer shellac coated foil paper and pellet of a 
thoroughly dried primer. When the solution is 
drained off and the items are mixed with inert 
material, primers which have soaked only an hour 
will explode with about the same characteristics 
and under the same circumstances as completely dry 

The scrapped primers which were to be burned were 
placed in a desensitizing solution by a worker approx- 
imately one hour before the incident occurred. The 
furnace operator stated later that he was not aware 
that these primers had been soaked for an inadequate 
time in the desensitizing solution. 

Primers were removed from 
the desensitizing solution and 
started through the furnace. 

Within a short time a violent 
explosion occurred. There 
were no injuries, but damage 
to the furnace and fuilding 
was estimated to exceed $10,000 
(See Photo ). The safety 
barricade at the west end of 
the furnace was deformed by 
the explosion but remained in 
a supporting position. 

The following actions were taken to prevent repe- 
tition of the furnace explosion: 

1. A personnel shield was constructed of a 
heavier material and installed with the reinforced 
anchoring . 

2. The idler extension from the furnace drive 
mechanism was extended through the barricade and painted 
a distinguishing color. By observing it the operator 
could determine when the furnace core was rotating. 



3. The feed chute was constructed of a 
heavier material with reinforced anchoring. 

4. All scrap except that produced at 
charging or priming operations would be tagged with dates 
and hours specifying the time the material was placed 

in the desensitizing solution. These tags would be 
of water-resistant material and would be securely 
fastened to the bucket. The identifying marks would 
be applied with a wax crayon or other waterproof 


A millwright and his co-worker were assigned the 
job of installing a hose retriever inside a building. 

The equipment weighed about 80 pounds, and the install- 
ation point was 14 feet above the floor. Raising and 
holding the heavy item in place for installation pre- 
sented a challenge. 

The two men tried to meet it by improvising. 

For a work base they located a seven foot two inch 
(84") square wooden platform with handrails on three 
sides. It had not been designed or authorized for 
use as a personnel work platform. To raise the mill- 
wright into place they selected a 20,000 pound capacity 
forklift truck. They disregarded a red tag on the 
truck which made clear it was not to be operated under 
any circumstances. 

The platform was placed on the forks of the machine. 
These were 48" long and were designed to support a 
38" unsupported overhang. The platform had a 36" over- 
hang. This seemed safe enough to the two workers. 

The 80-pound hose retriever was placed on the overhang, 
and the heavier millwright stood back on the supported 
section . 

The helper too k the controls of the machine and 
raised the millwright and the hose retriever into place. 
The operator then dismounted from the machine and left 
the building to obtain tools needed for the job. He 
returned with these and took a position at a work- 
bench several feet away from the forklift. 


While his co-worker had been moving about below , 
the millwright had remained on the raised platform. 

He now moved forward on his platform to take up the 
hose retriever. His movement brought his weight, as 
well as that of the mechanism, onto the overhang. 

The platform tilted. The millwright, the retriever 
and the platform fell 14 feet to the floor. The man 
struck the floor before the platform and it struck 
both of his ankles . 

The millwright was moved to the Post Dispensary 
and then to a hospital. It was found he had three 
fractured metatarsal bones in his right foot, hematoma 
on his left ankle, and contusions and lacerations of 
his left elbow. He was expected to be away from work 
for six weeks . 

The following actions were taken to prevent similar 
accidents : 

1. The lift truck operator's license of 
the man who operated the tagged machine was revoked. 

2. Written reprimands were issued to the 
millwright and the operator of the lift truck. 

3. Special meetings of Engineering Division 
personnel were held to publicize the accident. 

4. The accident was made an area of special 
attention in the plant's lift truck training program. 

5. A plant bulletin brought information on 
the violations involved in the accident and preventive 
action to supervisors and workers. 


A laborer was cleaning the coolant sump on an 
engine lathe. He was not aware that the fourth-year 
apprentice who operated the machine had failed to 
turn off the master electrical switch. 


At one point in his work the laborer worked from 
the front of the machine instead of a normal position 
in the rear. To reach the coolant tank from the front, 
he had to lean over the machine, with his head between 
the saddle compound rest and the chuck. To do this he 
straddled the rapid traverse control lever. 

As he leaned forward in this awkward position his 
leg moved the lever that activated the rapid traverse. 
The machine began its normal movement. The worker's 
head was caught between the compound rest and the chuck. 

The man was rescued from the machine and taken 
first to the post medical branch and then to a hospital. 
A neurosurgeon diagnosed his injury as a depressed 
skull fracture. 

All supervisors and employees at the installation 
were reimpressed with the importance of disconnecting 
all power on machines before maintenance or cleanup 
work was started. 


Personnel at an Army installation were discing 
the ground about burning pits. While the work was in 
progress a sergeant noticed a small amount of smoke 
arising from the soil at one spot. He reported his 
observation, saying the smoke appeared to be produced 
by white phosphorus. 

An officer who was crossing the field to investigate 
the area placed a stick in the ground to mark the 
exact spot where the smoke was rising. He then 
moved back about 25 feet and stopped to check for the 
presence of other personnel. At the moment he turned, 
the smoke source, a white phosphorous rifle grenade, 
exploded . 

The officer was struck by fragments of the gre- 
nade. These inflicted an abrasion to his left eye and 
lacerations on both forearms. Pie was disabled for 
five days. 

Investigators concluded that the discing operation 
had uncovered and exposed the grenade. The officer 
had failed to appreciate fully the hazard of a po- 
tential explosion and to evacuate to a safe distance. 


Personnel were instructed to obey safety instruc- 
tions when they were working in areas where explosives 
materials might be present. Safety glasses and face 
shields are to be worn when appropriate. 

J. }i J \ 


Safety Topics, Iowa Army Ammunition Plant 

Mixing of conventional and radial tires on private 
automobiles is a dangerous practice, according to U.S. 

Air Force safety experts. 

The Air Force recently experienced a private ve- 
hicle fatality where use of a radial tire on the right 
front wheel, with conventional tires on the other three, 
was considered a significant factor in the accident. 

It was suspected that the radial tire held a true track 
while the conventional tires skidded, causing a head- 
on crash. 

Preferably, radial tires should be installed on 
all four wheels. If two radial tires are used they 
should always be used on the rear wheels. 

Radials should never be used on the front wheels 
with conventional tires on the rear. 

The basic design of radial tires is such that when 
you turn the steering wheel they immediately take the 
new direction without the normal side deflection of con- 
ventional tires. They hold a true imprint area. 

In the case of radial tires on the front only, in 
a slight skid situation, the front tires hold a true 
grip allowing the rear ones to break loose and cause 
a severe skid. 

Use of one radial tire on the front with conventional 
wheels is considered a very dangerous practice. In this 
situation, vehicle control would be highly questionable 
even under ideal road conditions. 



Lyle D. Soltau, Safety Inspector 
Atlanta Army Depot 

SFC Gene Power will not forget one bright Sep- 
tember day. He was breezing along the interstate seated 
aboard his trusty motorcycle with hardly a care in the 
world, except possibly his upcoming parachute jump. 

This is a monthly requirement for all members of the 
Airborne Equipment Detachment stationed at Atlanta 
Army Depot. 

SFC Power recalls that 
traffic was particularly light 
and his view in front and to 
the rear was very good. The 
next thing he remembers was 
that a car directly along- 
side him struck the front of 
his cycle. (See Photo 1.) 


SFC Power was cruising 
at approximately 60 MPH. 

The force of the impact 
threw his cycle out of 
control. Power was 
taken to a hospital. The 
cycle remained on the 
highway and burned. (See 
Photo 2) The hit and run 
driver remained unidentified. 


At the hospital it was 
found that SFC Power had a 
left collar bone fracture, 
a fractured finger on the 
right hand, and contusions 
of both knees and thr rib 
cage. While he considers 
himself quite lucky, he 
gives a large measure of 
credit for his survival to 
his safety helmet, protec- 
tive visor and the heavy 
suede jacket he was wearing. 
(See Photo 3) 




About 100,000 stolen cars are involved in accidents 
each year, the National Safety Council reported in a 
recent issue of its Accident Facts. One out of every 
six stolen automobiles is in an accident before it is 
recovered. The accident rate is about 200 times higher 
than that for vehicles driven by their owners. 

Some authorities estimate that a million cars a 
year will be stolen by 1970. About one of every 153 
is stolen now. 

You certainly do not want any firsthand experience 
with car thieves. The experience can be disturbing, 
inconvenient and perhaps costly, even if you are lucky 
enough to recover your vehicle undamaged. There is the 
one in six chances your automobile will be in an accident. 
It may be badly damaged, damage other vehicles and prop- 
erty or inflict injuries on innocent persons. 

Although a determined, ingenious thief can steal 
almost any vehicle, its contents or parts from it, there 
is much you may do to protect yourself and your prop- 
erty. Consider the following facts: 

1. About two-thirds of the cars stolen are 
taken on the spur of the moment by teenage delinquents 
who are not equipped to steal a locked car. They often 
joy ride until the fuel tank is empty. If the car has 
not been wrecked before this happens, they simply 
abandon it . 

2. Most of the cars stolen -- 80 to 85 per 
cent — are left unlocked by their owners. 

3. Over 30 per cent of the stolen cars have 
keys in the ignition when the eyes of thieves fell upon 
them. This makes it easy for the potential thief to 
yield to temptation. 

4. The typical car thief is an amateur, nerv- 
ous and in a hurry. He does not want to attract attention 
to himself. 


These simple facts make it easy for you to shift 
the odds in your favor by making your automobile a less 
attractive target for the thief. Your car will usually 
be safe if you take the following simple precautions: 

1. Remove the key from the ignition and take 
it with you. 

2. Roll up the windows, regardless of the 


3. Lock all doors 

4. Leave no packages or clothing visible 
inside the car to attract the thief. If valuables must 
be left in the automobile, lock them out of sight in the 
trunk . 

5. Avoid parking on poorly lighted streets. 
Park under the light or, better still, in an attended 
parking lot . 

6. Make certain you secure a claim check if 
you park in a parking lot. 

A look about you will reveal that many insects, 
birds and animals survive by making themselves less 
visible and attractive prey for predators. It is easy 
and practicable to protect your automobile by adopt- 
ing part of their system. It is also effective. 

* * * 



Robert R. Cavanaugh, Safety Officer 
St. Louis Army Ammunition Plant 

Can you recognize the TOYS that may cripple and 
kill your children? 

Our nation's stores display menacing playthings 
that may be every bit as lethal as they look. One 
company produces and sells do-it-yourself bomb kits 
complete with casings, chemicals, fuses and instructions 
on how to make your own gun powder. Parents may arm 
their children with chilling arsenals of make believe 
weapons, and the children can then act out the violence 
they see on television. 

Even the most innocent appearing toys may contain 
built-in booby traps. A cuddly teddy bear has eye 
prongs that a baby can pull out and convert into min- 
iature bayonets. Stuffed rabbits and baby rattles can 
be pulled apart to display an uguly stick pin. Cap 
pistols have exploded into the eyes of small children, 
rubber tipped arrows have blinded small warriors, thin 
coverings have worn off rubber swords exposing razor- 
sharp metal edges. 

In 1966 Congress passed the Child Protection Act 
which was intended to outlaw hazardous toys. The law 
bars from the stores such dangerous delights as dolls 
stuffed with flammable gun cotton, bright beads made 
of poisonous jequirity beans, revolvers that fire a 
gas, and play tunnels covered with flammable fabrics. 

In spite of the law, toy makers are still turning 
out trinkets and trifles that splash, puncture, burn, 
shock, choke, maim and even kill many children each 

One toy kitchen range can reach a heat level that 
is higher than the average home oven. One crib playpen 
has a heavy top to prevent the child from escaping. 

The cover is held down by plastic straps that stretch 
in warm weather. This sometimes permits the child 
to squeeze his head between the lid and the railing. 
Several parents in one city complained that their babies 
were strangled in this manner. 


A number of electrical toys, plug-in irons, toy 
toasters and monster making machines have turned out 
to be electrical hazards. Burns and even deaths may 
result. In one city, several children had to have one- 
inch darts removed from their lungs when they inhaled 
instead of blowing the dart through a plastic toy jungle 
weapon. An estimated six million of this toy have been 
sold . 

One six year old girl had her scalp pierced by 
an arrow that had a suction cuy on it. The wooden stem 
rammed through the suction cup. Another nine year old 
boy was blinded in one eye with the same toy. 

Legislation that would tighten the 1966 law has 
been introduced. But why wait for new laws? You may 
be the one who purchases these killing toys for your 
children. If you do, you are at least partially guilty 
for any injury that may occur. If you do not purchase 
the dangerous toys, the manufacturer may get the 
message and construct safer and better toys for your 

What happens is really up to you! 

s 5 :*** 


AR 385-14, 19 August 1969 

Safety, Accident - Incident Reporting - Military 
Shipments of Explosives and Dangerous Articles by 
Commercial Carriers. 

AR 385-41, Change 2, 19 August 1969 
Safety, US Army Accident Codebook 

AMCP 385-23, July 1969 

Safety, Management System Safety 

AMCR 385-17, 15 April 1969 

Safety, Hazardous Items Contracts 



Scientific progress and 
rapidly evolving technology 
in the military field is a~ 
never ending process. 

In this day of the missile, the helicopter gunship, 
the night vision device, much of the Army’s success 
can be attributed to its fine research and development 

In its research programs on various items ranging 
from compact space foods to jungle boots, from missile 
fuzes to heart pumps, the Army Materiel Command labor- 
atory chain covers the entire spectrum of new scienfi- 
fic apparatus and techniques. 

AMC's 17 research and development laboratories/ 
centers continually strive toward a goal of improvement 
of the state-of-the-art in their specific fields. Each 
subordinate command maintains its own laboratories 
to conduct research and development in support of 
its assigned mission and commodity category. 

AMC's six in-house central laboratories /centers - 
Aberdeen Research and Development Center, Aberdeen, 

Md. ; Terrestrial Sciences Center, Hanover, N.H. ; Ma- 
terials and Mechanics Research Center, Watertown, 

Mass.; Harry Diamond Laboratories, Washington, D.C.; 
Natick Laboratories, Natick, Mass.; Aeronautical 
Research Laboratory, Moffett Field, Calif. - are 
equal to and in many cases superior to their industry 
counterparts. Their combined budgets in FY '69, 
for example, exceeded $14 5-million . 

To make a more centralized laboratory system, 

AMC recently consolidated four labs into a single 
facility. The Ballistics Research Laboratories, 

Human Engineering Laboratories, Coating and Chemical 
Laboratory, and the Nuclear Defense Laboratory, all 
have been combined into the Aberdeen Research and 
Development Center. 


The new center also will be home for another 
lab - The Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency. 

This laboratory will plan and conduct broad programs 
of materiel-oriented systems analysis. 

The Aberdeen Center conducts research in weapons 
technology, ballistics, target vulnerability, weapon 
systems evaluation, wound ballistics, automotive 
chemicals, coating, cleaners, fuels, lubricants, 
health physics, human factors capabilities, human 
factors engineering applications, and nuclear weapons 
effects in areas of radiation, fallout, shielding 
and thermal radiation. 

The Natick Laboratory conducts research on opera- 
tional capability of the fully equipped individual 
soldier, under varying degrees of operational and 
environmental stress. 

The Terrestial Sciences Research Center carries 
out research and experimental engineering in snow, 
ice and frozen ground and earth physics. 

The Materials and Mechanics Research Center obtains, 
evaluates, and disseminates scientific information on 
matallurgy, plastics, and other materials in Army 
equipment . 

The Harry Diamond Laboratories complex originally 
was established to work on proximity fuzes, but its 
broad capabilities have led it into development of 
materials, components, systems, and technologies far 
beyond fuzing. 

The Aeronautical Research Laboratory accomplishes 
basic and applied research in the field of sub-sonic 
aerodynamics applicable to aircraft, missile and other 
aerodynamic devices. 



Safety Office, Aberdeen Proving Ground 

An accident that occurred recently at this in- 
stallation resulted in the death of an employee and 
more than $3,000 damage to government property. As 
is the case with all serious accidents, it was 
thoroughly investigated, studied, analyzed and re- 
viewed. Voluminous reports were prepared by various 
elements of command and staff. The purpose for all 
this effort to examine the accident is to prevent a 
recurrence . 

The exact causes of this accident have been 
identified and specific remedies have been developed 
to prevent the recurrence of similar accidents. Know- 
ledge of direct causes is important only to persons 
involved in similar operations, but knowledge of the 
indirect causes and conditions is of vital importance 
to every person who handles explosives or items with 
explosive potential. 

The most important message is that this accident 
almost did not happen. The operation was being shut 
down when it occurred even though the unsafe con- 
dition had existed all night. If the condition had 

Editor’s Note: It has often been noted that experience 

is a harsh but excellent teacher . An AHC installation 
that experienced a fatal accident a few months ago took 
pains to make certain its supervisors and personnel 
learned the lessons taught by the incident . This ar- 
ticle is extracted from a five-minute safety talk pre- 
pared and used at the installation. 


discovered and corrected at 0630 hours, fifteen 
minutes before the explosion, no one would have believed 
a man had been within one spark of tragedy all night. 

Many times foremen, supervisors and operating per- 
sons use an unblemished safety record as proof of safe 
operations. While accident records can be positive 
proof of safety failures, they are no measure of 
safety success. This is especially true in explosives 
operations where accidents are normally rare but usually 
disastrous. Complacency based on a good safety record 
may have been a contributing factor in the accident. 

Since the accident was not a true explosives 
accident, it is now appropriate to review the lessons 
learned from this incident and relate them to explosives 
operations . 

The responsibility for the accident is fixed by 
regulation to the chain of command from the operator 
to the Post Commander. However, not one of those in- 
dividuals can actually be blamed for the accident. The 
accident was caused by a number of people who didn't 
know or didn't understand, or didn't do everything 
they should have. None of these acts or omissions by 
the people involved were of great importance but when 
combined, they produced the accident. 

The operation was covered by a standing operating 
procedure which, viewed with the benefit of hindsight, 
had some shortcomings but which would have prevented 
the accident if followed explicitly. Explosives 
operations also have standing operating procedures which 
are adequate only if they are complied with. Every 
operator and every supervisor must be intimately familiar 
with every part of every SOP they or their subordinates 
must follow. Having a standing operating procedure 
nailed to the wall in a conspicuous place is not 
sufficient. It must be read and understood. In add- 
ition, supervisors are charged with the responsibility 
of assuring that their subordinates understand the stand- 
ing operating procedure fully. 

The facilities involved in the operation and 
subsequent accident were old and much less than ideal. 

If fact, a deficiency in the test chamber was a factor 
in the accident. But the inadequacies of the facilities 
are no excuse for an accident. No one has perfect 
equipment and facilities. Operators, and especially 
supervisors, must be aware of the shortcomings and 


limitations of their facilities so that these problems 
cannot increase the hazards to personnel and equipment. 

The next link in the tragic chain was the saddest 
of all. The various personnel in and around the op- 
eration failed to communicate with each other. There 
seemed to be a relationship between the supervisor, 
his subordinates, and the support personnel where 
information was neither solicited nor advanced. Nor- 
mally, operating personnel are the people most likely 
to notice an improper, unnatural or unsafe condition. 

And, normally, first line supervisors are the people 
best able to analyze these conditions, A continuous 
give and take of information among all persons in- 
volved in an operation is essential for a safe and smooth 
operation . 

The stage was set for an accident. The major 
indirect causes discussed above can be listed in very 
simple terms. 

1. Failure to comply with the standing op- 
erating procedure. 

2. Deficiency in facilities. 

3. Failure to communicate 

Please note that none of these conditions caused this 
accident. But correcting these factors would have pre- 
vented the accident. 

As a matter of interest, the direct cause of the 
accident was testing a device in an unsafe condition. 
Without getting involved in an engineering discussion, 
the problem with the device was that it continuously 
released gasoline into the air. However, even with 
the unsafe device the situation should never have 
deteriorated to the level where the accident happened. 

The lessons for explosives personnel are very 
simple : 

1. Understand and follow the correct standing 
operating procedure. 

2. Know the limitations of your equipment. 

3. If any problem is noticed or anticipated, 
it should be discussed with the appropriate super- 
visors and operating personnel. 

* * * * 




Most people consider non-electric blasting caps 
to be safe from an electrostatic source of energy. 

While this may be correct under many conditions, there 
can be exceptions. The incident related below reveals 
that any conductor in the vicinity of the cap primer 
mix and insulated from the cap body can result in the 
cap initiating from relatively low electrical energies. 
If vinyl coated detonating cord with a lead core should 
be used in conjunction with non-electric caps, it is 
possible that some conditions could lead to a similar 
cap initiation. 

The worker involved in the accident was performing 
an operation that involved several steps. Sequentially, 
a handle was installed in a polystyrene housing. A 
firing line was next installed in the center cavity of 
the housing. The line was properly secured, and a 
firing mechanism was positioned. The housing was loaded 
with a fragment retaining material which was held in 
place with cardboard. A polystyrene lid was applied 
to the top of the housing with adhesive. To insure 
proper seating of the lid, it was hand-rubbed over the 
glue joint. The housing was turned over and explosive 
device was installed. 

The injured completed placing a polystyrene lid 
on a polystyrene housing. As he reached toward the 
underneath side of the housing to turn it over, a No. 

6 non-electric (Type A) blasting cap initiated. This 
cap was protruding from a groove on the underside of 
the housing. Injuries caused by the blasting cap 
fragments consisted of minor fragment wounds to the 
right forearm, left hand, abdomen and thighs. 

It was known from experience that a static charge 
was generated by rubbing the polystyrene lid. It was 
not known, however, that (Type A) No. 6 blasting cap 
could be initiated by this static electricity. The 
blasting cap was crimped onto a vinyl jacketed, RDX 
lead encased detonating cord. This cord butted against 
the blasting cap primer mix, which is a lead styphnate, 

The information presented in this article was made 
available by Mr. R. W. Wheeler. Safety Manager of Explo- 
sive Technology, a Ducommun Incorporated Subsidiary 
located at Fairfield. California. 


KCLO sub 3 mixture adjacent to lead azide. The gap 
between the outer diameter of the lead cord and inner- 
diameter of the blasting cap wall was a nominal .076 
inches. It was proved in the laboratory that voltages, 
well within the capacitance limitations of a human being, 
would arc across this gap and initiate the primer mix 
of the cap. From these data and the experiences of 
static previously encountered, it was concluded that 
initiation by static electricity was the most probable 
cause . 

A second possible cause was considered. When the 
vinyl-coated line was inserted into the blasting cap, 
it was possible the lead cord inside the line might 
protrude a short distance beyond the end of the vinyl 
coating. If this condition had occurred, and the lead 
cord was actually penetrating the primer mix of the 
cap, any subsequent motion could cause friction and 
initiate the mix. Therefore, it was possible an inad- 
vertent motion of the capped firing line initiated the 
cap if the lead cord had, in fact, penetrated the cap 
primer mix. 

Type B blasting caps , which are considerably less 
static sensitive than the Type A caps, had been the 
standard caps used for production. However, Type A 
caps which were in stock were substituted when the supply 
of Type B caps was depleted. Approximately 90 units 
had been assembled using the Type A caps; however, the 
method of assembling the unit that initiated differed 
from the previous 89; i.e., the cap was not secured in 
place before assembling the lid. This resulted in the 
cap hanging free from the housing. 

The operation was being performed in a mobile home 
type structure. The construction of this type facility 
lends itself to generating static electricity. The 
motion from exterior winds and from movement of person- 
nel in the trailer reacting with the metal exterior, 
Fiberglas insulation and non-conductive interior, re- 
portedly results in the structure acting as a huge 
capacitor. Therefore, static electricity in this type 
structure would be very difficult to control. 

The controlling procedure had not been approved by 
Manufacturing Quality Control and Safety. Furthermore, 
the process was being performed out of sequence , which 
resulted in the cap hanging free. 


In previous operations static grounding precautions 
had been provided. The area had been used for an op- 
eration which did not require this type protection; 
therefore, the operator removed the protection. When 
the production of this item resumed, the static grounding 
precautions were not replaced. Therefore, there was 
no provision to dissipate static energy during the 
assembly of the housing. 

The following measures were taken to preclude 
recurrence of the accident: 

1. Non-electric blasting caps that are the 
least sensitive to static electrical energy were used. 

2. A metallic cap 
will be placed over the end 
of the detonating cord before 
it is inserted into the blast- 
ing cap. This will provide 
electrical continuity between 
the cap and lead cord and 
preclude the lead cord 
penetrating the primer mix of 
the cap. (See sketch that 
shows the blasting cap before 
and after modification.) 


Cap Primer Mix 

No. 6 Non-Electric 
Blasting Cap — w 

Nominal .076 

Cap Crimped to 
Vinyl Coating 

Vinyl Coated 
Detonating Cord 

Lead Coated Detonating Cord 
'Explosive Filler 


Cap Crimped Over 
Metallic Cap & Vinyl Coating 

Cap Primer Mix 

No. 6 Non-Elect t 
Blasting Cap * — 

Vinyl Coated Detonating Cord 
Lead Coated Detonating Cord 
•Explosive Filler 

3. Equipment tables, floors and personnel 
will be grounded to a common ground. 

4. Before any operation involving hazardous 
materials commences, an approved operating procedure 
will be required. Changes and/or deviations to this 
procedure must have the concurrence of the approving 
authorities . 

5. Operations involving hazardous materials 
will not be performed in mobile home type structures. 

Editors Note: If miners safety fuse is not suitable 

use primacord with No. 6 blasting cap taped to the oord. 



Recently, 4.2 inch mortar rounds, FSN 1315-935- 
9140-C705, Lot No LOP 8-37, were being renovated. 
Unserviceable ignition cartridge containers were being 
removed from rounds and replaced with serviceable con- 
tainers . 

A munitions operator 
attempted to remove an igni- 
tion cartridge, FSN 1315-827- 
0456, after he had previously 
removed cartridge extension 
and striker. Operator was 
using knife to break Pitman 
cement that had stuck car- 
tridge in container. As ig- 
nition cartridge was loosened, 
cartridge ignited causing a 
low order explosion. both 
operators in the bay received 
minor first aid injuries and 
were able to return to duty. 

Apparently ignition was caused by pinching loose 
grains of powder between the metal cap and container. 

A close observation of the plastic liner indicated that 
a rupture occurred near the crimped area on end oppo- 
site the primer, allowing black powder to spill from 
liner into cartridge container. As cartridge was freed 
from cement, the movement caused enough friction to 
ignite powder. Primer cover was free of any indent- 
ations and/or scratches which indicates primer did not 
function . 

To prevent recurrence of this type incident, the 
following corrective action has been taken: 

1. Ignition cartridges will be removed from 
container by hand only when free enough to remove with 
fingers . 

2. Similar operations will be separated by 
plexiglas shields. 


3. Ignition cartridges that cannot be 
readily removed by hand will be placed in tote boxes 
with primers protected, transferred to another bay and 
removed by machine press utilizing a wood drift. A 
plexiglas shield on machine will protect operators. 

4. All cartridges that cannot be removed 
from containers by machine, without use of undue force, 
will be transferred to burning ground for disposal. 


Most of us know cadmium as the tin-white coating 
found on hand tools. As a protective covering, it does an 
excellent job of preventing corrosion. Yet, this same 
element which protects steel tools can, under certain 
conditions, cause deterioration of magnesium and de- 
struction of titanium compounds. 

Cadmium plating has a tendency to chip off tools 
during maintenance. If these minute particles find their 
way into some lubrication system, they will contaminate 
the lubricant and cause deterioration of any magnesium 
parts they may contact. Similarly, when a cadmium plated 
tool is used on a titanium part, small cadmium particles 
may be deposited on the part. If the part is then 
subjected to high temperatures, the cadmium will react 
with the titanium, making it brittle and causing stresses 
which could result in cracks and possible part failure. 

Magnesium castings are found on a variety of engines 
and other aircraft components. Presently, the fifth 
stage compressor disc in some T-53 engines is made of 
titanium, and future modification of engines may include 
additional titanium parts. 

To prevent failures from this cause, use nickel- 
plated or unplated tools when performing maintenance on 
systems or parts which may be adversely affected by 
cadmium deposits. 

Monthly Maintenance Summary, US Army Board of Aviation 
Accident Research, Fort Rucker, Alabama 



W. R. Bishop, Quality Assurance Inspector 
Thiokol Chemical Corporation 
Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant 

Many of us have made statements like these: "Here 

comes the safety man." "The safety man is in the building." 
"Everybody put on your safety glasses and safetv equip- 
ment. Watch what you are doing! The safety inspector 
is here!" 

Think for a moment about the tone of these remarks. 

It often reveals a failure to realize that the safety 
inspectors have responsibilities and a job to do just 
as you and I have. If all employees constantly keep 
and practice a good safety attitude, the approach of a 
safety inspector should not cause anyone to have a guilty 
conscience . 

Take a mental inspection tour through your building. 
What safety hazards or violations do you see? How is 
the housekeeping? Do you see any items strewn around 
in such a manner as to create hazards? What about items 
placed on ledges? Are all employees using the proper 
safety equipment? Are any of the workers wearing 
prohibited clothing or articles? Are the bays over- 
loaded? Are any of the exits blocked? Is anybody in- 
volved in horseplay? Are any of the employees doing 
their jobs in an un-safe manner? 

Let's look at these questions one at a time and 
see why we have asked them. While we are doing this, 
remember that all safety rules and regulations were 
written, and are to be followed, for our protection. 

We are not being spied upon and we should not feel 
as if we were. Without recognizing our mistakes, we 
may unconsciously violate some of these safety rules. 
Mistakes cause accidents and injuries. The safety 
inspectors inspect daily to identify and to help us 
correct our mistakes. 

Good housekeeping consists of keeping your areas 
clean, not only for neatness, but also for oomfort and 
maximum individual safety. If the floor has oil or 
grease spills or is cluttered, you run the risk of 
someone falling and injuring himself. 

This article was extracted from the report of an employees' 
safety meeting conducted by Mr. W. R. Bishop. 


Safety equipment is issued to protect your head, 
face, eyes, hands, body and feet. If you .were not wearing 
your safety glasses and a flying piece of steel hits you 
in the eye, you are the loser. Wearing clothing that 
could cause static electricity could cause a fire that 
could result in injury to you. 

An overloaded bay can contribute to accidents in 
many ways. A fire might not be contained. Injury 
could be caused by lack of enough room for escape. A 
forklift or pallet lift operator could collide with 
an employee coming from behind stacked material. 

Blocked exits have caused deaths of employees that 
might otherwise have a chance. When we have had fires, 
employees were injured during evacuation and not 
directly by the fire or incident itself. 

Horseplay, such as throwing different items at 
one another, has caused injuries to many individuals. 

Even though it may seem harmless it could result in 
serious injury to you or to a fellow employee. 

If an employee does not do a job as he has been 
instructed to do, he may injure himself or someone 
nearby. If a worker is staking an item and does not 
pay attention, or gets in too big a hurry, a finger 
or hand may be torn, ripped or mashed. 

On one occasion, one of our employees jabbed 
himself in the eye with the arm of his safety glasses. 

He had made it a practice to lay his afety glasses 
aside and put them on quickly when he saw the safety 
man coming. Do you want a worker like that working' 
near you? He could hurt you the next time he is 
careless. Remind employees like this that you do 
not appreciate this lack of good safety practice. 

When you came through our personnel office upon 
hiring in, you should have noticed a sign which 
reads, "If you do not want to work safely, we don’t 
want you!" This still holds true. 



Jon E. Parkhurst, Safety Training Instructor 
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation 

Badger Army Ammunition Plant 

Host plants have a few employees who are old 
enough in years but not adult enough in their 
attitude towards others. These are likely to be 
practical jokers or horseplay practitioners who 
assume no responsibility for the results of their acts. 

The practical joker is usually a person who 
wants to provide amusement for the gang. He is 
a life of the party type. He gets his greatest 
satisfaction from the laughter of his fellow workers 
when he causes embarrassment or discomfort to some- 
one else. He insists he does not mean any harm. When 
he tries to make someone look ridiculous, he does it 
for the sake of 'the gag. 

Often he is more rugged than his victim and he 
enjoys showing off his physical superiority. This may 
take the form of wrestling or scuffling with a weaker 
opponent. If the victim becomes annoyed or attempts 
to fight back, the "wrestler" has achieved his goal. 

He never seems to think he may injure his victim or 
himself. This kind of horseplay often results in a 
fall, a sprain or perhaps a head injury. 

A familiar type is "the gooser" who picks a 
nervous or ticklish person as his target. "Goosing" 
can be dangerous. A nervous person reacts very quickly. 
If he is startled, he may come into contact with 
moving machine parts. In his attempts to get clear 
of the prankster in a hurry, he can easily trip and 

Then there is the crude fellow who never misses 
a chance to catch someone else off balance. He may 
think it fun to walk behind his companion and 
deliberately trip him. Some people trip easily and 
fall hard and they can be severely injured by this 
trick . 

Tossing a small object, like a nail or a nut, may 
seem harmless enough. This way of livening things up 
can cost someone an eye. 


Some individuals on a scaffold cannot seem to 
resist the temptation to drop tools and material to 
make workmen below leap out of the way. 

The danger of shaking a ladder when someone is 
working on it is so obvious that this kind of horse- 
play hardly needs to be mentioned. Some people 
think that act is a big joke. The individual on the 
ladder does not agree with the man who shakes it. 

Do not forget the driver who jams on the brakes 
to get a laugh when a rider loses his balance, and 
the daredevil who runs his vehicle at a person and 
then suddenly swerves to avoid him. 

Last but not least is the horn-honker who likes 
to startle people out of their wits. 

The practical joker often gets away with his 
pranks. If he is fortunate, a long time may pass 
before he appears to injure a victim. Still his 
practical jokes do backfire. The person on the 
receiving end builds up a feeling of resentment. 

He may not wish or be able to retaliate, but he may 
be so annoyed that he cannot keep his mind on his 
job. He is in just the right state then to cause 
injury to himself or to others. 

The employee who indulges in horseplay is a 
show-off, a nuisance and an accident maker. He 
violates safety regulations that have been established 
to protect him and his fellow workers. He is not 
a good employee, because he has nonsense rather 
than his work on his mind. 

The answer to the horseplay problem is simple. 

It cannot be tolerated if an organization is to 
be safe and efficient. All personnel must be made 
aware of this. The prohibition of horseplay must 
be vigorously enforced by all supervisors. The re- 
sponsible supervisor will give prompt and 
enthusiastic support to the rule against horseplay, 
because it can save him the unpleasant additional 
duty of reporting and explaining accidents the 
joker will eventually cause. 


BE FOUND IN AMCR 385-224 . 


1 When two explosives have been assigned to the 
^ same quantity-distance hazard classification 
group, does it follow these may be stored to- 

Answer and reference: 

O Would you be fully protected from injury if 
you work in an office separated from an 
ammunition or explosive location by inhabited 
building distance? 

Answer and reference: 

Q What is a Class II hazardous location, as de- 
^ fined by the National Electrical Code? 

Answer and reference: — 


Are electric utility lines placed underground 
’ a when these lead into explosive manufacturing 

Answer and reference: 

Is more than one path to ground desirable for 
; an air terminal that is part of a lightning 
protection system? 

Answer and reference : _ 

What is meant by the work hypergolic? 


Answer and reference: 

Is it necessary for an operator to wear safety 
' goggles if a grinding wheel is equipped with 
a hood? 

Answer and reference: ________________________ 

If the local governmental organization adopts 

■ a more stringent health regulation, should 
your installation comply with it? 

Answer and reference: __ 

Do waste or spent acids present any hazard 
b that is not present when the acid is first 
received or manufactured? 

Answer and reference: . ■ ■ 

What minimum distance should be maintained 

■ between two operating forklift trucks? 

Answer and reference: 



Of approximately 10,000 
employees, 23 sections have 
won awards for operating 
200,000 hours without a dis- 
abling injury. LTC George 
H. Wray, C.O. is shown pre- 
senting Day and Zimmerman 
supervisors W. F. Franz, 
Controller; W. 0. Dunn, 
Engineering and Maintenance, 
and Stanley Nettles, Technical 
Services safety awards for 
their sections. 




Safety personnel from 
two of the AMC subordinate 
commands play prominent roles 
in the activities of the Fed- 
eral Safety Council of Great- 
er St. Louis. Mr. William 
White (shown at left in photo), 
Health Physicist at the U.S. 

Army Mobility Equipment Com- 
mand, is chairman of the or- 
ganization. Mr. Malcolm 
McLuckie, (left), Safety 
Officer, U.S. Army Aviation 
Systems Command, is Secretary 
of the organization. Not 
shown is Mr. Leo R. Gegg, 

Safety Officer, MECOM, who is 
Chairman of the Fire Prevention 
Committee, a working affiliate 
of the Federal Fire Council. 



did you know? 



44. All 

auestions were based 


Inf or- 



"Tn 'AMck 385-224 . — 7 T 






paragranh follows each 

answer . 

1_. No . Explosives are classified for quantity- 
distance according to the damage expected if 
they explode or ignite. Different items in 
the same class may not be compatible. Before 
different items are stored together their stor- 
age compatibility should be determined. 
References: Paragraphs 1701 and 1903. 

2 . No , Inhabited building distance protects 

against substantial structural damage. It 
does not provide protection against glass 
breakage or injury to personnel from glass 
breakage. For protection of personnel, 
greater distance should be used, if practic- 
able. Reference: Paragraph 1702C. 

3 . Class II is applied to locations that are 

hazardous because of the presence of com- 
bustible dust. Rooms or buildings containing 
explosives dusts or explosives which are of 
such chemical composition or physical size 
that through movement, handling or other 
means, particles of the explosives may become 
dispersed in the surrounding atmosphere, either 
through normal or unusual means, shall be 
considered as Class II hazardous locations as 
defined in the National Electrical Code . 
Reference: Paragraph 603e(l)(b). 


4 . 

Yes . For future ' installations each light 
service and each power service to explosives 
buildings shall be run for the last 50 feet 
underground. Reference: Paragraph 611. 

5. Yes . Where practicable, all air terminals 

should be provided with at least two paths to 
ground. Reference: Paragraph 803b. 

6 . Hyper, golic is the term used to describe the 
self-ignition of certain fuels and oxidizers 
upon contact with each other. Reference: 
Paragraph 1502c, 

7. Yes o No hood will conf ine all particles pro- 
duced during a grinding operation and some will 
be thrown into the open. Goggles should be 
worn by all employees on every grinding od- 
eration. Protective eyeshields should also 

be mounted on each grinding machine. 

Reference: Paragraph 920b. 

8. Yes . All local and state health laws, reg- 

ulations and codes are to be observed. 
Reference: Paragraph 1107. 

9. Waste or spent acids usually contain small 

amounts of nitrobodies and present the hazard 
of explosive materiel. Spent acid from the 
manufacture of nitroglycerin is particularly 
hazardous. Reference: Paragraph 1307. 

10 . A distance of at least three truck lengths 

should be maintained between trucks in oper- 
ation. Reference: Paragra ph 2411a. 





There once was a man named McNaster 
Who had to do everything faster. 

His skin took some rips 
When his car did six flips — 

Now he's doing some time in slow plaster. 

An impatient young man named O'Malley 
Took a rapid short cut down an alley. 

His car hit some ice 
And it spun once or twice— 

Now the alley's named after O'Malley. 

There once was a worker named Blurry 
Who had to get home in a hurry. 

His rush caused a fuss 
When he rammed a school bus — 

Try telling that tale to a jury. 

* M. H. Faust. Safety Officer 
Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency 


3 1262 09304 9210