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Given By 
U. S. SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS 



THE UNITED STATES 
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 

n. 



Effects of Air Attack 

ON 

Urban Complex 
Tokyo-Kawasaki- Yokohama 



t *.i-«.V- 



Urban Areas Division 
June 1947 



U 



THE UNITED STATES 
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 



Effects of Air Attack 

ON 

Urban Complex 
Tokyo-Kawasaki- Yokohama 



Urban Areas Division 



June 1947 



PUBLIC 






U. K. Slt^RlfrrfNDENT OF 0OCUM£Nli 

JUL 19 t^ 



•.■fc*' 



This report was written primarily for the use of the U. S. Strategic Bombing 
Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. 
Any conchisions or opinions expressed in tliis report must be considered as 
limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation 
in the light of furtlier studies conducted by the Survey. 



FOREWORD 



Tlu' I'liiti'il Stall's Slnilc^ic IJonihiii;;- Sur\fv 
\v;is i\st;il)lislie(l h\ tlie Secretary of AVar on :'> 
XoveiuixM- I'.'44, i)urHiiant to a diivctivf froiii tlii' 
late I'lesidt'iit Roosevelt. Its mission was to con- 
(liu't an impartial and expert stiuly of the effects 
of our aerial attack on ( iermany, to he used in con- 
nection with air attacks on .Japan and to estaliUsli 
a hasis for e\ahiiitini>' I lie importance and poten- 
tialities of air power as an instrument of mihtary 
stratei>:y for iiianinnii' the future development of 
the Fnited States armed forces and for determin- 
iu<:' futui'e economic policies with respect to tlie 
national defense. A summary report and some 
200 supporting reports containin<i' the findinjis of 
the Survey in Germany have been published. 

On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested 
tliat the Survey conduct a similar study of the 
elfects of all types of air attack in the war against 
Japan. sul)mitting reports in duplicate to the Sec- 
retary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy. 
The officers of the Survey during its Japanese 
phase were : 

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. 

Paul H. Xitze, Henry C. Alexander. Vice 
Chairmen. 

Harry L. Bowman, 

J. Kenneth Galbraith, 

Eensis Likert, 

Frank A. McNamee, Jr., 

Fred Searls, Jr., 

Monroe E. Spaght, 

Dr. Lewis R. Thompson, 

Theodore P. Wright. Directors. 

Walter Wilds. Secretary. 
The Survey's complement provided for 300 
civilians, 350 officers, and 500 eidisted men. The 



inilifary segment of the org;inizat ion was drawn 
fi'om the Army to the extent of (JO percent, and 
from the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both 
the Army and the Xavy gave the Survey all possi- 
ble assistance in furnishing men, supplies, ti'ans- 
port, and information. The Survey operated from 
headcjuarters established in Tokyo early in Sep- 
tember 1945, with subheadquarters in Xagoya. 
Osaka. Hiroshima, and Naga.saki. and with mobile 
teams operating in other parts of Japan, the is- 
lands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland. 

It Avas possible to reconstruct much of wartime 
Japanese military planning and execution, en- 
gagement by engagement, and campaign by cam- 
paign, and to secure reasonably accurate statistics 
on Japan's economy and war production, plant by 
plant, and industry hy industry. In addition, 
studies were conducted on Ja])an"s over-all stra- 
tegic plans and the background of her entry into 
the war, the internal discussions and negotiations 
leading to her acceptance of imconditional sur- 
render, the course of health and morale among the 
civilian population, the eft'ectiveness of the Jap- 
anese civilian defense organization, and the eifeets 
of atomic bombs. Separate reports will be issued 
covering each phase of the study. 

The Survey interrogated more than 7(1(1 Japa- 
nese military, government, and in(bistrial officials. 
It also recovered and translated many documents 
which not oidy have been useful to the Survey, 
but also will furnish data valuable for other 
studies. Arrangements have been made to turn 
over the Survey's files to the Central Intelligence 
Group, through which they will be available for 
further examination and distribution. 



lil 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Page 

Summary and Conclusions 1 

The Target Area 3 

Air AttacliS *j 

Eponomie Effects of Air Attaclis ^ 

Industrial Production 18 

Effects of Romtiing on Industrial Tokyo liS 

Table 1. Population and Density 3 

2. Number and Type of Huil<linKS 4 

3. Extent and Distribution of Huilt-up Areas 4 

4. Monthly Tonnage of Ronibs Dropped in Area Raids 6 

5. Monthly Tonnage of Bombs Dropped in Precision Attacks 6 

6. Physical Damage Caused by Air Raids 7 

7. Weight and Results of Major Area Raids 7 

8. Air Raid Casualties "S 

9. Comparative Effects of Bombing 8 

10. Monthly Pre-Raid Average of Water-Borne Commodities 10 

11. Monthly Average of Truck-Borne Commodities 11 

12. Coal Consumption 12 

13. Coke Consumption 13 

14. Charcoal Consumption 13 

15. Electric Power Consumption 14 

16. Gas Consumption 15 

17. Industrial Labor Force 16 

18. Labor Efficiency 16 

19. Decline in Iudu.strial Factors 17 

20. Decline in Industrial Factors During Raids 21 

21. Comparison of Declines in Industrial Groups 21 

22. Decline in Industrial Ratios 22 

23. Decline in Production Factors — Damaged and Undamaged Plants 22 

24. Number of Plants and Workers Prior to Raids 26 

25. Decrease in Number of Plants and Workers During Raids 27 

26. Decline in Workers During Raid Period 27 

27. Decline in Production Factors, by Industry 29 

28. Comparative Decline in Production Factors, by Industry 29 

29. Decline in Production Ratios, by Industry 29 

30. Decline in Production Factors, by Labor Group 30 

31. Comparative Decline in Production Factors, by Labor Group 30 

32. Decline in Production Ratios, by Labor Group 31 

33. Workshops Destroyed in Air Attacks 32 

34. Decline in Production Factors, by Damaged and Undamaged Plants 32 

35. Comparative Decline in Production Ratios, Damaged and Undamaged Plants 

(ilonthly Figures Covering Period Octolier 1943 to August 1945) 32 

Graph 1. Shipping — Gross Registered Tonnage, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 34 

2. Shipping — Total In and Out, Tokyo- Yokohama-Kawasaki 34 

3. Average Daily Carloadings, Tokyo Division, Japanese Government Railway 3,5 

4. Trucking — Total In and Out, Tokyo- Y'okohama-Kawasaki 3,5 

5. Coal Consumption, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 36 

6. Coke Consumption, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 3g 

7. Charcoal Consumption, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 37 

8. Electric Power Consumption, Tokyo- Yokohama-Kawasaki 37 

9. Gas Consumption, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 38 

10. Industrial Labor and Productive Hours, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 38 

11. Production, Tokyo- Y'okohama-Kawa.saki 39 

12. Total Plant Sample, Tokyo-Yokoiiama-Kawasaki 39 

13. Total Hit Plants, Tokyo-Yokobama-Kawasakl 40 

14. Total Unhit Plants, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawa.saki 40 

14-A. Production, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 41 

14-B. Electric Power Consumption, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 42 



Page 

14-C. Labor Fonf. Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki '^^ 

15. Aircraft, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki '*'* 

16. Ordnance. Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 44 

IT. Shiphuildinpr and Repair, Tokyo-Yokoliania-Kawasaki 45 

18. Motor Vehicles, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawa.saki 45 

19. Electrical Products, Tokyo-Yokohania-Kawa.saki 46 

20. JIachinery and Tools, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 46 

21. lletal Products, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 47 

22. Basic Metals, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 47 

23. Chemicals, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 48 

24. Petroleum, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 4S 

25. Miscellaneous Industries, Tokyo-Yokoharaa-Kawasakl 49 

26. Public Utilities. Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 

27. Total Plant Sample, Tokyo 

28. Aircraft, Tokyo 

29. Ordnance, Tok.vo ^'^ 

30. Shipbuilding, Tok.vo 51 

31. Motor Vehicle.s, To.vko I- 52 

32. Electric Equipment, Tokyo '. 

33. Machine and Tools, Tok.vo 

34. Met.il Products, Tok.vo 53 

35. Tokyo Basic Metals Production 54 

36. Tok.vo Chemicals 54 

37. Tokyo Miscellaneous 55 

38. Tok.vo Hit Plants 55 

39. Tokyo Uuhit Plants 56 

(Bomb Damage Plots) 

Map A. City of Tokyo Facing Page 56 

B. Kawasaki, .Japan, Bomb and Fire Damage o" 

C. City of Yokohama ■!: Facing Page 58 

I - ■ ' ' 



49 
50 
50 



o2 
53 



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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 



Tlic Area I'rior to Ah- Attacks. J5y tlie time the 
air attack was seriously undertalveii afiainst tiie 
Japanese home islands, in November ly-t-t, Japan 
had been condnctin<>- military campaigns in China 
for seven years, and the I'acitic [ihase of Woi'ld 
War II had been inider way for tlirec years. 'Tiie 
far-tiung' activities of its ai'niy and navy had 
drained tiie resources of the nation, the tigiitening 
Allied blockade and the sulnnarine menace iiad 
reduced its sea-borne traffic, and its inept policy 
in allocating men and materials at home had 
placed a further strain on the already disintegrat- 
ing economy. The great port city of Yokohama, 
which had long handled a quarter of Japan's 
foreign trade and ranked second in importance 
among the shipping centers of the Empire, was 
almost at a standstill, and its shipyards were given 
over to the repair of the few ships that coidd still 
put into its harl)oi'. The enormous industrial con- 
centration of Kawasaki was rapidly consuming its 
diminishing supply of I'aw materials in a iinal 
sjiurt of forced production; and the vast assembly 
plants of Tokyo were suli'ering a critical lack of 
component j^arts, which could no longer be turned 
out in sufficient quantities to meet the demands of 
the war machine. Although electric power was 
still abundant, the supply of coal had long been 
critically short, and consumption of its by-prod- 
ucts, coke and gas, was drastically curtailed. 
While a sufficient number of w^orkers was at all 
times available to industry, the efficiency of the 
labor force had been greatly reduced because of 
the administration's inability to achieve an equit- 
ale distribution of manpower between military 
and civilian requirements; and the conscription 
of skilled workers for the armed forces had left 
a void that could not be adequately filled with un- 
trained laborers, women and minors. Thus, de- 
spite the fact that industry by consuming its 
dwindling inventories, had attained a ])eak ])ro- 
duction during the last months of 1D44, the decline 
had already set in before the first devastating in- 
cendiary raid, in March 1945, laid waste to almost 
16 stjuare miles of the most densely jiopnlated 
areas of Tokyo. 

The P.sysiral Ejfcctn of Air Attark.s. Apart 
from a few sorties against aircraft plants on the 
outskirts of Tokyo between November 1944 and 
Febriuiry 1945, which served chiefly to accelerate 
the dispersal progi'am in that imlnstiT, and seve- 



lal intensive piecision allacks on the oil refinei-ies 
of Kakasaki in July and August 1945, which came 
too late in the war in iidlnence the over-all decline 
in the comi)lex, the entire bombing program was 
carried out during three consecutive months in the 
spring of 1945. Foi- all strategic purposes, the air 
attack in this area of Jajjan was over by the end 
of May. ]n this short period, over 1S,()()() tons of 
bond)s were dropped on the three cities, out of a 
total of almost i!;5,()()() tons delivered to the com- 
plex. J^racticiilly all of the physical damage and 
most of the casualties occui-red during the seven 
area raids in these three months. Altogether, 
over 70 of the 142 square miles of bult-up ai'ea 
were complclely devastated, and almost 863,000 
out of a total of 1,454,0()() liuildings were de- 
stroyed. Some 4.6 million of the H million inhabi- 
tants were evacuated, more than 3.4 million hav- 
ing lost their homes. The total number of killed 
amounted to nearly 1()(),000, and an equal number 
was injured. The physical effectiveness of the 
area raids is demonstrated by the fact that an 
average of 300 tons of bombs were dispatched 
from the Marianas to devastate 0.45 square mile, 
destroy 54 buildings and produce 6 casualties. 

The Economical Effects of Ah- Attacks. If the 
mass incendiary raids against Japanese cities were 
intended to disrupt the economic life of the com- 
numities, destroy their industrial potential, and 
tliereby weaken the will and the ability of the 
people to support the military operations of its 
leaders, these attacks may be said to have been 
highly successful. The industrial sample of the 
complex showed a loss in Yen production of 66 
]iercent, the Tokyo sample 65 percent. These 
samples, however, contained only those plants 
employing over 100 workers, which in Tokyo ac- 
counted for about 50 pei'cent of the total city prod- 
uct. Here it was found that production in plants 
employing under 100 workers, representing the 
remaining 50 percent of the total product, de- 
creased ai)proximately 75 jiercent. Thei-efore, if 
one-half of Tokyo's production declined 65 per- 
cent and the other half 75 percent, the total decline 
amounted to 70 percent, which closely approxi- 
mated (he di'op of 74 percent shown by the over- 
all data for the complex in Table 19. The loss due 
to bomb damage in the larger plant category in 
Tokyo was found to be 32 percent out of a total 
decline of 65 percent : and almost all of the decline 



in the smaller category was due to the same cause. 
Thus, if a 32 percent loss in one-half of the city's 
production and (conservatively) a 68 percent loss 
in the other lialf were due to bomb dama<;e, the 
total loss from this cause was 50 percent out of a 
total decline of 70 percent. "While Tokyo con- 
tained an unsually high proportion of small 
plants, as compared with the complex as a whole 
(whose sample of larger plants was found to have 
lost only 1!* percent out of 66 i)ercent as a result 
of bomb damage), it must be emphasized that the 
sample did not contain those plants which were 
completely destroyed, and whose inclusion would 
have increased the percentage of loss due to 
destruction. Therefore, it may be concluded that 
approximately half of the drop in production for 
the entire complex was the result of direct bomb 
damage to plants. 

Conclusion. The Survey has estimated else- 
where that, even had there been no air attacks on 
the home islands of Japan, increasing shortages 
of raw materials would have depressed industrial 
activity by August 1945 to around 60 percent of 
its pre-raid level. However, as the Yen value of 
production in the Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama 
complex had declined at least 70 percent, the dif- 
ference between the Survey's estimate and the 
actu_al tlrop must reflect disturbances other than 
the shortages mentioned above. In view of the 
fact that the decline in production had already 
set in well before March 1045, it is quite possible 
that bomb damage merely had the effect of de- 
stroying surplus productive capacity, which in no 
wav atfected the rate of decline thereafter. If 



this is true, it is ecjually valid to state that the 
shrinking stocks of raw materials also proved to 
be partially surplus during the same period, as 
the actual drop in production was eventually 
greater than the estimated loss due to shortages 
of sucli materials. Bomb damage alone, as we 
have seen, accounted for a loss equal to that which 
might have been induced by shortages, and both 
were exceeded by the actual decline. It may be 
said, then, that even had there been no direct bomb 
damage to plant and equipment and no shortage 
of raw materials, tlie ultimate decline would not 
have been radically changed. The same, however, 
cannot be said of the indirect effects of air attacks, 
for the destruction of homes, the injury or death 
of relatives and friends, the disruption of local 
transportation and other public services, all had 
produced a critical rise in absenteeism at the 
plants and lowered the efficiency of the remaining 
workers. Just how much of this undermining of 
j)ublic morale was the result of air attacks, and 
liow nuich can be attributed to undernourishment, 
illness and fatigue, could not be determined pre- 
cisely from the statistics collected; but it is evi- 
dent from the individual reports of manufac- 
turers that the incendiary raids on the complex 
played a decisive role. This fact, coupled with 
that of bomb damage to industrial plants, war- 
rants the conclusion that, in the final analysis, the 
decline in production in most industries in this 
area after December 1944 was due primarily to 
the effects, both direct and indirect, of air attacks, 
and only secondarily to shortages of raw mate- 
rials, fuel and, to some extent, skilled workers. 



THE TARGET AREA 



Tlw h'liiito I'hdn. One of the iiio.st liif;lily in- 
dustrialized and densely populated areas in the 
world lies in the lowlands of the Kanio I'hiin, on 
the eastern coast of tiie main Japane.se island of 
Honshu. This plain, at the vertex of the angle 
formed by the island, covers an area of approxi- 
mately 2,500 square miles, or 5 percent of the total 
area of the homeland, and contains almost 20 per- 
cent of Japan's population. Twenty-eight of the 
country's 182 chartered cities lie within this dis- 
trict, approximately 85 percent of the 12,000,000 
inhabitants living within urban communities. 
Although some minerals are mined in the plain 
(particularly copper, at Hidachi in East Kanto), 
fabrication of tini.shed products represents its 
main contribution to the country's economy. Most 
of the raw materials and semi-fini-shed products 
converted in its factories are shipped in from 
abroad and from other sections of the Empire. 
Large ciuantities of rice are grown in the alluvial 
lowlands and some wheat and barley in the more 
arid uplands of the plain; but tlie valley is one 
of the least fertile of the country. Of the 13 per- 
cent of national food products contributed by the 
Kanto district in 1940, all but 1 percent was rep- 
resented by the fish catch. In the same year, 25 
percent of all Japanese industrial workers were 
employed in this area, a percentage which prob- 
ably corresponds closely to that of its industrial 
production. 

The TJrban Complex. The industrial heart of 
the Kanto Plain is the urban complex of Tokyo. 
Kawasaki, and Yokohama, which forms a con- 
tinuous built-up area extending 25 miles along the 
western shore of Tokyo Bay, on a jiarallel ap- 
proximating that of Los Angeles, California, and 
Raleigh, N. C. (35° N). The three cities com- 
bined cover 429 square miles, with a normal popu- 
lation of 8 million, or 11 percent of the national 
total. Prior to the destruction caused by air at- 
tacks, over .30 percent of the above area was thickly 
settled, particularly along the water fronts. The 
congested wards of Tokyo, north and east of the 
Imperial Palace, contained numerous small and 
medium-sized workshops, while the larger indus- 
trial installations were situated on the outskirts 
of the city, and south along the bay into the harbor 
di.strict of Kawasaki. The principal trading cen- 



ters were east and soutli of the Palace, and occu- 
pied practically the whole of Yokohama. Ship- 
ping activities were conducted along the entire 
length of the bay shore, with the chief port facil- 
ities in Yokohama. 

Population. In tlie twenty years between 1920 
and 1940, the number of inhabitants in the three 
cities had doubled; and by the beginning of 1944, 
the complex was supporting 18,800 persons to the 
sfjuare mile, the more congested wards averaging 
80,000 per square mile. The most densely popu- 
lated area in the complex, Asakusa ward north- 
east of the Imperial Palace, had a density of 130,- 
000. Table 1 shows the population of each city for 
four census years, together with the density based 
on the 1940 censvis : 

Table 1. — I'opiilaiioii mid dr».si7;/ 



Year 


Tokyo 


Kawasaki 


Yokohama | Total 


1920 

1930 

1940 

1944 (February) 

Area (square 

mile) 

Density (per 

square inile)_. 


3,358,597 
4,986,913 

6,778,804 
6,577,620 

223 

30,398 

1 


85,133 

148,447 
300,777 
380,919 

50 

6,016 


.579,310 

704,236 

968,091 

1,034,740 

1.56 

6,206 


4,023,040 
5,839,596 
8,047,672 
7,993,279 

429 

18,759 



Source: National Census. 

Note. — The population drop in the Tokyo figures for 1944 was due 
to planned evacuations prior to the pei iod of air attacks on the capital. 

Hoimng. After the disa.strous earthquake of 
1923. many modern fireproof buildings were con- 
structed in the devastated areas of Tokvo. Kawa- 
saki, and Yokohama, principally in the heavily 
damaged commercial sections of the cities. The 
remainder of the area, however, continued to house 
the majority of the population in the inflammable 
wooden structures prevalent throughout Japan. 
In early 1944, there were approximately seven 
pensons per unit in the 1,135,800 residential build- 
ings. Though dwellings represented 75 percent 
of all buildings, many so-called residences were 
used partially for small stores and workshops, 
while portions of many larger buildings, counted 
as industrial plants or commercial houses, were 
utilized as residences by the owners. Thus, the 
figures in Table 2 can be accepted only as approxi- 
mate for the number and function of buildings 
existing at the time of the February 1944 census: 



Table 2.-^Xiinilii r (uul tiiiir of hnildiiif/s 



City 


Residential 


Industrial 


Other 


Total 


Tokyo 

Kawasaki 

Yokohama 


875.2(X) 

60.50(1 

200,100 


48,300 
1,600 
2.3(HI 


237,500 

6.S00 
21,500 


1,161,000 

68,9011 

223,»(Hi 


Total 


1,135,800 


52,200 


265,800 


1,4.53.80(1 



Source; National Census. 1944. 

Note. — The figures for "Industrial" and "Other" categories in 
Kawasaki were estimated from the proportion of buildings in the 
other two cities, and from a comparison of building areas and number 
of industrial workers, 
planned evacuations prior tothe period of air attacks on the capital. 

La/i(i-nse Zonvs. The built-ui) s^ections of the 
three citie.s constituted 33 percent of the ai'ea 
of the urban coinple.x. and represented 35 percent 
of the total built-up area of the 66 Japanese cities 
subjected to area attacks. Table 3 shows the ex- 
tent of built-up areas in the three cities, together 
with the areas actually covered by various types 
of buildings: 

Table 3. — E.rteiit and distiibulion of hiiill-iip (iird.i 
(square miles) 



Area 


Tokyo 


Kawa- 
saki 


Yoko- 
hama 


Total 


Total urban area 

Total liuilt-up area 

Percent of Imilt-up area 

l!uil(ling: areas: 

Residential 

Industrial 

Other 


223.0 

111.0 

50 

20.3 

.5.8 
14.8 

46.9 

42 


50.0 
11.0 
22 

1.1 
.4 

.7 

2.2 
20 


156.0 
20.0 
13.0 

3.8 

.7 

2.4 

6.9 

35 


429.0 

142.0 

33 

31.2 

6.9 

17.9 


Total Imlldingarea 

Peivent of liuiUling area to 
built-ui) area 


56.0 
39 







Source: AAF Photo Interpretation: Japane.se municipal statistics. 

Importance of Urhaii Co/)i/>Jex. The metropol- 
itan area covered by Tokyo. Kawasaki, and Yoko- 
hama is one of the largest and most important in 
the world. Tokyo, the capital and largest city in 
the Japanese Emi)ire. was surpassed in popula- 
tion only by New York and London. As the home 
of the Emperor, it was at once the center of Japa- 
nese culture and the source of all civil and military 
authority: but more significant still, it was the 
commercial and industrial heart of the Empire. 
Kawasaki, the ninth city of Japan, contained the 
gi-eatest single concentration of industrial plants 
in the country, nearly all of them producing the 
materials of war; and because of its position he- 
tween Tokyo and Yokohama, it was an essential 
link in the transportation system of the nation. 
Yokohama, the fifth city and second port of 
Japan, was of primary imixn-tniife in Japanese 



foreign trade and as a j^ort of entry for the entire 
Kanto Plain. Though chiefly a trading centei", 
it was also of vital importance in the production 
of war gooils. 

Lntid Tnnixporfation. The urban complex con- 
tained the most complete network of railroads in 
Ja])an. with Hve main government lines leading to 
all parts of the main island of Honshu, two of 
them passing through all three cities. Although 
Yokohama contained I'ailway repair shops of 
some importaiu-e. and a few minor shops were lo- 
cated in Tokyo, the most extensive and comi)lete 
repair facilities were to be found at Omiyo, 17 
miles north of the capital. The large marshalling 
yards in the area handled a considerable portion 
of goods for transhipment to and from all parts 
of the Emipre. Closely tied in with the rail trans- 
portation system were the five main highways of 
Japan, all of which radiated from Tokyo. The 
Tokaido Road, which traversed three-quarters of 
the length of Honshu, passed through all three 
cities of the complex, and was of extreme import- 
ance in the transi:)ortatioii of both civilian and 
war goods. 

><hipping. The importance of the urban com- 
plex as a center of land transportation was ex- 
ceeded by that of its shipping. Prior to the war, 
Yokohama alone handled about '25 percent of all 
Japanese foreign trade, and most of the water- 
borne goods to and from Tokyo were funnelled 
through this port. Its 25 mooring buoys could 
accommodate 16 ocean-going vessels of average 
size, and its passenger wharves could handle ships 
up to 5l).000 tons. Yokohama contained the fourth 
largest .shipbuilding yard in Japan, with extensive 
repair facilities. There were excellent docking 
facilities also at Kawasaki, though they were not 
so extensive as those in the other two cities. Tokyo 
had no natural deep water harbor, but dredging 
permitted the entry of ships up to 10,000 tons. 
Some SO vessels up to 6,000 tons could be accom- 
modated at one time, and the 3 large wharves 
handled a large part of the city's own shipping. 
Tok-yo and Yokohama together had almost SO 
miles of navigable rivers and canals, which could 
take barges and lighters up to 20 tons ; and these 
inland waterways played an essential part in local 
transportation both before and during the war. 

PiiUic rtiUties. During the year 1943, Tokyo, 
Kawasaki, and Yokohama accounted for 11 per- 
cent of the 29 billion kilowatt-hours of industrial 



I'lec'tric power consuiiii'il in J;i|);iii, 7(1 |)t'r ci'iit of 
the local power being consumed in Tokyo. More 
than 80 pei-ccnt of this electi-icity was supplied 
from hydroeh'ctric ])iants in the liifildanils, the 
remainder beinji; furnished by coal -powered sta- 
tions throufi'liout the urban iireas. Steam ])ower, 
wliich was used to some extent locally, was supplied 
1)V Kawasaki with this city alone accountiiifj for 
more than ^5 i)ercent of all steam power produced 
in Japan. Duriiifr the same year, the three cities 
consumed oxer 4()7 million cubic meters of gas, 
produced mainly by the large works in Yokohama 
and Kawasaki. The water supply, like the gas 
and electric systems, was an integrated network 
throughout the (■oiii|)le.\, Kawasaki lieing the 
jirime producer. 

I ml list rial Ini fxirfdiice. It is estimated that 
during the war yea is Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Yoko- 
hama together accounted for about 20 jiercent of 
the total industrial output of .Japan. The numer- 
ous home workshops existing throughout the area 
prior to I'.l-fO had been greatly reduced and their 
owners and workers transferred to larger jilants 
where their labor could be utilized more efficiently. 
In Tokyo alone, the total number of industrial 
])lants of all sizes had decreased from 91,S70 in 
lO-fO to 41,548 in October 1944, while the number 
of workers had increased from 7'28,09ii to 1,101,- 
507 over the same period. At the time of the 
national census of February 1944, the three cities 
employed 1,542,7.35 workers, or 16 percent of the 



industrial lalioi- I'on-e of llic nation. I^css than a 
(|uarter of a million were engaged in tiade al the 
same time. The principal ))i'oducts turned out of 
its factories and relineries weie aircraft and air- 
ci'aft engines, niacliinery and tools, iron and steel, 
munitions, chemicals, textiles, and oil. Tokyo 
was responsible for the greatei' |)oi'l!on of most of 
these proilncis, though Kawasaki possessed tlu^ 
important oil refineries and a large share of the 
chemical i)lants. Yokohama's chief importance 
lay in its shipyards, although its industi-ial out- 
put was considerable. 

Strateciic I in jKirtdhcc. The meti'opolitan area 
of Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Yokohama, with the 
largest city, the second lai'gest port, the highest 
trade volume, and the greatest concentration of 
industrial plants in the country, was of the utmost 
strategic importance to Japan's wartime economy. 
As the seat of all authority, l)oth civil and mili- 
tary, it was the administrative as well as the eco- 
nomic heart of the Japanese Empire. Its network 
of land and sea transportation, which carried the 
materials of war from its vital factories, added 
further to its prime significance in the Japanese 
economy. Any disturbance of its efficient opera- 
tion was, therefore, bound to affect to a great de- 
gree the essential activities of the nation as a 
whole; and it was inevitable that this urban com- 
plex should l)ecome the first and main target in 
the air war against Japan. 



AIR ATTACKS 



Target Location. In the iiiituniii of 1!.)44. wlien 
air attacks were initiated aijainst the Japanese 
lionie ishmds the first raids were launched from 
(luani. 1,500 miles away. Before I wo .lima (600 
miles) and Okinawa (840) coidd l)e used as air 
bases, .Japan's larj^est cities liad already suffered 
the heaviest attacks of the canipaii^n. The urban 
complex of Tokyo. Kawasaki and Yokohama, 
located in the heart of the central island of Hon- 
shu, was the most vital and at the same time one 
of tlie most inaccessible of the city tar<iets on the 
Allied bombing program. 

Hintory of Air Attacks. During the period 
from November 1!)44 to August 1945, the Twenti- 
eth AF conducted 11 major raids and innumerable 
lesser attacks and isolated sortiee against the three 
cities with the overwhelming weight of bombs 
falling on Tokyo. The capital was the target for 
six of the eight major ai'ea raids, Kawasaki and 
Yokohama receiving one each. ( )f the three major 
jjrecision attacks, one was directed against air- 
craft plants on the outskirts of Tokyo, the other 
two against oil refineries in Kawasaki. During 
the Ill-month period of the air war, 4.230 planes 
delivered ii:2,S85 tons of bombs to the area, repre- 
senting 14 percent of the total tonnage (159,744 
tons) dropped on the 6() Jajianese cities subjected 
to area raids. ()f the local tonnage, 1(5,217 tons, 
oi- 71 percent wei'e incendiaries. Navy strikes 
were responsil)le for 144 tons, directetl iirimai'ily 
against aircraft plants and shi|)ping. 

Area Ra'xls. Area raids accounted for 79 per- 
cent of the toiniage dropped on the three cities. 
The most devastating attacks were carried out 
during .March, .\pril and May 11145. Kigjity-nine 
l)ercent of the total area raid tonnage was dropped 
in these '■'> months. By far the most eti'ective air 
atta<k against any .Japanese city was the jjredawn 
incendiary raid on Tokyo on l(t March 1945, which 
i-esulted in a gi-eater degree of death and destruc- 
tion than that ])i<)duced by any other single mis- 
sion in any theater during A\'orld War II. The 
success of this raid was due ])artly to the surprise 
performance of the high-altitude B-29s operating 
at low levels (5,000 to 7.000 feet ) in the first such 
attack of the war. Table 4 gives the tonnage of 
bombs dropjied on the three cities during the area 
raids. 



Table 4. — Mi»itJilii toiiiuigv of boiiibx (IruiipiO in (irrii raids 



Month 


Tokyo 


Kawasaki 


Yokohama 


Total 


November 1944 

Deeemher 


302 

102 

205 

859 

2,060 

3,031 

6,976 

10 
386 


~8 

3 

1,504 

7 

32 


4 

4 

3 

14 

~3 

2,570 


306 

106 


.January 194.5 

P^ebruarv 


208 
881 


March 

April 


2,063 
4,538 


Mav 


9,553 


.June 

.July 

August 


10 

418 


Total 


13,931 


1,554 


2,598 


18,083 



Source: Twentieth AF. 



Prerifilon Attack.9. Attacks against limited 
targets and specific installations accounted for 
only 21 percent of the total bomb tonnage deliv- 
ered to llie three cities. The primary objectives 
were the aircraft and oil industries, with a few 
minor attacks directed against the steel and elec- 
trical ecjuipment industries and shipping. The 
The major attacks on the aircraft industry, carried 
out almost exclusively against the Nakajima in- 
stallations on the outskirts of Tokyo, occurred in 
April 1945; while the greatest weight of bombs 
was dropped in this type of attack on the three 
large oil refineries in the harbor district of Kawa- 
saki in July and August, just prior to the termina- 
tion of the war. The remainder of the attacks 
were of minor importance. Table 5 gives the ton- 
nage of l)ombs delivered to specific targets during 
the raid pei'iod : 

Tahlk ."i. — Moiilhlii to)n)(if/f' of bombs rlini)i)ftl in prrcision 
attacks 





Targets 




Month 








Electric 




Total 




Air- 


Oil 


Steel 


Equip- 


Ship- 






craft 






ment 


ping 




November 1944. 


112 










112 


December 


247 


12 


3 






262 


.January 1945 


42 


9 


6 







57 


February 


35 


3 







6 


44 


March 


112 


3 








115 


April 


2,002 












2,002 


May 


3 










3 


June 


38 
5 


1,102 
1,017 





~42 
42 


~"3 

9 


38 


July 


1,110 


August 


1,059 


Total ___ 


2,596 


2,146 


9 


4,802 



Source: Twentieth AF; Naval Air Force, 



Plujx'ii-dl I>iiiii'i</i'. '\^'Ilil(' precision uttiicks 
iialur;illy cau.sL'tl coiisidei-alfie physical daniufie in 
limited areas, the greater part of it was produced 
on tlie pei-iplierv of Tokyo, wliose oiitlyinof siibui'bs 
are not cotisidei'ed in tiiis discussion, and on the 
liarboi- district of Kawasaki. The area raids niav 
thei-efore be considered responsil)k' for piactically 
all of the jihysical damage produced in tjie tlii-ee 
cities. The devastated sections of the url)an com- 
plex covered 70 sipiare miles, or slightly more than 
49 percent of the built-up areas of tlie three cities. 
This destroyed area in turn represented 39 percent 
of the total devastation caused by bombing in the 
66 cities subjected to area raids. Approximately 
59 percent of all buildings in the urban complex 
were destroyed, and an additional 5 percent were 
damaged. The attack of 10 March alone was re- 
sponsible for 23 percent of the devastated area 
and 9 percent of the building destruction. Harbor 
facilities were damaged in all cities and almost 
half of the warehouses along the water fronts 
were demolished. Damage to substations and 
transmission lines reduced the electric power ca- 
pacity availal)]e in tlie area from approxinuitely 
2 million to 1.7 million ki]owatt-ami)eres; and the 
destruction of gas plants cut jn'oduction of this 
fuel to less than half the nornuxl capacity. 
Table 6 shows the areas of devastation and the 
number of buildings destroyed in each city. 

Distribution of liomh Damage. The pattern of 
destruction in the area raids followed the most 
heavily built-up and densely populated districts 
along the water fronts of the three cities (Maps 



Table 6. — Physical damaye canned by air raids 



Type of Damage 


Tokyo 


Kawasaki 


Yokohama 


TotaJ 


r>uiU-iip arc;! 










(square iiilcs) 


in 


11 


20 


142 


.\rea (lestr()yc<l_. 


57 


4 


!» 


70 


I'erci'iit of 










(Instruction 


51 


36 


45 


4!) 


Nunil)ei' of 










liuildiiifrs 


1,161,000 


(iS.HOO 


223,!)0() 


1,453,8(K) 


Uuild'UKs 










destroyed. 


727,655 


35.107 


100,070 


862,832 


Percent 










desti'oyed 


63 


51 


45 


5!) 



Source: Police officials. Tokyo, Kawasaki, Yokohama. 

A, B and C). The greatest damage was inflicted 
in the congested ward of Asakusa, northeast of the 
Imperial Palace, in the raid of 10 March. The 
raid of 13 April destroyed sections north of the 
Palace, while that of 15 April .struck the extreme 
southern shore line of Tokyo, with a spill-over 
into Yokohama. The attacks of 23 and 25 May, 
while devastating the greatest area, were less ef- 
fective than tiie others, as they were centered in 
the thinly populated districts in the .southwestern 
l^art of the capital. The raid of 15 April on Kawa- 
saki laid wa.ste tlie highly industrialized harbor 
area and spilled over into northern Yokohama; 
while the attack of 29 May on the latter city gutted 
the main business di.strict along the water front. 
Of tlie 6.9 square miles occupied by industrial 
buildings in the urban complex, 1.9 square miles, 
or 28 percent were destroyed in the course of the 
air war. Table 7 gives the tonnage of bombs 
dropped and the extent of destruction in the three 
cities for each of the major area raids. 



Table 7. — Weight and results of major area raids 



Date of attack 


Bomb tonnage 


City 


Area destroyed 
(sq. mi.) 






HE 


IB 


Total 




1945 

25 Feb. 


45 

82 
15 
38 

"i 

184 


412 
1,667 
2,037 

754 
1.072 
3.646 
3,258 
2,570 


457 
1,667 
2,119 

769 
1,110 
3,646 
3,262 
2,570 


Tokyo 

do 

do 

do 

Kawa.saki 

Tokyo 

do 
Yokohama 


1.0 

15.8 

11.41 

*7.5 

3.6 

3.2) 

lS.6f 

8.9 

70.0 


27 970 


10 Mar. 


256,010 
217,130 


13 Apr. 

15 Apr. 


15 Apr. 


31,603 


23 ilay 


25 May 


221,160 


29 May 


89,073 




Total 


15,416 


15,600 


842,946 





Source: Twentieth AF; city police departments. 'IncludinK 1.5 square miles of Yokohama. 



Ca.sualfles. According to Japanese estimates, 
the number of people left homeless as a result of 
the air attacks on the three cities reached 3.4 mil- 
lion, or 43 percent of the total population. Official 
Japanese estimates also place the number of per- 
sons evacuated from the urban area at around 4.6 
million, or 58 percent of the population. The 
records of city police officials show that casualties 
in the area amounted to almost 199.()()0, or 40 per- 
cent of the casualties for Japan as a whole, ap- 
proximately 60 percent of the local figure being 
the result of the one raid of 10 March 194.5. The 
number of missing persons was never determined 
in tliis area. It is quite possible that many people 
otherwise iniaccounted for should luive been 
counted among the dead. In like manner, many 
of tlie severely injured proljably died later of tlieir 
wounds, wliile a considerable number of the slight- 
ly injured may never liave been re]iorted. In view 
of tliese possibilities, tlie figures in Table 8 should 
be considered as minimal. 

Table 8. — Air raiil cuaiKilties 



Casualties 


Tokyo 


Kawasaki 


Yokohama 


Total 


Population, 










Fetiruarv 1944 


6,577,620 


380,919 


1,034,740 


7,903,270 


Killed 


93,056 


1,-520 


4,832 


99,408 


Iii.jureil 


72,840 


8,759 


17,967 


99,566 


Dehousefl 


2.890,000 


154,426 


399,187 


3,443.01. S 


Percent dehoused. 


44 


41 


39 


43 


Evacuated 


4.100,000 


1.50,000 


350,000 


4.600,00(1 


Percent evacuated 


62 


39 


34 


58 


Population, 










August 194.5 


2,310,734 


216,197 
43 


637,024 
38 


3,163,9.55 


Percent decrease 


65 


60 



Source: Ministry of the Interior; city police departments. 

Ai?' Raid Defeme. In anticipation of air at- 
tacks, the Japanese organized a Civilian Defense 
Corps (Keibo Dan), which centered around tiie 
local police stations. It was composed of civilians 
charged primarily with the duties of fire figliting 
and evacuation. Tiie Japanese (Tovernment fur- 
ther instructed the jjeople through press and radio 
in air-raid precautions and urged them to con- 
struct tlieir own shelters. This seems to have been 
the full extent of official aid in the protection of 
the populace against air attacks. The .shelters 
constructed by individuals consisted mo.stly of 
shallow trenches covered with boards and dirt ; 
only the larger factories were able and willing to 
provide adetiuate shelters for their own workers. 
AVitli the advent of mass incendiary attacks, how- 
ever, the entile defense sj'stem collapsed, and the 



inadeijuate shelters proved to be more of a trap 
than a refuge. 

Rehoidiirig and Evacuation. The municipal 
authorities made inefi'ectual attempts to house the 
flood of air-raid victims, thi-owing open the tem- 
ples and schools to the homeless. This was a mere 
emergency measure, however, providing shelter 
for a week or 10 days. The immense majority of 
the bombed-out population migrated to the sur- 
rounding country side. The government set up 
a system of compensation for completely de- 
stroyed buildings, amounting to 40 percent of 
their values, with an additional payment of 50 
Yen per occupant to cover personal losses. Many 
of the people used the money to rebuild their 
homes, but the shortage of building materials 
rendered impossible any large scale program of 
reconstruction. By the end of the war. the popu- 
lation of the urban complex had been reduced to 
a little more than a third of its pre-raid figure. 
Tokyo alone lost almost two-thirds of its inhab- 
itants. 

The Impact of Area Raids. The |)rogiam of 
mass incendiary attacks on the metropolitan com- 
l^lex of Tokyo. Kawasaki, and Yokohama, with its 
inital element of surprise, its devastation of con- 
gested areas, and its vast destruction of life and 
proiierty. was bound to have a terrifying effect 
upon the people and to produce a complete if tem- 
porary paralysis of the economical life of tiie com- 
numity. In its disruption of transportation and 
communications, its reduction of the output of 
industry and the efficiency of its workers, and its 
injection of confusion into the already ineffectual 
administrative machinery, the results of the air 
war against the most important of Japan's urban 
areas affected to a marked degree the morale and 
economic productivity of the entire nation. An 
indication of the importance of the damage in- 
flicted is given in Table 9. which compares the local 
efiect,s of bombing with those for Japan as a 
whole : 

Table 9. — Compurative e'ffects o/ bombing 



Damage 


All Japan 


Urban 
complex 


Per- 
cent 


Area de.stroyed (square 
miles) 


178 

2,236.159 

8.735,079 

*9,789,022 

235,616 

265,556 


70 

862,832 

3,443.613 

4,600.000 

99,408 

99,566 


39 


Huildings de.stroyed 

Persons dehoused 

Persiins (evacuated 

Killed 


39 
39 
47 
42 


Injured 


37 







* This figure is only for the 66 cities subjected to area raids. 



8 



ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIR ATTACKS 



I lit ri/diiction. Kroin (lie extent of physical 
ilaiiiii>>e described in the t'uiegoinfj' seel ion it would 
seem that honibinji' must luive liad a treniendous 
<lii'ect ert'ect on tiie economic activities of I'okyo, 
i'Cawasaki. and 'idkohania. Piiysical (himajie, 
liowever, cannot be iisetl as a measure of tiie total 
economic loss due to air attacks, foi-, while area 
raids, and to some extent pi'ecisioii attacks, did 
reduce the total industrial potential, reinainin<i' 
plant facilities were iu general still ade([uate for 
the ever diminishing supply of fuel, raw materials, 
and component parts brought into the area. The 
shoi-tages of these essentials wei'e due not so nuich 
to air attacks as to ett'ective sea blockade oi fJapan 
and tiie inadequacy of both water and land trans- 
portation at home and al)i'oad. 

T I unf<povtath>ii. The network of highways, 
railroads and ship])ing lines that made up the 
trans[)ortation system of Japan was, by its very 
nature, susceptible to enemy action in all parts of 
the PjUijiire, a)id reflected to a remarkable degree 
the economic ills of the nation. It was at once the 
agent and the barometer of fiuctuations in indus- 
trial production and distribution and any disrup- 
tion of its efficient operation iu any part of the 
Empire was felt to a greater or lesser degree in 
the mining and manufacturing centers of the 
home island and in the economy of the country as 
a whole. Thus, an analysis of the transportation 
jjroblems on a city level must take into account the 
factors, both normal and Avartime, which afi'ected 
the situation in other areas. This is particularly 
true of the Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama complex, 
where the shortage of transportation facilities was 
caused primarily l)v forces operating far beyond 
the limits of the area itself. 

Xhipitiug. (_)wing to the peculiar problems of 
Japanese shipping during the last 2 years of the 
war, the fluctuations marking the movement of 
Tessels in Tokyo Bay cannot be measured in terms 
of the direct and indirect effects of bombing on 
ships and port facilities locally. The generally 
critical situation throughout Japan, attributable^ 
to air and submarine attacks and the miniiig of 
channels, exercised a decisive influence on activ- 
ities in the harbor. Enemy action reduced the in- 
flow of iron and other metals from the south and 
coal fi-oni the north ; and the shortage of bottoms, 
either lost at sea or tied up in other ports, created 
iurther difficulties in the export of finished goods 



and component paiis to other lit ic> on tlic main 
island.s and to the di.stant military outposts of the 
Emj)ire. The movement of ships was at all times 
erratic, with the gross registered tonnage of ves- 
sels airiving in the harbor chopping from 18.8 
million in l!)-f'2 to 7.8 million in 1!)4;» and :i(> mil- 
lion in 1944. The number of ships putting into 
port dniing the same years was 5,88ii, 3,205 ajid 
2,()7r), respectively. Thus, long before the boml)- 
ing program was initiated against the area, ship- 
ping had suffered a sharp <lecline. 

Derline in Shipping during the Raid I'viiod 
((ii-a])h 1). During the period under survey. Oc- 
tober iy4;3 to August l!)4;"i, a peak of 570,969 gross 
legistered tons was reached in Eebruary 1944, the 
most precipitous drop occurring between May and 
August of that year. P'roin the latter month until 
Eebruary 194.5. gross registered tonnage arriving 
in the harbor liuctuated between 116,000 and 176,- 
OOO monthly, thereafter declining steadily to 25,- 
OOt) tons in July. Incoming freight tonnage was 
much greater than that of outgoing, the monthly 
average during the preraid period being 168,070 
tons and 112.772 tons, respectively. The trend in 
freiglit tonnage followed rouglily that of gross 
registered tonnage of vessels in the harbor, diverg- 
ences being attributable to the fact that ships often 
arrived with partial loads and departed in ballast. 
Though there was some damage done to wai'e- 
houses and port facilities throughout the area dur- 
ing the period of air raids, attacks on the harbor 
district did not materially accentuate the fluctua- 
tions in sea-borne traffic. 

Wafet'-horne Cornmodifiesi. Figures on freight 
shipments were obtainable only for the months of 
January 1944 through March 1945; and the com- 
modity classifications even for this period are in- 
complete. However, as fluctuations in freight 
movements follow the general decline of gross 
registered tonnage during comparable periods, it 
may be assumed that the trends were similar to the 
end of tlie war (Graph 2) . In the statistics avail- 
able, a jjeak of 388,096 tons of incoming freight 
was reached in January 1944, with a high of ls4,- 
81)4 tons of outgoing freight occurring the follow- 
ing month. The decline in both categories was 
gradual, the low point of 46,049 incoming tons be- 
ing registered in December 1944 and 53,787 out- 
going tons in February 1945. The relative import- 
ance of the various commodities is seen in Table 



10. which shows the average monthly sliipments 
recorded during the preraid period, February 
1944 through Janiuiry lU4r). 

Table 10. — Monthly preraid averiujc of icater-bornc 
commodities 

[Metric tons] 



Commodity 


Incoming 


Per- 
cent 


Outgoing 


Per- 
cent 


Fuel 


79,701 

24.153 

6.554 

718 

3,711 

53,225 


48 

14 
4 

~2 
32 

100 


13,994 

20,877 

9,801 

2,029 

250 

65,722 


12 


Metals and metal 
products 


10 


Building materials 

Machinery 


9 
o 


Food 




Others 


58 


Total 


168,062 


112,673 


100 







Sources: Maritime Bureau, Tokyo; harbor master, Yokohama. 

Damage to Harbor InstaUatiom. Ahnost all of 
the de.struction around Tokyo Bay occurred in 
April and May 1945, during the four heavy area 
raids on the three cities. Three docks, with a com- 
bined capacity of Id vessels of o,0()() tons, were 
destroyed in Yokohama, leaving only the central 
pier intact. Of the 60 loading cranes in Tokyo. 
31 were damaged and disruption of utilities in 
Yokohama temporarily prevented the operation 
of electric-powered cranes in that city. Of the 
3,185 lighters operating in the harbors, with an 
average capacity of 100 tons each. 1,066 were de- 
stroyed. Warehouses covering 3,900,000 square 
feet were demolished, representing a loss of almost 
45 percent of the 8.7S3.500 square feet of available 
space in the three cities: and 48.270 tons of stored 
goods, 33 percent of wliicli were foodstuli's. were 
damaged in Tokyo alone. In the latter city. 304 
dock laborers were killed and 5.S57 injured, out of 
a total of 8.471. Dock laboi' in Kawasaki and 
Yokohama was reduced to 20 percent of normal: 
but as only about Hi jjercent of the normal cargo 
was handled after tlie raids, reduction in tlic labor 
force was not important. No attempt was made 
to refiair or enlarge \»nX facilities in any of the 
cities, as the undamaged installations were suffi- 
cient to conduct the diniinislied sliipping opera- 
tions. The extent of pliysical damage would a])- 
pear at first glance to iiave been sufficient to dis- 
rupt activities in the ix)rts. but the fact that re- 
maining facilities were a<le(iuate for the reduced 
operations in the Bay nullified the (himrging ef- 
fects of the raids. There were no sudden drops 
in shipping coincick'ut with air attacks: and it is 
therefore evident that the erratic fluctuations and 



steady decline in the movement of water-l)orne 
freight were the results of wartime factors atfect- 
ing transportation elsewhere. 

Rail Transportation. The main islands of 
Japan were divided into railway divisions cover- 
ing fairly large areas of the country: and very 
little data could be obtained for individual cities. 
The Tokyo division included the major portion 
of the Kanto Plain ; but as the greater part of all 
rail activities in the area centered around the ur- 
ban complex of Tokyo. Kawasaki, and Yokohama, 
figures for the division may be accepted as indica- 
tive of rail movements in the complex (Graph 3). 
The average monthly car loadings were 4.981 dur- 
ing the ])reraid period. February 1944 through 
January 1945. Up to the latter month, car load- 
ings fluctuated between 4.700 and 5,300, the trend 
thereafter registering a steady decline, except for 
slight rises in March and May. to a low of 3.500 
in June, the last month for which statistics are 
available. The fact that car loadings did not de- 
crease more rapidly is due primarily to the nec- 
essity for shifting the burden of transiiortation 
from ships to railways ; and it is evident that air 
attacks on the cities around Tokyo Bay contril)- 
uted only in a minor way to the disruption of rail 
transportation. There were no figures available 
for rail-bome commodities in the complex. 

Damage to Railway Installations. Physical 
damage due to air attacks was not sufficient to cur- 
tail rail shipments at any time. Railway stations 
wiihiii the cities were hit. and one of Tokyo's three 
nniin freight yards was damaged, while a few 
locomotives and some rolling stock were lost. Ob- 
solescence and lack of repair parts incapacitated 
much of the equipment, and a shortage of truc'king 
facilities and freight handlers at times further 
delayed rail movements. In general, however, it 
was the inade(juacy of the entire rail system, as it 
was with shipping, that hastened the final collapse 
in the uiban economy of the Kanto Plain. This 
ina(U'(|uacy cannot, however, be atti'ilmted even 
indirectly to air attacks on the cities. 

TntckiiKj. The amount of goods coming into 
the urban complex by trucks was generally twice 
that of outgoing commodities, the main imports 
being metals, food, and building materials, with 
fuel leading the list of exports. Unclassified mili- 
tary goods and other commodities accounted for 
more than half of both incoming and outgoing 
tiuckin.'r. Accurate data on the amount of goods 



10 



iiiovi'd l)_v (rucks could lie ohlMiiicd oidy I'roui 
Aujjfiisl 1'.I44; l>ul it is evident from tliesc li^^uies 
thiit l)onil)iu^f had a drastic eiiect on lliis form of 
tran.sportatiou (Graph 4). From a peak of more 
than (;;);>,()<•() tons in Jamiarv 1!>4.5, incomin;^ truck 
frei<i;lit dropped to a little o\er .'S.'il,(»)() tons the 
following month, while out^oinfi frei^dil was i-e- 
duced from approximately :'.()'J, ()()() toTis to l.^S.OOO 
at the same time. Trior to the raid period, incom- 
ing tonnage had fluctuated between 529,()()() and 
();]S),()()0 tons and outgoing tonnage between '.iV.i,- 
000 and 380,000 tons. In July, the categories had 
reached the low figure of 218.000 and 128,000 tons, 
respectively. Table 11 shows the average monthly 
tonnage during the pre-raid months, August li)44 
through January 1945. and the average percentage 
of decline during the raid jjeriod, February 
through July 1945. 

Table 11. — Monthly average of trurk-bonir runnimdities 
[Metric tons] 



Commodity 


Preraid 
incoming 


Percent 

loss in raid 

period 


Preraid 
outgoing 


Percent 

loss in raid 

period 


Metals 

Fuel 


79,394 
17,737 
48,222 
12,009 
57,326 
203,595 
160,660 


50 
19 
62 
4 
41 
46 
57 

49 


49,618 

48,745 

11,341 

9,007 

2,058 

146,846 

70,250 


69 
36 


Building materials. 

Machinery 

Food 


60 

4 

30 


Military goods 

Others 


52 
49 






Total 


578,943 


337,865 


.50 



Source: Trucking Control Assn. 

Damage to Trucking Facilities. At the begin- 
ning of 1944 there was an estimated total of 15.- 
000 trucks avaihible to Kokyo, Kawasaki, and 
Yokohama, however, owing to wartime attrition, 
lack of replacement parts and a shortage of 
trained mechanics, only half of them were in use 
at the time. Even the operative vehicles could not 
be employed to full capacity because of shortages 
of gasoline, oil, and tires. An indication of the 
inadequacy of trucking facilities is given in the 
fact that only .H(l jiercent of legitimate orders 
could be filled in Tokyo prior to air attacks. 
Bombing further reduced the number of operat- 
ing trucks to about 2.200; jmd although -SOO were 
put back into service after repairs had been ef- 
fected, the number of vehicles in good condition 
was far fi'om sufficient to meet current needs. It 
is evident from the sudden drop in freight move- 
ments coincident witli the de.struction of vehicles, 
that air attacks were directly responsible for tlie 
decline in truck ti-ansportation. 



Local Traruiportation. There are no accurate 
data on the number of busses and streetcars in the 
thiee cities, l)ut according to official estimates, 15 
percent of the trolleys and 00 i)ei-cent of the buses 
were immobilized piior to the I'aid ])eriod owing 
to lack of repair facilities. It is further estimated 
that approximately 45 percent of the streetcars 
and 10 percent of the buses weie destroyed by 
bombings. I'asseiiger tiaflic decreased about 50 
percent during the raid peiiod hut this wiis due 
as much to a reduced population as to the loss of 
vehicles. Local trucking was iiiadecpiate for city 
freight transportation, and was at times respon- 
sible for slow-downs in l)oth lail and water-borne 
movements. 

Fuel. The fuels used in the urban areas of the 
Kanto Plain were, in order of importance, coal, 
coke, charcoal, and oil. Normally, about 50 per- 
cent of the coal supply was imported from the 
Ishikari fields of Hokkaido, and about 30 percent 
from tlie Joban field north of Tokyo. The re- 
nuiinder came from southern Japan and Korea. 
The urban complex of Tokyo, Kawasaki, and 
Yokohama was normally self-sufficient in coke 
production, practically all of its needs being sup- 
l)lied by the Tokyo Gas Co., with plants in the 
three cities. Most of the charcoal was produced by 
small hand-operated furnaces scattered through- 
out the forested mountain districts, about 72 per- 
cent of tlie local supply coming from Tohoku, the 
northern section of Honshu. Fuel oil was used 
relatively little, and all of it had to be imported 
from abi-oad. 

< 'ual. About 65 jiercent of the coal used in the 
urban complex was bituminous, most of it being 
shipped in from Hokkaido. This type of coal 
was used primarily in the production of coke and 
gas. Both bituminous coal and lignite were em- 
ployed for steam generation in industrial plants, 
while anthracite, representing only about 4 per- 
cent of all coal consumed in the area, was con- 
verted almost exclusively to briquettes for heating 
purposes. Industry normally accounted for about 
82 percent of all coal consumed in the three cities, 
with utilities using about 7 jiercent. The princi- 
pal industrial consumer was the metals production 
industry, with metal products, machinery, and 
chemicals following in that order. Tlie consump- 
tion of coal by utilities was almost exclusively for 
the production of gas and its by-product coke. 

Coal Shortages. Coal was allocated on the basis 



11 



of priorities, the i)r<)(lueei's of .steel beiiiji' con- 
sidered tlie most vital coiisiiiiiers; but allocations 
"were never fulHIled in any category after the be- 
ginning of li)4-l-. Prior to SeptenLlier of that year, 
only 70 to 80 percent of the allotted coal was actu- 
ally received; between September and Decendier 
receipts dropped to .")•> percent, and thereafter to 
only 30 percent of allocations. Tlie use of coal for 
domestic and public heating was prohil)ited after 
March 1944: and many of the smaller industries, 
such as textiles and food jjrocessing, began to use 
wood as fuel. The principal reason for coal short- 
ages was the lack of transportation. Shipping- 
losses and the submarine blockade eft'ectively 
stopped shipments into Tokyo Bay and threw the 
burden of transi)ortation on the already over- 
M'orked and inadecjuate lailways. After October 
19-13. 70 percent of the coal from Hokkaido came 
in by rail, the remaining 30 percent being shipped 
through Japan Sea ports. From March 1944 on, 
the movement of lignite from southern Honshu 
was discontinued because of a shortage of rail 
facilities, and after May 1945 there were no fur- 
ther imports from Korea and Kyushu. Finally, 
the Xavy strike of June 1945 against Hakodate 
and Aoniori destroyed the ferries plying between 
Hokkaido and Honshu and brought rail transpor- 
tation of coal into Tokyo from the noi'th to a com- 
plete stop. 

Coal ConHiini pt'idii. Statistics for coal consump- 
tion in the three cities were obtainable only as far 
back as April 1944, but it is evident that the de- 
cline had set in long before that month. Coal con- 
sumption in industry, the major consumer, de- 
clined steadily during the entire period, there be- 
ing no marked fluctuations occurring at the time 
of air attacks (Graph 5) . From a total of 420,800 
tons in April 1944, consumption in the area 
dropped to 134,600 tons in Jidy 1945. Table VI 
shows the average anioiiiil of coal consumed in 
the various categories in the three cities during 
the preraid months. A])ril 1944 through Januai-y 
1945. together with the decline during the r.-iid 
period. Februai'v through .Inly 1945. 

Coke. Highest piiorities in tiie use of coke were 
given to the aiiciaft parts and munitions indus- 
tries. Bomb damage to coking ])lants was ivla- 
tively light; consequently there v,as no decline in 
])ro(luction from this cause. Shortages, which 
existed pi-imarily in the low prioi'ities category of 
(■onsumer. were due aliiio>l cxrhisix-eh' to the ilif- 



Taulk 12. — Colli i-iiiisiiiiiiitinn 
[Metric tons] 



Period 


Consumption 




Industry 


Utilities 


Others 


Total 


Ti>k.vo : 

l'ie-rai(l_ 

Ha ill 


73,590 

28,716 

61 

200,850 

115,835 

42 

274,440 

144,.5.51 
47 


23,580 

12,716 

46 

1,830 

1,515 

17 

25,410 

14,231 

44 


34,890 

28,866 

17 

3,160 

2,683 

15 

38,0.50 

31 ,549 

17 


132,060 
70,298 


rerceiit of decline 
Kawas;ik; and 
Ydkdii.-iiiia : 

I're-iaid 

Raid 


47 

205.840 
120,033 


Percent of decline 
Total : 
Pre-raid 
Raid 


42 

337,900 
190,331 


Percent of decline 


44 



Source: Japan Coal Association. 

liculty in importing the raw material, coal. Ke- 
lief was given to certain vital plants by the impor- 
tation of coke from Hokkaido during the last 
(juarter of 1944 but there was seldom sufficient to 
meet current needs thereafter. Domestic use of 
the fuel was discontinued in October 1944, after 
an especially precipitous Avo\y in production. 

Ciih-c CiiiiKiiin pt'/on (Graph G). Consumption 
fluctuated between 39,300 and 4ii,-J(iO tons monthly 
fiom ()ctol)er 1943 through September 1944. In 
()(tol)ei-, it dropped sharply to a little above 28,- 
(iiii) tons, but the importation of Hokkaido coke 
brought it back to average during the months of 
November and December. In January 1945, a 
permanent decline set in, and by ,)uly monthly 
consumption had reached a low of slightly over 
15,500 tons. Here, again, as in the case of coal, 
sudden drops did not coincide with the occurrence 
of air attacks, difficulties in transportation exer- 
cising the decisive effect on supply. Table 13 
sho«s the monthly averages of coke consuin])tion 
during the pre-raid and raid periods, and the de- 
cline registered during the latter months: 

Clunioiil. Aj)pro.\imately 79 percent of all 
charco;il in the area was consumed domestically, 
iiulusliy accounting for only 16 percent. The re- 
mainder was used principally as motor fuel in 
civilian vehicles and in public baths. Monthly 
fluctuations in the use of charcoal were highly 
erialic, Init in general the trend followed normal 
seasonal requirements (Graph 7). The January 
1944 ]ieak of 28,422 tons for all uses had declined 
to 21,(i;')6 for the .same month of 1945, while the 
.seasonal low ]ioint of 8,891 tons in October 1944 
had reached ;'>.S54 by July 1945. This over-all 



12 



Tahi.k l.'i. -Ctikr <fHisfntii>(i'"i 
[Meti'ic lonsj 







Consumption 






Industry 


Utilities 


Others 


Total 


Tok.vo : 
I'l'e-i'iiiil 


13,076 

9,762 

25 

19,668 

7,193 

63 

32,744 

16,955 
48 


2,S18 

1,182 

58 

1,898 

861 

55 

4,716 

2,043 

57 


312 

1.50 

52 

163 

5 
97 

475 

1.55 

67 


16,206 


Kaifl 

Percent of ilecliiie 

Kawa.saki and Yokohama : 
I're-iaiil 


1 1 ,094 
31 

21,729 


Raid 

Percent of decline 
Total : 

Pre -raid_ 

Rail! 


8,0.59 
63 

37,935 

19.153 


I'ercent of decline 


.50 



Source: Japan Coke Association. 

decline was due perhap.s as imich to the destruc- 
tion of homes and the consequent decrease in de- 
mand as to the lack of transportation facilities for 
tiie delivery of this fuel. The whole charcoal situ- 
ation, however, had little effect on the economy of 
the coinjdex. Table 14 shows the averap;e monthly 
consumption diuinp; the pre-raid and raid periods : 

Taki.k 14. — Vhitrcoul conmniiiition 
[Metric tons] 



Period 


Homes 


Industry 


other 


Total 


Pi'e-raid 
Raid 


13.277 
6.932 

48 


2.933 
2,138 

27 


466 

303 

35 


16,676 
9,373 


Percent of decline 


44 



Public Utilities. The entire utilities system of 
Tokyo, Kawasaki and Yokohama formed one 
integrated network within the urban comi^lex 
and, to a certain extent, throughout the Kanto 
Plain. Electricity was supplied to the whole area 
from hydroelectric plants in the mountain regions 
througli a series of substations in or near the cities, 
only about 20 percent of the power being fur- 
nished by auxiliary coal-powered stations within 
the municipalities. Thus, bombing of the urban 
areas themselves could not effectively disrupt the 
supply of electric power or destroy the installa- 
tions which ]>roduced it. Gas, on the other hand, 
was produced within the urban complex, and 
depended exclusively f>n the ever diminishing 
supply of coal. In.stallations were also liighly 
vulnei'able to air attacks, as they were located 
mainly in Iniilt-up industrial areas. Steam power, 
furnished almost solely by Kawasaki, suffered 
from the same shortages and vulnerability as the 
gas supply, but the water system, with its outlying 
reservoirs and underground mains, was not sus- 



ccplihle loseriDiis disruplioii lliroiigli incendiary 
raids on the cities. 

Klectririty. At the beginning of 1944. the t(jlal 
electric power capacity available to the three 
cities was 2,(l()4,i:i2'2 kilovolt-am])eres. \^\• the end 
of the raid period, this hatl beeii leduced to 1,722,- 
022, a I0.S.S of almost 17 percent. In Tokyo alone, 
()() substations were damaged, transmission lines 
were broken in 4S3 places, and IJii power line sup- 
ports were wrecked. \'ery little was done, how- 
e\'er, to restore tmy but the most vital of the dam- 
aged installations, which weie rapidly lepaired, 
as the need had been i-eiluced considerably through 
bomb damage to consumer facilities. There is no 
information available on physical damage in Ka- 
wasaki and 'i'okohama, but as a shortage of elec- 
tric power was not reported in these two cities, it 
may be assumed that any disruption experienced 
there was of minor importance and did not materi- 
ally affect an adeciuate supply of electricity. 

Electric Power Coii-sit/iier-s. Japanese records 
cover only three categories of electric power con- 
sumption : (1) lighting, both i)rivate and jtiiljlic, 

(2) installations, industrial or otherwise, having 
a capacity of .5(1 kilowatt of power or less, and 

(3) installations having a capacity of more than 
50 kilowatts. As domestic use of electricity for 
purposes other than lighting represents less than 
3 percent of the second category, this factor is 
ignored in the present analysis. Similarly, power 
requirements of nonindustrial installations are 
insignificant, and consumption by railways is not 
included in the assembled statistics. Nornuilly, 
83 percent of all electric power output went to 
industries with a capacity of .50 kilowatts and 
over, while 7 percent was consumed by installa- 
tions of less than 50 kilowatt capacity. It was 
found from a comparison of data for Japan as a 
whole that plants of less than 50 kilowatt capacity 
generally employed fewer than 50 workers, while 
those of over 50 kilowatts employed more than 50 
workers. Thus, for the sake of brevity, industry 
is here referred to as small or large on the basis 
of the above figures for electric power consump- 
tion and labor force. 

Electric Poirer Short agex. Prior to November 
1944, electricity was limited to a certain extent 
among the less important consumers, owing to a 
diminution in the water flow at the hydroelectric 
jjlants and the irregularity of the coal supply 
locally. The use of electricity was curtailed for 
lighting and cooking and prohibited for heating 



13 



during the winter months of liUii— 1:3 and I'J-io— t-t. 
Hifrhest priorities went to phmts manufacturing 
products directly for the armed forces, while sec- 
ond priorities were held by those industries indi- 
rectly serving the military. Very few large in- 
dustries generated their own power, as most 
private generators had been transj)orted to south- 
ern Asia by government order. At no time, how- 
ever, was there a critical shortage of electric 
power: and even minor shortages ceased by the 
end of 11)44, when air attacks began to reduce 
power needs througii damage to consumer 
facilities. 

Electric Power Coihsmnption (Graph 8). Dur- 
ing the i)reraid period. October 19-1:3 through Jan- 
uary 1SH5. total electric power consumption for all 
categories fluctuated between 2.i(l million and 310 
million kilowatt-hours monthly, the low point 
being registeied during tlie sununer of 1944. By 
July 1945. however, total consumption had de- 
clined to aroiuul li!3 million kilowatt-hours. 
Electricity for lighting purjioses was naturally 
most affected, owing to diminished seasonal needs 
and the black-outs then in force. Consumption in 
small industries was reduced first by the closing 
and consolidation of small plants and later by 
destruction due to bombing. Evidence of this was 
found in Tokyo, where the number of small con- 
sumers decreased from 92,000 in October 1943 to 
78,()()0 in Jatuiary 1945, and to 25,000 by July 
1945, representing a decline of 15 percent prior to 
air attacks and a further decline of 58 percent 
duiing the laid period. Over the same period, 
installed capacity in small industries was reduced 
from 375,000 kilowatts to 354,000 kilowatts pre- 
paid, and to 118,000 kilowatts by the end of the 
raid period, or 6 percent and (13 percent, respec- 
tively. ]SIost of the decline in the second period was 
due to bomb damage to facilities, as a large portion 
of the small industrial installations were located in 
the devastated areas. The larger plants suffered 
considei'ably less from bombing, partly because 
many of them were located on the periphery of the 
cities, and partly because tlieir more solid con- 
struction was less vulnerable to incendiaiy attacks. 
The consiunption decline in large indu.stries was 
due to cui'tailed ])roduction caused by shortages 
of coal and raw materials rather than to a loss of 
electi'ic ])ower capacity. In genera!, su])])]y of 
electricity was adecjuate for all demaiuls in all 
categories of consumers. Table 15 shows the aver- 
age monthly consumptifni of electricity jirior to 



air attacks, and tl 
Table 1.">. — Elrcti 



le tlecline during the raid period. 
ic poicer consumption [1.000 kw.h.] 



Period 



Tokyo : 

Pre-raid 

Raid 

Percent of decUne 

Kawasaki and 

Yokoliania : 

Pre- raid 

Raid 

Percent of decline 

Total : 

Pre- raid 

Raid 

Percent of decline 



Light 



23,820 

15,889 

33 



4,242 

2,892 

32 

28,062 

18,781 

33 



Power 
(under 
50 kw.) 



16,307 

9,077 

44 



3,013 

1,929 

36 

19,320 

11,006 

43 



Power 

(over 

50 lew.) 



Total 



148,07.5 188.202 
SS,.o07 I 113,47.S 
40 40 



74,534 

43,392 

42 

222,609 

131,899 

41 



81.789 

48,213 

41 

269,991 

161,686 

40 



Source: Kanto Haiden (Distributing) Co. 

Gas. All of the gas used in Tokyo. Kawasaki, 
and Yokohama was produced by eight plants in 
the three cities, with a total pre-raid capacity of 
around 48 million cbm monthly, distributed as 
follows : 



City 


Number of 
plants 


Monthly production 
(cubic meters) 


Tok.vo 

Kawasaki 


4 
1 
3 


17,411,000 
8,222,000 


Yokohama 


22,730,0(R) 







The average monthly consumption during the 
same period, February 1944 through January 
1945, was approximately 42 million cbm, or 87 
percent of capacity. The supply of gas was short 
during the entire period of the war. and subject 
to numerous restrictions. Its use for heating was 
prohibited, and home consumption for cooking 
was strictly limited. As the supply of coal dimin- 
ished it became increasingly difficult to meet the 
urgent requirements of war industries as well as 
to provide for minimum domestic needs. There 
was also a serious shortage of replacement parts, 
and the loss of trained workers through military 
conscription and general absenteeism handi- 
capped both plant operation and repair work. 

Damage to Gas Plants. Damage to plant facil- 
ities by air attacks was considerable. Of the four 
producers in Tokyo, one was completely destroyed 
and two others damaged, the greatest destruction 
occurring in the raid of 10 March 1945. The two 
lai-gest plants in Yokohama were badly damaged 
in the raid of 29 May, while the Kawasaki works 
suffered loss of production mainly because of lack 
of maintenance. During the raid period, accord- 
ing to the Gas Control Corp., total capacity for the 



14 



llirt'c cilics was I'cdiircil liy aliiKist lialf, wliilt! 
()V(>r-all iiioiillily coiisiiniiil inn ilccliiicil .5.5 per- 
cent. Tlius, air attacks liad tlie eH'crt of rolicviiii^ 
tlie gas shortage by destroying tiie demand, cliiefly 
in tlie domestic category. 

Gan Consumption (Graph 9). From a peak of 
over 49 million cubic meters in Maich 1944, con- 
sumption dropped to slightly under 36 million in 
February 1945, just pi'inr to the lirst damaging 
area raid. Thereafter, the decline was greatly 
precipitated, reaching a low of ;">.() million cubic 
meters in July, the greatest drop occurring be- 
tween March and May. As these were the months 
of heaviest air attacks, the decline was due to a 
physical decrease in botli producer and consumer 
capacity, although production was still comfort- 
ably in excess of consumption during tiie last 4 
months of the war. Table IG shows the monthly 
pi'eraid averages of consumption, and the decline 
during the raid montlis. 

Table 16. — Oas consuiiiptinn 

[1.000 cubic meters] 



Period 


Industry 


Homes 


Other 


Total 


Tokyo : 
Pre -raid 
Raid 


15,310 

7,731 

50 

3,329 

1,887 

43 

2,5.53 

2,124 

17 

21,192 

11,742 

45 


16,720 

5,566 

67 

416 

236 

43 

783 

651 

17 

17,919 

6,4.53 

64 


3,034 

840 

72 

38 
21 
45 

68 
56 
18 

3,140 

917 

71 


35,064 
14,137 


Percent (if decline 

Kawasaki : 
Pre-i-ai(l 
Raid 

Percent of decline 

Yokohama : 
Pi-e-raid 


60 

3,783 

2,144 

43 

3.404 


Raid 

Percent of decline 

Total : 
Pre-raid 


2,831 
17 

42,251 


Raid 

Percent of decline 


19,112 
55 



Source: Gas Control Corp. 

Water. There was no shortage of water eitlier 
prior to or during the raid period, in spite of 
minor breaks in the system. Information merely 
disclo-ses that the u.se of it in Hrelighting was 
generally ineffectual because of the intensity of 
incendiary attacks. In Tokyo, where raids were 
most damaging, consumption of water dropjied 
from a pre-raid monthly average of 27 billion 
liters to 9 billion in June 194.5. Industrial con- 
sumption represented 41 percent of the total. This 
decline was due exclusively to a decrease in demand 
caused by destruction of consumer facilities. 

Mampou-ef. According to the national census 
of February 1944, the total labor force of the three 



cities, inchidiiig sludciii workers, amounted to 
3,559,8^1, or II pcneni of all giiinfully employed 
])ersons in Japan. Of tiiis number, 1,542,73.5, or 
43 peicent. were en:ployed in in<bistry, and 21)1,- 
208, or (i |iri(i'nl were engaged in wholesale and 
I'etail trade. 'I'liis comj>ares with 30 percent and 
7 percent in the two categoi'ies for tlie nation as 
a whole ((ira])li 10). From the peak figure of 
l,793,52fi in November 1944, the total industi'ial 
labor force declined to 712.587 in July 1945, the 
sharpest drop lieing registered between January 
and March 1945 in the loss of over 6f)0,000 workers. 
The tremendous decrea.se in Tokyo, which suffered 
the greatest destruction of property, was f)tfset 
somewhat by a sliift of workers to tiie otlier two 
cities. Tal)le 17 gives the average monthly total 
of industrial workers in the three cities, together 
with the jiercentage of decrease or increase during 
the raid period. It was im})ossil)le to obtain fig- 
ui'es for other categories of emplo3'ment. 

Manpower Shortages. In practically all cate- 
gories of employment there were some complaints 
of shortage.s of skilled workers. Women and stu- 
dents were added increasingly to the labor market, 
small industries were consolidated or closed out 
eutirel3' and trade establishments were shut down 
in order to fill the labor gap left by the conscrip- 
tion of able-bodied men into the armed forces. 
Chinese and Koreans were brought in to increase 
the supply of manual workers, and soldiers were 
sometimes put into service to overcome a tempo- 
rary lack of manpower in transportation and com- 
munications. In February 1944. 30 percent of the 
1,287,258 full-time factory workeis in the three 
cities were women; but as females were favored 
in evacuations following the heavy area raids, this 
figure had been reduced to 26 percent by July 1945. 
Children represented 5.6 percent of the total in- 
dustrial labor force prior to air attacks; but pre- 
sumably this class of worker was also favored in 
the evacuations. The final closing of all schools 
in the area took place in the summer of 1944. and 
from that time on approximately 95 percent of the 
more than half a million students formed a sub- 
stantial part of the labor force. Thus, while there 
was no shortage in the actual number of workers 
required for all categories of employment, their 
lack of training and constant shifts from one job 
to another could not but have a harmful effect 
upon the already collapsing economy of the com- 
plex. The air attacks fui-ther reduced the effi- 
ciency of workers by increasing absenteeism, while 



15 



Table 17. — liitlii.'itiidi hilior force 



Period 


Full-time workers 


Part-time 


Clerks 


Total 




Male 


Female 


Total 


workers 


Tok.vo : 

Pre-raid 

Raid 

Percent of decline 


860,386 
409,469 

52 


352,913 

165,096 

53 


1,213,299 

574,565 

53 


30,106 

11,491 

62 


197,665 

93,581 

53 


1.441,070 

ti79,637 

53 


Kawa.saki : 

Pre-raid 

Raid 


62.411 

75.076 

(17) 


29,444 

28.736 

2 


91,8.55 

103.812 

(12) 


6.589 

7.103 

(7) 


13,778 

15,571 

(12) 


112,222 
126.486 


Percent of decline 


(11) 


Yokohauiii : 

Pre-raid 

Raid 

Percent nf decline 


87,340 

89,999 

(3) 


37,171 
37,990 

(2) 


124..511 

127.989 

(3) 


8.093 
8.391 

7 


18,819 

19,199 

(2) 


152,323 

155,.579 

(2) 


Total : 

Pre-raid 

Raid 

Percent of decline 


1.010.137 

.")74..^)44 

43 


419..528 

231.822 

45 


1.429,665 

806,366 

44 


45,688 

26,985 

41 


230,262 

128,351 

44 


1.705,615 

961.702 

44 



Source: Ministry of Welfare. 
Figures in parentheses are increases. 

adding to the idle labor force through the destruc- 
tion of productive facilities. The critical situa- 
tion in labor seems to have been caused primarily 
h\ the lack of any well-organized official planning 
and the resultant inequitable distribution of man- 
power to meet botli military and civilian needs. 

Labor Efficiency. Xorma'lly. Japanese indus- 
trial workers were expected to perform 27(> hours 
of productive labor per month. In Tokyo. Kawa- 
saki and Yokohama, however, workers were aver- 
aging only 222 ])i()tluctive liours during tlie pre- 
raid months. Labor jjroductivity had therefore 
already decreased 18 percent prior to air attacks 
on the complex. During the period of the raids, 
average monthly productive hours were reduced 
to 117. representing a decline of 47 percent from 
tile i^reraid average. According to information 
available, this decline was due partly to air attacks 
and partly to curtailed production caused by lack 
of raw materials and fuel. Loss of efficiency was 
further occasioned by the necessity for employing 
untrained workers in skilled occupations, and by 
the general letdown in morale as a result of adverse 
economic conditions. Table 18 gives the monthly 
average of ]jroductive iiours per worker prior to 
and during the raid period. 

Trade. \'ery little information could be ob- 
tained concerning wholesale and retail trade in the 
three cities. As foreign sources of supply were cut 
off and local commerce diminislied. the number of 
workers and trade e.stabiisjinients di'astically de- 
creased; and the 900,(X)0 men and women em- 
ployed in commerce in October l!»4(i liad already 



Table 18.— 


-Labor efflciency 




Period 


Factory 
workers 


Productive 
hours 


Hours 

per 
worker 


Tok.vo : 

Pre-raid 
Raid 


1.213,299 

574,565 
53 

216.366 
231,801 

(7) 

1,429,665 

806,366 

44 


274,858,500 

66,052,100 

76 

43,299.500 

27,475,800 

37 

318.158.000 

94,427,900 

70 


227 
117 


Percent of decline 

Kawasaki and Yokohama : 
Pre-raid 
Raid 


48 

200 
119 


Percent of decline 

Total : 

Pre-raid 
Raid 


40 

223 
117 


Percent of decline 


48 



Basic data from Ministry of Welfare. 
Figures in parentheses are increases. 

been reduced to 2(K).()0(l by February 1944. Sales 
and <listributi()n units were taken over by the gov- 
ernment and used to implement its rationing sys- 
tem. Data on commercial employees during the 
raid ])eriod were obtainable only for Tokyo, and 
in this city (which accounted for the greater por- 
tion of this category of workers) their number 
iiad been reduced to (ii) percent from November 
1944 to the end of May 1945. This decrease was 
due in great part to bomb damage to .shops and 
stores, as the official combing-out process had 
reached its peak prior to the raid period. The 
over-all shortage of wholesale and retail outlets 
had no .serious effect on the economy of the area, 
however; the decline in the production of con- 
sumer goods had for the most part rendered them 
unneces.sary. 

Iruliisfrial Produrfioii. While it was impossible 



16 



to ()l)l;iiii del ill It'll |)riHliic't ion sl;it isl irs lor I lie ril y 
as a wliole, tlie over-all tiata axaihiltlc, Iroin .laiiii- 
ai'y l!t44 to August 1945, serve to point up I lie 
ti-eiid tor inilustry in <j;eneral (Graph 11). Duiing 
the pie-raid period, total production amounted to 
a nu)nthly average of 453.-1: nnllion yen, 8G per- 
cent of which was for military purposes. The 
decline in civilian pi'oduction had already set in 
by October 1!J44:, but it was not until January 4945 
that military production, and hence tlie over-all 
industrial output, began its precipitous drop. 
The rajjid decline was checked momentarily in 
May and June at around 155 million Yen, but 
continued downward through July, reaching the 
low point of a little les.s than 118 million Yen in 
that month. This represented an average deci-ease 
of 54 percent from the pre-raid period. At the 
same time, full-time factory employment de- 
creased only 44 percent, while productive hours 
declined 70 percent. One of the most vital factors 
in industrial production, for which over-all sta- 
tistics were not ol)tainable, is the supply of raw 
materials and component parts; but as these items 
de])ended upon the increasingly inadequate trans- 
portation system, there was generally a critical 
shortage of the materials required by tlie factories 
in the conqjlex for conversion to finished i)roilucts. 
The direct eti'ects of bombing on industrial instal- 
lations are shown in the section on industrial 
jiroduction. 

Economic Collapse Coincident with Air At- 



tacks. While it isditlicull at tlii^ point lo measure 
the direct cH'ects of aii' attacks on the over-all 
economy of the area encompassing Tokyo, Kawa- 
saki and Yokohama, it is of .some value to com- 
p;ire the decline of contiibuting factoi's during 
the raid period. Tal)le 19 gives the average 
monthly figure for each industrial factor diwing 
tlie pre-raid and raid periods and for the last full 
month of the war, together willi tlie percentages 
of decline. 

From these figures it would appear that shipping, 
•sliowing the greatest decline, was the primary 
cause for the decrease in production, as most of the 
other contributing factors show less of a decline 
than industrial output. If, however, electrii' 
power consumption be taken as the measure of 
}) reduction (as yen value here merely represents 
sales), it will be .seen that almost all the other 
factors likewise contributed in large measure to 
the ultimate collapse. Bomb damage itself, with 
its resultant destruction of physical installations, 
would have brought all factors to the same de- 
creased level as production itself, however, it did 
not do so. The conclusion may therefore be drawn 
that destruction of a portion of the physical means 
of production merely reduced the excess capacity 
of plants, and contributed less to the decline in 
industrial output than did the indirect eti'ects of 
air attacks. This seems to be borne out by the fact 
that little or no repair was undertaken by those 
factories which actually' sufl'ered bomb damage. 



Table 19. — Decline in industrial factors 








Factor 


Monthly averages 


Percent 
average 
decline 


July 
1945 


Percent 
total 


• 


Pre-raid 


Raid 


decline 


Incoming shipping (gross rated tons) 


279.620 

578,943 

274.440 

32,744 

2,933 

241,929 

21,192 

1,429,665 

4.53.410 


75,110 
293,554 
144,551 

16.9.55 

2,138 

142,905 

11,742 
806,366 
207,632 


73 
49 
47 
48 
27 
41 
45 
44 
54 


25,271 

218,184 

99,210 

13,985 

1,883 

109,127 

4,394 

595,031 

117,890 


91 


Incoming truclving (tons) 


62 


Coal consumption (tons) 


64 

•57 


I'oke consumptiiin (tons) 


Cliarcoal consumption (tons) 


36 


Electric power (l.fK)O kilowatt-hours) 


55 


Gas consumption (1,000 kilowatt-hours) 


79 


Factory workers 


58 


Industrial production ( 1,000 ven ) 


74 







17- 



INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 



Industrial Plant Sample. In ordei- to undertake 
a more detailed analysis of industrial activity than 
was possible from the over-all data assembled for 
the urban complex, questionnaires were sent to 
some 1000 plants in Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Yoko- 
hama. Of these. 516 were returned with statistics 
complete enough to establish a valid industrial 
sample for the area. The following list gives the . 
industrial classihcations used throughout this 
study, togetlier witli the number of plants com- 
pleting the questionnaire in eacli industry group: 



Category 


Industry 


Number 
of plants 


1 

9 


Aircraft and alternating-current engines 
Ordnance 


17 
23 


3 


Shipbuilding 


90 


4 
5 


Motor vehicles 

Electrifal products 


19 
76 


6 

7 


Machinery and tools 

Metal products 


81 
74 


8 


Metals production 


70 


9 


Chemicals 


53 


10 


Petroleum 


4 


11 

12 


Miscellaneous (textiles, leather, etc.) 

Public utilities 


75 
2 



Value of Plant Sample. Though the (jiiestion- 
naires were directed only to ]>lants employing 100 
or more workers, the returns represented o7 per- 
cent of the industrial electric power consumption. 
32 percent of the industrial labor force, and 31 
percent of the productive labor hours accounted 
for by the entire complex prior to the period of air 
attacks. Thus, it may be assumed that the sample 
represents about one-third of the total industrial 
capacity of the area under wartime conditions. 
The plant sample is comjjared with data for the 
entire complex as follows : 





Productive 
hours 


Labor 
force 


Electric 
power 


Complex 


318,1.58,000 

97.569,000 

31 


1,429,665 

451,7.54 

32 


241,929,000 


Sample 


90,154,000 


Percent 


37 







Signifeanee of Industrial Factors. The meas- 
ure of industrial production is ordinarily under- 
stood to be the value of work in process during a 
given accounting period. Usually in Japanese 
data the yen value of finished products, or deliv- 
eries, reflects output with fair accuracy, but in 
certain industries, the measure of monthly fluctu- 
ations in actual production nuist be sought in 



factors more inuneiliately susceptible to wartime 
economic conditions. This is particularly true in 
the Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama complex, where 
shipbuilding and heavy machinery were import- 
ant items in the industrial output. A more sensi- 
tive gage of the immediate reactions of production 
is foiuitl in eitlier the electric power consumption 
of plants or the productive hours of labor, or both, 
since these factors would immediately reflect the 
consecjuences of material shortages and the impact 
of air attacks. It was found upon examination 
that total labor hours, productive and lost, are a 
constant nuiltiple of the total labor force in each 
industry, and may be used as an accurate measure 
of fluctuations in the number of plant workers. 

xoTK. — After the graphs for this section of the report 
had been drawn, it was discovered that several plants had 
represented their labor force as man-days: therefore, the 
decline in labor force is represented hereafter by that of 
total labor hours. However, for the purpose of establish- 
ing an accurate value for the sample, labor force figures 
were adjusted in the comparative table. 

Ration of Production Factors. Industry places 
a predominant reliance on either hand labor or 
electric power; and in plants which are primarily 
concerned with assembly, one may be partially or 
wholly substituted for the other. Thus, a decrease 
in electric power consumption in relation to pro- 
ductive hours would indicate either an increasing 
use of unskilled workers (men untrained in the 
operation of complicated power-driven machines), 
resulting in a decreased demand for electric power, 
or immobilization of the machines themselves 
througli damage, obsolescence or lack of mainte- 
nance. In the basic metals industry, however, 
electric power consumption is not so much depend- 
ent on skilled labor as on the supply of raw mater- 
ials, as even untrained workers might be employed 
to operate the furnaces. The efficiency of labor 
can be determined from tlie ratio of productive 
hours to kilowatt hours; and labor productivity 
can be measured by the rate of yen sales per pro- 
ductive hour. The ratio of kilowatt-hours to sales 
may be used as a furtlier check on labor efficiency 
and productivity. Finally, in determining the 
cause of production declines, the percentage rela- 
tionshi[) of each industrial group to the total of 
the sample nuist be taken into consideration. 

Limiting Factors in Production. The 516 
sampled plants in the urban complex reported a 
variety of reasons for the decline in production 
during the period under survey. The chief causes 



18 



for the over-all decline, in order of tVe(|Ueiicy ;iiid 
importance, were : (1) hdior ditliciilties, (2) sliort- 
afj:es of raw niatei'iiils, and {?>) shortajivs of fnel. 
Bomb damage us a direct canse of produdion 
losses was cited seventh on the list. .V word of 
clarification is necessary, howe\ei', in order to 
undei'stand the si<>nilicance ol' these limit in"- fac- 
tors and their relationship to one another. The 
lahor prohlem cannot he interpreted merely as a 
shortage of plant workers. It I'onsisted rather in 
absenteeism, induced by the need of workers to 
care for their families and repair their homes dur- 
ing the period of devastating area raids, and by 
the necessity for seeking food in distant rural 
areas after air attacks had disrupted the rationing 
system in the cities. Absenteeism was further in- 
creased by the disruption and inadequacy of local 
transportation, likewise the result of air attacks, 
and the efRciency of the workei's was lowered and 
their productivity lessened as a result of the under- 
mining psychological eifects of frequent bomb- 
ings. Though shortages of skilled workers oc- 
curred in some industries, thei'e was at no time a 
critical lack of manpower in the plants except 
thi'ough absenteeism. Thus, air attacks may be 
said to have been the primary cause, even though 
indirectly, of the decline in industrial production 
after the end of 1944. On the other hand, short- 
ages of raw materials, component parts and fuel 
(gas and coal) had been the principal limiting 
factors prior to the raid period, and continued to 
plaj' an important part in reducing output during 
the succeeding months. As we have already seen, 
these shortages were due primarily to the Allied 
blockade, and the antishipping program, and to 
the inadequacy of the Japanese allocations and 
transportation system. While air attacks de- 
stroyed numerous small worksho2)s and tempo- 
rarily disrupted production in many of the larger 
plants, the reporting industries escai^ed major 
destruction of their facilities. The only other 
limiting factors WQrthy of mention were : official 
orders changing the nature or model of end prod- 
ucts; changes in the requirements of customers, 
and dispersal. 

Periods of Limitation. Shortages of fuel ex- 
isted as early as 1943, owing to drastic enemy- 
induced restrictions on shipping, and continued 
to be the primary limiting factor on production 
until March 1944. From April to October, al- 
though peak production was attained during this 



))ei-iod. raw iiialerials were llie Ixill lencrk lint 
from November 1944 until the end of the war the 
eft'ects of air attacks ininiini/.cd tlie shortages 
thi-ough an increase in :d>senteeism at the plants 
and a Fiirlher slow-down in production ihroiigh 
the necessary use of untrained workers in skilled 
categories. ]>oth raw materials and fuel, how- 
ever, renuiined short tliioiiLdiont the entire raid 
period. While official orders and changes in cus- 
tomer demands slowed production in almost every 
industi'Y prioi' to the jjei'iod of air attacks, these 
factors became less pronounced during the raid 
months. Dispersal was im])ortant only in the 
aii'craft industry, which iiegan its program as 
early as August 1944. though early in 194.5. trans- 
fers of plant and e(iui|)inent began to take place 
to a certain extent in almost every industry. The 
following li.st shows the relative importance of the 
limiting factors of production in each of the in- 
dustrial groups in l)oth the pre-raid and raid 
periods : 

Reasons given for decline in production 



Industry 


Pre-raid period 


Raid period 


1. 


Aircraft 


1. 

2. 
3. 


Labor. 

Official orders. 
Change in 
demand. 


1. 

2 


Labor. 
Disper.sal. 
Bomb damage. 


2. 


Ordnance 


1. 
2. 
3. 


Raw materials. 
Labor. 
Official orders. 


1. 

2, 
3. 


Fuel. 
Component 

parts. 
Labor. 


3. 


Sliipliuilding 


1. 
2_ 

3. 


Labor. 

Official orders. 
Change in 
demand. 


1. 

2 

3. 


Labor. 

Change in 
demand. 
Official orders. 


4. 


Motor vehicles.. 


1. 

i'. 


Labor. 

Official orders. 
Fuel. 


1. 

2 

S. 


Lal)or. 

Official orders. 
Fuel. 


5. 


Electrical 
products. 


1. 

2. 
3. 


Raw materials. 
Labor. 
Change in 
demand. 


1. 
o 

3. 


Labor. 

Raw materials. 

Fuel. 


6. 


Machinery and 
tools. 


1. 
2. 

3. 


Raw materials. 
Change in 
demand. 
Labor. 


1. 
2. 
3. 


Lal)or. 

Raw materials. 

Fuel. 


7. 


Metal products.. 


1. 

o 

3. 


Labor. 
Change in 
demand. 
Official orders. 


1. 
o 

3. 


Labor. 

Raw materials. 
Change in 
demand. 


8. 


Metals 

production. 


1. 
2 

3. 


Raw materials. 

Labor. 

Fuel. 


1. 
2 

3. 


Raw materials. 

Labor. 

Fuel. 


9. 


Chemicals 


1. 

2 

3'. 


Raw materials. 
Fuel. 
Change in 
demand. 


1. 
2 

3. 


Raw materials. 

Fuel. 

Labor. 



19 



Reusuns i/in ii for decline in production (continued) 



Industry 


-Pl*e-raid period 


Raid period 


111. Fetnileum 


1. 


Rawnwterial.s. 


1. 


Raw materials. 




2 


Labor. 


2, 


Disper.sal. 




3. 


Fuel. 


3. 


Fuel. 


n. Miscellaneous.^ 


1. 


LalH>r. 


1. 


Labor. 




*) 


ChanKe in 


2. 


Fuel. 






demand. 


3. 


Itonib damage. 




3. 


Fuel. 






12. Public utilities 


1. 


Raw materials. 


1. 


Raw materials. 


(Kasl. 


2 


Labor. 


•) 


Labor. 




3. 


Fuel. 


3'. 


Fuel. 


AH industr.v 


1. 


Raw materials. 


1. 


Labor. 




2 


Labor. 





Raw materials. 




3. 


Fuel. 


3. 


Fuel. 



Over-aJl Produetion Trench. For the purpose 
of this study, the months October 1!)43 through 
September 1944 have been established as tlie base 
period, all percentaoes beino- calculated on the 
average monthly fiirure for this full pre-raid year 
(dnipli 1j!). Prior to the period of air attacks, 
sale-s rose steadily from 352.2 million yen in Xo- 
vember 1943 to a peak of 494.!) million in October 
1944. From the latter month, however, the trend 
was steadily downward, with sales reaching the 
low figui'e of 140 million yen in July 1945, the 
last full month of the war. This represented a 
total drop of 66 percent from the base period 
average of 405.9 million yen. Electric power con- 
sumption fluctuated between 86 and 96 million 
kiloM-att-hours during the pre-raid months, with 
a base average of 90.2 millicm. The decline in this 
factor began in December 1944, consumption fall- 
ing otf gradually to 35.4 million kilowatt-hours in 
July 1945. a decrease of 61 percent. Productive 
labor hours increased from 86 million in October 
1943 to 113. :> million in November 1944, the aver- 
age for the base i)eriod being 97.6 million. In 
Jamiary 1945, however, productive hours dropped 
below normal and continued to decrease gradually 
t(i 47 million in July, representing a decline of 52 
])ercent. TJie labor force as rei)resented by total 
labor liours. divtjjped only 13 percent during the 
I'aid period. The most significant decline in pro- 
duction occurred in Aj)iil 1945, when yen sales 
fell oil 28 percent. That this was an accurate re- 
flection of the actual dro|) in production is attested 
l)y the fact that both electric power consmnption 
and |)i<iiliict i\c hours registered their greatest 
decrea.ses in the same month — 16 iicrcent and 15 
l)ei-cent, res])ectively. 

Causes of Decline in I'lddiict'ioii. A\'liile |)i()- 
ductive labor hr)urs representeil 79 |)ei(eiit of the 



total labor hours during the pre-raid period, by 
July 1945 they were only 44 percent of the total. 
Conversely, lost hours increased from 21 percent 
to 56 percent. During the same months, sales 
dropped from 4.17 yen per productive hour to 
2.98, and kilowatt-hours per productive hour de- 
creased from 0.93 to 0.75. Yen sales per kilowatt- 
hours declined from 4.48 to 3.96. As the labor 
force had decreased only 13 percent during the 
same period, compared with a drojj of more than 
50 percent for other factors of production, it is 
evident that there was no actual shortage of 
workers. As we have seen in the section on Eco- 
nomic Efl:'ects of Air Attacks, there was likewise 
no shortage of electric power; therefore, the de- 
cline in this factor nuist have been due to dimin- 
ished neetls on the part of consumers. We find, 
however, that productive hours i)er total hours 
decreased .■55 percent, an indicatioit that labor was 
not devoting fidl time to its norntal functions; 
and a decrease of 29 j)ercent in yen sales i)er pro- 
ductive labor hour is evidence of the diminishing 
productivity of workers either through lack of 
training or absenteeism. This is further borne 
out by the fact that electric power consumption 
23er productive hour had fallen off 19 percent, indi- 
cating an increasing reliance on workers as against 
the use of machinery. Yen sales per kilowatt- 
hours had declined 11 percent, from which it may 
be deduced that untrained labor was becoming 
more and more an obstacle to the efl'ective mainte- 
nance of production standards. This analysis 
upholds the reporting plants in their declarations 
that labor was the principal limiting factor of 
industrial production during the raid period. 
Such being the case, it is obvious that even had 
more materials and fuel been available, the con- 
tinued inefficiency of the workers would have pre- 
vented any appreciable increase in output, and the 
ultimate decline in production would not have 
been measurably altered. The iiiHuence of each 
industrial gi-oupon production as a whole is shown 
in Table 2(1. 

Decline Aftrihufahle to Individual Industries. 
Although the late of decline in factors within the 
se])arate industrial categories is a mea.sure of pro- 
duction losses of individual industries, it is im- 
l)ortant to evaluate the coiitiilmtion of each group 
to the decline in industry as a whole. Table 21 
shows the percentage of the lo.ss in each industry 
in relation to the total loss for all plants in the 
sample ; 



20 



Tahi.k 20. — Divl'.iK ill iiiitiinliiiil fiiihiis iluiiiiii iiiids 
[Units in 1,0001 









Yen sales 








Productive hours 




Kilowatt-hour consumption 























































Loss 








Urns 




Base 


Per- 


July 


Per- 


per- 


Base 


Per- 


July 


Per- 


per- 


Base 


Per- 


July 


Per- 


per- 






cent 




cent 


cent 




cent 




cent 


cent 




cent 




cent 


cent 


1 


45,236 


11 


6,873 


5 


85 


9,477 


10 


4,503 


10 


52 


4,714 


5 


1,371 


4 


71 


2 


7,945 


2 


5,640 


4 


29 


4,178 


4 


2,661 


6 


36 


1,027 


1 


481 


1 


53 


3 


28,010 


7 


12,362 


9 


5»! 


10,665 


11 


3,383 


t 


68 


3,904 


4 


1,610 


o 


.59 


4 


22,299 


6 


4,638 


3 


79 


7,633 


8 


4,707 


10 


38 


4,1.58 


5 


1,441 


4 


65 


5 


68,817 


17 


24,927 


18 


CA 


14,(i37 


15 


6,772 


14 


54 


7,844 


9 


3.111 


9 


60 


6 


53,545 


13 


22,328 


16 


5,S 


14,288 


15 


4,174 


9 


71 


.5,195 


6 


2.880 


8 


45 




21,265 


5 


7,813 


6 


63 


6,737 


7 


3,470 


I 


48 


3,487 


4 


937 


3 


73 


8 


66,690 


16 


27,454 


19 


.59 


13,097 


13 


7,206 


15 


45 


35,719 


39 


12,169 


35 


66 


9 


29,736 


7 


13,905 


10 


53 


8,954 


9 


5,131 


11 


(78) 


12,193 


13 


4,693 


13 


62 


10 


l,."il4 


1 


90 





94 


274 





488 


1 


43 


525 


1 


97 





82 


11 


57,848 


14 


12,670 


9 


78 


7.492 


8 


4,463 


10 


40 


9,056 


10 


5,288 


15 


42 


12 


3,489 


1 
100 


1,.395 


1 
100 


60 
66 


137 
97,569 



100 


115 




KM) 


16 
52 


2,332 


3 

100 


1,166 


3 

100 


.50 


Total 


406,394 


140,095 


47,073 


90,1.54 


35.244 


61 



Figures in parentheses are increases. 

Table 21. — Coiiiinnistjii of dcclinrs in intliistrinl i/nmpfi 

[Units in 1,000s] 





Yen sales 


Productive hours 


Kilowatt-hour 
consumption 


Industry 
















Loss 


Per- 
cent 


Loss 


Per- 
cent 


Loss 


Per- 
cent 


1 


38.363 


14 


4,974 


10 


3,343 


6 


2 


2.305 


1 


1,.517 


3 


346 


1 


3 


15,648 


6 


7,282 


14 


2 294 


4 


4 


17,661 


7 


2,926 


6 


2,717 


5 


5 


43,890 


16 


7,865 


16 


4,733 


8 


6 


31,217 


12 


10,114 


20 


2,315 


4 


7_ 


13,4.52 


;^ 


3,267 


6 


2,550 


5 


8 J 


39,236 


15 


5,891 


12 


23,5.50 


43 


9 


15,831 


6 


3,823 


8 


7,500 


14 


10 


1,424 





(214) 


(1) 


428 


1 


11 


45,178 


17 


3,029 


6 


3.768 


i 


12 


2,094 


1 
100 


22 





1.166 


2 


Total_. 


266,299 


50,496 


100 


54.910 


100 



Fisrures in parentheses are increases. 

Thus, we find tliat only five industrial <iroui)s were 
■responsible for 74 percent of the decline in total 
industrial sales, tlie miscellaneous catejrory ac- 
counting^ for the lari>est percentage. In like man- 
ner, five gi'oups accounted for 7"i percent of the 
loss in productive hours, witli the macliinery and 
tools industry contributing the greatest sliare. In 
this factor, however, shipbuilding replaces the 
miscellaneous industries as one of the important 
groups. In kilowatt-hours of electric power con- 
sumption, two industries alone accounted for 57 
percent of the total decline, the metals production 
industry being by far the most important in this 
factor. The only other significant decrease was 
registered in the cliemicals industry. It will be 
remembered that these two groups sufi'ered pri- 
marily from shortages of raw materials. It is 
of interest to note that the five groups accounting 



for 74 percent of tlie decline in yen sales during 
the raid niontiis were also responsible for 71 per- 
cent of yen sales during the pre-raid period; there- 
fore, the causes of decline in these groups would 
be indicative of tlie reasons for the decrease in 
industry as a whole. AVe find, then, that labor 
difficulties, that is, ahsenteeism and .some short- 
ages of skilled workers, constituted the chief ob- 
stacle to production in each of the groups, with 
a shortage of raw materials and fuel as second and 
third causes. Rornb damage contributed to the 
decline in both the miscellaneous and aircraft 
industries, with dispersal in the latter adding to 
the difficulties in production. 

Factor Ratios in Indiridiial Industries. In 
order to better understand the difficulties and re- 
quirements of production in the various industrial 
groups, it is necessary to apply the ratios men- 
tioned in the paragraph on Katio of Production 
Praetors. "We find that in four of the five major 
groups there was a serious decline in yen sales per 
productive hour. Machinery and tools, however, 
actually showed an increase of 43 percent in this 
factor, and an increa.se of !)'2 percent in kilowatt- 
hours per productive hours. This exception is 
accounted for by the fact that there was no critical 
shortage of skilled workers in this industry, which 
had sufficient component parts to continue assem- 
blies at a high rate per hour, even though its total 
output dropped 58 percent because of absenteeism. 
The increase of 132 percent in kilowatt-hours per 
productive hour in basic metals production is not 
surprising, for unskilled labor could be used to 
operate the furnaces and output per kilowatt- 
hours actually increased in spite of a decline in 



21 



yen stiles per proiliu-tive hour. Table -I'l shows 
the ratios for both tlie base period and the month 
of July l!)4o. tooetJier witli the itercentages of 
decrease or increase. 

Prudiictioti Losxex Due to Bdinh I>(a)i(ige. In 
order to isolate the direct etl'ects of air attacks 
(bomb damatre to plant and equipment) from the 
indirect etl'ects (absenteeism, worker moiale, etc.) 
and aenerul wartime conditions (shortages of raw 
materials, obsolescence of machinery, etc.), it is 
necessary to compare the decline in production 
factors of damaged plants with that of undam- 
aged plants (Graphs 13 and 14). Table 23 com- 
pares the figures for the preraid period with those 
of July 1!)45. and shows the percentages of decline 
during the raid mouths. 

Thus, the ratio of loss of damaged plants to tliat 
of undamaged plants is 70 to 47, or 1.5 to 1.0 for 
Yen sales, ii.5 to l.i» for jiroductive hours, and 1.7 
to 1.0 for electric' jiower consmnption. Assuming 
that jiroduction in all plants, both damaged and 
undamaged, was influenced equally by prevailing 
economic conditions, including the indirect etl'ects 
of air attacks, we find that the decline in yen sales 
due to such causes would amount to 47 ]iercent, 
as shown in the midamaged category. Tliis same 
percentage would also liold true for the dauiaged 



plants; therefore, any loss in excess of the 47 per- 
cent in the damaged category can be attriljuted 
to the direct effects of bombing. As the decrease 
in yen sales of damageil plants was 70 percent, 
the difference between the losses in the two cate- 
gories, or 23 percent, represents the loss due to 
these direct effects, that is, the destruction of plant 
and e<iuipment. We Hnd. then, tliat in plants 
actually hit during air attacks, the ratio of direct 
bomli-damage loss to that from all other causes 
would be 23 to 47, or 1.0 to 2.0 for yen sales, 1.5 to 
1.0 for productiA-e hours, and 1.0 to 1.4 for electric 
power consumption. In order to find the produc- 
tion loss due to bomb damage for the entire plant 
sample, we again assiune that, of the total decline 
in yen sales of 66 percent, 47 percent was due to 
general wartime conditions, including the indirect 
effects of air attacks. The difference of 19 percent 
in these two percentages would then represent the 
proportion of loss due to the direct effects, or bomb 
damage. Therefore, the ratio of bomb-damage 
lo.ss to that from all other causes would be 19 to 
47. or 1.0 : 2.5 for yen sales, 1.2 : 1.0 for productive 
hours, and 1.0 : 1.7 for electric power consump- 
tion. I'rom this analysis it may be concluded that, 
all other factors being equal, direct hits on indus- 
trial plants increase In" about 50 percent the losses 



Table 22. — Decline in industrial ratios 



Industry 


Yen sales per 
productive hour 


Yen sales per 
kilowatt-hour 


Kilowatt-hours per 
productive hour 




Base 


July 
1945 


Loss 
Percent 


Base 


July 

1945 


Loss 
Percent 


Base 


July 

1945 


Loss 
Percent 


1 


4.77 
1.00 
2li3 
2 92 

3.75 
.S.16 
5.09 
3.32 
5..52 
7.73 
2.55 
4.17 


1..53 
2.12 
3 1 in 

.99 
3. 68 
5.35 
2.25 
3 81 
2.71 

.18 

2.S4 

12.13 

2.98 


68 
(12) 
(39) 

m 

22 
(43)' 
29 
25 
18 
97 
(!3 
(376) 
29 


9.58 
7.66 
7.19 
5..34 
8.74 
10.35 
6.10 
1.87 
2.44 
2.87 
6.38 
1..50 
4.48 


5.01 
11.73 
7.68 
3.22 
8.01 
7.75 
8.34 

2.96 
.93 
2.40 
1.20 
3.98 


48 

(53) 

(7) 

40 

8 

25 

(37) 

(21) 

(21) 

68 

62 

20 

11 


0.50 

.25 

.37 

.55 

.54 

.36 

.52 

.73 

1.36 

1.91 

1.21 

1.70 

.93 


0.30 
.18 
.48 
.31 
.46 
.69 
.27 

1.69 
.91 
.20 

1.18 

10.14 

.75 


40 


2 


28 


3 


(30) 


4 


44 


5 


15 


6 

7 


(92) 

48 


8 


(132) 


9 


33 


10 
11 


90 
2 


12 


(496) 


Total industry 


19 



Figures in parenthesis indicate increases. 



Table 23. — Decline in prndnctinn fnetora — Dain<i<i(il and inid(t)iiii(t( d idiints 

[Units in 1.000's] 



Category 


Yen sales 


Productive hours 


Kilowatt-hour consumption 




Base 


July 


Percent 


Base 


July 


Percent 


Base 


July 


Percent 


Daniaged-i 

Undaiiiagefl 


327,534 
78,860 


229,479 
36,819 


70 
47 

66 


75,973 
21, .596 


45,476 
5,021 


60 

23 

52 


73,502 
16,652 


48,462 
6.287 


66 
38 






Total 


406,394 


266,298 


97,569 


50,497 


90,154 


54,749 


61 



22 



ill |iri)(liicl ion (.■illlscd iiidirci'I ly liy :iir r;ii(ls aii<l 
other wartime coiidifioiis. If, howcxcr. we coiilil 
iiu'lude tlie ))liints coinplelely desti'dycd liy lioiiih- 
iiij:- (wliicli ;in' nut rcprescMited in I lie sample), 
the ]ir(i|)(irl iciii of loss due Id iiif iiltiicks would be 
greatly increased, as is sliuwii liy tlie rollowing 
fifjures {•oinpariii'T llic decline in indnstrial I'acfors 
For tlie iirlian c( implex with that of I he sample : 





Yen sales 


Labor force 


Productive 
hours 


Oimplex 

Plant sample 


Percent 
74 

m 


Percent 
5S 
17 


Percent 
85 
52 



Note. — The decline in electric power consumption for the 
complex, as reported by the utilities company, was only 
56 percent. It is evident from the other factors, however, 
that tlie complex as a whole must have suffered a much 
greater loss than the sample plants. 

Aircraft (Grapli 15). The yen value of deliv- 
eries in this industry tliictuated iireatly from 
month to month. Labor difficulties and chanoes in 
the model of end products contrilnited to the er- 
ratic nature of [)roductic)n durino- the preraid 
months. Iveference to the electric power consump- 
ti(m indicates that production beaan its steady 
and precipitous decline after November 1944 and, 
except for a temporary recovery in April 1945, 
continued its downward treml until the end of 
the war. It is curious to note that this momentary 
check in the decline occurred precisely in the 
month of heaviest precision attacks on the in- 
dustry. Of the total drop in production during 
the raid jjeriod (81 percent of electric power con- 
sumption by July 1945), the sharpest decline 
occurred in .January 1945, when kilowatt-hours 
decreased more than 24 percent. Yen value of 
deliveries suffered its greatest drop in April (23 
percent out of total of 85 percent). The Naka- 
jima plants, which dominated the aircraft indus- 
try with their 37,500 workers, stressed absentee- 
ism, lack of skilled workers, dispersal, and bomb 
damage, in that oi-der, as the chief causes of the 
decline in production, although these installations 
had been continuous targets for precision attacks 
since P'ebruary 1945. 

Ordnance (Graph IC). The peak in ordnance 
production came at the end of 1944, with electric 
power consmnption first falling below the base 
period average in February 1945. After April, 
the sharp decline was arrested, permitting end 
product deliveries to rise from 55 percent to 70 
percent of normal during the remaining of the 



\\:\r. Tlic labor Ini'cc rclnaincd laii-ly cDii^lant 
iit around 95 jiercenl of the liaM' ])('riod. after a 
l)recipilons drop in .March. I'rior to air attacks, 
shortage.s of raw materials had played the pre- 
dominant role in |iriidiirt ion de<'lines, with labor 
taking a serondai-y part. J)tiring(he raid jieriod, 
however, the chief shortage was fuel, while pro- 
duction was further (aiitailcd (linmgli ;i reduced 
supply of component parts. L.-ibor dilliculties 
were cited only as a thir<l cause of the decline. 
Thus, air attacks seem to lia\e had a negligible 
effect on the production of ordnance, and ev'en 
their indirect effects, though labor, were only of 
tertiary importance. 

Shiphuild'nig (Graph 17), Pi-oduction of ships 
was extremely erratic during the entire period 
under survey. Deliveries were on the increase 
until August 1944 and continued at a high level 
until the end of the year. Ellectric power con- 
sum|)tion and labor were faiidy constant during 
the pre-raid months, though the former showed 
continuous light fluctuations from a steady trend. 
During this i)eriod. the main complaint of the 
industry was absenteeism, with some shortages of 
qualified workers, and further slowdowns due to 
changes in government renuireinents. Once the 
raid began, however, the labor prol)lem ceased to 
be a critical factor, and the ensuing decline in pro- 
duction was attributable primarily to a shortage 
of raw materials, with customer demands for 
changes adding to the difficulties of production. 
By July 1945, both deliveries and electric power 
consumption had dropj)ed more than 55 percent, 
while the labor force had decreased only 31 per- 
cent. 

Motor Vehicles (Graph 18). Labor was at all 
times the i)rimary cause of reduced production in 
this industry, with government orders effecting 
changes in end products and shortages of fuel 
following in that order. Here again, production 
was maintained at a fairly constant level until 
November 1944. with deliveries producing the 
usual erratic fluctuations. The labor force re- 
nnrined above the preraid average until June 1945, 
but electric power consumption had already begun 
to fall off in December 1944. The decline in the 
latter factor was gradual until April 1945. with a 
precipitous drop thereafter, bringing the total loss 
to 65 percent by* Jidy. Deliveries in the meantime 
had fallen 79 percent, while the labor force was 
reduced only 9 percent. The decline in the pro- 



23 



duction of motor veliicles was due to absenteeism 
and shortages of skilled workers. 

Electrkal Products (Graph 10). Deliveries in 
this industry reached their peak in December 
1944. held above normal until March 194.5, then 
began an almost vertical drop to June, leveling 
off during the last '1 months of the war with a loss 
of 64 percent. Electric power consumption fluc- 
tuated only slightly until February 1945, when it 
began to decline sharply. In April the dro]) was 
precipitous, liut by June it had leveled otl' witli de- 
liveries, finishing the last '1 months with a total 
decline of lit) pei-cent. During the preraid months, 
the shortage of raw materials was the most ini- 
j)ortant factor limiting higher production and 
labor was a secondary problem; but after the air 
attacks had begun, absenteeism and some lack of 
skilled workers became primary cause of the 
decline, in spite of the fact that the total labor 
force had diminished oidy 10 percent by July. 
The shortage of raw materials continued, how- 
ever, as a secondary cause, followed by a shortage 
of fuel. 

Marlihiei'i/ (111(1 Tools (Graph 20). The erratic 
fluctuations in this industry during the pre-i'aid 
months were attributable to shortages of raw 
materials and government orders effecting changes 
in end products. Peak deliveries were reached in 
November 1944. with maximiun electric power 
consumption occurring at the same time. Thougli 
j)roduction fell off' sligiitly in January 1945, the 
real decline did not set in until March of that 
year. In May, the drop in both electric power 
consumption and deliveries was slowed down, 
ending in July with los.ses of 45 percent and 5.s 
percent, respectively. The labor force in the 
meantime had decreased only 20 percent. Ab- 
senteeism was cited as the main cause of the 
decline in production during the raid period, with 
shortages of raw materials and fuel as second 
and third causes. 

Metal Products (Grajih 21). After an erratic 
preraid production ascribed to labor difficulties 
and official orders effecting changes in end produc- 
tion, this industry reached its peak of deliveries 
in October 1944; thereafter the decline was rapid. 
Electric power consumption, on the other hand, 
attained its peak as early as December 1943, with 
the final decline beginning ju.st 1 year latei'. 
Thereafter, the two factors showed a paiallel 
decline, yen sales dif)pping (>S pei-cent and Kwh 



74 percent by .lune 1945; though both registered 
slight rises in July. The labor force had decreased 
only 18 percent at the end of the raid period; but 
absenteeism was still cited as the main cause of the 
decline in production. Shortages of raw mate- 
rials wei-e secondary. 

Basic Metal Production (Graph 22). During 
the entire period under survey, the causes given 
for difficulties in the production of basic metals 
were, in order of importance, labor, fuel and raw 
nuiterials. The decline in both deliveries and 
electric power consumption began in December 
1944, continued gradually until March 1945, then 
dropped sharply in April. After a temporary 
ciieck in the downward trend in May and June, the 
gradual decline was resumed, yen sales ending in 
July with a loss of 59 percent and electric power 
consumption declining (i6 percent. The labor 
force had diminished only 5 percent during the 
same pei'iod. 

Chemicals (Graph 23). In this industry, raw 
materials and fuel were at all times critically 
short. For this reason, production was fairly 
steady, with no e.xtreme i)eaks or tioughs during 
the pre-raid period. A gradual decline in all fac- 
tors set in after November 1944, electric power 
consum})tion decreasing (U percent and yen sales 
56 percent by June 1945. The labor force had 
risen 4 percent by the same month. 

Petroleum (Graph 24). As the raw materials 
for this industry liad to be imported, critical 
sliortages existed in this factor throughout the 
war. Labor difficulties were a secondary cause of 
tlie erratic fluctuations occurring throughout the 
preraid months, while dispersal played an import- 
ant part in the decline during the period of air 
raids. Finally, in June and Julj' 1945, precision 
attacks further reduced oil production in the area, 
though physical damage occurred too late in the 
war to permit an attempt at recovery. The labor 
force increasecl steadily until July 1945, ending 
that month at 236 percent of the preraid average. 
The downward trend in both yen sales and electric 
power consum])tion began in November 1944, and 
though fluctuation in both factors continued to be 
extremely erratic, deliveries registered a total de- 
cline of 94 percent and kwh a drop of 82 percent 
by July 1945. 

Miscellaneous Industries (Graph 25). Labor 
difficulties were the chief cause of production 
decline in the leather, textiles and paper indus- 
tries, \r,\y\ of whose output was intended for civil- 



24 



iiiri consiiiii])! ion. Oliicial ordcis n'(|iiiriiij;- pi'o- 
(liiclioii cliaiijjji's wcri' also ri'S|)oiisil)l(' I'oi- lliict na- 
tions eliii'in<i the pie-iaid nionllis. while fuel played 
a secondary pait dnrinj:- the period of air raids. 
Daniapo dne to aii- attacks iiati a serious ell'eet on 
production, as many of the plants in this c'atejrory 
were situated in the bombed areas of tiie cities. 
Tlie decline in prodnction herran aftei' the Octobei- 
194:4 peak, deliveries droppinji 7S percent and 
electric power consumption 42 peiceni by July 
1!)4.5. Tlie labor force decreased only 21 percent 
over the same period. 

I'lihlic UtiUties (Graph 26). Gas plants suf- 



fered continuous shortages of the piime raw 
material coal, at all times. I)e]iveries continued 
fairly steady thi'oujih Hecemher 11»44, aftei- which 
month they began a gradual decline. In April 
l'.)4r), sales dropped shar])ly. hut steadied during 
the following montiis, ending in -July with a io.s.s 
of 60 percent. Ellectric power consumption in this 
industry began its downwai'd trend oiil\- in March 
l!)4r), reacliing .50 percent of its pre-raid average 
by the end of the war. The labor force had in- 
creased somewhat during tliis period. (The other 
two utilities, electric power and w'ater, are not 
included in this study.) 



25 



EFFECTS OF BOMBING ON INDUSTRIAL TOKYO 



Intrvduction. As the iiulusti-i;il statistics for 
Tokyo are more complete and in greater detail 
than those for the complex as a whole, especially 
in the matter of physical damage, an analysis of 
the decline in production in this one city gives a 
clearer picture of the industrial activity of the 
entire urban area under survey. According to the 
Japanese national census of February 19-1:4, Tokyo 
accounted for 85 percent of the industrial workers. 
80 percent of the industrial buildings, and 84 per- 
cent of the industrial building area in the three 
cities. It likewise consumed 68 percent of the 
electric power and 72 percent of the gas used by 
industry in the complex. It is significant that the 
capital, depending to a great extent on small shops 
employi}ig a large proportion of hand workers, 
recpiired only 27 percent of the coal and 4(i per- 
cent of the coke consumed Ijy plants in the area. 
Of the 51() plants sampled for the over-all anal- 
ysis. Tokyo's 337 accounted for 58 percent of the 
j-en sales. 54 percent of the i)roductive labor hours, 
50 percent of the labor force, and ;>7 i)ercent of the 
electric power consumption. Thus. Tokyo itself 
represents a fair sample of industrial activity in 
the complex as a whole, while its great variety of 
industries and the wide range of its plant sizes lend 
additional validity to the analysis. 

Industrial I'lant-s Prior to Air Affarks. The 
total number of plants in Tokyo in li)40 was 91,- 
370, the workers numbering 728.092. The process 
of amalgamation and combing out of smaller in- 
stallations, and the resultant shift of workers to 
larger plants, had reduced the total number of 
plants to 98 percent of the above figure by 1942. 
and to 45 jiercent by October 1944, just prior to the 
first air attack. The number of workers, on the 
other hand, had increased to 100 percent and 151 
percent during the same periods. The changes in 
number of plants and workers, by size of installa- 
tion, together with the percentage loss or gain 
from 1942 to October 1944, ai-e shown in Table 24. 
The over-all increase in labor force came about 
chiefly thrf)ugh the closing of wliolesale and retail 
establishments and the transfer (d' their emi)lovees 
(over 8(1(1.01 to in V.iU)] to factory work. By Octo- 
ber 1944. there were oidy 190.000 persons engaged 
in trade. Category 2 shows the major gain in 
iniinber of both plants and workers, some of the 
increase ha\ing ijecn ar(|niicd from Category 1. 



Table 24. — Xiniihcr of ijltnit.s uiul irorkcrx prior to raids 











Percent 








October 


of 


Number of workers 


1940 


1942 


1944 


increase 
or (de- 
crease) 


Category 1, 










(1 t(i9) : 










Plants 


S1.04S 


79.793 


23,963 


(70) 


Workers 


239,469 


217,058 


81,518 


(66) 


Catejioi-y 2, 










(10t(>4".M : 










I'lants 


8,6(19 


8,410 


15,759 


83 


Workers 


177,351 


168,173 


510.624 


188 


Category 3. 










(Soto'.l'.il : 










I'lants 


939 


905 


919 


(2) 


Workers 


63.862 


61,511 


70,419 


10 


Category 4, 










(KHlnncl over) : 










I'lants 


774 


765 


907 


17 


Workt-rs 


247,410 


322,696 


438,946 


77 


Total : 










I'lants 


!)1.3T0 


89,873 


41,548 


(55) 


Workers 


728,092 


769,438 


1,101,507 


51 



Source: National Census. 

Figures in parenthesis are increases. 

Plant Loses During the Raid Period. By 
August 1945, the total number of plants operating 
in Tokyo had been reduced to 13,193, or 32 jjer- 
cent of the October 1944 figure, while the number 
of industrial workers had declined to 596,364, or 
54 percent. Table 25 shows the decrease in each 
category during the raid jjeriod. Category 2, 
which had registered the gi-eatest increase prior to 
air attacks, sutl'ered the sharpest drop during the 
months of air attacks. Plants in the first two cate- 
gories were located for the most part in the more 
den.sely populated sections of the city and were 
thus highly vulnerable to the incendiary raids 
which desolated those areas; but the larger plants, 
situated in the more sparsely settled suburbs, 
generally escaped major damage. In all, (jver 
25,000 [dants were destroyed or badly damaged, 
afi'ecting more than half a million workers. 

I mportance of Small Plants. It was impossible 
to olitain a valid sample of small plants (under 
100 workers), for the simple reason that most of 
them h;id been destroyed in the devastating area 
raids of the spring of 1945. However, the im- 
poitiince of this category jirior to air attacks, and 
the eti'ect which their destruction exercised on the 
industrial production of Tokyo, is evident from 
the figures sliown in Tables 24 and 25. In 1940, 



26 



Table 25. — Dccnuxi- in ni(iiili<r of iihnils diul irr/rkfr.f 
iluiimi niidft 



Tabi-k 26. — Decline in workem during raid period 



Number of workers 


October 

1944 


August 
1945 


Percent of 
decrease 


Categor.v 1 ( 1 to ) : 

Plants 

Workei-s 

Categor.v2 (10to40) : 

Plants 

Workers 


23,063 

81,518 

15,750 
510,624 

010 
70,410 

007 
438,046 

41,.548 
1,101„507 


8,408 
35,781 

3,300 

83,082 

668 
58,125 

808 
410,376 

13,103 
506,364 


65 
56 

70 

84 


Category 3 (50 to 99) : 
Plants 

Workers 


17 


Category 4 (100 and 
overt : 
Plants 


11 


Workers 


4 


Total : 

Plants 

Workers 


68 
46 







Source: Welfare Ministry. 

these smaller plants accounted for 52 percent of 
the total industrial output of the city (4,587 mil- 
lion yen), and in 1942 for 53 percent of a total of 
6,019 million yen. In the same years their total 
labor force amounted to 66 percent and 58 percent, 
respectively. In October 1944, the labor force of 
these small plants represented 60 percent of the 
city's total, and it is logical to assume that their 
combined production would have been between 
50 and 55 percent of the total at that time. Kefer- 
ringto Table 25, we find that in industries employ- 
ing under 100 workers. 28,256 out of a total of 
40,641 plants had ceased operation by July 1945, 
and that the number of workers in this group had 
dropped from 662,561 to 176,988, a loss of 73 per- 
cent. On the basis of small plant production for 
1940 and 1942, therefore, we may assume that 
bomb damage desulted in a production lo.ss of 
approximately 75 percent. As this category 
accounted for about half the production of the 
entire city, the decline actually represented an 
industrial loss of around 37 percent for Tokyo. 
Therefore, the Tokyo plant sample, which con- 
tains only those plants employing over 100 
workers, is representative of only half of the city's 
industrial activities. Table 26 compares the two 
categories of plants and shows the percentage of 
decline, in terms of labor force, during the raid 
l^eriod. 

Value of Plant Sample. The sampled plants in 
Tokyo accounted for 19 percent each of the total 
labor force and productive hours and 20 percent of 
the industrial electric power consumption in the 







Workers 




Per. 


Category 


October 
1944 


Per. 
cent 


July 
1945 


Per. 
cent 


cent 
loss 


Unilcr 1(10 woi-kers 
Over too workers. 


661^,561 
4,38,046 


60 
40 

100 


176,0.S.S 
410,376 


30 

70 


73 
4 


Total 


l,101,.-)07 


596,364 


4G 



Source: Welfare Ministry. 

city prior to the period of air attacks. If, how- 
ever, we consider only that portion of the city's 
industries represented by the sample (plants em- 
ploying over 100 workers) , we find that the report- 
ing plants would actually account for 53 percent 
of the labor force and a corresponding proportion 
of the Yen output and electric power consumption 
in this category. (While 37 out of the 337 .sampled 
plants reported fewer than 100 workers, their com- 
bined production represents only one percent of 
the total sample. As these small industries have 
already been covered in this report, this small 
i:)ercentage may be ignored in subsequent anlyses.) 
In order to afford a better cross section of Tokyo 
industries, the sani[)led plants have been arranged 
according to two classifications: (1) by industrial 
category and (2) by labor group, that is, by size 
of plant. The ratios of industrial factors have 
been worked out on both bases. Throughout this 
study, therefore, the plants are grouped according 
to the following lists. 



Number 




Number 

of 

plants 


1 


By industry 
Aircraft and alternating-current engines 
Ordnance 


9 

19 


3 


Shiplniilding 


7 


4 

5 

6 


Motor veliicles 

Electrical products 

Machinery and tools 


9 
40 
60 


7 

8 

9 


Metals products 

Basic metals 

Chemicals 


52 
51 
36 


10 


Miscellaneous (textiles, etc.) 

Total 


54 
337 


1 


By labor group 
Under 100 workers 


37 


2 

sIIIII 

4 

5 


100 to 2.50 workers.,^ 

250 to .500 workers ^ 

500 to 1000 workers 

1000 to 2.500 workers 


127 
68 
62 
27 


6 


2500 to .5000 workers 


12 


7 


Over .5000 workers 

Total 


4 
337 









Over-all Production Trends (Graph 27). A 
sales peak of 296.2 million yen was reached in 



27 



October 1944, and it was not until January 1945 
tliat deliveries dropped below the monthly aver- 
age for the pre-raid jjeriod. At the end of April, 
the sharp decline was arrested somewhat and 
sales even rose slightly in June, but in July the 
total decline had reached 65 percent. Electric 
])()wer consumption continuetl at a fairly steady 
level thn)ugh November 1944. then declined grad- 
ually until February 1945, and fell otl' sharply the 
following niontli. The downward trend in this 
factor was also checked momentarily in April, 
but continued thereafter, registering a total drop 
of 54 penciit by .Inly. Productive labor hours 
began to decrease slightly in November 1944, liut 
did not drop ])elow the pre-raid average until Fel)- 
ruary 1945. In spite of an accelerated decline in 
April, productive hours rose temporarily in May, 
only to fall again thereafter, showing a loss of 
49 percent by July. The lalmr force was normal 
until May 1945, and had lost only 19 percent by the 
end of the war. Evidence of the drastic etl'ects of 
the area raids is seen in the precipitous droj) in all 
factors during March and April. 

Decline in Production Ratio--:. At the enil of 
the raid period, yen sales per worker had decreased 
57 percent, and productive hours j^er worker had 
dropped 87 percent. Thus, not only was the pro- 
ductivity of active labor reduced; inactive labor 
had greatly increased and absenteeism had become 
the most serious factor in the labor problem. The 
fact that sales per productive hour had also fallen 
otf '.Vl percent indicates a growing inefficiency on 
the part of workers. This is further borne out by 
the decline in sales i>er kilowatt-hour, of 24 per- 
cent evidence that machine efficiency was reduced 
because of the employment of untrained workers. 
Kilf)watt-Iiours per worker had (lro])])ed 4;^) pei'- 
cent and kilowatt-hours per productive hour 11 
l)ercent (hiring the raid months. 

]>p(Tnie in I mli ridiial I iidiixtriex. Table 27 
shows tlie avei-age monthly Hgui'es of each prii(hic- 
tion factor in each industry fV)r the pre-raid period, 
October 194:1 through Septembei- 1944. and the 
figures foi-.Iuly 1945, together with tlie percentage 
i-elationshi)) which each industry bears to the total 
and the percentage of decline oi- lf)ss during the 
raid period. We find that the ])iedominant in- 
dustries during the base or pre-raid period were 
aircraft, maciiinery and tools, basic metals, and 
miscellaneous, these four categories alone account- 
ing for fi8 percent of yen sales. The gi-eatest 
losses occurred in the aircraft and miscellaneous 



industries, with shipbuilding, electrical products, 
and metal products each registering the next high- 
est losses. Monthly fluctuations in each industry 
may be seen on Graphs 28 to 37. The most erratic 
activities are found in the aircraft and shipbuild- 
ing industries, while the motor vehicle industry 
proved to be the steadiest. Production in almost 
every industry had dropped below the base period 
by the end of 1944, but the production level in 
ordnance and electrical pi'oducts was maintained 
until March 1945. Aircraft registered the most 
precipitous drop prior to the heavy area raids, 
production falling from 58.4 million yen in Octo- 
ber 1944 to 19.4 million in February 1945, a loss 
of 67 percent in 4 nu)nths. The miscellaneous 
industries (textiles, leather, paper, etc.) also 
showed a marked decline prior to the incendiary 
attacks, production dropping from 55.5 million 
Yen in ()ctol)er 1944 to 19.(1 million in January 
1945, a loss of (Hi percent in ;') months. Of the 10 
industrial groups, all except airci-aft, sliipbnilding 
and the miscellaneous industries registered their 
sharpest decline during the months of heavy incen- 
diary raids on Tokyo. Table 2S compares the 
decline in each industry with the total decline for 
all industries. Here it is seen that the four groups 
accounting for 68 percent of the yen sales during 
the pre-raid period were also responsible for 75 
percent of the loss during the months of air 
attacks. 

Decline in Production Ratios of Individual 
Industrie^!. Table 29 shows the decrease in pro- 
duction ratios in each industry, in both absolute 
figures and ])ercentages. In all sales ratios, air- 
craft and the miscellaneous industries showed the 
greatest drops, wiiile the other two nnijor groups, 
machinery and tools and basic metals, closely 
paralleled the average decline for industry as a 
whole. In the last mentioned group, sales per 
kilowatt-hour actually increased dui-ing the raid 
l)eriod which indicated a nmre etlicient use of 
electric power, and although there was also a 
decline in kilowatt-houi'S per productive hour this 
industry had less need of skilled workers than did 
the others. Examination of the figures shows 
that in almost every case the loss of production 
was due (1) to absenteeism (decrease in produc- 
tive hours ])er worker) and (2) loss of efficiency 
among the ])ro(liictive woi'kei's (decrease in sales 
per productive hour) : and at least a portion of 
that inefficiencv is due to a lack of skilled labor. 



28 



Tahi.k 27. — Decline in production factors, hif itnlusiri/ 
[All units in lOOO's, except Labor ForceJ 





Yen sales 


11 

V 


Kilowatt-hours 


S'o 




Labor force 




■4J 0) 

Z 


Product! 


ve hours 






3 
C 


11 


c 


•-9 


c 


n 


1 


3 


c 

Pi 


V 

00 


c 
t 
0. 


"a 


1 


n 


c 
u 
o 
u 
V 
P< 


3 


C 


*^ en 

ll o 


1 


41,914 


18 


4,980 


6 


88 


4,725 


14 


1,267 


8 


73 


37,553 


17 


23,648 


13 


27 


7,961 


15 


2,889 


11 


64 


2_ 


6,760 


3 


5,041 


6 


25 


932 


3 


454 


3 


51 


15,138 


I 


13,.565 


8 


10 


3,995 


8 


2,475 


9 


38 


3 


7,175 


3 


2,224 


3 


69 


952 


3 


387 


2 


,59 


1.5,916 


7 


9,781 


5 


38 


3,573 


7 


964 


4 


73 


4 


14,277 


6 


12,083 


15 


15 


825 


2 


416 


3 


50 


13,462 


6 


12,119 


7 


10 


3,040 


6 


1,839 


7 


39 


5_ 


18,565 


8 


5,674 


7 


69 


925 


3 


411 


3 


.56 


22.629 


10 


18,800 


10 


17 


4,450 


8 


1,851 


7 


.58 


6 


45,,S09 


19 


17,729 


21 


61 


4,019 


12 


2,130 


14 


47 


46,833 


21 


36,285 


20 


22 


12,153 


23 


6,527 


24 


46 


7 


9,986 


4 


.3,113 


4 


69 


1,272 


4 


340 


2 


73 


13,490 


6 


12,462 


7 


7 


3,092 


6 


1,666 


6 


46 


8 


27,660 


12 


12,438 


15 


55 


11,152 


33 


4,214 


27 


(i2 


21,881 


10 


19„345 


n 


12 


5,243 


10 


3,074 


11 


41 


9 


18,527 


S 


11,416 


14 


38 


4,013 


12 


2,705 


18 


33 


14,605 


6 


17,218 


9 


(181 


3,270 


6 


2,434 


9 


26 


10 


45,636 


19 


7,225 


9 


84 


4,669 


14 


3,109 


20 
100 


33 


23,554 


10 


18,762 


10 


20 


5,937 


11 


3,409 


12 


43 


Total. 


235,809 


100 


81,923 


100 


65 


33,484 


100 


15,433 


54 


225,067 


100 


181,986 


100 


19 


52,714 


100 


27,128 


100 


49 



Note. — Figure in parenthesis indicates increase. 



Table 28. — Compurativr decline iu production factors, hii indusfrit 
[All units in lOOO's, except Labor Force] 



Industry 


Yen sales 


Kilowatt-hours 


Labor force 


Productive hours 




Decline 


Percent 


Decline 


Percent 


Decline 


Percent 


Decline 


Percent 


1 

2 


36,934 
1,719 
4,951 
2,194 

12,891 

27,.580 
6,873 

15,222 
7!lll 

38,411 


24 
1 
3 
1 

8 
18 

5 
10 

5 
25 

100 


3,4.58 

478 

565 

409 

514 

1,889 

932 

6,938 

1,308 

1,.560 


19 

3 
3 

2 

3 

10 

5 

39 

7 
9 

100 


13,905 
1,.573 
6,135 
1,343 
3,829 

10,547 
1,034 
2,.536 

(2,613) 
4,792 


32 

4 

14 

3 

9 

25 

2 

6 

(6) 

11 

100 


5,072 
1,520 
2,609 
1,201 
2,599 
5,625 
1,426 
2,169 
836 
2,528 


20 
6 


3 


10 


■ 4 
5 


5 
10 


6 


22 
6 
8 
3 

10 


7 


8 


9 


10 




Total 


1.53,886 


18,051 


43,081 


25,.586 


100 





Figures in parentheses are increase. 



Table 29. — Decline in ijrodiution ratios, by industry 



Ind. 



1_ 
2_ 
3_ 
4_ 
5_ 
6_ 
7_ 
8_ 
9_ 
10_ 



Total Iiidusti-' 



Yen sales 



per worker 



Base July Loss 



1,116 

451 

447 

1,061 

820 

967 

740 

1,264 

1,269 

1,937 



211 
372 
227 
997 
302 
488 
260 
643 
663 
385 



1,048 4.50 

I 



Per- 
cent 
81 
17 
50 
6 

63 
50 
65 
49 

48 
80 



;)i 



per productive hour 



Base 



5.26 
1.69 
2.01 
4.70 
4.17 
3.73 
3.23 
5.27 
5.67 



4 47 



July Loss 



1.72 
2.04 
2.31 
6..57 
3.07 
2.71 
1.87 
4.05 
4.69 
2.12 

3 02 



Per. 

cent 

67 

(21) 

(15) 

(40) 

26 

27 

42 

23 

17 

72 

32 



per kilowatt-hour 



Base 



8.90 

7.30 

7.50 

17.30 

20.10 

11.30 

7.90 

2.40 

4.60 

9.70 

7.00 



July 



3.90 

11.10 

5.70 

29.10 

13.8 

8.30 

9.20 

3.00 

4.20 

2.30 

5.30 



Loss 



Per- 
cent 

56 
(.52) 

24 
(68) 

31 

27 

(16) 

(25) 

9 

76 

24 



Productive hours 
per worker 



Base 


July 


212 


122 


263 


182, 


225 


99 


226 


152 


197 


98 


260 


180 


229 


134 


240 


159 


224 


141 


252 


182 


235 


no 



Loss 



Per. 
cent 

42 
31 
56 
33 
.50 
31 
41 
34 
37 
28 

37 



Kilowatt-hours 



per worker 



Base July Loss 



126 

62 

60 

61 

41 

86 

94 

510 

272 

198 

149 



54 
33 

40 

34 

22 

59 

27 

218 

157 

166 



Per. 

cent 

58 
47 
33 
44 
46 
31 
71 
57 
42 
16 

43 



Figures in parentheses are increase. 



per productive hour 



Base 



0..59 
0.23 
0.27 
0.27 
0.21 
0.30 
0,41 
2.13 
1.23 
0.79 

0&^ 



July Loss 



0.44 
0.18 
0.40 
0.23 
0.22 
0.33 
0.20 
1.37 
1.11 
0.91 

0..57 



Per. 

cent 
25 
22 

(48) 
15 
(4) 

(10) 
51 
36 
10 

(15) 

11 



29 



Decline in Individual Labor Crruups. Table oO 
shows the average monthly figures for each pro- 
duction factor in each labor group during the pre- 
paid period and the figures for July 1945, together 
with the percentage relationship which each group 
bears to industry as a whole and the percentage of 
decline or loss during the raid period. "We find 
here that the larger groups have the larger labor 
forces and are responsible for the greater produc- 
tion prior to the period of air attacks; although 
Group 2 (100 to 250 workers) shows a relatively 
high rate of sales. The high percentage of electric 
power consumption in Group 4 (500 to 1,000 
workers) is accounted for by the fact that it con- 
tains most of the basic metals production industry, 
the main industrial user of electricity. Grouj) (i 
(2,500 to 5.000 workers) showed the greatest de- 
cline in all production factors, while Group 4 
actually registered an increase in number of 
workers. This latter phenomenon is attributable 
to the chemicals industry, which had almost dou- 
bled its labor force in this group by the end of the 
war. Production in all groups began to decline 
between October 1944 and January 1945, the 



larger groups beginning later than tlie smaller. 
The most erratic was Group 7 (over 5,000 workers), 
which contained the largest aircraft plants and 
shipbuilding yards. The steadiest production 
trend is foimd in Group 4, a large proportion of 
which was the basic metals production industry. 
ExcejDt for Groujjs 2 and 7, major declines occurred 
during the months of heaviest area raids on the 
city. Table 31 compares the decline in each labor 
group with the decline for industry as a whole. 
Here it is seen that the two largest groups account 
for the greatest proportion of the decline in all 
factors except electric power consumption, and in 
this. Group 4 contributes the greate.st share. These 
same groups also registered the highest percent- 
ages of the same factors during the preraid period. 
It is of significance that the extent of decline in 
production factors bore no relationship to the 
size of the plants; and it may be concluded that 
the indirect effects of air attacks and the influence 
of the disintegrating wartime economy of the city 
were felt equally l)y all plants regardless of size. 
Decline in Production ffat/oy of Labor Groups. 
Table 32 shows the decrease in production latios in 



Table 30.- 



-Decline in production facfots, by labor group 

[All units in lOOO's, except Labor Force] 





Yen sales 


II 


Kilowatt-hours 


ll 

0.0 


Labor force 


II 


Productive hours 




Group 


& 


C 
If 
o 


--3 


1 


n 


c 

at 
ft. 


3 


c 

s 


03 


1 

ft. 


3 


1 




C 

ft. 


3 
•-3 


c 
ft. 


15 


1 

2 

3 ~ 

4 

5 

6 

7 


3,.506 
42,589 
25,730 
29,301 
33,458 
44,645 
56.579 


2 
IS 

11 

12 
14 
19 
24 


3,021 
10,792 

9,921 
19,055 
10,988 

8,148 
19,999 


4 
13 
12 
23 
13 
10 
25 


14 
75 
61 
35 
67 
82 
65 


210 
3,SH0 
5,944 
10,615 
3,177 
2,149 
7,449 


1 

12 
18 
32 
9 
6 
22 


187 
1,656 
2,366 
5,841 
1,656 

766 
2.961 


1 
11 

15 

;"5.s 

11 

5 

19 


11 

58 
60 
45 
48 
64 
(50 


2,971 
20,100 
21.565 
35,481 

3(i,57S 
47,807 
60,565 


1 

9 
10 
16 
16 

21 
27 


2,806 
17,203 
19.908 
37,332 
30.260 
33,920 
40,557 


2 
9 

11 
20 
17 
19 

22 


6 
14 

8 

(5) 
17 
29 
33 


794 
4,841 
4,889 
8,377 
8,969 
10,306 
14,538 


1 

9 
9 

16 
17 

20 

28 


601 
2,920 
2,812 
-5,292 
6,104 
3,238 
6,160 


2 
11 
10 
20 

22 
12 
23 


24 
40 
42 
37 
32 
69 
58 


Total. 


235,809 


100 


81,924 


100 


65 


33,484 


100 


15,133 


100 


54 


225,067 


100 


181,986 


100 


19 


52,714 


100 


27,127 


100 


49 



Table 31. — Comparative decline in production factors, by labor group 
[All units in lOOO's. except Labor Force] 





Yen sales 


Kilowatt-hours 


Labor force 


Productive hours 




Decline 


Percent 


Decline 


Percent 


Decline 


Percent 


Decline 


Percent 


1 


485 
31,797 
15,809 
10,246 
22.470 
36.497 
36.580 


1 
21 
1(1 

7 
15 
23 
23 

100 


23 

2.284 
3..578 
4.774 
1..521 
1.383 
4.488 



13 

20 

26 

8 

8 

25 

100 


165 

2.897 

1.657 

(1.8.51) 

6.318 

13,887 

20,008 


1 
7 
4 

(5) 
15 
32 
46 

100 


193 
1,921 
2,077 
3,085 

2,865 
7,068 
8,378 


1 


•> 


7 


3 


8 


4 


12 




11 


fi 


28 


7 


33 






Total 


1.53,884 


18.051 


43,081 


25,587 


100 







Note. ^Figure in parenthesis inilicates increase. 



30 



Tahlk 32. — Dcrtilic in jiiikIiicI iaii idlius, hit I'lliiirfiriiitiJ 





Yen sales 


Prodi 
Pe 


ictive hours 


Kilowatt hours 


Group 


Per worker 


Per productive hour 


Per kilowatt-hour 


r worker 


Per worker 


Per productive hour 




Base 


July 


Loss 


Base 


July 


Loss 


Base 


July 


Loss 


Base 


July 


Loss 


Base 


July 


Loss 


Base 


July 


Loss 


1 

2 


1,180 
2,118 
1,103 
826 
912 
934 
934 


1,077 
627 
498 
510 
363 
240 
493 


Per. 

cent 
9 
70 
58 
38 
60 
74 
47 


4.41 
8.79 
5.26 
3.50 
3.73 
4.33 
3.89 


5.02 
3.69 
3.53 
3.60 
1.80 
2.52 
3.24 


Per. 
cent 
(14) 
58 
33 
(3) 
52 
42 
17 


16.70 

10.80 

4.30 

2,80 

10.. 50 

20.80 

7.60 


10.20 
6.50 
4.20 
3.30 
6.60 

10.60 
6.80 


Per. 
cent 

3 

40 
2 

(18) 
37 
49 
11 


267 
241 
227 
236 
245 
216 
240 


214 
170 
141 
142 
202 
95 
1.52 


Per. 
cent 

20 
29 
38 
40 
18 
56 
37 


71 
196 
276 
299 
87 
45 
123 


65 
96 
118 
1.56 
55 
23 
73 


Per. 
cent 

8 
51 
57 
48 
37 
49 
41 


0.26 
0.81 
1.22 
1.27 
0.35 
0.21 
0.51 


0.31 
0.57 
0.84 
1.10 
0.27 
0.24 
0.48 


Per. 
cent 

(19) 
30 


3 

4 


31 
13 


6 

7 


23 

(14) 
6 


T(ital_^_ 


1,048 


450 


57 


4.47 


3.02 


32 


7.00 


5.30 


24 


235 


149 


37 


149 


85 


43 


0.64 


0.57 


11 



it'igures in parentheses are increase. 

each labor group, in both absohite figure ami pei-- 
centages. These ratios bear out the previous con- 
clusion that size of plant has no direct relationship 
to declines. Groujj 4, as we have seen, showed an 
actual increase in labor force during the raid 
period. In this grouji we find that, despite the 
evidence of absenteeism, active labor became more 
productive (increase in sales per productive hour) 
and electric power was used more efficiently (in- 
crease ill sales per kilowatt-hour) tlian during the 
preraid period. Group 6 suffered most from 
absenteeism (decrease in productive hours per 
worker) and consequently showed the greatest 
loss in productivity (decrease in sales per worker) . 
Loss of worker efficiency was most serious in group 
2 (decrease in sales per jiroductive hour). 

Damage to Plants in Samph. It will be 
i-ecalled from Table 25 that the industrial group 
represented by this sample (plants employing 
over 100 workers) lost only 99 of its 907 plants 
and 4 percent of its labor force. Of the ■V?)7 in- 
dustrial plants in the Tokyo sample, 190. repre- 
senting 76 percent of the workers, were hit by 
bombs. Altogether, 3,626 workshops in these 
plants were completely destroyed, and of the un- 
determined number of those damaged, only 310 
M'ere restored. In 371 cases, a new building was 
erected on the site of the destroyed shop, and in 
26.5 additional cases, new .sites were cho.sen. Thus. 
less than 19 percent of the totally destroyed shops 
were rebuilt. Table 33 gives the number of work- 
shops destroyed in each industrial grouj). by 
month. From this it appears that the most (lam- 
aging raids were the two occurring in April, 
although the bomb tonnage for May was much 
greater. However, it is quite possible that the 
smaller plants (under ion woi-kei's) suffered most 



in the raid of 10 March, which struck the most 
thickly settled area in Tokyo. Most industries 
were fairly well dispersed throughout the city, 
though aircraft plants were found chiefly in the 
suburbs and shipbuilding yards were limited to 
the harbor district. The chemicals industry re- 
ported the greatest amount of destruction in 
almost every air attack. 

Production Losses Due To Bomh Damage. The 
damaged plants in the sample accounted for 
approximately three-quarters of all production 
factors as shown in Table 34. Fluctuations in the 
damaged and undamaged plants can be seen in 
Graphs 38 and 39. Assuming that all plants are 
equally affected by general wartime conditions, as 
well as by the indirect etl'ects of bombing, the dif- 
ference between the decline in damaged jilants and 
that in undamaged plants woidd lepresent the loss 
due to bomb damage. Therefore, as the sales 
decline in damaged plants during the raid period 
was 72 percent and in undamaged ]ilants 33 per- 
cent, the difi'erence, 39 percent can be attributed 
to the direct effects of air attacks, or bomb damage. 
This is true, of course, only if the same i)lants (all 
damaged) are considered. If we include also the 
jilants undamaged by air attacks, the loss due to 
bombing will be found by subtracting the per- 
centage loss of undamaged plants, not from that 
of damaged plants, but from the percentage loss of 
industry as a whole. In the case of yen sales, the 
total loss was 65 percent, that of undamaged 
[ilants 33 percent, and the difference, representing 
the loss due to bomb damage for the entire sample. 
32 percent. The ratio of loss caused by bombings 
to that from all other causes would then be : 1 : 1 
for yen sales. 2.2 : 1 for electric power consump- 
tion, 9 to 1 for labor force, and 1.2 to 1 for pro- 



31 



Table 33. — WorkKfiDii.s dcntroiied in air attacks 



Industry 


Plants 
hit 


1944 


1945 


Total 




Nov. 


Dec. 


Jan. 


Feb. 


Mar. 


Apr. 


May 


June 


July 


Aug. 


shops 


1 


6 
10 
6 
5 
22 
34 
26 
31 
20 
30 


7 
"i 
"4 

2 


16 

"4 

2 


7 

~4 

~5 
.24 


2 

7 
14 

5 
39 
27 


3 

16 

125 

20 

10 

69 

142 

150 

210 

69 


13 

58 

50 

46 

129 

231 

87 

113 

252 

279 


16 
18 

10 
203 
277 

88 

77 

252 

31 


10 
"3 
17 


— 


16 
40 

16 
18 
4 
29 
16 
38 


78 


o 


134 


3 


181 


4 


76 


5 


373 


6 


621 




325 


8 


377 


9 


776 


10 


485 


Total 


190 


17 


22 


40 


96 


814 


1,258 


972 


30 


— 


177 


3,426 







Table 34. — Decline in production factors, by damaged and undamayed plants 

[All units in lOOO's, except Labor Force] 





Yen sales 


C cfl 

01 en 

O't.-i 
PhO 


Kilowatt-hours 


u 

CU 


Labor force 




Productive hours 




Category 


& 


a, 




c 

it 




C 




s 




G 

a) 
Ph 


>> 


1 




B 
0) 

CI, 




■4J 

B 

i- 


C CO 

(2 "3 


Damaged__ 
Undamaged 


195,270 
40,539 


83 

17 


54,815 
27,109 


67 
33 


72 
33 


26,310 
7,174 


79 
21 


9,516 
5,916 


62 
38 


64 

18 


172,159 
52,907 


76 

24 


129,733 
52,253 


71 
29 


25 

1 


39,570 
13,144 


75 
25 


16,818 
10,309 


62 

38 


57 
22 


Total 


235,809 


100 


81,924 


100 


65 


33,484 


100 


15,432 


100 


54 225,066 


100 


181,986 100 


19 


52,714 


100 


27,127 


100 


49 



T.\BLE 35. — Coniiianitive decline in i)rodiictinn ratios, daiinn/cd and inidiuiiai/rd jilants 





Yen sales 


Production hours 


Kilowatt-hours 




Per worker 


Per production hour 


Per kilowatt-hour 


Per worker 


Per worker 


Per production hour 


Category 


m 




c 




•-a 


c 


CQ 


3 


i 


J 


>> 

3 
•-B 


c 


3; 


>, 

3 


3' 


% 

n 




01 

2 


Damaged 

Undamaged 


1,134 
766 


422 
519 


63 
32 


4.93 
3.08 


3.25 
2.63 


34 

15 


7.42 
5.65 


5.75 
4..58 


22 
19 


230 
246 


130 
197 


43 

21 


153 
136 


73 
113 


52 
17 


0.56 
0.55 


0.57 
0.57 


14 
(4) 


Total 


1,046 


450 


57 


4.47 


3.02 


32 


7.00 


5.30 


24 


235 


149 


37 


149 


85 


43 


0.64 


0.57 


11 



Note. — Figure in parenthesis indicates increase. 

ductive liours. It is of further interest to coiupaiv 
tlie clefliiic in production ratios of the two cate- 
gories, as in Table 35. Taking yen sales per 
worker as an example, we tiiul that the total loss 
for the sample comes to 57 percent. The difference 
between this and the loss shown by the undamaged 
plants ('.V2 jjercent) is 25 percent, representing tiie 
loss due to bomb damage in the entire sample. In 
like manner, the decline attributable to bombing 
in yen sales per productive houi' is 17 percent, in 
kilowatt-hours per productive hour, 5 percent in 
productive hours per woi-ker. 17 percent, etc. 
Hence, in this efficiency and jiroductivity series. 



the ratio of decline <lue to Ijombing, as compared 
witli that diu' to all other causes, is approximately 
one to one. 

Conclusion. We have seen that small and large 
plants each accounted for about one-half of 
Tokyo's industrial out]nit, and that the decline in 
yen value of their production was 75 percent and 
65 percent, i-espectively. The total decline would 
therefore be 70 percent. Similarly, loss of pro- 
duction due to bomb damage accounted for ahnost 
all the decline, or approximately 70 percent, in the 
case of small plants, and 39 percent in the case of 
large plants; consequently, the total loss attrib- 



32 



utable to the direct etTects of bombing would be by the indirect effects of air attacks ;iiid of lier war- 
around 55 ])eicent. Tlie remaining 15 percent of time econoiiiif conditions, 
the over-all decline would then be accounted for 



33 



PERCENT 



160 



SHIPPING-GROSS REGISTERED TONNAGE 

TOKYO- YOKOHAMA- KAWASAKI 

BASE period: OCT. 1943- SEPT. 1944 



100 



60 































100% =367,783 








/ 


\ 










































/ 


\ 


1 


/ 


\ 






























/ 


— 


\ 


/ 




\ 


/ 


\ 


I 






































\ 


/ 




\ 












































\ 


V 












































\ 




^ 


\ 




/ 




^ 






























\ 


^ 




\ 




/ 




\ 




S 












































S 


\ 


— 


^ 



%CT NOV DEC I JAN FEB MAR APL MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC I JAN FEB MAR APL MAY JUN JUL AUG 
1943 _L 1944 J. 1946 

Giailll 1. 



leo 



30 



SHIPPING— TOTAL IN & OUT 

TOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI 

BASE period: JAN 1944- SEPT 1944 











1 






























100 


% 


OUT 130,388 








/ 


1 
\ 




J 


\ 




































/ 


\ 


X 


f 

\ 

\ 


\ 


\ 












































\ 


V 




N. 




/ 


N,: 




































--,, 


s 


:: 


/ 


1 
1 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 


\ \ 
\ \ 


k; 






































N 


/ 

















OCT NOV DEC I JAN FEB MAR APL MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC I JAN FEB MAR APL MAY JUN JUL AUG 
1943 J_ 1944 _]_ 194S 

G r II llh 2. 



34 



AVERAGE DAILY CARLOADINGS 



PERCENT 
140 



TOKYO DIVISION -JAPANESE GOVERNMENT RAILWAY 
BASE PERIOD : OCT 1943 -SEPT 1944 































100% = 5,022 












,y 


, 


^^ 








\, 


























X 












^ 


y 




\ 


^ 




\ 


\ 


^ 


\ 


J 










































\ 


A 


\ 











































































































































OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG 
1943 1944 1945 

Graph 3. 



120 



80 



TRUCKING -TOTAL IN 8 OUT 

TOKYO-YOKOHAMA- KAWASAKI 

BASE period: AUG 1944— JAN 1945 































100% 
































,^ 


578,943 


\T\ 
































QlIT •>■■-» Of K 1 




1 






















\ 






/ 


\ .- 




































w 






/. 


^\ 


\ 














































































\ 


^ 


_„*-'-^ 


/ 


\ 


\ 
\ 




































''^> 


^^ — 




\ 












































\ \ 












































\\ 












































\\ 












































\\ 


























































































:p^ 




^-— '*' 


\ 


\^ 












































s 


r-\ 












































>) 

















































OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG 
I 1943 _L 1944 _L 1945 



35 



COAL CONSUMPTION 

TOKYO - YOKOHAMA - KAWASAKI 
BASE PERIOD-. APR.I944 -SEPT. 1944 



140 

































- INDUSTRY 

- UTILITIES 


100% 
301,908 

27,26 8 






100 
80 

80 
40 
















^ 


- 








/ 




































^ 


^7 "" 


.^<. 








X 


^ 


\ 


\ 






























""■<>•.. 




\ 


\ 


^ 




































X 

\ 














































\ 
\ 















































\ 

\ 

1 



OCT NOV DEC JAN FE8 MAR APR MAY WH JUL AUe SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAT JUN JUL AU« 

1943 -'■ 1944 -'- 1945 

Graph 5. 



COKE CONSUMPTION 

TOKYO - YOKOHAMA - KAWASAKI 
BASE PERIOD: OCT 1943-SEPT 1944 



120 



100 




OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUS SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUS 

1943 1 1944 -L 1945 

Graph 6. 

36 



CHARCOAL CONSUMPTION 



PERCENT 












TOKYO - YOKOHAMA 

PERIOD -OCT. 1943- 


^ - KAWASAKI 

SEPT 1944 












160 


27 


8 




100% 

INOUSTRYMIZ 

HOMES ii.iX 

OTHER T50 








































































/N 


I 




































1£0 


\ 
\ 
\ 


/ 




k 


\ 




































100 




/ 
// 


/ 


^ 


\ 




/ 
/ 


\ 

\ 


/A 


\\ 










/ 


\ 
















\r 




-\ 


V 


,N 


C- 


.-V 


A 


I 


- — 


\ 




i 


/ 


\. 










1 

/ 


60 


^ 


1 






\ 




/ 






w 

\ 




\ 


^ 


J- 


^-»' 


— 








/ 

/ 






















\ 

> 


-- 


\, 


[7 


/ 






kv 






'^•■•. 


/ 


40 






?0 
























\ 


^ 


/ 


/ 








'» 


^^ 


/ 













































\ 


f 



OCT. NOV. DEC. I JAN FEB MA M J J A S ON Olj F MAM J J A 

1943 J_ 1944 J. 1945 

(li(i',>h 7. 



ELECTRIC POWER CONSUMPTION 

TOKYO - YOKOHAMA - KAWASAKI 
BASE PERIOD: OCT. 1943 -SEPT. 1944 



100% 



INDUSTRY (OVER 50 KWH)229,960,000 

— ' (UNDER 90 KWH) 19,583,000 

LIGHTING 28,818,000 




Oravh 8. 



37 



PERCENT 



GAS CONSUMPTION 

TOKYO - YOKOHAMA - KAWASAKI 
BASE PERIOD OCT. 1943 -SEPT. 1944 



140 


V 






y 


/ 


\ 


















100% 
— — — — INDUSTRY 19,404.000 
— .... HOMES 18,299,000 


120 


\ 






/ 


/ 


\\ 




















\ 


- 


/ 


/ 


/ 


^ 


'■>^, 


Nv 


\ 
N 


.-- 






""^ 


-- 


^^ 


^s 














^•- 


•-.^ 


/ 

r 


/ 








v 


'- 


■ ^^ 


V 


^■. 


% 








\ 
\ 










80 




If 












\ 












^. 






\ 










60 


y 
^ 














> 


\ 


^ 


s. 




^ 




\. 


- — 


"•^ 


\ 
\ 

\ 


\ 






























\, 


X 








k 




\ 


\ 








































\ 


/ 


\\ 


\ 
\ 








40 
































> 


f 


\ 1 


t 












































\ 











































\ 




=^ 


^ 



OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL A^^S SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUQ 

1943 1 1944 1 1945 

Graph !). 



PERCENT 



INDUSTRIAL LABOR & PRODUCTIVE HOURS 

TOKYO - YOKOHAMA - KAWASAKI 
BASE PERIOD: 0CTI943-SEPTI944 



140 






























100% 


1 20 






























PRODUCTIVE HOURS 298,766,000 










y' 


/ 

/ 






V 


' 


. ^^ 




— ■■ 




^^-- 


















80 






/ 


/ 






















\ 
> 


\\ 














' 




/ 


























> 


\ 














' 






























v\ 














































\\ 












60 


































\ ^ 


•s- 










































\ 


V 












































\ 

\ 




N 




. 








40 
«0 












































































\ 




^ 














































N 





^ 
^ 


















































iTjJ 



OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUS SEP OCT NOV DEC | JAN FEB 

1943 -■- 1944 

Graph 10. 

38 



APR MAY JUN JUL 
1945 



PERCENT 



40 



ZO 



PRODUCTION 

TOKYO - YOKOHAMA - KAWASAKI 
BASE PERIOD: JAN.1944-SEPT.I944 































100 V. 






























— CIVILIAN 62,220,000 






























— — •- MILITARY 391,733,000 








































/ 


\ 


^^ 


^ 

X 




.^ 


/ 

7^ 


s. 


r^ 


—^ 


\ 






















!I!^ 


9 




*"■< 


-^ 


^— 


3^ 


r 




\^ 












































\N 


^ 










































\ 


"^^ 








































N. 


\ 










































V, 


v.\ 












































\ 


^ 










































\\ 












































\ 


».. 










































V.::: 


:?^ 


S 












































> 


V 












































> 



OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUe SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG 

1943 -L 1944 1 1945 

Oraph 11. 



TOTAL PLANT SAMPLE ' 

TOKYO- YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI 

OCT. 1943- JULY 1945 

















1 












100% 




























LABOR HOURS 123,162,000 




























PRODUCTION (YEN) 416,394,000 




























ELECT POWER CONSUMPTION 90J54pOO 
























/' 


S 






































/ 


~~ 


^ 


\ 




















^.J 


^■- 


-■^ 


N 


/ 




i3'->: 


■^ '- 


ii^ — 


/ 








...->» 


s 

\ 






















....N, 


f- 


y 


















\ 




















--. 




















"n 


^ 












































V ^ 
'% 














































\ 




s. 












































> N 














































^'^^ 






1 


1 C 


1 




1 


\ 


* t 


» 


a 


J 


/ 


k J 


( 


) ► 


c 


n 


i 


F 


Ik 


t 


k 


i 


J 


A 


1943 


1944 




J 


1945 



Graph 12. 

39 



TOTAL HIT PLANTS 

TOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI 
OCT I943-AU6 1945 



ISO 






























100% 
































PRODUCTION (YEN) 327;534,000 
































ELECTRIC POWER 
































CONSUMPTION 73^4.000 


























• ■. 








































/ 
/ 


> 


• 


^>.- 




























i 


V 
















■[ — 


























/ 






































^•^ 


■^ 


•^. 




/ 


.-> 


r^i?- 


— -- 





















. 



















-••■H 


•y- 








— • — , 








^.— 





s^ 


\ 








- - . . 










"*»--, 


J'- 

























■^s/i 












































XN 














































N. s 














































^::> 












































N 


\ 














































\. 














































»\ 


























































































^•— ■ 


s 










































--^ 














































s 


ti 


J FMAMJ JASONOJ FMAMJJA 


1943 


1944 1945 



Graph 13. 



TOTAL UNHIT PLANTS 

TOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI 
OCT 1943-JULY 1945 



ISO 








1 


















/ 












100% 








PRODUCTION (YEN) 78,860,000 

ELECTRIC POWER 

CONSUMPTION 16£52,000 


I2S 














• 


N 


/ 
/ 
/ 


N. 
..'N 

i 


>< 


/ 


-' 


N 












••-- 










\ 
\ 




100 


• 


-^- 








y' 






s 


< 
















\ 

\ 










/ b 




































-•» 


>•.'! 


i 

\ 
\ 
> 


'V 


■'\ 


SO 














































25 















































N D 


J 


MAMJ JASONO 


J F M A M 


J J A 




19 


43 
















194 


4 










J 










19 4! 


i 







Griiiih 1 '/. 

40 



PERCENT 



PRODUCTION 

TOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI 
OCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945 



li!b 


N 


■•"--^ 


N 

\ 




/ 










\ 


/ 


100 
7 5 










-— 


^ 


\ 


^-^ 


/ 

V 










N 


/ 














\ 
\ 
\ 

\ 
\ 
\ 


















1943- 
ri944— 


SEPT 19" 
AUG 194 


*4 
5 




' --^^ 




"^v 




25 







-- OC^ 

























OCT NOV DEC JAN FES MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP 



125 
























1 


2_8 


126 








































f 




\ 










1 
























> 


\/ 


\ 


y 


\, 




\ 
\ 

1 V 


























/ 


\ 


/ 


\ 
\ 


/ 

/ 


/ 


,N 


/ 


\ 


-~- 


























/ 


-s 


' 




...^ 


1 










v> 


























/ 




















\ 


'■■■ 


\ 
















/ 


























\ 


















V 


?*■ 


1. 


^ 


' 




















> 






\ 


























































/ 






























\, 


















































\ 










7S 


































\. 


\ 


/ 


I 








































\ 




/ 












































V 


f 


\ 

\ 

\ 






50 














































1 1 1 1 1 1 




















\ 












UNHIT PLANTS 

1 t 1 1 1 1 






















\ 








?n 










































■^ 


V 















































\ 



N D I J F M 
)43 -L 



1943 



A M J A S 
1944 

Graph 14-A. 



N D I J F M A M 
i- 194; 



J J A 



1945 



41 



ELECTRIC POWER CONSUMPTION 

TOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI 

OCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945 



125 
1 00 








^ 




y 












.- -- - 


'"•- 


--^^ 


\ 




y 












75 
50 


^x 














'x 
















1 








-.^ 












25 


" 


OCl 


' 1944- 


4U6 194 


5 










N. 




















































OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP 



125 



75 



50 



ZS 



























































































*<^ 


f' 


~-> 


s 




/ 


=i: 


^, 




' 


•», 




- 


^. 


























- — 


/ 






> 


/ 
/ 




^ 


r^ 


\ 


'x 

N 


^^ 


\ 

N 

N 


X 










































\ 


\ 


* 


■~, 


X 


\ 


































s 






' 


UIT Dl AMTC 






















\ 










... 


.— 


JNH 


IT 


PLA 


NT 


S 






















\ 




\ 


V 












































\ 



OHOJFMAMJJASO 
1943 -L 1944 

Qraph U-B. 



N oT 



JFMAMJ JA 
1946 



42 



LABOR FORCE 

TOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI 

OCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945 



li!5 

































--,. 




>^ 
























75 
50 





^ 










""' 


~~^ 


-~,,_ 




















































nrT tnAi—nroT i^aa 














25 




-- OCl 


■1944- 


MG 194 


5 






























































OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP 



i: 5 














\ 


^ 


*< 


.-• 


., 


^ 




^,'' 


1^ 




\ 


\ 










00 








■■**- 






-j^ 


-^ 


<r 




^ 




















^ 


^ 




\ 


\ 




^ 




75 
SO 












































v'% 












































\ 














































































25 






~^ 




UNh 


IT 


PL 


ikNT 


s 











































































ONDJFMAMJ J AS ONDJ F MA MJ JA 
1943 -L 1944 1 1945 

Graph 1!,-C. 



43 



AIRCRAFT 

TOKYO - YOKOHAMA- KAWASAKI 

OCT. 1943 - AUG. 1945 




(Inij)li 15. 



ORDNANCE 

TOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI 



OCT 1943-JULY 1945 




SHIPBUILDING a REPAIR 

TOKYO-YOKOHAMA- KAWASAKI 
OCT 1 943- JULY 1945 



150 






















y 


s 






100% 

LABOR HOURS 14,476,641 

PRODUCTION (YEN) 28,010,494 

ELECT CONSUMPTION 3,904,316 

PRODUCTIVE HOURS 10.665.067 


rzs 




















I 


'' 


s 





\ 






















^ 




^ 




;;r^ 


^ 


^^ 


_, 


f 


>^ 


^ 


y 




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. 




; 








100 


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.--/ 
^ 




/ 


^ 


'v, 


^ 


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1 










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\ 


4 


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rs) 


































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\ 


. 








































\ 


^< 


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\ "^ 


'^ 




so 






































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\ 


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D N 1 J F MA M 


J J A S 


2ND 


J F M A M . 


J A 




19 


43 


1 












194 


4 










J 










945 









{iiiijiii n. 



MOTOR VEHICLES 

TOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI 
OCT 1943-JULY 1945 



150 










































100% 






PRODUCTION (YEN) 22^98,765 

ELECT. CONSUMPTION 4,158,121 


11^5 


r- 




^ 


-.- . 


/ 


\ 


J 

/ 


k 
\ 

^ 








5« 


:^ 




PRODUCTIVE HOURS 7,633.23r. 




















100 


K 










^^ 


r 


K 


s. 






". 




















• 


















N 


/ 


\ 


\ 

\ 






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SO 
25 






































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\ 


/ 
/ 


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C 


N ( 


) 


J FHAHJ J A SON \ ■> ^ HAHJJ A 




19 


43 
















194' 


» 










I 








1945 









Graph 18. 

45 



ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS 

TOKYO - YOKOHAMA- KAWASAKI 
OCT. 1943 - AUG. 1945 rir'^ 




Gidjili li>. 



PERCENT 



MACHINERY & TOOLS 

TOKYO-VQKOHAMA-KAWASAKl 
OCT 1943— JULY 1945 



ISO 


































00% 
7,616,682 




































































PRODUCTION (YEN) 5};545,l 1 3 | 


































ELECT CONSUMPTION 

PRODUCTIVE HOURS 


5,199,188 
4^87,990 


I2S 






























' — 
























_^ 




y 




^ 




































/ 


"^ 


'^ 


/■ 






\ 


















,' 


*^ 










/ 


-^ 


~ -> 




. 










\ 
















100 


.— 


r^ 


^\ 


^ 

^•^ 




^ 


A 








r " 


,.^'' 




,^ 




.^ 


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■ \ 


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S ^ 






1 


75 






































\ 


> 

\ 


^ 


\ "* * 


\ 


SO 








































\ 


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-V 




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N 


J F 


M A 


^ i JASONO 


J F M A H J 


J A 


1943 J 






1944 J 


1945 





(liiiiili 2<l. 

46 



METAL PRODUCTS 

TOKYO -YOKOHAMA- KAWASAKI 

OCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945 



100 w 





























100% 




























PRODUCTION YEN 21,264^48 




























LABOR HOURS 8,462,621 




























ELECTRIC CONSUMPTION-- 3,486,535 
























y 


\ 
























/ 




\ 




















y 






\ 




.i^- 


V 




*-^ 






/ 


\ 


^N 


'•, 


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■•••• 


, 








\ 






\ 


V 


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.— ■^ 


^^•- 












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^^ 














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^ 


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.-" 








^ 


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— 


\ 


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« 








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f 










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— ^ 








































N 





\ 












































V 












































N 



N I J F M 

1943 X 



AMJJASONDljFMAMJJA 
1944 i 1945 



Graph 21. 



PERCENT 
150 



BASIC METALS 

TOKYO-YOKOHAMA - KAWASAKI 

OCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945 



75 



50 









































100 % 


. 1 








ELECTRIC CONSUMPTlON-55,719,056 








y 


^ 


'^.^ 


''Vl^ 




^ 


>^ 


i^ 


^ 

^ 


/ 


y^ 


— 


-— - 






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,- 





., 










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ip 








■)^ 








<N 


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\ 








« 








•v.: 


































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\ 






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•- 




> 














































\ 



ON Dij FMA M JJ AS ONDIj F MAMJ JA 

1943 J. 1944 ±. 1945 

Criivh 22. 



47 



PERCENT 
ISO 



CHEMICALS 

TOKYO-YOKOHAMA- KAWASAKI 

OCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945 





























100% 
























































ELECTRIC CONSUMPTlON-12,193,471 






























^ 














































^f— 










^ 


^^1: 


■^"7 


>£! 


^ 


%» 


mP- 


'•-^ 


s *** 










• 


'•.. 




/ 




^ 


^ 


^ 


'^' 


Ir^ 


-^*«« 


»»»* 


(Sf*^ 






Ci-: 


\ 


\ 






• , 


..•• 


»• 






f 






-■■' 


















^-^ 


._ 


\ 










« 






























•=^>4.\ 












































^^ 


y 


\, 








































\ 




v> 








































\ 


\ 








































> 


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^ 










































— 


\ 















































N D I J F M 

1943 X 



ftMJJ ASOND 

1944 



r 



F M A M J J A 

1945 



Graph 23. 



PETROLEUM 

TOKYO- YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI 

OCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945 



1 

\ 
































.•'1 


.5 ■••. 


"■ 




•2561 


St ; 


T 

\ 
\ 

1 
\ 

V \ 

V 








/ 
/ 
/ 


V 


■A 


,..-• 


f 




-"^t^ 


/ 
/ 

1 


\ 
\ 


1 


5 






\, 






/ 




/ // 
1 1 


\ 


^-^ 


7 


r^ 


• 








'-' 


1 
1 




1 
1 

1 
1 

1 


\ 
\ 


1 




V 


\ 




/ 




\ 


4f— 
If 


I 

I 
\ 


/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 

/ 

r 


















V 


1 

r 
\ 

\ 
\ 


/ 

/ 

/ 


\ 


^> 


s, 




/ 
/ 


\ 
\ 






























\ 


/ 


>, 


y 


\ 

\ 


\ 


/ 


\ 

\ 
-I 






100% 
PRODUCTION YEN 1,513,716 




















' 


\ 


1 — 


\ 







ELE 
PR( 


CTRIC 
JOUCT 


con; 
VE H 


JMPT 
OURS 


ION 


52 5,2 
2,73,6 


72 
50 



N I J F M~ 

1943 -L 



AMJJASONDIJFMAMJJA 



■S45 



Hirilih ,?;. 

48 



MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIES 

TOKYO- YOKOHAMA -KAWASAKI 
OCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945 



l»U 




























100% 






























PRODUCTION YEN 57,847,786 






























LABOR HOURS 9,071,379 

ELECTRIC CONSUMPTION - 9,055,607 
































125 






























1 




\ 








^> 


<:, 


..i 


/ 


y 


S^ 


••.. 


y 


\:- 


,.• 


•. 










100 


\ 




\ 


^ 






<v 


^^ 


r*^-; 


r^'l 


/ 




*} 






\. 














..V 
\ 

\ 


• •• 


/ 

/ 
/ 


N 


^■^ 


tit. 


y^ 




^^' 


^ 


r 








V 


\ 


v 





•._ 


,. 


•^ 
































\ 


\ 




V 








\ 
































\ 


N^" 


\\ 








\ 






































\ 


— . 








50 






























\ 
\ 








^"•■» 


-^ 


^ 


\ 
































— — . 


—•I 














































\ 














































\ 














































\ 














































\ 


^—•^ 


^^ 






25 




































































































































"^^ 


n 















































01 1 I — I I ' I 

N D J F M 

1943 X 



AMJJ ASOND 

1944 



IJ F M A M 

1945 



J J A 



(Iniith 25. 



PERCENT 



PUBLIC UTILITIES 

TOKYO- YOKOHAMA - KAWASAKI 
OCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945 




I 50 



125 



100 



7 5 



50 



25 



TOTAL PLANT SAMPLE 

TOKYO 

OCTOBER 1943 TO JULY 1945 































100% 






























YEN SALES 236^24,892 






























ELECTRIC POWER 






























CONSUMPTION 33,48V65 






























PRODUCTIVE HOURS S2.7I4.449 
























t 


*^, 






































\ 


/ 


*^ 


^ 
















y 





^,^ 




» 
/ 
/ 




^ 






/ 
/ 
/ 


V 


/ 
/ 




V 


. 
















■ 


r 






"^^^ 


/ 


.'^^ 




_^«-' 


"*■" ■ 












■■**>-^ 
















/ 


^ 




<^- 


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--^ 


■^--^ 


— 






\ 










^ 




,^^ 
































\ 










































\ 


/ 


\ 




































N-'. 




\ 






































> -- 





^^>, 




































\ 






■--. 













































N J_ J F M A M i J A S N _|_ J F M A U J J 



1943 



1944 



1945 



Gra;j?( 27. 



AIRCRAFT 

TOKYO 

OCTOBER 1943 TO JULY 1945 



ISO 










154; 

f 
1 
f 


\ 
\ 








/ 




I 


-.^ 


\ 


100°/. 

YEN SALES 41,914,018 

ELECTRIC POWER 

CONSUMPTION 4,724,963 

PRODUCTIVE HOURS 7,961,424 








> 




/ 

/ 

( 


' 


■/ 


\/ 




t 

1 


\ 


1 


\ 


\ 




















^ 

y.... 






-^ 




A 


^ 


1 


\ 


» 


,-^ 


^s 




\ 
















// 
il 

1 1 






' 










— . 


1 
1 

1 




^' 


\, 


\ \ 


\ 












7S 


_,. 


t 1 

r 1 


















1 

\ 


,' 






\ 


V \ 




V 




























\ 








\ 






\ 






























1 


/ 

( 






\ 


\ 




\ 








50 

































-A- 


^ 


\ 


^ 
\ 






































-v 


y 


*v 


---^ 


\ 


25 










































\ 






































^~-- 


'-' 


\ 
















































N D_[ J F M A M J J A S N _[ J F M A M J j 

1943 1944 1945 

Craph 28. 



50 



ORDNANCE 

TOKYO 

OCTOBER 1943 TO JULY 1945 



125 



100 



78 



80 



£8 



1 


























100% 




















, 


"^^^ 




^ 


~ — — ■ 


YEN SALES 6,759,708 




















1 






*■'' 




ELECTRIC POWER 






























CONSUMPTION 932,150 




















:'/ 


s. 








PRODUCTIVE HOURS 3.994J75 
















/ 


.,._ 


: 


S 


^\ 


N^ 


/ 


1 




%^ 










/ 


'^. 








« 


\y 


/ 
/ 


,/ 


/ 


, — 


— - 




^•^ 


<. 


''N 


\, 


1 










V 




.^ 


^. , 




/'\ 


^'^^^ 




,^ 














\ 










/ 




—^-> 




V 


!*^ 




-*' 


' -^ 














"•-k\ 


\ 

1 








/ 


y 


^ 


t 


r* 
























"^ 
















f 




























A 






••• 




































V 


^ 








































* 








































h 






^^ 






































' ^v^ 

























































































N D J J f 

1943 



J J A S 

1944 

diiipli 29. 



N 



M A M J 

1945 



ISO 



125 



SHIPBUILDING 

TOKYO 



OCTOBER 1943 TO JULY 1945 




MOTOR VEHICLES 

TOKYO 
OCTOBER 1943 TO JULY 1945 



I2S 



100 



75 



50 





























100% 






























YEN SALES 14,277,468 






























ELECTRIC POWER 

CONSUMPTION 825,305 






























PRODUCTIVE HOURS 3:039.980 


.^ 

^ 


.'^ 


\ 

\ 








>*i? 


5>^ 






_^ 


^ 


^, 


















-•'' 






< 








« 


—- 


^^ 


<* 

^ 




^•. 


--.t 


^ 


Sj^ 








































» , 


-^;r^~- 


\ 




^ 

/ 




































■^~,.-\- 


f 






































-A 


,^- 










































"n 





















































































ONDJF MAM JJASONDJFMAMJ i 



1943 



1944 



1945 



Gra;j7i il. 



ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT 

TOKYO 

OCTOBER 1943 TO JULY 1945 



1 so 






















/ 
/ 








/ 

/ 


100% 

YEN SALES 18,869,138 

ELECTRIC POWER 

CONSUMPTION 924,783 
PRODUCTIVE HOURS 4.449.661 
























1 






V 


/ 


!• 


8 


» 












/ 


' 




N 


^ 


^ 


* ^ 


/: 


k:\ 


* 


1 


^ 


/ 




N 


\ 














100 
78 


^ 




\ 

N 

\ 


<? 


^ — 


'/ 


^ 


N 


/ 


'" 




/ 












< 

^ 


\ 

\ 


\ 










', 


t 






























^ \ 


s. 












































I 

1 


s 


\ 


SO 










































\\ 


-A 


i 8 



























































































N D I J f M A M J J A S N D J_ J F M A M J 

1943 1944 1945 

iiraph S2. 



52 



MACHINE a TOOLS 

TOKYO 



















OCTOBER 1943 TO JULY 1 


945 
















rso 

































100% 
YEN SALES 45,309^40 
ELECTRIC POWER 

CONSUMPTION 4,019,031 


125 
































PRODUCTIVE HOURS IZ,ISZ,32S 


^y 


.'" 





\ 






r--«^ 






-- -- 










V 

\ 

\ 

V 

\ 












100 





-''' 




A 

/' 

e 
r 










\ 

1 


.'" 


"' 




y 




^^ 


< 




\ 








75 


































\ 


t \ 










































V \ 












































\N 


^^ 










































* 




Xt^ 








































t 




^^ 


l^.^ 


50 






































^ 




^*^ 






































\ 
\ 














































^^^ 


^,- 


25 


































































































































N D I J F M A M J J A S N D J_ J F M A M J 
1943 194" 1945 

(Iraph 33. 



100 



78 



80 



SB 



METAL PRODUCTS 

TOKYO 

OCTOBER 1943 TO JULY 1945 





























1 100% 






























YEN SALES 9,963,990 






























ELECTRIC POWER 






























CONSUMPTION l,27i,SZI 




I 


^ 
























PRODUCTIVE HOURS 3.092.363 


.' 


-/- 


\ 
















^ 


\. 




















:.._ 


/ 


'.\ 
















,-'* 








\ 






















\\ 








^,1'''''^ , 


s, 




» 










s 






















/ 


/ 
















\ 














^ 




\ 
t 


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/.^ 


if y 


....'J 


V,. 


t 


/ 

^ 





— 


» 




-V 


\ 














1 

« 


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1V.% 




\ 












' 


























lX 










































\ 


1 
\ 

t 




\ 




































v'. 




\ 


^ 










































































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i \*> 






































j \ 


~ ~~ " 





















































































O N D J_ J FMAM JJASO N D J_ J F M A M J J 

1943 1944 1945 

Graph 34- 

53 



TOKYO BASIC METALS 
PRODUCTION 

OCT 43 — JULY 45 



150 


























100% 
YEN SALES 27,659,614 


























• 
• 




ELEC. POWER CONSUMPTION 11,152,342 
























^- 


/ 


> 


PRODUCTIVE HOURS 15^43^4 






'■^■. 




... 




,^ 








/ 

/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 








\ 

\ 
\ 

> 




,-■ I 










lUU 




^ 


\ 






5^ 


i^-^ 


\ 


>< 








y V ^ 


^ 


• 


■5 

\ 


V 










y' 




7 






\ 





































\ 










































1 » 


\ 












































>A 








90 


































\ 


\ 
\ 

\ 






■" 




































y — — 

\ / 


, 


"■- 


25 

























































































D N D 


J FMA MJ J A SON d|j r MAMJJ 




IS 


43 


J 














944 












J. 






1945 







Grapli 35. 



TOKYO CHEMICALS 

OCT 43— JULY 45 




(Svnpli 3<>. 

54 



TOKYO MISCELLANEOUS 

OCT 43— JULY 45 



ERC 


ENT 










































I5U 




























100% 
— YEN SALES 4^635^682 

ELEC. POWER CONSUMPTION 4,669^59 

PRODUCTIVE HOURS S937,44« 


125 


-•^ 






/ 
/ 


"-., 


^^^ 


\ 




/ 


/ 
/ 


y 


''' 


\ 
\ 
\ 




y 


\ 






















\/ 






^^ 


— ^ 




,/ 


'>' 


'X' 




V 


y 


N 



















■^^'i 


^^^ 


■ 


^ 




-*»■■ 


><' 


/ 


'v 




> 


/ 






S, 
















/ ^ 


c 




/ 






"s 


/ 






^■-r-^ 






\, 












/ 
1 


.,-- 


t 


























\ 


\ 








H 


1 
1 
1 
1 




























\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 




■•V 
> 


^\ 


N 





y 
./ 












































































1 








































































































































\ 








25 




































-^ 


1 
















































n 













































ONDJ FMAHJ JASONDJ F MAMJJ 

1943 i 1944 1 1945 

Graph 37. 



TOKYO HIT PLANTS 

OCT 43 — JULY 45 



PERCENT 



I9U 




























100% 






























YEN SALES 195^69,691 






























ELEC- POWER CONSUMPTION 26,509,914 


125 




























PRODUCTIVE HOURS 39,570^63 


y 








/ 


V 


^ 


\_ 




/ 
/ 
1 


\ 

\ 
\ 
\ 


/ 
/ 

/ 


> 


''■s, 
























100 


/- 






' — 




^ 




S.-^ 


r ' 


^ 


^ - — 




V"****^ 


















/ 


---. 


7^ 


--' 


K"^^ 






^ 










A— 
\ 


\ 


\ 












75 


,^ 


r 
























\ 


\ 




\ 


I 








































w 


\ 










































N 


^^ 


/ 


\ 




90 

25 
O 




































\ 




S 






































1 


N 

N 

\ 




^ 













































N 
1943 



I J F M A 



MJJASOND 
1944 



1 J F M A M 

i 1945 



Graph 38. 

55 



TOKYO UNHIT PLANTS 

OCT 43-JULY 45 



PERCENT 
160 



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100 



75 



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100% 




























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— -ELEC POWER CONSUMPTION 7,174^52 




























PRODUCTIVE HOURS 13,144^54 
























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1943 1 



AMJJA50N0JFMAMJJ 
1944 1 1945 

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56 




CITY LtMITS 

AA RAIDS 

^^ NWEW8CR 29,1944 - OECEh©ER 30, (944 -JANUARY 28J943 
APRIL I3.t943 -APRIL 15,1945 
MAY 23.1945-MAY 25,1945 
MARCH 9.1945 



S STWTEOC •0«i<"6 5U»lv£t 



CITY Of rot*!'© 




57 



UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 



LIST OF REPORTS 



The foUdwiiiK is a bihliography of reports resulting fnmi 
the Survey's studies of tlie Pjuropeaii and Pacific wars. 
Those reports marked with an asterisk (*) may be pur- 
chased from the Superintendent of Documents at tlie 
Government Printing Ottice, Washington, D. C. 

European War 
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 

*1 Tlie United States Strategic Bombing Survey : Sum- 
mary Report (European War) 

*2 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Over- 
all Report (European War) 

*3 The FItYects of Strategic Bombing on the German 
War Economy 

AIRCRAFT DIVISION 

(By Division and Branch) 

*4 Aircraft Division Industry Report 

5 Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Report) 

Airframes Branch 

6 Junkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Dessau, 

Germany 

7 Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Heiterblick. German 

8 A T G Maschinenbau, GmbH, Leipzig (Mockau), 

Germany 

9 Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany 
10 Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany 

Over-all Report 

Part A 

PartB 

Appendices I, II, III 

12 Dornier Works, Friedrichshafen & Munich, Germany 

13 Gerhard Fieseler Werke GmbH, Kassel, Germany 
4 Wiener Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener Neu- 

stadt, Austria 

Aero Engines Branch 

15 Bussing NAG Flugmotorenwerke GmbH, Bruns- 
wick, Germany 

16 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke GmbH, Taucha, 
Germany 

17 Bavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach & Durrerhof, 
Germany 

18 Bayerische Motorenwerke AG (BMW) Munich. Gei • 
many 

.9 Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany 



Light Metal Branch 



11 Messerschmitt A G, 

Augsburg, Germany " 



20 Light Metals Industry f Part I, Aluminum 

of Germany ) Part II, Magnesium 

21 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hildesheim, Ger- 

many 

22 Metallgussgesellschaft GmbH, Leipzig, Germany 

23 Aluminiurawerk GmbH, Plant No. 2, Bitterfeld, 

Germany 

24 Gebrueder Giulini GmbH, Ludwigshafen, Germany 

25 LuftschifTt)au, Zeppelin (! ni b H, Friedrichshafen 

on Bodensee, Germany 

26 Wieland Werke A G, Ulm, Germany 

27 Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Solin- 

gen, Germany 

28 Lippewerke Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke A G, Lunen, 

Germany 

29 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Heddernheim, Ger- 

many 

30 Duerener Metallwerke A G, Duren Wittenau-Berlln 

& Waren, Germany 

AREA STUDIES DIVISION 

*31 Area Studies Division Report 

32 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 

on Hamburg 

33 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 

on Wuppertal 

34 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 

on Dusseldorf 

35 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 

on Solingen 

36 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 

on Remscheid 

37 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 

on Darmstadt 

38 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 

on Lubeck 

39 A Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on 

Berlin, Augsburg. Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dort- 
mund, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen 

CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION 

*40 Civilian Defense Division — Pinal Report 

41 Cologne Field Report 

42 Bonn Field Report 

43 Hanover Field Report 

44 Hamburg Field Report— Vol. I, Text; Vol. II, Ex- 

hibits 

45 Bad Oldesloe Field Report 

46 Augsburg Field Report 

47 Reception Areas in Bavaria, Germany 



59 



EQUIPMENT DIVISION 

Electrical Branch 

*48 Geniian Electiioal Equipment Industry Report 
49 Brown Boveri et Cie, -Mannheim Kafertal, Cieriiiauy 

Optical and Precision Instrument Branch 

*50 Optit'al ami I'ret'ision Instrument Industry Iti'imrt 

Abrasives Branch 

*5t The (Jerman Abrasive Industry 
52 Mayer and Schmidt, Offenbach on Main, Germany 

Anii-Friclion Branch 

*5S The (ierman Anti-Friction Bearings Industry 

Machine Tools Branch 

*o4 ila<-liine Tools & Macliinery as Capital Equipment 
*55 Machine Tool Industry in Germany 

56 Hernuin Kull) ("o., Colosriie, Germany 

57 Collet and Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany 

58 Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany 

MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION 

59 The Defeat of the German Air Force 

60 V- Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign 

61 Air Force Rate of Operation 

62 Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Opera- 

tions in the European Theatre 

63 Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium 

Bombers in the ETO 

64 Description of RAF Bombing 

64a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Lo- 
gistics 

MORALE DIVISION 

*64b The Effects of Strategic Boml)ing on German Morale 
(Vol. I and Vol. II) 

Medical Branch 

"65 The Effect of Bombing on Health and Jledical Care 
in Germany 

MUNITIONS DIVISION 
Heavy Industry Branch 

The Coking Industry Report on Germany 
Coking Plant Report No. If Sections A, B, C, & D 
Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhau.sen, Germany 
Friedrich-AIfred Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany 
Neunkirchen ELsenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger- 
many 
Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G, Hallendorf, 

Germany 
August Thyssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany 
Friedrich Knipp A G, Borbeck Plant, Es.sen, Ger- 
many 
Dortmund Hoerder Huettenverein, A G, Dortmund, 

Germany 
Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany 
Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, 
Bochum, Germany 



*66 
67 
68 
69 
70 

71 

72 
73 

74 

75 
76 



Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch 

►77 Oernian .M<it(ir Vehicles Industry Report 



■ *78 Tank Industry Report 

79 Daimler Kenz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany 

80 Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris 
ST Adam Opel, Ru.sselheim, (Jermany 

82 Daimler Benz-(!aggenau Works, Gaggenau, Germany 

83 Maschinenfabrlk Augsburg-Nurnberg, Nurnberg, Ger- 

many 

84 Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany 

85 Henschel & Sohn. Kassel, Germany 

86 Maybach Motor Works, Friedrichshafen, Germany 

87 Voigtlander, Maschiaenfabrik A G, Plauen, Germany 

88 Volkswageuwerke, Fallersleben, Germany 

89 Bussing NAG, Brunswick, Germany 

90 Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, Ger- 

many 

01 Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke, Magdeburg, Germany 

Submarine Branch 

92 German Submarine Industry Report 

93 Maschinenfabrlk Augsburg-Nurnberg A G, Augs- 

burg, Germany 

94 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany 

95 Detitschewerke A. G, Kiel, Germany 

96 Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, Ger- 

many 

97 Friedricli Krui)p (iernianiawerft, Kiel, Germany 

98 Howaldtswerke A. G, Hambtirg, Germany 

99 Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Germany 
100 Bremer Vulkan, Vegesack, Germany 

Ordnance Branch 

*101 Ordnance In<lustry Report 

102 Friedrich Krupp (irusonwerke A. G Magdeburg, 

Germany 

103 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Bo- 

chum, Germany 

104 Henschel & Sohn, Kas.sel, Germany 

105 Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany 

106 Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallendorf, 

Germany 

107 Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany 

108 Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany 

OIL DIVISION 

*109 Oil Division. Final Report 

*110 Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix 

•111 Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Pro- 

pellants. War Gases and Smoke Acid (Ministerial 

Report #1) 

112 Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Ger- 

many 

113 The German Oil Industry, Ministerial Report Team 

78 

114 Ministerial Report on Chemicals 

Oil Branch 

115 Ammoniakwerke Mer.seburg G m b H, Leuna, Ger- 

many — 2 Appendices 

116 Braunkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Germany 
Wintershall A G, Luetzkendorf, Germany 

117 Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works of I G Farbenindustrie 

A (!, Ludwigshafeu, Germany 



60 



118 Ruhroel HydroKciiation Plant, Rottrnp-Boy, Ger- 

many, Vol. I, Vol. II 

119 Khenunia Ossaj; Miiicraloehverke A (!, llailmrK Ue- 

finery, Hamburg, Germany 

120 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Grasbrook 

Refinery, Hamburg, (Jermany 

121 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A (i, Wiibelmslmrg 

Refinery, Hamburg, (iermany 

122 Gewerksclinft Victor, Castrop-Itauxel, (iermany, \(i\. 

I & Vol. II 

123 Europaeische Tanklager und 'I'ransport A G, Ham- 

burg, Germany 

124 Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg Refinery, Ham- 

burg, Germany 

125 Meerbeek Rheinpreussen Synthetic Oil I'lant — Vol. I 

& Vol. II. 



Hanau on Main, 



Rubber Branch 

126 Deutsche Dunlop Gununi Co., 

Germany 

127 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany 

128 Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant 

129 Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry 

Propellants Branch 

130 Elektrochemischewerke, Munich, Germany 

131 Schoenebeck Explosive Plant, Lignose SprengstofE 

Werke GmbH, Bad Salzeman, Germany 

132 Plants of Dynamit A G, Vormal, Alfred Nobel & Co, 

Troisdorf, Clausthal, Drummel and Duneberg, 
Germany 

133 Deutsche Sprengcheniie G ni b H, Ki'aiburg, (iermany 

OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION 

134 Over-all Economic Effects Division Report 



Gross National Product . 

Kriegseilberichte 

Herman (ioering Works. 
Food and Agriculture . . . 



Special papers 
which together 
comprise the 
above report 



134a Industrial Sales Output and Productivity 

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION , 

134b Physical Damage Division Report (ETO) 

13.5 Villacoublay Airdrome, Paris, France 

136 Railroad Repair Yards, JIalines, Belgium 

137 Railroad Repair Yards. Louvain, Belgium 

138 Railroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, Belgium 

139 Railroad Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium 

140 Submarine Pens, Brest, France 

141 Powder Plant, Angouleme, France 

142 Powder Plant, Bergerac, France 

143 Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgiiim 

144 Fort St. Blai.se Verdun Group, Metz, France 
14.5 Gnome et Rhone, Limoges, France 

146 Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France 

147 Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans, 

France 

148 Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Germany 

149 Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant. Toulou.se, France 

150 S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France 

151 A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulou.se, France 



1.52 V Weapons in London 

1.53 City Area of Krefeld 

1.54 I'\il)lic Air Raid Shelters in Germany 

1.55 (ioldenberg Thernjal Klectric Power Station, Knap- 

sack, Germany 

1.56 Brauweller Transformer & S\vit<'hing Station, lirau- 

weiler, Germany 

1.57 ^torage Depot, Nahbollenbacb, (iermany 

1.58 Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, (iermany 

1.59 Railway Bridge, Eller, (iermany 

160 (iustloff- Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany 

161 Henschell & Sohn (i m b H, Kassel, (iermany 

162 Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany 

163 Hanomag, Hanover, (iermany 

164 M A N Werke Aug.sburg, Augsburg, (5ermany 

165 Friedrich Krupp A (J, Essen, (Germany 

166 Erla Maschinen werke, GmbH, Heiterblick, Germany 

167 A T (i Maschinenbau G m 1) H, Mockau, (iermany 

168 Erla Maschinenwerke (-i m b H, Mockau, Germany 

169 Bayerische Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, Germany 

170 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke GmbH, Taucha, 

Germany 

171 Submarine Pens Deutsche- Werft, Hamburg, Germany 

172 Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany 

173 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany 

174 Kassel Marshalling Y'ards, Kassel, (iermany 

175 Ammoniawerke, Mer.seburg-Leuna, (iermany 

176 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, Germany 

177 Adam Opel A G, Russelsheim, Germany 

178 Daimler-Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany 

179 Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany 

180 Volkswaggonwerke, Fallersleben, Germany 

181 Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany 

182 Ship Y'ards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, (iermany 

183 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, (iermany 

184 Daimler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany 

185 S.vnthetic Oil Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg, Germany 

186 Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany 

187 Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm, Germany 

188 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Germany 

189 Neukirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neukirchen. Germany 

190 Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany 

191 Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Germany 

192 Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany 

193 Fire Raids on (ierman Citie.s 

194 I G Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen. (iermany. Vol. I 

& Vol. II 

195 Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard. Ulm, (iermany 

196 I (i Farlienindustrie. Leverkusen, (iermany 

197 Chemische- Werke, Huels, Germany 

198 (Iremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, (iermany 

199 Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, (iermany 

TRANSPORTATION DIVISION 

*lj(Mi The Effects of Strategic Bombing on (ierman Trans- 
portation 

201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass 

202 Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations in 

Regenslnirg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions 

2(13 (ierman Locomotive Industry r>uring the War 

204 German Military Railroad Trafiic 



61 



UTILITIES DIVISION 

*205 German Electric Utilities Industry Eeport 

206 1 to 10 in Vol. I "Utilities Division Plant Reports" 

207 11 to 20 in Vol. II "Utilities Division Plant Reports" 

208 21 Rheinisehe-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A G 



Pacific War 

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 

Summar.v Report (Pacific War) 



*1 
*2 
*3 



*10 



*11 



Japan's Struggle to End The War 
The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki 

CIVILIAN STUDIES 

Civilian Defense Division 

Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 

Subjects, Tokyo, Japan 
Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 

Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan 
Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 

Subjects, Kyoto, Japan 
Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 

Subjects, Kobe, Japan 
Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 

Subjects, Osaka, Japan 
Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 

Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan — No. 1 
Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection and 

Allied Subjects in Japan 
Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and 

Allied Suljjects in Japan 



Medical Division 

*12 The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Serv- 
ices in Japan 

*13 The Effects of Atomic Boml)s on Health and Medical 
Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 



►U 



*]0 



M7 



•IS 



«19 



Morale Division 

The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale 

ECONOMIC STUDIES 

Aircraft Division 

The Japanese Aircraft Industry 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 
Corporation Report A'o. / 

(Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK) 
(Airframes & Engines) 
Nakajima Aircraft Company, Ltd. 
Corporation Report No. II 
(Nakajima Hikoki KK) 
(Airframes & Engines) 
Kawanishi Aircraft Company 
Corporation Report Xo. Ill 

(Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushikl Kaisha) 
(Airframes) 
Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc. 
Corporation Report No. IV 

(Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo Kabushiki 

Kaisha) 
(.\irframes & Engines) 



*20 



*21 



*23 



*24 Jap, 



*26 



*3i) 



*31 



*3l' 



*33 



*34 



*2S I 



*20 



Aichi Aircraft Company 

Corporation Report No. V 
(Aichi Kokuki KK) 
(Airframes & Engines) 
Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller Division 
Corporation Report No. VI 

(Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puropera 

Seizosho) 
(Propellers) 
Hitachi Aircraft Company 

Corporation Report No. VII 
(Hitachi Kokuki KK) 
(Airframes & Engines) 
Japan International Air Industries, Ltd. 
Corporation Report No. VIII 

(Nippon Kokusai Koku Kogyo KK) 
(Airframes) 
n Musical Instrument Manufacturing Conipan.\ 
Corporation Report No. IX 
(Nippon Gakki Seize KK) 
(Propellers) 
Tachikawa Aircraft Company 
Corporation Report No. X 
(Tachikawa Hikoki KK) 
(Airframes) 
Fuji Airplane Company 

Corporation Report No. 
(Fuji Hikoki KK) 
(Airframes) 
Showa Airplane Company 
Corporation Report No. 
(Showa Hikoki Kog 
(Airframes) 
ikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd. 
Corporation Report No. XIII 

(Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki 

Kaisha) 
(Engines) 
Nippon Airplane Company 

Corporation Report No. XIV 
(Nippon Hikoki KK) 
(Airframes) 
Kyushu .\irplane Company 

Corporation Report No. XV 
(Kyushu Hikoki KK) 
(Airframes) 
Slinda Engineering Company 

Corporation Report No. XVI 
(Shoda Seisakujo) 
(Components) 
Jlitaka Aircraft Industries 

Corporation Report No. XVII 

(Mitaka Koku Kogyo KabusliikI Kaisha) 
(Components) 
Nissan Automobile Company 

Corporation Report No. XVIII 
(Nissan Jidosha KK) 
(Engines) i 

Army .\ir Ar.«enal & Navy Air Depots 
Corporation Report No. XIX 
(Airframes and Engines) 
Underground Production of Japanese Aircraft 
Report No. XX 



XI 



XII 

?yo KK) 



62 



Ba$!r Materials Division 

*36 Coul and Metals in .Tapan's War Mcuiioiny 

Capital Goods, Rqiiipmriit and Construction Division 

*37 'riit> .Japanese Const ructidii Industry 

*3S Japanese Electrical Hquipinent 

*30 The .tapanese Machine UtiildinK Industry 

Electric Power Division 

*40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan 
*41 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Plant Re- 
ports) 

Manpower, Food and ('ivilian Supplies Division 

*42 The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utili- 
zation of Manpower 

Military Supplies Division 

*43 Japanese War Production Industries 

*44 Japanese Naval Ordnance 

45 Japanese Army Ordnance 

*4fi Japanese Naval Shipbuilding 

*47 Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry 

*48 Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding 

Oil and Chemical Division 

49 Chemicals in Japan's War 

50 Chemicals in Japan's War — Appendix 

51 Oil in Japan's War 

52 Oil In Japan's W^ar — Appendix 

Over-all Economic Effects Division 

*53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War 
Economy (Including Appendix A: U. S. Economic 
Intelligence on Japan — Analysis and Comparison ; 
Appendix B : Gross National Product on Japan 
and Its Components; Appendix C: Statistical 
Sources). 

Transportation Division 

*54 The War Against Japanese Transportation, 1941- 
1945 



Urban Areas Division 

Effects of Air Attack on Japane.se Urban Economy 

(Summary Report) 
Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo- 
Kawasaki-Yokohama 
Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagoya 
Effects of Air Attack on ( )saka-Kol)e-Kyoto 
Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagasaki 
Effects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima 



*56 



59 
60 



MILITARY STUDIES 
Military Analysis Division 

61 Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War 

Against Japan 

62 Japanese Air Power 

63 Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics 

64 The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army 

Logistics 

65 Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific 

Command 

66 The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bom- 



07 

68 

69 
70 



78 
79 



80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 



88 



89 



90 

91 

92 
93 
94 

95 



96 



hardnu'iit in tlie War Against Japan (Twentieth 

Air Forc(!) 
Air Operations in China, Burma, India -World War 

II 
The Air Transport Command in the War Against 

Japan 
The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against Japan 
The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War 

Against Japan 
The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan 

Naval Analysis Division 

The Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols. I and 
II) 

Campaigns of the Pacific War 

The Reduction of Wake Lsland 

The Allied Campaign Against Rabaid 

The American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap, 
Mille, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II and III) 

The Reduction of Truk 

The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan 

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party — Fore- 
word, Introduction, Conclusions, and General 
Summary 

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 
closure A ) , Kamaishi Area 

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 
closure B), Hamamat.su Area 

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 
closure C), Hitachi Area 

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 
closure D), Hakodate Area 

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 
closure E ) , Muroran Area 

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 
closure F), Shimizu Area 

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 
closures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima- 
Saki Areas 

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 
closure I), Comments and Data on Effectiveness 
of Ammunition 

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 
closure J), Comments and Data on Accuracy of 
Firing 

Reports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 
closure K), Effects of Surface Bombardments on 
Japanese War Potential 

Physical Damage Division 

Effect of the Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan (a 
Report on Eight Cities) 

The Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb on 
Japanese Targets (a Report on Nine Incidents) 

Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan 

Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan 

Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japa- 
nese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents) 

Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and Five 
Hundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets (a 
Report on Eight Incidents) 

A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (Summary 
Report ) 



63 



C-2 Division 

97 Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence 

98 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- 

nese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive Report 

99 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- 

nese Homeland, Part II, Airfields 

100 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- 

nese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb Plotting 

101 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- 

nese Homeland, Part IV. Urban Area Analysis 

102 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- 

nese Homeland, Part V, Camouflage 



103 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- 

nese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping 

104 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- 

nese Homeland, Part VII, Electronics 
lOo Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- 
nese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach Intelligence 

*10G Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- 
nese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery 

*107 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- 
nese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads 

105 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- 

nese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis 



^U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1947 736?25 



64 



^ 



^ 



m^l^l'^^uc 



3 9999 



l-IBRARy 



06313 



355 5 



1^ 









.C.