‘The (Im)possibility of Sustainable Lifestyles —
Can We Trust the Public Opinion and
Plan for Reduced Consumption?’
Christer Sanne
Urban Research Program
Working Paper No.63
August 1998
Research School of Social Sciences
Australian National University
‘THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF SUSTAINABLE LIFESTYLES —
CAN WE TRUST THE PUBLIC OPINION AND PLAN FOR
REDUCED CONSUMPTION?’
Christer Sanne
Urban Research Program
Working Paper No.63
August 1998
SERIES EDITOR:
R.C. Coles
ISBN 0 7315 3500 6
ISSN 1035-3828
Urban Research Program
Research School ol Social Sciences
Australian National University
Canberra, ACT 0200
Urban Research Program, Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University 1998
National Library of Australia
Cataloguing-in-Publication data:
Sanne, Christer
The (im)possibility of sustainable lifestyles — can we trust the public
opinion and plan for reduced consumption?’
Bibliography
ISBN 0 7315 35006
1. Environmental protection - Citizen participation. 2. Social change.
3. Hours of labor. 4. Consumption (Economics). I. Australian National
University. Urban Research Program. II. Title. (Series: Urban Research
Program working paper; no. 63)
333.713
u
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in
IV
‘The (Im)possibility of Sustainable Lifestyles — Can We Trust
the Public Opinion and Plan for Reduced Consumption?’
Christer Sanne*
Environmentalists hold that in order to achieve sustainability, the Western
lifestyle must change - all the more so since it is also a model lor people in
other countries aspiring to a fast economic growth. But others claim that
Westerners are so materialistic that reduced consumption is ruled out. I o
escape this impasse, we need a better understanding of consumption: the
attitudes to it, its cultural meaning in the rich Western countries and the role
of consumption in the political and economic fields.
This paper starts with a model of three principal actors which are
crucial for future changes towards sustainability: people, business and the
political class. It is noted that the demand to reduce consumption challenges
fundamental interests. But there are, on the other hand, attitude surveys from
rich countries which seem to contradict the materialistic attitude. They rather
indicate a composed attitude to material consumption and a corresponding
preference for shorter hours and more leisure. The relevance of these
surveys is discussed, including some objections which can be raised against
them. One point made is that such objections are part of the problem if they
serve to explain away findings that do not fit into the ruling paradigm.
All of this implies that political infeasibility to change lifestyle and
reduce consumption may not be due to failing public response as much as to
structural factors in society. Planning may have to shift focus from assumed
citizen resistance to the institutions which thrive on present consumption
patterns.
The last section hints at some perspectives of overconsumption which
lead to various demands on the political decision process. A conclusion is that
a sustainable development in the end would best be served by a continued
reduction of the working hours.
1 The Map : Heading for a Steep Hill
The notion of a ‘green’ and sustainable society has strong support in public
opinion. After three decades of attention — Silent Spring was published in the
early 1960s — more than a generation has been influenced by environmental
ideas. In politics, green issues can no longer be dismissed — certainly not in a
country like Sweden where nature plays a significant role in people's minds.
But what has been achieved by this greening of opinion? And what is
lying ahead? I will outline three (possibly overlapping) phases using a crude
model of three interacting types of actors: CAPITAL (business), PEOPLE (the
Infrastructure and Planning, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden. (MSc, PhD)
2
public), and THE POLITICAL CLASS, each with its interests and mindsets. The
mass media is regarded as a powerful intermediary between the actors,
capable of creating a dominant world view, a perception of reality to which
the actors react. 1
To characterise the actors briefly, CAPITAL is the main organiser of
production. It is profit-oriented but basically indifferent to what is being
produced (but may be sensitive to what the consumers think of its action).
CAPITAL is also mobile, compared to PEOPLE, possessing the obvious power
to withdraw. PEOPLE appear, to the other actors, as employees, consumers
and voters/members. PEOPLE strive for well-being; what this implies is
strongly influenced by cultural values. THE POLITICAL CLASS is basically
concerned with continuity and legitimisation; it is composed of politicians
and leaders of the many-faceted organisations which - supposedly -
represent people in the political arena, but also of administrators, ‘bureau¬
crats’ and many researchers who work in conjunction with the government
and organisations.
The model implies that change will not necessarily follow when and
because ‘we’ (all actors) get informed and begin to act rationally and morally
‘right’. The different interests will lead to controversies and alliances of
another nature than we normally assume. The simple assumption about
‘PEOPLE’ as one of the actors is confounded by the fact that human beings
constitute all the actors, picking up prescribed roles in their particular
position, but also alternating between positions. CAPITAL and, possibly to a
lesser degree, THE POLITICAL CLASS are likely to follow an instrumental
rationality while PEOPLE may be more apt to follow a ‘communicative
rationality’ with a broader set of deliberations.
Phase 1: walking the plains
In the West, ecological awareness - paired with democratic institutions - has
been instrumental in bringing about changes in production and products. It
has curbed - but no more - the previous tremendous waste in manufacturing,
marketing and usage of the products. Smoke-stacks and sewage pipes emit
less dirt. Normally fewer resources (and less energy) will go into each
product or be required for its use. 2
People have, by and large, accepted these changes. Many consumers
demonstrate their willingness to contribute even if the products have become
more costly; eco-friendliness has become a sales argument. One example is
catalytic converters for cars which in economic terms give an extra cost or a
lower efficiency (higher price per mile). The manufacturers have grudgingly
1 Media - with the exception of the diminishing public service share - is in tact in a very
ambivalent situation. It is part of Business or dependant on the benevolence of Business
(as advertisers) but still retains an ambition to scrutinise Business and the Political Class in
the public interest.
2 But we may have too rosy a picture of this. New cars in Sweden in the last 15 years do
not use less petrol, contrary to common belief. Also American cars are said to use more
petrol now than in the 1970s.
3
accepted the measures as well as many safety-improving devices and rules
(and passed the increased costs ol their products on to the customers). Cars
also illustrate how improvements are incorporated in the continuous
development of products.
The general picture is that behind superficial tugs-of-war, industry and
government have co-operated in the gradual changes, acting with public
consent. In terms of lifestyle changes, very little has been called for — mainly
a bit of ‘eco-cycling’ household garbage. Thus government agencies handle
environmental issues with a two-fold message to the public. The manifest one
is to act green. But the latent one is that the situation is under control, no
need to worry. In line with this economists have been claiming that economic
growth is compatible with, or even a condition for, environmental
improvements.
Phase 2: facing the hill
The leaner and cleaner production is, however, not taking us any closer to
sustainability. Too little is being done and the growing volume of production
has offset the improvements of each product. International treaties on
environmental issues are insufficient. Renewed estimates by independent
researchers and ecological pressure groups indicate the need for more
fundamental changes in production/consumption and thus in lifestyle.-
This is how I perceive the present situation. Government agencies are
at work to improve the situation but with the tacit instruction that changes
must not disrupt other processes in society which are judged to be equally, or
more, important - foremost perhaps the efforts to alleviate unemployment
by way of economic growth. Meanwhile the public must rest assured that the
problems are under control and can be solved with available means - the
‘technical fix’.
But the public understanding is also formed by reports of the
‘alarmists’ and its own observations. The Rio Conference in 1992 brought
many controversies to the surface, not only between North and South but
also between GROWTH and GREEN and between governments and non¬
government organisations (NGOs). 4
~ The Friends of the Earth use the concept of ‘environmental space’ allotting each human
being an equal share in the use and depletion of the resources of the world. Energy use is
limited by the CO 2 -emission and they suggest a reduction to 40% by 2010 - to be
achieved mainly by an ‘efficiency revolution’ - and to 15% by the year 2030. mainly by
converting to energy sources not available today. This way, the FoE try to plav down the
need for changes in lifestyle.
The Swedish EPA, in a scenario study, makes the point clear that even if international
treaties were to be followed, this would not suffice to create a satisfactory situation
(Naturvardsverket 1993). The message of the second generation book on the ‘limits to
growth’ is equally pessimistic (Meadows, Meadows & Randers 1992).
4 Compare the description of the different world views of 'hierarchists’ and ‘egalitarians’ in
(Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky 1990).
4
Phase 3: starting uphill
The progression so far must be considered to have been rather easy.
Ecological improvement and better efficiency have often gone together.
Much remains to be done - and is quite possible - along these lines. 5
So tar, the (small) sacrifices and the participation demanded from the
public have also been met with fair understanding. The situation ahead may
not be so smooth. ‘Dematerialisation’ in production is not enough. To make
real progress towards sustainability, the wasteful lifestyles must be curtailed.
It will mean going beyond choosing the ecologically correct goods and rather
settling for less. Buy less and consume less. This is a fourfold challenge:
1. It will challenge business at large. Buying eco-friendly may even
have been advantageous to business but buying less is a threat.
2. Reduced - or even levelled-off - consumption and economic activity
will also threaten economic growth with repercussions for state
finances and in the end the legitimisation of the government (and the
political class) which rests upon its ability to collect taxes and deliver
the services expected. It would certainly challenge ingrained ideas of
Progress and Development as continuous material growth.
3. It will challenge the secondary aims of consumption: the satisfaction
of wants and whims beyond needs as well as the social stratification
that is expressed by means of a ‘distinctive' consumption. Social
interchange has become geared to consumption as we:
*buy (consume) to gain satisfaction - getting new clothes for a
change in appearance - and
*express social affiliation or distance - buying the right things for
the group we want to belong to - and
Remunerate, reward or felicitate by offering (purchased) gifts. 6
4. It will in particular challenge resource consuming habits which
constitute much of the distinction of high income groups. Estimates
indicate that a high-consumer household would use 4 to 5 times more
energy than a thrifty one, which is more than the income differential.
The skewed distribution of travelling, a markedly energy-dense
activity, is also illustrated by the report that more than 50% ot all
travelling is done by just 10% of the population. 7
5 This is the ‘Faktor 4’-idea and the first message of that book before it goes on to establish
that more profound changes are inevitable. (Lovins, Lovins & Weizsacker 1995)
6 As discussed by a number of prominent writers, e.g. Jean Baudrillard. Pierre Bourdieu and
others mentioned below. Also see Featherstone (Featherstone 1991). Still another derived
function of consumption is to support our memories - “souvenirs’ have become an integral
part of touristing as well as many other events.
7 Calculations presented in the daily paper Dagens Nyheter 96-03-11 and (Vilhelmsson
1990). Two worlds intersect here: family Jones’ weekly trip to the country-house and their
annual vacation flight to the Mediterranean must somehow be made comparable to Mr
Businessman's weekly trips to customers far and wide. I'nless both parties agree to a
reduction, there is an obvious risk for a stalemate blocking any progress.
5
A note on the history of ideas:
It is illuminating to trace the ideas of a consumer society and ol the
environmental issue side by side. In both cases, intellectual prediction preceded
reality. Abundant consumption and its consequences to society was anticipated
by many turn-of-the-century writers — e.g. Georg Simmel, Walter Benjamin and
Thorstein Veblen - long before it became an economic and social reality (in the
US in the 1920s, in Europe after WW II). Likewise, environmental degradation
from industry was anticipated in the 19th century but became a public concern
in the last decades. Thus the two ideas intersected in the early 1970s when basic
consumption needs were met (in the rich countries) and the environmental harm
became obvious.^
In terms of public acceptance, green ideas can be compared to ideas ol gender
equality. Both have been promoted from above (as well as Irom the grassroots)
and have made great progress in the last decades. It is of great importance for the
future that children (and adults) are aware of nature’s condition and that we are
prepared to sort garbage and set composts. Likewise it is important that boys
and men share in household work and that men occasionally take time off work
to care for the children. But for green ideas as well as for gender equality ideas, it
is obvious that these are only first steps, the sign of recognition that is a
prerequisite for a general adoption of possible future practices.
2 What People Say...
Is our society prepared for changes in activities and consumption patterns
which challenge these interests, ideas and habits? This section presents some
survey results which do indicate a degree of readiness among People in their
capacity as customers and employees. In the first place, they are counter¬
evidence to the prevailing ‘economic wisdom’ about the insatiable consumer
which guides politics. A discussion of the results follows in the next section.
Pour kinds of evidence will be used:
- attitudes to consumption and needs,
- preferences for free time versus paid work,
- views of life changes over the last generation and
- declarations of concern for the environmental effects of present
lifestyles.
It applies to the situation in rich welfare countries in general but by choosine
material from different countries - here mainly the US and Sweden - we can
also compare what differences in culture and politics mean.
8 (Sorlin 1991; Sanne 1995)
6
How much is needed?
The well-known ‘income paradox’ claims that happiness is hardly related to
income, either in longitudinal or in cross comparisons. It is supported by a
Swedish survey where a majority state that they are satisfied (completely or
fairly) with their income. Likewise 70% in a recent US survey claim to be
satisfied with their personal economic situation. 9
In the US survey 88% agree (or even ‘strongly agree’) that ‘most of us
buy and consume far more than we need’ and 77% state that they could
choose to buy and consume less than they do. But the study also reveals a
strong ambivalence to consumption. While most people condemn
‘materialism’ in their society as an important factor behind the erosion of
good American features like commitment to the family and the community,
they also accept the benefits of consumption and value material abundance in
their life. A third - and intervening - factor is the importance attached to
freedom which leads to a reluctance to interfere with other people's choice
of lifestyle.
A Swedish survey fills out such broad statements. It was initially con¬
ducted in order to map ‘consensual poverty’ in terms of necessities for a
normal life. Thus it avoids the problems of defining and delimiting the elu¬
sive concept of NEED but allows us to study people's attitudes to goods and
services.
The most relevant information stems from the survey's mapping of the
occurrence of certain belongings and habits of consumption and people's
perceived need for them. This created four categories out of the alternatives
HAVE/HAVE NOT and NEED/NEED NOT (see Figure 1 ).
We find that almost all households have-and-need a number of basic
welfare means such as health care and proper housing. 73% also have-and-
need a car (as compared to a mere 47% who consider it NECESSARY, a
thought-provoking discrepancy 10 ). Some household appliances are also very
common and considered essential. But as one moves down the list, the
categories ‘has, no need’ and ‘has not, no need’ become dominant.
The smallest category is those deprived (to the right in the diagram).
Approximately 15% claim that they cannot take holidays away from home or
devote themselves to activities like going to the cinema or a night out. 11
9 This has been discussed by a great number of researchers,( e.g. Easterlin 1973; Allardt
1975; Scitovsky 1976; Lane 1978; Thurow 1983). For data from Sweden see Sanne
1995, which also contains a review of the literature on NEED. For this section I have
chosen as my main sources of data for the US, Hat wood Group (1995) and tor Sweden,
Hallerod (1994). The last survey is modelled on a British one by Mack & Lansley (1985)
which gives very similar information (but uses it to describe and discuss the development
in ‘Poor Britain’).
1° In addition to the 73%, another 6% consider themselves deprived of a car. Is the big
difference between 73% (or 79) and 47% an example of a cognitive dissonance due to the
awareness of environmental problems of the car?
1 1 The issue of vacations is often pointed to by the trade unions. As for the other acti\ lties.
could a contributing factor be lack of initiative?
7
Figure 1 What do you have and what do you need? Examples from a survey.
100 %
modern housing
t «
is_J
1 " TV ... 1
in§
a holiday away 1 week/year Hi j
nr
VCR
I I
microwave oven
"HAS AND NEEDS" "HAS, NO NEED"
| = ’’necessity”
’’HAS NOT, NO NEED” ’’NEEDS BUT
CANNOT AFFORD"
Source:
Note:
Hallerod 1994, Poverty in Sweden: a New Approach to the Direct
measurement of Consensual Poverty, Umea, Umea Studies in Sociology
No 106
Thick vertical lines indicate how many consider it ‘necessary for a normal
life’ (in reply to a general question).
The most relevant feature however is that respondents were able (and
willing) to distinguish between essential and non-essential consumption. In
many cases the latter comprises the largest part: there are many VCRs,
microwave ovens and other gear in the homes which are not deemed
‘needed’. This indicates a ‘rational’ approach to consumption. The reasons
for acquisition may have been curiosity, status, comfort or wish for
distinction. It indicates that if given good arguments, one might refrain from
such purchases. 12
^ Evidcmiy these replies do not mean that needs are defined for ever; the perception
likely to change over time as new habits are formed.
is most
8
Use of time: opting for time over money?
The idea that time is too short is a recurring theme in the popular debate. It
is often combined with complaints about ‘stress’ in everyday life (see below).
This is also apparent in many surveys. People regret the lack of time for
what they consider important: to spend time with family and friends. This is
also a theme in the American study: while very few people say that they
would be more satisfied with a nicer car and other consumption, a majority
expect to gain satisfaction from more social time, less stress and more
community participation. Swedes are likely to stress family, leisure pursuits,
learning something new and friends. 1 3
Figure 2 Preferred use of increasing resources in society 1989
Source: Survey presented by government report on working time 1989
There is an obvious link between material consumption, income and
the duration of work. Attitudes to working hours also reflect the attitudes to
consumption and needs. Desired working houis has been the object ot a gtcat
number of surveys. In Swedish surveys, and it the question is phrased as a
matter of a choice for the future, a majority of 50-60% favour shorter hours
instead of a higher income. Likewise about halt ot the respondents suggest
that additional resources in society should be used for shorter hours and
13 see Sanne 1995; for the US (Harwood Group 1995). Similar information is given in an
article entitled ‘The Great American Slowdow n which is a real misnomer; the thrust ot the
article is the increasing ‘time famine' over the last decades although the authors claim that
it might have levelled off in the mid-1990s (Robinson & Godbey 1996).
9
only a small minority prefer increased private consumption (see Figure 2).
Meanwhile only a minority - 15-20% - is prepared to forgo income for
shorter hours. In these surveys, very few want increased work hours. 14
A general conclusion would be that the shortage ot time is an under¬
valued aspect of modern life. When basic needs are satisfied people do seem
to opt for time over money. This may be more so in Sweden than many
other countries.! 5 But Andre Gorz (in several texts) has also emphasised this
attitude of ‘we have enough’ or ‘we can make do' as a general trait in the
rich West.
Has life become better?
In brief, these surveys give a picture of contentment with the material
standard achieved. Other issues are brought forward in a survey which asked
people to consider the changes of life over the past 30 years (see Figure 3
where arrows indicate positive or negative factors (and an overall
assessment)). 16
Figure 3 How has life changed in the past 30 years and what do you expect for
the next 30 years?
workV s,ress
family
leisure time N \F
economy
”joy of life”
\ personal
security
human
relations
LIFE IN GENERAL
environment
Source : (see footnote 16)
The general pattern has been consistent for many years but there is evidence that part-
timers increasingly request more hours. There is no indication that the present economic
crisis should have weakened the general quest for shorter hours but it may increasingly be
regarded as a means to alleviate the mass unemployment (which is a rather recent'
phenomenon in Sweden).
Note the different nature of the questions: the first one is future-directed and concerns
a common action, the second one assumes individual and immediate action which is also
in defiance of a social norm; see further discussion in section 3.
15 Attitudes to shorter hours differ in European countries with Swedes at the most
sympathetic end.
16 The survey was done in 1995 in Sweden by TEMO with altogether 21 Questions to 2700
nf S ^y entS ' ThC aiT0WS lndlcate trends with a gradient roughly corresponding to the'net
of positive oyer negative answers (but the picture is blurred by'the varying frequency of
the answers ‘same or ‘don't know’). 3 y e irequcncy ot
10
The improved working conditions and economy are duly appreciated. But
they stand out as exceptions. In most respects, things seem to have changed
for the worse. There is much more stress (even if leisure time is unchanged),
family life has deteriorated as have personal security and human relations.
This is an almost unanimous view (compared to the opinion about the
economy which is composed of diverging views). The same goes for
environmental degradation.
More people say that life, all in all, was better before. The answers as a
whole could be taken as a declaration of how WELL-BEING is perceived. The
better economy (higher income and consumption) is not at all as predominant
as the general political debate - mirrored in mass media - implies.
The survey also asked about expectations for the coming 30 years. This
seems to confirm the limited impact of the economy by an inversion of the
expectations: the economic outlooks appear very bleak but overall life is still
expected to turn out better! Contrary to a common notion, respondents do
not foresee a further degradation of the environment. Neither are people so
pessimistic about human relations or family life. 17
Views on the interplay of environment , living standards and
working patterns
The American survey reveals a high environmental awareness connected
with an abundant consumption. Almost everyone agrees that ‘the way we live
produces too much waste’ (93%) and that major changes in lifestyle will be
needed to protect the environment (88%). This is particularly deeply felt
with regard to the prospects for the children and future generations. A
majority supports ideas for action like increased lifetime of products, less
spending and less driving. Similarly most Swedes declare themselves willing
to sacrifice material standards for a better environment (close to 90% agree
‘absolutely’ or ‘probably’). 18
But public opinion may sometimes appear contradictory. Only 51% of
the Americans were ready to admit that their own buying habits have a ne-
17 Those with a positive view in general on the past development tend to point at the better
economy (and economic equality), security, housing conditions and schooling. I hose
critical are likely to stress deterioration of family life and intergenerational contacts and the
worsening prospects of peace. Both categories record more stress and degradation ot
human relations and of the environment.
In my understanding, the negative views on ‘human’ aspects of the past indicate a
disappointment. Promises of a better life have not been fulfilled (and many observers,
within and outside the academic field, have predicted consumption's inability to provide
satisfaction).
As would be expected, views on the future are generally more uncertain, w rule the
poor prospects for the economy have been widely discussed, there is little to validate the
relative optimism about the ‘human’ categories for the future. It bears witness to an
inherent but possibly unjustified human optimism: things may have changed tor the worse
but one is reluctant to admit that they may turn even worse. As for the environment, most
experts in the field seem to hold that it will deteriorate but this view is not shared by these
respondents.
18 SIFO, (see Sanne 1995)
gative effect on the environment (although 88% saw the need for changes in
lifestyle). At times this causes cynical comments (see further below) - but it
may also be explicable (in other ways than as inconsistent thinking).
Figure 4 describes reactions to some statements on a desirable society.
The first statement shows the very strong majority in favour of a better
environment, even at the expense of material standards. The second statement
shows that shorter hours at the expense of living standards have moderate
support. A substantial group even disapproves outright of the idea of ‘down¬
shifting’ work.
Figure 4
Acceptance of proposals about environment, living standards and
working hours.
%
/o
50 T 1 - "Better environment even
at the expense of standard.’
40 •;
30-
20 -
10- 1
0
Good/agrees
2. Less work, more leisure even
at the expense of standard.”
Bad/disagrees
Source: Attitude surveys in Sweden 19
The two statements give a picture ot the public understanding of these issues.
Environmental concern has been boosted for decades with information about
the risks for ourselves, our children and nature. But we have also mown
accustomed to economic growth and learnt to look at it as ‘normal
beneficial and a panacea for all problems. As mentioned above, the conflict
between growth and environment has seldom been stressed.
19 rn
[Personal communication from investigators (LNU 1991
Unweighted responses. The statements are not entirely
refers to the present situation, not the future
and Umea
comparable
993)].
as latter
12
Thus people seem to associate environmental hazards with their own
living standards but not - or not to the same degree - with economic growth.
It obviously takes time to switch perspectives and begin to regard economic
growth (or their own work!) as a problem.
In addition to this, work and diligence are still held to be virtuous.
More leisure may be appealing but does not exert the same pressure for
change as does the environmental threat. That makes the idea of
‘downshifting’ - working and earning less - ambiguous. Many more Swedes
are prepared (mentally) to sacrifice living standards for the sake of the
environment. According to the American study, a majority would endorse a
list of changes for their consumption. But although both groups express that
they have enough and that non-material aspects of life were the most
important, ‘downshifting’ appears too radical a change.
3 ... and What the Opinions Mean - a Discussion
At this stage, it may be sensible to forgo the intuitive quest to untangle the
issue further. The authors of the American study make a point of the fact
that their respondents seemed eager to discuss these matters but were
unprepared and lacked an adequate vocabulary to do so. It could also be a
scientific as well as a political mistake to press ahead trying to uncover
preferences which are still under formation. It may be more relevant to
observe how opinions are formed by a public discussion in a society. 20
The basic question of what the attitudes mean for the greening of
politics, remains. Is there a line from public awareness to public acceptance
and onwards to political action? But let us first discuss whether the attitudes
can be trusted. Objections may be raised - but it is also essential to turn the
light on them and examine their ideological base. I will also suggest how the
survey results may be interpreted in the social setting and discuss if they may
be relevant under present conditions.
Objections ...
Apart from limitations due to the survey design there are three main objec¬
tions:
- the satisfaction (contentment) with consumption and income may be
influenced by a downwards adaptation of preferences, the so called
“‘sour grapes" reaction'. 2 !
- the replies mirror an ‘instilled needlessness' created by the dominating
social forces. This objection, which is closely related to the one about
20 The investigators stress that these questions appear so big that they escape scrutiny; it is
‘the elephant in the living room of American life’: its presence is undeniable but it is too
big (or close up) to be properly described.
21 (Elster 1983). The researchers do point to such an adaptation but only for respondents
with the lowest income. Note that this is an inversion of the taken-for-granted upward
adaptation of ‘needs’ with rising standard.
13
adapted preferences, had a special bearing in the times of N early
labour movement in Sweden which had to confront such a submissive
attitude in order to organise the workers. 22
- the replies given do not match actual behaviour. Stated preferences
are not supported by revealed preferences. This would be an eco¬
nomist's standard objection (while the previous ones are typically
sociological approaches)
The technical and sociological objections are not, in my view, strong enough
to disqualify the results. As the dean of opinion polls, Daniel Yankelovich,
suggests: the essence of quality in public opinion (in contrast to a volatile
mass opinion) is that people understand the consequences and take respon¬
sibility for their attitudes (Yankelovich 1991). This condition seems to be
well satisfied, especially in the choice of time-or-money - a true 'wallet-
issue’ where people are likely to be knowing and realistic. 22
... and rebuttals
It is even more important to realise that the two first objections tit within a
particular frame of thinking, the paradigm of the insatiable consumer in
standard economics. This means that a scientific explanation ot people s
opinions (in the latter case with a tint of political agitation) also might serve
to deny them the right to express a justified judgment. There is an obvious
risk here that science, embedded in an ideology, is used to explain away such
statements in favour of a ‘politically correct’ understanding.- 4
In contrast to this, the relaxed or composed attitude to consumption
may obviously be construed as a statement of ‘true’ contentment (in a
positive sense of that word 25 ). This interpretation could - if given a chance -
22 The words of the Greek philosopher Epicurus illustrate the two sides of the coin:
‘If you want Pythokles to be rich - then do not expand his resources but reduce
rather his demands.’
This statement can obviously be regarded in two ways. In one perspective it expresses the
wise insight of contentment as expressed by many philosophers of welfare and good life
from Aristotle and onwards, (see Nussbaum & Sen 1990). But given the social
stratification of ancient Greece, it could also be seen as a way of instilling the principle of
graded needs which characterises a hierarchical society.
25 Economists may claim that the system gives a false signal due to the ‘tax wedge' caused
by the taxes levied on work time (but not on leisure time). Thus the individual would
choose without regard to the consequences for the government, the availability of public
services etc. This is correct in principle. But there has always been a tax wedge and it
seems reasonable to assume that people include the wider consequences as a background
to their attitudes.
24 Yankelovich adds that experts compile and interpret what people do and say but that they -
as well as media - prefer to think of people as ignorant and ineducable. It resembles what
Dryzek calls a common notion in policy science to regard voters as ignorant and at most
casually interested in political matters. (Dryzek 1990)
25 It is difficult - in English as well as in Swedish - to express the attitude of being satisfied
with one s circumstances without conveying a patronising tone. This is not my intention.
Thus I prefer CONTENTMENT over COMPLACENCY; the term FRUGAL points in another
direction. To speak of a COMPOSED attitude is my present choice; comments are welcome.
14
open the way for a reduction (or levelling off) of consumption and
promotion of other aspects of a good life (and a healthier environment).
Figure 5 Work and Spend Circle
WORK
>
SPEND
As for the objection against stated - versus revealed - preferences, a
counter argument is that the situation is wrongly conceived. The household is
not in a real ‘market' position where behaviour reflects preferences. The
social order means that what the household does - e.g. in terms of working
hours and consumption - is not freely chosen but rather institutionally
determined or guided. Most jobs are obviously offered in a standard
package: full-day, every day and life-long. This can be depicted with a
‘work-and-spend' circle (developed following Schor 1991) - (see Figure 5).
The traditional economists view is that demand to spend leads to work
(upward arrow). But this is matched by an inverted, more institutionalist,
view: work done (and income earned), as the standard package prescribes,
leads to spending (downward arrow). In this perspective, consuming to the
limit of your earnings from work is a rational response - especially in view
of the important social role of consumption.
The situation fits in well with the social dilemma described by A.O.
Hirschman. The preference for shorter hours instead of higher salary (see
previous section) is, in his terms the ‘voice* of the citizens in a situation
where there is no ‘exit' - no real opportunity to act in another manner (such
as choosing shorter hours) (Hirschman 1970).
This ‘voice’ also implies that a change must be a social, collective
choice, not an individual’s departure from a common pattern. The first
manner also implies a fair distribution ot benefits in society.
15
Figure 6 The Ratchet Effect in Consumption
CONSUMPTION
It is also instructive to take the households' view on consumption -
granted that there is some substance in the attitudes they pronounce (i.e. that
greed and insatiability do not reign). There are obviously strong outside
incentives to boost consumption. Marketing efforts are ubiquitous and
material aspects penetrate social life (see above). At the same time, it may be
well-nigh impossible to cut consumption, at least at short notice, since most
household budgets are tied up with present commitments, loans or simply
habits. Few households will - as we saw - accept working hour cuts if they
also mean wage cuts. This creates an asymmetrical ‘ratchet effect' (Figure 6):
social pressure tends to inflate consumption but budget restraints block the -
genuine - desire to decrease it: thus different answers to the questions on
preferred work hours. A k no’ for the present is still compatible with the
opinion - held by a majority - that shorter hours are preferable to a higher
salary.
Will opinions remain?
In regard to this, will the opinions remain and provide an impetus for change
in the way we assume that democracy works, as rule by the People?
In the first place I assume that our understanding in these matters
derives from a past society of scarcity. Of necessity, it honoured virtues like
industriousness and thrift. In contrast to this, current opinions mirror a
dawning understanding of sufficiency leading to contentment - amplified by
the fear ot ecological harm - but also to a disappointment. The first is the
case when people distinguish HAVE/NEED from HAVE/NO NEED, the second
16
the admission that things did not turn out the anticipated way in the 30 year
perspective.
It this was all, change might simply follow as ‘post- materialism’
replaces ‘materialism’ (to use the vocabulary of Inglehart) in people's minds.
But new tacts have to be added. We must acknowledge that working hours
are longer than they were a decade ago (for those holding a job) while
salaries seem to have levelled off. This is quite pronounced in the US where
real wages for the average worker have been falling for many years. 26
More important is that dual-wage households have become the rule in
most countries. Thus the input ot paid labour from the household (in work¬
ing age) has increased considerably. The presumption in Sweden is that the
dual-wage household is a way of creating equal opportunities for men and
women. In the US, the need to make ends meet for the household appears to
be more emphasised. I take it that both explanations - the offensive as well as
the defensive - are valid in both countries. If this increase in work - which
by tar offsets the gains in leisure during the past decades - is really a way of
mitigating lower compensation, it is necessary to discuss the relevance of the
survey questions. The wish (in Swedish surveys) to trade future higher
earnings for less work raises the question ‘what if one can no longer expect
pay rises?’ Even if the national wealth continues to grow, this may go to non¬
working groups - as the retired - or to the (already) well-paid?
Against this we may counter that in the case of working hours, there is
a long record of very stable opinions, seemingly unaffected by changes in
well-being or economic trends. Most surveys are also quite recent and the
results should mirror the experiences of turning trends. It may still be that
people have not yet grasped that things have changed. I am, however, more
inclined to other explanations like a compartmentalisation in thinking or a
refusal to accept the present situation as inevitable. This leads to the final
question of this paper: what could stop consumption growth, more in line
with expressed opinions?
4 Planning for Reduced Consumption
The opinions which people voice in the surveys together with the ecological
threat seem to warrant a planning for reducing - or at least reforming - the
present consumption. But such ideas, no matter how explicable and rational,
obviously do not catch on in mainstream public and political debate. It has
been suggested that this is due to the lack of an established (political)
vocabulary - these are evidently novel thoughts. But more tangible reasons
are the opposed interests of expansion and growth from the other actors.
This is amplified by the way the media interacts with the POLITICAL CLASS.
Change is also checked by the ‘new social inequality’. This last section will
briefly consider by what means a reduced consumption might be approached.
26 (Krugman 1994 (1990); Economic Policy Institute 1996). Per capita hours of work have
also increased lately in Sweden but at a more moderate rate.
17
For a start, I focus on the complex role of the media and the recent changes
in living conditions.
The media and the lure of consumption
Material contentment runs counter to strong interests. Agnes Heller calls
ours a ‘dissatisfied society’ (Heller 1993). The discourse is dominated by
growth-oriented actors - Business and the Political Class - and economic
growth thrives on dissatisfaction just as much as economic theory assumes
unlimited needs (demand). Many organisations - political parties, trade
unions and business organisations and other interest groups - are based on it.
Their raison d'etre is to give voice to what can be found of popular
dissatisfaction in a political decision process more and more characterised by
lobbying and by deliberately propagated perspectives.
The media plays an important role in propagating this. But it is also in
the nature of the media to focus on problems rather than progress and to pay
attention to losers and individuals rather than to winners and groups. That is
why it abounds with examples underlining discontent. In this way, the media
and organisations form a symbiotic relationship which perpetuates and
normalises a world view where dissatisfaction with material conditions stands
in the way of shifting the political course towards stabilisation and
sustainability. 27
On the global level, this ties in with the radical political changes in the
former 'Second World’ and many ‘developing countries’ where the market
economy and more democratic institutions have been promoted or installed
hand in hand. Although democratising is welcome, economies all over the
world increasingly fall into the hands of transnational corporations which
market similar consumer goods and offer standardised information and
entertainment world-wide - a trend toward a uniform 'McWorld' of
common habits and preferences. 28
Vanishing welfare and growing inequality
The golden years’ after World War II brought a prosperity that was widely
distributed in the population. Full (or near full) employment became the rule
and the gap in incomes decreased. In addition to that, a welfare safety net
bolstered people for life s risks and distributed life chances more fairly.
This development has now been halted and in some respects reversed
with mounting unemployment, dismantled welfare provisions and growing
income gaps, in many cases the result of hyper-salaries and more or less
fraudulent financial activities in the highest social echelons. A growing
number of people become hard-pressed to make ends meet, while they see
others profit ostentatiously. This may redirect their attention to matters of
27
28
In addition media like TV tends to give a simplistic view, often amplifying the wron*
signals rather than broadening the views of the spectators. 8 g
See ‘Jihad vs McWorld’ (Barber 1995).
18
social distribution and displace the issue of voluntary ‘down-shifting’ (and
likewise the concern w ith the widening gulf to the poorest countries).
Excessive work zeal, motivated by fear and a perceived need to hoard for the
future, may also result, whereas a social setting of security (with pensions
and welfare benefits) would allow people to refrain from such exaggerated
efforts.
Reduced consumption in a field of forces
Reduced consumption has to come about in a field of forces formed bv the
three actors — PEOPLE, CAPITAL BUSINESS and The POLITICAL CLASS.
Of the three, the only genuine proponent of a sustainable development
seems to be PEOPLE. I have already remarked that BUSINESS is not likely to
favour a reduction of the markets. BUSINESS is also exerting pressure on the
POLITICAL Class to satisfy their interests. But in the end, the POLITICAL
CLASS also depends on the acceptance by PEOPLE. And PEOPLE as
enlightened consumers are the only ones who can stop the spending spree.
This is evidently a democratic ideal: change emanates from enlightened
citizens and consumers. To succeed, it depends on both actors and structure.
Many writers emphasise the importance of the individual's commitment, his
or her ability to reach beyond greed and selfishness for a common good.
Others focus on the efficiency of the state to set the conditions for the
activities of the individuals and the corporations: the required ‘artificial’
prices which would reflect environmental and sustainability considerations
and the development of important infrastructural elements which literally lav
the course for the future: the urban settlements, the communication arteries,
the preserved land and other major elements which will set the frame for
people's daily life tomorrow.
Still others question if the dominant model of democracy in the West
the one Yankelovich implicitly refers to and the one ‘exported’ to other
countries as mentioned above - will prove able to handle the situation. This
liberal, representative democracy with rights of freedom for individuals and
for corporations is a ‘thin democracy’. Government remains passive in
economic matters, rendering ample room for the market. Politics has in
itself market-like features: voters choose between competing parties and sets
of opinion. It can be described in terms of negotiation, exchange, strategy
and voting. In this view, society is nothing more than the sum of private
interests.- 9
- 9 Much of the current public resentment to politics seem to be a reaction to this and to the
intimate relationship between THE POLITICAL CLASS and BUSINESS. (Ferguson &
Rogers 1986)
A common view even holds that global capitalism presently senes as a battering ram
for democracy while some may counterclaim that imposed democratic institutions open the
way for global capitalistic forces. (Barber 1995)
19
Figure 7 Three-actor model of forces on consumption
Capital
Business
consumer action
marketin
People
issues of
democracy
(lobbying
etc)
The Political
Class
Barber contrasts this to a ‘strong democracy’ and other authors discuss
a ‘deliberative’ or ‘discursive’ or ‘participatory’ democracy (Barber 1984,
Reich, 1988). The ideas are often based on a communicative rationality
(following Habermas and basically referring to Aristotle). But today
‘participatory’ democracy is mainly an issue on the local level, as civic or
grass roots environmentalism and community development (Sirianni &
Friedland 1995). However important as such, it is of limited interest here
compared to the levels ‘below’ where personal choices are made and ‘above’,
the structural one.
Clarifying overconsumption - a step forward
Although many of us may scorn consumption habits, we hold on to our
lifestyle. I will close this paper with some reflections on what
overconsumption implies and how it relates to human aspirations. I regard,
for a start, the present overconsumption in three different perspectives, each
suggesting how to attack it:
20
- it is wasteful because it is inefficient, spending too many resources for
too little benefit
- it is wasteful because the lifestyle of the well-to-do is unduly resource
demanding
- it is abundant because the general living standard is ecologically
untenable.
1 have examined various proposals for reducing consumption only to find
that they share two unfortunate traits: they do not go very far in saving and
they are likely to be strongly opposed. Too little social imagination has been
used to find practical ways to cut consumption in either of these senses. 5b
To reduce waste in production and consumption seems perfectly
rational - almost trivial. But for this to make ecological sense, it demands
that prices - as a major determinant for our choices - are set to reflect
environmental effects. The process to achieve this may be underway but it is
painfully slow. And to reduce waste may not even match Business' interests:
cheap and durable products may be good for the consumer but not for
profits.
Sumptousness is a matter of distribution within society and resembles
other aspects of a class struggle. Environmentally ‘correct’ prices -
administered as ‘green taxes’, tradable emission permits etc - may help to
limit the most resource consuming activities such as long distance travelling.
But it is likely to encounter fierce resistance from those consumers who have
made it their lifestyle (and they are often socially influential) as well as from
the producers behind those activities.
Tackling abundance is still another problem since it touches upon
central political beliefs like that of the insatiable consumer and the
importance of continued economic growth. To secure sustainability requires
a commitment to society, setting new societal norms and actions in
contradistinction to the prevailing reference to people's ‘preferences’. This is
a new agenda and takes a political pedagogy and a discourse which puts
‘consensus on normative positions’ in the centre, a ‘reconstruction of private
and partial interests into publicly defensible norms through sustained debate’
(Dryzek 1990 quoting Barber).
The individual's reaction to the overconsumption issue may take one or
the other route. It has been suggested that a way out of the dilemma is that
the individual, in his/her action, assumes responsibility for its ecological
consequences (Martinez-Alier 1995). It has also been intimated that ‘post-
materialistic’ tendencies, with a rejection of further material consumption
will solve (or rather ‘dissolve’) the problem.
50 j have (in another report. Sanne 1986) discussed the possibility ot making (a share of) the
‘empty nest’ households move into more appropriate housing to allow larger families
adequate housing rather than constructing more and more housing. Further I have
scrutinised a government report on how households can adapt to greener living and 1 have
calculated the effects of limits on excessively energy consuming leisure activities
21
An idea that may hold more of a promise is the suggestion by Fred
Hirsch that consumption eventually will drift towards ‘positional goods’ as
basic needs are satisfied (Hirsch 1976). Such ‘positional goods’ are basically
undecided in character. That opens an opportunity to guide consumption into
a sustainable track. Bluntly worded, it is a call to ‘accept people's lust for
social distinction but turn it in a harmless direction’.
In the end, a fundamental change would however require that we
rethink our organisation of work to match its rising productivity. For a
century, working people all over the globe have struggled to shorten their
working hours as their material standard allowed it. This urge still holds.
But in the wake of neoliberal restructuring of work and globalisation of the
economy, the trend has nearly halted. I am convinced that to achieve a
sustainable society, the best we can do is to start again along that road. This
also has a good chance of success because it coincides with people’s interests.
To do so, we have to fashion the living conditions for workers and the
working conditions for business. These are major political tasks.
22
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No 28. Greig, Alastair W., The Structure and Organisation of Housing Production: a
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the Fordist Models or Social
^ch\fe l TiAd!xcf\995 Iian Urban and Re S ional Development Review: What Can It
N ° 47 ' H'olfe, Aprill^S^ Magazines and Modernist Dreams: Designing the 1950s
N0 48 ' feSApril ^ WMte Cliff ° f CWiW -' ** "onte,
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MlbouZ, ZnU995 ranSfOrmati0n ° f ^ ^ I9,h and 20th Ce ^
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Politics of Home Ownership in iheColdti’ar, NovembeM 995 ^ ^ ” e
NO 51 to ,977 ant,
N ° ” SiirSc ‘Tm * Fm " : T "‘ »oseho„, in ,h, Gkba ,
No 53 Greig, Alastair, The Accommodation of Growth: Canberra's ‘GrowinePainV /W5-
7955, July 1996 *
No 54 Reid, Paul, How the Canberra Camel Got Its Hump: The Departmental Board's Plan,
Its Origins and Consequences , July 1996
No 55 Mullins, Patrick, Exploring the Line of Descent in the Inter,gene rational Transmission
of Domestic Property , September 1996
No 56 Blarney, Russell, The Activation of Environmental Norms: An Illustrated Model
August, 1996
No 57 Gleeson, Brendan, No More Imperial Cities: On Futurology in Social Science
September 1996
No 58 Mees, Paul, Do Public Choice and Public Transport Mix? An Australian-Canadum
Comparison, October 1996
No 59 Stilwell, Frank, Globalisation and Cities: An Australian Political-Economic
Perspective , January 1997
No 60 Freestone, Robert, The Federal Capital of Australia: A Virtual Planning History June
1997
No 61 Marsden, Susan, A History of Australian Capital City Centres Since 1945. October
1997
No 62 Harris, Richard, ‘7b Market! To Markey!: The Changing Role of the Australian
Timber Merchant, 1945-1965 , April 1998
No 63 Sanne, Christer, The Impossibility of Sustaianable Lifestyles - Can We Trust Public-
Opinion and Plan for Reduced Consumption?, August 1998
URU Monographs
Schreiner, S.R. and C.J. Lloyd, editors. Canberra What Sort of City ? Papers of a Conference
Sponsored by the Urban Research Unit, 29 October 1987. URU Canberra, 1988.
Coles, R. editor, The End of Public Housing? A Discussion Forum Organised by the Urban
Research Program 25 October 1996, Urban Research Program February 1997
Troy, Patrick, The Urban Research Program 1966-1996, Urban Research Program 1997
Gleeson, B. and Hanley, P. editors. Renewing Australian Planning? New Challenges. New
Agendas, a discussion forum organised by the Urban Research Program held on June 17-18
1998, Urban Research Program August 1998. Copies are available in return for a
contribution of $10.00 to cover production costs. Make cheques payable to Urban Research
Program/ANU and mail to:
Urban Research Program. RSSS
Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200
tel: 02 6249 2297; fax: 02 6249 0312