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JPRS 80610 

20 April 1982 

USSR Report 


No. 1, January 1982 



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JPRS 80610 
20 April 1982 

USA; Economics, PoLiTics, !DEOLOGY 
No, 1, January 1982 
Translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONO- 

MIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of 
U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences. 


1982: A Year of Alarms and Hopes........ TETELEPELILELILTLT ETT eocccces 1 

Washington and the New International Economic Order 
(A. Vv. Nikiforov) ee ff ee ee *enereinrieeeneeee eereeneeeeeneeeeeeeneeeeneneeeeeeee#e## *# ee 7 

President F. D. Roosevelt: Political Realism and Ac*tion* 
(N, Vv. Sivachev) ne © fe *eerenrerneneeneteeeneeeneeeenrtenenee eereeeeee*e se erewenereneeene eeeeee#se 21 

United States-Israel: Special Relations 
+ M. Rogov) eee eeeeneeeeretee *e © © *enrnrneeneeeteneneneneneeneneeneteeeneneeneeneeeeeneee#ee 22 

United States Military Build-Up in the Indian Ocean 
(V. P. Kozin) *eereeeeeeee ne eet eeweneeneneeee# *enereeneeneneeneteeneteeneneneneneneneneneneneeeeee 36 

American Destiny as Seen by Novelists of the 1970's* 
(A. Ss. Mulyarchik) eee ee eeee ee ee © ere eereeeeeeeee seer erereeeneeneneneeeeee*es 49 

A. A. Troyanovskiy, the First Soviet Ambassador to the United States 
of America* 
(Ye. I. Krutitskaya, L. S. Mitrofamova)....ccccccscccsccssessseseses 49 

Western Europe Opposes U.S. Plans To Deploy New Missiles 
(S. A. Ulin) eevee eee eeeeeeeeeneenener er errr eee “ee eeeenenee ‘eee ee eee eneeneenee 50 

‘Jubilee’ Congress of AFL-CIO* 
CM. ZT. Lepdtakhy) cccccccccccccccccccccccccccce ccccccceces ceccccceces 54 

Legislation for Foreign Investment 1. Canada* 
CV. ZT. Al@RREM) ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccecceceeceeoceceoees 54 

* Not translated by JPRS. 

-ae- [III - USSR - 39] 

CONTENTS (Continued) 

Friendly Fasciem: The New Face of Power in America® 
Cyl I ) PPrTTTTTrTrerrrrererrrrresrrrersrrrrrerTe Sen ee. @ ee ee 54 

Ecological Analysis and Its Impact on the Economy* 
(MW. P. Yevdokimova, V. 2. BOROLOV) ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccces 54 

Book Reviews 
Military Spending and Employment,* by V. B. Benevolenskiy and 

A. Re DOYVRIR ccc cee reece eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeereccere 55 
Erosion of Middle-Class American Dream,* by V. S. Vasil'yev 
and A. A. Ts «can eneee ne 6aesenseseodensees enceoseees eee fe 55 
Factors Affecting Foreign Policy Decisions,* by N. M. Travkina..... 55 
American Capitalism and Technology Transfers, by A. B. Parkanskiy.. 56 
Ecology and the Capitalist City, by V. I. Sokolov........... occccce 57 
Arthur A. Harman--New U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union*........... occcece 58 
Chronicle of Soviet-American Relations (September-November 1981)......... ee 59 

* Not translated by JPRS. 

English title 

Russian title 

Author (s) 

Editor (s) 

Publishing House 

Place of Publication 

Date of Publication 

Signed to press 




No 1, January 1982 


: N. D. Turkatenko 

: Izdatel'stvo Nauka 

: Moscow 

: January 1982 

: 30 December 198! 

: 33,640 

COPYRIGHT : Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, 
politika, ideologiya™", 1982 

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 3-7 

[Text] The dangerous heat of arms race escalation must be mode- 
rated. The p ch of tension must be lowered, dangerous sparks 

of crisis mus. be extinguished, the sensel: ss arms race must be 
ended and there must be a return to normal relations between 
states, mutual respect, understanding and consideration for one 
another's legitimate interests. A serious and businesslike 
approach must be taken to the problems of arms limitation and 
reduction. All of this can and will eliminate the danger of 
nuclear war. (from L. I. Brezhnev's responses to NBC television, 
reprinted in PRAVDA, 22 December 1981) 

There has been no period of history, and probably never will be, that has been 
completely placid for individual countries and all mankind as a whole, there has 
been no period of history that has not been full of troubles, or even tragic wars 
which have taken the lives of millions of people. The period of cold war lit the 
spark of “local” conflicts, which ceased to be local long ago because they gene- 
rally came to involve countries located far away from the “hot spots." Imperialism 
brought the world to the verge of thermonuclear catastrophe several times by 
starting and escalating these conflicts. In V. I. Lenin's words, there has been 

a continuous game of chance, a game in which the blood of millions is shed for the 
sake of conquering and plundering foreign lands. 

In the United States this game was defined accurately by W. Fulbright, a veteran of 
American politics, who called it a symptom of the "arrogance of power.” 

The failure of the aggression against the people of Indochina seemed to prove the 
futility of this policy once and for all. A new era began. The process of 

detente quickly gathered momentum. The principle of peaceful coexistence by states 
with differing social systems, a principle defended by the Soviet Union from the 
very first moment of its existence, began to visibly and tangibly take hold in the 
world irena. This principle was once officially recognized by Washington, which 
promoted the normalization of Soviet-American relations. This, in turn, had a 
favorable effect o1 the political climate throughout the world. 

However, militarism, according to V. I. Lenin's definition, is one of capita'ism's 
"vital signs,” and the more aggressive imperialist circles objected to detente 

from the very beginning and started to attack it. These attacks were particularly 
overt in 1981. lafluential forces in the most powerful capitalist nation, the 
United States, made a much more energetic effort to “cure America of the post- 
Vietnam syndrome." Political scientists of all schools began to interpret this 
"syndrome," a concept they themselves had invented, as something just short of 

"a masochistic obsession with an accidental defeat," which should te "cured as 
quickly as possible" so could get back to normal. 

Under the cover of pseudoscientific phrases and chauvinistic slogans, Washington 
began to flex its muscles and allocate more and more billions of dollars for mili- 
tary needs. At first this was done on the pretext that it was necessary to 

"defend peace through power." Later even this pretext was discarded. Washington 
announced its intention to eradicate a strong guarantee of peace and security: the 
balance of strategic power between the USSR and United States, between the Warsaw 
Pact and NATO. A policy of U.S. military intervention throughout the world was 
i!so announced when entire regions were declared "spheres of American vital 

Many new pretexts were invented for this policy, but they were essentially the 
same as the old ones. "The monopolies decided," the accountability report of the 
CPSU Central Committee to the 26th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union says, "that they needed someone else's oil, uranium and nonferrous metals, 
and so the United States declared the Middle East, Africa and the Indian Ocean a 
sphere of U.S. ‘vital interests.’ The U.S. military machine is actively pushing 
its way into this region and plans to stay here a long time. The island of Diego 
Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Oman, Kenya, Somalia, Egypt--what next?" 
The old scarecrow of the "Soviet threat" was once again dragged out into the open 
to camouflage this policy more effectively. When Washington leads itself into a 
blind alley, whether in the Middle East or in Europe, it makes a tremendous effort 
to convince the entire world that the "hand of Moscow" is directing all revolu- 
tionary conflicts and upheavals, which are known to be nothing other than symptoms 
objective historical processes taking place in today's world, because Moscow 
did not want--and never will want--to live according to the "code of behavior" 
stipulated by Washington. 

As a result of all this, the threat of a nuclear conflagration was intensified in 
1981. The world was seized by troubles. The United States had its share of these 
troubles too. Washington's reversion to a foreign policy from a position of 
streneth and anti-Soviet hysteria were called insane by such experienced diplomats 
and politicians as A. Harriman and G. Kennan. One of the pillars of the American 
establishment, THE NEW YORK TIMES, loudly declared that Washington's policy was 
costing the United States too much. It was losing economic strength and diplomatic 
influence, its national security was being undermined and its moral prestige in 

the international arena had declined, not to mention domestic political and eco- 
mic consequences. 

The troubles seemed countless, but life would not be life if there were nothing 

but trouble. There is also hope, and the foundation of this hope is the Soviet 
Union's consistently peaceful policy, which is free of temporary considerations 
and which is winning more and more approval throughout the world, including the 
approval of sensible people in the United States. 

First of all, the Soviet Union introduced clarity and some calm into confused minds 
in the Western European countries, which Washington had tried to convince of the 
inevitability and even acceptability of “Limited nuclear war"--although, of course, 
{t would mean the end of the European continent. The Soviet Union discredited and 
refuted this delirious idea and simultaneously warned Washington officials that if 
a nuclear war were to break out, whether in Europe or in any other place, it would 
unavoidably and irrevocably take on global dimensions, and those who hope to set 
fire to the nuclear powder-keg and then sit on the sidelines and watch should not 
entertain illusions. 

The Soviet Union exposed the myth of the "Soviet threat." The tor Soviet leader, 
L. I. Brezhnev, has stressed over and over again that the Soviet Unfon is not 
threatening anyone, does not plan to attack anyone and has a military doctrine 
which is purely defensive in nature. 

Last vear the Soviet Union continued its peaceful offensive. It made new proposals 
and suggestions in repord to specific, carefully considered and fair ways of lower- 
ing the pitch of international tension and eliminating seats of conflict in the 
vast expanses trom Central Europe to the Far East, including the Middle East, the 
Persian Gulf zone and the I[ndian Ocean. 

The Soviet Union has been equally consistent in pro»vosing the normalization of 
relations with the United States, based on mutual respect and on consideration for 
one another's rights and interests. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has stressed 

its desire to have good and friendly relations with the United States and cooperate 
with it for the sake of stronger peace co earth. 

At the end of 1981 the hope that the world still hid the will to eliminate the 
danger of war was reinforced by the start of talks on the reduction of nuclear 
weapons in Europe by representatives of the USSR inc the United States in Geneva 
on 30 November. There was the possibility that this would be followed by the con- 
tinuation of the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of strategic weapons. 
President Reagan said that the United States was willing to discuss this matter 
with the Soviet Union, as well as other matters on which the two sides disagreed. 
The Soviet side applauded this willingness but stressed the need for words to be 
backed up by the appropriate actions. 

The hope that peace and security would be consolidated and that detente would be 
continued and strengthened was given strong momentum by L. I. Brezhnev's visit to 
the FRO and his talks with Chancellor H. Schmidt. This visit was of tremendous 
importance, and not only in the bilateral relations between the USSR and the FRG. 

At this tense and extremely crucial moment in international relations, when they 
could deteriorate dramatically or change for the better, L. I. Brezhnev's visit to 
the FRG is of particular significance in relation to the entire group of problems 
between the East and West and the general trends in world politics. 

The new Soviet-West German summit meeting and its results provide more evidence of 
the efficacy of the Soviet policy line in international affairs, which was worked 
out by the 26th CPSU Congress and is aimed at eliminating the danger of war, 
especially nuclear war, at disarmament and at detente and peaceful cooperation 

by states with differing social structures. L. I. Brezhnev's negotiations, con- 
versations, meetings and statements in the FRG represented a major political step 
in the implementation of the Program of Peace for the 1980's. 

The fundamental security interests of the Soviet people, friends and allies of the 
USSR and all of the Europeans dictated the need to focus the talks in Bonn on the 
most urgent and momentous issue: the elimination of the danger facing Europe in 
connection with the plans to deploy new types of American nuclear missiles in 
several Western European countries, especially the FRG, and the prevention of the 
disruption of -:he balance of power in favor of the NATO bloc. This issue was 
raised as “trectly and definitely as possible. 

While he was in the FRG, L. I. Brezhnev set forth new, far-reaching proposals with 
a single aim in mind--the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement to 
deliver Europe from the danger of a nuclear conflagration. These proposals were 
not only intended for the FRG and other Western European countries, but were also 
addressed to the United States in connection with the start of the Soviet-American 
talks on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. 

In essence, the new Soviet proposals are the following. 

First of all, the Soviet Union considerably supplemented its earlier proposal 
regarding the moratorium on the deplovment of new medium-range nuclear weapons in 
Europe and the modernization of existing ones for the period of the talks on these 
types of weapons. The Soviet side expressed its willingness, on the condition 
that the other side consent to this moratorium, to unilaterally reduce the number 
of its medium-range nuclear weapons in the European half of the USSR, thereby mov- 
ing toward the lower level which the USSR and United States might agree upon 
during the course of the talks. 

Secondly, the Soviet Union stressed its intention to advocate the radical reduc- 

tion of medium-range nuclear weapons by both sides at the Geneva talks--to reduce 
the number of these weapons by hundreds and not by dozens. Naturally, this will 

include American forward-basing weapons and the corresponding nuclear weapons of 

England and France. 

Thirdly, the USSR would be prepared to agree on the complete elimination of all 
types of medium-range nuclear weapons aimed at targets in Europe by both sides, the 
West and the East. 

Furthermore, L. I. Brezhnev stressed, the Soviet Union is completely in favor of 
eliminating all nuclear weapons, medium-range and tactical, from Europe. This 
would be a genuine final solution that would be fair to both sides. 

‘he proposals set forth by L. I. Brezhnev represent a program for the curtailment 
‘f nuclear weapons in Europe. It is consistent with the desires of all people and 
the demands of the broad masses opposing the danger of nuclear war. 

The Soviet Union expects the West, especially the United States of America, to 
give the new Soviet initiatives its full attention and objective consideration. 

The issue of nuclear weapons in Europe is an issue concerning more than the future 
of the continent and the fate of the hundreds of millions of people inhabiting it. 
It is also an issue concerning the fate of the entire world. The Soviet Union wants 
to negotiate the kind of settlement that will not harm anyone's security but will 
lower the level of military confrontation in Europe. 

It would be an illusion, however, to imagine that this kind of settlement will come 
about by itself. Judging by many indications, the chief NATO powers, especially 
the United States, are still hoping to gain military advantages for themselves and 
are actually hoping for the unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union. As L. I. 
Brezhnev has stated firmly and clearly on several occasions, including his trip to 
the FRG, the Soviet Union will not agree to this. The Soviet people and the 
Communist Party will never compromise the security interests of our country and our 
allies and friends. The European people, the American people and all those who 
value the cause of disarmament and peace must know about this. Western government 
officials must also realize this. 

One of the main conclusions that can be drawn from L. I. Brezhnev's talks in the 
FRG, as underscored in the document of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme 
Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers "On the Results of the Visit of 
Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chair- 
man of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, to the Fereral Republic of Germany," is 
that states, regardless of their social order or thelr membership in various mili- 
tary alliances, must make every effort and continue to work together in order to 
consolidate peace and restore the climate of detente and trust. It is essential 
that all states take this as a guide. 

The document states that L. I. Brezhnev's talks in Bonn revealed the common views 

of the Soviet Union and FRG about the importance of maintaining political dialogue 
between states in complex international situations. The CPSU and the Soviet State 
have always believed that each country, sensing its responsibility for the course 

of international events, should do everything within its power to create a political 
atmosphere favoring the successful conduct of talks and the development of dialogue. 
As for the dialogue between the USSR and the United States, the Soviet position on 
this matter has been defined quite clearly, primarily at the 26th CPSU Congress. 

It is in favor of this dialogue. 

The Soviet Union's international activity for the security and progress of people, 
for detente and for the curtailment of the arms race is strengthening the will of 
people everywhere on earth to preserve the highest value of human civilization-- 
peace--and tc defend it actively and daily. 

Experience has shown that the chance of success in the struggle for peace increases 
as the voices of individuals, various social fo ces and groups in defense of peace 
become louder and more demanding. The results c.f L. I. Brezhnev's trip to the FRG 
are increasing the chances that the struggle for the preservation of peace will 
become more effective and are giving people more confidence that even the most 
difficult international problems can be solved. 

The hope of a peaceful future on our planet would be even stronger if Washing*on 
could give up its dream of attaining military superiority to the USSR. After all, 

if the need should arise--and experience corroborates this--the Soviet people will 
find a way to make an additional effort and do everything necessary to provide 
their country with reliable defense. Washington will not be able to intimidate the 
Soviet Union with economic pressure either. It should remember that the benefits 
of economic cooperation are not at all the privilege of any one side. This kind 

of cooperation is mutually beneficial and those who oppose it will harm themselves 
at least as much as the other side, if not more. 

Who now does not know that wise government does not consist in "responding quickly" 
with force or various types of "sanctions," but in responding correctly, with a 
view to the objective realities of today's world, and finding peaceful ways of 
solving problems? 

We hope that precisely this kind of wisdom will triumph. We hope that the people's 
wishes for peace and disarmament will triumph. We hope that the vear of 1982 will 
alleviate fears and strengthen hopes. 

Man is responsible for everything that happens on our planet. There is nothing 
predetermined or inevitable about a thermonuclear catastrophe. The people who are 
involved in the constantly growing movement for peace and security are well aware 
of this. Responsible politicians and leading scholars in all countries are also 
aware of it. These are precisely the ideals that lie at the basis of, for example, 
the international Pugwash movement of scientists, the latest meeting of which was 
held at the end of 1981. The members of this movement are guided by the belief that 
mankind can only be saved through the actions of people. It is the duty of all 
people, working together and individually, to save civilization. Science, just as 
all other spheres of human activity, must be used for the good of mankind and not 
for the escalation of the arms race or for the sake of general destruction. 

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982 

5 588 

CSO: 1803/8 

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 8-19 
[Article by A. V. Nikiforov] 

[Text] The heads of state and government from 8 developed capitalist nations and 
14 developing countries met in Cancun (Mexico) at the end of October 1981. The 
meeting was part of the "North-South" dialogue, which began in 1975, regarding 
international economic cooperation and the development of young states. The prepa- 
rations for the conference and the discussions at te meeting directed the atten- 
tion of the international community to the struggle of the developing countries for 
a "new international economic order" (NIEO), which has made the problem of reorga- 
nizing international economic relations one of the central issues in contemporary 
international politics. As a necessary continuation of the process of decolonial- 
ization, this kind of reorganization, conducted on a democratic basis and in line 
with the principles of equality, would be historicilly natural, as speakers 
stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress.! The struggle of the developing countries for 
the NIEO, which is intended to eliminate neocolonial exploitation, has given rise 
to a new sphere in the foreign policy of the largest neocolonial power, the United 
States--policy on the reorganization of international economic relations. 

Washington's approach to this problem, particularly the demands of the NIEO progran, 
has been shaped by three main groups of factors. The first consists of the comp- 
lex of U.S. economic and social interests in the developing countries. The scales 
of U.S. economic ties with this group of countries are constantly growing. In 1979 
this group accounted for almost 34 percent of all American exports and 45 percent 
of U.S. imports. In 1978 more than half of the industrial commodities exported by 
the young states to the developed capitalist countries entered the U.S. market, 
including almost 60 percent of their exported machines and transport equipment. 

The United States receives almost a third of its imported raw materials and 37 per- 
cent of its imported mineral fuel (oil and gas) from the same states. In turn, the 
developing countries receive one-fifth of all their imported machines, one-fourth 
of their chemicals, one-third of their textile fibers and more than one-half of 
their cereal grain from the United States.2 The combined direct investments of 
American monopolies in the developing countries are now growing more quickly than 
capital investments in the developed capitalist countries and totaled 47.8 billion 
dollars by the beginning of 1979. The profit norm on these investments was 26.5 
percent in the first case and 17.7 percent in the second.3 It must be borne ‘n 
mind, however, that the lion's share of American investments is concentrated in a 

small group of the most highly developed countries in Latin America and Southeast 
Asia. According to some data, American private banks account for around 40 percent 
of all the bank credit received by the developing countries, or almost one-third 
of the overseas credit extended by these banks. 4 

The United States and other Western nations regard the developing wor]d with its 
population of millions as a reserve for the expansion and rejuvenation of the 
entire capitalist system by means of its development "in breadth." In recent years, 
however, Washington has been pressured by the "Group of 77" to take some steps to 
reform the system of neocolonial exploitation.) The only specific change in the 
U.S. stand on the NIEO, however, has consisted in attempts to guarantee U.S. monop- 
olies compensation for the economic ".osses" they sometimes incur as a result of 
the disruption of neocolonial relations by attaching the young states to the world 
capitalist system with economic and political bonds. 

Therefore, the economic and social interests of the United States in these count- 
ries will determine the objective limits and possibilities of change in the U.S. 
approach to the NIEO--from attempts to preserve the essence of neocolonial rela- 
tions as much as possible to the satisfaction of some of the demands of the devel- 
oping countries, but certainly only on the condition that these demands do not 
transcend the capitalist framework. 

Secondly, differences in the foreign policy philosophies of the Democratic and 
Republican parties, particularly in their approaches to relations with the develop- 
ing countries, play a significant role in determining the U.S. stance in talks on 
the NIEO at different stages. 

Thirdly, the U.S. approach to the demands of the liberated countries has been 
greatly influenced by foreign political factors, the dynamics of the developing 
world's struggle for the NIEO and the effectiveness of its political pressure on 
the Western countries, especially the United States. In turn, these factors are 
closely related to the overall state of international relations and the evolution 
of the central global conflict of the present day, the conflict between socialism 
end capitalism. There was a natural connection between the atmosphere of detente 
in the mid-1970's and the initial success of the developing countries’ struggle 
for the NIEO, just as there is now an obvious connection between the United States' 
present negative stand on these problems and its general line of undermining 
detente and relying on military force to settle international problems. Against 
the background and within the framework of this connection, the attitude of 
Washington's Western allies toward the NIEO is certainly affecting the specific 
solutions chosen by Washington as ways of settling the conflict over this issue. 
Although there are noticeable differences in the allies’ opinions, the Western 
Furopean countries and Japan have had a general restraining effect on the U.S. 
stand on the NIEO. These countries are more dependent on the developing world for 
their raw materials and oil, have a keen awareness of the peculiarities of the 
developing countries and have a great deal of experience in sociopolitical maneuv- 
ering, and these generally lie at the basis of their more flexible position with 
regard to the NIEO. Although the United States will still have the "final say" on 
matters pertaining to changes in capitalism's world economic ties, it has had to 
modify its policy on the NIEO talks and certain aspects of its counterproposals 
under pressure from its allies. 

The Demands of the Developing Countries 

The abovementioned general international conditions of the mid-1970's and the 
reduced ability of the impertalist powers to use extra-economic means of coercion, 
primarily military force, allowed the developing countries to, first of all, actu- 
ally begin rebuilding their economic relations with the West "from the bottom up," 
so to speak (by nationalizing branches of American and Western European monopolies, 
raising the prices of raw materials, regulating their extraction, etc.) and, 
secondly, force the West to discuss the NIEO program. We should recall that its 
basic provisions were set forth in four UN General Assembly documents: the decla- 
ration and program of action for the establishment of a new international economic 
order, adopted by the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1974, 
the charter of economic rights and obligations of states, adopted by the 29th 
regular session in 1974, and the resolution on development and international eco- 
nomic cooperation, adopted by the seventh special session in 1975. 

The demands of the developing countries are aimed at the attainment of three main 
groups of objectives. The first group includes the implemencation of certain prin- 
ciples and their total establishment in international relations--principles such 

as the unconditional sovereignty of states over their economic resources, the 
sovereign equality of states, the freedom to choose economic and social systems, 
the prohibition of discrimination on these grounds, and some others. The second 
group of objectives is concerned with “guaranteeing them fair participation in the 
international decision-making process." It includes, above all, the augmentation 
of their role in existing international economic organizations (IMF, the IBRD group 
and others), and not only a role commensurate with their economic strength and 
financial contribution, but a role based on the gradual elimination of the absolute 
connection between the contributions of members and their number of votes in the 
decision-making process, and, secondly, the creation of new organizations in 
accordance with this principle. Besides this, the developing countries are demand- 
ing that the functions of overall supervision and the elaboration of international 
economic reforms be transferred to organs in which the political equality of states 
is already guaranteed (the UN General Assembly, UNCTAD, UNIDO and other UN bodies). 

The third group of objectives covers demands in various spheres of economic rela- 
tions between the developed capitalist states and the developing countries. One of 
the central demands concerns the stabilization of the developing countries’ reve- 
nues from raw material exports. Their main proposals in this sphere are all set 
forth in the so-called incegrated program of raw materials and the general fund.® 
Besides this, to eliminate the negative effects of inflation, the raw material 
price index is to be regularly brought in line with the price index of the 89 prin- 
cipal commodities imported by the developing countries from the developed states 
(indexation). The developing countries are also demanding, in addition to this 
price maintenance mechanism, considerably broader scales of compensatory financing 
(to cover a deficit in the balance of payments in the event of declining export 
revenues): a simpler procedure for the consideration of requests, the cancella- 
tion of the practice of extending credit on the basis of the general balance of 
payments, etc. 

The proposals pertaining to currency and financing problems cover such items us 
the "general alleviation of the burden of debts,"/ increased resource transfers® 
and the reform of the international currency and financing mechanism. ? 

In the sphere of trade in finished industrial goods, the developing countries are 
demanding the general reduction of the import customs tariffs of the developed 
capitalist countries; the establishment of differentiated and more favorable cus- 
toms terms for the commodities of the young states (that is, lower tariffs than 
those charged in trade between developed countries on most-favored-nation terms); 
a pledge by the developed countries not to institute any new non-tariff restric- 
tions on imports from the Third World (the "status quo" principle). By the end of 
the 1970's all of the problems connected with the world trade in industrial goods, 
the increased export of which is rightfully viewed by the young states as the 
chief means of their industrialization and development, were set forth by these 
countries in the concept of the "structural reorganization of the world economy 
for the purpose of global development." This concept essentially signifies that 
coordinated measures will be worked out on the UN level (by UNCTAD, UNIDO and the 
ILO) and carried out by the developed countries to move certain spheres of produc- 
tion to the developing countries when the latter have relative economic advantages 
in these spheres (the proximity of raw materials, for example). 

Finally, the developing countries have demanded measures to strengthen the inter- 
national legal regulation of the activities of multinational corporations. The 
central demand in this area concerns the development and adoption of a "code of 
behavior for the multinationals," which would regulate the main spheres of rela- 
tions between private investor firms, host countries and the multinationals’ base 
countries.l0 Another special code would regulate international technology trans- 
‘ers in order to simplify and expand these transfers, particularly in the develop- 
ing countries, and eliminate excessive restrictions on the transfer of patented 

t echnology ° 

The developing countries believe that both codes should be legally binding, should 
apply only to multinational corporations and should provide for the settlement of 
disputes in accordance with the national legislation of the states receiving the 
investments and technology. Besides this, international bodies should be set up 
to oversee adherence to both codes. At the initiative of the developing countries, 
draft standard legislation is being elaborated in UNCTAD with regard to "restric- 
tive business practices" (the restriction of the access of firms to markets by 
monopolies, the "unfair" restraint of competition, the exertion of negative pres- 
sure on the consumer, etc.), which could lie at the basis of the appropriate 
national economic legislation in these countries. Although the provisions of this 
draft are universal in nature and are not directed exclusively against the multi- 
national corporations, it is precisely the monopolistic "business practices" of 
these corporations that are threatening the development of the national economies 
of the young states. 

Tt is not difficult to see that the NIEO program is based on the following main 
principles: the sovereign equality of states and the establishment of state 
sovereignty (primacy in domestic affairs and independence in foreign affairs), the 
principle of the responsibility of the developed capitalist countries for the 
underdevelopment of the young states and the related principle of non-reciprocity 
(special privileges, the redistribution of financial resources in favor of the 
developing countries, etc.) and the principle of the political regulation of eco- 
nomic relations by means of the expansion of international legal agreements, which 
should be aimed at establishing the political equality of states in order to eradi- 
cate their economic inequality. 


The principle of interdependence plays a special role here. The definitions of 
this term in documents pertaining to the NIEO contain cautious references to the 
common long-range interests of the developed capitalist nations and the developing 
countries, For example, the charter of the economic rights and obligations of 
states says that "the prosperity of the developed countries and the growth and 
development of the developing countries are closely interrelated" and the declara- 
tion on the establishment of the NIEO states that "the interests of the developed 
countries and the interests of the developing countries can no longer be isolated 
from one another."!1 Although the specific demands and the abovementioned "working" 
principles of the NIEO often turn out to be unacceptable to the United States and 
other Western countries in practical talks, the concept of interdependence, in the 
sense that the developed capitalist countries must agree to the NIEO for their own 
good, is laying the ground work for compromises. This is why the thesis regarding 
interdependence has become the common "theoretical" basis for the entire North- 
South dialogue and all of the reforms proposed by both sides for world economic 
capitalist relations, regardiess of how different they might be. 

The Carter Administration's Approach 

It was this interpretation of the thesis of interdependence that served as the 
basis of the Democratic administration's approach to the idea of reorganizing 
international economic relations. "We are fully de ermined to support the rapid 
and comprehensive growth of the developing countrie as something that is consis- 
tent with our national interests and ideals," said .ormer Secretary of State Vance. 
"We realize that this will sometimes require some adaptation of our own economy."12 

The Democrats’ characteristic policy of safeguarding long-range U.S. interests in 
the developing countries by means of socioeconomic reforms (this is attested to by 
just the main goals of the "New Frontiers" policy and the "Alliance for Progress") 
evol ed, when it encountered the NIEO issue, into a recognition of the need for 
specific reforms in capitalist economic relations, the stronger international 
regulation of the capitalist economy, a slightly important role for the developing 
countries in the regulation process, etc. These countries, regardless of the level 
of their development, were viewed by Washington as an integral part of the capital- 
ist system. Furthermore, whereas certain concessions to the more highly developed 
young states or those with the richest natural resources appeared to be vitally 
necessary, aid and “special privileges” to the poorest were viewed as an essential 
condition for the "social peace" of the entire system. 

The Carter Administration's approach to the NIEO issue was based on these premises 
and had the following distinctive features. Above all, it was a global approach. 
The administration regarded the reorganization of international economic relations 
as one of the most important global problems in whose resolution the United States 
should take the leading role in order to reinforce its global positions and estab- 
lish a new variant of the "Pax Americana" in the future, this time on the basis of 
interdependence. The reorganization was intended to strengthen integration 
processes in the world capitalist economy, which were to focus on the developed 
Western countries, headed by the United States, and reinforce the capitalist 

basis in the developing countries. At the same time, the reorganization was 
intended to bring about the more active "involvement" of the socialist countries 
in this economy. 


Another distinctive feature of the Democratic approach to the NIEO was 
Washington's view of interdependence in the global reformist context as the 
antithesis of strong state sovereignty for the developing countries. It has 
begun to view the entire non-socialist world as an arena of collective efforts 
aimed at economic development based on the principles of private enterprise. For 
example, when former U.S. Representative to the United Nations D. McHenry spoke 
at the 34th Session of the General Assembly (1979), he said that the practice of 
dividing states into developed and developing -ountries should be abandoned in 
favor of a "spectrum" of development. All countries and even specific regions in 
these countries supposedly occupy specific places along this spectrum, and con- 
stant ascent is the common objective, 13 The United States countered the most 
important principle of the NIEO, the sovereign equality of states, with the con- 
cept of the “equality of individuals." It announced that the strategic purpose 
of the reorganization of international economic relations and, consequently, of 
the talks on the NIEO would be the achievement of bourgeois "equal opportunities" 
for all "citizens of the world," accompanied by the gradual eradication of state 
sovereignty and the reinforcement of supranational global organizations. 

In this area, the United States is endeavoring to consider the increasing socio- 
economic and political differences between developing countries. Some of them 
are developing according to the capitalise pattern. In states with a socialist 
orientation, on the other hand, the development of capitalism has been deliber- 
ately restricted by progressive reforms, and in the majority of liberated 
countries it is being restricted by the weight of pre-capitalist traditions. 

In the case of the first group of states, the concessions the United States was 
prepared to make with regard to the NIEO were viewed primarily as a means of 
bringing about the overall improvement of relations, within the context of which 
stronger pressure could be exerted on some of them to safeguard bourgeois demo- 
eratic "human rights" (Chile and South Korea) or, in other words, to bring about 
some liberalization of reactionary regimes. As for the other developing countries, 
the satisfaction of the "basic needs of the individual" has been demanded in 
exchange for these concessions instead of "human rights." 

The elevation of the concept of "basic human needs" to the leve! of official 
policy in questions pertaining to "aid" to the developing countries was the third 
distinctive feature of the Democrats’ approach to the NIEO. This concept stresses 
the need to "increase the productivity of the poor.” In rural areas this would 
mean that the poor would have to be given access to land, credit, elementary medi- 
cal services and education. In industry, the stimulation of small enterprises 
with labor-intensive technology was proposed. This war supposed to guarantee the 
growth of agricultural and industrial production, employment and the income of 
most of the population, lower the birth rate, etc. The “basic needs” strategy 

was intended to stimulate the development of small-scale private production, 
increase the number of small property-holders and thereby guarantee the capitalist 
development of young states. In contrast to the policy of the 1960's, this 
strategy, which stressed the developmat of small-scale agricultural and indus- 
trial production and preached the idea of renouncing large-scale industrialization, 
was supposed to take the productive forces of the young states out of the devel- 
»pmental mainstream. In this way, the objective interests of their development 
were to be sacrificed for the maintenance and spread of capitalist production 
relations. The Carter Administration slightly increased government aid to the 


developing countries for such purposes as food production, education and public 
health in an attempt to use bilateral ties and the NIEO talks to force ruling 
circles in these countries to commence socioeconomic reforms in line with this 

In this way the United States actually countered the NIEO program with its own, 

far from equivalent "new world order," which could be described as "Americanocentric 
international interdependence." Nevertheless, the Democrats’ slightly more con- 
structive overall approach to the reorganization of international economic rela- 
tions and some of its basic principles (for example, the recognition of the 

specific interests of developiag countries and the need for the stronger inter- 
national legal regulation of the world capitalist economy and a stronger role for 
international organizations) afforded certain opportunities for compromise. 

The Results of the 1970's 

As a result of long and difticult talks, certain compromises had been reached on 
some of the developing countries’ demands by the end of the Democratic administra- 
tion's term in office. In June 1980, for example, an agreement was concluded 
within UNCTAD on the creation of a general raw material fund.!4 Under the pressure 
of the United States and other Western countries, the developing states decided 

not to assign the fund the function of overseeing t.e implementation of individual 
trade agreements, direct involvement in markets, co’ pensation for losses from 
exports of raw materials not covered by internation: 1 trade agreements, initial 
demands regarding total capital in the fund, etc. in exchange for this, the United 
States agreed to the establishment of a "secondary source" in the fund and, in 
general, to the creation of its initial capital through direct contributions from 
member states. 

As a result, the fund in iis final form resembled the original Western model. The 
1980 agreement, which specified the autonomy and independence of international 
trade agreements in relation to the fund, actually nullified the fund's signifi- 
cance as the central eler.ent of the integrated raw material program. Instead of 
serving as the regulating center for virtually all world trade in raw materials 
and adjusting market trends to benefit the developing countries, the fund will 
serve only as a source of preferential credit extended according to the terms of 
separate international trade agreements and will otfer subsidies to some states 
for the development of raw material exports. Nevertheless, the United States and 
most of the other developed capitalist countries still have not ratified the 
agreement or honored their pledges regarding contributions to the fund. 

The relative progress in carrying out the integrated raw material program (the 
creation of the general fund) has also been nullified by the standstill of talks 
on international trade agreements on specific commodities. The only agreements in 
force at present are those regulating the trade in tin, rubber, coffee and sugar 
(and the last one does not meet the requirements of the "Group of 77"). The con- 
clusion of a new cacao agreement was blocked by the United States. It is still 
refusing to even consider the young states’ indexation proposals. 

The efforts to expand compensatory financing have been more successful: Access to 
this kind of financing within the IMF framework has been simplified, and 


the STABEX (stabilization of exports) system of compensation has been modified so 
that the compensation can be offered in larger volumes and on easier terms within 
the framework of the second Lome convention on the association of 58 developing 
countries with the EEC, +6 According to the estimates of UNCTAD experts, however, 
the IMF compensation mechanism, which takes in all of the developing countries, is 
now covering much less than half of the actual reduction in their export revenues. 
For this reason, they are demanding that the West, especially the United States, 
ensure that the amount of compensation they receive for their losses is not based 
on the country's quota in the IMF, but directly on the deficit in its balance of 
payments (this principle, with a few restrictions, already lies at the basis of 
the STABEX system). 

Most of the NIEO objectives in the sphere of currency and finance have not been 
attained. The main debtors and creditors arrived at a compromise decision on the 
question of the foreign debt of the developing states in March 1978: a program 

to bring the terms of early bilateral intergovernmental loans, extended by the 
developed countries to the 30 poorest developing states, in line with today's more 
preferential terms.!? The United States, however, has not joined other states in 
making specific moves in this direction. The administration simply obtained the 
consent of the Congress to authorize the President to allow the poorest countries 
(but strictly on an individual basis) to accumulate their total unpaid debt in 
local currency for the subsequent use of these funds in development projects 
approved by the United States. But the attempts to obtain Congress’ approval of 
even a limited version of the "retroactive relaxation of terms" for 16 countries 
for a sum of only 18.8 million dollars, which they were supposed to pay the United 
States in 1980, were unsuccessful. 

In the matter of the flow of financial resources into the developing countries, 
Washington objected to various "automatic" aid mechanisms and the "mass transfer 

of resources" and did not honor the pledge to increase total government aid to 

0.7 percent of the GNP (U.S. aid in 1980 amounted to only 0.18 percent of the GNP).18 
[t stressed the need to augment the role of international organizations: the IMF, 
IBRD and regional development banks. The U.S. contribution to these was around 

‘+ billion dollars over a period of 3 years (1977-1979) .19 For the sake of compari- 
son, we should note that these organizations extended a total of 63.3 billion dol- 
lars in credit to the developing countries between 1973 and 1979.20 In the sphere 
of bilateral aid, there was a slight increase in the funds offered by the United 
States to many of these countries to cover "basic human needs” (from 800 million 
dollars in 1977 to 1.2 billion in 1979). On the other hand, just two countries, 
Egypt and Israel, received 2.3 billion dollars each during the 1977-1979 period in 
the form of "aid for the maintenance of security” (non-military shipments for mili- 
tary construction). 

In the sphere of trade in ii.dustrial goods, the United States and the other Western 
countries objected to the proposal made by the developing states at UNCTAD-V in 
1979 and the Third UNIDO Conference in 1980 regarding the structural reorganization 
of the world economy with the creation of an international administrative organ and 
a special financial fund. The GATT agreement reached in 1979 as part of the "Tokyo 
round,” however, envisages the reduction of duties on industrial and agricultural 
goods circulating primarily among developed capitalist countries by 33-41 percent, 
while the duties on the export goods of developing countries will decrease by less 

than 20 percent.2! Although this agreement contains a provision which authorizes 
the developed countries to offer more favorable customs rates to developing 
countries (the differentiated approach), it is not compulsory and will depend on 
bilateral agreements, which will actually inhibit the extension of these terms. 
Furthermore, in exchange for this concession, the West won the developing countries’ 
consent to the principle of "gradation"; in other words, the favorable terms will 
gradually be eliminated as the economies of these countries develop. The exports 
of the young states will continue to be harmed considerably by the institution of 
quantitative import quotas [In the Western countries (by the beginning of the 

1980's the United States, for example, had instituted additional quotas of this 
kind for imports of footwear ond television sets), and the young states are demand- 
ing the adoption of a "“coce of multilateral guarantees" within tne GATT framework, 
which would envisage automatic compensation for their losses in such cases. 

In the regulation of multinational corporate activity, the most significant prog- 

ress was noted in the dratting of a standard law on restrictive business practices. 
The agreement on this matter was reached at the beginning of 1980. As for the 
"code of multinational corporate behavior" and the "technology transfer code," 
although an agreement ‘is been reached on the basic principles of regulation, the 

main problem has not been solved--the determination of the judicial force of these 
documents. The Uniteu Stutes and other Western countries are insisting that the 
codes should be indicative rather than binding, ana that the parties involved should 
reach an agreement on which country's laws will be used to settle disputes. Besides 
this, the United States has not abandoned its efforts to extend the force of the 
codes to the host governments as well as the multinationals, in order to protect 

the monopolies against "political risks." 

Theretore, the progress in ‘nuplementing the NIEO ; rogram by the beginning of the 
1980's could only be described as moderate at bes.. The most significant U.S. 
measures were taken in such traditional spheres as compensatory financing and 
international channels of development assistance. As the UN secretary general 
noted in his report, "most of the developing countries are still in a fundamentally 
unfavorable position in the chief markets...and their participation in the manage- 
ment of vitally important elements of the international economic system is still 

In the hope of beginning a new round in the struggle for the NIEO, at the end of 
the 1970's the developing countries proposed "global talks on international eco- 
nomic cooperation" in 1981 within the UN framework to reach specific, all- 
encompassing decisions with regard to raw materials, energy, trade, development 
and finance. Their attempts to assign the function of overseeing reforms to a 
body based on the political equality of states (like the UN General Assembly), 
however, were impeded by Washington. The United States and some other Western 
countries expressed the opinion that decisions pertaining to the functions of 
existing international organizations should be made by them. Therefore, by the 
time of the change of administrations in Washington, the talks on the NIEO had 
reached an impasse. 

The Reagan Administration's Approach 

It is known that the Reagan Administration swept into power on a wave of conserva- 
tivism, as a result of a rightward shift in sociopolitical life in the United 


States. Some of the fundamental principles of its platform were connected with 
the topic of this article. 

Above all, this administration has a narrow, egotistical view of international 
economic relations. Whereas the Democrats believed that the future "prosperity" 
of the American economy would depend on the general state of the world capitalist 
economy, the Republicans are giving this relationship the opposite interpretation. 
"Other countries must realize," the President said in one interview, "that a 
healthy U.S. economy and indus «rial base are the key to their security and the 
healthy state of their economy " In other words, the Republicans have resolved 
to concentrate on the revitalization of the U.S. economy largely at the expense 
of their partners in the developed and developing countries. In particular, 
Washington's raising of interest rates on U.S. credit for this purpose has led to 
a slight rise in the exchange rate of the dollar. As a result, the developing 
countries have had to pay 10 or 15 percent more than before in other currencies 
for oil (all transactions in this area are carried out in dollars). 

The second general principle is the actual identification of the American govern- 
ment's domestic and foreign policy interests with the interests and goals of big 
business. This principle lies at the basis of the administration's domestic eco- 
nomic program, which is known to envisage considerable financial and legal privi- 
leges for monopolies, and presupposes the cancellation of a number of restrictions 
and standards which also regulate their foreign economic activity. This is most 
possible in transactions with the developing countries because they are relatively 
weak partners. According to Washington's plans, it is the multinational corpora- 
tion that should become the main "instrument of development.” 

fhese principles lie at the basis of the pointedly negative U.S. policy on the 
economic demands of the developing countries, particularly the demands connected 
with the NIEO program. One of the Republican Administration's first moves was its 
retusal to sign the draft convention on the international law of the sea, prepared 
with the participation of its predecessor. This document imposed certain restric- 
tions on the activities of mining monopolies in the interest of the majority of 
states, but this is precisely why Washington found it unacceptable. The fate of 
this convention attests to the fairly gloomy prospects for international legal 
documents prepared during the talks on the NIEO, especially the "code of multi- 
national corporate behavior" and the "technology transfer code." 

This administration has also taken a tougher stand in other areas of economic 
relations with the developing countries. In the sphere of trade, for example, 
the United States, in addition to the quantitative limitation of its imports, has 
been more unyielding than other states in its pursuit of a policy of "selective 
customs exemptions,” in accordance with which many of the commodities imported 
from Mexico, Brazil and some other countries were no longer allowed to enter the 
United States duty-free after 31 March 1981. 

fhe present administration prefers bilateral aid to multilateral assistance in the 
sphere of economic aid to the developing countries, because imperialism has had the 
greatest success in using bilateral aid in its own immediate political interests. 
In this area, Washington is emphasizing "security maintenance aid" (2.6 billion 
dollars in 1982, as compared to 1.9 billion for economic development aid), and 


primarily to such "key countries” as Egypt (750 million dollars), Pakistan (100 
million), Sudan (100 million), Somalia, Kenya and several others, not to mention 
Israel, Realizing, however, that it will be impossible to stop, or at least cur- 
tail dramatically, American participation in multilateral aid programs (this was 
recommended by the Heritage Foundation, one of the "brain trusts" serving ruling 
circles), the administration confirmed the U.S. intention to contribute to the 
International Development Assoctation (3.2 billion dollars) for 3 years, but stip- 
ulated that the contribution would be reduced in 1982. In addition, Washington 

has objected to the developing countries’ demand for the expansion of the functions 
of the IMF and IBRD. At a joint session of their administrative bodies in May 
1981, American representatives objected to the proposal made by these countries 
regarding the issuance of additional special drawing rights totaling 15.6 billion 
dollars and their distribution among the developing countries. At the same time, 
the United States declared that it was "deeply disturbed” by the IBRD plans to open 
a branch to finance the development of new sources of energy in the Third World and 
informed the bank that it would not contribute to the maintenance of this branch. 

Washington's position in economic relations with the developing countries as a 
whole has also undergone a slight shift from a "global" approach to a regional one. 
Certain concessions, aimed at smoothing out conflicts ard strengthening economic 
ties, will be made only to the United States' closest neighbors: Mexico (the idea 
of the North American Common Market) and the Caribbean countries (the "Caribbean 
Plan"). American economic interests in other parts of the capitalist world are to 
be safeguarded primarily by American monopolies, free of control and supervision, 
and the infringement of American "vital" interests (including oil imports) will 
result in the use of military force. 

Apparently, the Reagan Administration originally had no intention of making any 
integral proposals regarding the reorganization of international economic relations 
and the demands of the NIEO program. Viewing the developing countries primarily as 
a "field of competition with the USSR," Washington centered its policy in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America around the guaranteed ‘'security"” of these countries, 
essentially by suppressing the national liberation movement and subverting pro- 
gressive regimes in every possible way, including even armed aggression. Under 

the pressure of the developing states, and even of the majority of its Western 
allies, however, the administration had to first cautiously admit the "connection 
between security and development" and then, just before the meeting in Cancun, 
finally set forth its long-range views on economic relations with the developing 

According to the organizers of the meeting (Mexico and Austria), it was supposed 
to give "political momentum" to the entire North-South dialogue and end the dead- 
lock in the abovementioned "global talks" within the United Nations. However, the 
American Government's proposed "strategy of cooperation to guarantee global eco- 
nomic growth" completely ignores the very idea of these talks and the specific 
economic demands of the developing countries. It does not even mention the inte- 
grated raw material program, international trade agreements, the currency and 
finance problems of the young states, the "code of multinational corporate 
behavior,” and so forth. The economic development of the liberated countries is 
actually equated with the stimulation of private enterprise and foreign ca, ital 
investments, and the main obstacle to this development is specified not as the 


"international system''--that is, the system of neocolonial exploitation--but the 
attempts of many developing countries to concentrate on the consolidation of the 
state sector of their economy and regulate multinational corporate activity in the 
national interest. 

It is clear that this is not simply another inappropriate U.S. response to the eco- 
nomic demands of the developing countries, but a new type of aggressive strategy, 
aimed at preserving traditional forms and methods of neocolonial exploitation and 
at using economic blackmail to divert many of these states from the path of pro- 
gressive internal socioeconomic reforms. It is not surprising that the developing 
countries had a negative response to the Reagan Administration's platform. 

Therefore, the intention to use old, bankrupt methods to solve new problems is 
clearly reflected in the U.S. stand on the reorganization of international eco- 
nomic relations, just as in other spheres of U.S. foreign policy, and even domestic 
policy. This line is essentially reactionary and could lead to serious complica- 
tions in U.S. relations with the developing countries and, if we consider the 
obvious inclination of the present White House masters to deal from a position of 
strength, in the entire system of international relations. The experience of the 
1970's proved, however, that the reorganization of international economic relations 
with a view to the just demands of the develoning countries could be accomplished 
more quickly in an atmosphere of detente, uuiversal adherence to the principles of 
peaceful coexistence and the organization of equal and mutually beneficial coopera- 
tion by all states on this basis. 


1. "Materialy XXVI c"yezda “PSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 
1981, p 15. 

Calculated according to: "1979 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics," 
United Nations, New York, 1980, pp 1076-1123. 

}. For more detail, see No 4 for 1981, pp 117-125--Editor's note. 

+. "North-South Dialogue: Progress and Prospects. Hearings Before the Subcom- 
mittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and on International 
Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 
May 1, 13, 15 and June 19, 1980," Washington, 1980, pp 33, 114. 

>». For more detail, see M. Ya. Volkov, "American Neocolonialism: The Current 
Stage,"’ SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 12, 1981--Editor's note. 

6. It envisages international trade agreements on the 18 major crude resources. 
The prices of 10 types (cacao, coffee, sugar, tea, cotton, coarse fiber, jute, 
rubber, copper and tin) will be stabilized through the creation of buffer 
stocks, and the prices of the other 8 (bauxite, iron ore, manganese, phosphates, 
tropical wood, bananas, vegetable oil and oil-bearing seeds, and meat) will be 
stabilized by means of export quotas. According to the plans of the developing 
countries, the general fund, which would be financed by contributions from the 








economically developed and developing countries, would be responsible for the 
centralized financing of buffer stocks within the framework of individual 
trade agreements; the support of prices stipulated in these agreements, by 
means of direct involvement in markets and other methods; compensation for 
losses from exports of crude resources not covered by international trade 
agreements; the funding of the development and diversification of raw material 
and food production. 

The original demands included the cancellation of the debts of the 30 poorest 
countries, moratoriums on the repayment of debts by the "most seriously 
victimized" countries and the consolidation (postponement of repayment) of 
the commercial indebtedness of some countries with a new repayment schedule 
extending over at least 25 years. 

The augmentation of the aid offered by all economically developed countries 
to 0.7 percent of the GNP, the elimination of restrictive conditions on the 
extension of aid, the creation of "automatic'"' aid mechanisms, etc. 

The reduction of the role of national currency (particularly the U.S. dollar) 
and gold and the augmentation of the role of special drawing rights as inter- 
national reserves; the more equitable distribution of currency resources "with 
special consideration for the needs of the developing countries"; several 
measures to stabilize currency exchange rates and prevent the transfer of 
inflation from the economically developed countries to the developing states, 

The draft code proposed by the developing countries demands that the multi- 
nationals observe the national sovereignty of the host country, uphold its 
economic and social goals and refrain from irterfering in its domestic 

affairs and international relations. It also contains several specific provi- 
sions regarding ownership, control, price transfers (in the trade between the 
multinational corporation and its branches), taxation, competition, etc. 

UN Resolution A/3281, adopted by the 29th Session of the UN General Assembly, 
ch IV, p 31; Doc A/9556. 3201 (S-VI), art 3. 

[Ibid., December 1979, p 55. 

The fund consists of two virtually independent parts. The first, with initial 
capital of around 400 million dollars, extends credit on preferential terms 

to international organizations overseeing the implementation of international 
commercial agreements. The funds from the second (initial capital of around 
350 million dollars) will be used for loans and subsidies to “heighten the 
long-range competitive potential and prospects" of raw material production 

and sales, or, in other words, to heighten labor productivity, improve market- 
ing, expand technical aid to producers, etc. 

In August 1979 the compensation was extended to invisible items of the halance 
of payments (tourism, emigration, etc.), the annual limits were abolished, the 
loan volume increased to 100 percent of the country's quota in the IMF, etc. 


1981, pp 125-131. 

17. This refers to the so-called "retroactive relaxation of repayment terms." 
These loans totaled 3.2 billion dollars by 1 January 1978, including around 
1 billion in U.S. loans. 

18. "World Development Report 1980. The World Bank," Washington, August 1980, 
pp 140-141. 

19. "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organiza- 
tions, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1979," Washington, 1980, p 6. 

20. Ibid., pp 208-252. 
21. "Report of the UN Secretary General, A/S-11/5, 7 August 1980," p 78. 
22. Ibid., p 164. 

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982 

CSO: 1803/8 

Moscow SSHA: E!lONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 20-33 

[Article by N. V. Sivachev: "Franklin Roosevelt--President of Action and Political 
Realist (Commemorating the Centennial of His Birth)"] 

[Not translated by JPRS] 

cso: 1803/8 


Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 34-45 

[Article by S. M. Rogov: "The American-Israeli Alliance: Its Nature and Distinc- 
tive Features" ] 

[Text] The relations that have developed between the United States and the State 
of Israel in recent decades probably have no parallel in Washington's foreign 
policy. The U.S.-Israeli alliance is unique because it represents a specific type 
of partnership between a leading imperialist power and a small capitalist state 
with limited human and economic potential. In the economic sphere, Israel is 
actually dependent on the United States. In the military sphere, its armed forces, 
armed mainly with American weapons, are a factor contributing to constant tension 
in the region as a result of U.S. support. In the political sphere, Washington 
and Tel Aviv are pursuing parallel policy lines on the basis of a system of con- 
sultations outside the legally formalized system of American international obliga- 
tions. At the same time, Israel represents an influential political factor within 
the United States: Working through the American Jewish community and its allies, 
it influences the process of foreign policymaking in Washington. 

The activity of the Zionist lobby in Washington! contributes a great deal to the 
"uniqueness" of American-Israeli relations, guaranteeing their stability and 
continuity and smoothing out conflicts and temporary differences between the 
policy lines of the two states. The influence of Zionist circles within the 
Congress and the mass media and the myth of the “Jewish vote” give the Israeli 
Government substantial leverage in dealing with the U.S. administration. Renowned 
American correspondent K. Rowen wrote, for example, that "the Begin government 
apparently believes that if it displays enough nerve, it will get away with any- 
thing, especially if the Israeli lobby and Israeli propaganda in the United States 
do their job well.""2 

American Zionists played a key role in the seizure of power in Israel by Zionist 
circles and then made every effort to convince ruling circles in this state that 
they should throw in their lot with the United States. 

[Israel's privileged place in U.S. Middle East policy also stems from the fact that 
this country, in contrast to other states in the region, has firmly embraced the 
capitalist way of life and has a stable bourgeois regime. Ruling circles in Israel 
and the United States share a common class hatred for the USSR, other socialist 


countries and the world workers and national liberation movement. Furthermore, the 
Zionist ruling clique in Israel has willingly offered Washington its services for 
anti-Soviet and anticommunist provocations. 

The policy lines of the United States and Israel are paralle* but not identical 
because Israeli interests are essentially confined to the Middle East while Washing- 
ton regards its Middle East policy as only one element, although an important one, 
of its global policy line. The military and political domination of the region by 
Israel is Tel Aviv's main goal, but for Washington it is only one of the possible 
ways of maintaining and consolidating imperialist control over the Middle East. 
Furthermore, the United States has to consider not only Israel's wishes, but also 
the interests of its main imperialist partners, Western Europe and Japan, and Arab 
feudal and bourgeois circles in the countries of the Middle East. 

The Zionist dogma that the Jewish community in various countries represents 
Israel's only reliable ally in the world has a tremendous effect on the position 

of the Israeli leadership. However, Tel Aviv has always had to seek the support of 
one or more imperialist powers to back up its own aggressive plans. After flirt- 
ing briefly with England and France, Israel settled on the United States in the 
second half of the 1960's. Without the economic and political assistance of the 
United States, Israel would be unable to continue pursuing its aggressive policy. 

As L. 1. Brezhnev stressed, "the Israeli aggressors are becoming more insolent 
because they know that they are fully supported by their overseas patrons."3 

American-Israeli Economic Relations 

Trade relations with Israel are of no great importance to the United States. 
Despite their noticeable growth in the 1970's, they account for less than 1 percent 
of all American foreign trade. The limited nature of the Israeli domestic market 
will keep Israel from becoming a serious foreign trade partner of the United States 
within the foreseeable future, particularly in view of the huge market of the Arab 
countries. American exports to Israel in 1980 totaled 1.5 billion dollars and 
imports were around 1 billion. Furthermore, Israeli imports from the United 

States are largely financed by American government loans. 

The economic development and even the very existence of the State of Israel have 
always depended on a colossal flow of capital from abroad. According to a report 
published in New York in 1978, "Israel and American Jewish Interaction," during 
the 30 years of Israel's existence the flow of foreign capital into this country 
has amounted to the colossal sum of 31 billion dollars. Approximately 9 billion 
came from the American Jewish community. The main instrument for the collection 
of money for Israel is the United Jewish Appeal (UJA). Each year Israel receives 
more than 300 million dollars through this channel. Besides this, a total of 
around 50 million dollars a year is collected by organizations of "friends" of 
Israeli universities and other institutions.4 All of these contributions are 
exempt from federal taxes in the United States and essentially represent covert 
channels of government aid to Israel. Israel's foreign loans totaled 4.2 billion 
dollars between 1951 and 1978, and it floated 3.478 billion of this amount in the 
United States.5 Private American capital investments in Israel are considerably 
rent pee by non-refundable contributions. In 1977 they totaled 1.5 billion 


Prior to the Six-Day War of 1967, and even up to the time of the October War of 
1973, U.S. state aid to Israel did not play a leading role in Tel Aviv's budget. 
The military failures of 1973 not only dispelled the myth of Israel's invulnera- 
bility but also made this state's economy completely dependent on Washington. 
Since that time, American aid to Tel Aviv has constantly amounted to around 2 bil- 
lion dollars a year, and there has been a constant proportional increase in non- 
refundable allocations and a decrease in credit. 

Israel ranks absolutely highest in terms of total aid received from the United 
States and in terms of per capita aid received. Funds allocated to Tel Aviv in 
fiscal years 1949-1982 totaled 23 billion dollars, and the Export-Import Bank 
extended Israel an additional 577 million dollars between 1949 and 1979. During 
fiscal year 1981 alone, per capita U.S. aid in Israel was 515.6 dollars, while the 
figure for Egypt was 35.3 dollars and the figure for the Yemen Arab Republic was 
3.2 dollars. Payments on American loans are a heavy burden on the Israeli econ- 
omy, totaling 2.7 billion dollars between 1949 and 1979.8 Between 1981 and 1990 
Tel Aviv will pay the United States 4.5 billion dollars just in interest on mili- 
tary credit.? Around 40 percent of Israel's huge foreign debt, which is almost 
equivalent to this state's gross national product, is owed to the United States. 
Furthermore, Israel's payments on its debts to Washington in fiscal year 1981 were 
virtually equivalent to all of the economic aid received by Tel Aviv from the 
United States. Therefore, economic dependence on the United States is not contrib- 
uting to the vitality of the Israeli economy. In 1980 it broke two "records": for 
inflation--133 percent--and for per capita foreign indebtedness--4,500 dollars. 

A speaker at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of Israel in February 1981 
remarked that the main reason for the crisis in the Israeli economy is "military 
spending, including the cost of colonizing occupied territories."10 

The United States and the Machinery of Israeli Aggression 

American arms transfers played the main role in the creation of Israel's modern 
military machine. In the 1970's Israeli imports of American weapons were surpassed 
only by the imports of Saudi Arabia and the shah's Iran. 

After October 1973, Washington essentially took on the function of funding the 

huge slice of the Israeli military budget used for arms purchases and let Tel Aviv 
take care of its day-to-day expenditures on the maintenance of the armed forces. 
setween 1975 and 1980, Washington added a billion dollars to the 3-4 billion Israel 
spends annually on military needs. Half of the additional sum was allocated in the 
form of non-refundable aid, and the other half was credit. Besides this, Washington 
is compensating Tel Aviv to some degree for the inflationary rise of military 
equipment prices (for example, the cost of the M-60 tank rose from 565,000 dollars 
in 1977 to 1.39 million in 1979)11 by increasing military aid in 1981 to 1.4 bil- 
lion dollars to "reward" Israel for increasing its military expenditures to 5.4 
billion dollars that year, /2 Therefore, the ratio of American military aid to 
Israel's own military budget has been kept at around 1:3. 

Finally, by taking on the expense of building two airfields in the Negev Desert, 
the United States actually assumed the responsibility of supplying and, to some 
extent, deploying Israeli armed forces. 


The military machine created by the Zionist ruling clique in Israel is obviously 
inconsistent with the economic capabilities of this state. A country with a popu- 
lation of 3.7 million (600,000 of the inhabitants are Arab citizens with limited 
rights) is maintaining a standing army of 169,000 and can mobilize 252,000 reserve 
personnel within 24-48 hours. According to the estimates of Professor G. Kemp, 
who is now the National Security Council staff member in charge of Middle East 
affairs, Israel's mobilization resources consist of 450,000 individuals, who could 
make up 14 divisional groups, and most of these would be armored divisions. The 
weapons of the Israeli Army include 3,175 tanks, 4,700 armored personnel carriers, 
1,200 heavy-caliber guns and 620 combat planes. 

Besides this, Israel has a developed military industry, which is now producing not 
only firearms but also modern tanks, fighter bombers and guided-missile ships. As 
FORTUNE magazine noted, the Israeli military-industrial complex is headed by a 
company called Israel Aviation Industries. This firm, founded by American citizen 
A. Schwimmer, "often obtains technology through joint enterprises with American 
companies .""14 Israeli weapon merchants began to compete successfully with American 
firms in the 1970's because production costs are 40 percent lower in Israel than in 
the United States.!? By 1979 Israel was exporting 750 million dollars' worth of 
weapons, and the figure rose to 1.3 billion in 1980.16 Israel sends weapons to 
more than 40 countries, most of them states with revressive pro-American regimes. 
In the past it sent weapons to monarchic Ethiopia, che shah's Iran, Somoza's 
Nicaragua, Taiwan, Chile, South Africa, Guatemala and El Salvador 2? This is 

often convenient for the United States because it camouflages Washington's support 
of dictatorships. Between 1972 and 1977, for example, 81 percent of all weapon 
shipments sent to the Salvadoran junta came from Israel.18 The Reagan Administra- 
tion announced that it does not intend to prevent ‘'el Aviv from exporting weapons. 

U.S. Private and Government Arms ‘ales to Israel, 
in millions of dollars 

Years Total Government contracts Private contracts 
1950-1970 654.1 581.2 72.9 
197] 337.1 300.5 a7ta 
1972 485.7 399.8 85.9 
1973 183.0 162.5 21.5 
1974 2,500.7 2,450.6 50.1 
1975 875.0 828.3 46.7 
1976 1,169.5 979.5 190.0 
1977 724.6 503.0 221.6 
1978 1,090.3 867.3 123.0 
1979 1,146.4 987.8 158.6 
1980 562.2 290.4 271.8 
1981* 850.0 600.0 250.0 
1982* 1,300.0 1,000.0 300.0 

—— i 

* Administration request. 

"Foreign Military Sales 1950-1977," Wash., 1977; "'U.S. Security Interests in 
the Persian Gulf,’ Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of 
Representatives, March 16, 1981,"" Wash., 1981, p 81. 


According to the U.S. State Department, Israel can satisfy around 40-50 percent of 
its own demand for modern weapons and ammunition. In a report prepared for the 
U.S. Congress in 1980, G. Kemp wrote that Israel had stockpiled enough weapons to 
conduct military actions, equivalent in etanppee | to the battles of October 1973, 
for 21-28 days without any additional shipments.?!9 

There is a great deal of evidence that Israel is capable of producing nuclear 
weapons. Furthermore, the press in the United States and other Western countries 
has reported that Israel has 10-20 atomic bombs and the means of their delivery. 
Although the Israeli Government has refused to confirm this fact officially, the 
nuclear factor plays an important role in the assessment of Israel's military 
potential. According to many, the Israeli leaders are prepared to resort to 
nuclear weapons "in critical situations."20 To some degree, Israel's accumulated 
military potential explains the willingness and ability of the Israeli leadership 

to use tactics which sometimes diverge in some respects from Washington's policy 
line, particularly after M. Begin, leader of the extreme Zionist Right, took office. 
Pro=-Zionist groups in the United States are taking every opportunity to suggest 

that Israel's military "independence" has made the American administration unable 

to exert pressure on Tel Aviv. American ruling circles are also making use of this 
story, particularly in relations with the Arab world, portraying Washington as 
something just short of the victim of Israeli blackmail. Besides this, American 
propaganda often argues that Washington's reinforcement of Tel Aviv's military 
potential was supposedly intended to encourage the Israeli Government to make polit- 
ical concessions to the Arabs, because only a "Strong Israel" could agree to such 

But no one really believes the story that Israel is "independent" of the United 
States. American aid to Israel through government and other channels has acquired 
such dimensions that the Israeli economy would collapse within 3-6 months without 
it. The reinforcement of Israel's military potential has been accompanied by Tel 
Aviv's increased economic dependence on Washington. On the whole, in comparison to 
the services performed for American imperialism by the Israeli Zionists, the scales 
of real U.S. aid to Israel are such that Tel Aviv is still a "cheap" ally for 
Washington. A statement by Director T. Dine of the American Israeli Public Affairs 
Committee (AIPAC) to the congressional Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East 
on 25 March 1981 indicates the specific services Israel could perform for the United 
States: "The United States can rely on Israel as a regional deployment base, a 
supply route between Europe and Asia, a refueling station and a tactical support 
and repair base. Israel has some of the most modern tactical air bases in the 
world and two more are now being built in the Negev Desert with the help of the 
United States. Other bases in the Sinai--Etsion, Eitam and Sharm el Sheikh--will 
be transferred to Egypt in 1982, but they will probably, as Secretary of State 

aig, and the President have noted, become American troop deployment sites in the 
future. Israel also has deep-sea ports in the Mediterreanean and Red Seas. The 
port ot Haifa is now being used by ships of the American Sixth Fleet for fueling 
erations and for the rest and recreation of personnel. Israeli ports and air 
bases can service and repair virtually any type of tactical aviation or warship 
owned by the United States." 

American-Israeli cooperation in the sphere of intelligence, which began in the 
1950's, plays an important role. “Israel always shares its intelligence with the 

United States and other states. For shares information it obtains 
about the Soviet fleet in the East Mediterranean and information about the Iraq- 
Iran war," T, Dine said.22 According to a man who played a prominent role in the 
Republican campaign in 1980, J. Churba, who once worked for the American Navy's 
intelligence service and is now the director of the Center for International 
Security in Washington, "Israel's intelligence system gives the United States the 
kind of advantage the Americans need in each country and in each ethnic group in 
the Middle East. Israel, with its system for the collection and assessment of 
intelligence on the local level, is the best source of reliable military and polit- 
ical information in the region."23 In March 1981 the AIPAC distributed a memo to 
members of the Congress and the administration, stressing the need to supplement 
Israel's intelligence capabilities with electronic equipment .24 

The Political Framework of the U.S.-Israeli Alliance 

The unilateral U.S. assumption of "obligations" to Israel was the main factor in 
the formation of the American-Israeli alliance. These obligations are mentioned 
in a number of resolutions of the American Congress and in statements by American 
presidents, from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan. Although these "obligations" are 
tairly vague and cannot be compared to treaties on the constitutional level, 
Washington has used them as its main pretext to justify its support of Israel's 
aggressive policy. 

At the same time, the American-Israeli alliance is unique because the two countries 
do not have any formal military and political agreements of the treaty type. 

This is tne only alliance in the system of U.S. imperialist alliances which has 
not been recorded in a bilateral or multilateral .reaty, such as, for example, the 
North Atlantic Treaty. Former Israeli Minister o. Foreign Affairs A. Eban writes 
about how “alliance evolved into tradition" in American-Israeli relations: ''This 
partnership was never recorded in official documents, but its stability has been 
impressive ,"25 

It is true that the Israeli Government has made attempts to conclude a "mutual 
security treaty" with the United States, particularly at the time of the Eisenhower 
and Kennedy administrations. Washington officials decided against this, however, 
in the belief that open military alliance with the Israeli Zionists would streng- 
then anti-American feelings in the Arab world. Of course, this did not mean that 
Washington refused to cooperate with Tel Aviv, but that an unofficial alliance with 
Israel gave the United States much more freedom to maneuver: It could use Israel's 
actions in its own interest without taking any responsibility for them. Further- 
more, this kind of relationship curned out to be convenient for the ruling elite in 
Israel too: Without being bound by rigid official obligations to Washington, Tel 
Aviv has a chance to enjoy all of the "blessings" of a military and political 
alliance with the main power center of international imperialism but has retained 

a certain degree of independence in its relations with its senior partner. 

The American-Israeli alliance is built on a functional foundation, and the solidity 
of this foundation is not ensured by treaty obligations, but by the parallel 
interests of ruling circles in both countries in the struggl against forces for 
socialism and national liberation. The machinery of the functional cooperation 


between Washington and Tel Aviv is not inferior, and is even superior in some cases, 
to the United States’ bilateral relations with its "treaty" allies. It includes a 
system of regular (four or five times a year) summit meetings, regular contacts 
between foreign and defense ministers and the heads of other departments and a 
close working relationship between the Israeli Embassy and various federal agencies 
in Washington. 

A 1952 document, an agreement on assistance for the mutual consolidation of secur- 
ity, which authorized Israel to receive American economic and military aid, laid 
the legal basis for the American-Israeli alliance. It formally requires Israel to 
use the weapons it receives only for defensive purposes and to offer American armed 
forces the use of its territory and every type of assistance if the need arises to 
sateguard U.S. security. The agreement also stipulates the mutual obligation of 
the sides to refrain from political activity within one another's territory (in 
essence, this should prohibit the Zionist lobby's activity in the United States). 
This provision, however, has never been enforced. 

One of the distinctive features of American-Israeli relations in the 1970's was the 
signing of several memoranda recording the specific level of military and political 
interaction by Washington and Tel Aviv and the specific U.S. obligations to offer 
israel economic and military assistance and coordinate diplomatic positions in the 
process of Middle East regulation. 

American-Israeli relations are now defined in agreements signed after the separate 
[sraeli-Egyptian "peace treaty" was engineered by the United States in March 1979. 
[t is no secret that this treaty was essentially an attempt to put together a 
reactionary bloc consisting of American imperialism, Israeli Zionists and Arab 
reactionaries to fight against the national liberation movement and the heightened 
prestige of the USSR in the region. In accordance with these agreements, 
Washington also took on a number of obligations which considerably raised the level 
of the U.S.-Israeli military and political alliance. This is attested to by the 
nine-point memorandum on the U.S.-Israeli intergovernmental agreement, which was 
signed in March 1979 by Secretary of State C. Vance and Israeli Minister of Foreign 
Affairs M. Dayan. According to this document, "the United States will take the 
necessary measures to guarantee the complete fulfillment of the treaty" between 
Egypt and Israel, including "diplomatic, economic and military measures.''26 

Point 3 is particularly significant; ''The United States will offer the support it 
deems necessary for actions taken by Israel in response to confirmed violations of 
the peace treaty. In particular, if the violation of the peace treaty poses a 
threat to Israel's security, including, among other possible violations, a blockade 

to keep Israel from using international waterways, a violation of the peace treaty 
ovisions regarding troop limitations or an armed invasion of Israel, the United 

tates will be prepared to immediately consider such measures as the augmentation 

f U.S. presence in the region, the transfer of emergency supplies to Israel and 

he exercise of its own shipping rights to put an end to these violations.” In 
riew of the fact that similar agreements were not concluded with Egypt, the state- 
ment above can actually be interpreted as a military alliance against Egypt, which 
is viewed as a potential violator of the separate treaty. 


According to Point 5, "the United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against 
any UN action or resolution which, in the opinion of the United States, could have 

a negative effect on the peace treaty." The United States pledges to give Israel 
military and economic assistance (Point 6) and Washington also promises Tel Aviv 
that {it will not allow unauthorized transfers of American weapons by recipients to 
third countries, and that "the United States will not supply weapons or authorize 
transfers of weapons to be used in armed attacks on Israel and will take steps to 
yrevent unauthorized transfers of this kind" (Point 7). Israel is therefore given 

4 guarantee that American weapons sent to, for example, Saudi Arabia or Egypt, will 
not be transferred to Israel's opponents. 

Finally, Point 8 reaffirms earlier American-Israeli agreements, including the anti- 
Soviet provisions of the memorandum of 1 September 1975. 

Therefore, the absence of an official "treaty on mutual security safeguards" has 
not inhibited the development of a real American-Israeli military and political 
alliance. It is also noteworthy, however, that many of the “obligations” taken on 
by the United States are not automatic and allow for their fulfillment (or non- 
fulfillment) in accordance with the United States' own interpretation of these 

The Reagan Administration and the Begin Government 

The present heads of the American foreign policy establishment have said that the 
main objective in their approach to the Middle East is the construction of an 
anti-Soviet bloc under the guise of the "strategic consensus" uniting Israel with 
conservative Arab regimes. Washington officials have announced that the Arab- 
Israeli conflict is only of secondary importance in comparison to the notorious 
"Soviet threat." Israel, on the other hand, is regarded as the United States’ most 
reliable ally in the Middle East. As Ronald Reagan stressed in an interview, "this 
is a country which shares our ideals, has trained troops which have met the test of 
combat and represents a force which gives us a real advantage in the Middle East. 
This is why the support of Israel is our primary moral obligation." 7 

The Republican administration has not concealed its pro-Israeli inclinations. Its 
leaders have stated that they regard the Jewish seitlements created by Israel in 
occupied Arab territories as "legal" communities, have called the PLO a "terrorist 
organization" and have recognized Israel's "right" to persecute Palestinians in 

On 18 March, Alexander Haig described the Reagan Administration's approach to 
Israel to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, saying: "The safeguarding of 
Israel's security is still one of the United States’ main concerns and an uncon- 
ditional American commitment. We are fully determined to guarantee that Israel 
retains its military capability to counter the attacks of hostile forces. Fur- 
thermore, we admit Israel's importance in our own current regional strategy. 
Israel represents an important factor of deterrence in the region and certainly 
could play one of the main roles in counteracting more serious dangers involving 
the USSR."28 


(he stronger pro-{srael tone of U.S. policy in the Middle East has not eliminated 
American=Israeli conflicts, however. The Carter Administration was already exper- 
iencing some difficulty in relations with the Begin government, which was not always 
willing to adhere to the tactical line of its American patron.29 The present 
Israeli leadership has refused to make even the slightest "concessions" and has 
thereby complicated U.S. diplomatic maneuvers. Begin's obstinacy stems from the 
Zionist ruling elite's desire to preserve Israel's status as the main partner of 
the United States in the Middle East and to turn Israel into a kind of sub- 
imperialist power in the region. Officials in Tel Aviv are afraid that U.S. eco- 
nomic interests might motivate Washington to strengthen its influence in the Arab 
world by restricting the Zionists' expansionist ambitions. To avoid this, the 
Israeli ruling elite has taken "harsh measures" whenever there has been any sus- 
picion that the United States might stop supporting Israel 100-percent. 

lhere is no question that Washington officials would prefer to have more obliging 
people in power in Israel than M. Begin, the leader of the extremely chauvinistic 
Zionist Likud bloc. Right up to the time of the elections in Israel (in June 1981), 
the Reagan Administration did not make any serious moves in its Middle East policy 
because it wanted to first learn the outcome of the elections. At that time, the 
American-Israeli "strategic consultations" which had been broken off the year before 
by the Carter Administration were resumed when Israeli Foreign Minister Y. Shamir 
visited the United States in February and Secretary of State A. Haig went to Israel] 
in April 1981. 

On 7 June 1981 Israeli aviation conducted a completely unprovoked attack on an Iraqi 
nuclear reactor near Baghdad. According to official data, eight F-16 bombers, 
accompanied by six F-15 fighter planes, were used in the raid. In an obvious 
attempt to use this action to enhance his popularity during the campaign, Begin 
did not try to cover up the action and even turned it into a propaganda device. 

The Reagan Administration was in an extremely difficult position. The NEW YORK 
TIMES reported: "There are differing opinions in the administration. Some 
officials have secretly applauded the bravado and effectiveness of the Israeli 
iir raid.... Others say that broader American interests are at stake and that 
Israel's action...could harm the long-range strategy of the U.S. Government." 30 

xtremely influential circles in the United States expressed displeasure with 
israel's action. "The worst thing is the Begin government's inclination to treat 
the United States with undisguised contempt," J. Kraft wrote in a WASHINGTON POST 
irticle. In his words, "the Reagan Administration has done nothing to warrant 

this kind of treatment. It has supported Israel's goals in the Middle East and in 
the United Nations. It has displayed more goodwill toward Israel than the majority 
of the U.S. population. Therefore, Begin's shabby treatment of Washington at this 
time is a clear show of defiance."31 

fhe Reagan Administration had to resort to all sorts of tricks to dissociate 
itself from the Israeli action. After 2 days of debates in the White House, Haig 
ent Chairman C. Percy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a letter, "with 
the personal approval of the President," in which he remarked that "this might 
nave been a serious violation of the 1952 agreement" 32 in accordance with which 
Israel can use American weapons only in self-defense. Washington first made an 


effort, however, to block the adoption of measures against the Israeli aggressors 
by the Security Council. The White House gave J. Kirkpatrick, American representa- 
tive to the United Nations, "precise instructions," envisaging the Security Coun- 
cil's adoption of a resolution which "will not cut the United States off from the 
Arab world but will not harm Israel either."33 

According to reports in the press, in a letter the U.S. secretary of state sent to 
the prime minister of Israel after the attack on the Iraqi nuclear center, he tried 
to “impose some kind of consultative procedure on Israel" to give Washington direct 
control over the use of American equipment by Israel and "give the United States 
the right to vote on the definitions of the offensive and defensive uses of this 
equipment."' Although Begin expressed "categorical objections" to Haig's demand, 
the American side raised the question again when State Department legal counsel 

R. MacFarlane met with M. Begin in July 1981. Once again, the Israeli prime minis- 
ter turned down the U.S. proposal that Israel inform the United States of the 
projected use of American wespons, at least in some situations, so that the United 
States would not be put in an awkward position. 34 

Although the Likud bloc did not win the parliamentary elections by a landslide, 
Begin's self-confidence continued to grow. Tel Aviv began its long-planned mili- 
tary escalation in Lebanon. Again, just as in 1978. Israel used American military 
equipment on a mass scale against states having nornal diplomatic relations with 
the United States, which is prohibited by American !egislation on weapon sales. 
Under these conditions, the President had to announce his decision to temporarily 
stop sending planes to Israel. The American delegation in the United Nations sup- 
ported the Security Council resolution on a cease-fire in Lebanon. At the same 
time, frank appeals were heard in the United States for the reassessment of rela- 
tions with Tel Aviv and the cessation of the situa ion in which, in American polit- 
ical jargon, the “tail wags the dog." 

The White House did not support this approach, however. Reagan did not allow his 
staff members to criticize Israel. The U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, R. Newman, 
had to resign because of his disagreement with the White House line. 

Nevertheless, Reagan was unable to obtain Begin's consent to stop the Zionist 
lobby's opposition to the sale of the AWACS system to Saudi Arabia. The White 
House had to mobilize all of its forces by creating a special interdepartmental 
group, headed by National Security Adviser R. Allen, to win Senate approval of the 

The President's own prestige was at stake. The Israeli Government and Zionist 
lobby were trying to obtain something like veto power over the administration's 
Middle East policy. Besides this, the Democratic Party saw this as a convenient 
excuse to attack the Republican administration. The House of Representatives 
condemned the sale  f AWACS planes by a vote of 301 to 1ll. It was only after the 
administration hac mobilized all of its forces that it was able to push the deal 
through the Senate, where the senators approved it by a vote of 52 to 48. During 
this process, the President took the unprecedented step of publicly opposing Tel 
Aviv's "interference in U.S. domestic affairs." 


The death of A, Sadat proved to Washington that its Arab partners were "unreliable" 
and underscored Israel's importance in American policy in the Middle East. Under 
these conditions, the Reagan Administration decided to raise the level of military 
and political cooperation with Israel without waiting until the tactical differ- 
ences with the Begin government had been overcome. When the American President and 
the Israeli prime minister met in Washington in September 1981, the two sides were 
already openly declaring their intention to develop "strategic cooperation." It is 
true that the matter did not go as far as the signing of a treaty, which would have 
finally formalized the Washington-Tel Aviv alliance. An important step in this 
direction was taken on 30 November 1981, however, when the defense ministers of 
both states signed a memorandum on mutual understanding in the area of strategic 

People in Washington tried to deny the significance of this memo. For example, the 
WASHINGTON POST called it a "calculated gesture by the administration to calm 
Israel's nerves and satisfy Begin's political needs after the sale of the AWACS 
planes to Saudi Arabia. This is something like a consolation prize: The Saudis 
got AWACS and Israel got a new sheaf of papers." 

In fact, however, the purpose of the memo is to establish Israel as a military 
ally of the United States. A coordinating council with extensive powers will be 
set up in accordance with the document. It will concern itself with such matters 
as the organization of joint air force, naval and ground maneuvers, shipments of 
weapons to Israel, the deployment of weapons in Israel for the American "rapid 
deployment force,'' etc. The American-Israeli agreement is of an overtly anti- 
Soviet nature, and its signatories have not even tried to conceal this. Further- 
more, on the pretext of combating the "Soviet threat,'"’ Tel Aviv has agreed to 
place Israeli armed forces at Washington's disposal. Although the two sides 
declared that the agreement is supposedly not directed against other states in the 
Middle East, it is absolutely clear that Israel has been assigned the role of a 
bridgehead for aggressive actions by American imperialism in this part of the world. 

[t is also noteworthy that the memorandum was signed after Israel agreed to the 
American demand that troops from the Western European countries be included in the 
"multinational force" in the Sinai, created in accordance with the Camp David 
agreements. Therefore, the reinforcement of the American-Israeli alliance turned 
out to be connected with Washington's plans to deploy U.S. troops and the troops 
of other NATO countries in the Middle East. In this way, conditions are being set 
up for the integration of the "special'' American~-Israeli relationship within the 
system of imperialist military blocs. It was no coincidence that France's LE MONDE 
reported on 2 December 1981 that the American-Israeli memorandum "reinforces the 
belief that more and more of Tel Aviv's policy is being made in the United 

Influential opposition forces in Israel, including former Prime Minister Y. Rabin, 
objected to the memo. The critics of the agreement pointed out the fact that it 
would attach Israel even more closely to the U.S. war chariot and "not only will 

’t strengthen Israel's security but will even put it ina dangerous position," 36 
The government had a great deal of trouble in winning the Knesset's approval of 
the memorandum. 


The present Israeli leadership, headed by M. Begin and A. Sharon, hopes to use the 
"strategic consensus" with the United States to perpetuate the occupation of the 
territories it has seized and for new aggressive actions against the Arabs. For 
the sake of its own expansionist aims, the Zionist ruling elite is willing for 
Israel to continue serving as imperialism's policeman in the Middle East. 

"The so-called ‘strategic cooperation’ between the United States and Israel will 
bring the Arabs bloodshed, destruction and grief," L. I. Brezhnev said.? 

The agreement between the Reagan Administration and the Begin government not only 
confirms the imperialist nature of the Washington-Tel Aviv military and political 
alliance but also testifies to the beginning of a new stage in its development, 
which will be extremely dangerous for the people of the Middle East and for the 
cause of peace throughout the world. This was corroborated by the Israeli 
Knesset's insolent decision to annex the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan Heights, 

a decision which was made almost immediately after the signing of the American- 
Israeli memorandum. 


lL. For more detail, see N. V., "The Carter Administration and the Zionist Lobby," 


3. PRAVDA, 28 October 1981. 

"Israel and American Jewish Interaction," Repe~t of an International Task 
Force, The American Jewish Committee, N.Y., 1978, pp 27, 29. 


5. "American Jewish Year Book 1978,"" N.Y., 1978, p 182; "American Jewish Year 
Book 1980," N.Y., 1980, p 153. 

6. <A. Lilienthal, "The Zionist Connection," N.Y., 1978, p 763. 

7. "Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1981," Hearings, Wash., 1981, 
» 32% 

8. "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1979,"' Wash., 1979, 
p 19. 

9. "Security Assistance Program. FY 1982,"' Congressional Presentation, Wash., 
1981, p 120. 

10. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 7, 1981, p 41. 

ll. "'Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY 1981 (pt 3),' Hearings Before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, April 25, 1980," Wash., 1980, 
p 25. 





TIME, 18 May 1981, p 38. 

"'The Political Economy of the Middle East," A Compendium of Papers Submitted 
to the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, April 21, 1980," Wash., 1980, 
pp 426-427. 

FORTUNE, 13 March 1978, p 73. 


THE JEWISH WEEK, 7 December 1980. 

"Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1979 (pt 5),' Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, House of Representatives, 
February 6, 8, 15, 28, March 1, 6, 13, 16, 1978,"" Wash., 1978, p 224. 

OLITICAL FOCUS, 1 November 1980, 

"The Political Economy of the Middle East," p 434. 

For more detail, see V. F. Davydov, "Tel Aviv's Nuclear Lust and Washington," 
SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 9, 1981--Editor's note. 

"Statement by T. A. Dine, Executive Director, American Israeli Public Affairs 
Committee, Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, March 25, 
1981," pp 4-5. 

Ibid., p 8. 

ORBIS, Summer 1980, p 360. 

THE NEW YORK TIMES, 4 April 1981. 

A. Eban, "An Autobiography," N.Y., 1977, p 161. 

"Search for Peace in the Middle East. Documents and Statement, 1967-1979,' 
Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,"' Wash., 
1979, pp 55-57. 

THE NEW YORK TIMES, 3 February 1981. 

"Statement of A. Haig, March 18, 1981," Wash., 1981, p 9. 

E. Weizman, "The Battle for Peace," N.Y., 1981, pp 364-366. 

THE NEW YORK TIMES, 11 June 1981. 


Ibid., 13 June 1981. 

34, THE WASHINGTON POST, 12, 16 July 1981. 
35. Ibid., 2 December 1981. 
36. Ibid., 3 December 1981. 

37. PRAVDA, 28 October 1981. 

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya”, 1982 

CSO: 1803/8 


Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 46-56 

[Article by V. P. Kozin: "Augmentation of American Military Presence in the Indian 
Ocean" ] 

[Text] The escalation of international tension as a result of militaristic U.S. 
policy is directly affecting such a vast part of the world as the Indian Ocean basin, 
whi ° covers an area of more than 100 million square kilometers (around one-fifth of 
the ,.anet) if the territory of the more than 40 states located here is included in 
this area along with the expanses of the ocean with its seas and inlets. 

The facts testify that the Reagan Administration is substantiating its own military 
preparations in the Near and Middle East, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf 

with the aid of the "Carter Doctrine," which was announced in January 1980 and 
which envisaged the use of military force to protect American "vital interests." 
However, the new administration is backing this doctrine up with a more powerful 
military arsenal. It was no coincidence that U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, a magazine 
close to the State Department and the Pentagon, predicted at the end of 1980, or a 
month before the change of administrations, that President Reagan would "move faster 
and further than Carter to strengthen American military presence in this region with 
U.S. ground forces to guarantee constant access to oil in the Persian Guif."! Just 
2 months after the Republicans took office, TIME magazine ascertained that Washington 
intended to “actually threaten the use of fists." 

The present administration is stressing the need to plan broad-scale military 
actions. The concept of “one and a half wars," which was subscribed to by the 
Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations, has been discarded and, according to the 
new military strategy, the United States and its closest allies could fight "two 
major wars'=--presumably in Europe and the Middle East (or in any other region that 
might arbitrarily be declared a zone of U.S. "vital interests") .3 

In accordance with the "defense reinforcement plan" submitted to Congress by 
Secretary of Defense Weinberger and in accordance with the President's orders for 

a “massive build-up of military strength" in the Indian Ocean basin and Southeast 
Asia, the Pentagon plans to “expand and step up” Carter's efforts to acquire mili- 
tary support points near oilfields in the Persian Gulf and create "rapid deployment 
forces" to provide the region with a "convincing military presence."4 When General 
E. Meyer, U.S. Army chief of staff, addressed the House Armed Services Committee, 


he stressed the need to "guarantee free access to the natural resources of the 
Middle East and Persian Gulf," advocating the constant presence of U.S. ground 
forces in "this important economic, political and strategic region of the world." 
General D. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also confirmed that the 
United States intends to have sizeable contingents of armed forces permanently 
stationed in this region.” 

The United States is using more than just the "Carter Doctrine" or various clever 
terms, such as the "crescent of crisis" which supposedly stretches along the Afro- 
Asian coastline of the Indian Ocean, as theoretical grounds for its military prepa- 
rations in the Indian Ocean basin. It is also making active use of the thesis that 
American interests in the region must be protected against a "double threat": the 
"absence of regional stability" and the "potential Soviet threat." On this basis, 
the Reagan Administration is arguing the need for "double opposition."® By this, 
Washington means large-scale military operations involving, in one case, sizeable 
U.S. military contingents and, in the second case, interaction by the united armed 
forces of several states in the region, for which purpose regional military and 
political groups are to be created in the Indian Ocean basin, with the United States 
prepared to take on a significant role in these groups. Washington's propaganda 
machine is constantly stressing the importance of participation by the Indian Ocean 
states in the "double opposition" to the "Soviet threat." These statements are 
backed up by the concept of a "strategic consensus" in the region, which essentially 
consists in the redistribution of the "burden of responsibility" in the sphere of 
military activity in the Indian Ocean basin and in the Near and Middle East among 
the states located here, including Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, Kenya, Oman, 
Somalia and Saudi Arabia, and involving them in Washington's efforts to "safeguard 
regional security." 

Judging by all indications, the Reagan Administration has already put together a 
new "Asian doctrine." According to U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, it has three central 
elements: the creation of a "broad group of friendly countries" (including the 
Indian Ocean states of Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia), the offer of military aid 
to the United States' allies in Southeast Asia and, finally, the deployment of 
"large U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis without weakening 
the Pacific Fleet."/ 

The United States is striving to establish itself permanently on the territory of 
sovereign states in the region by winning access to their military facilities. 
Washington is not even trying to conceal the fact that these military installations, 
ports and airfields, could also be used as spring-boards for the transfer of 
American interventionist units for intervention in the internal affairs of the 
Indian Ocean states. The Pentagon has been allocated 742.6 million dollars for the 
modernization and enlargement of naval and air force bases in Egypt, Kenya, Oman, 
Somalia and on the island of Diego Garcia in fiscal year 1982 alone. The Reagan 
Administration's 5-year program for the consolidation of American military strength 
in the Indian Ocean basin and Southeast Asia, on the other hand, envisages the 
allocation of over 30 billion dollars for this purpose, including more than 2 bil- 
lion earmarked for the Persian Gulf zone.8 

According to this program, the U.S. base infrastructure in the region will repre- 
sent a multileveled network of military bases, support points, weapon depots and 


communications and administrative centers. Plans also call for the transformation 
of regtlonal linited-purpose military facilities into huge multipurpose military 
strongholds whose functional sphere of activity will transeend regional boundaries. 
From these bases, American armed forces will be able to train their sights on the 
vast territory stretching from Africa to Australia and from Asia to the Antarctic. 
The United States is also attaching great strategic significance to straits in the 
Indian Ocean basin, hoping to use the territory of countries in this region to 
control the waterways leading to the ocean. According to MILITARY REVIEW, this can 
be done on the territory of 12 Indian Ocean states.9 

These plans are already being carried out. Whereas Washington had 13 large military 
facilities in the Indian Ocean basin and Southeast Asia at the beginning of 1980, 

in 1981 it began to conduct its global base strategy and acquired "access" to another 
él military facilities and bases in several countries, including Australia, Egypt, 
Israel, Kenya, Somalia, Oman and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the United States either 
owns or has access to more than 30 military bases in the region (see map), or one- 
fifth of all regional military facilities. 

Even this number seems insufficient to the United States, however. According to 
NEWSWEEK, “Reagan's strategists are not satisfied with the agreements Carter con- 
cluded with Oman, Kenya and Somalia on ‘limited access to military facilities in 
these countries,’ and the Pentagon has already prepared a secret report on the 

need to conclude new agreements with a group of local countries on military bases."10 

fhe region's largest combined U.S. naval and air force base on the island of Diego 
Garcia, seized by Great Britain from Mauritius, is still growing. In accordance 
with President Carter's memorandum 51, nuclear weapons have already been deployed 
here. In August 1981 the U.S. Navy signed a contract on the enlargement of military 
tacilities on the island at a cost of 300 million dollars. This is only one-tenth 
of the sum which is to be invested in the creation of an even stronger U.S. military 
hbase on Diego Garcia in the next 5 years. The U.S. Department of Defense hopes to 
keep 130,000 tons of ammunition and spare parts on this base, or almost three times 
is much as today's warehouses will accommodate. 

[n addition to the military facilities it already possesses in Australia, the United 
States has been authorized by the Fraser government to use aviation located in the 
Indian Ocean zone and Australian airfields in Darwin and Learmonth. The Australian 
Sterling naval base in Cockburn Sound will supply the American fleet in the Indian 
Ocean with all necessary equipment, which now has to be shipped from the American 
Subic Bay Base in the Philippines. 

washington also intends to use Israeli air bases in Eitam and Ezion in the Sinai 
ind the offshore anchorage in Sharm el Sheikh in the Gulf of Aqaba. 

Egypt the United States has access to the Cairo West and Qena air bases and the \ 
naval base in Ras Banas. The American press has estimated that a billion dollars 
ould be allocated for the modernization of the base in Ras Banas before 1986. The 

‘ontagon intends to use this base to store nuclear weapons and to use the base in 

Marsa Matruh to store chemical and bacteriological weapons. In the future, 18,000 
\merican servicemen and B-52 bombers are to be stationed on the territory of the 

sase in Ras Banas. 




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Bases on territory of: 

@ Egypt Ss South Africa 

© Saudi Arabia © Israel 

Kenya @ Australia 

@ Oman @ Somalia 

gY Bahrein O Seychelles (Mahe) 

The Naval (designated on map as BMC), Air Force (BBC) and Military Communications 
(YC) Bases of the United States Armed Forces on the Territories of Indian Ocean 
Basin States 

[Key on following page] 



lL. Ezion 19, Salala 

2. Sharm el Sheikh 20. Berbera 

3, Marsa Matruh 21. Mogadishu 

4. Catro West 22. Diego Garcia 

5. Qena 23. Mahe, Seychelles 
6. Ras Banas 24. Darwin 

7. Jizan 25. North West Cape 
8. Embakasi 26. Learmonth 

9. Kismayo 27. Alice Springs 
LO. Nanyuki 28. Boomer 
ll. Mombasa 29. Cockburn Sound 
12. Eitam 30. Pine Gap 
13. Dhahran 31. Adelaide 
14, Manama 32. Capetown 
15. Sib 33. Simonstown 
16. Matrah 34. Silvermine 
17. Masira 35. Durban 
18. Tamridh 36. Hobart 

The possibility of a new military treaty with Pakistan is being given serious 
consideration in the White House. According to the WASHINGTON POST, Pakistan has 
become "a Western stronghold on the Asian front."11 The aims of this treaty are 
not being concealed either. It is intended to "protect American interests in the 
Persian Gulf zone."' The Pentagon also has no objections to settling down in the 
ports of Karachi and Gwadar and the airfield near Peshawar. 

Despite the official closure of U.S. bases in Thailand, American military advisers 
are still working on Thai bases. 

Within the near future the American administration hopes to increase arms transfers 
by 25 percent and expand other forms of military aid to the ASEAN states (four of 
the five states making up this organization--IndoneBia, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Singapore--are located in the Indian Ocean basin). 

(fhe Sudan (which has a Red Sea coastline) has expressed its willingness to offer 
the United States military bases on its territory. The former U.S. Air Force base 
in Dhahran (Saudi Arabia) is being re-equipped and will be used by the United 
States during its projected military actions in the Persian Gulf. 

The danger of Washington's military and political schemes with bases in the Indian 
Ocean and Persian Gulf stems from the fact that these facilities, whether they are 
under national jurisdiction or belong completely to Washington, are bridgeheads for 
potential U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of states in the region, as 
attested to by recent events: The United States used military bases in Egypt and 
Oman in its diversionary operations against Iran in April 1980. 

[There is still a high level of U.S. naval presence near the coastlines of the Near 
and Middle East, southern Africa and the Indonesian Straits. Before Ronald Reagan 
was even inaugurated, the Pentagon announced that the American naval squadron would 
not be leaving the Indian Ocean. It still consists of around 30 ships, including 


two attack aircraft carriers and one amphibious task force, missile cruisers, 
destroyers and submarines.!2 This force, with its nuclear weapons and around 200 
aircraft on board the carriers, poses a real threat to regional and international 

American advance depot vessels are located in the Indian Ocean to supply "rapid 
deployment forces" with weapons and ammunition. Whereas four U.S. aircraft carrier 
task forces entered the Indian Ocean in 1977-1978 (two each year), there were five 
in 1979 and ten in 1980. Within just the first 9 months of 1981, six American 
aircraft carrier forces entered this zone. In 1980-1981 there were five times as 
many U.S. naval ships in the Indian Ocean basin as in 1977-1978. 

The U.S. Navy's Middle East task force in the Persian Gulf has increased from three 
to five vessels. The deployment efficiency of U.S. ships has been heightened, par- 
ticularly in the case of the larger vessels. Dredging operations in the Suez Canal 
made it possible for American aircraft carriers of any tonnage to enter the Indian 
Ocean directly from the Mediterranean Sea, reducing the travel time from the Atlantic 
to the Indian Ocean by around a week.13 In May 1981 the 81,700-ton aircraft carrier 
"America™ went through the Suez Canal for the first time. The creation of a separate 
and permanent U.S. [fleet in the Indian Ocean is still being considered. 

Soon after the Reagan Administration took office, an important change was made in 
general naval strategy, namely the emphasis on "globs1l patrols in all oceans." An 
extended program of naval ship-building was approved and a number of reserve vessels 
were put back in action. The program envisages the construction of another two 
large attack aircraft carriers within the next 10 years, in addition to the carrier 
planned in the budget for fiscal year 1982. This means that the United States will 
be able to station carrier task forces on a permane..t basis in the world's three 
largest oceans, including the Indian Ocean. Other Large vessels will be built and 
brought out of reserve in accordance with Reagan's naval program. As a result, the 
number of U.S. naval ships will increase from 418 to 600 by 1990, 14 

American airborne forces in the Indian Ocean region are also being built up. Alter- 
native plans for bombing targets here by means of carrier aviation and land-based 
aircraft are being considered. Besides this, a special squadron of B-52-H strategic 
bombers, a so-called strategic task force, is being established in the United States 
to bomb large oil deposits and waterways in the Persian Gulf zone within 36 hours 
after the planes take off from an airfield in North Dakota. 15 

The United States launched another geostationary spy satellite over the Indian 
Ocean in spring 1981 for the reconnaissance of the situation in the Indian Ocean 
and Persian Gulf. American planes equipped with the AWACS system are observing a 
huge part of the Persian Gulf zone from Saudi territory. 

The Pentagon is now relying more on the "land factor" in its military presence in 
the Indian Ocean--that is, on the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Egypt, Israel, 
Oman and Saudi Arabia. According to high-level Pentagon spokesmen, the "rapid 
deployment force" can already be used “at any time and in any part of the world," 
but its main potential strike zone, as attested to by a map printed in the 16 March 
1981 issue of NEWSWEEK magazine and depicting the scenario of U.S. armed interven- 
tion in the Persian Gulf, is the Persian Gulf zone. The number of men in the 


"rapid deployment force," which was first set at 110,000, now exceeds 200,000. 
Furthermore, according to reports in the American press, more significance is 
being attached to their combat readiness than to the readiness of NATO units. The 
Pentagon has been allocated 2.5 billion dollars to equip this force.16 The opera- 
tions of this force were already being perfected in the first half of 1981 in 
several maneuvers and training exercises in the United States and Egypt. 

Carter Administration Administration 
4b} vam ~ Wy, dq 
| j \sun’ 3 97) Ay $b, n 
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AQMGMUUGE ONE OmamuudtcontIngma 
1979 * vides! Sali i967 

————— total number of ships  ----- number of aircraft carriers 

This diagram illustrates the presence of U.S. naval ships in the Indian 

Ocean zone during different periods depending on the military and political 
situation at the given time: The number of American warships increased 

each time there was increased tension in the region or whenever significant 
domestic political events occurred in any of these countries. For example, 
the number ''peaked" at the end of 1978 (November and December) and the begin- 
1ing of 1979 (January-May) in connection with the revolution in Iran and the 
irmed conflict between the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the 
Yernen Arab Republic, at the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980 in connec- 
tion with the events in Afghanistan and in September 1980 when the Iraq-Iran 
contliect began; the number of U.S. warships also increased in April 1980 

when preparations were made for the diversionary military action against 

[ran and half a year prior to this when the American Embassy in Tehran was 
seized and the “hostages” were taken. Throughout 1981 the Reagan Administra- 
tion did not lower the high level of U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, 
keeping it at almost "peak" level. The slightly lower number of American 
‘hips here in October 1981, when a task force was transferred to the 
Mediterranean after Sadat had been assassinated in Egypt, was back up to 30 
by the end of the year. 

‘he largest Pentagon maneuvers ever conducted by the United States in Southwest 
Asia were concluded in November-December 1981 in Egypt, Oman, Sudan and Somalia. 
American troops from the "rapid deployment force" took part in these maneuvers, 


code-named "Bright Star." The newest American 
cratt were used in the maneuvers for the first 
flying non-stop from the United States, bombed 

The leading Western countries and their allies 
training exercises and maneuvers involving air 

F-16 bombers and AWACS-equipped air- 
time. Six strategic B-52 bombers, 
targets close to Cairo. 

conducted nine large-scale military 
and naval forces in the Indian 

Ocean basin in 1981, and U.S. armed forces took part in seven of them. 

Washington's widely publicized list of planned defense cuts, including some affect- 
ing the "rapid deployment force,'' which was submitted to the White House by Secre- 
tary of Defense C. Weinberger, essentially does not envisage any reduction in 

combat strength or the number of personnel (the recommendations include virtually 

no real reduction in the present size of the U.S. Armed Forces, the number of "rapid 
deployment force" brigades has been restored to the originally planned nine, and 
reserve ammunition for "rapid deployment force" ground troops will stay at the 60- 
day level envisaged by the Carter Administration). 

Washington is quite interested in the "Sinai spring-board'--in the deployment of 
"multinational armed forces" in the Sinai, planned for 1982. American airborne 
and ground troops will make up the backbone of these forces. They will represent 
the first large American military contingent in the Middle East. The American 
military command will also be responsible for the ge ieral supervision of these 
According, to NEWSWEEK magazine, the Reagan Administration has already 
created a special united U.S. command for the Indian Ocean. 


[In short, when the monopolies need someone else's oil, uranium, nonferrous metals 
or other raw materials, when they are kept from ro»oing other nations by revolu- 
tionary reforms in the liberated countries and by -he desire of these countries for 
real independence, imperialism's ideologists and s' rategists immediately find 
"grounds" for their policy and declare the Middle Fast, Africa and the Indian Ocean 
a “sphere of U.S. vital interests," the accountability report of the CPSU Central 
Committee to the 26th party congress states. "The U.S. military machine is ener- 
getically pushing its way into this region and plans to stay there a long time. 

The ae of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Oman, Kenya, Somalia, Egypt--what 

The mass-scale U.S. military preparations in the Indian Ocean are being accompanied 
by a vigorous attempt to undermine the proposal of the Indian Ocean and non-aligned 
states that the Indian Ocean be turned into a "zone of peace." This proposal has 
been discussed within the UN framework for the last 10 years.19 The U.S. view on 
the matter was most clearly expressed during the preparations for a representative 
international conference on the Indian Ocean, which was supposed to work out an 
international agreement on its transformation into a "zone of peace." The United 
States and its closest NATO allies tried for a long time to keep several of the 
socialist countries, which use the waters of the Indian Ocean extensively and 
actively support the proposal that it be turned into a "zone of peace," from being 
included in the special UN committee on the Indian Ocean. 

The present American administration has raised particularly flagrant and tactless 
objections to this conference. When questions connected with the preparations for 
the conference to work out an international agreement on the transformation of the 


Indian Ocean into a "zone of peace" were discussed by the special UN committee on 
the Indian Ocean in 1980 and 1981, the United States argued that the presence of a 
limited Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan, which is known to have entered 
that country at the request of the Afghan Government, would make it impossible to 
hold the conference. Furthermore, the U.S. representative was not satisfied with 
this artificial pretext and also made the absurd statement that the conference would 
be impeded by the presence of Soviet armed forces in Soviet (!) Central Asia. At 
three sessions of the special committee in 1981, after Ronald Reagan had taken 
office, the representative of the United States not only announced the categorical 
U.S. refusal to support the proposal that the conference be held in 1981, but 
actually moved that the preparations be stopped altogether. At the July session 
of the committee, the United States and its allies used obstructionist methods to 
prevent any specific decisions from being made in regard to the conference. 

At the session in August 1981, when the draft resolution of the 36th Session of the 
UN General Assembly on the declaration of the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace" was 
being discussed, the American representative took an even more rigid stand, backed 
up by the FRG and Australia, and entered into a direct confrontation with the non- 
aligned countries. The United States refused to support any resolutions envisaging 
the organization of a representative conference within the near future to draft 

an international agreement on the transformation of the Indian Ocean basin into a 
"zone of peace." The U.S. delegation in the United Nations has insisted on the 
revision of the concept of the "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean, as reflected in 
documents of the United Nations and the movement for non-alignment . 20 

Now that a struggle has been launched for the implementation of the proposal regard- 
ing the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a "zone of peace," the U.S. attitude 
‘an only be interpreted as a desire to consolidate the U.S. military presence in the 
Indian Ocean basin and impede the conclusion of an international agreement on this 


fhe deployment of American carrier attack forces and nuclear submarines, the 
creation of a diversified network of military bases and the plans to use the "rapid 
deployment force" against the Indian Ocean states are also completely inconsistent 
with the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a "zone of peace." 

[It is clear that the United States is openly planning military and political expan- 
sion in this region, the creation of a material and technical base here for the 

purpose of organizing armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Indian 
Ocean states, the achievement of superiority in weapons and military equipment, the 
intensification of military maneuvers and training exercises and the transformation 

f the Indian Ocean zone into a connecting link for the United States' own global 
igzressive preparations, which would make this a third center of military strength, 
ilong with Western Europe and the Far East, covered by the American "nuclear 

These U.S. actions are nullifying the efforts of the Indian Ocean states to safe- 
guard their own security. Besides this, the expanded and unprovoked military 
presence of the United States in the Indian Ocean basin is forcing countries in 
the region to increase their military expenditures, which have already reached 

‘0 billion dollars a year, and thereby lose huge sums needed for the resolution of 
urgent socioeconomic problems. 


The escalation of U.S. military activity in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf zone 
is inhibiting the development of a trend which became apparent in the region in the 
1970's, a trend toward better international relations as a result of the collapse of 
colonial empires, the disintegration of military and political blocs and the rela- 
tively low level of foreign military presence. Washington's policy is directed 
against the liberated states in the region and could limit the sovereignty and inde- 
pendence they have won as a result of a long national liberation struggle. 

"The imperialists do not want the liberated countries to consolidate their inde- 
pendence," the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th 
party congress says. "By thousands of ways and means they are trying to attach 
these countries to themselves so that they can dispose of their natural wealth more 
freely and use their territory in their own strategic intrigues. The traditional 
"divide and conquer’ method of the colonizers is being widely used in this 

Is it at all plausible that the United States is striving to ensure the safety of 

oil shipments from the Persian Gulf zone if it refuses to conclude the appropriate 
international agreement and lower the dangerous level of military presence in the 

Indian Ocean? As speakers noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, "it would be absurd to 
think that Western oil interests could be ‘protected’ by turning this region into 

a powder-keg."22 

And who is threatening the American oil tankers in the Indian Ocean? Could this be 
of any interest to countries which make extensive use of the waters of this ocean 

On the other hand, the American nuclear submarines patrolling the waters of the 
Indian Ocean (located almost 11,000 kilometers fron U.S. territory) constitute a 
direct threat to the states located in this basin. 

Washington has not been satisfied with its attempts to gain military and strategic 
superiority in the Indian Ocean basin through its own efforts and the efforts of 
pro-American regimes and is now enlisting the help of its NATO allies for the 
"collective reinforcement of military strength" in the region. This is one of the 
aims of the recent plans to extend NATO's zone of action. 

The armed forces of Great Britain and France are in the Indian Ocean along with the 
U.S. Navy. West German ships have also been sent here. All of this testifies that 
the attempts of the United States and other Western countries to escalate inter- 
national tension and achieve military superiority to the USSR, as well as the 
regional escalation of their military activity in the Indian Ocean and Persian 

Gulf zone, are links of a common chain. 

Many states in the region, primarily India, Madagascar, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, 
Tanzania and Southern Yemen, believe that the tension in the Indian Ocean basin 
must be eliminated as quickly as possible. 

The attainment of this goal would also be promoted by the resumption of the Soviet- 
American talks on the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean. But the 
United States has stubbornly refused to return to the negotiating table to resume 


the talks of 1977 and 1978. Apparently, the conclusion of an agreement on this 
matter, just as the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a "zone of peace," does 
not fit in at all with Washington's far-reaching militaristic plans and actual 
behavior in the Indian Ocean. 

At the same time, American propaganda has taken every opportunity to distort the 
facts about Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean and to misinterpret their functions. 

The Soviet Union is not concealing the fact that its naval ships visit the Indian 
Ocean, however, just as it is not concealing the fact that it attaches great sig- 
nificance to the preservation of security and the relaxation of tension in the 
Indian Ocean basin. 

Soviet naval ships pass through the Indian Ocean in transit, traveling between the 
Atlantic and the shores of the Soviet Far East. This route is the only one that can 
be used year-round to connect the European half of the USSR with its Asian half. 

The Soviet Union has considerable trade, economic, political and scientific inter- 
ests in the Indian Ocean zone. Soviet ships take part in training cruises in the 
Indian Ocean and make friendly visits to littoral states. Furthermore, in contrast 
to the United States, the Soviet Union does not have any military bases, does not 
organize shows of military strength and aggressive military maneuvers, is not devel- 
oping strategic weapons and will not deploy nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean. 

In fact, in 1981 it reduced the number of its naval ships performing patrol func- 
tions in the Indian Ocean, although this number was already incomparably lower than 

the number of American naval ships in the region, not to mention the total number 

of U.S., British and French ships here.24 It is also worth noting that "military 
access" to Soviet territory is much c’ om the Indian Ocean, given the present 
systems of U.S. weapons, than from othe rts of the world. The ballistic missiles 

on American submarines are capable of destroying much of our state, and land- and 
carrier-based bomber aviation could devastate the southern regions of the USSR. 

[It is clear that the CPSU and Soviet State, concerned about the security of the \ 
USSR and its allies, must be concerned about the escalation of the military prepa- 
rations of the United States and its closest NATO partners in the Indian Ocean 
zone and must draw the proper conclusions from shis.25 
|. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 29 January 1980/5 January 1981, p 31. 

», TIME, 16 March 1981, p 20. 

}. V. V. Zhurkin, "The Republican Administration's Military and Political 
Strategy,'’ SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 11, 1981--Editor's note. 

>». NEWSWEEK, 23 March 1981, p 20. 

6. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 20 May 1981, pp H2369, 2371-2376. 











U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 10 August 1981. 

Ibid., 29 December 1980/5 January 1981, p 30; TIMES OF INDIA, 12 March 1981; 
SEA POWER, March 1981, p 21. 

MILITARY REVIEW, November 1980, p 68. 
NEWSWEEK, 23 March 1981, p 20. 
THE WASHINGTON POST, 30 April 1981. 

U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, February 1981, p 58; SEA POWER, May 1981, 
BD 3a 

The first stage of the Suez Canal reconstruction work was completed in December 
1980. After the canal had been widened and deepened, vessels of up to 150,000 
tons with a full-capacity cargo could pass through the canal. The second stage 
of this work should allow for the passage of the largest supertankers. 

NEWSWEEK, 9 February 1981, p 30; SEA POWER, February 1981, p 16; April 1981, 
» 27. 

NEWSWEEK, 16 March 1981, p 26. 
Ibid.; U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, January 1981, pp 30-31. 
NEWSWEEK, 8 June 1981, p 15. 

"Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 
1981, p 21. 

SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 2, 1981, pp 107-115--Editor's note. 

The basic principles of the concept of the "zone of peace” in the Indian Ocean 
are the following: the liquidation of foreign bases and installations in the 
region, the curtailment of the arms race, the creation of a zone free of nuclear 
weapons and weapons of mass destruction, the curtailment of the escalation and 
expansion of the military presence of the great powers, the creation of a system 
of general collective security without military alliances, the renunciation of 
the use of force or threats of force against the sovereignty, territorial integ- 
rity and independence of any state in the Indian Ocean basin in violation of 

the aims and principles of the UN charter, the guarantee of the right of free 
and unimpeded use of the zone by the ships of all states in accordance with the 
standards of international law, etc. 

"Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS,"" p 14. 
Ibid., p 2l. 

For more detail, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 7, 1981, 
pp 44-48--Editor's note. 


24, SEA POWER, May 1981, p 33; U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, July 1981, 
p 56. 

25. See the interview with Fleet Admiral N. I. Smirnov, first deputy commander-in- 
chief of the USSR Naval Forces, in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 22 July 1981. 

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982 

CSO: 1803/8 



Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 57-68 

[Article by A. S. Mulyarchik] 

[Not translated by JPRS] 

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No l, Jan 82 pp 69-79 

[Article by Ye. I. Krutitskaya and L. S. Mitrofanova: "A. A. Troyanovskiy--First 
Soviet Ambassador to the United States (On the Centennial of His Birth)"] 

[Not translated by JPRS] 

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Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 80-83 
[Article by S. A. Ulin] 

[Text] When U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger returned to Washington after 
an ll-day tour of Western Europe, he said on 26 October 1981: "We have under- 
estimated the strength of the antiwar movement." He thereby acknowledged a serious 
miscalculation in the present administration's policy of flagrantly pressuring the 
Western European countries for their further militarization by means of the deploy- 
ment of 572 medium-range missiles in the NATO countries, to be followed by neutron 

Washington's arrogance, its condescending attitude toward the mass antimilitaristic 
movement and its attempts to portray this movement as a result of the influence of 
"Soviet propaganda" have put the United States in a difficult position. If it 
continues to ignore the popular demonstrations of unprecedented scales in Brussels, 
Londoa, Bonn, Rome and other Western European cities, it will take the risk of 
losing even more prestige, its influence and eventually even its present political 
position in this region. This prospect naturally worries Washington. It was no 
coincidence that when President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig met with the 
leader of the West German opposition, H. Kohl, in October 1981, they discussed the 
possibility of "curbing" the mass protests against the arms race and the deploy- 
ment of new types of American nuclear missiles in Western Europe. 

Washington has a great deal to think about. Important processes, with seemingly 
irrevocable results, have taken place in Western Europe in recent months. The 
opposition to the White House's militaristic line is quickly gaining strength. 

When we now look back at the initial stages of the unprecedented public opposition 
to Washington's military policy, we can see that the leaders and pioneers of the 
movement were the small Western European countries, the Netherlands and Belgium, 

on whose territory NATO and the Pentagon plan to deploy 48 cruise missiles each. 

In the Netherlands the issue of American medium-range missiles was one of the main 
items on the agenda of virtually all political parties, including the government 
coalition of the Christian Democratic Appeal and the People's Party, at the time of 
the parliamentary elections in May 1981. Im May the largest party in the country, 
the Labor Party, headed by former prime minister J. den Uyl, resolutely opposed 
NATO's plans at its congress. Only the resistance of the party right wing kept the 
demand that all nuclear weapons be removed from the Netherlands without delay from 


being included in the congress documents. The leftist parties represented in 
parliament, however, openly objected to the NATO program, 

It is important to underscore the mass character of the Dutch antiwar movement. 
Approximately 60 percent of the people in Holland believe that their government 
should untlaterally renounce nuclear weapons and set an example for its neighbors. 
The country's influential Reformist Church has also joined the opposition to 
American nuclear weapons in the Netherlands. It is actively fighting not only for 
the refusal to accept new missiles, but also for the removal of all existing 
nuclear weapons from Dutch territory. 

Au active bloc of opponents of the new American weapons has taken shape in the 
FRG-Netherlands-Belgium "triangle." The provocative policy of the new U.S. admin- 
istration, which could plunge the world into a nuclear conflict, has also encoun- 
tered growing opposition itn Denmark and Norway, the Scandinavian NATO countries. 
Opposition forces in these five countries have made references to the official 
positions of Denmark and Norway, which prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons 
on their territory. For example, the Dutch socialists have tried to enlist the 
support of the Norwegian Labor Party and the Danish Social Democrats in the strug- 
gle against the deployment of new missiles in Holland. 

England's Labor Party, which heads the antimissile and antinuclear mass movement 
in that country, has objected to NATO's nuclear "reirmament." The resolution of 
this party's annual congress included the demand that American nuclear weapons be 
removed from English territory. Grand-scale peace marches by women and youth were 
held in many Western European countries in summer 1981. Large demonstrations 
against the deployment of American missiles were organized in a number of Italian 
and French cities. Influential political forces in Portugal have joined the 
struggle against the deployment of the new nuclear weapons in Western Europe. 

Lettist groups in the country are seriously disturbed by the heightened U.S. inter- 
est in Portuguese bases and the possibility that the offer of new bases to the 
United States will bring American aircraft carriers with nuclear weapons on board 
into Portuguese ports and will involve Portugal even more in NATO's nuclear 
strategy. The campaign against the deployment of nuclear weapons in Portugal has 
been supported by several high-placed individuals, including military leaders, 
such as General F. da Costa Gomes, former president of Portugal, and Colonel 
Ernesto de Melo Antunes, member of the Revolutionary Council (the most important 
government organ) and former minister of foreign affairs. When the latter spoke 
at a meeting of the Alliance for Socialist Democracy, he said that the United 
States’ attempts to win its NATO partners’ consent to the deployment of Pershing-2 
missiles and cruise missiles would turn the entire European continent into a 
colossal nuclear front if they should be successful. 

The center of the opposition to Washington's new dangerous plans is the FRG, where 
the struggle against the American missiles has united more than 40 parties, 
organizations and associations. They include the mass youth organizations of the 
ruling Social Democratic and Free Democratic parties, the German Communist Party, 
the Young German Socialist Workers, the Spartacus Marxist Student Union, associ- 
ations of democratic jurists and former victims of Nazi persecution, the Friends 
of Nature and other organizations of conservationists, etc. When the NATO 


nuclear planning group met in Bonn, more than 30 mass organizations attended a 
protest rally against the American missiles. This is probably the first time that 
this kind of broad and representative spectrum of political forces opposing the 
nuclear arms race has taken shape in the FRG. This movement of the early 1980's 
{s upholding the traditions of those who protested the atomic arming of the FRG in 
the 1960's and advocated the ratification of the "Eastern treaties" at the begin- 
ning of the 1970's, but it also has certain distinctive features, such as its 
militant nature and the determination of its participants. The slogans of this 
movement are eloquent: "Stop nuclear death!" and "We demand a constructive reply 
to Soviet initiatives!" 

The "Krefeld petition,'' which was adopted at a forum of the peace-loving West 
German public in Krefeld in November 1980, has become the present movement's rally- 
ing point. "Atomic Death Threatens Us All!"=-this was the title of the petition 
which was signed by almost 1.5 million people within a year. Prominent politicians 
and public spokesmen have joined the movement against the deployment of the new 
American nuclear missiles. Physicist K. Bechert, former Bundestag deputy from the 
SPD and chairman of the parliamentary committee on nuclear energy, wrote a special 
announcement: "If NATO carries out its dec .sion, it will sentence us to death. 
(his is why struggle is necessary. We cannot accept this decision!" Another 
convincing announcement was made by theology Professor W. Krek, a prominent West 
German public spokesman: "In accordance with official statements from Bonn, the 
so-called nuclear missile ‘rearming' will serve our security interests. We 
believe, however, that the territory of the FRG will thereby be put in the most 
erious danger, particularly in view of the American theory of ‘limited nuclear 

Wat . 

(he U.S. Republican administration is being accused more and more of unprincipled 
behavior and of interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. The 
irrogant statements by Washington spokesmen that “weak governments prevail" in 
Western Europe and that pacifists are "spreading lies and deception" are arousing 
widespread indignation. Some countries responded with measures to convince 
Washington officials of the strength of the antiwar opposition. During this cam- 
ign, American journalists covering NATO military affairs were offered interviews 

with defense ministers and other top government officials in the FRG, England, 
elyium and Holland. The conclusion drawn from the "fact-finding" talks, inter- 
views and meetings was a disappointing one for Washington: The Western European 
oarliaments were not prepared to increase their military expenditures, particularly 
luring a time of economic recession throughout the West. 

Public opinion polls indicated that most of the Western Europeans were strongly in 
favor of detente. For example, a poll conducted by a French public opinion 
research institute indicated that 67 percent of the population of the FRG and 52 
percent of the French population were in favor of better relations with the USSR 
(43 pereent in the United States). According to NEWSWEEK magazine, "most of the 
Westera) Europeans are in favor of arms limitation talks and politicians every- 
where on the continent have seconded L. I. Brezhnev's recent motion for a morator- 
ium on the deployment of the ‘Euromissiles.'" 

Washington's decision on the full-scale production of neutron weapons evoked a 
particularly strong wave of indignation in Western Europe. Three years after the 


same type of campaign in 1978, Western Europe responded to this decision with mass 

The sharp contrast between the constructive Soviet position, set forth at the 26th 
CPSU Congress and in numerous statements by L. I. Brezhnev in recent months, par- 
ticularly his new and far-reaching proposals, made during his trip to the FRG in 
November 1981 and aimed at a mutually acceptable agreement and the protection of 
Kurope against the danger of nuclear conflagration, on one side, and the uncon- 
cealed aggressive militarism of the U.S. Republican administration on the other, 
has been recognized throughout “urope. Thousands and millions of European citizens 
have realized or are just now realizing the origin of the real threat to Europe. 
Two lines were clearly delineated in Europe in 1981: the peaceful constructive 
line of the USSR and Washington's line of escalating international tension. There 
is no doubt that this was an important time for the European public to recognize 
existing realities and choose the proper position. 

This protest movement has also opened the eyes of many Americans, including some 
members of the administration (this is attested to in particular by Weinberger's 
statement cited above). but the American President has persisted in his distorted 
view of Europe. When he addressed the reporters and editors of small-town news- 
papers on 16 October, he said that the demonstratiors in Western Europe were "not 
serious" and were the result of "propaganda which c.early comes from the Soviet 
Union." Furthermore, Reagan announced that these demonstrations were of no impor- 
tance because none of the European governments had objected to the deployment of 
these weapons. 

"But events quickly refuted the American President's statement," American corres- 
pondent D. Browder remarked in an article printed in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD 
TRIBUNE on 29 October. "Within 2 days...the new Gceek government demanded the 
removal of nuclear weapons without delay and the yradual withdrawal of Greece from 
the NATO military organization. A few days later the defense ministers ot the NATO 
countries advocated, in spite of U.S. objections, a positive response to the Soviet 
proposal of a moratorium, and a week later mass demonstrations in London and Rome 
proved that the earlier warnings from Brussels and Bonn were serious." The author 
concluded, "the President is dangerously mistaken if he believes that the protest 
in NATO against U.S. nuclear policy is nothing more than communist propaganda." 

Therefore, the events of last year were quite indicative. As L. I. Brezhnev said 
when Fe was interviewed by the editors of West Germany's SPIEGEL magazine, the 
antiwar, antimissile movement that is now gathering strength in a number of NATO 
countries is the Western European people's response to the dangerous militaristic 
policy of the leaders of this bloc. The wave of public protest agiinst adventurism 
clearly corroborates the fact that Europe realizes the value of peace and the 
danger of the threat of war. 

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982 

CSO: 1803/8 

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 83-87 

[Article by M. I. Lapitskiy] 

[Not translated by JPRS] 

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 88-97 

[Article by V. I. Alekhin] 

[Not translated by JPRS] 


Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 98-102 
‘Third installment of digest by V. I. Bogachev of book "Friendly Fascism: The New 
Face cf Power in America" by Bertram Gross, New York, M. Evans and Co., Inc., 1980] 

Not translated by JPRS] 



oscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 103-113 

‘Article by N. P. Yevdokimova and V. I. Sokolov: "Ecological Analysis and Economic 

Management Decisions" ] 

Not translated by JPRS] 

CSO: 1803/8 



Military Spending and Employment 
Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 114-116 
[Review by V. B. Benevolenskiy and A. I. Deykin of book "Jobs, Security, and Arms 
in Connecticut. A Study of the Impact of Military Spending on the State" by Marta 

Daniels, Voluntown (Conn.), American Friends Service Committee, 1980, VIII + 60 
pages | 

[Not translated by JPRS] 

Erosion of Middle-Class American Dream 
Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in fussian No 1, Jan 82 pp 116-118 
[Review by V. S. Vasil'yev and A. A. Kokoshin of book "After Affluence. Economics 

to Meet Human Needs" by John Oliver Wilson, San Francisco, Harper and Row Pub- 
lishers, 1980, X + 244 pages] 

[Not translated by JPRS] 

Factors Affecting Foreign Policy Decisions 
Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No l, Jan 82 pp 118-121 
[Review by N. M. Travkina of book "Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for 

U.S. Policymakers" edited by F. Margiotta, Washington, The National Defense 
University Press, 1980, XI + 222 pages] 

[Not translated by JPRS] 


American Capitalism and Technology Transfers 
Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 121-122 

[Review by A. B. Parkanskiy of book "Amerikanskiy kapitalizm i peredacha 
tekhnologii (mezhdunarodno-ekonomicheskiye aspekty)" by I. Ye. Artem'yev, Moscow, 
Nauka, 1980, 190 pages] 

[Text] The author reveals the main aspects of the policy of private U.S. corpora- 
tions, primarily multinationals, in the area of overseas technology transfers. 

He describes the role of the government in this process and the effects it has on 
the American economy. He discusses the major ways in which American technology 
transfers influence the technological development of the leading capitalist states. 

The United States is the main capitalist supplier of technology because it is 
technologically superior to its imperialist partners and rivals. The author quite 
cogently demonstrates that one of the current symptoms of the law of uneven eco- 
nomic and political development in the capitalist states is the fact that, although 
the economic developmental levels of the United States, Western Europe and Japan 
are converging, there is still a gap between them in the area of technological 
development (p 34). 

fhe United States has prevailed in the technological competition between the 
developed capitalist countries essentially on the strength of the leadership of 
major American corporations, which actively use various forms of expansion based 
on overseas technology transfers in the competition for foreign markets. The 
U.S. multinationals control most of the international transfers of American tech- 
nology. They account for up to 90 percent of all U.S. revenues from technology 
sent abroad (p 47). 

The author has been able to cogently prove that the main feature of the technology 
export policy of the U.S. multinationals is the consistency of their attempts to 
transmit the latest technological, organizational and administrative achievements 

to their branches and affiliates through intraorganizational channels while trans- 
nitting obsolete technology to independent foreign firms in accordance with licenses 
ind other international commercial agreements which guarantee their technological 
lependence on U.S. corporations (p 92). 

fhe author logically exposes the policy of state control over exports of technology 
to the socialist countries, aimed at discrimination against these countries in 
international technological relations, and cogently proves the futility of the 
ittempts, which have grown increasingly frequent in recent years, of U.S. ruling 

ircles to use technological contacts as a means of interfering in the domestic 
ittairs of the USSR and other socialist states (p 187). 

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982 


Ecology and the Capitalist City 
Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 p 122 

[Review by V. I. Sokolov of book "Ekologiya i kapitalisticheskiy gorod" by A. K. 
Bystrova, Moscow, Nauka, 1980, 174 pages] 

[Text] In this discussion of the latest developments in the capitalist system, 
resulting from the urban ecological crisis, the author directs the reader's atten- 
tion to the socioterritorial division of the U.S. population according to the eco- 
logical conditions of habitation. It is quite indicative that environmental 
pollution levels are two or three times as high in poor neighborhoods as in loca- 
tions inhabited by well-to-do Americans (p 42). This means that ecological condi- 
tions in the cities are becoming another important factor in the continuous 
polarization of American society. 

Some particularly interesting sections of this book describe the engineering and 
implementation of the state-monopoly policy of solving ecological problems by 
controlling environment-related aspects of the urbanization process (the distribu- 
tion of industrial production and public service units, the limitation of the 
growth of metropolises, the establishment of new cities, the passage of urban 
zoning laws, etc.). 

[It is indicacive that expenditures on environmental protection now rank third among 
the expenditure items of U.S. municipal governments (p 77). 

The author's analysis of such topics as the ecological impact, potential, limits 
and contradictions of state-monopoly urban environuent quality control indicates 
that although the bourgeois state is intervening i. matters pertaining to urban 
environmental protection, the social causes of the negative ecological effects of 
capitalist urbanization still exist. 

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982 

CSO: 1803/8 



Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 82 pp 123-124 

[Not translated by JPRS] 

CSO: 1803/8 


Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No l, Jan 82 pp 125-127 
[Text] September 

2-4 -- Prominent American politicians, Senators A. Cranston and C. Mathias, came 
to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Parliamentary Group. The sena- 
tors met and spoke with USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of 
the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, with Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. 
Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Foices and first deputy minister 
of defense, and with members of foreign affairs commissions in the houses of the 
USSR Supreme Soviet. 

3 -- Members of the Zionist bandit Jewish Defense League committed another terror- 
ist act, placing two fire bombs under the cars of Soviet diplomats employed by the 
Permanent USSR Mission to the United Nations. The bombs were discovered and defused 
before they went off. 

4 -- CPSU Central Committee Secretary M. S. Gorbachev, member of the CPSU Central 
Committee Politburo, received J. Crystal, prominent American agricultural expert 
and public spokesman. They discussed the importance of improving Soviet-American 
relations for the sake of peace and mutually beneficial cooperation. 

The tourism committee of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council met in 

New York for its sixth regular session. During the session the two sides expressed 
their regrets about the low level of reciprocal tourist exchanges between the USSR 
and United States and agreed to take steps to develop tourism. 

A group of American scholars, headed by University of California Professor 

R. Scalapino, arrived in the USSR to attend the fourth Soviet-American symposium 
on current Asian events. They spoke with M. S. Solomentsev, chairman of the RSFSR 
Council of Ministers and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. 

7 -- At a luncheon honoring Secretary General Le Duan of the Central Committee of 
the Vietnam Communist Party, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and 
Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev said: "The Soviet 

Union is always advocating the refusal to develop new, even more lethal types of 
weapons. But I must say quite frankly that we will not stand by and watch these 
weapons appear in the arsenals of the United States and other NATO members. If 


this should happen, the Soviet Armed Forces will possess the necessary counter- 
balance to these weapons.” 

l6 == According to the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 60 percent of the American 
scholars who attended a congress of the American Political Se .ence Association 
believe that the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on arms limitation should be resumed without 

18 -- Addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State A. Haig 
tried to justify the program of intensive U.S. militaristic preparations in the 
Middle East by alleging that the "oilfields in the Persian Gulf, which are so 
important to the United States and our European and Japanese allies" are supposedly 
being "threatened by the Soviet Union." 

22 -- A. A. Gromyko spoke at a plenary meeting of the 36th Session of the UN 
General Assembly. In his speech he said that the policy line of militaristic 
circles in the imperialist states has been reflected in the following actions: 

"the continuous escalation of the arms race; overt attempts to achieve military 
superiority to the Soviet Union; the creation of a broad network of military bases 
and the deployment of American troops on foreign territory; the subversion of the 
bases of Soviet-American relations, established earlier as a result of tremendous 
effort; the exertion of pressure on other states, particularly in Europe, to cur- 
tail their political, trade and economic contacts with the socialist countries." 
"The Soviet Union," A. A. Gromyko stressed, “is in favor of dialogue on all 

aspects of the problem of curbing the arms race and on all debatable international 
issues, it is in favor of bilateral and multilateral dialogue." 

23, 28 -- Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko met in New York with U.S. Secretary 
of State Haig. They discussed key aspects of Soviet-American relations and impor- 
tant international issues. The two sides agreed to begin talks on 30 November 1981 
on the limitation of weapons, including the nuclear weapons which were discussed 
earlier by Soviet and U.S. representatives in Geneva. The Soviet side will be 
represented by a delegation headed by Ambassador Yu. A. Kvitskinskiy, and the 
\merican delegation will be headed by Ambassador P. Nitze. 

'} =-- the Sixth Annual Soviet-American Oncologists’ Convention ended in Washington. 
The two sides signed a protocol on the expansion and improvement of cooperation in 
the tield of oncology. 


2 =-- Speaking in the White House, President Reagan announced a new program for the 
further augmentation of the American strategic nuclear arsena’. 

| == Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev received and spoke with 
PepsiCo Chairman of the Board D. Kendall, prominent representative of the U.S. 
business community. 

12 -- The "Statement of the Government of the USSR to the Government of the United 
States of America," condemning U.S. attempts to interfere in the domestic affairs 
of the Arab Republic of Egypt, was printed in PRAVDA. 


14 == A regular session of the Soviet-American permament consultative commission 
began in Geneva. The commission was founded in 1972 to aid in implementing the 
goals and provisions of the Soviet-U.S. ABM limitation treaty, the provisional 
Soviet-U.S. agreement on some measures in the limitation of strategic offensive 
weapons and the agreement (of 30 September 1971) on measures to reduce the danger 
of nuclear war. 

15 -- the Fourth All-Union Conference of the USSR-U.S. Society was held in Moscow 
to discuss the results of the society's activities during the last 5 years and to 
plan future activities to improve mutual understanding between the populations of 
the two countries. The soctety board was elected, and it will be headed once again 
by Academician N. N. Blokhin. 

16 -- Speaking with American small-town newspaper editors, Ronald Reagan said that 
it was possible that Europe "might be the scene of an exchange of strikes involv- 
ing the use of tactical weapons against military contingents on the battlefield 
without any one of the great powers pushing the button." 

21 -- In response to the question of a PRAVDA correspondent, General Secretary of 
the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium 

L. I. Brezhnev reaffirmed the USSR's willingness to do everything within its power 
to prevent nuclear war and eliminate the very threa’ of war. "It would be good if 
the American President could also make a clear and unequivocal statement denouncing 
the very idea of nuclear attack as a criminal act," said L. I. Brezhnev. 

Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko received Arthur A. Hartman, the 
new U.S. ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Soviet Union. 

22 -- First Deputy Chairman I. V. Arkhipov of the USSR Council of Ministers 
received a group of administrators from several U.S. corporations in the Kremlin. 
These representatives of leading corporations in industry, power engineering, 
transportation and the news publishing sector were in Moscow on an unofficial 
visit. Certain aspects of Soviet-American relations and some current international 
events were discussed during the talk. 

26 -- A. Hartman, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, presented his credentials to V. V. 
Kuznetsov, candidate for membership in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and 
first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. 

27 -- Speaking at a luncheon in honor of President ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih of the 
Yemen Arab Republic, L. I. Brezhnev proposed that the number of participants in the 
international conference on the Middle East be supplemented with representatives 

of the states of Western Europe, North Africa and South Asia. 


} -- L. I. Brezhnev's responses to the questions of the editors of West Germany's 
SPIEGEL magazine were printed in PRAVDA. The replies cogently proved that all of 
the talk about the Soviet Union's desire for military superiority has no basis. 
L. I. Brezhnev reaffirmed and amplified the Soviet proposals aimed at the preser- 
vation of peace and the avoidance of nuclear catastrophe. 


14 -- A new tercorist act was committed against Soviet diplomats in New York: 
Shots were fired at the building of the Soviet Permanent Mission to the United 
Nations in the New York suburb of Glen Cove. 

]}7-19 -- The 15th Dartmouth Conference of Soviet and U.S. public spokesmen was 
held in Moscow to discuss current developments in Soviet-American relations. 

18 -- A. A. Gromyko received U.S. Ambassador Hartman at his request. They dis- 
cussed some aspects of Soviet-American relations and international issues. 

Ronald Reagan addressed the National Press Club in Washington, setting forth the 
U.S. position in regard to talks with the USSR on nuclear weapons in Europe, fur- 
ther talks on strategic arms limitation and a number of other issues. 

19 -- The session of the Soviet-American permanent consultative commission, set up 
to aid in the implementation of the goals and provisions of the ABM treaty, the 
provisional agreement on some measures to limit strategic offensive weapons of 

26 May 1972 and the Soviet-American agreement on measures to reduce the danger of 
nuclear war, concluded by the two countries on 30 September 1971, came to an end 
in Geneva. 

20 -- The Soviet-American talks on the drafting of a new intergovernmental shipping 
agreement, which began on 16 November, came to an end in London. Certain topics 
were set aside for further discussion when the talks are continued in Moscow in 
December 1981. 

At the insistence of the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board 
prohibited Soviet planes from making their regular flights between Moscow and 
Washington for a week, from 21 to 28 November. The pretext for this decision was 
the far-fetched accusation that an Aeroflot plane had "deliberately" deviated from 
its established route over American territory on 8 November. The Soviet Embassy in 
the United States protested this arbitrary decision to prohibit flights, which 
represents the American side's latest violation of the Soviet-U.S. air travel 

| -- The Soviet Embassy in the United States published a press release containing 
the text of L. I. Brezhnev's letter of 25 May 1981, sent to the U.S. President in 
response te the latter's letter of 24 April 1981, in connection with the American 
side's publication of this letter. 

23 -- During his visit to the FRG, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee 
ind Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev made new proposals 
1imed at the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons, medium-range and tac- 
tical, from Europe. 

i) -- Soviet and U.S. delegations began talks on the limitation of nuclear weanvons 
in Europe according to the terms of their agreement in Geneva. The heads of tie 
lelegations, Ambassadors Yu. A. Kvitsinskiy and P. Nitze, had a meeting. 

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982 

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