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NPS ARCHIVE
1997 r O(*
HURON, M.

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California

THESIS

THE ARMY TACTICAL COMMAND
AND

CONTROL SYSTEM

Mark A. Huron
June, 1997

Principal Advisor: Donald van Z. Wadsworth

Associate Advisor: John H. Gibson

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

This thesis is a summary of the capabilities of the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) and the guiding
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C 4 I) documents as they apply to the ATCCS. Its purpose
is to strengthen the knowledge base of Army officers entering the Joint C 4 I curriculum by providing a summary of Joint and
Army C 4 doctrine and guidance as it applies to ATCCS.

ATCCS is the Army’s primary Command and Control (C 2 ) system at echelons corps and below. ATCCS consists of five
smaller systems, each a Battlefield Functional Area Control System (BFACS) controlling seven Battlefield Functional Areas
(BFA). The five BFACS are: the Maneuver Control System (MCS), the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
(AFATDS), the Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control and Intelligence System (FAAD C 2 I), the Combat Service
Support Control System (CSSCS), and the All Source Analysis System (ASAS).

A clear strategy for the functional design of ATCCS is supported by three documents. Related to and supportive of each
other, the three documents are: Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems
Support to Joint Operations; The Army Enterprise Strategy consisting of The Vision and The Implementation Plan; and Army
Field Manual 100-5, Operations. This thesis draws threads of continuity from joint doctrine through Army guidance into
implementation in ATCCS.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
(C 4 I), Command and Control (C 2 ), The Army Tactical Command and Control System
(ATCCS).

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114

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

THE ARMY TACTICAL
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

Mark A. Huron
Major, United States Army
B.S., Texas A&M University, 1984

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1997

IT -

\ K'i O

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
NAVAL °OSTGRADU,-~
MONIERtY CA S3L 43-

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a summary of the capabilities of the Army Tactical Command and Control
System (ATCCS) and the guiding Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence (C 4 I) documents as they apply to the ATCCS. Its purpose is to strengthen the
knowledge base of Army officers entering the Joint C 4 I curriculum by providing a summary
of Joint and Army C 4 doctrine and guidance as it applies to ATCCS.

ATCCS is the Army’s primary Command and Control (C 2 ) system at echelons corps and
below. ATCCS consists of five smaller systems, each a Battlefield Functional Area Control
System (BFACS) controlling seven Battlefield Functional Areas (BFA). The five BFACS
are: the Maneuver Control System (MCS), the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data
System (AFATDS), the Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control and Intelligence
System (FAAD C 2 I), the Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS), and the All
Source Analysis System (ASAS).

A clear strategy for the functional design of ATCCS is supported by three documents.
Related to and supportive of each other, the three documents are: Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for
Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Support to Joint Operations;
The Army Enterprise Strategy consisting of The Vision and The Implementation Plan; and
Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. This thesis draws threads of continuity from joint
doctrine through Army guidance into implementation in ATCCS.

6 1 HI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

A. BACKGROUND 1

B. PURPOSE 1

C. COMMAND AND CONTROL 2

1 . The Lawson Loop 3

a. Sense 3

b. Process 4

c. Compare 5

d. Decide 5

e. Act 5

D. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 6

E. SUMMARY 7

II. JOINT PUB 6-0, DOCTRINE FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS,

AND COMPUTER (C 4 ) SYSTEMS SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS 9

A. WHAT IS DOCTRINE? 9

B. JOINT PUB 6-0 10

1 . The Role of C 4 Systems 11

2. Objectives and Components of C 4 Systems 13

a. Produce Unity of Effort 15

b. Exploit Total Force Capabilities 15

c. Properly Position Critical Information 16

d. Information Fusion 18

3. The Basic C4 System Principles 18

a. Interoperable 19

b. Flexible 20

c. Responsive 20

d. Mobile 21

e. Disciplined 21

f. Survivable 21

g. Sustainable 22

C. 'SUMMARY 22

VI 1

III. THE ARMY ENTERPRISE STRATEGY

A. FOREWORD 25

B. THE ARMY ENTERPRISE VISION 25

1 . The Purpose 27

2. The Threat 28

3. The Principles of The Army Enterprise Strategy 28

a. Focus on the Warfighter 29

b. Ensure Joint Interoperability 31

c. Digitize The Battlefield 32

d. Capitalize on Space Based Systems 33

e. Modernize Power Projection Platforms 35

/ Optimize The Information Technology Environment 35

g. Implement Multi-Level Security 36

h. Ensure Spectrum Superiority 36

i. Acquire Integrated Systems Using Commercial Technology ... 37

j. Exploit Modeling and Simulation 38

C. THE ARMY ENTERPRISE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 38

1 . The Purpose 39

a. Assessment of Existing Systems 39

b. The Investment Strategy For The Future 41

c. The Action Plan 41

D. SUMMARY 42

IV. ARMY OPERATIONS 45

A. COMBAT POWER 45

1 . The Elements of Combat Power 46

a. Maneuver 46

b. Firepower 47

c. Protection 47

d. Leadership 48

2. The Combat Functions 49

a. Intelligence 49

b. Maneuver 50

c. Fire Support 50

d. Air Defense 50

e. Mobility and Survivability 51

viii

f Logistics 51

g. Battle Command 52

B. SUMMARY 53

V. THE ARMY TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM 55

A. THE COMPONENTS OF ATCCS 55

B. COMMON HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 57

C. THE COMMUNICATIONS HUB 58

1. The Army Data Distribution System (ADDS) 59

a. EPLRS 59

b. JTIDS 60

2. The Combat Net Radios (CNR) 60

3. The Area Common User System (ACUS) 61

D. THE BATTLEFIELD FUNCTIONAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 62

1 . The All Source Analysis System (ASAS) 62

2. The Maneuver Control System (MCS) 62

3. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) 63

4. The Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, and Intelligence

System (FAAD C 2 I) 64

5. The Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS) 65

E. SUMMARY 66

VI. THE THREADS OF CONTINUITY 69

A. COMMON THREADS IN TONE 69

B. COMMON THREADS IN OBJECTIVE 71

1. Focus On The Warfighter 71

2. Ensure Joint Interoperability 72

3. Digitize The Battlefield 72

4. Capitalize On Space Based Systems 73

5. Modernize Power Projection Platforms 73

6. Implement Multi-Level Security 73

7. Ensure Spectrum Supremacy 74

C. COMMON THREADS IN GUIDANCE 74

1 . Interoperable 75

2. Flexible 77

3. Responsive 79

4. Mobile 81

5. Disciplined 82

6. Survivable 83

7. Sustainable 84

D. SUMMARY 86

LIST OF REFERENCES 89

APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY OF TERMS 91

APPENDIX B. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 93

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 103

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this thesis is to strengthen the knowledge base of Army officers
entering the Joint C 4 I curriculum by providing a summary of the capabilities of the Army
Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) and the guiding Command, Control,
Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C 4 I) documents as they apply to ATCCS.

Command and control is a process whereby commanders use personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities and procedures {command and control systems ) to plan, organize,
direct, coordinate, and control {command or control) their subordinates. The Lawson Loop
is an accepted model of the command and control process. Developed by Joel S. Lawson,
it is considered applicable to C 2 processes ranging from the Napoleonic era to the 1990s [Ref.
2]. The model consists of five functions: Sense, Process, Compare, Decide, and Act. The
Lawson Loop is an iterative process whereby commanders on both sides are constantly
executing the loop. As a commander on one side acts, in theory, it is sensed by the
commander on the other side, who then begins an iteration of the loop. Again, in theory, the
commander who can iterate the loop with the most speed and accuracy will act faster than
the enemy can respond to, thereby dominating the opposition. This is called “getting inside”
the enemy’s decision cycle [Ref. 2], Understanding the Lawson Loop allows the reader to
recognize the importance of C 4 I doctrine and systems that facilitate the command and control
process of sensing, processing, comparing, deciding, and acting.

Doctrine serves as authoritative guidance to commanders. It is intended to guide, but
not bound actions while conducting the full range of military operations. At the joint level,

doctrine for the C 4 I community exists in Joint Pub 6-0. It is the keystone document for the
command, control, communications, and computer (C 4 ) systems series of publications [Ref.
4]. As an all encompassing document, Joint Pub 6-0 covers all facets of C 4 systems support
to joint operations. Major topics discussed in this thesis are:

# The role of C 4 systems.

# Objectives and components of C 4 systems.

# The basic C 4 system principles.

Discussion of these three topics shows how the role, objectives and principles of C 4
systems relate to each other and support the C 4 I For The Warrior Vision. Understanding
these three areas of C 4 doctrine at the highest level allows the reader to understand the
impetus behind the Army’s Enterprise Strategy.

At the Army level, The Army Enterprise Strategy is the keystone document outlining
principles and the implementation plan for Army C 4 systems support to operations. The
strategy is “...the single, unified vision for the Army Cl community. ” [Ref. 6] The
Strategy consists of two documents: The Army Enterprise Vision and The Army Enterprise
Implementation Plan. The Army Enterprise Vision introduces ten principles vital to ensuring
information dominance for the warrior. The Army Enterprise Implementation Plan outlines
steps the Army must take to fulfill the vision. The guidance found in The Army Enterprise
Strategy falls under the authority of joint doctrine and supports it with common principles.
Understanding that there are threads of continuity that start at joint doctrine and flow through
Army guidance sets the doctrinal foundation for the design, development and procurement
of Army C 4 systems such as ATCCS.

Xll

ATCCS is the Army’s primary Command and Control (C 2 ) system at echelons corps
and below. A clear strategy for the functional design of ATCCS is supported by Joint Pub
6-0, The Army Enterprise Strategy, and Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. ATCCS is
an overarching command and control system comprised of subordinate Battlefield Functional
Area Control Systems (BFACS). The Army uses the BFACS to control seven Battlefield
Operating Systems (BOS) essential to sustaining combat power. The Intelligence BOS is
controlled by the All Source Analysis System (ASAS), the Maneuver BOS is controlled by
the Maneuver Control System (MCS), the Fire Support BOS is controlled by the Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), the Air Defense BOS is controlled by the
Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control and Intelligence System (FAAD C 2 I), and the
Logistics BOS is controlled by the Combat Service Support Command and Control System
(CSSCS). The other two BOSs, Mobility and Survivability, and Battle Command are
integrated into the other five. Since Mobility and Survivability enhances maneuver, that is
where it is controlled; in the Maneuver Control System. As the overarching BOS, Battle
Command, is the function that integrates and synchronizes the other six. The ATCCS
integrates and synchronizes the other BFACS. It represents the Battle Command combat
function. Understanding how doctrine and guidance affect the functional design and
capabilities of the Army Tactical Command and Control System provides the information
base for identifying threads of continuity from joint doctrine through Army doctrine and into
implementation in the Army Tactical Command and Control System.

Some of the threads of continuity are clearly identifiable in the text of joint and Army
doctrine and others are more abstract but, none the less, there. The author categorizes and

xiii

identifies three types of threads:

• Common Threads in Tone. This section validates that the guiding C 4 I
documents discussed in this thesis are written in a tone commensurate with
the definition of doctrine.

• Common Threads in Objective. This section shows the reader how the
fundamental objective of C 4 systems outlined at the joint level is also
supported by principles at the next lower level: The Enterprise Strategy
Principles.

• Common Threads in Guidance. This section validates that principles outlined
at the joint level are carried through the Army level, and that there is
evidence of implementation of those principles in ATCCS.

Understanding the threads of continuity accomplishes the purpose of this thesis.

xiv

I. INTRODUCTION

This introductory chapter outlines this thesis. It states the background and purpose
of this thesis. It also introduces the reader to command and control by defining terms
associated with command and control, showing how the definitions are interrelated, and
explaining the command and control process. Finally, this chapter outlines the information
found in the remaining chapters.

A. BACKGROUND

The background leading to this study is based on the author’s interviews with Army
officers entering the Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
(C 4 I) Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School; sections JC-51, JC-61 and JC-71.
Officers from those sections reported having little or no knowledge regarding guiding C 4 I
documents or current Army C 4 I systems. This is a function of how and when the Army
selects its officers for Advanced Civil Schooling and is unrelated to the thesis itself. The
current Joint C 4 I Curriculum is thorough, however, it starts at a point beyond the C 4 I
knowledge base of an incoming Army officer.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to supplement the Joint C 4 I Curriculum by strengthening
the C 4 I knowledge base of Army officers entering the curriculum. It will do so by providing
a concise summary of Joint doctrine, Army C 4 I guidance, and Army operational doctrine as
they relate to an Army C 4 I system; the Army Tactical Command and Control System
(ATCCS). 'As a final step to accomplishing the purpose of the thesis, the author will show

where there is evidence of joint doctrine and Army guidance implementation in ATCCS.
This text excludes the engineering behind the capabilities because the Joint C 4 I curriculum
accomplishes that. This thesis may also serve as a reference for officers from other services.
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C 2 )

In order to understand the purpose and functions of C 4 I systems, it is important to
understand what command and control is, what a command and control system is and what
the terms mean separately in a military context. Several authors paraphrase definitions and
all are relatively the same. The authoritative definitions exist in Joint Pub 1.02:

Command. The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces
lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.
Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using
available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing,
directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the
accomplishment of assigned missions. [Ref. 1]

Control. Authority which may be less than full command exercised
by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other
organizations [Ref. 1].

Command and Control System. The facilities, equipment,
communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for
planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant
to the missions assigned [Ref. 1].

Command and Control. The exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the
accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are
performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the
accomplishment of the mission. [Ref. 1]

The definitions are clearly interrelated and build on each other. There are three
concepts to understand after reading these definitions:

Command and control, separately, both refer to commanders’ authority over
subordinates. It involves planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and
controlling the forces under their command or control.

• A command and control system includes personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities and procedures that facilitate commanders’ ability
to command or control.

• Command and control, together, is a process, a process whereby the
commanders use personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and
procedures {command and control systems ) to plan, organize, direct,
coordinate, and control {command or control) their subordinates.

A firm understanding of the relationships between the definitions above will help the
reader progress through this thesis and the Joint C 4 I curriculum.

1. The Lawson Loop

The last definition above describes command and control as a process. The Lawson
Loop in Figure 1 is an accepted model of the command and control process. Developed by
Joel S. Lawson, it is considered applicable to C 2 processes ranging from the Napoleonic era
to the 1990s [Ref. 2]. The model consists of five functions; they are:

• Sense

• Process

• Compare

• Decide

• Act

a. Sense

Refer to Figure 1 ; the sense function collects data from the environment. The
commander uses all available assets to include intelligence gathered by soldiers, radar, and

Figure 1. The Lawson Command and Control Loop. After Ref. [2].

unmanned aerial vehicles ... The environment includes friendly and enemy forces, terrain,
weather and other information valuable to commanders. [Ref. 2]
b. Process

The process function pulls together and correlates the data gathered from the
sense function. Though the Lawson Loop function called “process” is a common term in
used in the information management community, the military C 4 I community calls this
function data fusion. The definition of fusion given in Joint Pub 1 .02 is:

In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of
information and intelligence to derive a complete assessment of activity [Ref.

1 ].

c. Compare

The commander takes the information just processed in the process function
and compares the current state of the emironment to the desired state of the emironment.
The current state may indicate enemy strong and weak points, disposition, and intent. The
commander's staff will probably develop courses of action to move the current state of the
environment toward the desired state. [Ref. 2]

(L Decide

Following the compare function, commanders decide from the courses of
action presented by their staff. This function may seem a small part of a large process, but
in reality is a thorough process whereby a commander examines and contrasts the available
courses of action for viability and effect. In some cases, the commander may reject all or
part of courses of action requiring more planning by the staff. Additionally, the commanders
will report their intended decision and subsequent action to higher headquarters; this too max-
affect rejection or modification of courses of action.
e. Act

The act function is the manifestation of the commander's decision. The
commander issues orders to affect the current state of the emironment. [Ref. 2]

The Law 7 son Loop is an iterative process whereby commanders on both sides
are constantly executing the loop. As a commander on one side acts, in theory, it is sensed
by the commander on the other side, who then begins an iteration of the loop. Again, in
theory, the commander who can iterate the loop with the most speed and accuracy will act
faster than the enemy can respond to thereby dominating the opposition. This is called

“getting inside” the enemy’s decision cycle [Ref. 2]. Understanding the Lawson Loop
allows the reader to recognize the importance of C 4 I doctrine and systems that facilitate the
command and control process of sensing, processing, comparing, deciding, and acting. With
respect to security, a command and control system that is easily violated will inevitably
hinder the ability of a commander to iterate the C 2 process quickly.

D. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION

Chapters II and III provide a summary of the guidelines and principles for the design,
capabilities and implementation of command and control systems such as ATCCS. Each of
the chapters corresponds to a document that affects ATCCS. The two documents are: Joint
Pub 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Support
to Joint Operations; and The Army Enterprise Strategy consisting of The Vision and The
Implementation. In the chapters are explanations of how the documents relate to and support
each other as well as how they relate to the Army Tactical Command and Control System.
They represent C 4 I guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff level down to the Army level.

Chapter IV summarizes portions of Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations; the
Army’s keystone warfighting document [Ref. 3]. In that summary is an overview of how
the Army fights at the task force level focusing on integration of seven Battlefield Functional
Areas (BFA): intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability,
logistics, and battle command. This chapter provides some insight for why the ATCCS
consists of five smaller systems; each a Battlefield Functional Area Control System
(BFACS) controlling the seven BFAs.

Chapters V provides an overview of the capabilities of ATCCS as well as the

individual capabilities of the five BFACS. It also outlines the systems and capabilities of the
Communications Hub of ATCCS, and familiarizes the reader with the Common Hardware
and Software Concept that supports ATCCS.

Finally, Chapter VI discusses the threads of continuity that flow from joint
publications through Army publications and into implementation in the Army Tactical
Command and Control System.

E. SUMMARY

This chapter provides the background and purpose of this study. It is the outline for
how the thesis is structured. The chapter introduces the doctrinal definitions of command,
control, command and control, and command and control system to prepare the reader for
concepts discussed in later chapters. Finally, this chapter provides an overview of the
remaining chapters by summarizing their content.

II. JOINT PUB 6-0, DOCTRINE FOR COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER (C 4 ) SYSTEMS SUPPORT TO JOINT

OPERATIONS

A. WHAT IS DOCTRINE?

In the United States Army, doctrine serves as authoritative guidance to commanders.
It is intended to guide, but not bound actions while conducting the full range of military
operations. This concept is clear in the definition of doctrine given in Army Field Manual
100-5, Operations:

Fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions
in support of national objectives. Doctrine is authoritative but requires
judgement in application. [Ref. 3]

The last sentence of this definition is important; it says “guide, not bound”. Given
the wide range of military operations and threats that face today’s commanders, this concept
is more important now that ever. The commanders on the ground, must have the authority
to prosecute their mission to ensure victory. This includes how commanders organize their
forces and equipment to include C 4 I systems in support of military operations. Joint
doctrine, in concept, is no different. It “...will be followed except when, in the judgement
of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.” [Ref. 4] Joint doctrine,
also, is intended to be authoritative, but not restrictive and exists for the wide range of
organizational structures that commanders may find themselves under. Again, the
authoritative definitions exist in Joint Pub 1.02:

Doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or
elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is
authoritative but requires judgement in application. [Ref. 1]

Combined Doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the
employment of forces of two or more nations in coordinated action toward
a common objective. It is ratified by participating nations. [Ref. 1]

Joint Doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment
of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common
objective. It will be promulgated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff.

[Ref. 1]

Multi-Service Doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the
employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward
a common objective. It is ratified by two or more Services, and is
promulgated in multi-Service publications that identify the participating
Services, e.g. Army-Navy doctrine. [Ref. 1]

These definitions are only separated by the organizational structure they apply to. There are
three concepts to understand after reading these definitions:

• The term “...fundamental principles.. .that guide their actions....” exists in
every definition. This is the essence of doctrine that makes it the cornerstone
for how the Services fight alone and together. Although the definitions above
apply to doctrine with respect to organizational structure, it can apply to all
areas of the military to include how the Services prepare for and plan the
execution of war.

• Doctrine provides a common approach to operations for those it applies to
[Ref. 3],

• The sentence “It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. ” from
the first definition of doctrine is implied in the definitions of combined, joint
and multi-Service doctrine.

Understanding these concepts will help the reader understand how the guidelines and
principles in Joint Pub 6-0, The Enterprise Strategy and Army Field Manual 100-5 effect the
design and implementation of the Army Tactical Command and Control System.

B. JOINT PUB 6-0

Joint Pub 6-0 is the keystone document for the command, control, communications.

and computer (C 4 ) systems series of publications [Ref. 4]. It is based on The C 4 I For The
Warrior Vision:

What the Warrior Needs: a fused, real time, true representation of the

battlespace - an ability to order, respond and coordinate horizontally and

vertically to the degree necessary to prosecute his mission in that battlespace.

[Ref. 4]

As an all encompassing document, Joint Pub 6-0 is joint doctrine covering all facets
of C 4 systems support to joint operations. Major topics covered are:

• The role of C 4 systems.

• Objectives and components of C 4 systems.

• The basic C 4 system principles.

• C 4 system configurations.

• The planning process and employment responsibilities.

• Joint and combined standardization.

• Global C 4 infrastructure.

Although all these topics are important, the purpose of this thesis limits discussion
of the first three topics only. Later chapters discuss how these topics relate to the Army
Tactical Command and Control System and the reader is encouraged to read the entire Joint
Pub 6-0 for a fuller understanding of C 4 systems support to joint operations.

1. The Role Of C 4 Systems

C 4 systems must meet a commander’s information needs by facilitating the
processing and flow of quality data; this, in essence, is the role of C 4 systems [Ref. 4]. This
role gains' importance today because the Armed Forces are smaller and less able to

overwhelm by mass. Though smaller in size, our Armed Forces must still overwhelm and
achieve decisive victory. The trend towards high-tech equipment and information
availability allows commanders to still overwhelm despite a smaller force. They achieve this
by better application of their force.

Technology incorporated into today’s war fighting equipment requires complex
command and control systems. Modem weapon delivery systems match speed with high
mobility, precision, lethality and stealth. These weapon features combined with the ability
to mass critical information on the enemy produces violent results. A single weapon system
can engage and destroy many targets with less ordnance thereby increasing the pace of
combat. While a fast pace allows commanders to overwhelm the enemy and maintain the
initiative, it also challenges commanders by presenting more options and opportunities in
combat. In the absence of sophisticated C 4 systems for management and control, it is likely
that some of these options and opportunities will be missed [Ref. 5]. Commanders must
have “...a fused, real time, true representation of the battlespace....” [Ref. 4] to offset the
complexity of today’s high tech, fast paced warfare.

Another trend increasing the importance of the role of C 4 systems is the worldwide
proliferation of information systems and the information they provide. This information
proliferation trend can lead to information overload. The role of C 4 systems addresses
information overload by limiting the role to the processing of “quality information.” Joint
Pub 6-0 provides a guide for what quality information is (Figure 2). Commanders need the
right information, not the most information, to be effective decisionmakers. This is not to
say that quality information will always lead to the right decision; it only helps. Quality

INFORMATION QUALITY CRITERIA

1. ACCURACY. Information that
conveys the true situation.

displays.

2. RELEVANCE. Information that
applies to the mission, task, or situation at
hand.

5. COMPLETENESS. All necessary
information required by the
decisionmaker.

3. TIMELINESS. Information that is
available in time to make decisions.

6. BREVITY. Information that has only
the level of detail required.

4. USABILITY. Information that is in
common, easily understood format and

7. SECURITY. Information that has
been afforded adequate protection where
required.

Figure 2. Information Quality Criteria. After Ref. [4].

information cannot compensate for poor human judgement [Ref. 3]. Quality information
can, however, help reduce the uncertainty commanders must deal with when making
decisions in combat.

2. Objectives and Components of C 4 Systems

The fundamental objective of C 4 systems is to get the critical and relevant
information to the right place at the right time [Ref. 4], Two key words in the fundamental
objective that cannot be overlooked are critical and relevant. Because of the vast amount
of information available, it is easy to overwhelm commanders with information that they do
not want or do not need (information overload). Relevant information is defined in Figure
2, Information Quality Criteria, but critical information is often difficult to discern; it is best
defined by the commander. A commander influences what critical information is collected
and processed by identifying what information they must have to ensure enemy failure or
acceptable friendly consequences [Ref. 1].

Within the fundamental objective are four specific objectives; a C 4 system that meets

these objectives helps a commander plan, direct, coordinate and control (< command and
control) their forces. The four objectives are:

• Produce Unity of Effort.

• Exploit Total Force Capabilities.

• Properly Position Critical Information.

• Information Fusion.

These four specific objectives focus the type of information provided to commanders. For
the purpose of this thesis, it is important to understand that a C 4 system meeting these
objectives affects a commander’s ability to employ Army operational doctrine found in the
Principles of War (Figure 3).

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

1. OBJECTIVE. Direct every military
operation toward a clearly defined,
decisive and obtainable objective.

position of disadvantage through the
flexible application of combat power.

2. OFFENSIVE. Seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative.

6. UNITY OF COMMAND. For every
objective, seek unity of command and
unity of effort.

3. MASS. Mass the effects of
overwhelming combat power at the
decisive place and time.

7. SECURITY. Never permit the enemy
to acquire unexpected advantage.

4. ECONOMY OF FORCE. Employ all
combat power available in the most
effective way possible; allocate minimum
essential combat power to secondary
efforts.

8. SURPRISE. Strike the enemy at a
time or place or in a manner for which he
is unprepared.

9. SIMPLICITY. Prepare clear,
uncomplicated plans and concise orders
to ensure thorough understanding.

5. MANEUVER. Place the enemy in a

Figure 3. The Principles of War [Ref. 3].

Produce Unity of Effort

A C 4 system that facilitates unity of effort provides information that focuses
all military efforts on the common objective. Joint Pub 6-0 explains Unity of Effort with
respect to C 4 systems:

C 4 systems should help a military force and its supporting
elements to combine the thoughts and impressions of multiple
commanders and key warfighters to allow the views of many experts
to be brought to bear on any given task [Ref. 4],

The Principles of War list unity of effort under the sixth Principle of War,
Unity of Command. This is because unity of command is the first step to achieving unity
of effort. Unity of command means giving command of all forces seeking a common
objective to one responsible commander. Unity of command is a tangible concept and
allows for a single commander’s intent; the commander’s vision of the desired end state of
the mission. Unity of effort, however, is less tangible, but complements unity of command.
Unity of effort means cooperation and coordination among the forces under the single
commander in order to achieve the common objective. It’s goal is to unite the actions of
subordinate commanders; unity of effort may cross command lines, but is always focused
on the objective. Only actions that support achieving the objective produce unity of effort,
and so, only a C 4 system that provides information that is critical and relevant to achieving
the objective will help commanders achieve unity of effort.

b. Exploit Total Force Capabilities

Joint Pub 6-0 explains the second specific objective of C 4 systems:

C 4 systems must be planned as extensions of human senses
and processes to help the commanders form perceptions, make

decisions, and react. This allows commanders to be effective during
high-tempo operations. [Ref. 4]

A C 4 system that achieves this objective helps commanders apply the
principles of mass, maneuver, surprise and economy of force. It will bring real-time
information from the five Battlefield Functional Areas together so that commanders know
the disposition and employment of the enemy. A C 4 system that provides real-time
information gives commanders a distinct advantage over the enemy. It allows them to mass
fires from direct and indirect weapons, maneuver to defeat the enemy based on their
orientation, and apply economy of force where necessary. Our commanders can fight
smarter with fewer casualties because they know what the enemy is doing shortly after they
do it.

c. Properly Position Critical Information
Joint Pub 6-0 says:

C 4 systems must be able to respond quickly to requests for
information and to place and maintain that information where it is needed
[Ref. 4],

The ability to do this depends on the functions and components of C 4 systems.
Proper configuration of the components and adherence to the C 4 Principles (to be discussed
later) achieves this C 4 objective. Properly positioning critical information involves the basic
transport of information and affects a commander’s ability to apply all the principles of war.
Joint Pub 6-0 defines information as “...data collected from the environment and processed
into a usable form....”. Putting that information into a usable form requires C 4 systems to
support the following five functions:

• Collect. Acquiring or gathering and initial filtering of information based on
a planned need and time sensitivity. Collection also involves putting the
information into a form suitable for transport. [Ref. 4]

• Transport. Moving information between processing devices [Ref. 4],

• Process. Storing, recalling, manipulating, filtering and fusion of data to
produce the minimum essential information in a usable form for the
warfighter [Ref. 4],

• Disseminate. Distributing processed information to the appropriate users
[Ref. 4],

• Protect. Ensuring the secure flow and processing of information and access
only by authorized personnel [Ref. 4],

The components of C 4 systems that execute the functions are:

• Terminal Devices. Items such as telephones, faxes and computers that turn
voice, data, imagery or messages into a format for electronic transmission
[Ref. 4],

• Transmission Media. Mediums such as free wave (e.g. radio and space based
systems), metallic wire or fiber-optic cable that connect terminal devices
[Ref. 4],

• Switches. Devices that route voice, data, imagery or messages through
networks of transmission media. Circuit switches typically route telephone
traffic through a dedicated connection. Packet and message switches
typically route pieces of the same data/message through many different
routes; the data/message is broken into pieces/packets at the sending location
and is then assembled at the destination. [Ref. 4]

• Networks. Terminal Devices and Transmission Media connected by
Switches to transport information to its destination [Ref. 4], Computers are
the most common terminal device found in networks.

• Control. Control provides management of Networks. Network Control
manages area, regional, theater or global networks while Nodal Control
manages smaller areas such as command centers [Ref. 4].

An example of the components of C 4 systems in a basic communications
system configuration is depicted in Figure 4.

A basic communications system consists of terminal devices
connected by transmission media through switching systems.
Control and management provide network access.

Figure 4. Basic Communications System. After Ref. [4],

d. Information Fusion

Information fusion, is the ability to compile data from many different sources
to give an integrated representation of the battlefield. Information fusion is usually
accomplished at a fusion center where intelligence experts analyze all available information
from the different sources to give a complete assessment of activity [Ref. 1]. This objective
is all encompassing in that it allows a commander to get a complete picture based on current
information. As with objective three, it depends on proper configuration of the C 4
components and adherence to the C 4 Principles.

3. The Basic C 4 System Principles

Up to this point, discussion is centered around getting the right information to the

right person at the right time. This single statement sums-up the essence of the C 4 I For the
Warrior Vision. The Basic C 4 System Principles address the concept that getting the right
information to the right person at the right time involves continuous and uninterrupted flow
and processing of information. The vision cannot become reality if the information is not
accessible at all times. These principles ensure accessibility of information in an Armed
Forces that traditionally procures equipment by Service, but must fight jointly. The Basic
C 4 System Principles say that C 4 systems must be:

• Interoperable

• Flexible

• Responsive

• Mobile

• Disciplined

• Survivable

• Sustainable

a. Interoperable

Joint and Service C 4 systems must possess the interoperability necessary to
ensure mission success in joint and combined operations. Interoperability is the condition
achieved among C 4 systems or items of C 4 equipment when information or services can be
exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and their users [Ref. 4], Joint Pub 6-0
is clear in saying that information must pass directly and satisfactorily between systems.
This means systems must transfer information without any intermediate processing and the
information must be usable when received. To promote interoperability, there are the

concepts of:

• Commonality. Equipment is common when personnel trained on other
(similar) equipment can operate and maintain it with no additional
specialized training. Commonality also means interchangeability of repair
parts and consumable items. [Ref. 4]

• Compatibility. Equipment is compatible when two or more systems can
operate in the same environment without interfering with each other. [Ref.

• Standardization. Equipment is standardized when it includes aspects of
commonality, compatibility and interoperability. Although operational
requirements of Services may limit equipment in size, weight or other
physical characteristics, standardization achieves the closest possible
cooperation among the Services to maximize the number of features of
commonality, compatibility and interoperability. This means common or
compatible technical procedures and common, compatible or interchangeable
supplies and parts. With respect to data, it includes standard graphics formats
and information transfer protocols. [Ref. 4]

b. Flexible

Flexibility is the concept whereby C 4 systems are designed and operate in a
way that allows for rapid integration of equipment between separate units. Flexibility is
necessary in joint operations because the organizational structure of a joint force is not
standardized. Flexibility is achieved through the use of standardized design, commercial off
the shelf (COTS) components and standards, commercial facilities, mobile and transportable
systems, and pre-positioned facilities [Ref. 4].

c. Responsive

Recalling that the C 4 I For the Warrior Vision calls for “...fused, real time, true
representation of the battlespace....’’, it is implied that information must come on demand.
In order for C 4 systems to achieve this, they must be responsive. Responsive systems must

be:

• Reliable. C 4 systems must be available when needed and must perform as
intended [Ref. 4].

• Redundant. Redundancy provides for alternate paths, back-up systems, and
equipment that recover communications quickly in the event of failure [Ref.

4].

• Timely. The processing and transmission time for warning, critical
intelligence, and operation order execution information is minimized [Ref.

4].

d. Mobile

Mobile systems are physically designed to compliment the mobility of the
forces they support. There should be no degradation in performance as a result of size,
weight or other physical limitations. [Ref. 4]

e. Disciplined

A disciplined system is less a function of system design and more an issue of
asset management. C 4 systems possess finite capabilities and are a limited resource on the
battlefield. It is, therefore, important that commanders manage and control the flow and
processing of information as well as the C 4 assets themselves. Additionally, commanders
must prioritize information. This prevents information overload or system degradation due
to excessive information flow. Finally, commanders must manage the frequencies along
functional lines (e.g. admin, logistics, operational) and in accordance with international and
host nation communication laws.

f Survivable

Since C 4 systems are the lifeblood of command centers, it only makes sense

that they must be survivable. However, they must only be as survivable as the command
center they support. This makes economic sense and is achieved by employing the full range
of security measures. Techniques include physical security measures such as dispersal of
facilities, multiple network nodes, hardening of equipment and facilities, personnel access
rosters, operations security measures (OPSEC), communications security measures
(COMSEC), or a combination of these. Other techniques include software protection
measures such as user access controls (passwords), intrusion detection software, viral
detection software, or a combination of these. Finally, survivability involves measures to
recover information and communications in the event of intrusion or system failure.

g. Sustainable

The final Basic C 4 Principle anchors the principles themselves. Sustainability,
in this context, means “continuous support during any type and length of joint operation.”
[Ref. 4] It is the single principle that specifically addresses continuous and uninterrupted
flow and processing of information; the specified focus of the principles. Inherent in
sustainment operations is the training and employment of maintenance personnel and system
operators as well as other system-specific logistics requirements like spare parts and
expendable supplies. A C 4 system that has the attributes of all the other principles, but lacks
sustainability, defeats the purpose of the principles as a whole.

C. SUMMARY

This chapter provided an overview of the top level doctrine governing C 4 systems
support to joint operations; Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications,
and Computer (C 4 ) Systems Support to Joint Operations. It provided the reader with the

basic doctrine governing the purpose and design of C 4 systems. It defined doctrine focusing
on the concept that doctrine is intended to guide, not limit the commander’s initiative in the
prosecution of their mission. That definition sets the foundation for discussion of the role
of C 4 systems, the objectives and components of C 4 systems, and the Basic C 4 Principles for
design of C 4 systems. It is a sequenced approach showing how the role, objectives and
principles of C 4 systems relate to each other and support the C 4 I For The Warrior Vision.

Understanding these three areas of C 4 doctrine at the highest level allows the reader
to understand the impetus behind the Army’s Enterprise Strategy, discussed in the next
chapter. It also allows the author to show joint doctrine’s influence on the Enterprise
Strategy. This chapter is the first step in showing what documents govern and influence the
functional design of the Army Tactical Command and Control System.

III. THE ARMY ENTERPRISE STRATEGY

The previous chapter outlined the top-level doctrine governing C 4 systems support
to joint operations: Joint Pub 6-0. It was a sequenced approach showing how the role,
objectives and principles of C 4 systems relate to each other and support the C 4 I For The
Warrior Vision at the Joint level. This chapter introduces the reader to The Army Enterprise
Strategy; the Army’s unified vision for the Army C 4 I community [Ref. 6]. The purpose of
this chapter is to show the reader how The Army Enterprise Strategy falls under the authority
of joint doctrine, namely Joint Pub 6-0. In achieving the purpose, this chapter will also
identify where the doctrine of Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, influences The Army
Enterprise Strategy.

A. FOREWORD

Just as Joint Pub 6-0 is the keystone document covering C 4 systems support to joint
operations, The Army Enterprise Strategy is a keystone document outlining principles and
the implementation plan for Army C 4 systems support to operations. The strategy is “...the
single, unified vision for the Army C 4 I community. ” [Ref. 6] Currently, the Strategy
consists of two documents: The Army Enterprise Vision and The Army Enterprise
Implementation Plan. The Army Enterprise Vision introduces ten principles vital to ensuring
information dominance for the warrior. The Army Enterprise Implementation Plan outlines
steps the Army must take to fulfill the vision. The strategy is best summarized in the
Foreword by then, Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan:

This capstone document outlines the strategy and the principles by
which we will exploit current and future technologies, adopting new systems

and using executive decision making as a means to advance the capability of
the Total Army Force. The advanced capabilities envisioned by this
document will enable the Army to project and sustain the force, protect the
force, win the battlefield information war, conduct precision strikes
throughout the battlefield, and dominate the maneuver battle.

The Army Enterprise Strategy is founded upon well-established
doctrinal foundations of Army Operations, FM 100-5, which we have
updated and expanded to fit the requirements of the 21 st Century.

The Army Enterprise Strategy is a structured approach to focus the efforts of the

Army C 4 I community so that Army C 4 systems support the warfighter in garrison and

combat. Below are some key points the reader should infer from General Sullivan’s excerpt;

they foreshadow the content of The Army Enterprise Vision:

• The Army must “...exploit current and future technologies....” The Armed
Forces are no longer the leader in technological advances; the commercial
sector is. This means Defense procurement practices must accommodate the
speed with which current commercial C 4 I technology is advancing in order
to exploit future technology. This is a challenge because the Army and other
Services cannot abandon technology they already have.

• The strategy must “...advance the capability of the Total Army Force.” This
means the strategy must address the requirements the Army has as a Service:
to organize, train and equip itself to fight as a Service; to organize, train and
equip itself to fight as part of a joint or combined force; and to sustain itself
from a tactical and business perspective [Ref. 6].

• “The advanced capabilities envisioned by this document....” must allow the
Army to execute across a wide spectrum of mission areas. Systems must
provide flexibility because the threats facing the Army are less well-defined.

• The strategy must be “...founded upon well-established doctrinal
foundations....” The Army must procure systems that compliment the ability
to employ the Principles of War and the Tenets of Army operations (Figure

5).

B. THE ARMY ENTERPRISE VISION

The Army Enterprise Vision is a concise document that states a purpose, describes

THE TENETS OF ARMY OPERATIONS

1 . INITIATIVE. Initiative sets or changes the terms of battle by action and implies an offensive
spirit in the conduct of all operations. Applied to the force as a whole, initiative requires a
constant effort to force the enemy to conform to the commander’s operational purposes and
tempos, while retaining freedom of action.

2. AGILITY. Agility is the ability of friendly forces to react faster than the enemy and is a
prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative.

3. DEPTH. Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, resources, and purpose. The
Army must have the ability to gain information and influence operations throughout the depth of
the battlefield.

4. SYNCHRONIZATION. Synchronization is arranging activities in time and space to mass at
the decisive point.

5. VERSATILITY. Versatility is the ability of units to meet diverse mission requirements.

Figure 5. The Tenets of Army Operations [Ref. 3].

the threat the strategy must address, and lists ten principles to focus Army C 4 systems
support of operations.

1. The Purpose

“The purpose of the Army Enterprise Strategy is to support the US Army Warfighters
into the 21 st Century ... It synchronizes Army programs with the Joint Staffs C 4 I for the
Warrior concept, business practices, and Defense Information Infrastructure” [Ref. 6]. This
clear statement of purpose is the first indication that The Army Enterprise Strategy falls
under the authority of joint doctrine. The strategy does this by design, not accident. The
Army recognizes that in order to fight as part of a joint force, Army doctrine cannot conflict
with joint Doctrine. Recall from the last chapter that Joint Pub 6-0 is the keystone document
for the C 4 systems series of publications. It is based on The OI For The Warrior Vision and
is the unifying strategy governing C 4 systems support to joint operations. The Army

Enterprise Strategy weaves a common thread by identifying the US Army Warfighter as the
core of its strategy for unifying the Army C 4 I community.

2. The Threat

The late Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, stated the major dangers facing the post
Cold War Armed Forces: rogue nuclear states, reversal of democracy in former communist
states, regional threats, and domestic economic problems related to Defense cutbacks.
Former Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan described our future strategic
environment as “...dynamic, uncertain, and unstable.” It is clear that today’s threat to the
Army is less well-defined; we have no single major enemy. Each adversary poses a unique
level of weaponry and command and control sophistication, and as such, poses a unique
threat. Because of an increased reliance on COTS technology and components, the Armed
Forces is less able to control sales of C 4 systems to foreign states. This provides opportunity
for future adversaries to enhance their command and control capabilities with the same
technology as our Armed Forces. This is the threat that The Army Enterprise Strategy and
future initiatives must address. [Ref. 6]

3. The Principles of The Army Enterprise Strategy

The Principles of The Army Enterprise Strategy are intended to ensure information
dominance for the Army warfighter. Here again, the influence of joint doctrine and Field
Manual 100-5, Operations, is evident. The ten principles are:

• Focus on the Warfighter.

• Ensure Joint Interoperability.

• Digitize the Battlefield.

• Capitalize on Space Based Systems.

• Modernize Power Projection Platforms.

• Optimize the Information Technology Environment.

• Implement Multi-Level Security.

• Ensure Spectrum Supremacy.

• Acquire Integrated Systems Using Commercial Technology.

• Exploit Modeling and Simulation.
a. Focus on the Warfighter

There is little question that the Armed Forces of the United States are
equipped with the most technologically advanced equipment in the world. The technological
advantage they enjoy, however, is still a function of the warfighters’ ability to use and
exploit the capabilities of that equipment. This is why the first principle of the Enterprise
Strategy is to focus on the soldiers that will use and maintain the equipment. The strategy
identifies five challenges to meeting the warfighters’ needs:

• Challenge One: Provide a responsive requirements process that reflects
warfighter’s needs [Ref. 6], The Louisiana Maneuvers and the Battle Labs
are two initiatives intended to improve the requirements process for the
warfighter. The Louisiana Maneuvers addresses Challenge One by providing
an accelerated decision making process that addresses requirements
forwarded from the field (Figure 6). The Battle Labs concept addresses
Challenge One by providing a forum where new technologies and concepts
are introduced and tested in a simulated environment (Figure 7).

• Challenge Two. Provide soldier friendly systems [Ref. 6]. Systems must
not degrade soldiers’ ability to perform combat missions. This means
systems that require few procedures to send and receive information. Not
only procedures related to automated processes, (i.e. keystrokes), but physical
procedures such as the removal of combat or protective gear. [Ref. 6]

Figure 6. The Louisiana Maneuvers Decision Making Process. The process begins
with issue nominations forwarded from the field. A General Officer Working Group
(GOWG) reviews issues for consideration and passes the most important of those to
the Louisiana Maneuvers Board of Directors (BoD) for deliberation. The BoD
considers the issues and approves some of them for study. Members of the BoD then
take responsibility for individual issues and supervise the study and evaluation of
issues through joint, combined and multi-national exercises. After investigation, the
members of the board report back to the BoD with observations, lessons learned, and
options. The BoD then adds its recommendations and forwards the final product to
the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army for decisions on funding
and priority. After Ref. [7].

• Challenge Three. Provide more deployable systems. This challenge is
fundamental to the warfighters’ ability to accomplish the combat mission.
As mentioned in defining the role of C 4 systems, warfighters of today face a
fast-paced operational tempo in training and combat. They must have
systems that are as compact and mobile as they are. [Ref. 6]

• Challenge Four. Provide capable and reliable systems. These terms were
defined in the Basic C 4 Principles from Joint Pub 6-0, but are still a function
of the warfighter in that they must articulate requirements that define

Figure 7. The Battle Labs Concept. The Army’s Battle Labs are located at six
installations around the nation. They provide a forum for functional integration of
new technologies and concepts and help the Army determine requirements by
focusing on emerging technologies using laboratory prototypes. The labs, though
geographically separated, use C 4 I technology to link together to run a single
simulation for experimentation. They help the Army to relate the cost of technology
insertion to value added on the battlefield; this can avoid expenditure of money if
the benefits do not justify the cost. After Ref. [7].

“capable and reliable.”

• Challenge Five. Provide systems that function in both garrison and tactical
environments. Meeting this challenge is necessary and makes sense
economically. The ability to use the same systems in garrison and tactical
environments reduces training requirements and the time required for a unit
to transition from peace to war.

b. Ensure Joint Interoperability

This principle reemphasises the first of the Basic C 4 Principles from Joint Pub
6-0 outlined in Chapter II. Interoperability is essential to mission success in joint and

combined operations. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, states:

The Army does not fight alone. It integrates its efforts in
unified operations with its sister services, with other national agencies, and
often with allied and coalition forces. By doing so, the Army’s operational
capabilities are enhanced, victory comes quicker, and friendly casualties are
reduced. [Ref. 2]

For Services to fight together, they must be able to communicate and pass
information with no intermediate processing. The Enterprise Strategy, in addition to stating
interoperability as a principle, implies the importance of commonality, compatibility and
standardization. These are concepts that promote interoperability.

Interoperability encompasses doctrine, procedures, and
training - as well as systems and equipment ... Achieving interoperability will
require adherence to industry standards for engineering, communications
protocols, and data elements. Standards define a common environment in
which new systems can be introduced at reduced risk. [Ref. 6]

c. Digitize The Battlefield

The goal of digitizing the battlefield is to provide the warfighter a digital
network to assure C 2 decision-cycle superiority [Ref. 6], The digitized battlefield exists
from the highest command post down to the foxhole. The benefits are, improved transfer of
information to provide a common operational picture (COP), and increased compatibility and
commonality across battlefield operating systems. The end result is increased
interoperability.

The COP is a concept whereby commanders, staff and their soldiers have a
“common picture” of the battlefield at the same time on one terminal device. The common
picture may include graphical displays of unit locations, attack routes, checkpoints and other
tactical information of relevance all on one display. Updates occur at real-time or near real-

time and are sent to all commanders, staff and their soldiers. The benefit is a decrease in C 2
decision cycle time because the operational picture shows the most current information to
commanders at all levels. Situational awareness is increased because every soldier, with the
COP, has the same information regarding friendly and enemy locations.

Another benefit of digitizing the battlefield relates to commonality and
compatibility. Recall from Chapter II that equipment is common when personnel trained on
other (similar) equipment can operate and maintain it with no additional specialized training.
Commonality also means interchangeability of repair parts and consumable items. [Ref. 3]
Equipment is compatible when two or more systems can operate in the same environment
without interfering with each other. [Ref. 3] Digitizing the battlefield facilitates
commonality because there is only one type of information (digital) to contend with; this
means less training of repair personnel and interchangeability of parts. Compatibility is
enhanced because battlefield systems are all sending and receiving the same type of data.

d. Capitalize on Space Based Systems

The Armed Forces use space based systems to enhance strategic and tactical
operations. At the strategic level, satellites transfer information between commanders in the
field and national agencies. At the tactical level, satellites provide communications
capability to remote areas where no communications infrastructure exists. Many special
operations depend solely on satellites for communications. The smaller, power projection
Army of today depends on space based systems to conduct split-based operations (Figure 8);
a new concept made possible by rapid advances in C 4 I technology, particularly, space based
systems. Space based systems also provide intelligence, positioning information, early

Personnel Systems
Logistics Support
Finance Records
Maintenance Files

XXX

Figure 8. The Split-Based Operations Concept. Army Field Manual 100-5,
Operations, discusses split-based operations: the full integration of supply and
transportation functions into a vertical distribution system is critical. Enhanced,
assured communications allow some logistics functions to be accomplished from
CONUS or from another theater, only deploying support for those functions
necessary. This is called split-based operations. In these operations, the industrial
base of the United States (or a base in another theater) receives requirements and
sends forward necessary support. Split-based operations reduce the burden on the
deployment flow and prevent unnecessary stockage in theater. After Ref. [6].

warning, data processing, and imagery support to deployed forces. All these capabilities
facilitate battlefield dominance, however, along with these capabilities come some
challenges. The largest of these is the dependance on commercial satellite usage to handle
the overload on military satellites. The Enterprise Strategy calls for initiatives to establish
procedures to allow military use of commercial satellites. Those initiatives will address
issues such as interoperability, security and rights of usage. The military’s increased use of

COTS technology and equipment will help resolve these issues. [Ref. 6]
e. Modernize Power Projection Platforms

The ability to project the power of the Army depends on a strong sustaining
base. The CONUS installations are the power projection platforms for today’s Army. As
described in Figure 8, they allow the Army to perform split-based operations, thereby taking
over many of the rear-area operations formerly performed in the theater of operations.
Modernizing CONUS based installations supports split-based operations and allows the
Army to reduce requirements for strategic airlift and in-theater stockpiles. Additionally,
fewer soldiers and equipment are exposed to the dangers of combat; this also allows for
quicker entry and exit of forces. [Ref. 6]

f Optimize The Information Technology Environment

This principle is a warning as much as a statement of guidance. It says that
while the Army leverages its capabilities with C 4 I technology, it must do it smartly because
there are fewer resources to procure technology. Maximum application of the concepts of
standardization, commonality and compatibility are essential to implementing this principle.
It is important to maximize the longevity of equipment even in an area where technology
improves so rapidly. An excerpt directly from The Enterprise Strategy best explains the
essence of this principle:

Our overall approach to information systems will address the
requirements of the warfighter and the economic imperative to provide
modernized technology in this era of decreasing resources. Army systems
will be modernized and leveraged, especially in the C 4 I arena, so that they
can be exported for other US and Allied use. Smart investments today in
information technology will generate savings and maintain information
superiority in the future. [Ref. 6]

S r.

Implement Multi-Level Security

Many of the Joint Pub and Enterprise Strategy principles up to this point refer
to the need for economy and efficiency in the development and procurement of C 4 I systems.
A single system that can do as many functions as possible without degrading capability is
the goal. It is an ambitious goal and requires multi-level security to achieve it. A multi-level
security device allows multiple users at different access (classification) and sensitivity
(compartment) levels to access one system at the same time. It also allows one user to access
different classification and compartment levels at the same time on one system. Though
many levels can be accessed at one time, by one user, a multi-level security system will only
allow the user to access information they are authorized. [Ref. 8] In the absence of such a
system, a soldier may have to access information with different sensitivity levels on different
systems; they may even be geographically separated. A multi-level security system will
allow soldiers to get the information they need in one place, regardless of the security level.
This principle supports initiatives to standardize and modularize support systems and allows
the Army to achieve cost savings in development, procurement and maintenance.

It. Ensure Spectrum Superiority

Although advances in C 4 I technology allow the Army to enhance warfighting
capabilities, the systems cannot operate without continuous and uninterrupted use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. The importance of this principle, first discussed in the Basic C 4
Principles in Joint Pub 6-0, is echoed as a principle in The Enterprise Strategy. As the
number of electronic battlefield systems increases, so does the dependance on the
electromagnetic spectrum. The Enterprise Strategy calls for two actions to ensure spectrum

supremacy: a single authority within a task force responsible for the spectrum and active
participation in policy formulation. The single authority responsible for the spectrum will
use techniques (technological or otherwise) to allocate the spectrum as the scarce resource
it is becoming. CSoordination will be essential to success in implementing this principle.
To facilitate the efforts of the spectrum authority at the task force level, the Armed Forces
must participate in and influence the formulation of international and allied policy regarding
the electromagnetic spectrum to our benefit.

L Acquire Integrated Systems Using Commercial Technology

In the Foreword of the Enterprise Strategy, General Sullivan calls for the
Army to “... exploit current and future technologies .... as a means to advance the capability
of the Total Army Force”. The principle of acquiring integrated systems using commercial
technology addresses his comment directly. The commercial sector is the defacto leader in
information and C 4 I systems technology and the generation of new commercial technology
happens quicker than the acquisition cycle allows the Services to buy it. In order to exploit
these trends, the Enterprise Strategy calls for the Army to affect the streamlining of the
acquisition cycle, work with industry to influence new technology development and
standardization, exploit current emerging technology, and only resort to Army-funded
technology when necessary [Ref. 6]. The benefits of implementing this principle are cost
savings due to the reduced price of technology based on commercial demands, and the
avoidance of costly research and development. Additional savings, as in the commercial
sector, will come in the form of technology upgrades. Through carefully planned
improvements, systems will advance in an evolutionary manner rather than developing new

systems [Ref. 6].

j. Exploit Modeling and Simulation

The days of costly field training exercises are numbered. Experience gained
through modeling and simulation provides a cost effective means to train soldiers, rehearse
missions and evaluate different courses of action [Ref. 6]. The same concept that produces
effective training in the field applies to this principle; training must be as realistic as
possible. In order to do that with respect to modeling and simulation, many of the other
principles must be implemented first or concurrently. The Enterprise Strategy identifies
three particular challenges to implementing this principle:

• Warfighters must be able to use tactical equipment in the distributed
simulation environment [Ref. 6]. The Battle Labs concept is an example of
an initiative already underway.

• Tactical equipment must function the same in tactical and simulated
environments [Ref. 6]. Meeting this challenge requires close coordination
between the Army and technology developers in the requirements generation
process.

• Decisions required of the warfighter must be the same in tactical and
simulated environments [Ref. 6]. Again, meeting this challenge requires
close coordination between the Army and technology developers in the
requirements generation process. It also involves integration of the actual
systems that provide information to commanders.

The ten Principles of the Enterprise Strategy provide guidance for Army C 4
systems support to operations. They are the essence of The Army Enterprise Strategy
Vision. They serve little purpose without an executable implementation plan.

C. THE ARMY ENTERPRISE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

The Army Enterprise Implementation Plan is the second of two documents that make

up The Enterprise Strategy. It is a detailed document that goes far beyond the purpose of this
thesis. It does, however, deserve discussion at a macro level for familiarization.

1. The Purpose

The purpose of The Army Enterprise Strategy Implementation Plan is to define the
steps necessary to implement the principles outlined in The Army Enterprise Strategy Vision
[Ref. 9]. It provides the “...institutional framework for the evolution and modernization of
Army C 4 I systems.” The plan lays a roadmap for guiding the Army C 4 I transition into the
21 st century. It consists of three parts:

• An independent assessment of existing systems; baselines under current rules
and assumptions [Ref. 9].

• An investment strategy for the future; a blueprint under new rules and
assumptions [Ref. 9].

• An action plan to implement the blueprint [Ref. 9].

a. Assessment of Existing Systems

The assessment of existing systems looks at why the Army must change the
way they develop, procure and use C 4 systems. It identifies eleven paradigms that are
affecting the Army and the Army C 4 I community. The eleven shifting paradigms are all
motivated by either new technology or a new conceptual/doctrinal way of thinking. Table
1 summarizes the eleven shifting paradigms. It represents the old way of thinking (Old
Model), the factors motivating change (New Concepts/Technology), and the new way of
thinking (New Model).

SHIFTING PARADIGMS

Old Model

New Concept/Technology

New Model

A Forward Deployed Army.

A Force Projection Army using Split
Based Operations.

Installations as Corps or
Division Rear Area.

Service focused information
using Service Stovepipes.

Joint Operations.

Joint and Combined
Information using Joint C 4 I
technology.

Deploy Extensive Information
Management Systems to the
field

Space Based Systems, Personal
Computers and switching
technology.

Send only terminal devices
forward.

Hardware dominated weapon
systems.

Computer technology and software
engineering practices.

Software enables combat
power.

Focus on targeting enemy
weapon systems.

Real time information distribution.

Information Warfare that
targets information targets
like sensors, C 2 posts.

Use of umbrella
communication grids to
blanket an area.

Force Mobility requiring forces to
move great distances quickly.

Use of space based systems,
remote terminals, and
automation support cells.

Acetate and grease pencils.

The information technology
revolution.

Imagery, simulation, COP,
and the ability to print locally.

Service and functionally
oriented stovepipe systems.

Distributed databases.

Process oriented support
based on the mission area.

Manual, serial coordination.
Staffing in sequence.

Groupware.

Electronic coordination.

Print plants involving multi-
step processes.

Direct publishing access

Electronic preparation and
distribution.

Military unique information
mission area equipment.

High tech changes in:

Commercial satellite
communications.

Start with COTS and modify
as needed or augment military
unique with COTS.

National and international
commercial standards and protocols.

Use of standard commercial
switches.

Commercial open systems
architecture.

COTS and Non-developmental items
(NDI).

Use of commercial equipment
and software.

Use of COTS.

Table 1. Shifting Paradigms Affecting Army C4I. After Ref. [9].

The factors motivating change, in some cases are a result of the post-cold war
decrease in resources. The Force-Projection, CONUS-Based Army is such an example,
however, it is important for the reader to note that the technology revolution serves the Army
well; it provides a means to offset force reductions by quickly providing information that
allows for a better application of the smaller force. Additionally, the proliferation of the
technology has driven the cost down which also serves a resource constrained Army well.

b. The Investment Strategy For The Future

This portion of The Implementation Plan graphically depicts the current
investment in the Army’s baseline systems, what those systems will migrate to in the near
to mid term, and then, where they will be in the year 2010. Near to mid term is defined as
from the year 1996 to 2001 and is based on the idea of incorporating technology into current
systems as long as those systems move the Army forward in accordance with the principles
outlined in The Enterprise Strategy Vision. Where the Army wants to be in the year 2010
was described in a visionary excerpt from General Sullivan on the 2010 battlefield. A
general example of the graphical investment strategy is depicted in Figure 9.

c. The Action Plan

This portion of The Enterprise Implementation Plan is based on the
independent assessment of existing systems, the investment strategy for the future, and The
Enterprise Strategy Vision principles. This part of the Implementation Plan is authored by
The Enterprise Strategy General Officer Steering Committee and consists of nine tasks. The
nine tasks give direction and proponency to different agencies of the Army for action. It is
not important for the reader to know what these specific tasks are, but rather that they exist.

BASELINE NEAR TO MID TERM YEAR 2010

1996-2001

Figure 9. The Enterprise Investment Strategy. In this example, the baseline column
represents systems that control information from a specific information mission area
such as maneuver, field artillery, or intelligence. The near to mid term column
represents the product of the baseline systems’ migration to a single integrated
system offering all the functional capabilities of the baseline systems. The final
column of The Enterprise Investment Strategy represents a future system embodying
General Sullivan’s excerpt about the 2010 battlefield. After Ref. [9].

D. SUMMARY

This chapter provided an overview of the Army level guidance covering C 4 systems
support to operations: The Army Enterprise Strategy, consisting of The Enterprise Strategy
Vision and The Enterprise Strategy Implementation Plan. The Vision provides ten principles
intended to focus efforts within the Army C 4 I community to ensure battlefield information
dominance for the warfighter. The Implementation Plan established a method for the Army
to implement the principles outlined in The Vision. This Army guidance falls under the

authority of the doctrine found in Joint Pub 6-0 and is influenced by Field Manual 100-5,
Operations. Initiatives such as Louisiana Maneuvers and the Battle Labs concept provide
a mechanism for soldiers and scientists to focus technology development on warfighter
needs supported by the C 4 I principles. This chapter was a continuation of the sequenced
approach showing how the guidance at different levels of the Armed Forces relate to and
support each other and the C 4 I For The Warrior Vision.

Understanding that there are threads of continuity that start at joint doctrine and flow
through Army guidance sets the doctrinal foundation for the design, development and
procurement of Army C 4 systems. This chapter is the second step in showing what
documents govern and influence the functional design of the Army Tactical Command and
Control System.

IV. ARMY OPERATIONS

The previous chapter introduced the reader to The Army Enterprise Strategy.
It outlined principles, implementation plans, and showed the reader how The Army
Enterprise Strategy falls under the authority of joint doctrine. Army Field Manual 100-5 is
referenced throughout the previous chapters as it relates to principles in joint and Army C 4 I
doctrine. This chapter summarizes how the Army develops combat power and is the last of
three guiding documents discussed in the purpose of this thesis; it gives the reader the
foundation for understanding the functional design of The Army Tactical Command and
Control System.

A. COMBAT POWER

The Army uses combat power to achieve its goals in combat. The accepted
Department of Defense and NATO definition of combat power is:

The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a
Military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time [Ref.

11 -

Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, expands on this definition by saying:

Combat power is created by combining the elements of maneuver,
firepower, protection and leadership. Overwhelming combat power is the
ability to focus sufficient force to ensure success and deny the enemy any
chance of escape or effective retaliation ... Overwhelming combat power is
achieved when all combat elements are violently brought to bear quickly,
giving the enemy no opportunity to respond with coordinated or effective
opposition. [Ref. 3]

The reader should infer from these two definitions that combat power is a real
phenomenon; it is the realized capability of a force to achieve results in combat [Ref. 10].

Furthermore, combat power is derived from an energy source called combat potential:

Combat potential is the latent capacity of individual fighting and
supporting elements organized as a force capable of achieving combat results
[Ref. 10].

Combat potential exists in two states: designed and actual combat potential.
Designed combat potential exists notionally under ideal conditions and actual combat
potential exists under current conditions. In either case, the broad definition of combat
potential includes “fighting and supporting elements” and is transformed into combat power
by command through instructions. [Ref. 1 0] All the Services apply and develop combat
power differently; the Army creates combat power by combining four elements, in concert,
against the enemy. The four elements, from the Army Field Manual 100-5 expanded
definition of combat power, are maneuver, firepower, protection and leadership. Creating
combat power only provides a force at the beginning of battle; in order to sustain combat
power, the Army integrates and coordinates seven combat functions with the four elements.
The seven combat functions are intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility
and survivability, logistics, and battle command.

1. The Elements Of Combat Power
a. Maneuver

Recall from Figure 3 in Chapter II that maneuver is the fifth Principle of War.
The Army also considers maneuver to be a dynamic of combat power. Maneuver gives
friendly forces the advantageous position or allows the enemy to maneuver into a
disadvantageous position in order to affect delivery of fires. Maneuver only refers to
position of forces in relation to the enemy and must be combined with the elements of

firepower and protection to be completely effective. Effects of positional advantage are
surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, massed effects, and/or moral dominance
of the enemy. These goals should sound familiar to the reader; they are closely related to the
other Principles of War (Figure 3) and Tenets of Army Operations (Figure 5). [Ref. 3]

b. Firepower

Firepower is the “destructive and/or disruptive force” portion of the DoD and
NATO definition of combat power. Firepower is the teeth of the friendly force and may be
direct (i.e. fire from an Armor Company) or indirect (i.e. fire from a Field Artillery Battery
or naval gunfire). While maneuver is rarely effective without firepower, there are types of
firepower that can be effective without maneuver. An example is the employment of indirect
weapon systems using munitions as laser guided bombs, and integrated target acquisition
systems. Whether direct or indirect, the effects of firepower are maximized when combined
with maneuver. [Ref. 3]

c. Protection

Protection refers specifically to the combat potential of a unit. Protection has
four components that when applied effectively, increase the actual combat potential of a unit.
The four components of protection are:

• Operational Security (OPSEC) and deception operations. This component
includes measures such as reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance,
camouflage, dispersion of units, and fortified fighting positions. [Ref. 3]

• Maintenance of soldier health and morale. This component includes
measures to maintain the equipment and supplies the soldiers require to
perform effectively in combat. It also includes measures to ensure adequate
health services for soldiers. [Ref. 3]

• Safety. This component includes active measures employed by commanders
to identify and mitigate dangers that soldiers face in training and combat.
[Ref. 3]

# Avoidance of fratricide. This component includes measures to avoid the
killing or wounding of friendly soldiers. [Ref. 3] There are many initiatives
working towards this combat problem. C 4 I systems will help by providing
a clear and common picture of the battlefield. Other measures include
disciplined operations carried out by the integrated forces of an Army Task
Force [Ref. 3]. This means application of firepower and support operations
at the right time and place as specified by an Operations Order (OPORD).

Application of all four of the components of protection will increase the actual

combat potential of a unit towards the designed combat potential. The reader should note

that protection is the single element of combat power that can affect combat potential before,

during and after direct combat. The goal is always to maximize actual combat potential to

result in the maximum combat power.

d. Leadership

The Army considers leadership to be the most important of the four elements
of combat power. The specific aspect of leadership referred to here is the ability of the
Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Army to combine and employ the other
three elements of combat power. This ability is the culmination of experience combined
with professional education including history, doctrine, theory, and successful personality
traits and techniques employed by previous leaders. It is:

... taking responsibility for decisions; being loyal to
subordinates; inspiring and directing assigned forces and resources towards
a purposeful end; establishing a teamwork climate that engenders success;
demonstrating moral and physical courage in the face of adversity; providing
the vision that both focuses and anticipates the future course of events [Ref.

3].'

When opposing forces are evenly matched, the ability of the leader to
combine and employ the other three elements of combat power will be the decisive edge.
[Ref. 3]

2. The Combat Functions

In order to plan and analyze complex Army operations, leaders break the operation
into seven functional operating systems. “Systems” in this sense is meant to represent an
operational process, not a hardware/software combination such as a “command and control
system.” They are called the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs) and exist (as a function)
at every level of war. The establishment of these BOSs provide the direct link between joint
and Army C4 doctrine and the functional design of The Army Tactical Command and
Control System.

a. Intelligence

Intelligence is the first Battlefield Operating System. It affects combat
operations before, during and after combat. It is the process/function of gathering and fusing
information about the enemy as it affects friendly operations. Its existence as a Battlefield
Operating System should not surprise the reader; references to intelligence operations are
found throughout joint and Army C 4 I doctrine. Examples found in this thesis are in Chapter
II; the first two functions of the Lawson Loop are to sense and process external information.
Recall that collection is the first function of a of a C 4 system and that Information Quality
Criteria is crucial to preventing information overload. Without collected information, the
Cognitive Hierarchy doesn’t exist and Information Fusion, the forth Objective of C 4 Systems
is not necessary.

b. Maneuver

Maneuver is discussed as a Principle of War and as an element of combat
power. The general concept is the same with respect to Maneuver, the Battlefield Operating
System. It is to put the enemy at a positional disadvantage. Recall that maneuver must be
combined with firepower to be effective.

c. Fire Support

Fire Support is the function by which firepower is brought to bear when
combined with maneuver. It exists as a Battlefield Operating System because it requires the
synchronization and coordinated efforts of organic and supporting fire support elements.
Because most of the commander’s indirect firepower comes from external sources
(supporting fire support elements), firepower must be synchronized through the function of
fire support in order to best use all available fires throughout the depth of the battlefield.
[Ref. 3]

d. Air Defense

Air Defense operations, as a Battlefield Operating System, allow commanders
to focus and exploit the full capability of their maneuver and firepower elements by offering
protection from enemy air threats. The majority of this responsibility falls on ground based
air defense units deployed throughout a theater. Those units provide air defense throughout
the depth of the battlefield against enemy aircraft, missiles (all altitudes), and unmanned
aerial vehicles. Though the air defense function offers protection, it is not in the context of
protection as an element of combat power. This type of protection is closer related to the
maneuver and firepower elements of combat power since it enhances freedom of maneuver

of friendly forces. [Ref. 3]

e. Mobility and Survivability

Mobility and Survivability, as a Battlefield Operating System, is related to
the maneuver, firepower, and protection elements of combat power. While Air Defense
provides freedom of maneuver by reducing the enemy air du-eat, Mobility and Survivability
is the Battlefield Operating System that, literally, enhances freedom of maneuver of friendly
forces. There are actually two components to the Mobility portion of the BOS: mobility
operations and countermobility operations. Mobility operations increase trafficability for
friendly forces. It includes missions to breach enemy obstacles, improve roads, build new
roads, provide bridges and rafts for river crossing, and identifying trafficable routes for
maneuver forces. Countermobility operations disrupt or deny the enemy its freedom of
maneuver. These missions include demolition of roads and bridges, building obstacles along
anticipated enemy routes of attack, or the use of smoke to hinder enemy maneuverability.
Survivability is the BOS link to the protection element of combat power. These missions
include those intended to deceive the enemy, OPSEC, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
(NBC) operations, use of camouflage, dispersion of units, and the building of
fortified/hardened fighting positions. [Ref. 3]
f Logistics

Logistics, as a Battlefield Operating System, is the single function that relates
to and facilitates all four of the elements of combat power. The Logistics BOS “... provides
the physical means with which forces operate ....” It is the process of planning and executing
the sustainment of forces in support of military operations. [Ref. 3] A key to logistics

operations is its uninterrupted flow of supplies to maneuver and supporting units. This
uninterrupted flow requires intense planning, anticipation, and flexibility on the part of
logistics planners so that the maneuver commander's actions are not limited by logistics
constraints. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, puts logistics into perspective by saying:

At the tactical level it focuses on the traditional CSS functions
of arming, fixing, fueling, manning, moving, and sustaining the soldier and
his equipment. Logistics cannot win a war, but its absence or inadequacy can
cause defeat. [Ref. 3]

g. Battle Command

The Battle Command Battlefield Operating System is very closely related to
the command and control process (Lawson Loop Model) discussed in Chapter I of this thesis.
Army Field Manual 100-5 describes the modem commander's challenge with respect to
Battle Command:

Ultimately, they must assimilate thousands of bits of
information to visualize the battlefield, assess the situation, and direct the
military action required to achieve victory. Thinking and acting are
simultaneous activities for leaders in battle. [Ref. 3]

The art of Battle Command influences all aspects of battle because it is a
combination of leadership and decision making. Looking back at the section on leadership
as an element of combat power, the reader should note that leadership not only includes those
decisions that leaders make, but those that their subordinates make based on the leader's
vision and the teamwork climate established.

Leadership is a thesis topic in itself and is defined and discussed in many
Service manuals. There are differing definitions, all closely related, but what is never in
dispute, is that leadership is a function whereby leaders make decisions based on many

dynamics and vast amounts of information. It should come as no surprise to the reader that
it is the last of the Battlefield Operating Systems because it requires a clear understanding
of the other BOSs to successfully execute. The last statement is the premise for the
functional design of the Army Tactical Command and Control System; an overarching
command and control system that incorporates subordinate functional control systems to aid
commanders in their decision making process.

B. SUMMARY

This chapter summarized how the Army develops combat power in cooperation with
the components of a Joint Task Force. Army Field Manual 100-5 is the last of three guiding
documents discussed in the purpose of this thesis; it gives the reader the foundation for
understanding the functional design and capabilities of The Army Tactical Command and
Control System. This chapter defined combat power and combat potential and the
relationship between the two. It also discussed the four element of combat power: maneuver,
firepower, protection, and leadership. It also discussed the seven functional operating
systems, called the Battlefield Operating Systems, that the Army uses to plan and analyze
complex Army operations: intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and
survivability, logistics, and battle command. This chapter also identifies where the seven
BOSs are integrated into the four elements of combat power. This chapter speaks less of C 4 I
specific doctrine and more of Army operational doctrine; it is the necessary transition to the
discussion of the functional design and capabilities of The Army Tactical Command and
Control System.

V. THE ARMY TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

The last chapter summarized a portion of Army Field Manual, 100-5, Operations;
specifically, how the Army develops combat power. It gave the reader the foundation for
understanding the functional design of The Army Tactical Command and Control System.
This chapter familiarizes the reader with an Army C 4 I system that shows evidence of
doctrinal C 4 I principles. As in former chapters, it is the building block for the next chapter.
In familiarizing the reader, it discusses capabilities only; the threads of continuity that travel
from joint doctrine through Army doctrine into ATCCS are drawn in the final chapter. This
chapter gives the reader an introduction to the components and capabilities of the ATCCS.
This chapter also discusses the hardware and communications hub that supports the ATCCS,
and finally, takes the seven Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs) and shows the reader how
those BOSs are the basis for the five Battlefield Functional Area Control Systems (BFACS)
of the ATCCS.

A. THE COMPONENTS OF ATCCS

The Army Tactical Command and Control System is the Army’s primary tactical C 2
system at echelons Corps and below. The functional design of the ATCCS is an overarching
command and control system (ATCCS in itself) comprised of subordinate functional control
systems (the BFACS). Recall that the Army considers the seven BOSs essential to
sustaining combat power. From these seven BOSs are derived the five BFACS that
comprise the ATCCS. The Intelligence BOS is controlled by the All Source Analysis
System (ASAS), the Maneuver BOS is controlled by the Maneuver Control System (MCS),

the Fire Support BOS is controlled by the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
(AFATDS), the Air Defense BOS is controlled by the Forward Area Air Defense Command,
Control and Intelligence System (FAAD C 2 I), and the Logistics BOS is controlled by the
Combat Service Support Command and Control System (CSSCS). This accounts for five
of the BOSs. The other two BOSs, Mobility and Survivability, and Battle Command are not
forgotten; they are integrated into the other five. Since Mobility and Survivability enhances
maneuver, that is where it is controlled; in the Maneuver Control System. As the
overarching BOS, Battle Command, is the function that integrates and synchronizes the other
six. The ATCCS integrates and synchronizes the other BFACS. It represents the Battle
Command combat function. Table 2 depicts the functional relationship between the seven
BOSs and their five controlling BFACS.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMBAT FUNCTIONS AND THE
BATTLEFIELD FUNCTIONAL AREA CONTROL SYSTEMS:

The Seven Combat
Functions ->

Are Controlled by These
Battlefield Functional
Area Control Systems ->

Which Make-up The
Overarching Command
And Control System.

Intelligence

All Source Analysis System

Maneuver

Maneuver Control System

Mobility and Survivability

Fire Support

Advanced Field Artillery
Tactical Data System

The Army Tactical Command
and Control System

Air Defense

Forward Area Air Defense
Command, Control and
Intelligence System

Logistics

Combat Service Support
Command and Control System

Battle Command

Table 2. Relationship Between the Seven BOSs and Their Respective BFACS.

Truly a system of systems, the entire ATCCS is supported by a Common Hardware
and Software (CHS) concept and can be separated into the five BFACS connected by a
Communications Hub. The Communications Hub is further composed of three smaller
communication systems to be discussed later in this chapter. The ATCCS provides the C 2
framework for decision making horizontally between BFACS at each echelon, and vertically
from battalion to corps level. Figure 10 depicts this ATCCS framework.

B. COMMON HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE

The Common Hardware and Software Concept (CHS) is designed to “... minimize
the proliferation of unique tactical computer systems.” [Ref. 11] It is based on common
Commercial of the Shelf (COTS) computers and peripherals. The Army intends to lower

Figure 10. The Army Tactical Command and Control System. After Ref. [12].

MCS

CSSCS FAAD C 2 I

life-cycle costs by standardized automation, protocols, and reusable software [Ref. 12].
Other goals include accelerated development, accelerated testing and fielding, and
streamlined user training requirements [Ref. 11]. The common hardware ranges from
portable to high end workstations that are ruggedized for use in wheeled and tracked
vehicles, shelters and tents. The common software includes UNIX and POSIX operating
systems, relational database management systems, and graphics support software. Table 3
summarizes the four processing units in the CHS concept; they are the hand-held (HTU),
portable (PCU), transportable (TCU), and lightweight (LCU) computer units.

CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMON HARDWARE IN CHS

'^^^Jslomenclature

HTU

PCU

TCU

’JCU

LCU

HCU2

TCU2

HTU2

Capabilities^

RISC

Processor Number

80286

68020

68040

RISC

80486

RISC

80486

Clock Speed in

Megahertz

Data Rates in

124

129.4

112.5

Megabits Per Second

RAM in Megabytes

2-6

4-20

8-128

80-400

8-32

32-512

16-256

4-32

8-32

8-128

Table 3. Characteristics of Hardware in the CHS Concept. After Ref. [12].

C. THE COMMUNICATIONS HUB

The communications hub that provides connectivity for the ATCCS is comprised of
three systems. Referring again to Figure 10, the Communications Hub provides the
connectivity between BFACS at each level as well as between levels. Figure 1 1 depicts the
three systems that make up the Communications Hub and provide connectivity at any of the

MCS

CSSCS FAAD C 2 !

Figure 11. The Communications Hub of the ATCCS.

four levels and between levels. The three systems are the Army Data Distribution System
(ADDS), the Combat Net Radios (CNR), and the Area Common User System (ACUS).
Each of these systems is also comprised of systems.

1. The Army Data Distribution System (ADDS)

The ADDS is several systems that provide data communications, position location
reporting, navigation and identification for units using ATCCS. The systems are the
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS), and the Joint Tactical Information
Distribution System (JTIDS).

a. EPLRS

EPLRS reduces contention for valuable combat net radio bandwidth;

approximately fifty percent of radio traffic consists of position location messages and
requests [Ref. 14]. The system uses manpacked, vehicle-mounted, and aircraft-mounted
transceivers (called EPLRS User Units EPUU) to report location, friendly identification, and
data communications to a Net Control Station (NCS). A typical system at Brigade Level
consists ofoneNCS and 250 EPUUs. [Ref. 14] EPLRS gives primary support to AFATDS,
ASAS, and MCS [Ref. 15]. EPLRS also interfaces with the Global Positioning System
(GPS), and JTIDS.

b. JTIDS

JTIDS is a high capacity system providing integrated communications,
navigation information, and identification of friend or foe capabilities to aircraft, surface
ships, and mobile ground units. The system employs Electronic Counter-Countermeasures
(ECCM) by using frequency hopping techniques. JTIDS, also known as Link 16, provides
its users with formatted and unformatted message capability, and as an airborne relay, can
provide over-the-horizon communications. [Ref. 16] The Army uses JTIDS for air defense
artillery to pass tracking information from sensors to command processing centers [Ref.
14]. JTIDS provides the bulk of interoperability capability for ATCCS in the form of three
classes of terminals. Table 4 summarizes the three classes of JTIDS terminals.

2. The Combat Net Radios (CNR)

The Single Channel Ground/ Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) is a VHF-FM
radio providing primarily voice communications for Army units down to team level.
Although not part of the ADDS, SINCGARS also provides low rate data connectivity for the
ATCCS. The radio can be operated in three modes for tactical use: an ECCM mode

CLASSES OF JTIDS TERMINALS

Class

Platform/Use

Class I

- For use on large aircraft such as Advanced Warning And
Control System (AWACS) aircraft, surface ships, and as
gateway facilities for ground-based networks.

Class II

- For use on fighter aircraft and small ships.

Class 111

- For use in mobile ground units and UAVs.

Table 4. Classes of JTIDS Terminals. After Ref. [14].

employing frequency hopping, a single channel mode for use with radios that don’t employ
frequency hopping, and as an airborne relay in the ECCM or non-ECCM mode [Ref. 1 6].
Additionally, SINCGARS can be configured for manportable, vehicle, or aircraft use. [Ref.
14] SINCGARS interfaces with Mobile Subscriber Equipment, current FM radios, JTIDS,
and some NATO single channel radios.

3. The Area Common User System (ACUS)

Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) is a multipurpose system providing secure
voice, data, and fax communications for fixed and mobile subscribers [Ref. 15]. MSE is
most often compared to a commercial cellular phone system. The system uses a network of
nodes throughout the area of operations to provide connectivity between Mobile Subscriber
Radio Terminals (MSRT), Digital Nonsecure Voice Terminals (DNVT), and Nonsecure
Facsimile Terminals. MSE provides increased mobility because the communication system
is not part of a command post (that is inaccessible while on the move); calls are switched
through the network to MSRTs and DNVTs mounted in command and staff vehicles. [Ref.
14] MSE interfaces with commercial systems, SINCGARS, multichannel satellite systems,
and other NATO systems.

D. THE BATTLEFIELD FUNCTIONAL AREA CONTROL SYSTEMS

1. The AH Source Analysis System (ASAS)

ASAS is the BFACS controlling the Intelligence BOS. It is a ground-based
automated system designed to give intelligence and targeting support to commanders. ASAS
uses communications and fusion capabilities to put sensor and other intelligence data into
a single database to be simultaneously available to multiple users at separate workstations.
[Ref. 21] ASAS is also capable of extracting information from national level databases.
Table 5 summarizes some of ASAS’s capabilities.

2. The Maneuver Control System (MCS)

MCS is the BFACS controlling the Maneuver BOS. MCS uses CHS to display and
distribute critical tactical battlefield information for commanders. Display capabilities
provide commanders with decision support aids including current situation reports,
intelligence reports, enemy contact reports assessing enemy strength and movements, and
reports detailing status of friendly forces. These decision support aids can then be used to
produce and distribute critical tactical battlefield information such as courses of action,
Warning Orders (WARNORDS), Operations Orders (OPORDS), and priorities of work.
Additionally, MCS can request intelligence, supply status, air operations, and fire support
information from other BFACS. Another MCS capability includes decision graphics
commonly found in a maneuver Tactical Operations Center (TOC). These overlays include
the basic scheme of maneuver, enemy disposition, air defense plan, fire support plan,
intel/electronic warfare plan, signal support plan, engineer obstacle plan, NBC, and CSS.
Included in the overlays are unit resource information (combat potential) that allow

ASAS FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES

Function

Capabilities

Database

- Automatic correlation of intelligence information to
create an all source database.

- Event alarms based on certain database updates that
triggers auto-retrieval of information for other
applications.

- Timer-base queries.

Situation Display

- Friendly/enemy databases.

- Interactive tools to support threat integration, collection
management, battle damage assessment, and force
protection.

Situation/Event Planning

- Auto-notification of threat and high interest events.

- Displays areas of interest, trafficability areas, avenues of
approach, and mobility corridors.

Target Planning

- Creates and maintains target databases.

- Alarms for high priority high value targets.

Message Dissemination

- Automatic message parsing and routing.

- Automatic message generation and release.

- Interactive message generation, edit, and review.

Table 5. All Source Analysis Capabilities. After Ref. [22].

commanders and staff to develop courses of action, WARNORDs, OPORDS, and
appropriate annexes for distribution. As part of the ATCCS, MCS uses the Communications
Hub to provide commanders at all levels with a common operational picture of the battlefield
that facilitates synchronization. [Ref. 18]

3. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)
AFATDS is the BFACS controlling the Fire Support BOS. AFATDS uses CHS to
coordinate and process fire missions in support of the commander’s scheme of maneuver.
In doing so, AFATDS optimizes use of all fire support assets such as mortars, field artillery,
cannon, missile, attack helicopter, close air support, naval gunfire, and offensive electronic
warfare. AFATDS software attempts to satisfy a fire mission by identifying the most

effective weapon system available at the lowest echelon to defeat a target. It also takes into
account information received from MCS on target priorities and commander’s guidance.
Display capabilities include graphical representation of fire support assets and combat
potential. [Ref. 19] AFATDS also manages and displays five critical field artillery
functional areas: fire support planning, fire support execution, field artillery movement
control, field artillery mission support, and field artillery fire direction operations. Table 6
summarizes the capabilities under each field artillery functional area.

As does MCS, AFATDS uses the Communications Hub as the data transport means
to provide commanders at all levels with a common picture of fire support assets and
capabilities. [Ref. 20]

4. The Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control and Intelligence
System (FAAD C 2 I)

FAAD C 2 I is the BFACS controlling the Air Defense BOS. It is the C 2 system that
integrates airspace with the battlefield. It is also a system of systems in that it integrates
capabilities from sensors, weapons, and C 2 systems to warn and protect ground forces from
low-altitiude air attack. The FAAD C 2 I information flow from sensor to shooter occurs as
follows: FAAD C 2 I uses JTIDS to receive long-range enemy air information from AW ACS
aircraft and passes it to the Division TOC and FAAD Battalion. That information (along
with AWACS C 2 information) is passed via SINCGARS to C 2 nodes where it is combined
with local air track information. This combined air picture is further disseminated (again via
SINCGARS) throughout the FAAD Battalion and down to individual FAAD weapon
systems for engagement. This process occurs near-real time as a result of the

FIELD ARTILLERY FUNCTIONAL AREAS

Functional Area

Functions/Capabilities

Fire Support Planning

- Develop fire support planning guidance.

- Develop fire support plans.

- Determine commander’s concept of operations.

- Develop and monitor FA logistic support plan.

- Determine target acquisition capabilities.

- Coordinate meteorological operations.

Fire Support Execution

- Process targets.

- Report FA status.

- Analyze FA attack systems.

- Analyze and perform Target Damage Assessment (TDA)

- Develop order to fire.

- Prepare ordtr to fire.

- Conduct FA sensor operations.

Movement Control

- Control fire support movement.

- Control FA movement.

- Prepare FA movement requests.

Field Artillery Fire Direction Ops

- Determine firing unit capabilities.

- Process fire missions.

- Report fire mission status.

Field Artillery Mission Support

- Control FA supplies.

- Control FA maintenance.

- Control FA personnel. ||

Table 6. The Field Artillery Functional Areas. After Ref. [20].

Communications Hub capabilities of ATCCS. [Ref. 22]

5. The Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS)

CSSCS is the BFACS controlling the Combat Service Support BOS. It consolidates
all admin and logistic related information from other Standard Army Management
Information Systems (STAMIS) to give commanders information such as ammunition levels,
fuel supplies, personnel (admin and finance) status, transportation and maintenance services,
and general supply levels. Recalling a point made in Chapter II about factors affecting trends
in technology; the CSSCS is a prime example of how the increased pace of combat

operations required development of a system to handle the enormous amount of information
required to plan operations. Manual systems cannot keep pace with rapidly changing events
on the battlefield. CSSCS provides commanders the capability to quickly access near real-
time information to determine their unit’s combat potential. Additional capabilities include
the ability to do trade-off analysis (based on resupply capability information) to develop
different courses of action. CSS commanders may also use the CSSCS to manage and plan
courses of action for their own units. [Ref. 23]

E. SUMMARY

This chapter familiarized the reader the Army Tactical Command and Control
System. It provided an introduction to the components and capabilities of the ATCCS by
discussing the hardware and communications hub that supports the ATCCS. Additionally
this chapter took the seven Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs) and showed the reader how
those BOSs are the basis for the five Battlefield Functional Area Control Systems (BFACS)
of the ATCCS. Finally, this chapter outlined the capabilities of the five BFACS of the Army
Tactical Command and Control System.

This chapter concludes the summary of critical information for the reader. It is the
last chapter that familiarizes the reader with C 4 I doctrine and ATCCS, and as such, finishes
the information base for the final chapter. Throughout other chapters, reference was made
to relationships between the doctrine at different levels, and how systems that implement that
doctrine will improve the way we fight, both joint, and as a single Service. The next and
final chapter turns that information base into a knowledge base by clearly identifying the
threads of continuity from joint doctrine through Army doctrine and into implementation in

the Army Tactical Command and Control System. It is the final step in accomplishing the
purpose of this thesis.

VI. THE THREADS OF CONTINUITY

The last chapter familiarized the reader with the Army Tactical Command and
Control System. It gave the reader an introduction to the components and capabilities of the
ATCCS. It was the last chapter that summarized critical information for the reader.
Throughout the chapters leading to this final chapter, reference is made to relationships
between the doctrine at different levels and how systems that implement that doctrine will
improve the way we fight. This final chapter takes the summarized information and clearly
identifies the threads of continuity from joint doctrine through Army doctrine and into
implementation in the Army Tactical Command and Control System. Some of the threads
are clearly identifiable in the text of joint and Army doctrine and others are more abstract
but, none the less, there. The author categorizes and identifies three types of threads:

• Common Threads in Tone. This section validates that the guiding C 4 I
documents discussed in this thesis are written in a tone commensurate with
the definition of doctrine.

• Common Threads in Objective. Recall from Chapter II that at the joint level,
the role and objectives of C 4 systems are supported by the Basic C 4
Principles. This section shows the reader how the fundamental objective of
C 4 systems outlined at the joint level is also supported by principles at the
next lower level: The Enterprise Strategy Principles.

Identifying threads of continuity is the final step in achieving the thesis purpose.

A. COMMON THREADS IN TONE

The first thread of continuity is seen in the way Joint Pub 6-0 and the Army

Enterprise Strategy are written: in the form of doctrine. This is to say that Joint Pub 6-0 and
The Army Enterprise Strategy are written with respect to the definition of what doctrine is,
and that like a chain of command, Army doctrine is supportive and falls under the authority
of joint doctrine. This is not to say that The Army Enterprise Strategy is accepted as
doctrine, just that it guides the actions of the Army C4I Community much like doctrine.

Recall from Chapter II that doctrine as defined by Joint Pub 1.02 is:

Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements

thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative

but requires judgement in application. [Ref. 1]

Similar definitions are cited for Army, Combined, Joint, and Multi-Service Doctrine leading
to three conclusions:

# The term “...fundamental principles... that guide their actions....” exists in
every definition. This is the essence of doctrine that makes it the cornerstone
for how the Services fight alone and together.

# Doctrine provides a common approach to operations for those it applies to
[Ref. 3].

# The last sentence, explicitly stating the balance between authority and
judgement, is stated or implied in all the definitions.

Both Joint Pub 6-0 and The Enterprise Strategy delineate the need for doctrine and
the three conclusions above can be drawn about the guidance found in each publication.

The clearest example of where both publications are “ ...fundamental principles... that
guide their actions....” is seen in the Basic C 4 System Principles in Joint Pub 6-0, and The
Enterprise Strategy Principles. In the case of Joint Pub 6-0, the Basic C 4 System Principles
are the fundamental guidance for how C 4 systems must operate to support joint operations.
Additionally, the principles serve to focus the actions of the Services when stating

requirements for the design, development, and procurement of C 4 systems. In the case of
The Army Enterprise Strategy, The Principles are the fundamental guidance to focus the
actions of the Army C 4 I community to ensure information dominance that will win the
battlefield information war. As with Joint Pub 6-0, The Army Enterprise Strategy is clear
in stating what to do, but not how to do it; both documents leave room for judgement in
application. A final point refers to the authoritative nature of Joint Pub 6-0 and The Army
Enterprise Strategy: both are endorsed by the ranking military officer at that level, the
Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff for Joint Pub 6-0 and the Army Chief of Staff for The
Army Enterprise Strategy. There is no room left for misunderstanding as to whether or not
these publications are to be followed.

B. COMMON THREADS IN OBJECTIVE

Recall from Chapter II that Joint Pub 6-0 states that the fundamental objective of C 4
systems is to get the critical and relevant information to the right place at the right time [Ref.
4]. This fundamental objective is supported by all but three of The Enterprise Strategy
Principles.

1. Focus On The Warfighter

This first Enterprise Strategy Principle identifies five challenges that carry the
common thread in objective:

• Challenge One: Provide a responsive requirements process that reflects
warfighter’s needs [Ref. 6].

• Challenge Two. Provide soldier friendly systems [Ref. 6].

• ' Challenge Three. Provide more deployable systems [Ref. 6].

• Challenge Four. Provide capable and reliable systems [Ref. 6],

• Challenge Five. Provide systems that function in both garrison and tactical
environments [Ref. 6].

These five challenges describe a hierarchical approach to providing one C 4 I system
(Challenge Five) that the warfighter needs (Challenge One), can easily use (Challenge Two),
can take anywhere (Challenge Three), and will work wherever they take it (Challenge Four).
Meeting these challenges will surely facilitate getting the critical and relevant information
to the right place at the right time.

2. Ensure Joint Interoperability

This second Enterprise Strategy Principle carries the common thread in objective by
identifying the need for systems that are not hindered by joint interoperability barriers.
Recall from Chapter II that interoperability is essential to mission success in joint and
combined operations. Joint doctrine does not expect the Army to fight alone and neither
does Army doctrine:

The Army does not fight alone. It integrates its efforts in unified
operations with its sister services, with other national agencies, and often
with allied and coalition forces. By doing so, the Army’s operational
capabilities are enhanced, victory comes quicker, and friendly casualties are
reduced. [Ref. 3]

For Services to fight together, they must be able to communicate and pass
information with no intermediate processing. A C 4 I system that is interoperable will surely
facilitate getting the critical and relevant information to the right place at the right time.

3. Digitize the Battlefield

Thfs third Enterprise Strategy Principle carries the common thread in objective by

identifying the need for a battlefield network that optimizes the transfer of information to
provide a Common Operational Picture (COP). The COP is a joint concept whereby
commanders, staff, and their soldiers, sailors, or marines have a “common picture” of the
battlefield at the same time on one terminal device. It could be viewed as the epitome of
presenting the right information at the right place at the right time.

4. Capitalize on Space Based Systems

This fourth Enterprise Strategy Principle carries the common thread in objective by
identifying the need to make use of space based assets. Providing communications to remote
areas, a power-projection Army conducting split-based operations, and the dependence on
commercial satellites to augment overloaded military satellites are all issues that require
getting the right information in a timely manner.

5. Modernize Power Projection Platforms

This fifth Enterprise Strategy Principle carries the common thread in objective by
identifying the need to modernize power projection platforms. The CONUS based
installations are the power projection platforms for today’s Army. Modernizing them
supports split-based operations. As with exploiting space based assets, our installations must
be as capable as the C 4 I systems that they support in the field. Anything less does not
facilitate timely transfer of the right information to soldiers in the field - it falls short at the
support base.

6. Implement Multi-Level Security

This sixth Enterprise Strategy Principle carries the common thread in objective by
identifying the need to implement multi-level security. An MLS system provides a single

system that can do many functions without degrading capability. It allows users at different
sensitivity (classification) levels to access one system at the same time and/or one user to
access different sensitivity levels at the same time on one system. In the absence of such a
system, a soldier may have to access information of different sensitivity levels on different
systems. The systems may even be physically or geographically separated; this is not
conducive to transfer of timely and critical information. Multi-level security is a clear
supportive principle of the fundamental objective of C 4 systems.

7. Ensure Spectrum Supremacy

This seventh Enterprise Strategy Principle carries the common thread in objective by
identifying the need to ensure spectrum supremacy. Advances in C 4 I technology allow the
Army to enhance warfighting capabilities, but the systems cannot operate without continuous
and uninterrupted use of the electromagnetic spectrum. This Enterprise Strategy Principle
calls for a single authority within a task force responsible for the spectrum, and active
participation in policy formulation. Additionally, information warfare and coordination will
increase the likelihood of success in this area. This principle supports the fundamental
objective of C 4 systems in that any degradation of the Services’ ability to use the spectrum
affects the timely transport of information. Table 7 summarizes the fundamental objective
of joint C 4 systems’ support to joint operations and its Enterprise Strategy Principles that
carry that common thread.

C. COMMON THREADS IN GUIDANCE

Recall from Chapter II that the Basic C 4 System Principles found in Joint Pub 6-0
support the fundamental objective of C 4 systems, also found in Joint Pub 6-0. This makes

SUMMARY OF COMMON THREADS IN OBJECTIVE

Fundamental Objective
of objective of C 4
systems as stated in Joint
Pub 6-0.

Enterprise Strategy Principles that carry the common
thread in objective.

The fundamental objective of
C 4 systems is to get the critical
and relevant information to the
right place at the right time
[Ref. 6],

Focus on the Warfighter

Ensure Joint Interoperability

Digitize the Battlefield

Capitalize on Space Based Systems

Modernize Power Projection Platforms

Implement Multi-Level Security

Ensure Spectrum Supremacy

' 'able 7. The Fundamental Objective of C 4 Systems and Supporting Enterprise Strategy

Principles.

sense because both the objective and principles exist as doctrine at the same level. This
section validates that those principles outlined at the joint level are carried through the Army
level, and that there is evidence of implementation of those principles in ATCCS. As in the
previous section, the author takes doctrine from the joint level (Basic C 4 System Principles
in this case) and identifies the supporting Enterprise Strategy Principles.

1. Interoperable

This first Basic C 4 System Principle is supported by the second Enterprise Strategy
Principle of Ensuring Joint Interoperability. Its implementation is in the Communications
Hub, and the Common Hardware and Software Concept (CHS) of ATCCS.

Joint Pub 6-0 says that joint and Service C 4 systems must possess the interoperability
necessary to ensure mission success jn joint and combined operations. It further states that
interoperability is the condition achieved among C 4 systems or items of C 4 equipment when

information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and their
users [Ref. 4], The Army Enterprise Strategy supports the joint principle by saying that in
order for Services to fight together, they must be able to communicate and pass information
with no intermediate processing. Furthermore, under the principle of interoperability at the
joint level are the concepts of commonality, compatibility and standardization. The
Enterprise Strategy Principle of Ensuring Joint Interoperability implies the importance of
commonality, compatibility and standardization, concepts that promote interoperability:

Interoperability encompasses doctrine, procedures, and training - as
well as systems and equipment ... Achieving interoperability will require
adherence to industry standards for engineering, communications protocols,
and data elements. Standards define a common environment in which new
systems can be introduced at reduced risk. [Ref. 6]

The implementation of the principle of interoperability and the supporting concepts
of commonality and standardization are seen in the Communications Hub, and Common
Hardware and Software Concept (CHS) of ATCCS. The Communications Hub uses
components of the Army Data Distribution System, Combat Net Radios, and Area Common
User System to pass information to the other Services. Those components, such as EPLRS,
JTIDS, MSE, and SINCGARS used singly and in combination, are the practical
implementation of interoperability. The CHS concept is the practical implementation of
commonality and standardization. Recall that for equipment to be common, personnel
trained on other (similar) equipment can operate and maintain it with no additional
specialized training. Commonality also means interchangeability of repair parts and
consumable items. [Ref. 4] This is clearly seen in the CHS concept where the five BFACS
all use the same hardware. Equipment is standardized when it includes aspects of

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