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Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 


An application of organizational and 
managerial principles as an improvement to 
the current Army training and evaluation 
program for the mechanized infantry 

George, Dewey Peter; Gerding, Richard Leo 

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: ] LIBRARY Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle 
Monterey, California USA 93943 


Dewey Peter George 


Monterey, California 




Dewey Peter George 


Richard Leo Gerding 

December 1978 

/Thesis Co-Advisors: S. Parry 

J.K. Hartman 

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 







5. Maar OF Ro On a sis; COVERED 

December 5 



4. TITLE (and Subtitie) 
An Application of Organizational and Managerial 
| Principles as an Improvement to the Current 
j}Army Training and Evaluation Program for the 
Mechanized Infan 
7. AUTHOR(e@) 
| Dewey Peter George 

Richard Leo Gerding 


December 1978 

. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ACORESS(1! aliferent from Controfiing Oltice, | 18. SECURITY CLASS. (of thie report) 


Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 

Naval Postgraduate School 

Monterey, California 93940 

Naval Postgraduate School 

Monterey, California 93940 

16. OISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of thia Report) 

‘17. OSTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the adetrect entered in Block 20, If different from Report) 


emer fhe 


19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reveree side |{ necessary and Identify by block number) 

Army Training and Evaluation Program 

20. ABSTRACT (Continue an reverse side i neceeeary and identity by biock number) 

The United States Army in the past five years has begun a 
revolutionary change in its concept of training. The Army 
Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) is the realization 
of this change. The implementation of the ARTEP has not 
achieved optimal results. Training management decisions at 
division, brigade, and battalion levels must be identified 
and their ramifications understood; research has shown certain 

DD -°Om™. 1473 DITION oF 1 NOV 65 18 CBSOLETE 
1 JAN 73 
S/N 0102-014- 6601 | UNCLASSIFIED 


en ee el 

(20. ABSTRACT Continued) 

approaches more beneficial than others. The training/ 
evaluation/control of external exercises uSing ARTEP has 
been identified as a universally deficient area. 

This study, through application of organizational and 
managerial principles, provides practical guidance to 
training decision makers from division down to company level. 
It also provides an improved system for the training/ 
evaluation/control of the external exercise. 

S migents tft UNCLASSIF 

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 

An Application of Organizational 
and Managerial Principles as 
an Improvement to the Current 
Army Training and Evaluation Program 
for the Mechanized Infantry 


Dewey Peter George 
Captain, United States Army 
B.S., Virginia Military Institute, 1970 


Richard Leo Gerding 
Captain (P), United States Army 
B.S., Benedictine College, 1975 

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 


from the 

December 1978 


The United States Army in the past five years has begun 
a revolutionary change in its concept of training. The Army 
Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) is the realization 
of this change. The implementation of the ARTEP has not 
achieved optimal results. Training management decisions at 
division, brigade, and battalion levels must be identified 
and their ramifications understood; research has shown cer- 
tain approaches more beneficial than others. The training/ 
evaluation/control of external exercises using ARTEP has 
been identified as a universally deficient area. 

This study, through application of organizational and 
managerial principles, provides practical guidance to 
training decision makers from division down to company 
level. It also provides an improved system for the training/ 

evaluation/control of the external exercise. 


I. GLOSSARY OF TERMS ----------------- == == == - = - = = = 
Il. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3-9-9939 -- 239-2 = 23-9 - = = = == - -- = = -- 
rt . BACKGROUND 3-9-9923 29 90 9 

THE MECHANED LNEANT RY o—_———-—----—----=-— = oa ee 
ET TEODUCTION =-2=s--=----=-25 "= —-- <0 eee 


2B RTOS en hee oe rr 


EXERCISE -------------------------~---- ------------- 

A. INTRODUCTION --------- 9-9-2 eo oer eo 



VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY -------------- = 9 3 3 rere 

VIII. INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ---------------------+----- 


Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). A training 

program designed to: establish unit training missions with 
specified tasks, conditions, and standards of performance for 
combat-critical missions; train and evaluate the ability of 
the unit to perform specified missions under simulated com- 
bat conditions; evaluate the effectiveness of past training 
of all echelons of the force; and assess future training 
needs. When supplemented with the appropriate directives, 
ARTEP serves as the basis for evaluation by which the level 

of training proficiency can be determined. 

Collective Training. Training, ‘either in institutions or 
units, that prepares a group of individuals (crews, teams, 
Squads, platoons) to accomplish tasks required of the group 

aS an entity. 

Controller/Simulator (C/S). A person who implements simula- 

tion activities to increase the combat realism of the ARTEP. 

Evaluation of Training. That process which, by objective 
and subjective means, seeks to determine the extent of 
learning progress of individuals and units. The purpose is 
to determine if a training objective has been attained and 
how well the available resources have been used in order to 
provide the training manager with the information he needs 
to modify or update the training program, and to provide 

feedback to trainers and soldiers undergoing training. 

External Evaluation. An evaluation of a unit initiated by 
higher headquarters which will diagnose the state of trainin 
proficiency of that unit, e.g., an external ARTEP evaluation 
which will be conducted either with or without advance notice, 

as needed to maintain training accountability and status. 

Historical Information. Within the scope of this paper, 
training information that has value or potential value for 
trainers and/or training managers. Examples are performance 
data on specific missions (target hits, time to completion, 
etc.) or conditions under which missions were performed 

(weather, personnel fill, etc.). 

Individual Training. Training the individual officer, NCO, 
or enlisted person receives, either in institutions or units, 
that prepares the individual to’ perform specified duties and 

tasks related to the assigned MOS and duty position. 

Information System. Within the scope of this paper, a system 
that gathers, processes and distributes information to 

improve training and training management. 

Internal Evaluation. An evaluation of a unit initiated by 
the unit commander in order to ascertain, for his use, the 
State of training proficiency of that unit. An example 

would be: the internal ARTEP evaluation which is conducted 

as often as the commander desires and resources allow. 

Mission Related Training. That training which contributes 

to a unit's ability to successfully accomplish its combat 

missions. This training is conducted in the unit and may 
consist of either collective or individual training and 
evaluation. An example of mission-related training would be 
training designed to enhance a battalion's ability to defend 

against an enemy attack. 

Need Additional Training (NAT). Used in place of "Unsatis- 

factory" as an evaluation rating. Expresses the true meaning 
of a non-satisfactory accomplishment of a training mission/ 


Off-Line T/E. In constructing the training exercise for 
the battalion external ARTEP, that training and evaluation 

of missions which take place outside of a scenario sequence. 

On-Line T/E. In constructing the training exercise for the 
battalion external ARTEP, that training and evaluation of 

missions which take place within a scenario sequence. 

Opposing Force (OPFOR). A unit totally dedicated to opposing 
another unit. The OPFOR would normally use enemy threat 
doctrine while opposing a unit that 1S conducting ARTEP 


Prime Time Training. Collective or individual training 
designed to develop and maintain unit capability to accomplish 
assigned Table of Organization and Equipment/Modified Table 

of Organization and Equipment (TOE/MTOE) missions and 

contingency missions. 


Single Battalion Evaluation. An exclusive evaluation of 

one battalion during a given period of time. The prime 
focus of all efforts is to achieve the best training/ 

evaluation of the subject battalion. 

Skill Qualification Test (SOT). A test that measures a 
soldier's individual skill ability based on the tasks shown 

in the Soldier's Manual. 

Soldier's Manual. Describes what is expected of each soldier 
for his appropriate Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 
skill level and duty position. It contains instructions on 
how to learn new skills and explains the standards which 

must be met for evaluation. 

Standard. An integral part of any training objective. The 
standard clearly defines the level of performance expected 
of those undergoing training. Wherever possible standards 
are expressed in quantifiable or measurable terms in order 
to determine if the training has been successful. The 
Standards for training should be exactly the same as those 

used for evaluation. 

Subunit Evaluation (SUE). The mission/task evaluation of 
specific subordinate elements of a unit. For example, the 
evaluation of a selected company, platoon, and squad mission/ 

task performance during ARTEP. 

Supplemental Missions. Those missions necessitated by 
conditions common to combat but not necessarily integral to 

a particular type of operation. 

Task. A statement which specified an action to be performed 

by an individual or team/unit. 

Training/Evaluation (T/E). Refers to the collective and/or 
individual training and the simultaneous evaluation of that 


Trainer/Evaluator/Controller (T/E/C). An individual who is 
responsible for the training, evaluation and control of a 

unit conducting collective training under ARTEP. 

Training and Evaluation Outline (T&EO) . Essentially a task/ 

conditions/standards outline, as found in the ARTEP on 

which will be shown the unit, its mission, the general con- 
dition under which the mission is to be performed, the primary 
training and evaluation standards upon which the unit will 

be evaluated, and the performance oriented objectives which 
describe the tasks, conditions, and standards for the mission. 
The T&EO should also include the estimated Support require- 
ments (e.g., Threat Forces, maneuver area, etc.) necesSary 

to conduct training or evaluation of the mission. 

Training Management. The art of employing limited resources 
(human, physical, financial and time) in a manner that permits 

efficient and effective development of individuals and units 


so they can successfully accomplish their peace and wartime 


Two Battalion Evaluation. A simultaneous evaluation of two 
battalions during a given period of time. This method of 
training/evaluation is characterized by reciprocal action, 
in which the two bawet Ii one oppose each other, alternatively 

using threat doctrine against the evaluated battalion. 



The Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) is an 
on-going, comprehensive program by which units and sub-units 
attain and maintain combat readiness. This relatively new 
ean sequires training managers and trainers at all levels 
to be especially familiar with the ARTEP philosophy and to 
understand the implications of the decisions that they make. 

The scope of this paper includes guidance and recommenda~ 
tions for implementation for the ARTEP in general, with pri-~ 
mary emphasis on the battalion external training/evaluation. 
This emphasis does not infer primary importance of the external 
training/evaluation, but indicates the need for improvements 
in this area. 

At Division level, the key decisions to be made regard 
resource allocation and organizational management of ARTEP. 
Since all unit training programs are a combination of fre- 
quent, internal T/E and the infrequent external T/E exercise, 
Division must provide for adequate resources to support both 
phases. The internal phase of ARTEP, by definition, is 
Managed at Battalion level or lower, so Division merely has 
to allocate and monitor gross resources and the Brigades/ 
Battalions will manage them. However, three vital decisions 
must be made’ regarding the external T/E exercises very early 
in the Division Master Training Program. These decisions 

concern sponsorship, evaluation approach and organization of 


the exercise. Because the Battalion level external T/E 
exercises consume great amounts of resources, it is impera- 
tive that they be managed to achieve the most training value 
for the evaluated unit. Brigade sponsorship of external 

T/E exercises is recommended to preserve the diagnostic 
character of ARTEP and to enhance individual tailoring for 
each battalion. The single battalion approach of evaluation/ 
control is recommended because of the unwieldiness of the 
alternative, the two battalion approach, where two battalions 
are trained/evaluated simultaneously. The concentration 
afforded the unit in the single battalion approach offers 
fewer control problems and thus better training/evaluation. 
The structuring of the external T/E exercise involves a large 
number of varied missions and sub-tasks. Some require ranges 
and special situations; others fit easily into an ongoing 
tactical scenario. The addition of an offline portion could 
accommodate the former. For these reasons, a combination of 
offline and online mission evaluations separated by a short 
interval is recommended as the structure for the external 

T/E exercise. 

Brigade level decisions deal with resource management of 
assets allocated by Division; also, under brigade sponsorship, 
the brigade must make the same decisions regarding evaluation 
approach and structure. The selection of brigade sponsorship 
is normally a result of conferences between the division 
commander/G-3 and the brigade commander/S-3. Implicit in this 

arrangement is an underlying "contract" between the division 


and the brigade: for a given amount of training resources 
division expects a stated level of training proficiency. 

The guidance given in these two areas is the same for Divi- 
sion or Brigade: single battalion approach and combination 
of offline and online structure. The brigade commander, 
based on discussions with battalion commanders, should be 
allowed to select which battalion should perform its external 
T/E exercise within a time frame allotted by Division. 

At battalion level, resources must be managed to provide 
for quarterly internal T/E exercises. The battalion training 
program should provide for integrated individual and collec- 
tive training to achieve and maintain Soldier's Manual and 
ARTEP standards. Maximum use should be made of the battalion's 
own assets for internal T/E. Current training management 
procedures, specifically organization under decentralized 
training, can be used to great advantage. 

At company level, T/E is conducted. The Company Commander 
1S primarily a trainer, not a resource manager. At company 
level, resource management is accomplished only to facili- 
tate training. 

The use of T/E results should include immediate feedback 
to the performing unit. This feedback consists of oral T/E 
comments made directly to the leader concerned, on the 
terrain Wire the action occurred. These comments are normally 
followed by written feedback that provides the basis for 

historical information that is useful in training analysis 


at all levels. An additional feedback loop results from 
the external T/E wherein the Trainer/Evaluator/Controller 
(T/E/C) provides not only immediate oral feedback as pre- 
viously described, but also a written evaluation that ulti- 
mately returns to the evaluated unit. Commanders at all 
levels can check the training status of their units at any 
time by personal: evaluation. | 

However, an important indicator of the training status 
of a battalion, available to the Division/Brigade/Battalion 
Commander, is the external T/E exercise; and the key to 
obtaining an accurate evaluation is the (T/E/C) system. 
Specific recommended improvements to the T/E/C guidance given 
in ARTEP 71-2, should provide a higher quality T/E for the 
performing unit and more useful evaluative information for 
the sponsoring headquarters. A fundamental structure of an 
information system is realized; useful information for train- 
ing managers and for high level analysis is potentially 

The improved T/E/C system includes closer involvement 
by the parent brigade headquarters and more attention to 
the proper selection and training of T/E/C personnel. The 
Opposing Forces (OPFOR) element also assumes additional 
importance and responsibilities. 

A well-structured T/E/C system for an external T/E exer- 
cise does not necessarily imply commitment of additional 
resources. It does imply optimal use of resources already 

committed. The fact that sufficient personnel, time, and 


equipment are allocated to the training/evaluation/control 
of an external T/E effort does not guarantee T/E/C effec- 
tiveness. A high level of training management and organiza- 
tional skill can increase T/E/C effectiveness with no corres- 
ponding rise in resource requirements and, in fact, could 

actually reduce requirements. 



Collective training in the United States Army has been 
based on an Army Training Test (ATT)/Army Training Program 
(ATP) mobilization model developed during World War II. 

That model was designed to train units in a progressive, 
sequential program for mobilization to deploy to a combat. 
theater at a scheduled date. While effective for its 
original purpose, this is not suited for today's needs. 

The current requirements for immediate deployment with 
combat ready units, doctrinal changes to accommodate in- 
creased weapons lethality, increasingly complex weapons, 
increasing maintenance requirements, higher costs, and eco- 
logical constraints are all changes in the training environ- 
ment which have caused a conceptual change within the Army 
Training System. The Army Training and Evaluation Program 
(ARTEP) is not related at all to the ATT/ATP, rather it is 
a revolutionary conceptual change which is designed to assist 
trainers and training managers in the conduct and management 
of the training needed to prepare a unit to survive and win 
on the modern battlefield. 

ARTEP is ig acu Ras and evaluation program that provides 
critical combat training objectives to units. It is a change 
in training philosophy that integrates both training and 
evaluation, with a focus on what should be done tomorrow to 

correct training weaknesses identified today. This is 


accomplished by giving the trainer/evaluator training objec- 
tives (tasks, conditions, and standards) which include criti- 
cal combat tasks that a unit must be proficient in, the condi- 
tions under which tasks must be performed, and specific 
Standards that should be met. With these objectives and 

other information found in the ARTEP's training and evalua- 
tion outlines (T&EO), the leader at each level can plan, 
conduct, and evaluate his training continuously. The ARTEP 
concept was approved in August 1975 by the Department of the 
Army for Army-wide implementation. 

A major field research effort was conducted by the Army 
Research Institute (ARI), beginning in December 1976, to 
analyze the methods used by field units in implementing the 
ARTEP for a Tank/Mechanized Infantry Task Force. This three 
volume report, completed in January 1978, is titled “Improved 
ARTEP Methods for Unit Evaluation." The information sources 
used in the ARI study were: field observations, interviews, 
consultations and literature. Seven battalions and subordinate 
units, representing four different divisions — two infantry 
and two armor — were sampled. All units were in the continental 
United States. Since the change from ATT/ATP concept to ARTEP 
concepts is revolutionary, not evolutionary, it is not sur- 
prising that the research revealed significant problems and 
variations of problems in ARTEP implementation. It should 
be noted and emphasized that although the research analysis 

was often critical of ARTEP, the ARTEP was unequivocally 


judged by users and analysts alike as superior to its prede- 
cessor, the ATT/ATP concept. The analysis by ARI is simply 
a means of refining and improving a program that is still 

in its infancy. 

Although our background research included the work that 
had been done by ARI, it also encompassed additional research 
On actual ARTEP after-action reports, and nearly three years 
of practical experience and field observations. Throughout 
our research, problems were identified at all levels and in 
various phases of ARTEP, however, the pervading issues had 
to do with organizing, tactically structuring, controlling, 
and supporting the ARTEP training/evaluation exercises. 
Problems emerged in the decision process in asSigning ratings 
and in the use of results to provide feedback. Local commands 
dealt with these problems with varying degrees of success. 

A need for practical management guidance for planners, 
trainers, training managers, and evaluators has arisen; 
ARTEP 71-2 and associated Training Circulars have not yet 
filled that need. 

Specifically, then, the problem addressed in our thesis 
is this: the current management of ARTEP in the field often 
does not result in achieving maximum training value for the 
participating unit. 

The approach adopted to address this problem is a prac- 
tical format providing specific guidance to commanders/ 
trainers/training managers at various levels to improve the 

efficiency of ARTEP implementation. Basic organizational 


and managerial principles were applied in formulating these 
recommended improvements. These principles, modified to 
fit the context of this problem, include the following: 

- The activities of an organization should lead, directly 
or indirectly, towards the achievement of the organiza- 
tion's stated goals. 

- Delegation of responsibility and authority to the lowest 
functionally efficient level. 

- Resource allocation decisions are a management function, 
not an operations function. 

- In an organization whose goals are essentially the 
refining of collective skills, decentralization of 
effort 1s optimal. 

- Feedback must somehow be made available to management 
in order to maintain a dynamic, adaptive organization. 

. The application of these principles, although not always 
Stated as such, should be apparent in the guidance and 

recommendations, which are explained in some detail. 






Division and brigade decisions involving the ARTEP are 
directly related to the availability of ARTEP training 
resources, the level of command sponsorship and the training 
proficiency of the units. Decisions related to the ARTEP must 
take into account the original ARTEP purposes which are: to 
evaluate the ability of a tactical unit to perform specified 
missions under simulated combat conditions; ‘to provide a 
guide for training by specifying mission standards of per- 
formance for combat-critical missions and tasks; to evaluate 
the effectiveness of collective training of all echelons from 
crew/squad through battalion/task force; and to provide an 
assessment of future training needs. Guidance and recommen- 

dations in this area are included in the following chapter. 


Division/Brigade Training Program should provide cone 

@ Adequate resources to support continuous internal 
T/E exeraetses by each maneuver battalion. 

@ Adequate resources to support planned external T/E 

For external T/E exercise: 

@ Brigade sponsorship. 

@ Single battalion evaluation. 

@ Combination of offline and online mission evaluation. 


ARTEP recording and reporting systems: 

@ Should provide for accurate, detailed data at 
battalion Levee. 

@ Should provide for summarized data at brigade and 
division Level. 

@ Can provide basis of quantitative data for training 

neseanch and analysis. 

@ The Division/Braigade Tratning Program should provide 
for adequate resources to support contanuous «nternal 

T/E exercises by each maneuver battalion. 

In order to fulfill the purposes of the ARTEP, sufficient 
training time is necessary not only to build up the profi- 
ciency of the units but to also maintain it. As a guideline, 
at least one month per quarter of the annual training cycle 
for maneuver battalions should be devoted to ARTEP proficiency. 
In providing the units with adequate time most Divisions use 
a system of prioritizing training time. An example would be 
a green, yellow, red phasing where green is priority training 
time (T/E exercises, Gunnery), yellow is lesser priority 
training time (Non-field training) and red is Mission and 
Divisional Support time. Figure 1-1 shows this type of 
system on a portion of a Division Master Training Schedule. 
Included also in Figure 1-1 is an example of the Battalion 

ARTEP training time. 


T-l a#uooLa 
*pepnypout a/L ddLyvy [euzeyXG pue [euzequr ATuUoy 


7 | tt Va ae 
“Se Bs wi GaTiff ti 


rhe “af = 

0 fee ee eee 
bas UISIKG, 




(Ww) Ud JUI OT/T 


ONL daniv 


Tt | ee) i 



Management of available terrain in order to allow ade- 
quate field maneuver areas is often a major link to the 
success of the T/E. If the amount of field training area 
is such that difficulties arise when more than one maneuver 
battalion trains simultaneously then a possible alternative 
would be to allocate sufficient terrain to the brigade that 
in the example, is in green time where it can be managed 
more efficiently than at division level. Although obviously 
there are real limits to the flexible use of training areas, 
repetition of the same missions over the same ground does 
little to inject surprise, fresh tactical thinking, or 
troop enthusiasm into the T/E exercise. 

The ARTEP is designed so that the commander can stay 
abreast of his units' collective training proficiency. The 
units’ strengths and weaknesses should be constantly monitored 
through internal evaluation which is the key to a successful 
program. Although Commanders' visits to their units con- 
ducting T/E are considered internal evaluation, they may 
not provide enough information on the actual collective 
training proficiency level of the unit. If needed, additional 
sources of information are available, one of which is the 

external T/E exercise. 

@ The Division/Braigade Training Program should provide 
fon adequate nesources to support planned external 

T/E @x@Aacrtsea. 


The Division Master Training Schedule and the Division 
Plan for annual training are influenced by so many variables 
that any set guidance is difficult. ARTEP 71-2 describes 
the procedure for conducting battalion external T/E exer- 
cises, but does not prescribe a minimum frequency. This 
built-in flexibility offers great advantages to division 
level planners who have to manage resources to maintain an 
effective training posture while still satisfying the require- 
ments of less visible activities, such as post support, 
Reserve/National Guard affiliation programs, etc. A general 
guideline is to maintain a Division Master Training Schedule 
that provides adequate oe to support at least one 
external T/E for each maneuver battalion per twelve to 
eighteen month period. While this guidance may seem less 
strenuous than most existing lower level policies, it should 
be noted that there is no implied reduction of frequency of 
ARTEP training and/or internal T/E's. Furthermore, the 
Division/Brigade Commander can tailor the frequency of external 
T/E's to meet individual battalions' needs. Within this con- 
text, the external T/E will require better management of 
resources, specifically in the trainer/evaluator/controller 
system. An improved system will be described in detail in 

Chapter 3. 

@ For external T/E exercises, baigade sponsorship 44 



Sponsorship refers to the specific headquarters that 
plays the predominant role in planning, supporting, and 
training/evaluating a battalion in its external T/E. Both 
division and brigade level sponsorship offer several advan- 
tages and disadvantages. Under division sponsorship, more 
staff assets are available for formulating the plan and con- 
siderably more resources are available to implement it. On 
the other nenian division control has psychological as well 
as physical drawbacks. Division control fosters a "test" 
atmosphere for the performing unit; its leaders perceive 
Division as a remote headquarters unfamiliar with the battalion 
and unsympathetic with its peculiar problems. If not care- 
fully avoided, division control can lead to a "canned" external 
T/E plan insensitive to a particular battalion's needs. This 
situation would seriously violate the philosophy of the ARTEP 
as a diagnostic training tool. The perception at lower 
levels, whether justified or not, would be reinforced that 
external T/E performance 1S the measure of performance for 
the Battalion Commander and the battalion, and that nothing 
short of all "Satisfactory" results 1s acceptable. It 1s 
also likely that the competition engendered by the Division 
approach would produce intensive efforts to "G-2" the problem 
and train accordingly. Physically, the ready availability 
and accessibility of Division resources invites over-use and 

Brigade sponsorship, however, encourages austerity and 

innovation. The natural (and desired) tendency is to do as 


much as possible with Brigade organic assets. Because non- 
organic assets will have to be justified, excesses and 

waste should be reduced. Also, the stigma of external T/E 
as a test is lessened as Brigade is more in touch with the 
battalion's needs and capabilities. The external T/E plan 
can be individually tailored for each battalion. The train- 
ing rather than the test nature of the external T/E is 
thereby enhanced. 

Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches, 
it is recommended that brigade sponsorship be used. Any 
staff "learning" that takes place in the sponsoring brigade 
headquarters can be passed to the other brigades through the 
ARTEP element of Division G-3, which plays a planning advis- 

ory role in the brigade sponsorship approach. 

@ For external ARTEP exercises, single battalion 

evaluations are Aecommended. 

In planning the allocation of resources for external 
T/E's, Division/Brigade headquarters must decide whether to 
use the Two Battalion approach or the Single Battalion 
approach. The Two Battalion approach offers the advantage 
of simultaneous T/E of two battalions in one exercise. The 
economy of resources available here is obvious. The disad- 
vantages of this approach, however, are Significant. The 
task of evaluation and control of two battalion size forces 

at essentially the same time requires a considerable resource 


commitment, one that a single brigade could not adequately 
meet. Sponsorship then falls to Division, a less than 
desirable approach for reasons already given. Also, the 
combat realism of the T/E suffers. In the worst case, the 
battalions oppose each other, each using standard US tactics. 
The value of this type of exercise is clearly low and in 
fact is hardly compatible with the ARTEP. In the best case, 
where the opposing units take turns using Threat doctrine 
and tactics, a stop-start syndrome develops, degrading the 
continuity of the exercise for its players, with the subse- 
quent negative effects on combat realism. The training 
benefit of sustained, realistic operations is thus forfeited. 
The Single Battalion approach avoids both of these pit- 
falls. The resources required for evaluation and control are 
reduced; Brigade sponsorship is possible. The OPFOR can be 
a totally dedicated force. Some training in Threat doctrine 
and tactics would be expected. Training aids and local 
ingenuity could be employed to enhance the physical appear- 
ance of the OPFOR. This approach offers a distinct improve- 
ment in the quality of the OPFOR when compared to the previously 
described alternative. The quality of the OPFOR is one of 
the key factors in attaining combat realism during the T/E 
exercise. Another key factor is the control and tactical 
Simulation of combat action. This factor, when viewed as a 
problem, can never be solved, only improved upon. The 

evaluation/control system described in Chapter 3 is this type 


of improvement. The Two Battalion Seeroeeh 1s unworkable 
under this improved system. If there is a disadvantage to 
the Single Battalion approach it is in possibly increased 
resource expenditures. 

Proponents of the Two Battalion approach argue for its 
greater economy of resources. There is a question, however, 
as to the amount of resource savings, if any. In considering 
the two alternative approaches the increased training/evaluation/ 
control available under the Single Battalion approach is the 
dominant factor. Therefore, the Single Battalion approach 

is recommended. 

@ For external T/E exercises, a combination of ofpline/ 

onlaAne missrzon evakuations 4S Aecommended. 

ARTEP 71-2 specifically states the mission requirements 
for a Battalion Task Force external T/E: at least six of 
nine primary missions, and seven of the eleven supplemental 
missions must be performed.* Factors that Division/Brigade 
Should consider when making the mission selections include 
the expected mode of employment in combat, contingency mission 
responsibilities, recent informal T/E results, and training 
resources available. The temptation is to try to force too 

many of both types of misSions into a scenario. The result 

lnepartment of the Army, ARTEP 71-2, p. 5-10, 1977. 


is often a cluttered, intricate, overly intenSive schedule 
for the performing unit; time for planning and troop leading 
procedures are often sacrificed in order to adhere to a 
scenario that squeezes in too many missions. 

The recommendation here is to keep things as simple as 
possible in the online portion by selecting a minimal number 
of primary and supplemental missions required for a Level l 
evaluation. Since resource availability normally restricts 
a battalion external T/E to a 3-4 day exercise, judicious 
planning of time is needed for even these minimum number of 
missions. The value of executing a simple plan well exceeds 
that of executing a more ambitious plan poorly. 

In constructing the scenario, the ideal 1s to arrange the 
selected primary and supplemental missions Te tactical 
sequence to optimize workability, realism, and tactical 
soundness. ARTEP 71-2 lays out a series of planning steps 
to follow. However, there is no simple mechanical formula 
to use. Each headquarters has its own set of variables and 
constraints; the scenario should be a result of staff planning 
in the truest sense. Failure to involve any of the principal 
staff input early in the formulation stage will amost surely 
result in compounding problems later on. The end result 
scenario should resemble an interval of expected combat 
employment in real time. The sequence of missions should 
"flow" with credibility for the players. 

In planning for this flow of action in the Scenario, it 

must be noted that evaluation of some subunit missions plainly 


violate this principle, and therefore are prime candidates 
for offline evaluation (evaluation that takes place outside 
of the scenario). Clearcut examples of such candidates are 
the Mortar Platoon Live Fire and the infantry squad Forced 
March/Live Fire. Because of the live fire range requirements, 
it is virtually impossible to credibly incorporate these mis- 
Sions into a tactical scenario. Many missions are tailor- 
made for evaluation within a scenario, such as squad recon- 
naissance patrol and platoon defense of a strongpoint. 
Therefore, it should be advantageous to evaluate some missions 
at squad, platoon, or even company level offline. This prac- 
tice has the added benefit of being much more amenable to 
employing training aids such as SCOPES, REALTRAIN, etc. Some 
of the subunit missions may be of particular interest to 
commanders and as such deserving of a closer evaluation than 
can readily be achieved online. However, should this selec- 
tive offline approach be used, it is strongly recommended 
that offline events not run concurrently with the online 
scenario. An example of a Battalion training schedule of 
selected missions for offline evaluation is shown in Figure 
1-2. A Similar example is also shown in Chapter 3, Figure 
3-4. Note that the end of the offline segment is separated 

from the start of the online Battalion scenario by 3-4 days. 

@ ARTEP xecording and reporting systems should provide 

jonmacoinwopmdetacled-—data at battalionelevedl. 

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Accurate record keeping of all ARTEP training is a 
necessity in maintaining collective training proficiency . 
(as well as developing the training posture) of the unit. 
Although detailed ARTEP after action reports should not be 
Becessary or required at division level it is a must at 
battalion and lower levels. Desired information should be 
obtained from all internal training/evaluations as well as 
external. Such information as number and type of target 
hits, duration times, strengths, weaknesses, unit leaders, 
Mission evaluation ratings should all be maintained in some 
form. The Training and Evaluation Outlines contained in the 

ARTEP manual are ideal for recording much of the information. 

@ ARTEP xecording and reporting systems should provide 

for Summarized data at brigade and division Level. 

The burden of recording and maintaining detailed and 
accurate T/E information should lie with the primary user 
of that information, the battalion. This does not intend 
to imply that no information should be maintained by brigade 
and division. The brigade should require summarized reporting, 
probably on a stazromm basis, from battalions regarding 
current ARTEP internal training/evaluations. An example of 
a report format is shown Figure 1-3. The example provides the 
brigade witha brief analysis of the most recent ARTEP training/ 

evaluation conducted and the next expected or planned training. 







Chapter Appendices Chapter Appendices 







General unit weaknesses should be shown to allow for any 
brigade level training management that may be required. 
Division level training managers need only that information 

which influences training resources allocation. 

@ ARTEP xzecording and reporting systems can provide 
a basrss of quantatatave data for trarning research 

and analysds. 

Future training developments and improvements in current 
techniques, doctrine and the overall effectiveness of the 
ARTEP for the units in the field is an ongoing responsibility 
at all levels. The current Evaluation Feedback Sheets (Chapter 
13, ARTEP 71-2) are an effort at concentrating field data 
to assist in this area. In order to continually update and 
improve the quality of the ARTEP more detailed data is re- 
guired. Although the field units should be the primary users 
of detailed T/E data it can also be used in training research 
and analysis for overall training improvement. For this 
reason historical data, that has been maintained by field 
units, is a valuable data source. The Infantry School and 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) maintain an ongoing 
interest in such improvements and therefore need access to 

this data. 







The Training Program at battalion level and below is a 
critical tool for developing and maintaining collective 
training proficiency. Its structuring and management will 
be the key to a successful training program. Battalion 
training managers must control all of the training resources 
available to them in such a way as to provide the company 
commanders, the principle trainers, with their required 
training resources. The Soldier's Manuals and the ARTEP are 
the basis of the training structure. The learning of the 
individual skills from the Soldier's Manuals and the collec- 
tive skills from the ARTEP are an integral process and can 
only be accomplished effectively under a complete training 
program. The soldier's development and his understanding 
of the fact that his individual skills are critical to the 
development of his unit's collective skills is the foundation 
for his understanding of Soldier's Manual (SM) and ARTEP 
integration. Individual training is a basic building block. 
Collective training introduces new or additional requirements 
in that individuals must time their responses with each other 
and they must learn to act as a smoothly functioning unit, 
Organizing their efforts. 

Improvement of training weaknesses and retention of 

training strengths can only be managed through an information 


system that provides both immediate feedback to unit leaders 
and individuals and detailed documentation to the managers. 
Through this process the soldier and his unit leaders can 
concentrate their efforts continuously on their known train- 
ing weaknesses while the training managers can organize 
battalion T/E with major efforts directed towards correcting 

overall unit weaknesses. 


Battalion Training Program should provide for: 

@ Integrated individual and collective training to 
achieve and maintain SM and ARTEP standards. 
Quanternky T/E exerercses udrcng ARTEP. 

@ Onganization under decentralized training. 
Complete use of own tratners/evaluators for r«nternal 
T/E exercerses. 

Company Training Program should: 

@ Be the focal point of all unit activities. 

@ Provide for practical techniques of SM and ARTEP 

The proper use of ARTEP Training/Evaluation results 


® peed. the unit betng trarined/evaluated with 
Ammediate feedback. 

@ Provide for the maintaining of accurate, detarled 

Anformation on Selected missions that were conducted. 


@ Battalion Training Program shoukd provide for 
Antegrated sndividuak and cokkective training to 

achieve and maintain SM and ARTEP standards. 

At battalion level, there should be an ongoing program 
of training that maintains a level of proficiency for the 
individuals based on the SM and for the units based on ARTEP. 
Knowledge and skills required by the SM are by no means dif- 
ferent than those required by the ARTEP. The distinction is 
Simply that the SM provides individual training objectives 
while the T/E of ARTEP focuses on collective skills. The 
interfaces of the individual skills identified in the SM, 
that support unit skills required for successful performance 
in an ARTEP mission/task, are in the process of being com- 
piled and presented as a practical tool for training managers. 

Faced with the current resource constraints, units can 
no longer afford to address SM and ARTEP as two separate 
training goals. The evolution of SM with emphasis on 
"hands-on" performance-oriented training is a natural exten- 
Sion of ARTEP. SM and ARTEP are closely interdependent, as 
they should be. Just as a unit's training proficiency 1s 
some function of the individual performances of its members 
and the collective performances of its sub-units, the T/E of 
a unit to achieve training proficiency is some function of 

the T/E of SM tasks and the T/E using ARTEP. 


The Battalion over-all training program should integrate 
the T/E of individual and collective skills. The results 
from T/E using ARTEP provides the Battalion Commander with 
an assessment of his unit's training strengths and weaknesses. 
The future training activities should provide, within resource 
constraints, an improvement in weak areas, and maintenance 
of proficiency in strong areas. The fundamental structure 
of any well-trained unit rests on well-trained individuals. 

The impact of SQT on the Enlisted Personnel Management 
System (EPMS) is so great that in many, if not most, cases 
there is a built-in incentive for the soldier to perform 
well. Leadership must provide the incentive to excel in 
collective skills through the development of unit pride and 
esprit. An optimal training program should satisfy both 
the needs of the individual and the unit. 

Referring back to the green-red-yellow scheme of allocating 
“prime"“ training time, a unit conducting T/E using ARTEP is 
normally afforded green status during the time period imme- 
diately preceding its scheduled exercise. As the ARTEP T/E 
1S primarily T/E of collective skills, it 1s natural to 
expect the unit's training efforts to be toward that end. 

The problem for the training manager, however, is how to 
allocate training when in yellow or red status. It has already 
been stated that internal T/E's should be performed continu- 
ously by the unit to avoid the need for "peaking" prior to 

an external evaluation. Internal T/E's are the most flexible 


of training tools. They can be supplemented by classroom, 
map, or verbal exercises; they can consist of the more char- 
acteristic field exercises; or any combination in between. 
Unit trainers can develop or modify internal T/E's to rein- 
force individual soldiers’ skills. For example, a platoon 
leader training/evaluating his platoon in the strongpoint 
defense can insert on-the-spot requirements for individuals 
such as putting a LAW into operation, actual range estima- 
tion, crew-served weapons assembly/disassembly for non- 
primary gunners, etc. Although these techniques may seem 
patently obvious, the tendency in training has been to treat 
individual and unit T/E separately. The more often that 
direct association between SM skills and ARTEP missions can 
be practiced, not merely verbalized, the more the perception 
of interdependence will be increased. 

As a unit approaches a time period when many of its mem- 
bers are scheduled for SQT, the natural tendency is to mini- 
mize other activities and "crash" on SQT training. Some 
degree of this change of direction is expected and tolerable. 
However, it is possible to retain the structure of internal 
T/E using ARTEP as the training tool by which SQT is prepared 
for. SM skills should be presented and trained for not in 
the context of an event to "pass" on the hands-on portion of 
SQT, but as an integral part of an ARTEP mission. Learning, 
that can be associated with realistic or expected events, is 

retained longer and with more accuracy. The simple analogy 


of "cramming" for exams and a few days later having little 
or no recall emphasizes this point. 

Individual training using the SM and collective training 
using ARTEP should be mutually reinforcing. The interdepen- 
dencies of individual and collective skills can and should 
be stresed and practiced under the structure of internal 
T/E's. The perception of these programs as separate enti- 
ties, and SQT as solely an EPMS tool, must be eliminated. 

It is the responsibility of the training managers to insure 
that the training program allows sufficient planning and 
resources for individuals to achieve their potential on 
individual skills while the unit maintains high proficiency 

on collective skills. 

@ Battakion Training Program Should Provide For 

Quarterly T/E Exerartses udstng ARTEP. 

Internal T/E's using ARTEP in whole or in part, should 
be incorporated into unit training programs throughout the 
year. The frequency of internal T/E's will be dependent on 
each unit's training needs, personnel turbulence, and 
availability of training resources. 

Although the T/E under ARTEP is a continual daily process, 
consideration should be given to conducting a well-organized 

and fairly complete internal ARTEP T/E exercise once per 

- Department of the Army, FORSCOM Regulation 350-1, 
me o-O, 1LOT7. 


quarter. This exercise should be directly responsive to 

the unit's training needs, concentrating on identified weak- 
nesses. From this concept, the battalion can develop and 
Maintain training proficiency throughout the training cycle 
rather than "peaking" just prior to the external ARTEP T/E. 
Maintenance of proficiency at a high level is much pre- 
férred over a proficiency that widely fluctuates and then 
peaks at external T/E time. Figure 2-1 illustrates three 
types of proficiency flows: preferred, acceptable, and non- 
preferred. There are a total of three years shown with an 
external T/E occurring during the third quarter of the first 
year and the second quarter of the third year. The pre- 
ferred flow is attainable only under optimal conditions. 

The acceptable flow is more realistic of a modern day unit 
that has implemented a quarterly internal T/E program. The 
non-preferred flow is typical of a unit that trains only for 
the external T/E exercise. The level of proficiency can 
only be determined as a result of an internal or external 
ARTEP training/evaluation. Although, in general, the unit 
is either considered as satisfactory or as needing additional 
training, a level of proficiency within that spectrum can be 
determined subjectively by the commander once he has com- 

pleted the T/E and analyzed the results. 

@ Battalion Training Program Should Provide For 

Onganization Under Decentralized Training. 


T-c ddnold 

wa LAWN 
UAP pag puzd 4ST UAP 












How to organize and plan for an internal ARTEP training/ 
evaluation iS not a simple process. However, the task 
becomes much more manageable if basic concepts are adhered 
to. One of these concepts is the decentralized organization 
of battalion training. 

Under decentralized training several steps of planning 
and interactions occur. First, the company commander 
assesses his training needs based on his obServations and 
on input from his platoon leaders and NCO's. The next step 
is a weekly programming meeting with the battalion S-3 
at which time the S-3 and company commanders iron out coor- 
dinating details for two or three weeks hence. They may 
also modify tentative training schedules to reflect the 
company commanders' current assessments of training needs. 
Third, the battalion S-3 then reconciles any scheduling 
conflicts, to include training resource availability, and 
ultimately publishes a battalion consolidated training 

With this concept the majority of actual training is 
decentralized at least to company level while the adminis- 
trative requirements (training schedules, training records, 
range requests, etc.) are consolidated and accomplished at 
battalion level. 

Properly applied, decentralization breeds better leaders, 
but at the same time requires better leadership on the part 

of those responsible for their development. It requires of 


the battalion commander and his staff a high degree of 
professionalism, planning and programming expertise, good 
management of limited resources, and a complete willingness 
to accépt mistakes, set them right and proceed. Of the com- 
pany commander, decentralized training demands the utmost 
skill in the details of how to train men. Empathy, percep- 
tion, initiative, imagination and creativity are his special 

Before a discussion of the battalion training schedule 
the battalion training forecast needs to be addressed. The 
battalion training forecast should be maintained as part of 
a planning calendar at battalion level. The training fore- 
case can be broken down to monthly forecasts for ease of 
distribution to company level, readability, and workability 
if necessary. An example of a battalion monthly training 
forecast is shown in Figure 2-2. Note that even though the 
battalion would not normally forecast training of individual 
platoons, they are included as Separate units under their 
appropriate company. This is done to provide the company 
commander not only with a forecast of the battalion's train- 
ing but to provide the opportunity for him to further fore- 
cast his company's training. The basis for the battalion 
training forecast is the division master training schedule 

and unit needs. This battalion training forecast example 

3pDepartment of the Army, Training Circular No. 21-5-7, 
oa 29777. 


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tracks with the earlier example of the division master 
training schedule shown in Figure 1-1. The training phases 
are discussed on page 23. 

The battalion training schedule ae be published as one 
schedule rather than as separate schedules for each company. 
An example of a battalion consolidated training schedule for 
an internal T/E using ARTEP is shown in Figure 2-3. Note 
that this particular example includes three complete weeks 
of training; the amount of time recommended to be devoted 
to exercising a nearly complete internal training/evaluation. 
The battalion movement order, operations orders, and SOP are 
not included, however, the scheduling of the missions trained/ 
evaluated are included along with an example of a scheduling 
procedure as attachments following Figure 2-3. In the example 
it should be noted that the T/E is continual from 11 September 
(Monday) through 28 September (Thursday). This allows the 
units sufficient time to both be trained and evaluated on 
all unit misSions at all levels. Since most of the scheduled 
time for a unit"s evaluation is only a portion of that unit's 
training day, the remainder of that day can be used for addi- 
tional training within the companies, concentrating on train- 
ing weaknesses. In fact, depending on where the battalion 
is in its training program and its level of proficiency, 
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known unit training weaknesses. 


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FIGURE 2-3 (Attachment 3) 


@ Battalion Training Program should provide for 
complete use of own tratners/evakuatorns for 

Anternak T/E e@xercrdses. 

Internal T/E exercises are the battalion and company 
commanders’ means of examining their decentralized training 
program. Maximum use should be made of the battlion'"s own 
trainers/evaluators and every effort should be made to find 
the best qualified trainer/evaluator for each particular 
mission. Attachment 3 to Figure 2-3 provides an example of 
how the separate missions could be trained/evaluated by 
trainers from within the battalion. Note that the battalion 
executive officer could be used as.a T/E/C for the battalion 
field training exercise portion. It would enhance the 
battalion's training 1f coordination could be made to pro- 
Vide for an opposing enemy force made up from another unit 
outside of the battalion in order to allow the battalion to 
train aS a complete unit and still have an opposing force. 

The example shown in Figure 2-3, along with its Attach- 
ments, 1S not intended as the exact method to follow but only 
as an example of a method that could be used if a complete 
internal T/E is deemed necessary. Complete internal T/E's 
Such as the one depicted can be accomplished only under ideal 
conditions; due to resource constraints, not all units can 
Manage two continual weeks or more of field training per 

Quarter. The internal program portrayed here can readily be 


partitioned and/or modified to fit any unit's needs and 
capabilities. Note that the battalion "pooling" of T/E/C's 
shown in Attachment 3, Figure 2-3 is a seeming contradiction 
of the decentralized concept. However, this approach may 

be desirable in situations where the battalion, because of 
the lack of qualified trainers in certain positions; needs 
to consolidate, and use qualified T/E/C's for each mission/ 


@ Company Training Program should be the focak point 

of alk untt actavatces. 

The commander's first concern must be to order all the 
activities of his unit to meet his primary obligation to the 
Army, his unit, and his soldiers: produce a unit ready to 
fight and win now.* The activities of the company are put 
in order through continual training under a complete train- 
ing program. The company commander is primarily a trainer 
with most of his resources and training being managed by 
battalion. The training manager provides guidance and 
establishes goals for trainers and supports them; the trainer 
concentrates on making training happen. Training management, 
a complex, deliberate, and administratively burdensome func- 
ron is difficult at company level and can be accomplished 

more effectively at battalion level. 

4 pepartment of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, p. 1-2, 
mo //. 


Under the decentralized training system, discussed 
earlier in this chapter, the majority of training and 
resource management for the company is done at battalion 
level. This does not mean that any of the company commander's 
authority or leadership and training techniques are being 
diminished. It does mean, however, that the company com- 
Mander can do the job that he was originally intended to 
do and that is to train his company. 

The effectiveness of company training is greatly increased 
by the company commander's presence. The time that the 
company commander spends with his units during training is 
inversely related to the time required of him to administer 
to non-training activities. If a company is training for 
Six hours during a normal duty day, the company commander 
should be free to spend as much as six full hours with his 
units while the ees 1S *oCCurrrndg . 

To produce a company ready to fight and win, if it were 
called into action tomorrow, the company commander must mold 
a fighting unit. This can only be accomplished by his con- 
Stant attention to the training of his individual soldiers 

and their collective development as a unit. 

@ The Company Training Program should provide for 

przacticak techniques of SM and ARTEP tntegration. 

In accomplishing this training objective the company 

commander must use a combination of training techniques for 


the practical integration of individual training using the 
Soldiers Manuals and collective training using the ARTEP. 
To provide an example of how this can be accomplished, it 
is first necessary to know when and where to concentrate the 
training effort. In using the green-red-yellow scheme in 
Chapter 1 for allocating "prime" training time, as much of 
the red and yellow training time as possible should be 
devoted to the individual training of soldiers and to the 
collective training of unit missions where training weak- 
nesses have been identified. As much of the green training 
time as possible should be devoted to integrated individual 
and collective training. 

The training of individual soldiers for their jobs and 
MOS can best be accomplished by decentralizing individual 
training to NCO's. The Soldier's Manual tells NCO's where 
to find material to support training for each individual 
task expected at each skill level within each MOS. Individual 
training in the units has the following characteristics which 
mee taken from TC 21-5-7: 

A. It is decentralized to the first line supervisor. 

B. It is individualized and tailored for each soldier. 

C. It is self-paced, requiring the commitment of each 
soldier, and full use of Training Extension Courses (TEC), 
correspondence courses, and General Educational Development 

D. It need not depend on scheduled classes only, but 
takes place continuously, whenever and wherever a leader 

can get his men together. 


A well-trained soldier is the basis for all combat 
ready, well-trained units. The soldiers' abilities, which 
result from an individual training program, are demonstrated 
in several ways. SQT performance is one; another is the 
individuals performance of an individual training task, 
which is included within a mission, in the ARTEP. 

It is this approach that ties individual and collective 
training together. The SM skills obtained by the individual 
soldier are demonstrated in any T/E uSing the ARTEP. Collec- 
tive training should be conducted at company level, using 
the ARTEP, with a development from crew missions up through 
platoon and possibly even company missions to assist the 
soldier in the realization of his skills and to emphasize 
the fact that they have practical and even critical value to 
the success of his unit. 

As the company's individual training progresses a transi- 
tion can be made into collective training. This is accom- 
plished through relating individual skills to time and space 
Within the context of a squad or higher mission. Although 
an earlier example shows much of the battalions green time 
occupied with battalion and below T/E's, it does not intend 
to present the picture that only collective T/E is accomplished 
during a training quarter. At company level, as the unit 
training iS progressing to the collective development stage, 
the company commander should concentrate his training empha- 

sis at crew and squad level. As this is developed there is 


a natural flow to platoon and company level. The collective 
training at squad level is where the integration of individual 
and collective skills is most evident to the individual 
soldier. It is here where the purpose of the SQT and the 
ARTEP are displayed to the soldier and it is here where the 

integration of the two must be accomplished. 

@ The proper use of ARTEP taaining/evaluation results 
Shoukd provide the untt beang trarned/evakuated with 

Ammedzate feedback. 

As indicated by the feedback loop models in ARTEP 71-2, 
the information obtained in the evaluation process is used 
as input into the decision-making process for the design 
and conduct of future unit training efforts. 

There are two features of closed-loop training programs 
that determine how effective they will be. The first is 
the structure for obtaining feedback and the second is the 
Willingness of unit leaders to accept and use the feedback. 
Feedback may take a variety of forms. It may be delivered 
orally or in writing, either by persons within or outside the 
unit being trained/evaluated. It may contain evaluative 
‘judgments and/or hard, objective facts. 

It is recommended that, whenever practicable, the unit 

(crew, squad, platoon) being trained/evaluated be given 


Department of the Army, ARTEP 71-2, pp. 4-1 and 4-5, 

immediate oral feedback following each mission/task. These 
critiques can either be scheduled as an integral part of 
training, or can take place during lulls in training. Also, 
in some missions/tasks additional written feedback can be 
provided. An example of a one page consolidation of the 
accurate, detailed result data of the mechanized infantry 
squad forced march/live fire mission is shown on the following 
page (Figure 2-4). A normal field T/E packet used by the 
trainer/evaluator would include the Training and Evaluation 
Outline (T&EO), a map of the terrain or range used, a scen- 
ario and possibly mission support information. The normal 
practice, upon completion of a mission, is for the trainer/ 
evaluator to give the results orally and/or provide the unit 
leader with a completed T&EO from the packet. The results 
shown on the T&EO allow for either satisfactory or unsatis- 
factory ratings and do not allow for specifics such as num- 
ber of target hits, preparation and execution times, and 
other exact data that could be important to the unit leader. 
Because of this, it is recommended that a one page consoli- 
dated mission data result sheet be used with a copy being 
provided to the unit leader. This can greatly aid the unit 
leader in providing him with exact information on his units' 
strengths and weaknesses. Note that in the example shown of 
the squad forced march/live fire result sheet, general infor- 
Mation such as weather conditions, weapons and equipment 
status, and number of unit members present are also indicated. 

This information may be valuable to the unit leader in the 


General Information. 

Squad Leader Members 
Sqd/P1t/Co Full Name Total # Date 

All Weapons and Equipment Present (If No, explain on reverse side) 
Gas Masks Worn During Firing Weather 
Yes/No Wind Cond. (rain,clear,etc) Temp 

Tasks and Task Evaluations. 
Conduct Forced March: Time = j.=-  — — = cewscccccccsceccs 

Conduct Live Fire: 
Prepare to Defend 

Time eee eee cca arora cota ee eee 
Start Finish Total SAT/NAT 
SOMOS LOM MOL .POSLELONS igi iene speic ic shevcieie «MMe « acelelaletois siciius 
Engagement of Personnel Targets 
_ # Of targets hit _ u 
zone 1 t of targets T7 B Wnineana: Setarereieue _ 
Zone 2 = + Of targets hit __ % 
of targets TO rete eee = 
Zone 3 = Of targets hit_ __s 2 
i oF targets 1 ee - 
Engagement of Armor Targets 
. tect tagger wits = 
Near Target ee ESS FTAN ds Fired Bo cert ee eeees 
Near Target Distance 
(75-175 meters) 
wy duote Palegebehi ts ane 
Par Target = 2 SF -Oomm rds fired a eee a 
Far Target Distance 
(At least 300 meters) 
Overall Mission Evaluation. 

Mission Trainer/Evaluator. 

Full Name (Print) Rank Branch Unit Signature 
* Comments are required on all areas needing additional training. 

Figure 2-4 


preparation for future missions and possibly in mission 

result comparisons. 

@ The proper use of ARTEP training/evaluation results 
Shoukd provide for the maintaining of accurate, 
detailed information on selkected missions that were 


There is little information available on the significance 
of keeping historical mission result data, mainly because 
there are so many variables involved such as time, weather 
conditions, and personnel transfers. However, the availa- 
bility of accurate and detailed mission result data is bene- 
ficial for observing overall trends in training strengths 
and weaknesses. Certain missions, such as the squad forced 
march/live fire, can provide results that are of extreme 
importance to battalion unit leaders as they provide nearly 
complete T/E analysis of the battalion fighting units. If 
the consolidated mission data result Sheets are prepared 
properly they can also be used as historical information. 

The battalion training managers cannot manage effectively 
without a training information system that includes T/E results 
obtained during a well-managed training program. The training 
information system concept will be discussed in Chapter 3. 

If the results are not there, training resources could be 
wasted by not following a well-managed plan of concentrating 

On training weaknesses while maintaining training strengths. 


In addition, the trend in the future for Army training 
is the development of ARTEP T/E models which will allow a 
commander to select priority missions with his given resource 
constraints and be provided a realistic estimate of what 
training he can conduct. These models will be based on a 
mission priority selection by the commander. The primary 
source of information for prioritizing missions can only 

come from accurate, detailed mission result data. 







Guidelines for the performing unit's conduct of the 
external T/E are generally well defined and specified. 
However, the guidance and instruction for the deciteididliron 
and control is generalized and often vague. In this chap- 
ter, an improved T/E/C system, with specific recommendations, 
will be presented with the purpose of providing a systematic 
structure for the preparation and conduct of evaluation 
and control. 

The objectives of conducting a battalion external T/E 
are to provide training for the battalion and to assist in 
diagnosing performance deficiencies in order to shape future 
training efforts to correct these deficiencies. With respect 
to both of these objectives, no element of the over-all 
evaluation effort is more critical than the T/E/C group and 
the way it does its job. Logically, in a performance-oriented 
atmosphere, it is absolutely essential that performance be 
evaluated properly and accurately. In this context, evalua- 
tion is highly dependent upon control and therefore both 
elements assume crucial importance. 

The rationale for devising the external T/E plan and 
the evolution of the scenario with missions and supplemental 

missions have been included in previous chapters. Given that 


these planning steps have been accomplished, the T/E/C 
group 1S expected to perform the following tasks: act as 
higher headquarters and conduct the performing unit through 
the offline and online segments; evaluate the unit's perfor- 
mance; assess casualties and battle results; control OPFOR; 
provide Seeederteia realism; give immediate and summary feed- 
back to the unit; make on-the-spot corrections whenever 
possible; and settle disputes. 

The economic facts of life dictate that because of train- 
ing costs, battalion-size units will undergo an external T/E 
only infrequently based on unit needs and higher headquarters' 
guidance. The expenditure of manpower and resources will be 
considerable; it is reasonable to expect in return a valuable 
training benefit from this experience. The T/E/C group is 
the key to realizing this benefit. An efficient, well- 
trained, well-organized system of evaluation and control is 
needed. This translates into resource commitments of time, 
personnel, and equipment, all of which are precious to com- 
manders at all levels. However, the simple fact remains 
that to reap the full dividends of the ARTEP philosophy, 
the needs of the T/E/C group must be satisfied. Feedback 
from the field supports this declaration; the single most 
often repeated criticism of external T/E's using ARTEP (Tank/ 
Mechanized Infantry Task Force) is the lack of quality and 

consistency in the evaluation and control. 



The Improved Trainer/Evaluator/Controller system should 


@ Higher quakity training/evaluation for the pergorming 
untt and more useful evaluative a«nforamation for the 
Aponsorting headquarters. 

@ A fundamental structure of an information system that 
WALk AuppLy usBefsul anformatzon for traanang managers 
and 40% tnradning analysts. 

The Senior Evaluator should: 

@ Provide and be provided quakity personnel as trainers / 

@ Insure that evakuatonr/contrzoller training 48 accom- 
plished prartor to the external T/E. 

@ Provide speckgic instructions to T/E/C'sS regarding 
feedback procedures, integration of ratings, and 
thetrn rznteraction witn OPFOR. 

An External Training/Evaluation Exercise should: 

® Include the use of a complete and detailed T/E/C 

@ Be scheduled in a way that wikk akhow for a natural 

mission flow and ease of evakuation and controlk. 

@ The imprzoved T/E/C system should provide higher quality 
training/evakuatzion for the pergoraming untt and more 
useful evaluative information for the sponsoring 



ARTEP 71-2 gives specific recommendations as to the 
Size and organization of the T/E/C group for the battalion 
external T/E. The current T/E/C system has not performed 
adequately in most cases, usually due to a lack of resource 
commitment and/or poor training. An improved prototype 
Organizational chart for the T/E/C group is shown in Figures 
3-2 and 3-3. The improved T/E/C system is no remedy 
for inadequate resource commitment. Division and Brigade 
Commanders will have to make the proper resource allocation 

The improved T/E/C organizational scheme has three 
important features: the formalization of T/E/C subgroups 
at Company/Team and Battalion/Task Force echelons; the crea- 
tion of a separate Control/Simulation (C/S) specialist posi- 
tion; and the ee te headquarters plays the dominant role 
in the T/E/C system. The improved T/E/C group structure has 
several advantages. First, formalizations of T/E/C sub- 
groups provide the basis for structured observation and con- 
trol at lower echelons. Prior planning of observational 
strategies and of cueing requirements is facilitated. For 
example, in a Company/Team mission, the Company/Team T/E/C 
could plan well in advance where he wanted each Platoon T/E/C 
to be, and what specifically to be observed. The Company/ 
Team T/E/C also has decided in advance how he plans to inte- 
grate the evaluations and observations from the Platoon 

T/E/C's to formulate an over-all Company/Team evaluation. 



This feature has been incorporated into most T/E/C group 
structures since ARTEP was introduced. 

Second, the creation of a separate (C/S) specialist 
position devotes resources solely to increase the combat 
realism of the T/E. The C/S specialist will devote full 
time to the scenario and the simulation of the technical 
aspects of combat, such as weapons Signatures and weapons 
effects on personnel and equipment. At the same time, sub- 
unit T/E/C's are relieved of some of the burden of C/S 
duties and can concentrate on observation/evaluation. With 
the infrequency of the external T/E, there is no anticipated 
problem in providing incentives for the performing unit's 
members. However, the perception by these members that 
considerable effort is being made to portray combat realis- 
tically should have a favorably reinforcing effect on their 
attitude toward the exercise and their subsequent participa- 
=ton init. 

Third, the sponsoring headquarters plays a dominant role 
in the training/evaluation/control of the performing unit. 
Brigade sponsorship is specifically recommended; the explana- 
tion and examples that follow assume that brigade sponsor- 
ship is the approach used. Figure 3-2 shows that the bulk 
of T/E/C personnel at Battalion/Task Force Headquarters comes 
from Brigade Headquarters. The Senior T/E/C is the Brigade 
Commander, the person most closely in touch with the needs 

and capabilities of the battalion, and excepting the performing 


unit's members, the person most intensely concerned with the 
training/evaluation of the unit. As both Senior E/C and 
Brigade Commander, he can tailor the external T/E to fit 
whatever schemes of offline-online, primary-supplemental mis- 
Sion combinations that he chooses, taking into consideration 
the ARTEP requirements, the Battalion Commander's training 
assessment, and any instructions received from higher head- 
quarters. Also, as Senior T/E/C, the Brigade Commander will 
be expected to utilize brigade assets as much as possible, 
and to fully justify any requests for outside assets. This 
is not to imply complete exhaustion of brigade assets; out- 
Side assets are often preferable and in some cases manda- 
tory. Detailed examples at the end of this chapter illus- 
trate this point. However, in the case of the Battalion/ 
Task Force Headquarters, the choice of respective Brigade 

iP aquarcens personnel as T/E/C's offers not only the opti- 
mal opportunity of first-hand T/E of the performing unit, 
but also the opportunity to identify and eliminate any 

Operational difficulties between the two headquarters. 

@ The improved T/E/C system shoukd provide a fundamental 
Atnhucture of an information system that wrk supply 
useful Anformation for trhatning managers and fOr 

tratning analysrs. 

Currently, much of the valuable data from a unit's T/E 
is essentially wasted. Information that is needed for train- 

ing analysis is either unavailable or available only in 


grossly aggregated form, e.g., the listing of Satisfactory/ 
Unsatisfactory mission results required by ARTEP 71-2 to 

be sent to Fort Benning. The improved T/E/C system is 

first and foremost intended to improve the effectiveness 

of ARTEP. However, a coincidental opportunity is available 
to gather data at little or no marginal increase of resource 
use. A Singular example is the evaluation sheet recommended 
for use in the Squad Forced March/Live Fire, Figure 2-4. 
Besides being a valuable T/E tool, these sheets can be 

stored as historical information available for future trainers 
and training analysts. Although the Forced March/Live Fire 
is a mission exceptionally conducive to quantification, it 

is expected that more subjective type missions will yield 
results, once their quantifiable aspects have been identified 
and analyzed. Initially, at least, this type of information 
system will be restricted to missions performed in the off- 
line segment of the external T/E, where situationally struc- 
tured events are expected and where T/E/C density will be 
high anyway, in order to support ranges, REALTRAIN, etc. 

The feedback loops in the ARTEP (both internal and 
external) can conceptually form the structure of an informa- 
tion system. See Figure 3-l. During the internal phase 
of T/E, the information flow is characterized by informal 
communication between the training managers at battalion 
level and the trainers at company level. Quantified results 
are stored at battalion level and available in formulating 

or refining training plans. The information flows between 




rt omich ARTEP 
Information Flow 

=» » SE ¢ GD @ 

eeee Internal ARTEP 
Information Flow 

© Qe « 


Qualitative and Quan- 
tiative Internal and 
External ARTEP Infor- 
mation Result Data 

Stored and Available 

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—_ a 
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—_ = eee eww Ee SE SS SEP ae ae a = oe 

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battalion and brigade and between brigade and division are 
one-way, from lower to higher. This information consists of 
summarized internal T/E results, in the case of information 
sent to brigade, and unit T/E status in the case of informa- 
tion sent to division. 

In the external T/E exercise, the information flow is 
somewhat different. The T/E/C elements at each level receive 
information from the performing unit in the form of opera- 
tional results; feedback from T/E/C to the unit is provided 
in two ways, immediate online critiques and end-of-exercise 
written evaluations. The end-of-exercise evaluations are 
passed up the T/E/C chain of command and aggregated at 
T/E/C headquarters (brigade headquarters). Brigade head- 
quarters passes the final detailed end-of-exercise evaluation 
to battalion, who in turn passes the appropriate portion to 
each company. The companies digest this information, formu- 
late a plan to correct deficiencies, and send it back to 
battalion, who in turn passes a plan of anticipated measures 
to correct identified weaknesses to brigade. The information 
that brigade passes to division, concerning the external 
T/E exercise, is a summarized evaluation which should be a 
confirmation of unit T/E status. 

The residual, quantified information from both internal 
and external T/E phases is maintained at battalion level. 

The format and detail in which it should be stored, so as 
to be readily available for training managers and analysts, 

should be standardized. 


@ The senior evaluator should provide and be provided 

with quakity personnel ads trainerns/evaluators/controllLers. 

The role of the T/E/C has already been discussed in 
some depth and is also defined in ARTEP 71-2. A major prob- 
lem is that personnel assigned as T/E/C's perform these duties 
as additional temporary duties. Units that are tasked to 
provide T/E/C's tend to fill these positions not ona 
“most qualified" or "best qualified" basis, but rather on 
a “qualified and can be spared" basis. The scheme of tasking 
by Division/Brigade Headquarters is a key to the quality of 
T/E/C's. The most often used and probably least optimal is 
the simple tasking of one battalion to provide the entire 
T/E/C structure for a like battalion, i.e., the Commander 
of Battalion 1 is the Senior Evaluator, the S-3 of Battalion 
1 is the S-3 T/E/C, the Commander of Company A, Battalion 1 
is the T/E/C for Team A, etc. Profoundly simple in organi- 
zation, adaptability, and ease of operation, this scheme 
1S seriously flawed. It is unreasonable and unrealistic to 
expect any battalion at any given time to have experienced 
personnel in every position; and this is precisely what is 
needed to fill the T/E/C function of the external T/E. There 
are organizational structuring techniques that can be used 
to improve the probability of getting quality personnel as 
T/E/C's. First, the Brigade Commander as the Senior Evalua- 
tor immediately attracts the attention of potential T/E/C 

suppliers within the brigade. Second, the requirements are 


spread among a number of units. This technique seemingly 
violates a previous recommendation for the brigade to do 
as much as possible with its own resources. However, 
requiring some assets from a number of units exploits the 
natural tendency to put one's best foot foward in high 
visibility activities such as an external T/E. A detailed 
example of such a scheme is presented at the end of this 


@ The Senior Evaluator should insure that trainer/ 
evaluatorn/controkler training 44 accomplished prrtor 

Lomene “excernal T/E. 

The inadequacies that are apparent in the training of 
most T/E/C's prior to external T/E's are usually the result 
of not enough time, effort, and command emphasis being placed 
on the development of the T/E/C's. This development should 
normally be accomplished during a two day T/E/C school. 
However, even this program takes precious resources; two 
more full days are required for T/E/C's already facing a 
3-4 day separation from their primary duties, not including 
the preparation required for the school itself. There are 
no easy ways to alleviate this requirement; it is essential 
that each T/E/C attend all sessions of the school, make the 
proper coordination, wargame the events, and walk the ter- 
rain. Command attention is the only solution, and again with 

the Brigade Commander as the Senior Evaluator, proper emphasis 


is already implied. The Brigade Staff is also the logical 
organization to plan and implement the school, with advice 

and assitance from G-3. In initially prescribing the require- 
ments for T/E/C personnel, and in the subsequent taskings, 

the duration of duty should be explicitly stated; attendance 
at the school should be a matter of command interest, with 

the Brigade Commander setting the example as Senior Evaluator. 

@ The Senior Evakhuator should provide specific 
Anstrauctzsons to the T/E/C's regarding feedback proce- 
dures, 4ntegratzon of rzatanas, and therzr zanteraction 

with OPFOR. 

the sample program of instruction described in TC 21=-5-7 
is an outline, and as such deals with topics and not detailed 
specifics. At least three areas require the special effort 
of the Senior Evaluator to give specific instructions to 
individual T/E/C's in order to standardize what are often 
general guidelines. 

The first of these areas involves feedback procedures. 
ARTEP 71-2 gives general information on how and when to con- 
duct feedback sessions during the external T/E exercise. 
However, the T/E/C school should refine these generalities, 
so that each T/E/C knows when to conduct a session, who 
should attend it, and what key points should be covered. 
Care must be taken not to damage the effectiveness of the 
chain of command by presenting critical comments to too 

general an audience. For example, there is little to gain 


and much to lose by critiquing a leader who has performed 
poorly or made a wrong decision, by airing his deficiencies 
in the presence of his followers. Normally, in such a situa- 
tion, the members realize that mistakes have been made and 
the public dissection of an already humbled leader can cause 
irreparable damage to his position as a leader. A better 
approach might be to give the group evaluative comments on 
its performance as a group, then take the leader aside and 
give him personal constructive comments on his performance. 
If the leader's mistakes were serious enough to cause his 
unit to not meet the standards of the mission or task, it 

is up to the leader himself to pass that information to the 
unit. In the case of a company/team or higher level mission, 
a procedure must be agreed upon in advance that includes 

some feedback in some form for all elements of the unit. 

The training responsibility of the T/E/C also mandates that 
the T/E/C explicitly understands the standards and the condi- 
tions; any guidelines on interpretation of subjective events 
should be standardized by the Senior Evaluator. 

The second area that requires specific instructions is 
the method to be used for integrating ratings. It is intuitive 
that the performance of a company/team is directly related 
to the performance of its platoons and ultimately related to 
the performance of its individual soldiers. The standards 
and conditions of many of the company level and higher missions 

significantly rely on the T/E/C's subjective judgment, e.g., 


"did the unit secure the objective without sustaining 
excessive casualites?" It is difficult for a single T/E/C 
to observe enough events simultaneously to make that judgment; 
for each mission, it should be agreed upon in advance what 
key areas should be observed and how the T/E/C's should be 
disposed to fill that need. Incidental information should 
be planned for, such as checking with higher headquarters 
On the accuracy and timeliness of reporting and indirect 
fire procedures. The T/E/C school is the proper format in 
which T/E/C's should coordinate and arrange for such plans. 
Concurrent improvisation during the external T/E exercise 
is difficult, if not impossible. 

An important aid to T/E/C's in fulfilling their respon- 
Sibilities is the proper use of a well-motivated OPFOR. 
After-action consultation with the leader of the OPFOR by 
an T/E/C on a particular mission is a vital link in making 
an accurate evaluation and in revealing training deficien- 
cles of the unit, such as early detection, improper camou- 
flage, skylining of vehicles, etc. Without prior coordina- 
tion between the T/E/C's and OPFOR, this link becomes ill- 
defined, or hastily improvised with significant loss of 
information. Also, it becomes increasingly obvious that the 
OPFOR must be well trained and imbued with the proper spirit, 
i.e., that the exercise is primarily intended to benefit the 
training status of the performing unit and is not perceived 
as an opportunity for the OPFOR to exhibit its superiority 

over a sister unit. 


@ An external training/evakuation exercise should 
AneLude the use of a complete and detaifed T/E/C 


Many of the T/E/C structures used for external training/ 
evaluations do not provide for the efficient use of all 
T/E/C's available. For example, when an external T/E is 
conducted under brigade control, the brigade has numerous 
officers and NCO's who are highly qualified who are not 
normally used as T/E/C's. The practice has often been to 
use a battalion staff from another battalion to evaluate the 
staff of the exercised battalion when in fact the brigade 
staff would be much more appropriate. The same is true for 
the chief T/E/C. Normally a fellow battalion commander is 
used as the primary evaluator of the exercised battalion 
commander. The Brigade Commander of the battalion being 
evaluated should be the senior T/E/C as well as the primary 
evaluator of his battalion commander. It is common in the 
majority of battalion external T/E exercises that the respec- 
tive brigade staff is required to participate in the exer- 
cise as the controlling headquarters anyway. Not using 
them as key members of the T/E/C structure can only lead to 
resource waste and inefficiency through mismanagement. 
Figures 3-2 and 3-3 on the two following pages present examples 

of possible T/E/C structures for both on-line and off-line 



Bn TF Senior T/E/C 

(Bde Cmdr, 0-6) 

Dep Senior T/E/C 

(Responsible for 


coordination w/OPFOR 
during On-line 

T/E/C Subgroup 

Opposing Force 



S-2, 0-—@) 
S-3, 0-4) 

S-4/Spt Opns: (Bde S-4, 0-3) 
Maint Opns: (Bde S-4, 0-3) 
Medical Opns: (Dir Med Bn, 0-2) 
Commo Opns: (Bde Sig Off, 0-3) 
HHC: (0-3) 

) {OPFOR Cmdr (0-5) 
(Only OPFOR Officer 
included in T/E/C 

CSC T/E/C Subgroup 
Co Senior T/E/C (0-3) 

Ti T/E/C Subgroup 
Tm Senior T/E/C: (0-3) 

BLY T/E/C'8: (2/0-2's) port: T/E/C 7) 

Asst. PLT T/E/C: (E-7) Mortar T/E/C (0-2) 
Asst. Mortar 

T/E/C (E-7) 

Scout T/E/C (0-2) 

Asst. Scout T/E/C (E-7) 

GSR T/E/C (E-6) 

Redeye T/E/C (0-2) 

T/E/C Personnel Requirements 

(0-2) l 

All Grades: 34 




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portions. The duties corresponding to each of the assignments 
are outlined below. 

A. Battalion Task Force Senior T/E/C. The Task Force 
senior T/E/C is the O-I-C of the evaluation exercise and 
the T/E/C group. He should normally be the Brigade Commander 
of the battalion being evaluated. His primary duties include: 

1. Overall supervision, direction and coordination 
of T/E/C group preparation and performance. 

2. Evaluation of Task Force Commander performance, 
and performance of Task Force as an integral unit. 

3. Provides Brigade Command/Staff simulation for the 
evaluated unit by issuance of orders, intelligence, etc. 

4. Assisted by Deputy, monitors and resolves 
exercise control, arbitration and simulation which impact 
on the overall evaluation effort. 

B. Deputy Senior T/E/C. The deputy senior T/E/C is the 
officer charged with direct responsibility for field control 
of the on-line portion and the running of the off-line por- 
tion under the general supervision of the senior T/E/C. He 
should be an O-4 and would typically be the brigade S-3 or 
one of the brigade non-evaluated battalion XO's. His primary 
duties include: 

l. Maintains field control through coordination with 
OPFOR during on-line portion of exercise. 
2. Maintains.current situation/location display 

for all Task Force and OPFOR elements. 

3. Directs tactical operations of OPFOR according 
to scenario schedule of events and senior T/E/C guidance. 

4. Responsibility for the control and execution of 
the off-line portion of the exercise. 

C. T/E/C Subgroup Personnel. T/E/C personnel assigned 
to Task Force elements are allocated as efficiently as 
possible while maintaining their capability to train/ 
evaluate/control. Their primary duties include: 

1. Conduct of evaluations of performance of Task 
Force elements as assigned. 

2. Provide feedback as directed by senior T/E/C. 

3. Assist Battle Simulation officer with implemen- 
tation of Simulation at appropriate Task Force level. 

D. Battle Simulation Officer. The battle simulation 
officer is charged with the control of tactical simulation 
functions under the general supervision of the senior T/E/C. 
His primary duties include: 

1. Coordination of simulation activities by OPFOR 
and Task Force level T/E/C's. 

2. Responsibility of major simulation activities 
Such aS bomb simulation, major NBC attacks, major artillery 
concentrations, etc. 

3. Accountability of simulation materials. 

E. Opposing Force Commander. The OPFOR Commander's 
duties include: 

1. Tactical command of the OPFOR in accordance 
with the scenario schedule of events and guidance from the 

senior T/E/C and/or coordination with the deputy T/E/C. 


2. Responsibility for preparation of OPFOR to 
conduct operations as defined in the evaluation plan, 
including appropriate threat doctrine. 

EF. Off-Line’ subgroup T/E/C. The senior T/E/C's of 
all of the missions exercised during the off-line portion 
can be the same officers used for T/E/C's during the on- 
line portion. Care must be taken to insure that the offi- 
cers are experts on the particular mission that they are 
responsible for. Their responsibilities include: 

1. The evaluation and control of the particular 
mission or misSions which they have been assigned under 
the guidance of the deputy senior T/E/C. 

2. Setting up of the exercise to include range 
preparation training and procurement, ammunition requests, 

G. Anme=Suppert Center Offvcemees This) officer would 
normally be a support platoon leader from one of the non- 
evaluated battalions of the brigade. He must be familiar 
with all of the ammunition requirements, both live and 
blank, of all the off-line missions. He is responsible, 
directly to the deputy senior T/E/C, for all control, 
delivery and pick-up of ammunition. He is further responsi- 
ble for the secure and safe maintaining of the ammunition 

throughout the exercise. 

@ An external training/evakuation exercise Should be 
Scheduled in a way that will allow far a natural mts- 

sion flow and ease of evakuation and control. 


Many of the officers and NCO's who were used as T/E/C's 
during the off-line portion can also be used as T/E/C's 
during the on-line portion of the exercise. Although in 
the examples in Figures 3-2 and 3-3 the total number of 
T/E/C personnel is not significantly smaller than is normally 
used, the overall exercise requires less personnel support. 
This is accomplished primarily through the use of the bri- 
gade staff as T/E/C's as well as higher headquarters. This 
efficiency improvement will also aid in the ease of evalua- 
tion and control in general since the brigade would normally 
be more familiar with its battalions' operations than would » 
a T/E/C source from outside of the brigade. 

/ The external training/evaluation exercise should be 
scheduled so that only key missions, and/or missions that 
would be difficult to evaluate otherwise, are evaluated 
during the off-line portion. The more subunit evaluations 
that are conducted during the on-line portion as part of 
the tactical exercise the more the soldier will see his 
responsibilities to his unit's overall efforts. However, 
the more subunit evaluations that are conducted during the 
On-line portion, the more difficult it becomes to structure 
an exercise that has a natural mission flow that maintains 
a realistic tactical scenario. An example of how this could 
be accomplished on a particular subunit mission would be 
the evaluation of the squad night reconnaissance patrol as 

part of an overall night attack mission during the on-line 


portion of an external T/E exercise is shown in Figures 3-4 
and 3-5. Note that they correspond to the earlier Figures 
on the T/E/C structure. 

Figures 3-4 and 3-5 include all of the minimum required 
mission Bee tons from ARTEP 71-2 as well as a few addi- 
tional ones. Evaluating all of the squads on the squad 
FM/LF mission follows an earlier recommendation, although 
1f only 1/3 of the squads were evaluated (the minimum require- 
ment), the off-line portion of the exercise depicted in the 
example would only last 2 days. The on-line portion can be 
accomplished in 2 days and 2 nights of continuous exercise 
and evaluation as shown in Figure 3-5. 

The off-line and on-line portion of the exercise should 
be separated by several days to assist in the ease of evalu- 
ation and control. The advantages of conducting an external 
T/E exercise similar to the one portrayed in the examples 
are Significant. There are fewer personnel required to 
Support the exercise; there is a natural tactical flow to 
the on-line portion which is not broken by individual sub- 
-unit T/E's; the structure of the exercise is simple and 
manageable; the soldier is included as an integral part of 
the T/E; and the exercise provides for the obtaining of 
detailed and accurate result data on key missions, which 
is the only realistic way to provide the evaluated battalion 

with an honest yet concise evaluation. 



Fire (App. 

29,39 & 40 

(App. 32) 
EN08 4642 

* If Tank Pits are eval. 1/3 of unit must be eval. on Ch. 8, App. 29 
(Battle Run) 
**Mission can be evaluated on 4th Day or before lst Day as appropriate. 


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Davis, Gordon B., Management Information Systems, 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1974. 

Department of the Army, Army Training and Evaluation 
Program (ARTEP) 71-2. Mechanized Infantry/Ttank Task 
Force, 17 June 1977. 

Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 71-1, The 
Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, 30 June 1977. 

Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 71-2, The 

Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, 
30 June 1977. 

Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, 
Operations, 1 July 1976. 

Department of the Army, Training Circular (TC) 21-5-7, 
Training Management in Battalions, 31 July 1977. 

Department of the Army, United States Army Forces 
Command, Forces Command (FORSCOM) Regulation 350-1, 

Betive Component Training, 15 December 1977. 

Department of the Army, United States Army Training 
and Doctrine Command, Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) Regulation 310-2 (Draft), Preparation of Army 
Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), July 1978. 

Mader, Chris, Information Systems: Technology Economics 
Applications, Science Research Associates, Inc., 1975. 

Shore, Barry, Operations Management, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 

United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral 
& Social Sciences, Improved Army Training and Evaluation 
Program (ARTEP) Methods for Unit Evaluation, by M. Dean 
Havron, Doris D. Albert, and Timothy J. McCullough, 

v. 1-3, 31 January 1978. 

Webber, Ross A., Management, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 




Defense Documentation Center 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria, Virginia 22314 

Headquarters, Department of the Army 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Operations and Plans t 


Washington, D.C. 20310 


U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
ATTN: Deputy Chief of Staff for Training 

Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651 


U.S. Army Training Board 

ATTN: Major Fitzgerald ATTSC-ATB-CT 
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604 

U.S. Army Infantry School 

ATTN: LTC Van Meter, Training Developments 

Fort Benning, Georgia 31905 

Library, Code 0142 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93940 

Professor Sam H. Parry, Code 55Py 
Department of Operations Research 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93940 

Professor James K. Hartman, Code 55Hh 
Department of Operations Research 
Naval Postgraduate School 

Monterey, California 93940 

Captain Dewey P. George 
1719 Colgate Street 
Roanoke, Virginia 24012 

Captain Richard L. Gerding 

P.O. Box 1123 
Corvallis, Oregon 97330 


No. Copies 


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Thesis 179524 
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and evaluation program 
for the mechanized in- 

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