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JPRS 81687 





1 September 1982 


USSR Report 


WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 


No. 5, May 1982 





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JPRS 81687 





1 September 1982 


USSR REPORT 
WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 


No. 5, May 1982 


Translation of the Russian-language monthly journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA 


I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of 
USSR Academy of Sciences. 


World Economy and International Relations, 


CONTENTS 

ae a RT OB ETT TTT TTT TT TEE EL CET TTTTerTTTerTrire l 
EEE DOE AOO OE “Reete ERCROEOS bisa ANTS DDD TEDSTER ER ed ddddd eee OoeddeES 3 
Role of Developing Countries in World Politics Reviewed 

3 es | PPT TTTI TITTLE LILI iti ierierirree 6 
Iran, Pakistan, Egypt: Islam Reacts To Modern World 

Pe | TT IT TTT LITLTL TLL rire 23 
Soviet Journal Reviews Book on Lenin Legacy 

37 


i Pe ccenb esta esse ee seeeeeccvereieerees 














‘lish title 


ian title 


Author (s) 


Fditor (s) 


Publishing House 


Place of Publication 


Date of Publication 


Signed to press 


Conie 
sp 1es 


PUBLICATI 


ON DATA 


> WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 


No 5, May 1982 


: MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE 


OTNOSHENTYA 


: Ya. S. Khavinson 


‘ Izdatel'stvo Pravda 


: Moscow 


: May 1982 


: 21 April 1982 


: 31,000 


: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika 
i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya”, 1982 














CONTENTS OF 'MEMO,' No 5, May 1982 


Moscow MILROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENTYA in Russian No 5, May 82 
(signed to press 21 Apr 82) pp 1-2 


[Articles published in this report are indicated with an asterisk (*) ] 


[Text] Contents 


"Torchlight of Revolutionary Thought and Action"............ bbbee de peSS5% ees 3 
*k'Nowly Independent Countries in International Relations"--Ye. Primakov...... 14 
"United Nations and Scientific and Technological Cooperation: 

Organizational Aspects"--S. Tsukanov and A. Miroshnichenko............. 30 
"Complex Problems of Trade end Development"=--P. Khvoynik.........seeececeees 40 
*"The Role of Islam in the Social and Political Life of the Orient"-- 

LT. Timofeyev..cccccces TEETTTIELILITIELETE LETT TETTLITILLAL LETT 51 
"The Conserv tive Onslaught™"=-John K. Galbraith... ..cccccccccccccccsesecesses 65 


Our Comments 

"The EEC in the Labyrinth of Reform"--Yu. Shishkov.......ccccccccscvccccces ; 78 
Criticism of Bourgeois Theories 

"The Theory of Value: The Foundation of Economic Science"=--K. Val'tukh..... 86 


In the Academic Council of the Institute of World Economics and International 
Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences 


oe: nh ¢ 8 —Be oo) me ey SS errr TTT TT TP ee ee rT Tree 100 


Our Foreign Correspondent 


"Some Aspects of Militurization in the FRG"--V. Fedorov.....ccccccccccecsces 119 
History nd Journalism 
a, « ©... SS Ee!) ft. MFPPPTTTTITITT TTT TTT Tr Teerrirriir?e Tree 128 

















Surveys and Reports 


‘Problems of Construction Efficiency--the Investment Aspect"'-- 
fm 8 gk Perr rrr rrr eT Teer re re TUT Cre Te TTT ET iveoeds 134 


Scientific Life 
"The Activities of Specialized Councils of the Institute of World 
Economics and International Relations, USSK Academy of Sciences"-- 


OEE CCC ET TOT CL PORTE Perr rr TERT TTT Terrie’ 139 


Books and Authors 


*"The Tertinence of Lenin's Legacy"=-I1. Kolikov....ccccccccscccccccsece ve daee 143 
"Natural Tendencies in World Socialism"--I. Dudinskiy........ TETEETEPT TTT 147 
"Mexican Scholars Criticize Washington Policy"--N. Zaytsev......seeeee- veeeae 148 
In Search of a "Balariced' Policy"--A. Zagorskiy....... -TEETETELELELELE TET 150 

"American Institutionalism in Search of New Theories"--V. bike outs oekeeee: 152 
"Plutocratic Domination"--G. Tsagolov.......eeeeeees TIETTTETTerriri iii 154 
"Natural Resources and the Arms Race'"--G. Gornostayev........ TUTTE ULE 155 


COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 
1982 


8 588 
CSO: 1816/8 











ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF 'MEMO' ARTICLES 


Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 
(signed to press 21 Apr 82) pp 158-159 


{Text} The editorial "Torchlight of Revolutionary Thought and Action" commemorates 
the centenary of the first Russian translation of "The Communist Manifesto” by 

K. Marx and F. Engels--the outstanding policy-planning document of Marxism that 
accomplished a crucial turnabout in the social consciousness of mankind. 


The Russian translation of "The Communist Manifesto" played an important role in 
the spread of Marxism in Russia, serving as a powerful incentive for combining sci- 
entific socialism with the working class movement which had brought the Great 
October Socialist Revolution to its victorious end. 


K. Marx and F. Engels traced the main tendencies in the historical process and 
determined the essential laws of the future communist society. The actual develop- 
ment of the contemporary socialist world testifies to their brilliant foresight. 
The main conclusion of "The Communist Manifesto," embodying its central idea, is 
fidelity to the principles of solidarity and internationalism and consistent strug- 
gle for the unity and solidarity of the international working class. This struggle 
is « particularly important task of today's revolutionary and liberation movements. 
The ideas of "The Communist Manifesto" have passed the test of time and have proved 
their vitality in the new era, remaining che guiding star for today's Marxist- 
Leninists and for all who struggle for peace, democrac, and social progress. 


In his article "The Newly Independent Countries in International Relations," 
rvcademician Ye. M. Primakov examines the process by which the countries of Asia, 


Africa and Latin America evolved from an object into the active subject of inter- 
national relations, the ways in which the developing countries affect the world 
political situation and their incerest in the present world situation. The author 
inalyzes the stages and components of the world system of international relations 
and reveils the nature of involvement and the specific role of the developing 
countries in this system as a result of the change in the correlation of forces 
between world socialism and world capitalism. The article examines in detail the 
place of the developing countries in the clashes and cooperation of the two oppos- 


ing systems and in the policies of the USSR and United States. The article exposes 
the causes of destructive processes, namely the U.S.-inspired arms race and inter- 
state regional conflicts, which have an extremely negative effect on the position 











the countries of Asia, Atrica and Latin America in the world. The article also 
considers the non-alignment movement as an important factor in world politics, in 
which the constructive and complex role ot the developing countries in the inter- 
national arena has been manifested. 





‘4 


S. Tsukanov and A. Miroshnichenko analyze UN ectivily in the field of international 
sclentifie and technological cooperation in their article "The United Nations and 
Scientifie and Technological Cooperation: Organizational Aspects." Special empha- 
sis is laid on the problems connected with the improvement of the workings of 
various UN agencies and organizations engaged in scientific and technological 
research and the incorporation of their achievements in economic development. The 
authors discuss the basic stages of UN organizctional forms of activity in science 
and technology and analyze some of the trends in their development. The positions 
of citterent groups of UN countries on the important political and economic issue 
of scientific and technological cooperation are discussed at length. In this con- 
nection, the role of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the efforts 
to strengthen UN activity in science and technology and to constantly channel this 
activity for peacetul and economic development is discussed in detail. The UN 
conference on science and technology for development, held in Vienna (Austria) in 
1979, represented an important stage in UN activity. The authors analyze the 
results of the conference in detail and cite specific examples to demonstrate the 
great contribution made by the USSR and other socialist countries. The UN efforts 
to implement Vienna conference recommendations and the initial results of this 
work are discussed at length. With a view to these results, the authors review 
prospects for the improvement of UN participation in international scientific and 
technological cooperation. 


P. Khvoynik analyzes the UNCTAD Secretariat 1981 report on trade and development 

in his article "Complex Problems of Trade and Development." This extremely inter- 
esting publication has aroused attention because of its contents and because it is 
the first of a series of annual reports and is therefore a largely experimental 
document. One of the report's salient features is its comprehensive examination 
of current economic issues and questions of long-range development. This points up 
complex analytical problems that are not present when these two matters are exam- 
ined separately. The report reveals many of the causes of various economic diffi- 
culties in the developing countries, stating that the responsibility for the situa- 
tion rests mainly with the industrialized Western powers because the level of 
economic activity in the countries with a developed market economy is still the 
single most important factor determining the export earnings of developing countries. 
‘he analysis indicates the negative consequences of the activities of transnational 
monopolies and of the protectionist policy of the developed capitalist countries. 
The author raises some questions about the methodology of the report and certain of 
its conclusions. In general, the author's evaluation of UNCTAD's latest report is 
positive. He regards it as evidence of this organization's great potential for the 
further improvement of research in the field of trade and development. 


[In his article "The Role of Islam in the Social and Political Life of the Orient," 
lL. Timofeyev says that in the search for means of overcoming the acute problems 
generated by the contradictions of capitalist economic "modernization," different 
classes and social strata in some Muslim countries resort to religion in an attempt 
te work out an original course of development based on traditional spiritual values. 








At the same time, slogans which are identical in form often have different social 
meanines, determined by the interests of various classes. What is the real nature 
of the Islamic movement? This is the focal point of modern Islamic studies. Only 
this kind of methodological approach can result in the objc tive evaluation of 
various trends in modern Islam and an understanding of the kaleidoscope of events 
occurring in the Middle East, Southeast and Southwest Asia and the African states. 
Citing numerous facts and figures, the author analyzes the political programs and 
actions ot radical Islamic groups and parties in such countries as Iran, Pakistan 


and Ceypt. He exposes the complicated and contradictory nature of the Muslim move- 
went, in which progressive anti-imperialist and antifeudal trends are often combined 
with extreme reaction, anticommuntism and anti-Sovietism. The author describes the 
ideolcwical and political attitudes of the religious Iranian leadership and the 

" amaat-i-islami" party in Pakistan, as well as the ideas and actions of radical 


sroups in Egypt, formed along the lines of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. 


The article "The Conservative O:.slaught" in THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 

(22 January 1981) by John K. Galbraith, one of the leading representatives of the 
liberal wing of bourgeois political science, is interesting because the author 
criticizes the conventional brand of conservatism that has recently gained growing 
acceptance among monetarists and has influenced government policy in the United 
States and Great Britain. 


in his discussion of postwar developments in the main capitalist countries, J. K. 
Galbraith notes that existing discrepancies and frequent contradictions have not 
kept the government, corporations and trade unions from reaching a compromise--or, 
in Galbraith's terms, a consensus--on a broad range of economic and social policies. 
this consensus is generally based on macroeconomic management and the implementation 
of certain social welfare programs to ease social tension. 


The author's investigation testifies that the conservative attacks on government 
intervention in the economy have not affected the essence of state regulation, which 
serves the selfish interests of monopolies. The massive campaign for the re- 
establishment of the primacy of the market and the restoration of free competition 
has been a cover for an attack on working class interests and the achievements of 
the working class struggle. 


Revealing the inconsistency of the monetarists' attempts to return to the era of 
free competition, J. K. Galbraith conveys doubt in the government's ability to cope 
with disorders in the capitalist economy by means of regulation. He proposes the 
combination of the free play of market forces with moderate government regulation 
in the particular spheres where the market does not work. Therefore, the tradi- 
tional consensus should not be rejected, but simply adjusted to fit new conditions. 


COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 
1982 


‘ Io 
CS: 1S16/8 














ROLE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD POLITICS REVIEWED 


Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENTYA in Russian No 5, May 82 
(signed to press ?1 Apr 82) pp 14-29 


[Article by Academician Ye. Primakov: "The Newly Independent Countries in Inter- 
national Relations"] 


[Text] "The period of the East's awakening in the present revolution will be fol- 
lowed by a period during which all of the peoples of the East will take part in 
deciding the fate of the entire world so as to stop being only an object of enrich- 
ment. The peoples of the East are awakening to the realization that they must take 
action and that each people must take part in deciding the fate of all mankind."! 
V. I. Lenin's brilliant prediction is becoming a historical reality. 


fhe transformation of the former colonies and semicolonies from primarily the object 
of history into active subjects has been accomplished mainly through structural 
changes in world economics. 2 During the present staze of historical development, 
however, changes in world politics and inte.national relations are perhaps even more 
important. In any case, the consequences of this transformation were manifested 
much more quickly and on a much greater scale in this area, particularly when the 
political liberation of the colonies and semicolonies was followed by a lengthy, 
persistent and far from finished struggle for economic independence. 


The transformation of the former colonies and semicolonies into an active subject 
of international relations occurred, first of all, when the liberated countries 
began to play an independent role in the world arena and, secondly, when their 
views began to be given increasing consideration in global decisionmaking. 


What position do the developing countries actually occupy in the present system of 
international relations, including relations between the states of the two systems-- 
socialist and capitalist? What are the main guidelines of the activity of the 
developing states and what kind of influence have they had on the world situation? 
\nswers to these questions will require an examination of specificallv political and 
methodological aspects of the position and role of the liberated countries in world 
politics. 


The Newly Independent Countries in the System of International Relations 


VY. I. Lenin stressed that "people live within a state, and each state lives within 
a system of states, which are within a system of political balance in relation to 








one another."3 History has proved that this balance can be more or less stable at 
ditterent times and more or less vulnerable to disruption. This naturally gives it 
a relative character. At the same time, it never remains static and does not pre- 


suppose the preservation of the social status quo in the world. 


The establishment of the Asian, African and Latin American countries as part of the 


worldwide system of international relations was directly connected with the develop- 
ment of capitalism. Prior to the formation of the world capitalist economy, inter- 
national relations were not of a truly global nature: [nu the political sphere they 
took the form of bilateral, and sometimes multilateral, ties, sporadically taking 
shape between states primarily in the form of military alliances, and in the eco- 


nomic sphere they took the form of irregular commerical exchanges. Neither in terms 
of their scales nor in terms of the intensity of their development could these rela- 
tions be regarded as a system evolving according to its own peculiar laws. 


The mechanism by which the worldwide system of international rela*“ions took shape 
determined the nature of the involvement of Asian, African and Latin American 
countries in this system and the specific position occupied by these countries in 
the system. This system, which was formed when the transition to capitalism 
acquired worldwide scales, consisted primarily of elements representing "vertical" 
complexes--the capitalist mother countries and their colonial and semicolonial 
possessions. The transition to the highest stage of capitalism marked the comple- 
tion of the formation of what were now imperialist colonial complexes, with natural 
changes in the relative importance of some of them. The chief characteristic of 
this system of international relations was the prevalence of conflicts between 
capitalist states and, after the late 19th and early 20th centuries, between imper- 
ialist states. The opposition to their policy by the peoples of the colonies and 
dependent countries could not compare at that time in terms of strength or scales 
to the inter-imperialist conflicts which eventually caused a world war. 


The struggle between the imperialist powers did not transcend the framework of the 
capitalist method of production. It was a distinctive feature of capitalism and of 
its imperialist stage. Nevertheless, the increasing intensity of inter-imperialist 
conflicts created an international situation which helped to break the chain of 
colonial dominion. 


fhe changes in the positior and ro’e of the Asian, African and Latin American 
countries in the international arena were not a result of the evolution of the 
global system of international relations in which they were originally included, 
but a result of its transformation and its replacement with a new system of inter- 
national relations, engendered by the creation of the world's first socialist state 
is 9 result of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. When the two 
opposing social systems began to interact, the structure of a new system of inter- 
nation el relations began to be influenced by the dominant methods of production in 
these two social svstems and the peculiarities of their sociopolitical structure. 
\itiough che colonies and semicolonies remained within the capitalist part of the 
ystem ot international relations tor a iong time, the colonial ties that bound 
these countries to the mother countries began to lose their political strength after 
triumph of Great October. The development of the national liberation movement 
reached a turning point. As a result of the constantly changing balance of power 
between the capitalist and socialist worlds, the transformation of the newly 














lependent countries trom objects to subjects of international relations began, in 

cordance with Lenin's well-known definition.4 This process correiated with the 
chaning balance otf power between the two systems in the world arena. It is obvi- 
ously important to stress that the change in the halance of power passed through 
several stages, during each of which the weight of political, economic, military 
and other factors diftered.? 


The original balance between the two systems, which took shape after the victory of 
the October Revolution in Russia, was essentially based only on the political fac- 
tor. At that time, socialism's only serious political advantages over capitalism 
stemmed from its progressive method of production and new order. In all other 
aspects, both in terms of basic economic indicators and in terms of the quantity 
and quality of weapons, the capitalist world far surpassed the first socialist 
state. Nevertheless, imperialism was unable to liquidate the Soviet regime in 
Russia, although it attempted direct military intervention against the worker and 
peasant state. 


The political factor lying at the basis of the original balance between socialism 
and capitalism was reflected in an entire series of processes and phenomena. It 
was reflected in the unprecedented surge of revolutionary enthusiasm in Russia and 
the internal strength of the new regime, which mobilized and utilized the colossal 
historical resources and capabilities of the Russian people as no other order had 
been able to do. Inter-imperialist conflicts played a special role at this time, 
making it difficult for the imperialist powers to unite their efforts in the 
Struggle against the new socialist state. 


The political balance between socialism and capitalism was enough to have a posi- 
tive effect on the ability of colonies and semicolonies to fight for their libera- 
tion. Soviet Russia established fundamenta’ly new and equal relations with the 
countries of the East. Capitalism began to lose strength--even if this was not yet 
completely apparent--and entered the stage of general crisis. 


fhe changing balance of power between socialism and capitalism entered a new stage 
atter World War II and the creation of the world socialist system. Revolutionary 
advances in the countries of Eastern Europe resulted in the formation of the world 
socialist community. The common class interests of laborers in the fraternal 
countries acquired an intergovernmental basis. The socialist states displayed a 
high degree of unity and solidarity by uniting in the Warsaw Pact Organization and 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). This was accompanied by the 
expansion of the economic and geographic basis on which socialism's advantages could 
be displayed more fully, particularly in the growth rate of productive forces. 


Evidently, from that time on the balance of power between the two systems began to 
be based on military and economic factors, and not just political ones. This made 
the balance more stable and simultaneously afforded extensive possibilities for a 
nore active role for the "peripheral" countries in the international arena. The 

st favorable conditions for the triumph of the national liberation struggle were 
established. As a result, impertalism'’s colonial system quickly disintegrated and 
several young sovereign states rose out of its ruins. 


The ec 9) the colonial system also had a significant effect on the balance of 
power berweren ie socialist and capitalist worlds. After the colonial and 











dependent countries acquired state sovereignty, they ceased to be imperialism's 
reserve. This applies to the former colonies and semicolonies which immediately 
embarked on the construction of socialism or adopted a socialist orientation and 
to the ones where the development of capitalism as the leading economic structure 
began or continued after the establishment of political independence. 


In reference to the first group of countries this conclusion is absolutely self- 
evident, but in reference to the second it requires some clarification. It would 
seem that the development of capitalism ir the former colonies and semicolonies 
would strengthen the capitalist world by expanding its geographic framework. But 
this would only have happened if the conflicts between the young states taking the 
capitalist course and the imperialist states did not transcend the framework of the 
usual or "traditional" conflicts between various capitalist countries or groups of 
countries. What actually happened was that the development cf several former 
colonial and semicolonial countries according to capitalist patterns did not divest 
their policy of its anti-imperialist purpose, or at least its anti-imperialist 
tendencies. The existence of these tendencies in India's policy is a characteris- 


tic example. 


The establishment of the military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United 
States, which Washington had to acknowledge in the 1970's, was particularly impor- 
tant with regard to the entire system of international relations and, of course, 
with regard to the changing position of the developing countries within this 
system. There was a real opportunity to transfer to a policy of international 
detente and establish the principles of peaceful coexistence by states of the 

two socioeconomic systems as the main guideline for world affairs in general. 


For the newly independent countries this was of fundamental significance because it 
‘ave them much more opportunity, in comparison to the period of fierce bloc con- 
frontation, to participate in world affairs, in the resolution of global problems 
ind in deciding the fate of the world. International detente also set up tangible 
obstacles to block the forces that had tried to take advantage of the situation of 
eneral tension to export counterrevolution to the liberated countries. Finally, 
detente also promoted tendencies and processes aiding in the growth of the economic 
potential of the developing countries, the improvement of their position in the 
‘yetem of world economic ties and, as a result, the augmentation of their role in 
international relations. 


Experience has proved without a doubt that peaceful coexistence does not impede the 
course of social processes in any way whatsoever because the development of society, 
prest opposing cardinal socioeconomic and political changes, is historically 


oom < } 
Ggetermined. 


formation o! the socialist community of states after World War II and the col- 


lapse of the colonial and semicolonial regimes led to extremely important structural 
inves » the system of international relations that benefited the liberated 
intries The former colonies and semicolonies established broader and stronger 


ties with the socialist states and this was reflected in various spheres of inter- 

‘ional life. There were changes in the relations between the developed capital- 
ist countries and their former colonial and semicolonial possessions that had 
embarked on independent governmental development. The Liberated countries formed a 
new subsystem in the structure of international relations. 











ldwide strupgle between soctalism and capitalism has always affected all 
ut tt international Life. The main contlict of our era--the conflict between 
ialism and capitalism--ultimately determines the basic processes occurring in the 


hewly independent countries. 


[here was absolutely no validity to the ideas and concepts of the ultra-leftist 
theorists who asserted that the focal point of world conflicts would move after 
world War II to the sphere of relations between imperialism and the oppressed 
peoples of Asta, Africa and Latin America, as well as to the relations between 
imperialist states. Obviously, it is true that conflicts between imperialism and 
national Liberation torces and conflicts within the imperialist camp became more 
intense and pervasive after World War II, but this certainly provides no grounds 
for the conclusion that the focal point of worid conflicts during the era of the 
global transition from capitalism to socialism would supposedly have no connection 
with the existence and struggle of the world socialist system--the main achievement 
of the international working class. In the first place, this assertion completely 
ignores the fact that the growth of the national liberation movements and their 
uccesstul anti-imperialist struggle would be simply inconceivable without the 
overall change in the balance of power between the two opposing sociopolitical sys- 
tems in favor of socialism and to the detriment of capitalism, or without the 
lirect and indirect support of these national liberation movements by the socialist 
states. Secondly, this is a onesided interpretation of the sicuation in the capi- 
talist world. Of ccurse, inter-imperialist conflicts are still a significant factor: 
Their exacerbation, at the basis of which lies the law of uneven development under 
capitalism, has created clashes between capitalist countries. The international 
relations within the capitalist part of the system, however, are affected by more 
ian just this disuniting tendency toward conflict; they are also affected by a 
second tendency--the tendency to unite al! of the resources and potential of the 
ipitalist countries, and primarily for a struggle against the socialist world. 
‘The growing general crisis of capitalism has been accompanied by changes in imper- 
ialism's strategic priorities in the world arena. The policy of imperialism has 
veen determined more and more by the class goals of a common struggle against the 
socialist world, national liberation revolutions and the workers movement . "© 


Disregard for the class features of the main conflict of our era led Mao Zedong and 
his tollowers to an anti-Marxist interpretation of the structure of international 
lations. According to this interpretation, one component supposedly consists of 
the "two superpowers"--The USSR and United States, the second consists of all other 
leveloped countries (both socialist and capitalist) and the third consists of all 
developing countries (including some socialist states). This concept differs little 
r not at all from the theories and models proposed by many bourgeois researchers. 
‘+, their models of various systems of international relations also ignore 
1% socioeconomic characteristics of the states interacting in the world arena. 
inplies completely to the Western theories about the "bipolar" and "multi- 
r’ worlds. The authors of these theories used the existence (including various 
of controntation and cooperat ion) of two economically and militarily strong 
wers--the Soviet Union and the United States--as grounds for declaring that the 
world was bipolar, and strictly in terms of national governments. Furthermore, the 


’ ) 


ipo | irityv”’ nN the it Ve! t)i WO ernment | | second iry and only reflec ts the division 


of today's world into two opposing sociopolitical systems. 








enon of polycentrism is presented in much the same way. [It is true that 
thy, rosence of various "power centers" was much more apparent during the late 
160)" | the 1970's than before in the capitalist subsystem of international 
re tions. This was one of the effects of the law of uneven development under 
whereas the U.S. industrial product in 1950 was more than twice as 
mbined products of Western Europe and Japan, by the beginning of 
''.S. share of capitalist industrial production had fallen to 28.8 
ire of Western Europe and Japan had risen to 47.1 percent.? The 
potential of the latter was not, however, accompanied by the loss 
dominant position in the military-political sphere, which 
n the leader in the capitalist subsystem of international rela- 
its approaches to fundamental issues on the other capital- 





tendency toward polycentrism in the capitalist world creates 
for the developing countries to take political action in 
: ‘tional interests. This conclusion is also corroborated by 
‘ney was reflected in the creation of "mini-centers of power 
|, something like "sub-imperialist centers." Many of these 
into support points of imperialist policy but retained their 


loped capitalist states. 


. olitical center" in the system of international relations 
1960's and 1970's in the West in connection with the clearly 
in China's foreign policy. The formation of the "Chinese center" 
result of the supposedly universal law of polycentrism. The 
t China from the general line of the socialist community was not 
the natural development cf the world socialist system, however, 
tive factor--the policy of the Beijing leadership which was incon- 
© objective requirements of the development of the world socialist 
world revolutionary process. In China there was an obvious contra- 
en objective processes stemming from public ownership of the means of 
d the voluntaristic, adventuristic and hegemonistic line of the 
adership. This contradiction could have led to the degeneration of the 
| structure or to the disintegration of the line which did not agree 
with the objective needs of socialist development in China. 


i tuite understandable that the PRC's global strategy and its alliance with 
rialism arc contrary to the fundamental interests of the struggle against 
rialism and therefore weaken the position of the newly independent countries. 


Besides this, Beijing's line is reinforcing the tendency toward the proliferation 
onflict in the East. 
Newly Independent Countries in the Context of Relations Between the Two Systems 


hy which the countries that freed themselves from colonial and semi- 


nial dependence became an active subject of international relations took place 
in an atmosphere of complicated relations between th- two sociopolitical systems in 
international arena. ‘The liberated states were certainly not isolated from 
interrelations. On the one hand, the conflicts--and also the development of 
eration in some areas after the process of detente began--between states of the 


11 














t wi orld systems were directly and indirectly connected with the role and place of 
i newly independent countries in the international arena. On the other hand, 
ise countries have also taken a more active stand on several cardinal issues in 

recent years and have been able to influence relations between states of the two 

‘ystems, which has been particularly apparent in the growing significance of the 

movement for non-alignment in world politics. As a result, the position of the 

developing states in the system of international relations has been affected by 
contradictory processes: Some aspects of relations between states of the two sys- 
tems reinforce the position of the developing countries; others, which are the 
result of imperialism's aggressive foreign policy, can have a negative effect on 
their position. [It seems that two destructive processes have the most negative 
effect on their position--the tirst is the unprecedented arms race which has been 
instigated by American imperialists and has created the danger of thermonuclear 
war, and the second is the group of intergovernmental regional conflicts which can 
yrow into global armed confrontations. 


At the turn of the decade the United States began to undermine international 
detente. [It escalated the arms race. The tendency toward militarization has 


become distinct in U.S. policy. All of this has also affected Washington's approach 
to contlicts, wh ch is governed by the military-political views of the most reac- 
tionary circles in the nation and otten serve as a direct means of expanding American 


» 


military presence in the conflict zone. 


We could say that Washington has completely "recovered" from the "Vietnam syndrome” 

under the Reagan Administration. The tollowing concepts have “acquired the rights 
f citizenship" in the U.S. capital: "Containment" on the global level is not 
mnough to sateguard U.S. national interests; the range of instruments that might 

be used by the United States must include "limited nuclear war"; it will be neces- 
ary to create the potential to fight two or two and a half wars simultaneously, 


" . ' , ; ’ - . " ~ , , . . . : 2 
icluding "total war" in the Near and Middie East (this is the military doctrine 
innounced by Secretary o!f Detense C. Weinberger). 


e Reagan Administration counted on more intense confrontation with the Soviet 
nion simultaneously on the global and the regional levels. The tougher American 
ilso reflected the desire of the country's most reactionary circles to stop 

| 


anges that were undesirable tor Washington in the sociopolitical development of 


-' 


‘ 


the Asian, African and Latin American countries by moving away from the process of 


he U.S. line of creating anti-Soviet coalitions as a supplement to NATO was also 
veloped further. The policy of rapprochement with China, particularly by means 
the cancellation of restrictions on sales of American weapons to this country, 
upted a special place in this plan. Increasingly overt moves have been made for 
, and several American 
creation of an anti-Soviet "triangle" consist- 
ot the United States, Japan and China. 


, 


i purpose ot using Japan in confrontation with the USSR 


iticians have openly proposed the 


. . . ‘ . * . ° ‘ _ es , ‘ . . ’ 
‘ normalization of Washington s relations with pbeljying, which began in Nixon's 


time and was continued by subseque nt idministrations, was oObv iously supposed to 
serve American military-political interests. [t was no incidence that this gave 
the United States a chance to strengthen i military preseice in Asia. 











(he Reagan Administration escalated the arms race, including the production of 
"cruise missiles" and the improvement of all 
nuclear weapon delivery systems. Special attention began to be paid to conventional 
weapons for the purpose of equipping the forces intended for rapid deployment in 
various conflict situations. At the same time, U.S. officials began to discuss a 
new version of the strategy of "flexible response" with which the Pentagon had 
armed itself in the beginning of the 1960's. It presupposed, as is well known, 
multiple=level confrontation with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization--from 
negotiations from a “position of strength" to the approach to the "critical thresh- 
old,” beyond which thermonuclear world war lay. It would probably be wrong, how- 
ever, to assume that the present discussion proposes a simple return to the earlier 
doctrine. In the beginning of the 1960's there was no international detente as 
such, and the strategic parity between the Soviet Union and United States was just 
taking shape. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, or in the last years of Carter's 
term in office and the first years of the Reagan Administration, the United States 
returned to a policy of military-political intervention in regional conflicts, the 
reintorcement of military presence in various parts of the world, accompanied by a 
departure trom the policy of detente on the global level, and attempts to disrupt 
the military-strategic balance with the Soviet Union. This caused the dangers 
inherent in American foreign policy to grow immeasurably. Sufficient proof of this 

in be found just in the statements of American strategists about the alleged pos- 
sibility of winning a "Limited" nuclear war. 


neutron and chemical weapons and 


American Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger called the new American strategy a 
strategy of “direct confrontation" with the USSR, stressing that it should be 
implemented simultaneously on the global and regional scales. This strategy, which 
ime to light during the new round of the arms race and the new stage of relations 
with the USSR, places special emphasis on more active American policy in various 
parts of the world. The United States is assigning priority to permanent military 


presence in certain zones and the creation of the necessary local conditions for 
the rapid deployment of American military contingents. 


The connection between the modification of American military strategy and the evo- 
lution of the attitude toward international conflicts has been clearly illustrated 
in Washington's approach to the Near East and Persian Gulf zone. It has declared 
this entire region a "third strategic zone,"' with Europe and the Pacific represent- 
ing the other two. In the expectation of open intervention, the United States 
announced its plan to create special intervention forces in this zone, consisting 
ee army divisions, four air regiments with 72 planes in each, two carrier 
forces and 50,000 Marines.® In the beginning of the 1980's Washington tried to 
icgquire bases in Oman, Somalia, Kenya and Egypt for the local deployment of these 


rces and to provide the U.S. Navy with the necessary facilities. There was an 
increase in American military aid not only to Israel, but also to several conserva- 


\rab regimes. In connection with the Camp David bargain, the United States 

‘ned an opportunity for permanent military presence in this region, with 

ts arme’ services serving as the backbone of the so-called "multinational force" 
that was nposed to patrol the Egyptian-Israeli border in Sinai. 


w military emphasis also appeared in U.S. policy on the settlement of the 


Middle East conflict. Israel's rapprochement with conservative Arab regimes became 
th iin goal. For this purpose, American politicians resolved to create a situa- 
tion j © Middle East that would be "neither full-scale war nor a general peace." 


13 











retore, even U.S. strategic concepts, which are based on the arms race, are 
mtributing to the artiticial exacerbation of intergovernmental regional] conflicts. 
wre is also a reciprocal connection: The conflict situations, which are often 


stimulated or even created by the United States on the regional level, escalate the 


fhe real prospect of the dangerous spread of nuclear weapons obviously deserves 
special consideration in this connection. Under these conditions, the struggle for 
the immediate institution of the strictest measures on the national and inter- 
national levels to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, heighten its 
impact and broaden the group of its signatories to the maximum has become even more 
important. Now that nuclear power engineering is being developed so intensely, 
there is an urgent need tor che system of control envisaged in this treaty to pre- 
vent tissionable materials from being moved out of the civilian sphere to the sphere 
of nuclear arms production. Countries capable of producing nuclear weapons in 
secret, such as Israel, which refused to have its reactors inspected by the IAEA, ? 
are taking advantage of the absence of the necessary control. The United States is 
indirectly encouraging this stand by exempting Israel (and, in the beginning of the 
1980's, Pakistan) trom the U.S. laws prohibiting the offer of aid to countries which 
refuse to ahide by the internaticnal regulations preventing the spread of nuclear 
Weapons. 


As tor the USSR, it has always realized the need for equitable political settlements 
of international conflicts. The Soviet Union's categorical opposition to the 

export of revolution was reaffirmed at the 26th CPSU Congress. V. 1. Lenin repeat- 
edly stressed that a revolution cannot be victorious in any country without the 
proper internal conditions./9 The Soviet Union is also resolutely opposed to the 
export of counterrevolution, believing that all people have the right to decide 
their own fate, the right of self-determination, and that external forces must not 
interfere in this process. 


he Soviet Union is known to support the limitation, and later the cessation, of 
the arms race between the USSR and United States and between the Warsaw Pact and 
NATO countries. In other words, it ts primarily in favor of the stabilization of 

i1irs on the global level. There is no question that regional initiatives can 


i} so serve the cause of pe ace ind security. 


i institution of confidence-building measures in Asia, especially the Far East, 

; L. I. Brezhnev said in the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee 
to the 26th party congress, could be an important step in this direction. These 
measures can be instituted collectively by all interested sides (in the form of, 
for example, a convention on mutual non-aggression and the refusal to use force in 

lations between the Asian and Pacific states) and on the bilateral basis. 


e measures proposed by the Soviet Union could include action to reinforce the 
ility of the military-political situation, to reduce and then eliminate mili- 
iry confrontation between various states and to alleviate suspicions about their 


nilitarv activity. 


« confidence-building measures could take in specific concerted actions (not only 
viet-American, of course, although they could play an extremely important role) 











i) ouch areas as the prevention of the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear 
wetpons; the non=proliferation of nuclear weapons; the prevention of armed con- 
flicts; the renunciation of attempts at the unilateral "management" of conflict 
situations in favor of coordinated actions for their regulation; the institution of 
an entire group of procedures for the advance announcement of combat maneuvers, 
training exercises and troop movements, the exchange of military observers and 
delegations and the reduction of the scales of maneuvers and exercises; agreements 
to turn some regions--already or potentially dangerous ones--into zones of peace, 
etc. 


All of this would certainly be promoted by the normalization of relations between 
the three countries of Indochina and the five ASEAN countries. It could be rein- 
forced with bilateral agreements on the peaceful coexistence of the countries of 
Indochina with the PRC and a system of international safeguards with the participa- 
tion of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. This would not exclude 
the possibility of a general treaty on peace and stability in this region. 


An agreement on the neutralization of several regions where armed forces and arms 
are being built up would be of great significance. Some of these regions are the 
Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean zones. 


As we know, Soviet-American talks on the limitation and subsequent reduction of 
military activity in the Indian Ocean were conducted in 1977-1978. Unfortunately, 
it was precisely at the time when real progress in these talks was apparent, in 
February 1978, that the U.S. Government refused to continue them and began the 
large-scale buildup of its military presence and military activity in the Indian 
Ocean. 


As tor the Persian Gulf zone, the measures proposed by L. I. Brezhnev in his speech 
in New Delhi on 10 December 1980 include the following mutual obligations: 


Not to establish foreign military bases in the Persian Gulf or on adjacent islands; 
not to deploy nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction there; 


Not to use force or threaten the use of force against Persian Gulf countries and 


not to interfere in their internal affairs; 
fo respect the non-aligned status chosen by Persian Gulf states; not to involve 
them in military groups with nuclear powers among their members; 


fo respect the sovereign right of states in this region to their own natural 


resources, 


Not to pose any dangers or threats to normal commercial exchange and the use of tie 


shipping lanes connecting the states of this region with other countries.!1 The 
Soviet Union proposed that this kind of agreement be concluded not only on the 

coviet-Amertean level, but also with the full participation of the states of this 
revion, China, Japan, the Western European countries and all states displaying an 


interest in this. 


[t is known that the Soviet Union made concessions to the West by agreeing to 
discuss all of these measures along with questions connected with Afghanistan. 


15 








Fven this constructive line, however, did not evoke a positive response from the 
western powers, 


As the Soviet side has repeatedly stressed, the question of military detente in the 
Mediterranean could also be discussed. This would envisage the coordinated reduc- 
tion of armed forces, the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons, the refusal 
to deploy nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean non-nuclear countries and the adop- 
tion of commitments by the nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against any 
Mediterranean country that has not permitted the emplacement of such weapons within 
its territory. 


fhe mutual Limitation of naval actions by the USSR and United States, proposed by 

L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the 17th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions, the exten- 
sion of confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans, particularly the 
regions of the most lively shipping, and, in general, all signs of maximum restraint 
on the part of both opposing blocs of states in their military activity could have 

a considerable positive effect on the world situation as a whole, including the 
position of the liberated countries. 


Of course, the successful implementation of these measures, or even of some of 
them, would tend to stabilize the situation in various parts of the world. 


lt is clear that the policy line of the USSR and its political and diplomatic 
activity are of great significance for the liberated countries. Whereas imperial- 
ism's line is impeding their establishment as an active factor in the development of 
international relations, the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist count- 
ries has created and is creating the fundamental conditions required for a more 
active role by the liberated states in the international arena. 


Non-Alignment--A Policy of Positive Influence in International Relations 


The role of the Liberated countries in international relations has been most clearly 
reflected in the policy of non-alignment pursued by the overwhelming majority of 
these countries. The history of its origins and development has been discussed in 
sufficient detail in works by Soviet and foreign authors. Here we will simply try 
to examine the essence of this phenomenon and its role and place in contemporary 
international relations, as well as some of the contradictory aspects of the actual 
meaning vith which the policy of non-alignment has been invested by various states 
belonging to this movement. 


fhe former colonial and semicolonial countries entered a world which was divided 
not only into opposite socioeconomic systems but also into opposing military blocs-- 


NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Whereas the sociopolitical sphere afforded the young 
tates an opportunity to advance toward socialism without going through a capitalist 
tage (during the course of an either socialist or national democratic revolution), 


is did not mean their automatic inclusion in the Warsaw Pact. In exactly the same 
way, when liberated countries chose the capitalist path of development, it did not 
nean that they had consented to participate in NATO or in military alliances related 
to this bloc, such as SEATO and CENTO. 


In this complex situation the developing countries began to seek their own path 
fer the purpose of making a constructive contribution to international affairs, 


lo 








creating a favorable external atmosphere for the reinforcement and defense of the 
national sovereignty they had won after an arduous struggle, developing their 
productive forees, raising the standard of living and guaranteeing their progress. 
This is how the policy of non-alignment was born. What are its basic features? 


Above all, struggle for the prevention of war, against the power tactics used by 
imperialist states and for a solid and just peace objectively became the main pur- 
pose of the movement for non-alignment at the time of its birth. This was not an 
abstract, humanitarian type of goal. For the liberated countries it was dictated 
by their immediate vital interests. 


The former colonies and semicolonies entered a world in which qualitatively new 
weapons of mass destruction had already been developed and could endanger the very 
existence of civilization. Another facet of the international situation in which 
the liberated countries found themselves was their tendency to serve as the object 
of the military-strategic lust of imperialism even when there is no full-scale war 
but there is tension and military confrontation. 


The implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence, which envisage, in 
particular, the coordinated efforts of states of both systems to solve global 
problems, became necessary to the Asian, African and Latin American countries pri- 
marily as a way of solving their socioeconomic problems. Within this context, the 
question of freeing the funds spent by the great powers on military needs, with 
the prospect of using part of them for the economic development of the former 
colonies and semicolonies, acquired colossal importance, |2 It is no coincidence 
that the developing countries associate arms Limitation with the hope of acquiring 
more financial, economic, scientific and technical outside assistance. Disarmament 
would not only make tremendous sums available, but would also considerably augment 
civilian scientific and technical potential by rechanneling military research and 
development into peaceful areas. 


The prospect of curbing and then stopping the arms race is also extremely important 
to the Liberated countries because it could stop all of the "mini-races" that are 
keeping colossal sums from being invested in the economy. As the weaker side in 
international division of labor, the developing countries bear a disproportionately 
large share of the burden of worldwide military expenditures. j%etween 1965 and 
1980, or precisely at the time when the liberated countries began to play a more 
noticeable and more active role in international affairs, their share of world 
arms expenditures rose, according to SIPRI data, from 6.3 percent!3 to 16 percent. 
Furthermore, in the 1970's the military expenditures of the Asian, African and 


14 


Latin American countries grew more quickly than their GNP. The figures for some 
regions are particularly amazing. In 1977 per capita military expenditures in the 
Middle Fast were 250 dollars, which is equivalent to the indicator for the developed 


, , , 5 
lpitaitsl councries.! ? 


lluve amounts of curreney, which could be invested in the economy or the purchase of 
the advanced technology that is so necessary to the developing countries, are being 
spent unproductively on weapons. According to UNCTAD calculations, the liberated 
countries were spending 9 billion dollars a year on the acquisition of patents and 
licenses at the end of the 1970's. At the same time, they were spending more than 
60 billion dollars a year on military preparations, 16 or a sum seven times as great 


17 











les cost of imported technology. Furthermore, the creation of a national mili- 
tary indust*y in the developing countries has had a negligible effect on their 
ientific, technical and economic progress in general. 


(this refutes the currently popular "theory" that the military industry can suppos- 
edly stimulate many of the civilian projects that are necessary to the developing 


countries, 


Another tacet of the problem is the effect of the arms race on the shortage of 
skilled personnel in the developing countries. In many cases, the personnel with 
the best training have been moved from the civilian sphere to the military industry, 
and at a time of an acute shortage of qualified personnel. In view of the fact that 
the total number of persons employed in the production sphere is only a few times 
wreater than the number of armed forces (for example, there were slightly more than 
1.5 million workers employed in industry and construction in Turkey at the end of 
the 1970's, while the Turkish Army numbered 500,000) ,17 this kind of diversion of 
human resources has a pernicious effect on economic growth rates. 


Of course, some of the military expenditures of the Liberated countries are valid. 
ln many cases they are dictated by a real threat to the security of these countries. 
lt should simply be borne in mind that the arms race on the global level is, on the 
one hand, objectively helping to strengthen the threat posed by imperialist circles 
ind their actual allies and, on the other, providing much of the inspiration for the 
“mini-races" in the developing world, which are being conducted for reasons having 
nothing to do with the security interests of the Liberated countries. 


lhe establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence as the norm in inter- 
national Life could make it easier for the liberated countries to assume their new 
role in world economic ties. Problems in the development of the economic, scien- 
tific and technical potential of the liberated countries and in the transfer of 
technological experience to them are relegated to a position of secondary importance 
in a cold war atmosphere. 1/8 The overall improvement of the international climate, 
on the other hand, promotes the widespread discussion of objectively necessary 
changes in the conditions of trade, economic, scientific and technical relations 
tween the former colonies and the mother countries. 


in 1973-1974 the developing countries challenged the existing system of trade and 
economic relations. At the fourth meeting of the heads of state and government of 
the non-aligned countries in Algeria in September 1973, a resolution on a new inter- 
national economic order was adopted. Within a month, OPEC proved for the first 
time that the developing countries, which control most of the major types of raw 
materials, possess a strong means of exerting economic pressure on the developed 
ipitalist states. It was precisely under the conditions of detente that the UN 
General Assembly adopted the famous fundamental documents--the "Declaration" and 
"Proyvram of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order," 
"Charter of Economic Rights and Obligations of States" and "Development and 
‘rnational Economic Cooperation"--at its sixth and seventh special sessions and 
its 29th regular session. They laid the foundations for a new system of trade, 
economic, scientitic and technical ties between developed and developing states. 


[The deterioration of international affairs at the end of the 1970's, caused by 
Washington's aggressive foreign policy line, soon affected the attitude of the 


18 











United States and some other developed capitalist states toward the problem of eco- 
nomic ties with the developing countries. During the course of the talks on the 
reorzanization of world economic ties, the developed capitalist countries took a 
noticeably tougher stand. It was already completely obvious at the Fifth UNCTAD 
Session in Manila, which was marked by the unconcealed opposition of the industri- 
ally developed capitalist countries to the adoption of resolutions which would 
advance the reorganization of international economic relations on a fair and demo- 
cratic basis. 


This was also the atmosphere of the 1lth special session of the UN General Assembly 
on economic problems, convened at the initiative of the developing countries. The 
work of the summer 1979 Vienna session of the UN Conference on Science, Technology 
and Development (UNCSTAD) also aroused some public disillusionment. The October 
1981 meeting of the heads of state and foreign ministers of 14 developing and 8 
developed capitalist states in Cancun, where the reorganization of the rules of 
international economic exchange was discussed, also ended unproductively as a result 
of the obstructionist behavior of the United States. 


The struggle at the turn of the decade to prevent a new cold war and continue 
detente was especially important to the developing countries. The dialectical 
interconnection and interdependence of the objectives of the struggle for peace 
and international security and the struggle for the national and social liberation 
of peoples was clearer than ever before under the conditions of that time. 


In their efforts to attain these objectives, the liberated countries could not and 
did not preach amorphous pacifism--apparently, this is another important character- 
istic of their policy of non-alignment. The movement for non-alignment as a whole 
has always been aimed (of course, other tendencies have also been apparent, but they 
have not been dominant) not at amorphous pacifism but at the implementation of the 
positive and constructive principles of peaceful coexistence by states. This aim 

is also an objective reflection of the growing group of tasks facing the former 
colonies and semicolonies and connected with the struggle for economic independence, 
and no longer just with the survival and reinforcement of political sovereignty. 


It is important to stress something else--from the very beginning the movement for 
non-alignment could not be neutral by virtue of the very nature of the problems 
facing most of the states in the movement, for which their material and political 
postition in the world is a vitally important factor of internal development. It 
never did become neutral, although some tendencies toward neutralism have always 
been present in the movement. 


From the very becinning non-alignmenc has been a policy of active struggle against 
Porees encroaching upon the national interests of the liberaced countries--the arms 
race, the preparations for global war, the series of local military operations aimed 
at depriving the liberated countries of their independence and the preservation of 
the international system of economic relations that leads to the exploitation of 

the developing world. Furthermore, the specific alignment of forces in the world 
‘bjectively made the movement for non-alignment anti-imperialist from the very 
beginning. When the non-aligned states faced the real situation, they gave their 
polieyv, worked out on an individual and collective basis, an obviously anti- 
imperialist character. 


19 








Of course, not all of the states in the movement have occupied the same anti- 
imperialist stand. There are states which have consistently fought against all 

igns ot imperialist aggression and there are countries which vacillate and take 
contradictory positions. Some developing countries have been guided by totally 
ditferent considerations, particularly those which can be eloquently summed up in 
the curse: "A plague on both your houses." This kind of attitude gives birth to 
theories of "equidistance” from the USSR and the United States and the policy of 
transforming the movement for non-alignment into some kind of "third power" equally 
opposed to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 


Sometimes “equidistance" is justified by the liberated countries’ desire for self- 
sufficiency and an independent role in international affairs. This self-sufficiency, 
however, does not actually come about as a result of equal "distance" from the 
socialist and capitalist worlds. It is no secret that the two worlds have taken 
opposite approaches to the movement for non-alignment. Whereas the Sovict Union and 
the other socialist countries have treated this movement as in extremely positive 
and completely independent factor in international life, the United States and its 
allies have viewed it as an essentially negative phenomenon. This was most fully 
reflected in the descrip*ion given to the policy of non-participation in military 
blocs in the 1950's by then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. He called this 
policy "amoral."" Later, when the movement acquired more prestige, potential and 
influence in international affairs, the leaders of the imperialist states refrained 
from making public statements of this kind. Nevertheless, the sharply negative 
attitude of imperialist reactionary forces toward the policy of non-alignment, 
toward the states in this movement and, in general, toward the prospect of a 

wreater role for the liberated countries in world politics has repeatedly been 
confirmed by many Western propaganda and political moves. 


lt is important to stress something else: "Equidistance" conflicts with the objec- , 
tive interest of the liberated countries in an alliance with other anti-imperialist 

forces and, of course, with the leaders among these forces--the states of the social- 

ist community. 


Understandably, the question of the natural allies and enemies of the movement was 
intluenced by the change in its membership. This occurred when a number of members 
(Vietnam, Cuba and others) chose the path of socialist development and others 
embarked on a socialist orientation. These countries are the main targets of the 
subversive activity of imperialist and reactionary forces in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, and their active participation in the movement has certainly strengthened 
its anti-imperialist potential. 


At the same time, processes of differentiation and diversification have become more 
pronounced in the developing world and so-called "sub-imperialist centers” have 
prung up. This has also been reflected in the birth of some antidemocratic ten- 
encies in the movement. They have not, however, prevailed over its primarily 

ti~imperialist purpose. Anti-imperialism could be called the past and present 
reed of this movement. 


By means of struggle against imperialism and colonialism and against war and 
aggression, the former colonies and semicolonies have won polit*cal freedom and 
the recognition of their place in world politics and have realized that they are 











an active and important factor of world development. The key to the further augmen- 


tation of the role of these countries in international relations and in the resolu- 
tion of major problems in their internal development lies in the fidelity of the 
liberated states to the principles on which the movement for non-alignment is 
founded. 

FOOTNOTES 


1. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniv" [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, 
p 328. 


2. Ye. Primakov, "The Place of the Liberated Countries in the World Economy," 
MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENTYA, No 3, 1982. 


3. V.I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 42, p 39. 
4. Ibid., vol 39, p 327. 


The primary elements of the political factor are the breadth of the social base 
and the internal stability of various regimes, the ability of states to make 
effective use of human and economic resources (the so-called organizational 
ability of the state), real opportunities to make decisions, the morale of the 
population and its capacity for mobilization, the degree to which state policy 
is supported by the public and the nature of this support. The political fac- 
tor also includes the resolution of ally problems on the governmental level and 
through the support given the policy of the state or group of states by broad 
segments of the world public. Other elements of the political factor are the 
ideological considerations connected with the attitudes of various population 
groups toward state policy, which influence the capabilities of the political 
system, and the power to mobilize support for this policy. The political fac- 
tor is not only reflected directly, but also through its influence in the eco- 
nomic and military spheres, where it largely determines the speed of economic 
and military construction and the morale of the army and rear. 


Fa) 
. 


The economic factor of the balance of forces also operates on many levels. In 
particular, it largely determines the scales and content of the state's military 
potential. At the same time, the economic level and economic poteitial of a 
country have a direct effect on its role in world politics and its influence in 
international events. For example, the significance of Japan and the FRG in 
international affairs rose sharply in the 1960's and 1970's precisely as a 
result of their growing economic potential and capabilities. 


Tho correlation o: forces is reflected most directly and most "measurably" in 
the military factor. Over the long range, however, even technological break- 
throughs in the military sphere cannot have a significant, prolonged effect on 
the balance of forces without the proper economic or political bases. 


The influe.. of the military factor is now being limited by the existence of 
the dynamic balance (or parity) of the military-strategic capabilities of the 
United States and USSR and of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as by the 


21 











destructive potential of nuclear weapons, which has necessitated the reconsid- 
eration of goals and means in the area of international relations. 


'Mezhdunarodnoye soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy" [Inter- 
national Conference of Communist and Workers Parties], Moscow, 1969, p 45. 


"Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1979," vol II, N.Y., 1980, pp 3, 5,7. 
NEWSWEEK, 8 June 1981, p 15. 


Besides this, Israel completely ignored the results of an IAEA inspection of a 
reactor located near the capital of Iraq, which proved that the reactor was 
being used for peaceful purposes, and launched an air raid on it in 1981. 


See, for example, V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 36, pp 457, 531. 


L. [. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" {Following in Lenin's Footsteps], vol 8, 
Moscow, 1981, p 557. 


According to the data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), world expenditures on weapons in 1980 reached 500 billion dollars and 
could rise to 820 billion dollars a year by 2000 if they continue to grow at 
the present rate. See "World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1981" 
(referred to hereafter as "SIPRI"), Stockholm, 1981, pp 147, 150. 


"SIPRI 1980," p XVIII. 

"SIPRI 1981," p XIX. 

"SIPRI 1979," pp 1-2. 

Calculated according to: '"SIPRI 1981," pp i56-158. 


Calculated according to: "The Middle East Yearbook," London, 1979; "Yearbook 
of Labor Statistics," Geneva, 1980. 


Everyone knows that science and technology play the key role in the accelera- 
tion of economic and sociocultural development. Everyone also knows that the 
level of scientific and technical potential is extremely low in the overwhelm- 
ing majority of Asian, African and Latin American countries. Although these 
countries are inhabited by 70 percent of the world population, they accounted 
for only 4 percent of world expenditures on science and technology and 2 per- 
cent of world scientific and technical potential in che mid-1970's. The ratio 
of per capita research and experimental design in the developed capitalist 
countries to the same indicator in the developing countries was 140:1 during 
that period (calculated according to: "UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1980," 
Paris, 1980). [It is obvious that the developing countries are not capable of 
closing this gap on their own. Access to the scientific and technical experi- 
ence of the developed countries is an important factor stimulating their eco- 
nomic and sociocultural progress. This allows the Asian, African and Latin 
American countries to "skip" the internediate stages in the development of 
productive forces that have already been undergone by highly developed 

count 4 ie > 


COPYRIGHT: [zdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye 
otnosheniya", 1982 


8588 
CSO: 


1816/8 











IRAN, PAKISTAN, EGYPT: ISLAM REACTS TO MODERN WORLD 


Moscow MLROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 
(signed to press 21 Apr 82) pp 51-63 


[Article by I. Timofeyev: "The Role of Islam in the Sociopolitical Life of the 
Orient" | 


[Text] In recent years increased activity by various movements for the revival of 
‘slam has been witnessed in a number of liberated countries and there have been 
attempts to put Islamic principles and ideals into social and political practice 
and to create a special "Tslamic state" and "Islamic economy." These processes 
have been manifested in their clearest and most acute forms in the countries where 
the capitalist modernization of the economy by means of a "synthesis" of traditional 
and bourgeois structures has been attempted for a number of years. This is no 
coincidence. The contradictions of the capitalist path of development, which is 
in the interest of the ruling elite and of ‘ocal entrepreneurs linked with the 
Western monopolies, have exacerbated the social class struggle in these countries 
and have promoted the growth of political movements that often adopt the religious 
slogans most easily understood by the mass mind. 


"In certain Eastern countries," L. I. Brezhnev has noted, "Islamic slogans have 
recently been advanced with great vigor. We communists respect the religious 
convictions of people who profess Islam and other religions. The important thing 
here is the aims pursued by the forces proclaiming particular slogans. A libera- 
tion struggle can develop under the banner of Islam. This has been demonstrated by 
history, including the most recent history. History also testifies that Islamic 
slogans are also used by reactionary forces stirring up counterrevolutionary 
rebellions. The actual content of the particular movement is consequently the 
point of the matter." 


Therefore, the actual content of Islamic movements is the central issue in today's 

Islami: studies. It is only on this methodological basis that an objective assess- 
ent can be made of the various trends in modern Islam and an analysis can be con- 

ucted ©* the kaleidoscope of events in the Near East, Southwest and Southeast Asia 
ind the <trican states. 


The term “the Muslim world,” which has been commonly used in political discussions 
in the last few vears, requires some clarification. Geographically, the "Muslim 


23 











rid” covers a huge territory--from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the easternmost 
the Asian continent. Since no population census has ever been held in many 

stim countries, it is impossible to determine the number of devout Muslims with 
sulfielent accuracy. It ranges between 500 and 800 million people, according to 
different calculations. The "Muslim world” is by no means monolithic from the 
‘standpoint of political structure and the orientation or level of socioeconomic 
development. It includes states that possess billions of petrodollars (for instance, 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait) and states that are among the 
world's poorest countries. In terms of their state structure, the Muslim countries 
form a very troad spectrum with revolutionary democratic regimes at one end and 
feudal theooccatic monarchies at the other. Some countries pursue a consistent 
ant -imperialist and anticolonialist policy and take an active part in the non- 
iligned movement and the struggle for peace and social progress, while others fol- 
lor in the footsteps of the aggressive imperialist policy of the United States and 
other Western powers. There are also differences in the relative clout of Islamic 
ideology and in Islam's place in the state structure of particular countries. Islam 
is the official state religion in 28 countries. Muslims constitute the numerical 
majority in 35 countries and an influential minority in 18 others. 


‘the "Muslim world" is also heterogeneous from the standpoint of religious doctrine: 
Contemporary Islam is represented by two main trends--Sunnism and Shi'ism--and each 
of these is broken down in turn into a number of sects and orders. Around 90 per- 
cent of the Muslims profess Sunnism, which is regarded as the orthodox trend in 
Islam, and the remaining 10 percent subscribe to Shi'ism. A political-religious 
contradiction, resulting from the fact that the majority of members of the community 
ipport one trend in Islam whereas the ruling elite subscribes to the other, is 
vanifested in an extremely acute form in some countries (Bahrain, for example, where 
‘t the population is Shi'ite but the power is in the hands of a Sunni dynasty). 


he reasons for the present "politicization’ of Islam and for its sharply increased 


intluence on the minds and emotions of broad segments of the population in some 
uuntries of the foreign East have recently been the subject of animated discussion 
» scientific literature. These tendencies stem from a number of Islam's intrinsic 
itures and trom the specific political and sociocultural conditions in the regions 
where it is widespread. 


ill, it must be borne in mind that Islam is more than just a confessional 
that includes religious philosophical dogma (iman) and ritual practice (din). 

lam actually regulates every aspect of the life of community members--the stand- 
of behavior in society, questions of family, marriage and inheritance, atti- 
les toward the outside world, etc. To a considerable extent, it also determines 
the social structure of society, legal precepts, economic relations, public moral- 
ind the consciousness of believers. In this sense, Islam can be regarded as a 

‘way of life," shaped by religious dogma and hallowed by centuries of tradition. 


r othe litions of colonial enslavement, when all power was effectively con- 
trated in the hands ot infidels--the colonial administration, the occupying 
, toreign companies and missionaries--Islam was often the only means of con- 
idating national and patriotic forces and the only form of social consciousness. 
is therefore natural that movements for national independence often assumed a 
ligious form and were accompanied by the slogans of Islamic liberation and 
retormist movements. 


/ 
24 











lt is 1 well-known fact that the development of capitalism in Europe was accompa- 
nied by the erosion of medieval traditions and the medieval tenor of life, by the 
decline of religion's influence and by the secularization of state and social 
institutions. The situation in the Muslim East was different. The formation of 
bourgeois relations, the involvement of these countries in world capitalist eco- 
nomics and their gradual introduction to the attributes of Western civilization 
were bound to undermine the traditional way of life. As a rule, however, "Western- 
ization" had a profound effect oniy on the ruling exploitative elite, while the 
broad popular masses remained firmly committed to Islamic dogma. 


The social base of Islam was made up of the peasantry, the semiproletariat and the 
lower strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie. Together, they accounted for over 

90 percent of the population of the Muslim countries. Under these conditions, the 
national bourgeoisie, which headed the struggle for independence, generally wrapped 
its demands in religious trappings, which made its ideas intelligible to broad 
segmeats ot the population. 


[his situation persists today in many respects. Anti-imperialist movements in a 
number of Muslim countries have essentially clothed themselves in religious garb 
and assumed the nature of a struggle for "the purity of Islam” and for the restora- 
tion of its supposedly inherent principles of social justice. 


At the same time, Islamic slogans are adopted not only by anti-imperialist and 
anticolonial forces, but also by local reaction, which is linked to imperialism and 
neocolonialism by the strongest bonds. Taking advantage of the religious fervor 
ind illiteracy of the broad masses, the exploiter classes seek to employ "Islamiza- 
tion" to strengthen their own dominance, divert the working people from the strug- 
gle for their rights and utilize believers against progressive and democratic 


fhe differences in the political orientation and social aims of various religious 
currents that put -orward similar, and often identical, slogans demonstrate the 
heterogeneity vi the Islamic movement and dictate the need for a differentiated 
approach toward these currents, for the determination of their class and social 
content and for the investigation of the specific situation in various countries. 
In spite of the active and, in some cases, leading role of the clergy in the anti- 
imperialist struggle, the socioeconomic programs it proposes, which are aimed at 


restoring patriarchal relations, most often assume the character of a petty 
hourgeois utopla. 

The experience of Iran is quite indicative in this respect: The antimonarchic 

ind anti-imperitialist revolution there operated in religious guise and culminated 
in the tormation of an "Islamic republic” that, to a certain extent but by no 
means entirely, implemented the ideas and principles of Shi'ite Islam. The des- 
potical] epressive nature of the shah's regime, the transformation of Iran into 


n economic, financial and military appendage of imperialism, its increasingly 
broad involvement in the system of neocolonial exploitation and the capitalist 
nature of socioeconomic development exacerbated the contradictions between the 
monar ind its imperialist allies, on the one hand, and the popular masses, on 














soother. These were, as the international research group of the journal PROBLEMY 
MIRA L SOTSIALIZMA stressed, the main reasons for the antimonarchic explosion in 
February 1979.1 


Under the conditions of a military police state that brutally suppressed any mani- 
testations of dissidence and banned the activities of political parties, the 
mosques were the only possible rostrums for the opposition, and various political 
forces in Iran grouped round these rostrums. Here it is necessary to consider the 
specific historical features of the Shi'ite trend in Islam, which predetermined, in 
many respects, the clergy's leading role in the events of 1978-1979. Although it 
had been the official religion of the majority of Iranians since the early 16th 
century, Imam-type Shi'ism, unlike Sunnism, had never been part of the state 
structure. As the creed of a persecuted minority from the very outset, Shi'ism had 
spent many centuries in opposition to the secular government, which seemed illegi- 
timate to its adepts. Because of their "debarment" from state power, the Shi'ite 
hierarchs were more closely linked than the Sunni hierarchs with the community of 
believers, in whose eyes they were endowed with special divine grace (barakah). An 
ulema's ascent of the hierarchical ladder depended on the prestige he enjoyed in 
the community as a result of his piety, erudition in theological sciences and 
qualities of leadership. In other words, only the unanimous support of the faith- 
ful could provide sufficient grounds for a religious figure to acquire a higher 
title in the hierarchy. The moral and political prestige of the Shi'ite ulemas was 
high that the religious injunction (fatwah) they issued on any particular aspect 
social life was regarded as law by the believers, even if it ran directly counter 


to the orders of the secular authorities. 


\n aeute conflict between the shah's government and the leadership of the Shi'ite 
clergy broke out in the early 1960's over the proclamation of the so-called "white 
revolution," which included, in addition to socioeconomic reforms, a number of 
‘ecu.arist measures, including women's sufirage, the transfer of divorce cases to 
the purview of the secular courts, etc. The "white revolution,"’ which accelerated 
the development of capitalist relations in Iran's economy, bound this country more 
closely to the world capitalist system and increased its dependence on the indus- 
trially developed West. The "Westernization"” of the economic structure was bound 
to be accompanied by the deformation of the customary way of life. "Western civi- 
ization,” which came to Iran in the form of skyscrapers, expensive cars, air 
mnditioners and luxury goods, brought with it such inevitable attributes of the 
onsumer society" as corruption, greed and moral decline. The Western way of life 
iid indeed promise privileged circles the "good life," but the majority of Iranians 
suuld scarcely make ends meet and all that they got out of the overseas "model of 
prosperity" was neon advertisements, garish magazine covers, pornographic movies 
ind a higher crime rate. The inevitable trend in backward societies that have 
nbarked on the road of capitalist modernization--class polarization with "the rich 
tt ing richer and the poor getting poorer"--was clearly manifested in Iran. 
"Americanization" ot everyday Life, education, upbringing and social norms 
ited the neocompradors, but the middle and lower strata saw it as an impermissible 
icroachment on the inviolability of national traditions, religious ethics and 
‘rality. It is therefore understandable that many Iranians interpreted political 
ind social liberation to mean liberation from foreign authoritarianism and a return 
to age-old spiritual values. "Revolutions and future changes," Iranian historian 








M. Jamell wrote, for example, in an attempt to express tnese feelings, "are more 
cultural than political because the East has gradually begun to realize, firstly, 
that it will be unable to secure political or economic independence without real 
cultural independence and, secondly, that an essentially social ideal is bound to 
be associated with historical, cultural and social factors."'2 

fhe coneept of the "Islamic state," put forward by R. Khomeyni, became the alterna- 
tive model of development and "social ideal." In his opinion, the Shi'ite Islamic 
state must have a form of government consisting of branches of executive, judicial 
and legislative power. The legislature has no right to promulgate laws, however, 
since all laws are already contained in the Koran. "There is absolutely no need for 
new legislation," Khomeyni wrote in his book "The Islamic Government." "It is 
simply necessary to enforce the laws that have already been created for you. This 
will save you considerable time and effort."3 


The legislative branch consists of two chambers: The first, in which mujtahedin 

and experts on Muslim law sit, is responsible for drawing up religious injunctions-- 
"tatwah"; the second, which is actually the "Islamic consultative assembly," 
includes representatives of the community and of religious minorities. The ruler 

of the Islamic state must possess at least two qualities--he must know Muslim law 
and he must be just. Muslim ulemas are vested with the broadest powers: They 
monitor the work of the executive, administrative and other state organs and even 
guide the activity of the ruler, ensuring that his decisions do not diverge from 

the precepts of the Shari‘at. 


Realizing that the religious "establishment" is incapable of ensuring the normal 
funetloning of all state institutions, despite the breadth of the powers granted 

to it, Khomeyni did not rule out the possidility of participation in state affairs 
by technocrats and officials of the civilian administration, provided that the 
bureaucratic apparatus was as compact as possible and that its activity would be 
suided by the demands of the Shari'at. "We will leave those who will obey and con- 
scientiously fulfill it (the Islamic "program'--I. T.) on the local level," 
Khomeyni wrote.” 


fhe Tranian revolution, which united various classes, strata and political forces 
in the country, culminated in the overthrow of the shah's regime in February 1979. 
\fter a referendum on 1 April 1979. the country was proclaimed the Islamic Republic 
f Iran. Even during its initial stage, the Iranian revolution had important 
measures to its credit, such as the denunciation of excessively binding agreements 
with the international oil consortium, the liquidation of American military bases 
in Iran, the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, racist Rhodesia and 
ublic of South Africa, the recognition of the PLO and the nationalization of 
nrivate banks and insurance companies, the energy, mining and aviation industries, 
errous. and nonferrous metallurgy, the automotive industry, shipbuilding and a 
| and Light industry enterprises. 


Although » majority of political forces supported the measures of the Iranian 


revolution's leaders, which were of a pronounced anti-imperialist and anti-American 

aracter, there is no unanimous opinion in Iran with regard to the country's 
future. he ruling Islamic Republican Party's political Line, based on the concepts 
‘ff the "Islamic state" and the "Islamic economy," is not supported by certain 


27 








ridical movements that have been vigorously opposing the regime lately, even to 
the point of armed struggle. Ruling circles have responded to this with large- 

ile repression. As a result, many opponents of the regine--ranyging from extreme 
lettists to overt monarchists--have been executed. 


In view of the contradictions in Iranian domestic political life, it is quite 
interesting to examine the ideology of the leftwing Muslim Mujahedin-e-Khalq group- 
ing, which has had a marked influence on the activity of radical Islamic movements 
in certain Muslim countries. ‘Ali Shari'ati, a writer and sociologist who was per- 
secuted under the shah's regime and died in mysterious circumstances in London in 
1977, is regarded as the spiritual father of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq. 


"Ali Shari’ati's political program was marked by extreme radicalism. Although he 
called for the overthrow of the shah's regime, he also sharply criticized the 
Shi'ite clergy because he believed that this clergy had distorted the religious 
doctrine of early Shi'ism. ‘Ali Shari'ati had outstanding oratorical gifts and 
delivered a series of lectures at the Khosseini Ershad religious center in Tehran 
in the mid-1960's which made him an extremely popular figure among the younger 
generation. Using Western scientific terminology and some Marxist and existential- 
ist propositions, he tried to prove that Islam alone was capable of solving modern 
man's moral and ethical problems. ‘Ali Shari'ati seemed to offer young Iranian 
intellectuals, accustomed to viewing Islam as the creed of “backward Arabs," new 
"revolutionary" aspects of the religion that filled the ideological vacuum created 
by the monarchical tyranny. 


Despite the clearly eclectic nature of his concepts, ‘Ali Shari'ati succeeded in 

rousing an entire generation of Iranians to action and channeling their feelings of 

opposition into a selfless struggle against the shah's regime. ‘Ali Shari'‘ati's 

theological speculations, which substantiate the thesis of man's "responsibility" 

is an Islamic precept, seem particularly i: portant. "Man," the Iranian ideologist 

wrote in his work "The Islamic View of Man," "is a complex phenomenon created from 

clay and the breath of God. He is given the freedom to choose either pole. The 

possession of a strong will makes him free, but also invests him with responsibility. 
om the Islamic standpoint, therefore, man is the only creature responsible for 

his destiny." 


Unlike the advocates of the “Islamic state" with its fusion of politics and reli- 
zion, ‘Ali Shari'ati was more inclined to support an "Islamic order" that assumed 
the subordination of politics and morality to the general spirit of Islam. 


spite the fact that the Islamic revolution in Iran has failed to implement any 
‘f the programs put forward by its participants in any consistent or complete forn, 
he influence of the "Tranian factor" on the "Muslim world" has been quite consid- 
erable. The explosion of the "Muslim revival," whose epicenter was Iran, has been 
hoed in various countries in the increased activity of Islamic movements or, at 
the very least, in the increased public interest in Islamic subject matter. 


"The concepts of the ‘Islamic state’ and ‘Islamic economy,‘ academician Ye. M. 


‘are being employed by petty bourgeois groups and by conservative 


'rimakov note - ’ 








ments of the grand bourgeoisie, which invest them with a quite definite social 
meaning==<the supremacy of bourgeois landowning circles with a clearly expressed 
preterence tor dictatorial forms of government .''6 


Pakistan provides a vivid example of the use of Islamic slogans for this purpose. 
lhe process of "TIslamization" here was accelerated dramatically when the military 
yovernment of General Zia-ul-Haq took power, but the struggle for '"Islamization" 
actually beyxan almost from the moment of Pakistan's birth. Secular tendencies in 
the activity of the country's first rulers evoked a sharp response from Muslim 
groups. Within 3 months after the emergence of this state, these groups launched 
a campaign to base its future constitution on the Shari'at. In March 1949 the 
constituent assembly finally passed a resolution stating that the "Muslims of 
Pakistan will be able, individually and collectively, to build their life in 
accordance with the teachings and demands of Islam, recorded in the sacred Koran 
and the Sunna."? This statement, with no change in the wording, entered the pre- 
amble to the constitution adopted in 1956, with two additions. The first stipu- 
lated that the head of state must be a Muslim, and the second declared Pakistan an 
"Islamic republic.” 

In the 1960's the concepts of "Islamic" or "Muslim socialism" became part of the 
oftictal ideology in Pakistan. One of the leading theorists of "Islamic socialism," 
D. Iqbal, put forth the theory of the so-called "middle way," the cornerstone of 
which was the idea of a "mixed economy," combining private enterprise with govern- 
ment control and ensuring the prosperity of the "middle class." President Ayub 


Khan of Pakistan also tried to modernize Islam in line with the theory of the 
"middle way."' "We must," he said, "bring the needs of our religion in line with 
the needs and possibilities of the present day. No nation can live in the past and 
survive exclusively on past glory."8 


fhe Indo=-Pakistani war, the creation of Bangladesh and the acute social conflicts 
in Pakistan that led to a rebirth of political activity in the middle strata 
stimulated the bourgeois modernization of public life. It was at this time that 
attempts were made to combine the modernist and traditional views on the Islamic 
path of development. In 1973, when Z. A. Bhutto was the head of the country, a 
new constitution was published. It said nothing about "Islamic socialism" but 
retained all of its references to the Koran and Sunna and remarks on the "zak'at" 
ind the need to abolish interest on loans--"riba." Its new elements included a 
‘tatement about official encouragement of the study of the Arabic language, the 
institution of the compulsory study of religion in academic institutions and the 


preparation of a new edition of the Koran with no editing or typographical errors. 
komestic politieal difficulties forced the Bhutto government to engage in political 

incuvers and give in to the pressure of conservative Muslim circles. Ome of the 
povernment's first actions, for example, was the cancellation of the restrictions 
imposed oy previous governments on pilgrimages due to the shortage of foreign 
currency. In May 1977, just 2 months before he was overthrown, Z. A. Bhutto passed 
| law prolthiting gambling and declared Friday the day of rest (prior to this, 


Sunday was considered to be the day of rest). 


The middle of the 1970's was marked by a crisis of the reformation currents that 
were trying to adapt Islam to the requirements of capitalist development. "In most 


29 








» developing countries it was clear by the second half of the 1970's," Soviet 
rosearehers L. Polonskaya and |. Lonova note, "that the pro-Western modernist 
(heortes had not been effective at all in the political mobilization of broad seg- 
ments of the population.... In search of mass support, the protectors of bourgeois 
landowner interests began to play up to petty ownership attitudes and illusions 
more than ever before. This revealed the many common elements of religious argu- 
ments and of some premises of the doctrines worked out by representatives of forces 
with differing class aims."9 


the military men who took power in 1977, headed by Zia-ul-Haq, decided to broaden 
the soctal base of the regime by seeking support from clerical circles and the 
religious segment of the population. Pakistan's foreign policy acquired distinct 
pro-imperialist aims and a tendency to establish close ties with conservative Arab 
regimes, especially Saudi Arabia. 


One otf the military regime's undertakings was the creation of a council on Muslim 
ideology and Shari'at courts. In February 1979 Zia-ul-Haq announced the enactment 
ot several Islamic laws envisaging public executions for persons who drank alcoholic 
beverages, bore false witness, committed adultery or acted as procurers. In 

accordance with the Shari'at, thieves would have their hands cut off. 


While an economic crisis increased in intensity and the position of the laboring 
masses grew worse, the military regime announced that the "Islamization" of the 
economy would be accomplished by instituting the traditional Muslim "zak'at" and 
"usher" taxes and gradually prohibiting usury ("riba"). According to the Pakistani 
leadership's plans, the implementation of Islamic principles in the economic sphere, 
which presupposed the collection of funds from the rich strata to benefit the needy, 
should help to resolve social contradictions. An important factor contributing to 
the decision to transfer legislation and tle economy to "Islamic channels" was the 
military regime's desire for closer cooperation with the oil-exporting Muslim 
countries that offered Pakistan the loans and credit it needed so desperately. In 
iddition to all this, the propaganda aspect of the Islamic innovations, with the 
aid ot which the regime hoped to divert public attention from the economic crisis 
ind the intensive militarization of the country, was also quite important. 


in recent years the extremely rightwing religious "Jamaati-i-Islami" party has been 
© regime's ideological sounding-board. It was founded in 1941 by renowned Muslim 
ideologist al-Maududi. In 1947 Jamaati-i-Islami was strictly against the creation 
Pakistan, objecting on the grounds that nationalism, which is limited to the 
‘ramework of one state, breaks up the universal Muslim community (umma), fosters 
regional attachments and, consequently, alienates believers. Later the party 
changed its position and led the fight to turn Pakistan into an "Islamic state." 


tl 


in contrast to the Muslim theologians who concede the possibility of the existence 
ceveral types of "Islamic states,"19 al-Maududi believes that the "Islamic state" 
suld be all-encompassing and universal. He calls his proposed state structure 

i "theodemocracy." This kind of structure, al-Maududi explains, "is not governed 

by any special religious class, but by the entire Muslim community.... The Muslim 

heritage as a whole is governed by the state in accordance with the ‘Book of Allah' 

ind the practices of his prophet. If I might be allowed to coin a new term, I 

would call this system of government a 'theodemocracy' or, in other words, a 


30 











divine democratic government, because it would give Muslims Limited public sover- 
ciynty under the suzerainty of Allah.... In this sense, the Islamic state is a 
democracy. However, as I have already said, it is also a theocracy, because if any 
precise teaching of Allah and the prophet already applies to a particular matter, 
no ipodeey | name legislative body or theologian can express an independent 
opinion." 


One ot the significant peculiarities of al-Maududi's "theodemocracy" is the idea 
that the ruler and the consultative body are elected by the masses, but not from 
the masses; they are elected from the elite, which is distinguished by "special" 
spiritual and intellectual qualities. The elitist principle, which is strictly 
maintained in the organizational structure of the Jamaat-i-Islami party, apparently 
impresses the military regime, which has supported it to the maximum, 


Atter the military coup of 1958, as a result of which M. Ayub Khan took power, 
Jamaati-i-Llslami refused to recognize the legality of the regime because any dic- 
tatorship is contrary to the concept of an "Islamic state" in which the ruler is 
elected by the community of believers. Today the leaders of Jamaati-i-Islami have 
apparently forgotten this principle. With their support, General Zia-ul-Haq is 
taking repressive actions against leftist democratic forces and has jailed thousands 
ot his opponents without a trial or any other legal proceedings. Hypocritically 
proclaiming religious slogans, the Jamaati-i-Islami ideologists have effectively 
viven the military regime's undeclared war on Afghanistan their blessing. They are 
spreading rumors about the "communist threat" and are fully in support of the 
[slamabad rulers’ plans to involve Pakistan in U.S. imperialist interests and turn 
the country into a stronghold of aggression and anticommunism in South Asia. Today 
Pakistan is feverishly building up its military potential with huge shipments of 
American weapons and represents a dangerous source of tension in the region and a 
real threat to the security of neighboring states, particularly India. 


Gangs of Atehan counterrevolutionaries, who have made a comfortable spot for them- 
selves in Pakistan, are also acting to the accompaniment of slogans about "struggle 
for the faith" and for the restoration of the "purity" of Islamic principles. With 
the knowledge and consent of the authorities, they have continuously committed 
provocative acts against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The military 
revime in Pakistan has authorized Afghan counterrevolutionaries to make use of 
office buildings and residences in Peshawar, Lahore and other cities. The Afghan 
ounterrevolutionary newspapers DEATH FOR THE FAITH and KHUBEI ISLAM are being sent 
to the DORA from these cities, and American, Egyptian and Chinese instructors in 
Pyhistanti training camps are preparing saboteurs and terrorists for actions in 
hoanistan,. 


foday it is completely obvious that Zia-ul-Haq's military regime, which has ver- 


billy expressed concern about the interests of the "Muslim world," has actually 

turned its country into a bridgehead from which the United States and China are 

tivhtinws on undeclared war against Afghanistan in an a-tempt to create favorable 
nditioos in the region for the realization of their own expansionist and hegemon- 


let ambitions. They are relying primarily on the Afghan counterrevolutionaries who 
disyuise their political program with religious slogans. 


\t 4 session of the Islamic Conference in Pakistan in January 1980, Afghan reaction 
was represented by the so-called "United Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan," 


31 














moaisting of six parties and groups. Although their tactics differ somewhat, all 
them are extreme rightwing nationalist organizations of the grand Afghan bour- 

veoisie and feudal landowners who want to restore the old order and regain the 
intluence they have Lost in Afghanistan. For example, the largest and best organ- 
ized Atghan counterrevolutionary group, "Khezbe Islami" or the "Islamic Party of 
Atghanistan," is headed by Gulbuddin Hiqmatyar, who owned huge estates in Kundus 
province before the revolution, The political program of Khezbe Islami, which 
envisages the overthrow of the progressive regime in Afghanistan, is set off by 
i number of traditional Islamic demands, such as, for example, the compulsory wear- 
ing of the paranji, the separation of the sexes in education, the wearing of a 
"national uniform" by employees instead of Western dress and the prohibition of 
liquor, gambling and other signs of "Western influence." The struggle against 
"Westernization" has not, however, kept G. Hiqmatyar from maintaining close contact 
with the CLA and Israeli intelligence and receiving weapons and financial aid from 
the United States, Egypt, Pakistan and China. 


Sayedh Ahmad Giliani, who heads the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, and 
Sobhatullah Mojaddedi, the leader of the National Front for the Salvation of 
Atghanistan, bear the hereditary title "pir"--or "religious zealot." They, just 
as G. Hiqmatvar, camouflage their own counterrevolutionary programs with religious 
phrases. Both are the scions of once influential feudal clans with huge agricul- 
tural holdings in various parts of Afghanistan. Burhanuddin Rabbani, the head of 
"Jamiyate Islamiye" (the "Islamic Society of Afghanistan"), is also a prominent 
feudal landholder. Before the revolution he owned estates in Kabul and Badakhshan 
provinees and was a major exporter of karakul to England and the United States. 
lust as Hiqumatyar, Rabbani is closely connected with the CIA, from which he 
receives tinancial support and instructions. It is not surprising that all of 
them are trying their best, with the aid of imperialist propaganda, to convince 
people that the objectives of the national democratic revolution in Afghanistan are 
radically contrary to Islam and are striving to stir up anticommunist and anti- 
Soviet feelings among believers. But the behavior of these "protectors" of Islam 
overned by class hatred, and not at all by religious doctrine. 


in recent years various religious groups have been noticeably more active in Egypt. 
repressive campaign against religious activists in September 1981 and the subse- 
quent assassination of President Sadat by members of the radical Islamic organiza- 


tion “at-Taqfir wa al-Hijrah" ("Redemption and Exodus") reaffirmed the existence of 
‘irty widespread religious opposition to the regime's policies in this country. 


‘ome of the characteristic features of Egyptian public life in the 1970's were the 
increased demand for religious literature, both legal and underground; ostentatious 
cpresstons of Islamic devotion; conversion to Sufism and the enthusiastic attend- 

ince of “zikrah" groups. These features were characteristic of the most diverse 
ial strata, from the urban lower classes to the technocratic elite. Demands for 
partial "Islamization" of the constitution, legislation and education have 
»xscome increasingly persistent. 


Islam is now being used as an instrument of political struggle in at least two ways: 
!) as a means of legitimizing secular authority; b) as a way of expressing social 
protest. 








lhe Leyptian regime could nvt remain indifferent to the opposition feelings of much 
of the publie. One of President Sadat's important concerns was the legitimization 
of his poliey in the eyes of believers. Taking every opportunity to stress his 
devotion to Islamic dogma, he announced in May 1971 that Egypt would have a consti- 
tution which would take Egyptian tradition into account and would rest on religious 
principles. In a referendum in September of the same year, the overwhelming major- 
ity of Epypttians supported a document which said: "Islam is the religion of the 
state; Arabic is its official language; the principles of the Islamic Shari'at are 
the main source of legislat ion. "1 

but the matter went no further. In 1977 bills banning liquor and stipulating that 
convicted thieves would have their hands cut off were submitted to the People's 
Assembly for consideration. But these bills were still-born: The first was "killed" 
by the tourist Lobby--high-placed officials with business and financial interests in 
th uirist industry; Sadat himself decided not to enact the second because this 
wou.d have discredited the regime's "Liberal" reputation in the West. Later, when 
Sadat encountered the widespread opposition to the Camp David agreement, he was able 
to talk the Al Azhar shetks into a special "fetwah" in support of the "peaceful 
settlement" with Israel. 


In the bewinning of the 1970's, however, the underground Muslim Brotherhood organi- 
ration, which had been banned officially in 1954 after an attempt on President 

G. A. Nasser's life, was noticeably more active in Egypt. The revival of the Muslim 
Brotherhood was promoted by Sodat himself, who freed all of the members of the 
organization who were in jail in 1973 (although the ban was formally still in effect) 
ind otficially authorized the publication of two of its press organs--AD-DAAWA and 
AL.-ITTISAM. Sadat was motivated, on the one hand, by his desire for a "reconcilia- 
tion" with radical Muslim groups and, on the other, by the hope of using their 


mti-Nasser and anticommunist aims for his own purposes, to "counterbalance" leftist 
Opposit ion torces in the country. 


The Egyptian regime's cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood seemed feasible at 
first, but the growth of the organization's social base was accompanied by increased 
indications of opposition in its propaganda, and in 1977, after Sadat's visit to 
jerusalem, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to put an end to this cooperation and 
subjected the regime to harsh criticism in the press. 


"Allah is our god and the prophet is our leader. The Koran is our constitution, 

the Jihad is our path and death for Allah's sake is our highest ambition''--these 

ire the main slogans of the Muslim Srotherhood. The final goal of its struggle is 

the creation of an "Islamic state," which is viewed as part of a larger "Islamic 

order," regulating the way of Life of believers on the basis of strict adherence to 
recepts of the Shari'at. 


Muslim Brotherhood attaches special importance to violence as a means of chang- 
inne socticty. Military doctrine, in their opinion, is a natural extension of reli- 
rious do ine, and terrorism is the main instrument of political struggle. The 

rinization relies most on religious agitation among students of higher academic 

‘titutions and secondary schools and junior army officers. It has been quite 
cuceesstul in this area. Suffice it to say that after 1977 various Islamic groups 
became much more active in Egyptian universities and won the majority of seats in 





33 











‘tudent councils after defeating the supporters of the late President G. A. Nasser, 
who were still quite influential in the mid-1970's. 


The Muslim Brotherhood's reaction to Sadat's "peaceful initiative" was extremely 
critical. At the end of 1978 one of the organization's ideologists, at-Telmesani, 
published an article in AD-DAAWA, in which he stated the brotherhood's views on 
the regime's new foreign policy line. All of the bargaining with regard to occu- 
pied Arab territories, especially Jerusalem--one of the Muslims’ traditional holy 
plaices--was hardest to accept for the Muslim Brotherhood, many of the members of 
which had fought in the war of 1948-1949, 


"The Muslim's virtues and his belief in his own rights," at-Telmesani says, "obli- 
zates him to bravely bear all deprivations and sacrifices until he has enough 
strength to restore all of his rights.... We must not be afraid of war, regardless 
of its results.... Our most important reason for taking this position is the comp- 
fete disregard of the question of Jerusalem and the absence of any references to it, 
which confirms Begin's remark about Jerusalem as the capital of Israel."13 


The growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood naturally disturbed the Sadat regime. 
Nevertheless, Sadat did not want to lose prestige among the religious segments of 

the population and refrained from taking any kind of radical action until his polit- 
ical opponents resorted to unconcealed violence. 


In April 1974 an extremist Islamic organization, which called itself the "Muslim 
Liberation Group," attempted a coup d'etat. The members of this organization occu- 
pied the military engineering college in Cairo's Heliopolis district and prepared to 
move on to the headquarters of the Arab Socialist Union, where the president was 
expected to speak. The conspiracy was revealed when one member of the group 
denounced it, and all of the conspirators were brought to trial. 


The revime was unable to stem the wave of violence, however. The 28 August 1977 
issue of Egypt's OCTOBER magazine reported that the police had arrested 104 members 
of the extremist religious organization "Jund Allah." Two days later, on 30 August, 
AL-AKHRAM reported that 80 members of the Jihad underground Islamic group in 
\lexandria had been arrested. The most sensational event of summer 1977, however, 
was probably the kidnapping and subsequent assassination of a prominent figure in 
the Egyptian religious "establishment," waquf Minister al-Dakhabi, who was believed 
to support radical methods of struggle against extremist Islamic groups, which he 
called "heretical." The then unknown at-Taqfir wa al-Hijrah organization took credit 
for the assassination. As a result of mass police raids and searches in Cairo's 
r .dential neighborhoods, 204 members of this underground organization were arrested 
and brought to trial in a military court. Five of its leaders were sentenced to 

ith and executed on 19 March 1978. Another 36 members were found guilty and sen- 
tenced to prison terms of varying length. 14 


malvsis of the political platform of these Islamic groups testifies to their 
lose ideological connections with the Muslim Brotherhood, with the only difference 
beings in the means of attaining goals. The Muslim extremists’ ultimate goal is the 
establishment of a new social order, based on the principles of orthodox Islam. 
ihe members of these groups assess present realities in much the same way. They 
helieve that the police force is now consumed by corruption and blame this on the 


34 








substitution of imported Western, man-made legislation for the Shari'at. The 
ruling elite does not care about the observance of Islamic principles and the 
tatural result of this is moral decline, mass illiteracy, disease and vice. 


There are some differences of opinion between these groups. The Muslim Liberation 
Group, in particular, believes that all of the defects are in the police system, 
and not in the society, which is merely a victim of this system. The ideology of 
the at=laqtir wa al-Hijrah group does not make these distinctions, proceeding from 
te assumption that the political structure and the society are two sides of the 
same coin. <A corrupt society, in their opinion, engenders a defective political 
system, and vice versa. 


The economic program of the radical Muslim groups is quite vague and confused. Most 
of them resolutely reject both capitalism and socialism but do not propose any kind 
olf balanced economic structure as an alternative. The common pr-mise is that the 
Islamic state must exclude the possibility of extreme poverty ana extreme wealth. 
This can only be achieved if believers adhere to the precepts of Islam and religious 
prohibitions (muharammat). The precepts include the compulsory payment of the 
"zak'at" tax, conscientious and diligent labor for fair pay, and good deeds. ‘The 
prohibitions include bans on fraud, waste, greed and usury. 


The political demands of the radical Islamic groups, just as their economic "pro- 
yram,'’ display some of the characteristic features of a petty bourgeois utopia. 
These tit in well with the general views of the ideologists of Muslim radicalism, 
the majority of whom come from the lowest strata of the rural and provincial 


bourgeoisie. 


lt is interesting to trace the ideological roots of radical Islamic groups. Above 
all, these groups do not separate themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood. Almost 
all otf their leaders come from the brotherhood or religious societies and parties 
with similar aims. The political program of the Muslim Liberation Group was drawn 
up under the influence of the ideas of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim 
brotherhood, and Said Qutb, its leading theorist. Their views were influenced by 
the theological works of al-Maududi, the ideologist of Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami 
party, and ‘Ali Shari'ati, the spiritual father of the Iranian Mujahedins. 


‘he Muslim Brotherhood has branches in many Muslim cities, where they have close 
issociations with feudal theocratic reaction, oppose progressive reforms and object- 
ively play into the hands of imperialist circles. The activity of the Muslim 
sNrotherhood in Syria is indicative in this respect. In Syria, militant groups of 
the organization tried to launch a bloody terrorist campaign against the national 
lemocratic leaders who were pursuing a consistent anti-imperialist policy in the 
interest of Arab unity and solidarity in a struggle to liberate occupied Arab lands. 





today's ‘uslim movement therefore cannot be regarded as anything integral and 
momoyenecus. Progressive anti-imperialist and antifeudal tendencies are often 
combined with extreme reaction, anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. Under these con- 
itions, it is particularly important to take a class approach to the analysis of 
political events in the "Muslim world," to interpret all causes and effects cor- 


reetly and to analyze specific events in each country objectively. Only this 
ipproeach can reveal the actions behind the words and the social and class aims 
behind the slogans. 


35 





FOOTNOTES 
|. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 2, 1980, pp 77-78. 


Masjid Jameii, ''The Revolution Which Islam Created," Tehran, 1980, p 4. 


Nm 


$. Ruhollah Khomeyni, "Al-Hukumah al-Islamiyah," Beirut, p 134 (in Arabic). 
4. Ibid., p 135. 
5. ‘Ali Shari'ati, "Islamic View of Man," Tehran, p 7. 


6. Ye. M. Primakov, "Islam and Social Development in the Countries of the Foreign 
East" (VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 8, 1980, p 65). 


7. "“Religiya i obshchestvennaya mysl' narodov Vostoka" [The Religion and Social 
Thought of the Peoples of the East], Moscow, 1971, p 126. 


8. "Religiya i obshchestvennaya mysl" stran Vostoka" [The Religion and Social 
Thought of the Countries of the East], Moscow, 1974, p Li. 


9. LL. Polonskaya and A. Ionova, "The Concept of the ‘Islamic Economy': Social 
Essence and Political Purpose" (MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENTYA, 
No 3, 1981, pp 54-55). 

10. Sudanese religious activist Sadiq al-Mahdi, in particular, believes that, due 
to differences in the developmental levels of various Muslim countries, each 
country might have its own constitution but still be an "Islamic state" (see 
"The Challenge of Islam,'' edited by Altaf Gauhar, London, 1978, p 131). 


ll. "Islam: Its Meaning and Message," edited by Khurshid Ahmad, Islamic Council 
of Europe, London, 1975, pp 160-161. 


12. Quoted in: G. H. Jansen, "Militant Islam,"’ London, 1979, p 140. 
13. AL-MUSTAQBAL, 21 October 1978, pp 9-10 (in Arabic). 
14. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, December 1980, p 452. 


COPYRIGHT: TIzdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye 
otnoshen iya" 9 1982 


3588 
CSO: 1816/8 





36 








SOVLET JOURNAL REVIEWS BOOK ON LENIN LEGACY 


Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA IL MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENTYA in Russian No 5, May 82 
(signed to press 21 Apr 82) pp 143-146 


[Review by N. Kolikov of book "Lenin kak politicheskiy myslitel'” [Lenin as a Politi- 
cal Thinker], edited by V. V. Zagladin, I. K. Pantin, T. T. Timofeyev and G. Kh. 
Shakhnazarov, Moscow, Politizdat, 1981: "The Pertinence of Lenin's Legacy"] 


[Text | In worldwide Leniniana, researchers--both Marxists and their opponents-- 
pay perhaps the closest attention to the subject of "Lenin as a revolutionary, 
politician and political thinker." What are V. I. Lenin's features as a political 
leader? What is the nature of the intellectual arsenal which enabled him, at each 
new turn in the revolution and with each successive change of scenery on the revo- 
lutionary stage, to seek out the only correct answer to the fundamental problems 
facing the Russian proletariat, the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet regime? What is 
Leninism's contribution to the development of 20th century political thought? 


Many Marxist scholars try to find adequate replies to these and related questions. 
Amons recent works the book under review is of undoubted interest, based as it is 
on the speeches of Soviet participants in the special session of the llth World 
Congress of the International Political Science Association held in Moscow. 





The book brings together articles by 30 authors. Naturally--and the preface notes 


this--the works of different researchers bear the imprint of their authors’ individ- 
uality. Let us add that they are not all of equal value. Some graphically illus- 
trate irticular aspects of Lenin's legacy and introduce the reader to the 


roletarian leader's laboratory of political thought, while others are more in the 


iv. | urveys. 


inthology coeently reveals the pertinence of Lenin's legacy. A special article 
evey deals with this subject. The importance of Lenin's propositions for 
nresent day is mentioned in virtually every article. This question is very 


ortar ind fundamental: As is well known, in our day there are people who call 
elve communists but who deny the pertinence of Leninism by referring to the 
itiquity of Lenin's works and to the difference between historical eras, the spe- 
fic features of political situations and so forth. 
iY , it would be naive to uphold the formula which says: “Lenin said such and 


consequently, in our era we should act in such and such a way.” This way 





'raming the question, when theory is based on the unquestionable nature of an 
mithority, on the absolutization of past experience and its application to an 

tered reality, is a very gross distortion of Marxism and a grave threat to its 
development, replacing the theory of history with the history of theory. V. I. 
Lenin himself constantly struggled against this caricaturization of Marxism which 
frequently emanated from the ranks of the revolutionary party and was done with the 
best of intentions. 


when communists speak of the topicality of Leninism and its significance for the 
revolutionary struggle even under present conditions, they have something else in 
mind, of course. "Today's conditions in both West and East are in many ways unlike 
Russian conditions. But Lenin's teachings contain such a wealth of ideas and 
proposals concerning the forms and methods of the struggle for socialism that they 

in provide a guideline under any conditions, in any country," V. V. Zagladin 
stresses in his article "The Summit of Revolutionary Thought.” "Of course, only a 
guideline. All the rest--the specific means and details of the great work of 
"introducing socialism'--must be elaborated independently by each revolutionary 
party and each people” (p 45). 


VY. I. Lenin considered power to be a basic and determining factor in the development 
of the revolution and its foreign and domestic policy. The anthology views class- 
based, group-based and personal power as "the real ability to implement one's will 

in public life and to impose it, if necessary, on other people" (see F. Burlatskiy's 
irticle "Leninism and the Development of Political Theory"). Policy is defined as 

"a form of mutual relations between classes, social groups, nations and states linked 
directly or indirectly with manifestations of power and ruling activity” (p 319). 


The central theme of the entire work is an analysis of the role of the subjective 
‘rr in the historical process and its relationship with the objective natural laws 
ot iety's development. It is no accidenc that the following words of V. I. Lenin 
been selected as the book's epigraph: "Marxism differs from all other social- 
theories by its remarkable union of complete scientific sobriety in analyzing 
e objective state of affairs and the objective course of evolution with the most 
te recognition of the importance of the revolutionary energy, revolutionary 
itv and revolutionary initiative of the masses and, of course, of individuals, 


- 


ips, organizations and parties knowing how to find, and act on, a connection with 
irticular classes.” 
t works in the anthology which help us to understand this feature of 
, ’ , , | < . . . i 
Mar mm we can single out I. Pantin's article "The Method of Political Thinking. 
ninine Lenin's enormous contribution to the theorv of Marxism--a contribution 


which Marxist thinking today would be totally inconceivable--the author 
“ es works reveal "the mechanism of the real impact of human will on 
I r ss (( 326) 
ina » wre the behavior of specific social strata is considered, 
er ‘ } t isse t he latte r' : ids Log’ bv ¢ yntrasting illusions to 
t istence. “It is not enough bs iuse, from being a 
. ess r the iSSst ind masses and, con- 
irticular i in no longer be 
“ w ‘ r dad" PT i3i- 532) 














ln) other words, as I. Pantin writes, the consideration of the fact that the 
contrast between "thinking" and "being" and between "ideology" and "practice" was 


losing its absolute nature in politics and had become mobile was a substantially 

new teature in the Leninist political analysis of reality. As a result, a new, 
quite specific "measure" of the historical process emerged. The repetitions and 

the regularity of the events on which the natural law of social development is based 
can no longer be viewed in isolation from the state of the social subject. 


lhe natural law thus acts as "a conflict and resultant force of objective tenden- 
cles," including--and this must be stressed--the diverse potential of historical 
movement (p 333). This means that the future acts “not as a programmed scheme but 
as the sum total of real alternatives, real in the sense that each accords with an 
objectively feasible course of economic evolution" (p 334). Hence the orientiation 
of Lenin's theory toward definite action and, at the same time, the consideration 


of the posstbility of another, less optimal variation of historical development. 


Lenin's understanding of the heterogeneity of the course of events and of the 
possibility, particularly in periods of crisis, of alternative solutions is examined 
by a number of authors in the book being reviewed. They correctly associate this 
with a very important distinctive feature of Leninism: the active attitude toward 
reality, in contrast to the philosophy of passivity and contemplation which inspired 
many members ot the Second International. Some bourgeois ideologists seex voluntar- 
ism in V. I. Lenin where there is actually an explanation of the true historical 
natural law and establishment of the active role of the revolutionary classes' con- 
sciousness and will. 


Reality and the process of its evolution also include the element of the definite 
unpredictability of events. Here the specific logic of historical creation proves 
far richer and "more cunning" than any forecasts built on theory. This is why poli- 
;, according to Lenin, is a very complex science and a very subtle art: Only 

tis kind of dual approach to politics enables a revolutionary party to apply cor- 
rectly the general and basic principles of communism "to the /uniqueness/ [in bold- 
face| in the objective development toward communism which is inherent in each indi- 
vidual country and which we must know how to study, find and divine." 


1 theorist and scholar, when V. I. Lenin renewed Marxism's tie with revolution- 
ice, he inevitably came un against the problem of his attitude toward 
Marxist solutions which no longer accorded with altered conditions. On the 

itical level, he viewed this problem (it is analyzed, in particular, in the 
irticl » V. Viasova and Ye. Plimak, entitled "Politics as a Science and Art") as 
ittitude toward tactical slogans, which are essentially one-track and ephemeral 
which, e adopted, possess a certain inertia and take a long time to overcome. 
which the party launches among the masses," V. I. Lenin stressed, “has 
t becomine stagnant, of dying or of retaining its force for many 
vhen the conditions which created the need for this slogan have changed. 
itable evil and, until we learn to combat and avoid it, we cannot 
arty policy." 
re, the politician must not only determine precisely the boundaries of the 
each slogan and the specific form of struggle but must also help 


for whom the need to convert to a new slogan is less clear 


»* 


39 








iN ‘ro a professional politician. Understandably, in revolutionary periods this 
lange takes place more trequently and political turns are sharper than in periods 
relatively peaceful development. V. I. Lenin pointed out to those who did not 
understand this and reproached the Bolsheviks for deviating from the "straight" 
path in their tactics that diversions are caused by the reality of the class strug- 
wle and the behavior of the political adversary. 


One characteristic feature of V. I. Lenin as an unrivaled party leader and prole- 
tarian revolutionary was his ability to assess soberly what had been achieved, his 
reluctance to acknowledge defeats and his ability to learn and draw conclusions as 
to what had to be changed in the party's activity. "It is necessary to speak 
bluntly,” V. I. Lenin taught. "This is interesting and important not only from the 
standpoint of theoretical truth but also from the practical aspect. We cannot learn 
to resolve our task by new means today unless yesterday's experience has opened our 
eyes to the inapplicability of old methods."4 


Lenin's greatness as a political thinker and leader was revealed in full in the 
period of the preparation and implementation of the October Revolution and later 
when he was the leader of the Soviet State. His political activity in those years 

is discussed at lergth in the book being reviewed. Articles of particular interest 
are A. Butenko's "The Building of Socialism: From Theory to Practice," Yu. Krasin's 
"Lenin's Theory of Socialist Revolution and the Present Day," Yu. Karyakin's and 

Ye. Plimak's "On the Forms of Struggle for Socialism," V. Petrovskiy's "The Working 
Class and Lenin's Policy of Socialist Construction," S. Kaltakhchyan's "The Teach- 
ing on Nations and the Principles for Resolving the Nationalities Question," 

N. Azarov's and L. Arskaya's "Economics and Politics” and a number of other articles. 


(he greatest theoretical tasks resolved anew by V. I. Lenin in precisely that 
period included the elaboration of the theory of imperialism, the substantiation 
of the possibility of revolutionary victory in one country and the development of 
the teaching on the state and of the Marxist concept of socialism and the ways of 
reating a classless society. If these and other related problems of social develop- 
‘nt had not been resolved--and resolved not only in the abstract, in theory, but 
also in life, in practice--the historical transition to a new formation, effected 

the Russian working people under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, would 


ive been impossible. 


the process of revolutionary transformations and during keen discussions within 
the party, the question of the correlation between economics and politics frequently 
rose on both the theoretical and the practical political planes. In resolving it, 
Lenin, as is well known, invariably insisted on the priority of the latter. 
Commenting on this very important premise, V. Petrovskiy writes: "The supremacy of 
litics over economics in the sense that Lenin understood it means not the sup- 
ting of economii mut the supremacy of the working class’ general 
nic interests over the most immediate individual interests, securing for soci- 
the maximum (to be more precise we should obviously say the maximum possible, 


} } 


»y politics 


he optimal--N. K.) tempo of e ‘onomic development" (p 216). 


il lvzing various aspects otf the experience of socialist construction in the 
, especially in the first vears of Soviet power, the authors show that the 
. tt « . ' ‘ ? - | 
reation of a new society is not a straight or smooth road but a tortuous patn 


40 








with many sharp curves, characterized by movement that is smooth or headlong, 
forward or backward (p 217). On this path the working class needs not only revo- 
lutionary determination and a willingness to make sacrifices, but also the ability 
to make virtually instantaneous changes in orientation and in the forms and methods 
of soctalist construction. 


The book cogently reveals the worldwide significance of the experience of the 
Russian revolution, the experience of socialist construction in Russia and V. lI. 
Lenin's tremendous contribution to the development of Marxism. "Socialism as a 
social system will be established everywhere only as a result of the creative appli- 
cation of the Marxist concept of socialism developed by V. I. Lenin,” A. Butenko 
stresses. "No matter how low or how high the developmental level of this or that 
capitalist country, no matter what distinguishes its specific paths toward social- 
ism, socialism itself, as a social system unified in its essence and diverse in its 
forms, will be organized on the foundation of Leninist ideas, which show all 
countries something very fundamental about their inevitable and not too distant 
future’ (p 85). 


Prominent among the articles dealing with individual aspects of political thought 
and action is A. Lebedev's work "The Problem of Political Compromise." The author 
stresses the importance and pertinence of this theme in the struggle for the unity 
of the proletariat itself, in the choice of paths of transition to socialism and 


in the consolidation of peaceful coexistence between states with different social 
systems. he revelation of Lenin's attitude toward compromises gives us a deeper 
understanding of the uniqueness of the political thinking of the leader of the 
revolution. V. I. Lenin describes the party's renunciation of part of its demands 
in accordance with an agreement with other parties as acompromise in policy, sees it 
is an utterly particular, peaceful form of struggle and links the need for it with 
the oblique, zigzag development of the historical process itself. 


A. Bovin's article traces the way in which Lenin's idea of peaceful coexistence 
between states with different social systems gradually matured and how it developed 
out of the practical needs of the Russian revolution and received fundamental theo- 


retical substantiation. "While initially," the author writes, "the side-by-side 
existence of states of different types was considered to be a temporary result of 
the delaved advent of revolutions in Europe, gradually--as the international posi- 
tion of Soviet power became stronger--the conviction grew in Lenin that the pro- 
| ire of this coexistence was inevitable. Hence the course toward 

iinin asting, steady relations with the capitalist world, especially eco- 

ns’ (pp 401-402). 
suthor particularly highlights what G. V. Chicherin calls V. I. Lenin's 


“" 


i ‘litical realism" and "peerless flexibility." Touching on the sphere 
international relations, he frequently warned against implacability, intransi- 


the issuance of ultimatums which sharply narrow the scope for political 

ind this approach, the article stresses, was certainly not dictated 

t the young land of the Soviets. Lenin saw it as an opportunity 

rt real influence on the policy of other states. "When the Soviet regime's 


icy objectives are being considered,” V. I. Lenin pointed out, "the 
ircumspection and restraint are needed so that extreme elements 


be aided by a thoughtless or rash move." 


: esi 7 ’ 
art Cs wiil 1ot 


~ 











le does not refer simply to military parties, but to their "extreme elements." This 
is highly characteristic of Lenin the politician--the ability to single out the dif- 

‘rent strata, groups and factions of the bourgeoisie, differing from one another in 
their political orientation and varying attitudes toward contacts with Soviet Russia. 


in the articles dealing with problems of foreign policy and international relations, 
the authors successfully reveal the organic link, stemming from the Leninist approach, 
between the policy of the CPSU and other fraternal parties at the present stage and 
their struggle to preserve and consolidate detente, effect disarmament and streng- 
then international peace. The book shows clearly that the development of weapons of 
mass destruction makes it impossible to regard nuclear war as a reasonable instrument 
of state policy and that the preservation of peace and peaceful coexistence are in 
the common interest of both the socialist and the capitalist states. 


On the other hand, the bourgeois consciousness, A. Bovin stresses, tends to place 
the idea of preserving the social status quo at the center of its interpretation of 
detente and peaceful coexistence. This view is incorrect. "War as a method of 
‘clarifying relations’ among states can and must be banned. In this sense, peace- 
ful coexistence includes the requirements of the status quo. But you cannot ‘ban' 
civil or national liberation wars, nor can you 'ban' revolution as a means of chang- 
ing political and social systems" (p 413). 


Of course, peaceful coexistence does not eliminate the differences between social- 
ist and capitalist class interests. Its social meaning lies elsewhere--in pievent- 
ing the inevitable clash of those interests from approaching the point beyond which 
"non-existence" begins. 
[he subject matter of this book covers a broad range. Virtually no aspect of Lenin's 
political activity or of his work on policy matters has been omitted from the 
author's purview. But it is more importan. to stress something else: The materi- 
‘ls of the anthology as a whole successfully carry on the tradition of research into 
Lenin's deeds and ideas from today's vantage point. This tradition correctly 
issigns priority to an awareness of the theoretical and methodological value of 
Lenin's statements. It is a tradition which helps us understand the "living soul" 
Leninism which, in the great leader's works--in this instance, on political 
‘ues--is of historical and current significance and makes these works immortal. 


FOOTNOTES 


V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], vol 16, 





p <3. 
IDI. , ol 4l, p kL, 
' id ’ oO] } » P L9G 
id ° l 44, p » 
1., vol 36, p 324 
IGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye 
‘nivya’’ 19R2 








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Soot, 9 1983.