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JPRS 84222 


30 August 1983 


USSR Report 


USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY 


No. 6, June 1983 





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JPRS 84222 


30 August 1983 


USSR REPORT 


USA: -Economics, Potitics, IDEOLOGY 
No. 6, June 1983 


Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the 
followings is a complete translation of the Russian-language 

monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in 
Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy 


of Sciences. 


CONTENTS 


Yuri Andropov's Reply to American Scientists (p 3) 
(mot translated) 


\vert the Danger of Nuclear War in Space (p 4) 
(not translated) 


Message to the Scientists of the World (pp 5-6) 
(not translated) : 


Reasons for Reagan's Hard-Line Foreign Policy Examined (pp 7-17) 
(Yu. P. Davydov)..... TEETTTIETILITITELITTTILITLIT iii l 


Investment Banks and Growing Monopolization of Economy (pp 18-29) 
(VY. T. Musatov) (net translated) 


Some Trends in American Culture (pp 30-40) 
(O. E. Tuganova) (not translated) 


Washington Objects to Nuclear-Free Europe (pp 41-45) 

(V. FPF. Davydov) .ccccccccccccccccccccccccccscccceccccceeeseeceesees 14 
“ilderness in Danger (pp 46-50) 

(I. V. Vasok) (not translated) 


'.S. Expansion in World Food Market (pp 51-59) 
(L. B. AvakOva)..ccccccccrscccccccccccccccseccssceseeeseseeseesess 20 


International Economic Role of U.S. Pacific States Stressed (pp 60-70) 
(A. B. Parkanekiy) ..cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccssesseccees 30 


-a- [III = USSR - 39] 








CONTENTS (Continued) 


Scandal of the Ice Queen and Her Court (pp 71-77) 
(N. A. Shvedova) (not translated) 


On a Clear Day You Can See General Motors (pp 78-85) 
(J. Patrick Wright) (not translated) 


Higher Crude Conversion pp 86-93) 
i. in Cd Wale MDs « n 6060060 600000066000060 6600006088 48 


Jimmy Carter: Memories and Excuses (pp 94-101) 
(E. A. Ivanyan) (not translated) 


took Reviews 

Review of "The Reindustrialization of America" by 
S. Zucker, C. Deutsch, J. Hoerr, N. Jonas, J. Pearson 
and J. Cooper (pp 102-104) 

(Ye. V. Pavlova) (not translated) 

Review of "The U.S. Government and the Working Class (from 
the Formation of the United States of America to the End 
of World War II)" by N. V. Sivachev (pp 104-106) 

(A. A. Popov) (not translated) 

Review of “Historical Study of Ethnic Relations in United 

States and Canada (1960's-1970's)" by V. B. Yevtukh (pp 106-107) 
(S. A. Chervonnaya) (not translated) 

Review of "International Relations in Civil Aviation" by 
V. G. Afanas'yev (pp 107-108) 

(V. D. Samorukov) (not translated) 


U.S. Military Bases--Strongholds of Imperialism (pp 109-115) 
Cees Be Se oa kkk eke ee eae heer ec ereseddeeeedsdcddervsssdere 57 


Plans To Upgrade Military Command-Control-Communication Systems 
Scored (pp 116-121) 
CV. Be FROME) ccc cccccccvoesecesdececccsecccdccvscccvecccescceces 66 


U.S. Air Transport (pp 121-127) 
(V. G. Afanas'yev) (not translated) 








Place ot Publicacion 


Dite of Publication 


»icned to press 





PUBLICATION DATA 


: USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY 


No 6, June 1983 


: SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA 


>: N. D. Turkatenko 


: Izdatel'stvo Nauka 


: Moscow 


: June 1983 


: 19 May 1983 


: 30,920 


> Izdatel'stvo ‘Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, 
politika, ideologiya", 1983 








REASONS FOR REAGAN'S HARD-LINE FOREIGN POLICY EXAMINED 


Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 83 (signed 
to press 19 May 83) pp 7-17 


[Article by Yu. P. Davydov: "The Reagan Administration's Approach to the 
Outside World" |] 


[Text] The foreign policy of the present Republican cabinet is formed within 
the framework of the general imperialist line of U.S. ruling circles, reflect- 
ing the balance of forces within these circles with regard to the country's 
place and role in today's world. In this sense, it is an amplification of 
many tendencies which were reflected less clearly in the policy of several 
postwar administrations, especially that of J. Carter. Im some areas, however, 
quantitative changes have become so apparent that they have given rise to some 
new features in Washington's approach to the external world--to socialist 
states, allies, neutral states and nonaligned countries--and in international 
affairs in general. This approach is not confined to the bounds of any kind 
of precise or logical scheme because the foreign policy philosophy of the 
particular segment of the ruling class which took charge in 1981 represents a 
zroup of eclectic views, opinions and attitudes--and extremely tendentious 
ones--with regard to today's world, the essence of the changes taking place 

in this world and Washington's ability to influence them. 


when we seek the sources of the conservative Reagan Administration's general 
ipproach to the outside world, we must remember that, in addition to every- 
thing else,! this approach essentially reflects the aims of a particular seg- 
ment of the Republican Party which was not allowed to take charge for over 

20 years and, because it remained on the sidelines of U.S. politics, retained, 
in more or less untouched form, the traditions and attitudes of the cold war 
md the overt anticommunism of J. F. Dulles’ day, based on the myth of a 
“worldwide communist conspiracy headquartered in Moscow." "An entire ‘cold 
war’ clique of inveterate ‘hawks’ and ‘neo-hawks' suddenly came into its own,’ 
American journalist R. Scheer writes in his recently published book "With 
Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War." "The members of this group 
categorically reject peaceful coexistence with the USSR.... They are obsessed 
with the strategy of confrontation."? 


Another distinctive feature of the present administration is that the 
President and his closest advisers had little contact with U.S. foreign policy 








prior to the election. Their approach to the outside world and its develop- 
ment and their interpretation of world events have been affected primarily by 
their experience in an area more familiar and more comprehensible to them: 
They are guided by their experience in business, by its interests and by the 
related type of social relations. As a result, they approach of Ronald Reagan 
and his closest associates (most of these are also businessmen: For example, 
Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger and Secretary of State G. Shultz were top 
executives in the California Bechtel corporation and W. Clark was the owner 
and manager of a real estate company, another California firm) to the world 
outside the United States is clearly influenced by the philosophy of "free 
enterprise," particularly “Reaganomics"--the only "original" idea the 
President brought with him to the White House. 


In the most simple terms, the "philosophy" of Ronald Reagan and the people he 
represents is based on the belief that the capitalist economy and the system 
of private enterprise in general are capable of regulating themselves spon- 
taneously and of ove .coming all problems without "excessive interference” from 
outside. "Excessive regulation" of the economy by the government is harmful, 
reducing its viability and making it weaker and more vulnerable to various 
ailments, as a result of which healthy competition wanes and the economy is 
burdened by the bankruptcy of obsolete and decaying portions of the economic 
organism (this is the reason for the appeals for the "deregulation" of U.S. 
economic affairs); competition and rivalry among firms, corporations and monop- 
olies are integral elements of the system of private enterprise, there is a 
tierce struggle for survival, in which the strong (the most clever, unprinci- 
pled, lucky, etc.) win and the weak either become dependent on the strong or 
disappear; the end justifies all means, the winner is always right, and it is 
he who determines the conditions of the future existence of the losers (the 
weak). 


When Ronald Reagan and his associates entered the White House and encountered 
the need to define the bases of their approach to the outside world, they tried 
to apply some of the elements of their overall view of international relations 
within the general context of "power politics” without burdening themselves 
with any excessive complications. The foreign policy outlook of many members 
of the Republican administration, especially those who still believe in 
"American omnipotence," clearly reflects a tendency to approach U.S. relations 
with the rest of the world (both economic and political) from the standpoint of 
the general principles of “free enterprise" and to practice foreign policy with 
the use of these principles as a guide. 


Under the influence of this group of men, the present Washington administra- 
tion is much more likely than its predecessors of the 1970's to view inter- 
national relations primarily as an arena of unrestricted competition with other 
states for hegemony, “for a place in the sun," for the right to direct world 
events. What is more, the implied goal of this struggle is not the conversion 
of the world according to the American model, but the “survival” of the United 
States and its system of values. According to some administration ideologists, 
competition in the world arena, just as in the capitalist economy, cannot be 
regulated in general by the international community. The Reagan Administration 
does not believe in the possibility of "peaceful relations and regulated 











relations with the Soviet Union,” Professor S$. Bialer from Columbia University 
ind J. Afferica from Smith College stressed.3 According to "Reagapolitics," 
the strongest and most influential leader comes to the fore as a result of 
fierce competition and the “free play" of forces in the world arena, in which 
the ultimate winner is the contender with the greatest resources, reserve 
strength and ability to impose his will on his rivals. 


Obviously, we must bear in mind, first of all, that the analogy with economics 
("free enterprise") is conditional and, secondly, that we are referring to 
only one aspect of the present administration's approach to the external world, 
which appears to be an extremely important aspect but is certainly not the 
only one. It can explain much about its behavior in the international arena, 
but it certainly cannot cover all of Washington's various foreign policy prac- 
tices and it certainly does not exclude the possibility of deviations or even 


reversals. Foreign policy is the object of a continuous struggle within the 
U.S. ruling elite. 


Objectively, this reliance on the spontaneous development of international 
relations and their actual "deregulation"4 refute, both in theory and in 
practice, the concept of peaceful coexistence by states with differing social 
systems (which assumes that international relations based on mutually bene- 
ficial cooperation are possible). What is more, it is actively hostile to this 
mecept because it denies the equality of states, perpetuates the division of 
states into strong and weak entities and impedes the democratization of inter- 


national relations. 

\fter choosing the line of unrestricted confrontation in the international 
irena--primarily, but not only, between East and West--the present American 
idministration announced that it would win this struggle without resorting to 


worldwide nuclear war ("lLimited"” war, however, is another matter). But if 
mpetition in the world takes on a “spontaneous, fundamentally uncontrollable 
nature,’ the statement that it will "stop at the threshold of worldwide nuclear 


war’ is politically quite dangerous as well as invalid. 
lt must be said, however, that the overall negative attitude of Washington's 
urrent leaders toward the conscious regulation of international relations 

loes mot mean that they are against any kind of negotiation between states: 

In the first place, they are inclined to regard negotiations and their possible 


results primarily as a way of strengthening American positions in world compe- 
tition; im the second place, by making proposals that are obviously unaccept- 
ible to negotiating partners, they try to force these partners to accept 
solutions based exclusively on their own terms (which is impossible in today's 
world), ard this also leads to the “deregulation” of international relations. 


Ky attempting to involve the entire international community in confrontation 


in the world arena, the Reagan Administration hopes that this process, which 
diverts states from the resolution of urgent problems, will undermine the 
socloeconemic positions of the socialist community countries--the basis of 
their influence in today's world--and keep the developing ‘tates from 
strengthening their political and economic independence, thereby increasing 
their dependence on the industrial West and simultaneously reinstating the 
United Stat: '¢ the undisputed leader of the imperialist countries. 


ed 


j 











Washington's attempts to launch unrestricted competition in today's world are 
evident in several areas. Washington tried to disrupt the completion of the 
Madrid conterence of signatories of the Final Act in Helsinki and has taken 

in obstructionist stance at the Geneva talks with the Soviet Union on the 
Limitation and reduction of strategic arms and the limitation of nuclear 
weapons in Europe and at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and 
irms in Central Europe. American representatives blocked the talks on the 
nuclear test ban, on the sale of conventional weapons to third countries and 
on antisatellite weapons aud effectively put an end to the so-called "North- 
South" dialogue. The United States refused to sign the convention on the law 
of the sea--the result of many years of serious negotiations at the Third UN 
Conterence, in which previous administrations had taken an active part, stopped 
the talks on several other urgent international problems and took an extremely 
destructive position in the United Nations in general. 


The free trade foreign policy philosophy of the Reagan Administration also pre- 
determines its behavior in the international arena. Since this implies unre- 
stricted competition between states and a struggle in which one of the opposing 
sides must be crushed either physically or politically, all means are justifi- 
thle and permissible in this kind of skirmish, according to the ideologists of 
this approach. The top leaders of the American administration are not at all 
embarrassed by the fact that they have repeatedly been caught falsifying the 
facts, defrauding the American and world public, behaving hypocritically 
(making shrill statements in defense of the political demands of the Polish 
"Solidarity" leaders while disintegrating the American union of air traffic 
controllers who dared to make economic demands on the government), practicing 
blackmail and breaking promises (the ones they made, for example, to their 
allies at the Versailles summit meeting). None of this is considered to be 
shameful; what is more, it is all regarded as enviable political ingenuity. 


Of course, this kind of behavior has always been present to some degree in the 
American bourgeois political process, but for the Reagan Administration it has 
become a characteristic political style rather than an extreme measure. The 
periodic blackmailing of allies with the threat of protectionist measures and 
the withdrawal of American troops from Europe, the obvious shuffling of figures 
in the assessments of the Soviet-U.S. military balance, the groundless state- 
ments about the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the 
incredible allegations that the USSR is involved in the organization of 
international terrorism and so forth are not merely isolated facts from the 
biography of the current administration, but a Line of behavior stemming from 

1 specific foreign policy philosophy. 


In addition to this, this administration, which defends the South African 
racists and the Latin American dictatorships that annihilate thir enemies, 
supports the Israeli military leaders who provoked the bloody massacre in 
Lebanon, and finances rightwing campaigns in Western Europe through CIA 
channels, is cynically showing other nations the way to "democracy" and "free 
elections" and is passing itself off as a fighter for "human rights.” 


There is no need to go into lengthy discussions about the dangers of the delib- 
erate line of unrestricted competition by states at a time of nuclear confron- 
tation or the unforeseen consequences the entire human race could suffer as a 


/ 
+ 





result. This Line is in the interest of only an extremely limited segment of 
the American ruling class, frightened by social changes in the world and by the 
ivalanche of problems facing the United States, which no American administra- 
tion has been able to solve. What is more, no administration has even been 
ible to Suggest any constructive solutions. This segment would like to weather 
the current changes in the werld in their customary "cold war" trenches and 
simultaneously earn capital from the escalation of international tension. 


[In an attempt to heighten rivalry in today's world, to put its opponents in a 
less advantageous position and to use its own, albeit temporary advantages 
(economic, financial, scientific and technical), the present U.S. leadership 

is trying to "raise the stakes'"--that is, to raise the "cost" of this competi- 
tion for other states (in the belief that it will retain enough "cash" for the 
last bet)--in order to deplete their resources prior to the decisive “test of 
strength” and to force them to admit that competition with the United States is 
too costly and virtually unacceptable for them and that they must consequently 
make concessions to Washington. The current administration's hope of raising 
the “cost” of the foreign policy operations of other states extends not only 

to the countries which have traditionally been regarded by the U.S. ruling elite 
us potential adversaries in the international arena, but also to some which are 
considered to be partners and allies. 





his is the reason for Washington's desire to drive the international commun- 
ly round of the arms race (can anyone but the United 
States survive it?), to raise the level of international tension (this is 
ilso expensive), to pursue a policy of economic sanctions against Poland, the 
Soviet Union and its own allies (if they want to be more independent, let them 
houlder most of the burden of confrontation with the socialist world) and to 
incite crises (Afghanistan, the Middle East, southern Africa, etc.) which will 
have to paid for (politically, economically and morally) dearly by others. 
When the Reagan Administration announced economic sanctions against the 
Soviet Union in December 1981 and against its own allies in June 1982, it 
evidently did not hope to completely put an end to the construction of the 
pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe, but it did expect the sanctions to 
lelay the completion of the project for at least 2 years, raise the expendi- 
tures of the USSR and the West European countries and force the latter to 
“think lone and hard" before making such deals in the future. 


since the present system of international relations, according to those in 


Washington, is based on increasingly intense competition among states (partic- 
ilarly the great powers), which should eventually lead to the defeat of one 
‘ide, only the side capable of dominating the other in one way or another--or, 
ideally, in all ways--can win (or survive), according to the ideologists and 
ipologist f the current administration (R. Pipes, W. Draper, P. Nitze, 

|. Buckley, N. Podhoretz, C. Gray and others). This is the reason for the 
maniacal session of the ircent Washington leaders with the idea of military 
superiority over the Soviet Union and NATO superiority over the Warsaw Pact, 
for the KE f which dozens of domestic social programs have been sacrificed. 
From this vantage point, the state of military balance or parity between the 


cep , leat + } < » toe a A hw *) ; »7 . ao a ls + 
USSR and the hited tates is regarded by the ruling elite as a window of 








vulnerability,” as a source of uncertainty, because this means that world 
events will not necessarily transpire according to the American scenario. 


'he members ot this elite are trying to convince their fellow citizens that 
only military superiority and a "situation of strength” on the American side 
will guarantee their “survival.” If the United States does not surpass al! 
other world powers in terms of strength, it will be crushed and smothered by 


its opponents and will be reduced to a secondary power. "The idea of a world 
in which the United States is an average nation or even just one of the great 
powers is still repugnant to the majority of Americans,” wrote Professor 

S. Hoffman from Harvard University, although it would be more accurate if 
this statement referred to a specific segment of the U.S. ruling class rather 
than to Americans in general. By idealizing the military-strategic situation 
of the period between the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1960's, 
Ronald Reagan aud his closest associates are trying to prove that ali of the 
problems, difficulties and failures the United States is now experiencing in 
the international arena will disappear as soon as it regains its previous 
military superiority. 


This kind of “conservative romanticism" essentially has little in common with 
the principle of the "businesslike approach" to the outside world, and even 
less in common with reality. Nostalgia for the past and a desire to revive 
the atmosphere of the days of the "containment” of communism and "massive 
retaliation” distinguish the approach to international relations of the par- 
ticular segment of the American ruling class that put Ronald Reagan and his 
administration in power. Its foreign policy is not based on a view of the 
real world of today, with all of its complexities and contradictions, but the 
world as it appears to the present U.S. ruling clique. In other words, it is 
trying to operate within the framework of outdated or disappearing patterns 

of international relations. "The present administration stubbornly formulates 
its policy in terms having little to do with today's international realities," 
Professor C. Kegley and E. Wittkopf concluded.® 


As a result, its foreign policy is constantly revealing disparities and dis- 
crepancies. Above ali, there is the disparity between the objective situation 
in the world and in individual regions and countries, between the actual ten- 
dencies and processes witnessed in international relations, and their assess- 
ment by Washington's political leaders. This disparity is characteristic of 
the majority of opinions of the chief members of the current administration, 
whether they concern the situation in the North Atlantic alliance, Central 
America or the Middle East. It is particularly apparent, however, in the 
assessment of the situation in the socialist countries. Some members of the 
administration prefer to see only the problems and difficulties of socialism 
and not to notice its considerable social, economic and cultural achievements, 
which are of interest to other nations, particularly those embarking on the 
road of social 1t»novation. When President Reagan addressed the English 
Parliament on 8 June 1982, he tried to convince his audience that "the Soviet 
experiment is failing” in the USSR and, in general, "communism is losing its 
ippeal""/ (he apparently forgot or simply did not know that the end of the 
"Soviet experiment” has been announced in the West since the day it began). 


There is another perceptible disparity between the foreign policy goals of the 
administration and the resources it has for their attainment. It is completely 








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that the present American administration's plans to attain military 
ity over the Soviet Union and NATO superiority over the Warsaw Pact 


lo not take the existing political and economic potential of the 
ates into account. "Throughout the postwar period,” Harvard Professor 


marked, “there has always been a certain disparity between U.S. 


ind U.S. strength. The more ambitious the interests, the more pro- 
he disparity." 
i third disparity between specific foreign policy measures and their 
The attempt to exert mass-scale pressure on the Soviet Union in the 
1ining concessions in several areas of international and domestic 

did not produce the anticipated results. The military-political 
for the intimidation of Cuba was unsuccessful. Washington's numerous 
) strengthen Atlantic solidarity did not have the desired impact 


e of these disparities and discrepancies is constantly expanding. 
is gave the abovementioned S. Bialer and J. Afferica reason to assert 
maximalist approach of the Reagan Administration is based on illu- 


ut the weakness of the Soviet system, the overestimation of the 


the United States and the entire Western alliance and overly 
ideas about the capabilities of American foreign policy."9 


have expected the extension of the principles of "free enterprise” to 
e of international relations (even in the form of "Reaganomics”) to 
he appearance of elements of pragmatism, rationalism and common 


\l characteristic of the businesslike approach, in U.S. foreign policy. 


pragmatism’ of the present American administration in iuternational 
is taken the form of a desire for quick success at any price and an 
yn immediate goals and on the particular areas of international activ- 


1ich results seemed more attainable to the ruling elite. This is the 


yr the present administration's vague and indistinct system of foreign 


yri.ies and its concentration on secondary or imaginary problems 
ittle to do with U.S. national interests. 


, 


that Ronald Reagan's pragmatism, which admittedly served him wel] 


is campaign, has not been reflected in the foreign policy of his 


ition? It appears that the world view of Ronald Reagan and his 
ation reflects the opinions and aims of the extreme right wing of the 
stablishment, whose behavior in the international arena is guided 
primitive class instinct than by class awareness. This group has 

1 less (in comparison to Europe or even Latin America) social] 
s within the country and usually encounters them from outside. When 


es the consequences of social changes in the world, it is incapa- 


scognizing their historical necessicv and tries to blame them on the 


. . . « ‘ . * . . *. . ~ 
nal activities of the socialist countries, especially the Soviet 


° . : ° . ° ' . 
+ . ‘ ‘ 9 . ~ “ ™ * a ‘+ . . . 
nother factor influencing the Reagan Administratior s approa 
ed States became much more 


~ 


nm the outside world and, as a result, much more vulnerable to it. 








This is an objective process stemmfig trom a variety of economic, political, 
military and ideological factors. The American public is growing increasingly 
aware of this reality. According to a public opinton poll conducted by 

D. Yankelovich, 42 percent of the Americans listed foreign policy problems 
among the country's most vital concerns in the beginning of 1980 (in compari 
son to 3 percent in 1979) ,10 


The realization of the nation's increasing vulnerability came from different 
directions and evolved under the influence of different events. first of all, 
it became increasingly obvious that the eradication of American superiority in 
strategic arms had made American territory accessible to a potential adver- 
sary's retaliatory strike. This was a shock to those who were accustomed to 
associating questions of U.S. security with U.S. invulnerability. In the 
second place, the flareup and increasing severity of the energy crisis in 1973- 
1975, and to some degree in 1979 as well, revealed that American welfare was 
much more dependent than before on the political and economic situation in 
ocher parts of the world. In the third place, the Japanese and West European 
economic invasion of U.S. territory, growing constantly more intensive from 

the second half of the 1970's on, revealed the vulnerability of U.S. industry-- 
the basis of American strength aud national pride. Finally, the defeat in 
Vietnam, the revolution in Iran, the victory of the Sandinist front in 
Nicaragua and the continuous (despite American aid to reactionary forces) civil 
war in El Salvador pioved that external upheavals could affect the nation's 
internal political atmosphere. 


lt is a fact that American vulnerability is now much broader and deeper (the 

. considerable dependence on some important types of strategic raw materials, 
the sometimes extremely unstable position of the dollar in currency markets, 
the transnational corporate activities dependent on the political situation in 
host countries, etc.). 


In principle, many countries are vulnerable in the same way, but they have 
iearned to live with this vulnerability and to find ways of neutralizing some 
of its negative consequences. The situation is new for the Americans, however, 
who were raised with the belief thac nothing of the kind could ever happen to 
them. This phenomenon, which has sometimes been dramatized deliberately by 
certain U.S. groups in their own interests, evoked different reactions from 
different social strata, primarily a sense of anxiety. 


American ruling circles, and the Reagan Administration in particular, are 
taking advantage of this anxiety to imply that the present increase in U.S. 
vulnerability is due solely to the growth of Soviet military strength in the 
1970's and are saying nothing about the real reasons. The other causes of 
this comprehensive U.S. vulnerability to the outside world are either ignored 
or discounted. As a result, the objective process of this vulnerability's 
srowth has been transformed into a so-called "Soviet threat" to America through 
the efforts of rightwing forces and the ideological machine of the military- 
industrial complex. The myth of "traditiona) Soviet expansionism” was put to 
work in the same way (in his very first public statement as the President's 
national security adviser, W. Clark noted that the United States "has vitally 
important interests throughout the world" and asserted that "the most obvious 
threat to them is posed by the Soviet Union") 21 


8 





In thi way, the Soviet Union is branded the chief generator of the misfortunes, 
problems and ditficulties with which the U.S. dominant class has had to con- 
tend in the international arena. In one of his speeches, Ronald Reagan said 
that the existence of the Soviet Union is "the greatest tragedy of our time. 
wichout it, “we would have no problems ir this world.” Statements like these 
testify that a black and white view of the outside world is once again charac- 
teristic of the chief members of the administration, just as it was during the 
cold war. They view the world exclusively through the prism of tough and force- 
ful confrontation with the Soviet Union and cther countries of the socialist 
community. They are actually living by only one rule: Anything that is bad 

for the USSR is good for the United States and vice versa. As a result, 
international events, the activities of other governments, including allies, 

and the United States’ own activity in all areas are generally evaluated 
according to a single criterion: How much it harms the Soviet Union and bene- 
fits (this usually concerns immediate benefits because there its a tendency to 
ignore far-reaching consequences) the U.S. ruling clique. 


"12 


fhe oversimplified views of the present American leadership about the nature 

ot controntation in the international arena and the sociopolitical aims of the 
opposing forces have seriously influenced the engineering of the specific U.S. 
foreign policy reflecting the following "ideas" of the current administration: 


in the international arena the. United States generally has either "real 
triends,” prepared to support Washington automatically and unconditionally in 
any situation, or opponents and enemies, overt or covert. There is no middle 
wround, and neutrality is treated, just as it was in Dulles’ time, as a swear- 
word (this is the reason for the cooler relations with neutral Austria and 
Sweden); 


the indicator (or criterion) of the "friendliness" of other countries toward 
the United States is not so much the state of their relations with Washington 
is the degree of their anti-Sovietism, the "total harm" they are capable of 
inflicting on the USSR ("If you call yourself an anticommunist, you will have 
no problems with the Reagan Administration") ;/3 


here is no clear dividing line between confrontation and cooperation among 
ites belonging to different social systems. In fact (despite the plethora 
statements about the willingness to cooperate with the socialist countries 
r the good of mankind"), the Republican administration believes that they, 
espectally the Soviet Union and United States, have no common interests, at 
least in the main areas, whereas the zone of conflicts is wide and deep; this 
is why the improvement of relations between the two powers will always be 
¥, as tension is a more natural state for them ("The policy of Ronald 
Reagan, as it is now formulated, offers the Soviet leadership only confronta- 
ion or surrender");!4 under these conditions, compromises or mutual conces- 


ions in relations among states (even when they belong to the same sociopolitical 
ystem) hold out little promise and, according to the administration's ideolo- 
ists, agreements based on these compromises will probably not be observed in 


ituations that are critical for either side; 


The structure of international relations or the “world order" can be based 
either on Soviet or on American terms (either on Soviet or on American 





supertority) and cannot be based on 4 Soviet-American or broader international 
consensus--this is unrealistic in today's atmosphere; in fact, the structure 
of international relations will be workable only if the United States occupies 
the dominant position; 


The claims of other countries to have their own specific interests in this 
black and white situation are either invalid or illusory; the attempts of some 
statesmen (primarily allies) to insist on these specific interests or on the 
right to them should be viewed, regardless of their motives, as a betrayal of 
the common cause, a break in the common front and evidence of "consorting with 
the enemy" (this is exactly how people in the White House defined the position 
of several West European governments on the "gas for pipes" agreement with 

the Soviet Union). 


Within the context of this bl ck and white view of the world, pressure becomes 
the main medium of U.S. influence on the surrounding world--opponents, allies 
and nonaligned states. These people who once had fairly abstract ideas about 
the possibilities of force, especially military strength, are now particularly 
inclined to insist on the use of some kind of force to secure the international 
interests of the American establishment. "Let us stop hesitating. Let us use 
our strength,” the American President said.15 


The emphasis on strength, especially military force, has taken on a truly 
maniacal nature in the present administration. Strength is the watchword for 
those engaged in arming the United States and for those advocating disarmament. 
[It has become a universal means of solving all international problems. Rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union? Strength is the only possible basis for these. 
With Western Europe and Japan? They will probably also respond best to 
strength. With the nonaligned countries? All the more so. A world without 
war? Yes, but through strength. Negotiations? Only from a position of 
strength. And so forth. 


When we assess Washington's current approach to the outside world in general, 
we should underscore the fact that the previous reformist line (the Carter 
Administration) of U.S. adaptation to the outside world and of the use of the 
possibilities created by its development in the United States' own interest 

has been replaced with the aim of reconstructing the world in accordance with 
the views of the extreme right wing of the American establishment. The members 
of this group have virtually equated their class instinct with the national 
interest and have made foreign policy their point of departure. As a result of 
this, this policy can again be reduced (just as it could decades ago) to a 
steugegle against "world communism" in any part of the world. The obsession 
with confrontation with the Soviet Union causes Washington to overreact to any 
events that appear unfavorable to the American ruling elite. This tendency to 
overreact in a country with enormous nuclear potential could have the most 
serious effect on international security and even the existence of all life on 
earth. 


Any method is assessed primarily in terms of how it works under the specific 
conditions of the current international situation. In this context, the 
approach of Ronald Reagan and his associaces to the outside world is distinctive 


10 








not only because it ts inetfective--that ‘s, it generally does not lead to 
the anticipated toreign policy goals--but also because it is sometimes counter- 
productive-=-that is, its results are the opposite of those anticipated. 


' i 


ne line of ‘deregulatirs" international relatione (or, in other words, the 
ittempt to regulate them exclusively on the United States’ own terms) and of 
unrestricted competition under the conditions of nuclear confrontation have 
heightened the risk of a conflict involving the use of all types of weapons of 
mass de.truction. This fact was y.ickly acknowledged by the world public and 
by many statesmen and evoked a backlash, strengthening the determination of 
the majority of states to regulate international relations, particularly in 
the case of situations capable of engendering military conflicts. 


Ihe Reagan Administration's attempts to attain the military superiority of 

the United States over the Soviet Union and of the NATO bloc over the Warsaw 
'act states have, despite all the danger they represent to the cause of peace, 
surprised Washington by being largely counterproductive: They have led to the 
unprecedented growth of the antiwar movement in Western Europe and even in the 
United States. This is a reality Washington cannot ignore. 


the aim ot military superiority, which is directed in part at the restoration 
| unconditional American leadership in the Western alliance, frightened the 
illies with its extremism and with the ease with which Washington discusses 
the possibility of nuclear war. "The administration's statements about 

} 


nuclear weapons and nuclear war had an impact that was the direct opposite of 
the anticipated effect,"!® Professor J. Nye stressed in this connection. 


‘he Reagan Administration hoped to use the situation in Poland as, in addition 
to everything else, a weans of raising the level of solidarity in NATO. The 
.inctions against Poland and the USSR, which Washington wanted the allies to 
uphold, were supposed to have the same effect. "Toughness" and "determination" 
were therefore supposed to lead to greater NATO unity on a solid platform of 
struggle against “atheistic communism.” But these steps were also counter- 
productive. "The embargo, which was the result of the President's personal 
decision and which was undertaken in spite of the protests of some of his 
idvisers, hurt the unity of NATO, which it was supposed to strengthen, more 
than it hurt the Soviet Union, which it was supposed to ‘punish,'” France's 
LE MONDE commented.!? The sanctions were lifted, but the wounds they inflicted 
relations with the allies remained. 


he “new continentalism,” the U.S. reliance on Latin America (Western Europe is 

inreliable) and the new “Monroe Doctrine" were the subject of much discussion 

wien Ronald Reagan entered the White House. But Washington's behavior during 

the crisis over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, its unilateral support of 

‘reat Britain and its organization of military provocations against Nicaragua 

created a situation that was the opposite of the one anticipated. This 

olicy alienated the Latin American countries from the United States instead 
ttrengthening the ties between them. 


Ronald Reagan's policy line has also proved to be counterproductive in several 
ther areas--in relations with developing countries, the movement for non- 
ilignment, the PRC and the socialist countries in Eastern Europe. 


lL] 











Fach new approach needs adjustment after it has been employed for a certain 
length of time. The time has apparently come for the Reagan Administration 
to do this. More thau half of Reagan's term in office is over. The ineffec- 
tiveness of Washington's foreign policy meas'res and their counterproductive 
nature in some areas have evoked a wave of criticism abroad and in the United 
States. Pecyle are starting to leave the administration. Several objective 
factors in the present international situation are impeding the establishment 
of new features in the American approach to the outside worid. They are 
creating unfamiliar and difficult problems for Washington. As yet, however, 
adjustments in policy have consisted only in foreign policy maneuvers by the 
administration and in a search for solutions whose form meets tiic requirements 
of the present international situation but whose content is still aimea 
exclusively at securing tue interests of the ruling clique in the United 
States. 


This is not what the international community wants. It certainly does not 
want a continuation of confrontation in the world arena, leading to the growth 
ot tension and the threat of nuclear conflicts. It wants constructive coope- 
ration and the resolution of the complex problems facing mankind. 


FOOTNOTES 


|. For a discussion of the sociopolitical base of the administration's upper 
echelon, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 1l, pp 117- 
127. 


2. R. Scheer, "With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War," N.Y., 
1982, p 5. 


'. S. Bialer and J. Afferica, "Reagan and Russia," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
Winter 1982/83, p 271. 


4. The need to introduce some kind of "order" into the system of relations 
between sovereign states was recognized long ago. Many sensible politi- 
cians realized that international relations could not take the form of an 
endless "war by everyone against everyone" and that they must be regulated. 
In the nuclear age this necd became even more apparent. It engendered 
international law, a system of treaties (bilaterai and multilateral), the 
United Nations and other international organizations (as well as such 
concepts as the "internationa! government" and the "world state"). The 
Soviet Union wants the kind of regulation of international relations that 
would eliminate the danger of war, promote disarmament and mutually bene- 
ficial cooperation in other areas, etc. Given the present balance of 
forces in the world, however, this kind of regulation would, in addition 
to everything else, tend to inhibit the imperialist aims of more reaction- 
ary circles in the United States and limit their capabilities in the 
international arena. This is the reason ‘or their attempts to sabotage 
the process of regulation and to secure their own freedom in the world 
arena in the hope of attaining superior strength. At the same time, the 
attempts to impose a system of regulation based on the United States’ own 


12 





terms, exclusively in the interest of the American ruling clique-- 
attempts which are made futile ty the current alignment of forces in the 
world--are only the opposite side of the process of "deregulation." 


3 
. 


S. Hoffman, "Requiem," FOREIGN POLICY, 1981, No 42, p 26. 


6. C. Kegley and E. Wittkopf, "The Reagan Administration's World View," 
ORBIS, Spring 1982, p 241. 


?. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, July 1982, p 26. 


8. J. Nye, "U.S. Power and Reagan Policy," ORBIS, Summer 1982, p 406. 





9. SS. Bialer and J. Afferica, Op. cit., p 271. 


lO. L. Kaagan and D. Yankelovich, "Assertive America," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1981, 
vol 59, No 3, p 70Ol. 


lL. THE WASHINGTON POST, 20 May 1982. 

|\2. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 26 July 1982, p 918. 
13. C. Kegley and E. Wittkopf, Op. cit., p 228. 

l4. S$. Bialer and J. Afferica, Op. cit., p 2/71. 

15. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, July 1982, p 28. 

16. J. Nye, Op. cit., p 403. 

17. LE MONDE, 16 November 1982. 


COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya”, 
1983 


R588 
CSO: 1803/11 


13 








WASHINGTON OBJECTS TO NUCLEAR-FREE EUROPE 


Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 83 (signed 
to press 19 May 83) pp 41-45 


[Article by V. F. Davydov] 


[Text] An inexorable choice faces Europe in 1983: Will it have to accept a 

new round of the race for nuclear missiles, lowering still further the sword 

of Damocles of total nuclear devastation that already hangs over it, or will 

the arms race be curbed and reversed and the process of the continent's libe- 
ration from nuclear weapons begin? A clear understanding of this alternative 
is nurturing mass movements for the creation of nuclear-free zones in various 
parts of Europe, including Northern Europe and the Balkans. 


The political declaration adopted by the Warsaw Pact states at a conference of 
the Political Consultative Committee in Prague in January 1983 says that the 
best way of strengthening security in Europe and ensuring the positive devei- 
opment of intergovernmental relations on the continent and the improvement of 
the entire international situation "would be the removal of all nuclear weapons, 
both medium-range and tactical, from Europe.” Conference participants supported 
proposals regarding the creation of nuclear-free zones in Northern Europe, the 
Balkans and other parts of the continent, the transformation of the Mediter- 
ranean Sea into a zone of peace and cooperation and the organization of the 
appropriate talks on these matters. 


As early as the middle of the 1950's, when NATO forces were equipped with 
nuclear weapons, the socialist states responded by suggesting the creation of 

a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, which would include Poland, the CSSR, 
the GDR and the FRG. They worked out the basic provisions of the concept of 
nuclear-free zones now used in diplomatic practice--the obligation of the 
non-nuclear states in the zone not to produce, acquire or permit the emplace- 
ment of nuclear weapons within their territory, and the obligation of nuclear 
states not to use nuclear weapons against countries in the zone, not to 
threaten the use of these weapons and to respect and not violate their nuclear- 
free status. The USSR announced its willingness to make these pledges, but the 
NATO countries did not follow its example, ano the United States decided to 
saturate the territory of its allies with nuclear weapons. 








‘ 


vorthern Europe 


The U.S. and NATO plans to deploy new American medium-range missiles on the 
Furopean continent in 1983 have made it essential for North European countries 
to consider ways of guarding themselves against the catastrophic consequences 
ot nuclear war if it cannot be prevented. An effective way of eliminating the 
nuclear threat would consist in the judicial registration of their non-nuclear 
status and the attainment of guar intees from the nuclear powers that nuclear 
,eapons will not be used against these countries. This course of action was 
already being discussed in Northern Europe in 1963 at Finland's suggestion. 


The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared its fundamental agreement with this 
proposal and has stressed its willingness to pledge not to use nuclear weapons 
ind not to threaten their use against the North European countries in a non- 
nuclear zone--that is, countries which pledge not to produce or acquire 

nuclear weapons or to allow their emplacement within their territory. The 
Soviet Union's guarantee could be secured by a multilateral agreement or by 
bilateral agreements with each of the countries in the zone. Furthermore, the 
Soviet Union does not exclude the possibility of the consideration of some other 
measures with regard to its own territory adjacent to the nuclear-free zone in 
Northern Europe. What is more, these measures could be considerable. From the 
standpoint of any nuclear state, this Soviet willingness represents an unprece- 
dented step, dictated by sincere concern for the security of the non-nuclear 
countries. Furthermore, the USSR has not made its pledge conditional upon a 
positive response to the zone by other nuclear powers, although it is under- 
standable that the countries in the zone would be more secure if the NATO 
nuclear powers could also pledge to respect their non-nuclear status. 


From the very beginning, however, the United States and the NATO bloc objected 
to the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. The Reagan Admin- 
istratior exerted pressure on the northern countries in the fear that the 
creation of a nuclear-free zone would interfere with NATO's long-range nuclear 
preparations in all of Western Europe. Under this pressure, the northern 


NA countries have taken actions attesting to their deeper involvement in the 
»loe's nuclear strategy. Norway is participating in the planning of nuclear 
trategy and the creation of the NATO infrastructure. In 1980 it signed an 


reement with the United States on the storage of American heavy military 
equipment on its territory. A similar agreement is to be signed by the United 
States and Denmark. Military and political leaders of the North European NATO 
runtries have refused to offer unconditional assurances that their territory 

t being used and will not be used, at least in peacetime, for transit 

Yioments of nuclear weapons. It is known, for example, that the American 


‘rapid deployment force,” which could use military storage facilities in 
Norway and Denmark, has nuclear weapons in its arsenal. 

NATO plans envisage the use of airfields and communication centers in 
Norway, Denmark and Iceland by strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons "in 
the event of military operations.” The flight trajectories of American mis- 
-iles located in Britain and aimed at the USSR cross the territory of Norway, 


neutral Sweden and even Finland. This testifies that the probability of the 
use of nuclear weapons in Northern Europe is much greater today and is increas- 
ine due to the actions of the United States and of NATO in general. 


— 
1 








Social democratic and communist parties, trade unions, politicians and nublic 
spokesmen in the North European countries advocate the creation of a nuclear- 
free zone without delay. At the 3lst Session of the Northern Council in Oslo 
in February 1953, representatives of communist and socialist parties addressed 
the governments of the northern countries with an appeal for immediate joint 
measures for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. They 
also suggested that a commission be created on the ministerial level to dis- 
cuss this matter and that a forum of parliamentarians be convened to investi- 
gate the problem. This matter is one of the central issues in the foreign 
policy programs of the Swedish and Finnish governments. "A nuclear-free zone 
today, and not tomorrow'--this is row the slogan of all peace-loving forces in 
the northern countries. 


The Balkans 


Northern curope is far from the only place on the continent where the possi- 
bility of nuclear-free zones is the subject of lively discussion. This idea 
is widely supported in the Balkans and in many Mediterranean countries. 


In 1981 Bulgaria proposed that the heads of the Balkan states meet to discuss 
this problem. The response to this proposal was positive in Yugoslavia and 
Romania, as well as in Greece, which has American nuclear weapons within its 
territory. When Chairman N. A. Tikhonov of the USSR Council of Ministers 
visited Greece in February 1983, Prime Minister A. Papandreou told him: "The 
proposed creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans is winning increasing 
support, and we hope that it will eliminate the threat of nuclear catastrophe 
here." 


The importance of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans stems from their 
seographic location, their direct proximity to the explosive Middle East, where 
Israel, an American client, is continuously committing aggressive actions 
against Arab countries with the direct support cf the United States. The fact 
that Tel-Aviv, as we know, plans to create its own nuclear weapons is particu- 
larly alarming. 


Ships of the American Sixth Fleet, carrying nuclear weapons, constantly patrol 
the Mediterr:nean. In Italy, in accordance with the well-known NATO "double 
decision,” preparations are being made for the deployment of new American 
cruise missiles with a range of up to 2,500 kilometers. In this way, 
Washington is turning Italy into a target for a retaliatory nuclear strike. 


fhe Soviet Union has repeatedly announced its support for the removal of all 
ships carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean, the refusal to deploy 
nuclear weapons within the Mediterranean countries and the assumption of com- 
mitments by the nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against any 
Mediterranean country not allowing the deployment of such weapons within its 
territory. 


Central Europe 


The movement for the creation of nuclear-free zones has also become popular in 
the countries of this region. 


16 








An increasing number of politicians and increasingly large segments of the 
population have realized the simple fact that the risk of nuclear confronta- 
tion would be diminished considerably if all nuclear weapons were to be 
removed from Central Europe. After all, the presence of just tactical nuclear 
weapons in this region--that is, close to the boundary between East and West, 
ind in a tense atmosphere--creates enormous risks, including the risk of 
unforeseeable accidents as a result of human or technical error. 





When the Swedish Government addressed the Warsaw Pact states and NATO countries 
in December 1982 with the proposal that a zone free of "nuclear battlefields" 
and approximately 300 kilometers in width--that is, stretching 150 kilometers 
on both sides of the boundary separating the Warsaw Pact countries from the 
NATO states--be created in Europe, the USSR was quick to respond to this 


proposal. 


Soviet reply to the Swedish Government said that this proposal had the 
same aim as the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. 
1 USSR regards the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe, 
including Northern Europe and the Balkans, as an important part of the strug- 
ule to consolidate peace and security on the European continent and as one way 
‘tT freeing the entire continent from nuclear weapons--both tactical and medium- 
range. The Soviet Union announced its willingness to participate in talks on 
| ion of this zone. With a view to the tactica’ and technical charac- 
ics of nuclear weapons discussed in the Swedish proposal, the Soviet 
side believes that the proposed zone could be a truly effective means of reduc- 
ing the nuclear threat if it stretches not 300 kilometers, but 500-600--that 
s, 250-300 kilometers to the east and west of the boundary separating the 
varsaw Pact states from the NATO countries. 


cre 
> | 
- 
* 
— 


The Swedish proposal was also supported by other socialist countries. 


But Washington objected to the idea. A State Department spokesman declared: 
‘hese proposals are unrealistic and ineffective. We do not believe that they 
will promote security and stability in Europe.” On Washington's instructions, 
ial NATO spokesmen made similar announcements, asserting that moving the 

“nuclear battlefield" farther away from a region as important as Central 

would be inconsistent with the NATO doctrine of "flexible response.” 

‘ton simultaneously began "twisting the arms" of its allies even more 
rrously in order to gain their consent to the deplovment of the new U.S. 
ium-range missiles on their territory. 


o 


ter taking its histeric unilateral pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, 
let Union continued to sympathize completely with the European count- 


rie efforts to safeguard their security in the face of the threat of nuclear 
wir. It stressed repeatedly that if the possibility of creating a nuclear-free 
” in any part of Europe should arise, the USSR would actively support any 


ractical steps in this direction. The very wording used by the Soviet Union-- 
Furope free of nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical"--presupposes 

1) broad range of measures and steps in line with the efforts of people to 

no ve '] nuclear weapons from Europe. 














The Pentagon's Nuclear Hostages 


In an attempt to prove that the proposed creation of nuclear-free zones in 
Europe would be contrary to Western interests, the At!antic ideologists have 
alleged that only the NATO "policy of intimidation," based on the ability to 
deliver the first nuclear strike, has kept the peace in Europe throughout the 
postwar period. Nuclear-tree zones, they imply, will weaken the strategy of 
the nuclear "deterrence" of the USSR. 


This thesis is not only totally false but is also serving to camouflage the 
selfish reasons for which American ruling circles are maintaining and augment- 
ing the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe. 


American nuclear weapons deployed in Europe have always been regarded by 
Washington as an integral part of U.S. nuclea: forces and, in Washington's 
opinion, an extremely effective part, due to the geographic location of the 
region. Pentagon strategists proceed from the assumption that these weapons 
can be used even if a conflict between U.S. and Soviet armed forces begins 
somewhere else. We should recall that the Pentagon declared the concept of 
"geographic escalation,” which essentially means that the United States should 
not limit its actions to the region where a conflict breaks out, but can resort 
to “appropriate actions” in other regions where, as Secretary of Defense 

C. Weinberger said, the United States has "more convenient positions from the 
geographic and tactical standpoints." According to the Pentagon, Europe is one 
of these "more convenient" regions. 


Guided by this concept, Washington decided to fill Western Europe with the new 
American missiles which, according to the unanimous opinion of American experts, 
are first-strike weapons But what is most important, Washington expects the 
delivery of a first nuclear strike from the territory of Western Europe to 
result in a retaliatory strike in precisely the same place while the United 
States remains, so to speak, on the sidelines. The Reagan Administration has 
repeatedly announced its adherence to the strategy of "limited nuclear war" on 
foreign territory, thereby confirming its plans to turn the countries and 
people of Western Europe into nuclear hostages of the United States. 


fo quell the wave of protest and indignation in Western Europe in connection 
with the assignment of the role of nuclear hostages to the people of this 
region, Washington launched a full-scale attack on the members of the anti- 
nuclear movement in Europe. American strategists are alleging that the crea- 
tion of nuclear-free zones would heighten the risk of hostilities involving 
conventional weapons. Of course, they are saying nothing about the proposal 
of the socialist countries that a non-aggression pact be signed to maintain 
peaceful relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO states, the focal! point of 
which could be the mutual pledge of countries of both alliances not to initi- 
ate the use of nuclear arms, conventional weapons or military force in general 
against one another. Washington has also implied that nuclear-free zones could 
give the Soviet Union unilateral advantages because the nuclear-free zone in 
Northern Europe, for example, would take in the territory of some of the 
United States’ NATO allies. But this situation could be balanced, after all, 
by the creation of, for instance, a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, which 


18 











would take in the territory of some Warsaw Pact states. This is another of 
the possibilities that Washington prefers not to mention. 


[In addition, Washington has stubbornly rejected the proposals of the USSR and 
other socialist countries that nuclear weapons not be deployed wherever they 
do not exist at present. This negative stance has been motivated by the 
selfish interests of the American military establishment and its desire for 

a tree hand in nuclear preparations on the European continent. 


The creation of nuclear-free zones would give the European countries a chance 
to make a perceptible contribution to the alleviation of the threat of nuclear 
war and the relaxation of tension. The more states there are in Europe which 
refuse to allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory, the more 
obstacles there will be to the use of these weapons and the less risk there 
will be of their use. 


Nuclear-free zones in Europe could pave the way to the total liberation of the 
continent from nuclear weapons. They would radically reduce the geographic 
parameters of nuclear preparations and completely invalidate the dangerous 
ideas about fighting a "limited nuclear war" on foreign territory. 


[fhe European states which do not possess their own nuclear weapons and do not 
have nuclear weapons on their territory have every legal and moral right to 

demand that all nuclear states give them guarantees, in the form of a treaty, 
that nuclear weapons will never under any circumstances be used against them. 


The Soviet Union has repeatedly announced its willingness to begin the inter- 
national legal formulation of these guarantees with any European country at 

any time. The peaceful initiatives put forth by the socialist countries at the 
Prague conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee have 
revealed new horizons in the struggle to turn Europe into a continent free of 
nuclear weapons. 


COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya”, 
L983 


$588 
CSO: 1803/1) 


L9 








U.S. EXPANSION IN WORLD FOOD MARKET 


Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, LDEOLOGLYA in Russian No 6, Jun 83 (signed 
to press 19 May 83) pp 51-59 


[Article by I. B. Avakova] 


[Text] In his State of the Union Message of 25 January 1982, President Reagan 
acknowledged the difficult position of the farmers in connection with the drop 
in wholesale grain prices in the nation. He proposed the more intensive export 
of foodstuffs to “revitalize rural America." The American press has reported 
the widespread sale of farms at auction due to the nonpayment of debts as a 
result of the drop in grain prices over the last 4 years. Agricultural 
"surplus" is growing, and this puts pressure on the prices of future harvests. 
It should be emphasized that the term "surplus" is quite relative as it is now 
used in reference to food in the United States. After all, this "surplus" is 
being exported intensively at a time when more than 32 million people in the 
nation are living below the official poverty level and are in a state of semi- 
starvation due to the constant rise of retail food prices. Furthermore, the 
efforts to augment food exports are depriving these people of even the aid they 
once received in the form of food stamps. This has been accompanied by a con- 
stant rise in the prices of agricultural machinery and fertilizers, in food 
storage and shipping costs and in the price of the energy used in agricultural 
production. 


But the appeals for larger grain exports are dictated less by concern for the 
farmers than by Washington's desire to strengthen U.S. positions in the world 
food market. Washington is aware of the fact that agricultural trade has 
acquired increasing significance in international economic relations in recent 
years. The increase in the scales of the grain trade has been particularly 
impressive. This product accounts for the majority of world agricultural 
exports and imports. 1! Grain exports in 1981 were double the 1970 figure and 
amounted to 196.1 million tons. Imported grain accounted for 12.6 percent of 
worldwide grain consumption in 1980 (8.7 percent in 1970). The growth of 
fodder grain exports was particularly impressive, increasing from 39 million 
tons in 1970 to 90 million tons in 1979, while wheat exports increased from 

50 million tons to 72 million tons, or by 42 percent, during the same period.2 
There has also beer a considerable increase in the international trade in oil- 
bearing seeds used in the production of Livestock feeds. Soybeans and groats 
(processed soybeans) constitute the basis of this trade. The increased 


20 





onsumpttion of oil-bearing seeds and, consequently, the increased trade in 
these seeds were the result of the consumption of animal husbandry products 
with a higher protein content in the developed capitalist countries. The 
volume of trade in soybeans and groats increased from 2-fold to 2.5-fold over 
the lasc decade and amounted to 45.1 million tons in 1980--28.3 million tons 
of sovbeans and 146.8 million tons of soy groats.? 


The constant expansion of world agricultural trade has been due in part to the 
growing gap between agricultural production levels in the industrially devel- 
sped and developing countries. Over the last decade the per capita output of 
‘rain (as the main element of the food trade) in the developed capitalist 
countries rose from 582.1 to 707.3 kilograms, but in the developing countries 
it dropped from 211.5 to 202.7 kilograms. The problem has been particularly 
1cute in Africa and Asia, where per capita grain production declined from 
183.7 and 169.2 kilograms respectively in 19/0 to 155.5 and 140.7 kilograms in 
19/9.% The narrow agricultural specialization of the majority of developing 
‘ountries, imposed on them by the colonial and neocolonial policies of imperi- 
ilist states, in combination with the low developmental level of the material, 
technical and social base of agriculture, has widened the gap between food 
production and consumption in these countries and has made them more dependent 
yn imports of the main food products--wheat and rice. The recent increase in 
the proportion accounted for by animal husbandry products in total food con- 
sumption in the industrially developed countries and some developing state 

nas played an important role in the expansion of the international trade i 
izgricultural products, especially grain and oil-bearing seeds. 


Ss 
i 


n 





Most of the countries in the world participate in the international exchange 
izgricultural products--developed capitalist countries, developing states and 
the uuntries of the socialist community. In itself, the growth of inter- 
national agricultural trade is a completely natural phenomenon, reflecting 
the processes of international division of labor and scientific and technical 
progress. Specialization in this area, connected with the different soil] and 
imatic conditions of different geographic regions and countries, has always 
been an important factor in international agricultural exchange. However, now 
it imperialism is making every effort to retain its influence in the world 
ind even to regain what it has lost, the food trade often becomes an instru- 
ent of blackmail and political pressure in the hands of monopolists. Many 
importing countries have had to resist these tendencies by pursuing a policy 


iimed at developing their own agriculture, through intensification and the 
i1largement of farming areas, in order to reduce food imports. This is also 
eing done tor the purpose of retaining the foreign currency earned from 
mnection with this, an analysis of U.S. export-import policy in the area 
izricultural trade is politically pertinent because it is precisely this 
ntry that occupies the key positions in world markets in terms of the 


<port of several major agricultural products (wheat, fodder grain and soy- 
eans) and is simultaneously one of the leading importers of agricul, iral 


; Y ] 4 } T \ - : ‘+ >» ool? . i, . > le 
products. In 1979 the U.S. foreign trade in agricultural products totaled 
; 


lars, or 13 percent of the world turnover in agricultural 








Table | 


U.S. Share of World Production, Export and Consumption of Major 
Agricultural Products in 1970-71, 1979-80, 1980-81,* %, 
(U.S. Statistics) 








Products Production Export Consumption 
Wheat 
1970-71 12 36 6 
1979-80 14 44 5 
1980-81 14 45 5 
Fodder grain 
1970-71 25 42 24 
1979-80 32 71 21 
1980-81 27 72 20 
Rice 
1970-71 1 19 l 
1979-80 2 22 1 
1980-81 2 22 1 
Soybeans 
1970-71 81 90 40 
1979-80 66 84 30 
1980-81 59 80 28 


* Forecast. 





"1981 Agriculture Outlook. Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and 
Forestry, U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, 2d Session,” Wash., 1981, p 102. 


Export shipments have been an important factor in the development of U.S. 
agriculture. At present, 1 out of every 3 hectares of farmland in the United 
States is used to raise export products. © In 1°78 export revenues accounted 
for 28 percent of the farmer's income. The proportion exceeded 60 percent in 
the case of the producers of the main agricultural products. In 1978, for 
example, this inaicator was 87 percent for rice producers, 80 percent for 
wheat producers, 75 percent for soybean producers and 62 percent for corn 
producers. 7 


Agricultural products are one of the main elements of U.S. foreign trade. In 
1980 they accounted for 12.7 percent of all foreign trade turnover--that is, 
for a higher percentage than machine-building products. 8 This is also the 
most profitable element of this trade and has played an extremely important 
role in reducing the deficit in the balance of foreign trade over the last 
decade. Between 1970 and 1980 exports accounted for 75 percent of the incre- 
ment in foreign agricultural trade while imports accounted for only 25 percent. 
Whereas in 1970 the positive balance of U.S. foreign agricultural trade was 
equivalent to 1.5 billion dollars, in 1981 the figure reac.,ed 26.6 billion.? 


22 








Agricultural Exports 


The decade of the 1970's was marked by the particularly rapid (in comparison 
to the entire postwar period) growth of U.S. agricultural exports. The volume 
increased 2,.6-fold during this period, and the value increased 5.9-fold. As a 
result, in 1981 agricultural exports amounted to 163 million tons in natural 
terms and had a value of 43.3 billion dollars.19 


The growth of agricultural exports was primarily a result of increased 
exports of foodstufts. They accounted for 90 percent of the increase in 
export value and 99 percent of the increase in volume, !1 


rain and grain products accounted for 72 percent of the increase in the phy- 
sical volume of agricultural exports, and oil-bearing seeds and the products 
of their processing accounted for 17 percent.! 


Grain was the main agricultural export in 1981, both in terms of volume and in 
terms of value (45 percent). The export volume reached 114.2 million tons 
(2.8 times as great as the 1970 figure, or 72.9 million tons more), including 
65.3 million tons of exported fodder grain (mainly corn), 45.2 million tons of 
wheat and 3.2 million tons of rice. 


An analysis of the structure of American grain exports testifies to a gradual 
increase in exports of fodder grain. For example, whereas wheat accounted for 
46 percent of natural export volume and fodder grain accounted for 50 percent 
of this volume in 1970-1972, the figure for wheat dropped to 34 percent in 
1978-1980 while the figure for fodder grain rose to 63 percent. The export 
volume of oil-bearing seeds in 1981 was double the 1970 volume and totaled 

}2 million tons. This included an increase from 11.9 million to 21.8 million 
tons in soybean exports and from 3.8 million to 6.8 million tons in soybean 
groats. Exports of sunflower seeds have been growing since 1977. In 1981 the 
figure reached 1.7 million tons.13 The increased exports of grain and oil- 
bearing seeds gave the United States a virtual monopoly in the world food 
market. For example, in 1979 the United States accounted for 52 percent of a 
world grain exports and 67 percent of all soybean and soybean groat exports.! 


1] 
4 


Animal husbandry products play a much smaller role in American exports. 

Despite the slight increase in export volumes (from 160,000 to 440,000 tons 

in the case of red meat and from 60,000 to 390,400 tons in the case of pouitry), 
animal husbandry accounted for slightly over 1 percent of the export volume and 
9 percent of export value in 1981. Export shipments between 1970 and 1980 
absorbed only 10-15 percent of the meat produced in the country. 


lhere has been a slight increase in exports of vegetables, fruit and nuts 
(from 1.96 million tons in 1970 to 3.4 million tons in 1980). These products 
accounted for less than 2 percent of the total agricultural export volume in 
1980 and less than 7 percent of export value.15 


The growth of U.S. agricultural exports was accompanied by geographic changes. 
Although most of these products are still being shipped to the developed 
countries, their share of total exports in the capitalist world dropped from 
65 percent in 1970 to 56 percent in 1981. The share of the developizg count- 
ries rose from 35 to 44 percent during the same period. 


23 








Table 2 


Geographic Structure of U.S. Agricultural Exports, % 


Regions 1970 1975 1981 
Western Europe 39 37 32 
Japan 17 16 18 
Other countries 9 7 6 
Developing countries 35 40 44 
Breakdown: 
Asia 21 23 19 
Latin America 10 ll 18 
Africa 4 6 7 





Compiled according to: FATUS, September/October 1980, p 84; January/February 
1982, p 10. 


American shipments of agricultural products to the developed capitalist count- 
ries are constantly growing. Their value increased from 4.6 billion dollars in 
1970 to 20.6 billion in 1981. Exports to the European capitalist countries 
amounted to 11.8 billion dollars in 1981 (32 percent of the value of exports 

to the capitalist developed and developing countries), including a figure of 
9.1 billion dollars (or 25 percent) for the EEC countries. Japanese imports of 
American agricultural products reached 6.6 billion dollars (18 percent). The 
United States supplies the markets of Western European capitalist countries and 
Japan primarily with fodder grain, soybeans, soy groats and soybean oil, cotton 
(particularly Japan), high-quality meat, nuts and lard. Export ties with these 
countries have become traditional and are relatively strong. In spite of this, 
however, the Unitea States often has to deal with crises in the world food 
market when capitalist competition grows more intense. One example of this 

was the 1973 embargo on exports of grain and soybeans from the United States, 
which was particularly injurious to Japan and shook Japan's trust in the United 
States as a reliable trade partner. Since that time, Japan has made constant 
efforts to expand the group of its suppliers of fodder grain and oil-bearing 
seeds. The policy pursued by the EEC in agricultural trade, which complicates 
the unimpeded penetration of the community market by American goods, is a 
source of constant irritation to American trade companies and the Washington 
administration. Experts believe, however, that this market will continue to 
play the deciding role in American exports. Western Europe and Japan will 
continue to display a high and stable demand for American foodstuffs, especially 
feeds. 


American agricultural exports to the developing countries amounted to 16.3 bil- 
lion dollars in 1981, or 44 percent of the total value of exports to all parts 
of the capitalist world. Most of the products were shipped to Asia--7.1 bil- 
lion dollars (19 percent), which was followed by Latin America--6.4 billion 

(18 percent) and Africa--2.8 billion (7 percent). The main U.S. exports to the 
developing states are wheat and soybean oil. Countries with a higher per 
capita income also receive fodder grain, soy groats, dairy products and animal 


24 








husbandry products (beef, veal, pork and poultry) from the United States. 
According to American economists, in the 1980's agricultural exports will 

play an increasingly important role in relations with the developing states. 
Shipments of foodstuffs to their markets are regarded as an important element 
of U.S. political leverage in these regions and a means of paying for chipments 
of energy and mineral resources from these states. Mexico, Venezuela and 
Nigeria are considered to be the most promising countries for the development 
of American agricultural exports, 16 


Assessing the prospects of trade with the developing countries in the coming 
decade, Professor M. Cook from the University of Texas, expert on international 
trade, postulates that the annual growth rate of exports to the developing 
countries in the 1980's will be 6 percent, or twice as high as the rate for 
developed countries.!7 A favorable situation for the development of American 
exports is taking shape in the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. 
Although these countries have enormous potential for the development of their 
own agrarian production, they invariably display a high demand for animal hus- 
bandry products and fodder from the United States, secured by their high reve- 
nues trom oil sales. 


An analysis of the commodity and geographic structure of exports testifies that 
the United States has been able to augment export volume in terms of virtually 
every indicator by not failing to take advantage of even the slightest oppor- 
tunity to strengthen its position in the world food market. This has been a 
deliberate process, displaying a clear tendency toward the monopolization of 
major food markets--grain and oil-bearing seeds--in order to establish control 
over the food networks of the developing countries importing foodstuffs and the 
developed capitalist powers whose animal husbandry is based on imported fodder 
grain and protein supplements. By 1980 the United States started to play the 
deciding role in these major markets. 


Ihe productive potential for the growth of American agricultural exports was 
created by the development of the agroindustrial complex, distinguished by its 
huge scales, strong material and technical base and substantial agricultural 
land resources. The total area suitable for the cultivation of agricultural 
crops in the United States amounts to 189 million hectares./8 Soil and cli- 
matic conditions (particularly in the main grain-producing regions) are 
extremely conducive to the development of agriculture and allow for the 
production of the main farming crops at a lower cost than in other countries. 
fhe considerable U.S. potential for agricultural development, which was com- 
pounded throughout the postwar period, allowed for the expansion of production 
volume in the 1970's, when world food problems became acute. The production 

t grain and legume crops displayed particularly dramatic growth.19 


fhe level and structure of agricultural production in the United States 
allowed for the export of 67 percent of the wheat produced in the country, 
8 percent of the rice, 55 percent of the soybeans, 30 percent of the corn, 
5? percent of the cotton and 35 percent of the tobacco in 1980.20 


The production base also rests on a developed infrastructure in rural regions 
(roads, storage facilities, elevators, repair and trade organizations, 


25 











telephone communications and computer centers) ,“) on a nationwide network of 
research organizations and a system for the dissemination and incorporation of 
research findings in production. The rates and scales of the development of 
this production and research infrastructure have surpassed the rates and 
scales of agricultural development itself. 


The emphasis on the cultivation of fodder crops in high demand also played an 
important role in the development of agricultural exports. In 1980 the major 
fodder crops--corn, sorghum, barley, oats and soybeans--accouiuted for 78 per- 
cent of the total output of grain and legume crops and totaled 248.2 million 
tons in volume, 22 


Agricultural Imports 


The United States is not only the largest exporter of agricultural products 

in the world. It makes extensive use of the advantages of international divi- 
sion of agricultural labor in its own interest by importing the products it 
needs. In 1975-1979 it accounted for 8 percent of the value of world imports .23 
Now the United States is the largest importer of agricultural goods in the world. 
In terms of value, its imports tripled between 1970 and 1981 and reached 16.8 
billion dollars. The rising value of imports has been due primarily to the 
rising prices of the main imported products. The actual volume of U.S. agri- 
cultural imports remained stable during this period and totaled 10-12 million 
tons (10.7 million in 1980) .24 


The main U.S. import goods have been tropical products (5.7 billion dollars in 
1981, or 34 percent of the total value of imports). The most important role 
among these is played by food products: coffee (1 million tons), cacao beans 
(400,000 tons), bananas (2.3 million tons), spices and tea. 


Animal husbandry products (mainly beef, veal, pork, lamb and cheese) were an 
important import item in 1980. They accounted for 21 percent of the value of 
imports--3.5 billion dollars--totaling 900,000 tons in natural terms. 


Other significant import products are sugar (4.6 million tons valued at 
2.1 million dollars), fruit, nuts, vegetables, vegetable oil and wine and 
other beverages.*~ 


The commodity structure of American agricultural imports and its stability 
indicate a definite import strategy. It is aimed primarily at guarding the 
domestic market against foreign competition. Import goods which are also 
produced in the United States account for a negligible percentage of national 
consumption. Animal husbandry products are a characteristic example of this. 
In 1976, for example, imported beef and veal accounted for 7 percent of 
national consumption, cheese accounted for 6 percent and pork accounted for 

} percent. The figures are slightly higher in the case of imported vegetables, 
fruit and industrial crops (24 percent of the tomatoes, 29 percent of the 
cucumbers, 29 percent of the tobacco, 22 percent of the mushrooms and 20 per- 
cent of the frozen strawberries). Only in the case of such preducts as sugar 
and wool is almost half of U.S. demand covered by imports (47 percent of the 
wool and 43 percent of the sugar) .26 


26 


Table 3 


Commodity Structure of U.S. Agricultural Imports, Millions of Dollars 





Products 1970-74 1975-79 1981 
Products not produced in the country 2,516 5, 764 5,698 
Coffee, cocoa and tea 1,596 4,382 3,931 
Rubber 296 615 769 
Bananas 190 315 541 
Spices 68 119 138 
Others 367 360 319 
Products produced in the country 3,864 7,297 11,081 
Animal husbandry products 1,935 2,686 3,486 
Sugar 1,172 1,285 2,141 
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 677 1,226 2,032 
Oil-bearing seeds and vegetable oil 307 595 872 
Tobacco 162 334 354 
Others 568 1,127 2,196 
Total 7,339 13,056 16,779 


Compiled according to: FATUS, February 1978, pp 62-63; February 1979, p 42; 
January/February 1980, p 62; January/February 1982, p 38. 


Imports of products produced in the United States are largely the result of 
the activity of transnational food companies of primarily American origin. 
Until recently, many types of agricultural products (this is particularly true 
of vegetables and fruit) were cultivated under suitable climatic conditions in 
the United States. Through the efforts of food industry magnates, their pro- 
duction was moved to the developing countries. Plantations in these countries 
attract American capital because of the possibility of minimizing production 
costs, primarily as a result of cheap labor and the lower cost of land and 
water. For example, around two-thirds of the winter and spring vegetables 

now consumed in the United States are grown in Mexico.2? The traditional 
crops which were once raised to fill the needs of the local population of 
these countries, such as corn, rice, millet, wheat and beans, are gradually 
giving way to products which are staples in the diet of wealthy population 
strata in the developed capitalist countries--asparagus, cucumbers, straw- 
berries, tomatoes, beef, poultry and even flowers. The income from the sale 
of these goods does not cover the cost of imported foodstuffs. By stimulating 
the agricultural exports of developing countries, transnational corporations 
are undermining the local base for the production of their traditional foods. 


At the same time, U.S. imports of products which are cultivated in the United 
States have a negative effect on the position of local producers of these 
goods: They lead to the ruin of some farmers whose products cannot compete 
with cheaper imports from the developing countries. 


Agricultural U.S. imports come mainly from the developing countries. The 
largest suppliers are the Latin American states (over 40 percent of the total), 


27 








where huge transnational food corporations have established highly intensive 
farms (using cheap land and labor), operating exclusively for the markets of 
the developed capitalist countries (cattle ranches, vegetable farms and fruit 
and berry plantations). Asia accounted for 17 percent of all imports in 1980 
and Africa accounted for 7.5 percent. 


The European capitalist countries provided the United States with only 1/7 per- 
cent of its imported products, mainly beverages, wine, vegetables and some 
meat products. 28 


Food Expansion 


The 1970's were marked by rapid U.S. expansion in the major world food markets-- 
grain and food protein. Plans and preparations for the reinforcement of U.S. 
positions in this sector of world trade were being made throughout the 1970's 
within the framework of the government's export-import policy. This led to the 
restructuring of agricultural production and its adaptation to export needs. 
Shipments for export became one of the most important elements of agricultural 
development. 


In 1981 American agricultural exports increased in value once again and 
totaled 43.3 billion dollars, while the positive balance of foreign trade in 
agricultural products reached the unprecedented level of almost 27 billion 
dollars.29 The export volume of the main agricultural export item, grain, 
increased to 114.2 million tons.39 More than 30 percent of the U.S. farmland 
used for grain cultivation is geared to the export market. Vice President 

R. Johnson of Cargill, the largest grain trading firm, believes that the 
figure could reach 40 oe by 1985 if this tendency should continue to 
develop in the 1980's. 31 


In the 1970's the U.S. Government took steps to strengthen government control 
over the export of agricultural goods and to stimulate its development. For 
this purpose, agrarian legislation was revised considerably; measures were 
taken to centralize the decision-making process in the area of foreign economic 
food strategy, and more authority was granted to executive agencies, especially 
the President of the United States, to make decisions on important matters per- 
taining to agricultural exports; the role of the State Department, the CIA and 
other agencies in the regulation of food exports was augmented; the program of 
food assistance to developing countries was revised in order to increase the 
demand for American agricultural products. 


In September 1981 a new program for the crediting of exports by the Commer: ial 
Credit Corporation (CCC), which is active in financing American foreign ¢) 

was adopted. According to this program, export credit is extended for terms 
ranging from 3 to 10 years (the term was previously limited to from 6 months 
to 3 years). The local currency obtained as a result of the sale of American 
toodstuffs on this kind of credit will be used for the development of a system 
for the shipment, storage, processing and sale of U.S. goods in the importing 
country. 


Since August 1979 the CCC has been operating in line with a so-called program 
of insurance against non-commercial risks. In accordance with this program, 


28 











the CCC insures the credit extended by private banks against risks arising 

as a result of military operations, the confiscation of goods or the impossi- 
bility of converting local currency into American dollars. The purpose of the 
new program is the more active involvement of private banks in the financing 
of American agricultural exports and the promotion of broader sales of these 
goods. Within the first year after the program went into effect, the value 

of goods exported on this basis increased from 63 million dollars to 698 mil- 
lion, or 49 percent of all CCC export operations. 32 


The creation of a special bank to finance trade with the developing countries 
is now being discussed in Congress at the initiative of the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture for the purpose of developing this trade. 33 


Another way of instituting stricter control over agricultural exports is the 
compulsory registration of grain exporting firms with a sales volume of over 
15,000 tons with the Department of Agriculture. 


The growing agricultural exports are being used more actively in U.S. foreign 
polley for political as well as economic reasons (the threat of export limits 
was used against Bangladesh, India and some other developing countries and an 
embargo was imposed on shipments of soybeans to the Common Market countries 
ind Japan). The use of the food trade as a means of political blackmail grew 
more intensive throughout the 1970's and reached its peak with the embargo on 
grain shipments to the USSR in January 1980. It inflicted substantial injur- 
ies on American farmers and was lifted by the current administration. 3 


The Soviet Union also participates with other countries in the international 
trade in agricultural products. In particular, in 1981 it bought fodder grain 
from several countries, including 9.5 million tons of corn and wheat from the 
United States. 35 


The embargo seriously harmed the U.S. position in world grain markets. The 
Common Market countries were able to gain a larger share of world grain exports 
when U.S. shipments were reduced. Many traditional importers of American 

grain were unable to maintain their previous level of purchases due to the 
lengthy economic crisis and rising prices. The resulting obstacles to the 
further augmentation of American grain exports again raised the problem of 
overproduction: The falling price of grain combined with the simultaneous 

rise of its production costs increased the farmers’ debts and ruined many of 
them. 


It is not surprising that the expansion of programs to limit farming areas, 


which have proved to be less effective than anticipated, has been accompanied 
by measures to stimulate agricultural exports as cne of the chief ways of 
reducing agricultural surplus. The U.S. administration has employed various 


methods of expansion in world agricultural markets: from the exertion of 
lirect pressure on countries involved in American policy or particularly depen- 
dent on American food shipments to the direct stimulation of U.S. exports by 
means of the offer of certain advantages to countries that could represent new 
or larger markets at the expense of other exporting countries. In this area, 
American imperialism does not consider the interests of any of its political 








partners. The Reagan Administration's efforts to increase grain exports are 
parcicularly interesting in this connection. Congress has already allocated 
300 million dollars for interest-free and low-interest loans to foreign pur- 
chasers of American grain during the current fiscal year. A similar program 
last year motivated some countries to abandon their traditional grain suppli- 
ers and purchase grain from the United States. The administration is also 
thinking of rewarding purchasers of American grain with additional free 
shipments. 


Another, equally important problem (some experts even regard it as the main 
one) is the growing conflict between the need to preserve the nation's soil 
resources and the intensive growth of agricultural exports. Many stuctes con- 
ducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture have indicated that the topsoil 

on the best farmlands is gradually being depleted by their excessive intensive 
use. Furthermore, the current level of scientific and technical development 
cannot compensate for the rate at which the soil is deteriorating. The contin- 
uation of this tendency could put the ability of the agribusiness and the 
American Government to increase food exports in question. 


FOOTNOTES 


|. For more about world food problems and the U.S. position, see V. F. 
Lishchenko and Ye. N. Vasil'yeva, "Some Aspects of the Food Crisis and the 
United States," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1979, No 6. 


2. According to the international system of classification used in the FAO, 
the fodder grains are corn, sorghum, barley and oats. Food grains are 
wheat, rice and rye. 


}. “World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates,” 12 February 1981, 
pp 14-15. 


4. Calculated according to "1979 FAO Production Yearbook," vol 33, Rome, 
1980, pp 61-71, 93-95. 


». “1976 FAO Trade Yearbook,” vol 30, Rome, 1977, pp 39-41; "1979 FAO Trade 


Yearbook," vol 33, pp 42-44. 


6. FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES (FATUS), December 1978, 
p 33. 


?. Ibid., p 35. 


8. SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, 1981, No 3, vol 61, pp S-18, S-19; FATUS, 
January/February 1981, pp 5, 38. 


9. FATUS, February 1977, p 95; February 1979, p 10; January/February 1982, 
p 6. 


lO. Ibid., February 1979, p 10; January/February 1982, p 6. 


30 





Ll. Ibid. 

l2. Ibid. 

13. Ibid. 

14, “1979 FAO Trade Yearbook," vol 33, pp 109-144, 119, 120. 
15. FATUS, February 1979, p 10; January/February 1981, p 5. 
16. BUSINESS WEEK, 24 November 1980, p 55. 

l7. Ibid. 

18. "1979 FAO Production Yearbook,” vol 33, p 145. 


19, “Agricultural Statistics 1980," Wash., 1980, pp 1, 129; “World Agricul- 
tural Supply and Demand Estimates,"’ 12 February 1980, pp 6-8, 10, 14. 


20. FATUS, December 1981, p 34. 


21. For more detail, see Ye. N. Vasil'veva, "The Production Infrastructure 
in Agriculture," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1975, No 5; 
V. F. Lishchenko, Ye. N. Vasil'yeva and A. N. Litvinov, "The U.S. Grain 
Elevator Industry," ibid., 1979, No 9. 


ro 
> 


"World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates,” 12 February 1981, 
pp o, 10, 14. 


Mh 


’3. "1979 FAO Trade Yearbook," vol 3, pp 42-44. 


24. FATUS, February 1977, p 95; January/February 1982, p 38; "Outlook for 
U.S. Agricultural Exports," 19 February 1981, p 13. 


25.  FATUS, January/February 1982, pp 39-41. 

2h. Ibid., January 1978, p 16. 
E. Feder, "The Penetration of the Agricultures of the Underdeveloped 
Countries by the Industrial Nations and Their Multinational Corporations,” 


Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1975, p 8. 


28. “U.S. Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistical Report, Calendar Year 1979," 
October 1980, pp 224, 225, 233, 242, 253. 


29. “U.S. Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistical Report, Calendar Year 1981," 

April 1982, pl. . 
10. Ibid., p 9. 
sl. BUSINESS WEEK, 24 November 1980, p 54. 


31 








32. FATUS, January/February 1981, pp 93-95. 
33. BUSINESS WEEK, 24 November 1980, p 55. 
34. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, No 6, pp 52-55. 


35. "“Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR v 1981 g."" [USSR Foreign Trade in 1981], 
Moscow, 1982, p 272. 


COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 
1983 


8588 
CSO: 1803/11 











INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ROLE OF PACIFIC STATES STRESSED 


Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 83 (signed 
to press 19 May 83) pp 60-70 


[Article by A. B. Parkanskiy: "The Pacific States: Tendencies in Foreign 
Trade and Economic Development" ] 


[Text] The economic development of the United States under the conditions of 
structural and cyclical crises is now being accompanied by considerable changes 
in the distribution of productive forces and by the broader regional differen- 
tiation of economic activity. The possibility of changes in the earlier 
regional division of labor is connected with the fact that some regions still 
have great potential for capitalist development "in depth and breadth." In 
particular, one of the distinctive features of U.S. economic affairs in the 
postwar period, particularly in the last decade, was the quicker development 
of the nation's western region. This is particularly true of the Pacific 
States. In American statistics the term refers to California, Washington, 
Oregon, Alaska and Hawaii. Their population increased around 1.5-fold just 
between 1960 and 1980 (while the total U.S. popula‘ on increased less than 
L.3-fold) and amounted to almost 31.8 million people, or around 14 percent of 
the national population (11.8 percent in 1960). In 1980, 14.3 percent of the 
adle-bodied U.S. population lived here. In 1978 the Pacific States accounted 
‘or 11.9 percent of all those employed in the U.S. processing industry (7 per- 
cent in 1950) and 12.4 percent of its net product (7.9 percent in 1950). The 
"big five's" share of the American voting public increased from around 13.2 to 
i4.2 percent between 1970 and 1980.1 


The Pacific States and Mountain States make up the nation’s largest region-- 
the West.* They are far ahead of the Mountain States, however, in terms of 
population, degree of urbanization and level of economic, scientific and tech- 
nical development in industry and agriculture. They have become one of the 
most highly developed U.S. regions in the industrial sense, along with the 
Northeast. But whereas the proportion accounted for by the Northeast in the 
national economy has constantly decreased in the postwar period, that of the 
Pacific States has increased. 


Furthermore, the Pacific States are playing an increasingly important role in 
U.S. foreign economic expansion and in international trade, scientific, techni- 
cal and economic ties. In the middle of the last century K. Marx and F. Engels 


33 














were already pointing out the "special importance" of the rapid colonization 
of the Pacifie West, and particularly California, to the development of al! 
world trade, consisting "in the stimulus California's mineral wealth has given 
capital throughout the world market, in the revitalization experienced bv the 
entire west coast of America and east coast of Asia and in the new sales mar- 
ket 1~: eaaieaes and in all countries where California's influence has been 
felt.” 


All of this has strengthened the political influence of the Californian, or 
southwestern, regional group of U.S. monopoly capital in the determination of 
U.S. domestic and foreign policy and directly in the pursuit of this policy.4 
As early as 1975, then President G. Ford said: "The center of political power 
in the United States has moved to the West. Our Pacific interests and concerns 
have grown."> Comments like these reflect real changes in the nation's 
regional development. 


All of this makes the continued study of current trends in the foreign trade 
and economic development of the American Pacific West expedient. This kind of 
research will aid in the more thorough understanding of the present and future 
place of this region on the U.S. economic and political map, as well as its 
immediate and long-range interests and positions in the Pacific basin. As 

V. L. Lenin remarked, the "gigantic area of the United States, just slightly 
smaller than all of Europe, and the tremendous diversity of economic conditions 
at different ends of the country certainly necessitate the separate examination 
of the main regions, which are quite different from one another in terms of 
economic conditions. '® 


Here it should be noted that American statistics on the economic development 
of the Pacific States are relatively meager, fragmentary and inaccessible. 
This means that the researcher must sometimes look into the facts and figures 
published by state governments, banks, private corporations and organizations. 


I 


Prior to World War II the Pacific States lagged far behind the nation's old 
industrial regions in terms of economic development. Their economy was based 
on the mining and woodworking industries, agriculture and fishing, although 
California and Washington were already distinguished by a highly developed 
aircraft and shipbuilding industry. 


World War II accelerated the development of the processing industry in the 
Pacific States. The government's huge military orders stimulated the develop- 
ment of military and other branches of industry in the region and established 
a foundation for the growth of its economic, scientific and technical potential. 
The subsequent colossal inflow of government funds and the state-monopoly 
policy aimed at securing an arms race and the related types of research were 
the main reasons for the accelerated development of California, Washington and 
some other states in the first postwar decades. An important role was also 
played by such factors as the region's substantial energy resources, rich 
deposits of several minerals, favorable climate and supply of skilled manpower. 


34 


\t the beginning o. the 1980's the basis of the economy in the Pacific States 
lready consisted in scientifically and technically advanced branches of the 
processing industry (aerospace, electrical equipment and instrument-building), 
intensive agricultural production and a developed infrastructure. For example, 

the volume of goods and services produced in California, the most highly 
developed state in the region in the industrial and agricultural sense, 
mounted to around 400 billion dollars in 1982, according to American 
estimates.’ If California were a senarate country, it would rank eighth in 
the world in terms of this indicator and would be ahead of such countries as, 
for example, Canada and Italy. According to the latest available data (1980), 
the Pacitic States account for around 11.3 percent of all products shipped out 
ot the U.S. processing industry. As Table 1 illustrates, California leads the 
region in the output of finished manufactured goods (176.7 billion dollars), 
ind Washington ranks second (35.5 billion). 








Table 1 
Dynamics of Processing Industry Output, Billions of Dollars 
Regions 1976 1980 1980, % of 1976 
United States 1,185.7 1,849.1 156 
California 102.0 176.7 173 
washington 18.8 35.5 18 
Oregon 12.3 18.9 154 
Hawaii 1.9 3.2 94 
\laska 1.0 1.8 324 
‘acific States 136.0 236.1 174 
* of total output value 11.5 12.8 - 


Calculated according to COMMERCE AMERICA, 22 May 1978, p 3; BUSINESS AMERICA, 
92 February 1982, p 13. 





he economic development of the Pacific States is directly related to 

ientific and technical progress. This is the location of such huge research 
enters as, for example, the University of California and Stanford University, 
with their many laboratories and institutes, the RAND Corporation and the 


imes research center. 


e high concentration of research activity in these states is connected pri- 
i1rily with the military industry and the economic branches serving it. By 
the beginning of the 1970's these states already accounted for 42 percent of 

ill people employed in the American aerospace industry and more than one- 

third of all those emploved in the manufacture of optical instruments. 
i1Llifornia alone accounts for 40 percent of all the blue- and white-collar 

workers engaged in the manufacture of arms and ammunition in the nation. 

in 1978 this state accounted for 50.8 percent of all NASA contracts and 27.3 

percent of Defense Department contracts. The cotal contracts received by the 
state from these agencies amounted to 9 billion dollars in 1978 and 10.1 bil- 


7¢ 


lion in 1979. California's aerospace industry alone employs around half a 


tz i » ‘ 
MLiilon people. 








lt should be stressed that military business is the main factor in the 
reinforcement of the monopolistic bourgeoisie's economic and political 
influence in the Pacific and other western states. "For the new monopolistic 
bourgeois groups in the American West and Southwest,'’ KOMMUNIST journal noted, 
"investment in the arms trade...has become one of the main sources, or perhaps 
the main source, of capital accumulations." The increasing strength of the 
western segment of the U.S. financial oligarcy, as some Soviet researchers 
have correctly pointed out, is one of the main reasons for the shift in the 
balance of forces in the American ruling class at the end of the 1970's and 
the beginning of the 1980's, "as a result of which the more reactionary segment 
(which can be described, using Lenin's term, as the “war party") has pinned 
down its moderate wing and has gained the upper hand."9 


The tremendous importance of military business to the giant monopolies is 
attested to by the following fact. On 31 July 1980 the value of the military 
contracts received by Litton Industries totaled 4.5 billion dollars, and the 
work on these contracts accounted for more than 27 percent of this huge con- 
wlomerate's total profits that year, 10 


One result of the Reagan Administration's 5-year military program is supposed 
to be the further reinforcement of the position of the Pacific West, especially 
California, in the military-industrial complex. According to experts from the 
California state administration and Wells Fargo Bank, within 5 years the pro- 
portion accounted for by California capital in total government military orders 
will increase from 22 percent to a minimum of 30 percent. California corpora- 
tions are the developers and producers of all of the main strategic weapon 
ystems now being manufactured in the United States. In particular, they are 
mong the Pentagon's main contractors in the manufacture of components for the 
MX system and B-l bomber (Rockwell International is the chief contractor), in 
the development of the new strategic Stealth bomber (the head contractor is 
the Northrop Corporation) and in the construction of the Trident II, 
Pershing II and cruise missiles. In all, 8,550 California companies are on 
the List of U.S. Defense Department contractors. 


This matter has another important aspect. Since most of the facilities of 

the monopolies making up the military-industrial complex are located in the 
western and southern states, the current sharp increase in military spending 
means that much of the federal budget will be redistributed in favor of monop- 
olistic groups in these regions and "at the expense” of monopoly capital in 

the Northeast and Midwest. They, according to American estimates, will thereby 
"lose" a total of 286 billion dollars between 1982 and 1986.11 The accuracy of 
these calculations could be questioned, but there is no question that one of 
the results of Ronald Reagan's military program will be the further reir rce- 
ment of the positions of the southwestern group of monopolists. 

lhe Pacific States have a large and diversified agricultural sector. Further- 
nore, the presence of favorable natural, technical and economic conditions 
(large capital investmei. s per unit of farmlaud, a high level of production 
concentration and mechanization and the relatively rapid incorporation of the 
latest technical improvements) allows for the production of far more within a 
smaller agricultural area than in other states. For example, according to the 


3 








latest available data, the value of the agricultural product sold by this 
zroup of states in 1978 totaled 13.] billion dollars, or 12.2 percent of the 
national value. The main producer is California, which accounted for more 
than /1l percent of all Pacific State sales in 1980. Washington ranked next, 
with 15.9 percent of the total. In Alaska there is virtually no agriculture; 
the value of the sold product here was only 8 million dollars in 1978,°* 


The economic development of the Pacific States has been marked by the same 
acute socioeconomic problems encountered by capitalist America as a whole. 

For example, the considerable dependence ot the economy of these states on 
military production is a destabilizing factor and gives rise to disparities in 
their economic development. 


In the late 1970's and early 1980's the decision to escalate the arms race 
brought arvother gold rush to the California industries connected with the 
Pentagon and NASA. As experts from Security Pacific Bank, one of the state's 
largest banks, reported with pleasure, "the greater importance attached to 
military expenditures by the Carter and Reagan administrations put the industry 
(aerospace--A, P.) on the track of even more dramatic growth, and this will 
apparently continue at least until the middle of the 1980's."13 In spite of 
these optimistic predictions, the beginning of the 1980's was a time of 
heightened activity in the military industry but it was also a time of severe 
crisis for many civilian branches of the California economy--housing construc=- 
tion, the production of durable consumer goods, etc. 


[Im general, the expansion of military provuction and the continued rise in 
military spending will not bring about the total economic recovery of the 
Pacitic States over the short or long range. On the contrary, this will 
eventually exacerbate socioeconomic problems in the region because it will 
lead to the redistribution of colossal resources to the military sector from 
branches where they could have a tremendous national economic impact. The 
higher expenditures on arms production are impeding overall economic growth 
ind the enhancement of production efficiency. 


fhe already large army of unemployed in California is constantly growing. In 
1970 there were 591,000 totally unemployed people in California, in 1980 there 
were 759,000 and in September 1982 there were 1.2 million. According to pre- 
liminary calculations, prices rose 9.1 percent in 1982. In addition to this, 
the accelerated industrial development of the Far West has seriously polluted 
the environment, and the rapid process of urbanization has given rise to a 
complex group of urban problems. 


--« 


The economy of the Pacific States depends largely on foreign econcemic ties. 

yen the infrequently published data indicate that foreign markets are of 

ital importance to the development of the processing industry in these states. 
Furthermore, the degree to which production in these states is geared to the 

vreign market is much greater than the national average: In 1980 the propor- 
tion accounted for by exports in the output of their processing industry was 
1.6 times as great as the national average. 











Table 2 
Importance of Exports to Regional Processing Industry 


United Pacific 
Categories States States California Washington Oregon Alaska Hawaii 











% of exports in 
total value of 
products shipped 


1976 7.0 9.2 7.9 17.2 6.7 23.5 9.9 
1980 8.4 13.3 14,2 29.6 16.1 36.9 5.0 
Total employment, 
in thousands 
1976 18,753 2,064 1,600 244 188 8 24 
1980 20,662 2,649 2,078 313 220 12 26 
Employment in 
export production, 
in thousands 
1976 1,173 172 124 30 13 2 3 
1980 1,505 277 192 59 21 4 1 
Employment in 
export produc- 
tion, 7% 
1976 6.3 8.3 7.8 12.3 6.9 25.0 12.5 
1980 7.3 10.5 9.2 8 9.5 33.3 3.8 
% of exports in 
agrarian sales, 
1977 25.5 -- 19.2 23.0 17.5 -- 18.0 





Calculated according to CALIFORNIA EXPORTS, November 1978, pp 10, 12; 
"Statistical Abstract of the United States 1979," Wash., 1979, pp 803, 812; 
BUSINESS AMERICA, 22 February 1982, p 13. 


Table 2 shows that the processing industry in Alaska is most dependent on 
foreign sales markets, with the state of Washington ranking second. The 
indicator is 14.2 percent for the largest industrial state, California. The 
indicators for Oregon also exceed the national average. 


The number of people employed in’the export sector of the processing industry 
in the Pacific States increased 1.6-fold between 1976 and 1980, while the 
total numbe~ of people employed in the processing industry increased 1.3-fold. 
As a result, the proportion accounted for by export production employees in 
the total number rose even higher during this period and far exceeds the 
national sverage. In 1980, for example, one-third of the employees in the 
processing industry in Alaska, around one-tenth in California and one-fifth 

in Washington were working on expurts. In the five states as a whole, 2/7,000 
people in the processing industry work directly on exports. 


38 











Certain branches of the processing industry are geared even more to foreign 
markets and constitute the basis of the state's export specialization. For 
example, according to some American estimates, around 30 percent ot the entire 
increment in the products of transport machine building in California between 
1972 and 1976 was the result of larger export shipments. A similar situation 
can be seen in branches of the extractive and food industries. The great 
importance of foreign sales markets to the development of these industries in 
Alaska, for example, is well known: By the beginning of the 1970's the main 
branches of the state economy--the lumber, woodworking and fish industries-- 
were completely dependent on Japanese demand. In the 1970's around one-fourth 
of all the wood produced in Washington and more than one-tenth of that pro- 
duced in Oregon were exported, and almost all of this wood was sent to Japan. 14 


Much of the product of the extractive industry is consumed by export production 
in the processing branches. We should also remember that thousands of people 
employed in transportation and communications, in public services, in adminis- 
tration and so forth are also working on foreign trade. Besides this, many 
workers and employees manufacture goods used in export production in other 
part ' the nation. The number of people employed "indirectly" in export 
production just in the processing industry of the Pacific States was 153,000 
in 1980, including 122,000 in California. 15 According to the California Coun- 
cil tor International Trade, another 80,000 people in this state are employed 
in the international service sphere (engineering, insurance and export-import 
orporations and banks) .16 


Agriculture in the Pacific States is geared to foreign sales markets even more 
than the processing industry. For example, the proportion accounted for by 
exports in total agricultural sales in fiscal year 1977 was 19.2 percent in 
Calitornia, 23 percent in Washington, 18 percent in Hawaii and 17.5 percent in 
Oregon. he production of some goods depends almost completely on foreign 
markets. For example, according to the Washington State Department of Commerce 
ind Economic Development, 80-85 percent of all the wheat produced here is sold 
ibroad. In 1980 more than 75 percent of California's entire cotton and rice 
harvest and 30 percent of its lemons were exported; what is more, California 
otton accounts for almost 60 percent of all U.S. cotton exports.!? 


blished information about the state of Washington illustrates the importance 
‘t exports in the region's economic development. This information indicates 
that the per capita value of state exports was already 1.8 times as high as the 


national average in the middle of the 1970's--1,100 dollars as compared to 


H00 dollars. The proportion accounted for by exports in the total value of 
roods shipped out of the state rose from 8 percent in 1963 to 20 percent in 
‘976. Around 79,800 people, or approximately 5 percent of all workers and 
mployees in the state, are engaged directly in the manufacture of goods for 


sport and the rendering of export-related services. Almost half of them work 
the processing industry (including one-fourth in the aerospace industry). 
the indirect influence of exports on employment is taken into account, in 


1976, 1 out of every 6 people in the labor force was working on exports (1 out 
every 16 in 1960), and the total number of employees of this category was 
8,700 (68,600 in 1960). According to American experts, 32 percent of all 


the people employed in the extractive industry and 17 percent in public 





services were working on exports in 1976. In branches specializing to a con- 

siderable extent in exports, the percentage of people employed in export pro- 

duction was much higher. For example, more than 45 percent of the workers and 
employees in the aerospace industry and almost 60 percent in wheat production 

were working on exports in 1976. 


Imports are also quite significant in the Pacific States. Imports cover the 
economy's need for several extremely important commodities, particularly 
energy resources, other raw materials and consumer goods. Machinery and 
equipment components, parts and accessories requiring further assembly at 
enterprises of the processing industry represent a large share of these 
imports. Pesides this, many of the goods imported through the Pacific States 
for other regions undergo some kind of processing here. One example is the 
assembly of Light-weight trucks and passenger cars imported from Japan, the 
FRG and Italy. 


It would be difficult to calculate the total effect of imports on regional 
employment. According to the California Council for International Trade, 
145,000 people in the state in 1980 had jobs due either directly or indirectly 
to the influence of commodity imports. According to other American estimates, 
the figure ranged from 96,000 to 385,000. It is known that more than 20,000 
Calitornians are engaged just in the sale of imported motor vehicles. !8 


Therefore, strong economic, scientific and technical potential was established 
in the Pacific States in the postwar period, especially in the 1970's. In 
turn, the economic development of the region created favorable conditions for 
the active foreign trade expansion of monopolies operating here and for the 
transformation of the region into an important center of international trade. 


The current U.S. administration is giving the monopolies of the Far West exten- 
sive assistance in foreign expansion, especially in Asia and the Pacific. The 
direct financing of sales of aviation equipment by the U.S. Export-Import Bank 
is a characteristic example of this. Within just 2 years, 1981 and 1982, the 
bank extended more than 630 million dollars in credit to airlines in Japan, 
Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and other countries of this region for the 
purchase of American planes. Furthermore, more than 92 percent of the total 
was earmarked for the purchase of planes from the Boeing Corporation (in 
Washington). l 


[TI 


K. Marx and F. Engels once wrote: "Both of the Pacific coastlines will soon 
he as densely populated, as open to trade and as developed in the industrial 
sense as the coastline from Boston to New Orleans is now. Then the Pacific 
Ocean will play the same role as the Atlantic Ocean plays now and the 
Mediterranean Sea played in antiquity and in the Middle Ages--the role of a 
great waterway for world relations."29 The history of the 20th century has 
proved the accuracy of this prediction. The more important economic and 
political role of the countries located in the Pacific basin and the growth 
of their international significance have been largely responsible for the 
development of the economy and foreign economic ties of the American Pacific 
West. 


40 








Table 3 


Foreign Trade of Pacific States 








Years Commodity turnover Exports** Imports 
1960 

in billions of dollars 4.3 2.5 1.8 

in 2%* 12.4 12.7 11.9 
1965 

in billions of dollars 6.2 3.5 2.8 

in %* 13.1 13.2 12.9 
1970 

in billions of dollars 13.4 7.1 6.3 

in %* 16.4 16.9 15.8 
1975 

in billions of dollars 34.5 16.9 17.6 

in %* 16.9 15.7 18.3 
1980 

in billions of dollars 93.5 46.3 47.2 

in %* 20.3 21.0 19.7 


* Percentage of national foreign trade. 





** Including exports of goods manufactured in other parts of the country. 
They represent a negligible portion of the goods exported from Pacific 
customs districts. 


Calculated according to "Historical Statistics of the United States. 
Colonial Times to 1970," Wash., 1975, pt Il, pp 889, 896; HIGHLIGHTS OF 
U.S. EXPORT AND IMPORT TRADE, July 1982. 


Active foreign trade has given the region a prominent place in the foreign 
trade relations of the United States as a whole. The foreign trade volume of 
the five states exceeded 93 billion dollars in 1980 (see Table 3). Between 
1960 and 1980 their share of national foreign trade turnover increased from 
12.4 percent to 20.3 percent, including an increase from 12.7 to 21 percent 
in exports and from 11.9 to 19.7 percent in imports (see Table 3). Their 
share of the trade in finished manufactured goods is being augmented quite 
dramatically. Between 1966 and 1980, for example, the export product of the 
U.S. processing industry increased 7.3-fold, but the figure was 10.8-fold in 
the Pacific States. As a result, their share of total exports of finished 
zoods rose from 12.1 to 18 percent (see Table 4). This indicator is percep- 
tibly higher than the Pacific States’ share of the total value of the output 
of the U.S. processing industry that same year (11.3 percent), clearly indi- 
cating that this industry is geared much more to foreign markets in these five 
states than in the nation as a whole. 


California is the leader in their foreign trade--56.2 billion dollars in 1980, 
or more than three-fifths of the entire commodity turnover of the "big five." 











It also accounts for a large share of all U.S. foreign trade--12.2 percent in 
1980. °! Furthermore, the growth of trade has been particularly dramatic in 
southern California--the largest Pacific foreign trade center in the United 
States. Almost two-thirds of California's foreign trade, more than half of 
the foreign trade of the Pacific States and over 7 percent of the national 
foreign trade turnover pass through its 15 sea ports and airports. 


Table 4 


Exports of Pacific States, Millions of Dollars 




















Regions Processing Industry 
1966 1972 1976 1980 1980, 2% of 1966 

United States 21,299 36 , 608 83,098 155,103 728 
Pacific States 2, 586 4,827 12,547 27,874 1,078 

% of U.S. exports 12.1 13.2 15.1 18.0 -- 
California 1,786 2,809 8,072 16,530 926 
Washington 602 1,781 3,235 8,738 1,451 
Oregon 143 237 824 1,946 1,361 
Alaska 38 -- 233 591 1,556 
Hawaii 17 -- 183 69 406 

Agriculture 
1968 1970 1977 1977, % of 1968 

United States 6,345 8,050 24,013 380 
Pacific States 630 837 2,467 392 

% of U.S. exports 10.0 10.4 10.3 -- 
California 4°3 592 1,774 430 
Washington 152 163 414 272 
Oregon 49 65 182 371 
Alaska -- -- 38 -- 
Hawaii 16 17 59 369 








Calculated according to CALIFORNIA EXPORT, Wash., November 1978, pp 10, 12; 
"Statistical Abstract of the United States 1979," pp 803, 812; BUSINESS 
AMERICA, 22 February 1982, p 13. 


Washington is in second place. In the 1970's its participation in foreign 
economic transactions grew constantly, and in 1979 its foreign trade turnover 
totaled 17.4 billion dollars, displaying an almost 1ll-fold increase since 
1965. Oregon ranks third (5.3 billion dollars in 1979), Hawaii ranks fourth 
(1.5 billion) and Alaska ranks fifth (just over 1 billion). 


The Pacific States trade mainly with the countries in the Pacific basin. In 
the past decade they, especially Asia and the Pacific (Southeast Asia, the 
Far East, Australia and Oceania), have tended to play a more important role 
as an area of U.S. foreign policy and economic expansion. The export markets 
and cheap labor and natural resources of the Pacific countries are particu- 
larly important to the United States now that its foreign trade positions in 
general have grown relatively weaker. 


, 
42 








This tendency is reflected in the rapid growth of American direct private 
investments and imports of U.S. goods and technology in this region. For 
example, between 1970 and 1980 the volume of direct private U.S. investments 
in the Asian and Pacific countries increased almost 3.2-fold--to 22.3 billion 
dollars--while total U.S. foreign investments increased 2./7-fold; trade with 
the countries of this region increased almost 6-fold--to 105.2 billion dollars. 
The Pacific countries supply the United States with almost all of its imported 
oroducts of the semiconductor industry. A network of enterprises controlled 
bv American electrical equipment corporations, most of which are located in 
California, has been created here and is now being actively enlarged. 22 The 
same countries supply the United States with large quantities of consumer 
goods. In all, the Asian and Pacific region's share of the foreign trade of 
the Pacific States was almost three-fifths at the beginning of the 1980's, 
while Latin America's share was less than one-sixth, Western Europe's share 
was one-seventh and Canada's was one-eighth. The countries of this region 
account for three-fourths of all export-import operations in California and 
Oregon, four-fifths in Washington and Hawaii and almost all of Alaska's 
foreign trade. The five states trade mainly with the countries of Northeast 
ind Southeast Asia, with Japan in the lead. 


The significant differences in the conditions, nature and level of economic 
development in the five different states predetermine some features of their 
foreign trade specialization. For example, California specializes in exports 
of machines and equipment (more than half of its total exports). It is the 
largest exporter of products of the processing industry in the United States: 
146.5 billion dollars in 1980, or twice the 1976 figure (see Table 4). Further- 
more, California leads the nation in exports of electrical equipment and ranks 
second in exports of transport and non-electrical equipment. Exports of non- 
energy resources, especially textile fibers, iron ore, scrap iron, leather and 
paper resources and fertilizer, also play an important part in its economy. 
Chemicals have become one of California's important exports. This state is 
the largest exporter of agricultural products, with fruit, vegetables, grain 
and meat as its main exported foodstuffs. 


Washington ranks second in the region and eighth in the nation in exports of 
processing industry products (8.7 billion dollars in 1980), with aircraft, 
spare parts for planes, wheat and wood making up three-fifths of its exports. 
Boeing, the huge aerospace corporation, has a monopoly on aircraft exports. 
Between 1970 and 1976 exports of these products more than doubled--to 1.5 
billion dollars. Washington is also a major exporter of wood, pulp, paper, 
foodstuffs (wheat, fish and vegetables) and aluminum. 


Timber, aluminum, wheat and meat make up the basis of Oregon's exports. Alaska's 
economic development in the past decade has been based primarily on exports of 
products of the Lumber and pulp and paper industries and natural gas. They 
wccount for 50 percent and 30 percent respectively of all Alaskan exports. 
Hawaiian exports consist primarily of the products of machine building, agri- 
ulture and the food industry. 


Moving on to an examination of the structure of the "big five’s" imports, we 
should note that they have exceeded exports in recent years. In 1980 the 


43 








deficit in foreign trade amounted to 900 million dollars. Its basis consisted 
of purchases of industrial and energy resources, particularly petroleum and 
petroleum products. The Pacific West is rich in energy resources but does not 
satisfy its own need for these resources because it is more convenient tor 
monopolies to import them. For example, Alaska, which is rich in oil and gas, 
satisfies its own need for petroleum products by importing them while much of 
Alaskan petroleum is not used locally or even in the other Pacific States 
(where oil refineries process mainly imported oil) and is sent to other parts 
of the country. 


Oil, gas and the products of their processing constitute California's largest 
import item (one-fifth of the total). Non-energy resources account for a 

large share (around one-tenth). Machines and equipment are also important 
import items, primarily the products of the electrical equipment industry and 
transport machine building. Consumer goods are another important item. Animal 
husbandry and farming products are imported in large quantities--coffee, tea, 
spices, sea food, oils and fats, fruit, nuts and others. 


Washington has traditionally had a positive balance of foreign trade, but 
increased imports of crude oil and natural gas have gradually reduced its size 
in recent years. They now account for two-thirds of all imports. Lumber is 
another important import item (one-sixth). 





Fuel, construction materials, machines, equipment and spare parts for the 
extractive and oil and gas industries occupy a prominent place among Alaska's 
imports. Imports of these goods were particularly sizeable in 1975 in connec- 
tion with the construction of the trans-Alaskan pipeline. By 1976, however, 
imports were reduced dramatically when most of the shipments for its construc- 
tion had been made. Alaska imports a wide variety of foodstuffs and manufac- 
tured consumer goods. 


Purchases of mineral, agricultural, timber and chemical resources and semi- 
manufactured products occupy an even more important place in Hawaiian imports 
than in the imports of other Pacific States. Even before the price of oil 
rose in 1973-1974, it accounted for two-thirds of all Hawaiian imports. The 
rest consisted of products of machine building and various manufactured com- 
modities, primarily consumer goods. 


lt is significant that a high percentage of the imports of the Pacific States 
‘ome from enterprises controlled by California, Washington and other corpora- 
tions but located in the Pacific basin countries. At the basis of this ten- 
dency lies the desire of monopolies to lower costs and raise profits, to 
icquire sources of raw materials and to move production units which have little 
competitive potential or are ecologically "dirty" out of the country. Wages 
it enterprises in the developing countries cf Pacific Asia are only one-eighth 
to one-tenth as high as wages in the United States and the other developed 
capitalist countries. Total working time at enterprises of transnational 
corporations in this region is approximately 1.5 times as great as working 
time in the Western countries as a result of the higher number of overtime 
hours, the longer workday, shorter vacations, etc. 











rican-controlled enterprises in the Pacitic countries are often part ot 
the transnational corporations’ global production and sales system. It is no 

ret that this system gives them great advantages. In particular, in accord- 
ince with American customs legislation, U.S. corporations which send components 
ind materials to their overseas enterprises for processing and then import the 
tinished products to the United States pay duties only on the value added by 
seas processing (in other words, excluding the value of the shipped compo- 
ments). Monopolies in the Pacific States make active use of these advantages. 
he activity of firms of the electronics industry, which is centered in 
ilitornia, is the most characteristic example of this. The low-duty intra- 
rzanizational imports of semiconductors manufactured by branches and affili- 


ites ot these firms in Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, Hong Kong and Mexico 

rccounted for around 80 percent of all American intraorganizational imports of 

emiconductors by the beginning of the 1980's, or 65 percent of the total quan- 
) 

tit imported. 


\s tor raw material branches, here an example is provided by the activity of 
the iltex firm, organized jointly by California's SoCal and Texas’ Texaco. 
oeginning of the 1980's it was extracting two-thirds of all the oil 
roduced in Indonesia. By controlling extraction, American capital can control 
the oil supply of the United States and the ASEAN countries, as well as some 
other states, primarily Japan. 


re several long-range tendencies can be discerned in U.S. regional 
momic development, such as the partial transfer of modern processing 
ranches to the Pacific Coast and the intensive development of several branches 
iericulture and the extractive industry. One of the main results of these 
been the growth of this region's foreign economic potential. 

[ts international commercial contacts are expanding at a rate exceeding the 
rational average. It would now be impossible to conceive of economic develop- 
‘nt in the Pacific States without foreign trade; furthermore, their export- 

import dependence now far exceeds the national average. 


esses nas 


processes have an important political aspect. The increasingly strong 
es of California, Washington and the other Pacific States and the 
liar teatures of their development have augmented their role in U.S. 
ind in policymaking in international affairs. Washington definitely 
izes the value of the use of their growing economic potential in its 
trategyv. In this connection, an interesting comment was made by 


er U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs 
lbrooke, who underscored the great political significance of this region's 
tive irticipation in economic relations with capitalist and developing 
intr in the Pacific basin. Holbrooke said: "If people in the American 
t ntinue to build special, closer relations with the Pacific region in 
ide. in iltural exchange, in contacts between individuals and in other 
WAYS, will strengthen our nation and this entire vast region."25 There 
esti that the United States’ perceptibly more active Pacific 


ent vears, particularly in relations with Japan, the ASEAN count- 
ind South Korea,“ has been motivated to a considerable extent bv the 


fo secure the economic interests of the United States and its western 
lies in the Paciti basin. 








In view of all this, we can assume that the Pacific states will plav an even 
more important role in U.S. economics and politics in the next few years. 


FOOTNOTES 


l. Calculated according to "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981," 
Wash., 1981, pp 10, 382, 497, 781. 


For more about the postwar economic development of this region as a 
whole, see N. T. Kaburov, "The American West," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, 
IDEOLOGLYA, 1976, No 8--Editor's note. 


Nm 


3}. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 7, p 461. 

+. For more detail, see Val. Zorin, "The Monopolies and Washington," SSHA: 
EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1978, No 7, pp 27-37; 1978, No 8, 
pp 45-56; A. A. Kokoshin and Yu. K. Abramov, "The Composition of the 
Reagan Administration's Upper Echelon,” ibid., 1982, No ll, pp 117-127. 

5. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 14 December 1975, p 1357. 


h. V. L. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch."" [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, 
pp 135-136. 


7. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 31 June 1981, p 2. 
8. "1979 Forecast,” Los Angeles, 1978, p 52. 


9. G. N. Tsagolov, "The Source of the Real Threat of War,"’ KOMMUNIST, 1982, 
No l, Pp 106. 


10. “Litton Industries Inc. Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1980," Beverly 
Hills, 1980, pp 34-35. 


ll. R. De Grasse et al, "The Costs and Consequences of Reagan's Military 
Buildup,” Council on Economic Priorities, N.Y., 1982, p 29. 


12. Calculated according to "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981," 
p 665. 


13. NORTHERN COASTAL COUNTIES OF CALIFORNIA, 30 November 1981, pp 3-4. 


\4. “United States-Japan Trade: Issues and Problems,’ Report by the Comptrol- 
ler General of the United States, Wash., 21 September 1979, p 136. 


15. BUSINESS AMERICA, 22 February 1982, p 13. 


16. “Who Needs Foreign Trade? California Does," San Francisco, 1979, pp 2-3. 


17. CENTRAL VALLEY COUNTIES OF CALIFORNIA, 31 July 1981, pp 1-2. 


46 





"Who Needs Foreign Trade? California Does," p 3. 
ASIA TRAVEL TRADE, December 1982, p 43. 
K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., vol 7, p 233. 


Calculated according to "Caltrade Highlights,” San Francisco, 1982, 
pp 2-6. 


"1978 Industrial Outlook," Wash., 1978, p 308; "1980 U.S. Industrial 
Out Look," Wash., 1980, pp 267-268. 


N. Pierce, "The Pacific States of America,” N.Y., 1972, p 287; OVERSEAS 
BUSINESS REPORTS, July 1980, pp 22-28; "Statistical Abstract of the United 
States 1981,"" pp 846-849. 


"1978 Industrial Outlook," p 308; "U.S. Industrial Outlook 1982," Wash., 
1982, pp 235-241. 


DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, August 1978, p 5. 
For more detail, see V. P. Lukin, "O politike SShA v Azii v nachale 


230-kh godov" [U.S. Policy in Asia at the Beginning of the 1980's], Moscow, 
1982, pp 2-8. 


COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya”, 


1983 


S588 
CSu. 


1803/11 


47 











HIGHER CRUDE CONVERSION 


Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 83 (signed 
to press 19 May 83) pp 86-93 


[Article by M. Ya. Kon' and V. G. Shershun] 


[Text] When the energy crisis grew into one of the most important problems 
facing the U.S. petroleum refining industry, the need arose for the more 
intensive refining of petroleum with a view to the derivation of the maximum 
quantity of the most valuable products--motor fuels and petrochemical raw 
materials. 


The petroleum refining industry, which satisfies almost the entire U.S. demand 
for motor and energy fuels, petrochemical raw materials, lubricants, coking 
coal, bitumen and other petroleum products, is one of the most important ele- 
ments of the U.S. national economy. In terms of its development, the total 
capacity of its plants (902 million tons a year), the number of its plants 
(303) and the refining volume (631 million tons a year),! the United States 
occupies the leading position in the capitalist world. 


Over the last decade the petroleum refining industry in the United States, 

just as in other capitalist countries, has undergone serious changes primarily 

as a result of two global factors: on the one hand, the limited nature of 

world petroleum reserves and the related rise in prices and, on the other, the 
stricter environmental protection requirements stemming from the higher percent cf 
sulfurons crude and heavy crude in the worldwide oil recovery and refining 
volume. 


The first of these factors led to stricter conservation measures and the 
reduced consumption of petroleum products, particularly the least valuable-- 
residual oil (or fuel oil). This, in turn, required more intensive refining 
for the extraction of larger quantities of the most valuable products--motor 
fuels--and smaller quantities of fuel oil, as well as the improvement of 
refining processes and, in particular, the enhancement of their energy effi- 
ciency. The influence of the second factor is reflected in the need for con- 
siderable improvement in the quality of petroJeum products (for example, the 
reduction of the sulfur content in diesel and boiler fuels, the curtailment of 
leaded gas production, etc.) with the simultaneous reduction of the negative 
environmental impact of oil refinery operations. 


48 





t m of Of] Consumpt ion 


ir must be said that the effects of the dramatic rise in oil prices began to 
be noticeable only in the last 3 or 4 years: The United States is the only 
leveloped country in the capitalist world where absolute oil consumption and 
the proportion accounted for by oil in the national fuel and energy supply 
increased perceptibly during the 5 years following the oil crisis of 1973, 
despite the multifold price increase. In 1978, for example, absolute oil 
‘onsumption totaled 946 million tons (48.6 percent)? as compared to 810 million 
(46.6 percent) in 1973. This was largely due to the United States’ own rela- 
tively large resources of oil, the price of which (and of petroleum products) 
wis controlled by the government until recently. Gradually, however, energy 
conservation measures reduced oil consumption after 1978, and its percentage 
of the national fuel and energy supply dropped to 43.2 percent in 1981. 


i general economic depression combined with the significant rise in the 


rices ot petroleum products, resulting from the lifting of price controls in 
1981, turther reduced oil consumption. By 1990 the proportion accounted for 
by oil in the nation's fuel and energy supply is expected to drop to 38.1 a 
cent, and absolute consumption should decrease to 808 million tons a year. 

in particular, the enhancement of the fuel efficiency of motor vehicles from 


6 (1978) to 8.9-9.3 kilometers per liter (1990) and the manufacture of more 
liesel vehicles is expected to reduce gas consumption by 20-30 percent; the 
ise ot more coal and nuclear energy should reduce the consumption of residual 
tuel by 15-30 percent; only the consumption of diesel and jet fuel is expected 
to imerease (by 35-60 percent and 28-35 percent respectively),4 as well as the 
onsumption of petrochemical raw materials. 


[n this way, passing through the "induction period" following the oil crisis 
Ԥ 1973, the United States entered a stage of continuous reduction in oil 


. 
msumption. 


must be said that the United States, which has a tremendous number of motor 
ticles, has always beer® distinguished by the high consumption of gasoline and 
r motor fuels; the proportion accounted for by residual fuels is relatively 
w (Table 1), and around 50 percent of the nation’s demand for this product is 
itistied through imports (the main petroleum product imported), primarily from 
iribbean countries. 


‘tion with this, petroleum refining in the United States is distin- 
hed by a high concentration of breakdown processes (catalytic cracking, 


frocracking, coking), making it possible to convert the least valuable part 

the il--fuel oil--into more valuable products, as well as a high percentage 

‘rrocesses adding to the commercial value of petroleum products (reforming, 
lkvlation, bhydrorefining and several others). In all, the proportion of 

ondary processes to primary refining was 112.6 percent in 1981 (Table 2), 

| the degree of refining, measured in terms of the output of motor fuels and 
etrochemical raw materials, exceeded 75 percent. For the sake of comparison, 
the same indicators are only 55.4 and 60 percent respectively in Western 
Furope, another large world refining center. 


ynnection with the inst. tion of stricter environmental quality standards, 
ficulties in the location of sites for the construction of large plants and, 


49 








what is most important, the system of government incentives existing prior 

to 1981 (compensation payments, less strict requirements on the lead content 
of gasoline, ete.), the total number of petroleum refineries increased primar- 
ily through the construction of small plants; between 1973 and 1980 around 60 
small refineries were built in the United States with an average capacity of 
500,000 tons a year (so-called "boilers"), and only one large refinery with a 
capacity of 8.5 million tons was built. 


The average capacity of the refinery is 3 million tons a year, and maximum 
eapacity is 35 million. Over 50 percent of the refineries are small (up to 
1.5 million tons a year), are distinguished by high proportional capital 
investments and operational costs and are extremely uneconomical. Besides 
this, these refineries are distinguished by a relatively low percentage of 
secondary processes, making higher crude conversion impossible. 


Table 1 


Petroleum Product Consumption Patterns and Proportion Accounted 
for by Oil in U.S. Fuel and Energy Supply, Z 


Categories 1972 1975 1980* 1985% 
Oil consumption, millions of tons 

a year 776 765.9 837 BOR** 
Percentage of fuel and energy 

supply 45.8 46.3 44.8 38.1%** 


Petroleum product consumption 
patterns, 7% 


Gasoline 38.8 39.7 38.5 35.4 
Intermediate distillates 24.7 24.9 23.2 24.5 
Residual fuel 17.2 16.9 14.8 13.4 
Others (including petro- 

chemical raw materials) 19.3 18.5 23.5 26.7 


oo ee + 1 


kk 1990, 
"BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry," 1978, 1980. 


© cancellation of the financia' and tax privileges of small refineries in 
1981 caused their economic indicators to drop dramatically, resulting in large 
losses for their owners. In recent years, however, despite the lower demand 
for petroleum products, capacities for primary refining have continued to be 
iugmented in the United States as a result of the completion of refinery con- 
‘truection projects begun when oil consumption was still increasing (the increase 
in capacities was 31 million tons in 1980 alone), all of which has led to the 
record underloading of U.S. capacities (68 percent at the beginning of 1981). 
By 1981 more than 40 small refineries and 6 relatively large ones with a total 
capacity of around 42 million tons a year--that is, around 5 percent of all 
capacities in the refining industry--had been closed either temporarily or 
.© A large number of small refineries will probably be closed in 
the near future. 


permanently 


50 








Hivher Conversion 


Despite the fact that the U.S. petroleum refining industry produces around 

/5 percent of the light products (the highest indicator in the world) and is 
distinguished by a high percentage of secondary processes, the underloading of 
capacities at a time of fairly high demand for light products requires the 
more intensive refining of petroleum, 


Table 2 


Proportion Accounted for by Secondary Processes, % of Capacities 
for Primary Refining (at beginning of year) 


Process 1971 1976 1981 
Vrimary refining, millions of tons a year 623.3 730.6 902.2 
Thermal cracking 12.2 9.8 8.6 
Catalytic cracking 44.9 36.2 Oe 
Catalytic reforming 20.0 21.2 19.4 
Hydroretining and hydrodesulfurization 30.0 38.2 47.0 
Hydrocracking 5.6 5.8 4.8 
\ikvlation 5.4 5.2 4.7 
lotal 118.1 116.4 112.6 


OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, 1972, No 13; 1977, No 13; 1981, No 13. 


This is complicated by the refining industry's traditional emphasis on the 
version of light, low-sulfur crude (with a top sulfur content of up to 

0.5 percent), and until recently only 40 percent of the capacities were suit- 
able tor the refining of petroleum with an average or high sulfur content. 

in view of the fact that the latter constitute most of the world petroleum 
suutput, they will continue to account for a higher percentage of the total 
refining volume. This is why cracking processes are the object of special 
interest in the United ‘tates at the present time. 


Ihe conversion of residue into more valuable light petroleum products is based 
m the augmentation of the ratio of hydrocarbons to initial raw material. 


here are two main ways of achieving this. The first is hydrogen redistribu- 
tion within the raw material--that is, the production of a specific quantity 
products enriched in hydrogen (motor fuels, etc.) by means of the simultane- 
lerivation of a product with a low hydrogen content (coke). One of the 
iin refining processes--slow coking--is based on this principle. This process 
relatively inexpensive but the quality of the light products derived in this 


nanner is relatively low, and what is most important (particularly in re- 
lfurous crude), it produces large quantities of almost unusable high- 


ir coke. Another process is catalytic fluid cracking, which was not used 
widely until recently because of its relatively low technical and economic 
idicators. This was due to high expenditures of the catalyst as a result of 
rapid contamination by the high metal content of residual fuel. The 
levelopment of highly resistant catalysts and a number of other improvements 


ive facilitated the successful use of this process. 


’ 
-_~ 














Another refining method consists in the enrichment of residual products with 
hydrogen from outside. This is the basis of hydrogenization processes, includ- 
ing hydrodesulturization and hydrocracking. These hydrogenization processes, 
which are conducted under high pressure and require larger expenditures of 
hydrogen, call for large capital investments and operational expenditures. 


Catalytic processes of hydrodesulfurization are usually conducted under pressure 
of up to 100 atm and are designed primarily to reduce the content of sulfur and 
heavy components--asphaltenes and carboids. These processes can be used for 
the preparation of raw materials in slow coking and catalytic cracking, which 
considerably augments the output and quality of the products of the latter 
processes. As mentioned above, the main difficulty in refining is the high 
cokeability of residual products and their higher content of heavy metals 
capable of contaminating catalysts. This is why hydrodesulfurization processes 
bexan to be used widely only in recent years, when highly resistant catalysts 
were developed and special technological methods of conducting the processes 
were perfected (for example, hydrodesulfurization in a fluidized catalyst bed 
with the continuous addition of the working catalyst). This is also true of 
catalytic hydrocracking, which is conducted under pressure of up to 200 atm and 
allows for the almost total conversion of residue into high-quality light 
products (for example, gasoline or jet fuel). These processes, however, are 
distinguished by the highest capital investments and operational costs. 


In addition to catalytic hydrocracking processes, thermal hydrocracking (so- 
called "dynacracking") has been developed in the United States in recent years. 
lt can be used successfully in the refining of synthetic oil--that is, the 
products of destructive hydrogenation, shale oil, bituminous oil, etc. 


Improvement of Retining Processes 


in addition to the need for higher conversion, the rising cost of oil necessi- 
tated more economical refining processes, the reduction of energy expenditures 
ind the improvement of the selectivity of processes. 


Ihe more intensive refining of petroleum and the improvement of the quality 

of petroleum products depend primarily on the development of catalytic processes 
md of new and improved catalysts. The quality of catalysts is assessed pri- 
marily according to their ability to be activated (which determines the tempe- 
rature of the process or the installation output), selectivity (measured by the 
sutput of specific products) and stability. Today the unprecedented scales of 
production (there are catalytic cracking facilities with a capacity of 7 mil- 
lion tons a year, hydrorefineries with a capacity of 4 million tons a year, 
ete.) and the dramatic rise in the cost of raw materials and energy make par- 
ticularly great demands on these indicators. 


The dramatic improvement of catalysts in catalytic cracking, one of the most 
widely used refining processes, was connected with the use of zeolites, which 
heightened the productivity of equipment and cugmented the output of gasoline. 
fhe first catalytic cracking facilities were converted for the use of zeolite 
catalysts in 1964, and over 90 percent of all these facilities were operating 
mn these catalysts by the end of the 1960's. The transfer from amorphous to 
reolite catalysts perceptibly augmented the productivity of equipment, 


1 
rh 








recluding the need to construct new cracking facilities with a total capacity 
' around 40 million tons a year, required for the satisfaction of the rising 
lemand tor cracked gasoline. 


‘he use of highly active and selective zeolite catalysts led to the consider- 
ible improvement of the technology of catalytic cracking. Improvements in 
this process almost doubled the output of gasoline over a decade. 


The same is true of other catalytic processes. For example, monometallic 
platinum catalysts were replaced by bimetallic and polymetallic catalysts in 
catalytic reforming in the 1970's, reducing the pressure required for the 
process by half and producing a considerable savings in energy expenditures 
ind a perceptible increase in the output of reformed gasoline, a valuable 
component of motor gasoline. 


lhe third-generation catalysts used today in hydrorefining require a much 
lower temperature and pressure than the catalysts of the 1950's and 1960's and 
-imultaneously augment the productivity of equipment and raise the level of 


desulfurization. 


in addition to the improvement of catalysts, the further improvement of tech- 
nology has raised technical and economic indicators and reduced energy expendi- 
tures. For example, the transfer to high-temperature reprocessing with the 
omplete combustion of CO directly in the regenerative chamber heightened the 
wrey efficiency of catalytic cracking, increased the output of gasoline and 
‘ir altaneously reduced expenditures of the catalyst. The development of reform- 
ing processes with continuous catalyst regeneration produced reformed gas with 

in Octane number of up to 105 with perceptibly reduced expenditures of energy. 


it is significant that U.S. oil companies are the leaders in refining technol- 
my in the capitalist world. This is attested to by the fact that they 
iccount for over 70 percent of the refining licenses sold in the world. 


(he wider use of computers and automated control systems makes refining 
nrocesses much more economical. 


erican firms were the first to use these systems in refining. Today more 
in 9O percent of the refineries use computers for organizational and eco- 
‘rations. Information and information-control systems are used in 

roduction control in combination with other types of administrative systems. 
mputers are used extensively in the control of technological processes; 
rthermore, these systems have become a standard element in designs for new 

ilities. Several control functions are performed by these systems without 
perator interference. Microprocessor equipment has been used in recent years 


tt 1utomation of administration and production. 
incorporation of these systems has been facilitated by the production of 
prehensive technical equipment and standard software based on typical admin- 
itive functions, particularly petroleum refining. A classic example is 
yvwell's TDC-2000 system with multichannel digital regulators (controllers), 
eprogrammed for the performance of several dozen specific functions. The 
entral mputer is generally set up as part ot the centralized control systen 


r greater ettictiency. 


53 











In addition to control systems, computer equipment is used widely for the 
processing of data, in data collection systems and for the automation of micro- 
piloting systems for the planning of processes. 


Along with the improvement of technology, the optimization of plans for the use 
of retinery heat, the improvement of furnace operations, the reduction ot the 
heat loss of technological equipment and the utilization of secondary energy 
resources are being given considerable attention in the United States. 


All of these measures have reduced energy expenditures considerably. Between 
1972 and 1980, for ex.mple, proportional energy expenditures in petroleum 
refining were reduced 20 percent (and even 40-45 percent in some refineries); 
a further reduction of 8 percent before 1985 is anticipated.’ 


Fnhancement of Product Quality 


Ihe desire to use petroleum as efficiently as possible has also led to the 
tendency to produce more diesel vehicles in the United States (the diese! 
engine is around 25 percent more economical than the carburetor engine). The 
necessary increase in the output of diesel fuel can be achieved through the 
Augmentation of its fractional composition (a lower final boiling point), 
which has been made possible by the use of special additives and the develop- 
ment of new processes of the soft selective hydrocracking of distillates with 
i final boiling point of up to 420° C, considerably lowering the pour point of 
these distillates. For example, the Mobil firm's process of catalytic deparaf- 
tination lowers the pour point of diesel fuel with a final boiling point of 
20° C. Furthermore, the output of commercial product is around 95 percent. 


lhe institution of stricter environmental quality standards is one of the most 
important factors influencing the technical progress of petroleum refining in 
the United States. This concerns the improvement of product quality and the 
improvement of production processes in order to reduce environmental pollution. 


Motor gasoline is the petroleum product used most widely in the United States. 
In recent years several laws have been passed in the nation to limit the use 

‘! lead-based anti-knock additives in gasoline because the lead compounds pro- 
luced by this kind of gas pollute the atmosphere and, what is most important, 
rapidly contaminate catalysts for the complete combustion of exhaust gas. Gas 
containing no leaded anti-knock compounds already amounted to 50 percent ot 
total consumption in 1980, and the figure should rise to 70-90 percent by 1990. 
tut the restrictions against the use of leaded anti-knock compounds do not 
signify lower requirements for gasoline octane numbers, which must remain 

fairly high due to the need for more fuel-efficient vehicles. This has 

required the increased production of high-octane gasoline components (reformate, 
ilkvlate, cracked gas, etc.). This presupposes an increase in catalytic 
reforming capacities, including a further increase in equipment operating on 
himetallic and polymetallic catalysts (75 percent in 1980) and the construction 
of continuous reforming facilities; plans have been made for the enlargement of 
facilities for the traditional production of high-octane gasoline components 
(alkylation and isomerization) and new catalytic processes, such as the deriva- 
tion of propylene dimers (dimersols). The octane number of cracked gas is to 
be raised considerably through the use of special new catalysts in the catalytic 
cracking process. 





[tr must be said, however, that the production of high-octane gas without anti- 
knock compounds has reduced the output of gasoline from petroleum, as a result 
t which extensive research is being conducted in the United States to opti- 
iize gasoline octane requirements with a view to the more economical use of 
petroleum in the entire "refinery-fuel-engine" system. 


the possibility of using various compounds derived from non-petroleum resources 
(various types of alcohol and esters) as high-octane gas components has aroused 

nsiderable interest. In particular, so-called "gasohol" (a mixture consist- 
ing of nine parts gasoline and one part ethyl alcohol) is already quite popu- 
lar; it is sold at 800 gas stations in 28 states. The alcohol needed for the 
production of gasohol can be obtained from agricultural waste (substandard 
seeds, syrup, etc.). According to some of the most optimistic forecasts, 8 
tleohol fuel with an ethanol or methanol base will amount to around 10 percent 
of all the gas consumed in the United States by the year 2000. 


lhe stricter requirements on the sulfur content of diesel, furnace and boiler 


fuel, combined with the simultaneous increase in sour crude, necessitated the 
quicker development of hydrodesulfurization processes. Between 1971 and 1981 
the yield ot these processes increased from 197 million tons a year to 

? million, and their relative capacity increased from 30 to 42 percent. 


lhese rates will remain high in the future. 
vironmental Protection 


idition to setting stricter quality standards for petroleum products, cur- 
rent environmental protection laws in the United States make serious demands on 
the very processes (and facilities) used in petroleum refining from the stand- 
mint of their environmental impact. In connection with this, several measures 
een taken in the petroleum refining industry to reduce emissions of 
uultur-containing gases and hard particles with flue gas, to reduce losses of 
‘'rocarbons through evaporation, leakage and so forth, to reduce fresh water 
nsumption through the use of recycling systems, to combat noise pollution, 
ording to estimates, total capital investments in environmental pro- 
tection in petroleum refining between 1974 and 1985 should amount to around 


illion dollars. 
it must be said that all of the programs for higher crude conversion, the pro- 
io t unleaded high-octane gas and so forth require huge capital invest- 
ice it to say that the cost of a catalytic cracking facility with 
t > million tons a year can exceed 300 million dollars, a hydro- 
irization facility with a capacity of 1.5 million tons a year can cost 
n, and a facility for coking with the subsequent liquefaction of 
ke (the flexicoking process) with a capacity of around 3 million tons a year 
round | billion dollars. 
me stimates, American refiners will spend around 13 billion 
ir tween 19 ind 1985” just on the resolution of problems connected 
with the deterioration of petroleum quality (in 1981 capital investments in 
etroleum retining industry totaled 6.3 billion dollars, 19 and much of this 
tal w u r the construction of facilities). Capital investments in 


ileohol-based fuel could reach 23.4 billion dollars by 2000. 








The recent drop in oil prices could obviously slow down this process somewhat, 
but American experts anticipate no changes in the main strategy otf the industry, 
iimed at higher conversion. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. All data are for 1 January 1981. 
2. OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, 1980, No 20, pp 68, 69. 
}. WORLD OIL, 1980, No 3, p 77. 
4. OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, 1981, No 14, p 52. 
5. Ibid., 1981, No 13, p 63. 


h. Ibid., 1981, No 38, pp 71-76. 


™ 
. 


Ibid., 1982, No 11, pp 27-31. 


x 


CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, 1980, No 15, p 17. 
4. OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, 1980, No 20, pp 43-46. 
10. WORLD OIL, 1981, No 6, p 254. 


COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 
1983 


RSRS 
cso: 1803/11 











.S. MILITARY BASES--STRONGHOLDS OF IMPERIALISM 


Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 83 (signed 
to press 19 May 83) pp 109-115 


|Article by E. G. Grigor‘ yev] 


_Text] In response to the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent, General Secre- 
tary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov reminded him that "hundreds 
of American carriers capable of a nuclear strike against our territory are 
concentrated along the entire perimeter of the USSR." Commenting on the 
increase in "feverish U.S. activity to situate military bases close to Soviet 
territory’ and the presence of “hundreds of runways thousands of miles away 
from the United States, on which American planes carrying nuclear weapons are 
standing, ready to take off at a moment's notice,"! Yu. V. Andropov underscored 
the dangerous, provocative nature of this activity. 


The United States now has more than 1,500 military bases and installations on 
the territory of 32 states on all continents. More than half a million 
American servicemen are stationed there at all times. In 1982 their number 
increased by almost 6 percent. American naval ships plough the waters of the 
\tlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and 
e Strait of Hormuz. Up to 12,000 American nuclear weapons are located outside 
United States. According to the data of the London Institute of Strategic 
Studies, the Pentagon has deployed a third of its combat-ready infantry and 
irime divisions, a third of its aiplanes, two of its four operational fleets 
several other naval units, including most of its nuclear missile submarines, 
itside U.S. territory.3 


.S. military installations on foreign territory are large air and naval 
, intantryv and Marine garrisons, tactical and antiaircraft missile sites, 


ts for nuclear, chemical and other weapons, materiel and ammunition, air 
space observation posts, coastal hydroacoustic submarine detection stations, 
id j ind radioelectronic reconnaissance centers, signal offices and various 
er types of tacilities. 
large U.S. military base on foreign territory is usually an isolated, 


sarded and largely autonomous complex with extraterritorial rights. It can 
include several dozen combat, auxiliary and suprort tacilities. 








The standard air base has one or two paved landing strips and several auxili- 
ary runways and taxi-ways. Depending on the type of base, the length of the 
landing strips can range from 900 meters (for army planes) to 4,500 meters 
(for heavy strategic bombers). Most of the bases have a main concrete or 
asphalt landing strip 2,400-2,600 meters long. They are equipped with con- 
nected and detached shelter and hard standing for planes, hangars, repair 
shops and warehouses of various types. The radar and communication equipment 
of large bases is at the service of planes day and night in all types of 
weather. 


fhe standard naval facility consists of port buildings, ship-raising and ship 
repair enterprises and a support and supply system. Many bases have airfields 
for naval aviation, storage and repair facilities and nuclear munition depots 
tor ships and naval aviation. 


Most ot the American military bases and installations are located in direct 
proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union and other countries of the social- 
ist community, in so-called "strategic forward defense areas" in Western Europe 
and Asta. 


Western Europe, particularly its central regions, is the main region for the 
deployment of American troops on foreign territory: The Pentagon regards the 
territory ot the FRG as its main stronghold against the Warsaw Pact countries. 
Over 375,000 personnel, four divisions, six separate army regimes and brigades 
ind more than 750 combat planes, the absolute majority of which carry nuclear 
weapons, are located permanently on numerous military bases and installations 
in Western Europe. The United States has more than 7,000 nuclear munitions in 
more than 150 depots, around 100 Pershing IA missiles with a range of around 
700 kilometers, Lance missiles and over 500 pieces of nuclear artillery in 
Furope. In accordance with a NATO Council decision (December 1979), the United 
States plans to begin deploying 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 land- 
based cruise missiles with a range of up to 2,500 kilometers in Western Europe 
in 1983. 





According to NATO's plans, all Pershing II missiles and 96 cruise missiles will 
be located in the FRG. The rest of the land-based Tomahawk cruise missiles 

will be located in Great Britain (160), Italy (112), Belgium and the Netherlands 
(48 each). The missiles should arrive in England, the FRG and Italv betore the 
end of 1983. 


\s Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, com- 
mented: "The United States intends to augment its offensive strategic poten- 
tial by deploying new American missiles in Western Europe and other regions 
close to the USSR and its allies. According to Pentagon military experts, this 
could heighten the survivability of the United States in a conflict. Actually, 
the U.S. ‘first strike’ doctrine is spearheaded against the NATO allies. They 
have been made the target of the first retaliatory strike, which would obvi- 
ously also be the last for most of them. Washington is violating the principle 
‘f equality and equivalent security even with respect to its own allies by 
turning them into the hostages of Pentagon nuclear strategy." 


58 








re are 188 Large military installations in the FRG, including 9 air bases, 
‘> army garrisons and the largest weapon depots outside the United States, 
including depots tor nuclear and chemical weapons, heavy armaments and combat 
juipment. This is the location of over 275,000 American military personnel, 
two armored tank and two mechanized divisions, one armored tank and two mech- 
anized brigades, two separate armored cavalry regiments, over 3,000 medium 
tanks and large quantities of artillery, aircraft, helicopters and other 


nateriel. 


In accordance with an agreement "on support in the event of a crisis or war,” 
signed in April 1982 by the United States and the FRG, the Pentagon acquired 
the right to supplement its existing divisions in West Germany with another 
‘ix divisions and 1,000 airplanes in a 10-day period--that is, to more than 
double the contingent of its air and ground forces in the FRG. 


nere are 18 large military bases in Great Britain, the most important ot which 
is the Holy Loch naval base, the advance base of the 14th squadron of American 
nuclear submarines and the ships of the Second U.S. Atlantic Fleet. An impor- 


’ 


tant role has been assigned to the 10 U.S. air force bases in the British Isles, 


where the third American tactical aviation army is located, and where strategic 
iviation will be based in the event of hostilities. According to the English 
press, the more than 340 American planes located on British territory surpass 
the entire British RAF in terms of combat strength. The radar missile detec- 


ion post here is of strategic value. In all, more than 25,000 American ser- 
vicemen are stationed in Great Britain, including over 20,000 Air Force 


\ large U.S. Air Force base is located in Holland, where 2,600 American ser- 
vicemen are stationed. American troop garrisons are also located in Belgium 
', 300 servicemen) and Portugal (1,500). 


wrican military presence in Northern Furope, in Scandinavia, is sub- 
‘stantial.’ The Pentagon makes extensive use of the islands of Denmark and 
lorway, including Denmark's Greenland, Bornholm and Faeroe Islands and Norway's 


in Mayen and Bear Island. Primary significance has been attached to the 


iblishment of naval and air force bases there. Large air bases and airports 
ive been built in Bardu, Andenes, Bodo and Bonak (Norway) and in Karup, Alborg, 
trup, Skrodstrup, Vandel and Vaerlese (Denmark). Hangars cut out of the 
ire used for the concealment of combat equipment on Norwegian airfields. 
truction of concrete shelters for aircraft has also been launched in 
ent vears. Plans have been drawn up for the enlargement of four air bases 
Denmark within the next few years. 


larvest naval bases in Scandinavia are in Ramson (near the port of Narvik), 
tad, Tromso, Horten, Trondheim, Bergen and Kristiansand (Norway) and in 


yhagen, Frederikshavn and Korsor (Denmark). Many deep fjords and sea 
the part of the Norwegian coastline that does not freeze in winter 
to be ed as anchorage sites. Various tvpes of radioelectronic recon- 
san sts have been set up on the border between the Soviet Union and 
rway in the north and on the Danish island of Bornholm in the Baltic Sea, 
ited close to the shores of the GDR and Poland. The Andenes (Norway) and 
ddstrup (Denmark) air force bases are being prepared for the deployment of 








WACS-equipped E-3A planes. According to reports in the foreign press, around 
»,000 tons ot various munitions and large quantities of fuel are stored in 
NATO warehouses in the western part of the Jutland peninsula (Denmark). At 
the end of 1980 the United States and Norway signed an agreement on the con- 
struction of a large warehouse complex in central Norway for the storage ot! 


the weapons of an American Marine brigade. 


in [celand, where 2,900 American servicemen are stationed, the American naval 
and air base in Keflavik is being used actively. According to a report pre- 
pared for the American Congress on "United States Foreign Policy Objectives 
and Overseas Military Installations,” "Keflavik is an important link in the 
chain of airtields used for flights by short-range aircraft through the North 
\tlantic."® The Keflavik base has one of the longest landing strips on 
American air bases (around 4,500 meters) and can accommodate planes of all 
types. American naval ships regularly enter this harbor. It is now known 
that the United States is deploying atomic weapons in Keflavik. 


The United States has 199 military installations in Southern Europe, in the 
Mediterranean countries, including 60 in Turkey, 24 in Greece, 52 in Italy, 


» » 


>? in Spain, 2 in Morocco, 4 in France and 22 in Portugal. 


Ihe United States was granted the right to use bases in Spain as early as 1953, 
under the Franco regime. After Franco's death in 1976, the seventh consecu- 
tive U.S.-Spanish treaty was signed, in accordance with which the United 
States retained the right to use all four of the main bases located in Spain-- 
in Torrejon near Madrid, Zaragoza in northern Spain, Morone and Rota in the 
Gult of Cadiz (the Pentagon had to partially evacuate the base in Rota)--and 
several other installations in exchange for military and economic assistance. 


\merican strategic, military-transport, tactical and patrol aviation is located 
om air bases in Spain. These bases are also to be used for the transfer of 
troops and cargo to Europe and the "rapid deployment force" to the Near and 
Middle East. Lajes Base on Terceira Island, one of the Azores (Portugal), 
where U.S. Air Force reconnaissance planes are based, can be used for the same 
purpose. Besides this, American planes carrying cargo from the United States 
to the Middle East, especially to Israel, are also authorized to use several 
Spanish military airfields and other installations belonging to the Spanish 
military establishment. In all, the United States has 27 military installa- 
tions on Spanish territory. This is also the site of the headquarters of the 
\merican air army, with jurisdiction over aviation units located in Spain, 
[talv, Greece and Turkey. The naval base in Rota serves American surface ships 
ind missile submarines in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. 


rhe United States has built and is using 52 military installations in Italy. 
They are of primary significance in the network of American bases in the West 
Mediterranean. The headquarters of the American Sixth Fleet (32,500 personnel) 
located in the Italian port of Gaeta. This fleet includes five submarines, 
two aircraft carriers and fourteen surface ships based permanently on large 
naval bases in the ports of Naples and Sigonella and on Maddalena Island near 
the shores of Sardinia. The headquarters of the supreme commander of NATO 
forces in Southern Europe is located in Italy. Besides this, the United States 
has three air force bases here (near the cities of Verona and Vicenza in the 


60 





rorctn) 
yases 
Cne in, 
Cary s 


Lilie 


Aare st 


(,rTee ce 


, two army bases and many support points (13,000 personnel). American 
in Greece (3,500 servicemen) play a significant part in the pursuit of 
yressive U.S. policy line in the Mediterranean. In exchange for mili- 


hipments and loans, the United States gained the right to use almost all 


‘reek air and naval bases and other military installations. The 


‘on has four large military bases here, including the air base near 


, one of the largest naval communication centers and other installations, 
t them on islands. The foreign press has reported that nuclear weapons 
ored on some of these installations, particularly those in northern 

ind on Crete. 


vy, where seven Large American bases are located, has been assigned the 
of a stronghold in Pentagon plans for combat operations against the 


Union in the transcaucasus and against the socialist countries on the 
Peninsula. It has also been assigned the role of a transfer point in 


‘nts of the "rapid deployment force" to Southwest Asia. This country, 


nas a long common border with the USSR, is regarded by American experts 
mventent spot for electronic reconnaissance. 


itegic importance of Turkey to the United States increased dramatically 
the overthrow of the Lranian shah and the elimination of the Iranian 
is the "policeman of the Persian Gulf,'' as well as in connection with 
ral deterioration of regional affairs from the U.S. standpoint. The 


ron is enmeshing Turkey in a network of new military bases and is sending 
} 


st advanced military equipment, fighter and bomber planes and radio- 


tronic reconnaissance equipment to this country. There have been reports 


American press about the Pentagon's secret plans for the deployment of 
an medium-range nuclear missiles in Turkey. Most of the bases in 
are earmarked for the use of the interventionist "rapid deployment 


military bases on Cyprus have recently been put under the broader 
of the United States and NATO. The United States has taken charge of 


aglish base in Akrotiri, where American SR-/71A strategic reconnaissance 


are located. They fly from Cyprus to Japan along the USSR border. 


tired States uses the bases of its NATO allies in Europe on a permanent 

porary basis in addition to its own installations. In particular, recon- 

nce rategic aviation uses the Greek air base in Ellinikon and the 

1ir base in Akrotiri, and patrol aviation uses the Suda Air Force Base 

e). Washington has gained the consent of its NATO allies to the "joint 
+3 airfields. In all, the Pentagon hopes to acquire 73 such bases. 


al 
+k 


ig the significance of the U.S. military presence in the Mediterranean, 


uthors of “United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military 
itions’ noted: The chain of military installations stretching from 


ral through Spain and [Italy to Greece and Turkey in the East Mediterranean 


tees effective and necessary support for the important ‘floating base' 
the Sixth Fleet.’ / 


AS ' ~~ > a } ' , aay limded¢dat eas ’ - Om T : > " | . mil? , 
- { star C i ~ af Re aga ‘ AC! ALi aeDe a ati Nn, st atements i out l De mit Ltary~- 
y 


gic aims in the Pacific basin have been made more trequentl 


in 





in the Far Fast, where the second Larges! Jerseas contingent of U.S. armed 


forces is situated close tuo the borders o! the Sovtet Union, the United 

States las over 300 military installations, including 83 large ones. Thu 
number of U.S. armed forces here exceeded 147,000 after it was augmented by 
11,000 in 1981 and by another 12,000 in 1982. American military bases in Japan, 


the Philippines, South Korea and Micronesia have been enlarged and modernized. 
An attempt has been made to link them with the new large American military 
base in the Indian Ocean on the island of Diego Garcia. The personnel of the 
U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific increased by almost a third last year 

(co 33,000). Plans call for the provision of ships with cruise missiles capa- 
ble of carrying both conventional and nuclear charges and for the deployment 
of American nuclear weapons in the West Pacific. 


The line of American military bases in this region starts in Alaska, passes 
through Japan and the Korean peninsula and goes on to include the Pacific 

bases of the United States, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. 
Washington administration spokesmen have not concea'’°4 the fact that the United 
States will deploy medium-range nuclear missiles . ‘sian theater of war 
"if necessary." 


One of the Pentagon's most important military strongholds 1 the Far East is 
South Korea. This is the only territory in the region where American troops 
and bases are located directly at the border of a socialist state, the DRPK, 
close to Soviet territory. 


Almost 40,000 American troops, including 30,000 infantry, an aviation division 
and tactical misstles are located in South Korea. The American press has 
reported that around 1,000 nuclear warheads are here. The most important of 
the 40 main !'.S. bases in South Korea are the air bases near Taegu, Osan and 
Kunsan, the naval bases in Pusan and Inchon and the many army bases, some of 
which are in direct proximity to the DMZ. 


Pentagon plans attach equal importence to the Japanese stronghold, which has 
long been called an "unsinkable U.S. aircraft carrier’’ in the Far East. Here 
the United States has 32 large bases where the headquarters and many units of 
the Fifth Air Army, military depots end support and auxiliary installations 
are located. Japan is the site of a garrison of more than 50,000 American 
troops, large air bases--Yokota and hadena--and naval bases--Yokosuka and 
Sasebo, serving the ships of the Seventh Fleet. A division and aviation wing 
of the infantry corps (over 22,000 personnel) are located on Okinawa. 


The American bases in the Philippines were established at the beginning of the 
century, when the United States seized the former Spanish colony. There are 
now ll large American military installations here. The Subic Bay base (naval) 
and Clark Field (aviation) have served U.S. imperialism for decades as a 
springboard for expansion in Asia. It was precisely from this point, from 
Subic Bay, that the Pentagon transferred 1,809 Marines to the Persian Gulf zone 
at the height of the American-Iranian conflict. Even today the Philippines 
essentially perform the functions of a rear support base for ships of the 
Seventh Fleet and units of the ‘rapid deployment force" permanently stationed 
in the Indian Ocean. Pentagon officials believe that the Clark Field base 
could be used for shipments to Tel-Aviv over the U.S.-Clark Field-Diego Garcia- 
Israel route in the event of a war in the Middle East. 


62 








ictive return of the U.S. military establishment to regions adjacent to 


Ind ina {s apparent. American Air Force planes are once again using their 
rmer base in Utapao (Thailand). This base, as well as the bases the United 
cates hopes to acquire in Takli and Dommuang, can serve as a transfer point 
rr American military transport planes flying between Clark Field and Diego 

9 
\fter declaring the Indian Ocean region, which takes in the shores of 36 


W 


, a zone of its own "vital interests, the United States stationed two 
‘arrier task forces from the Sixth and Seventh Fleets there on a permanent 
basis. The remodeling of the Pentagon's largest base in the central part of 
the ocean on the island of Diego Garcia is continuing. The deployment of U.S. 
nuclear weapons has already begun. The number of service personnel on the base 
JOO. In American strategic plans the island is viewed as an 
ideal stronghold, a natural "axis" of the ring of naval and air bases estab- 


has reached 3), 


lished the United States along the perimeter of the Indian Ocean. 

we Ly .ltary transport ships of the U.S. Navy are anchored near the island. 
‘heir holds contain enough fuel, food, tanks, artillery, helicopters and ammu- 
iti ‘rr a month of combat by 12,000 Marines from the "rapid deployment 


‘hese ships can be moved to the shores of any country where events 

ig a turn objectionable to Washington. The bay of Diego Garcia can 

it iircraft carriers and missile submarines and the airfields can 
mmodate strategic B-52 bombers and military transport planes. The Air 
rce base on this island was already used during the unsuccessful L[ranian 
vasion of April 1980. 


iced States uses more than 20 installations in Australia, which occupies 
spectal position in the Indian and Pacific oceans. They include Sterling 
Naval Base in Cockburn Sound, air bases in the west and the Pine Gaps observa- 
‘ion station in Alice Springs. The Pentagon is working on plans for the 


storage of U.S. nuclear weapons in Australia and the permanent deployment of 
troops on its territory. 


iccordance with an agreement concluded with Oman, Somalia and Kenya on the 
sc of their bases by the American armed forces, the United States received 
ss to 10 airfields anc ports in this part of the Indian Ocean. 9 Prepara- 
1's are being made tor the radical remodeling of the Oman air base on Masira, 
{hb airport in the capital of Oman, the Markaz-Tamarid air base, Kenya's 
Mon 1 port and airfields in Mombasa, Embakazi and Nanyuki and the Somali 
ival and air base in Berbera are being modernized. American armed forces are 
idvy using some of these bases, as well as airfields in Saudi Arabia 
‘afro-West, Ras-Banas, Wadi Qena, Luxor and Aswan), the 
uti (Diibouti) and Bahrain. A "Strategic agreement" with 
gave the United States unlimited access to this country's bases. In 


Out ‘sia the United States is taking great pains to acquire access to the 
Litary bases of Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The United States has around 25 
istallations tn South Africa, Liberia, Morocco, the Seychelles, Reunion and 
reenland plays an important role in the system of U.S. military bases as part 


Ame rican ytinental security zone.’ This is the location of the 











largest northern basgese-Thule and sondrest: --as we!l as tour radar missile 
md alreraft detection stations and communication centers. A modern port, 
airfields with a 3-kilometer landing strip, hangars, repair enterprises ar 
huge fuel and ammunition depots were erected on the Thule base as early is the 
mid-1950's. At the southern tip of the island the Pentagon built naval bases 
in Narssarssuaq and Groenendaal and the Sondvestrom air base and in the 
northeast it built several military airfields. 


‘he United States has a naval base in Canada, a DEW line stretching 6,400 
Kilometers along the 70th parallel and several communication installations. 
Canada's Goose Bay Air Force Base on the Labrador Peninsula and the Nanaimo 
naval base are used extensively, 


The United States also has a diversified network of naval and air force bases 
in Latin America. There is a large base in Puerto Rico. There are 14 U.S. 
bases in the Panama Canal Zone. The Pentagon is still holding on il galiy to 
the Cuban naval base in Guantanamo, one of the main centers for the organiza- 
tion of aggreseive actions against socia.!st Cuba and other progressive states 
in Central America. There is a large U.S. air base in Bermuda and auxiliary 
bases in the Bahamas and in Turks and Caicos. A base for underwater weapon 
tests has been built in Antigua. More than 30 U.S. installations of various 
types, including a naval base, two air bases anc an infantry complex, are 
located in Panama. They are used constantly for intervention in the internal 
attairs of Latin American states. 

[The United States is striving to gain maximum advantage from Argenciina's 
defeat in its conflict with England over the Falkland ( ‘vinas) Islands and 
to consolidate its presence near Argentina's shores 


The energetic development of the network of U.S. military bases and strongholds 
on foreign territory is convincing proof of Washington’: desire to ruie the 
world. The proximity of U.S. bases to Soviet borders and the actual encircle- 
ment of the socialist community countries by these bases reveal the purpose of 
the Pentagon's military preparetions. By using its bases, it iopes to retain 
or regain imperialist dominion in the former colonies and dependent countries 
ind stifle national liberation movements. 


'e U.S. bases pose a threat to the cause of peace. The diversitied system ot 
‘’e"tagon bases and strongholds thousands of miles from U.S. borders is intended 
‘ry the subjugation of independent states, the exertion of economic, political 

ind military pressure on them and the pursuit of the policy of threats and 
lackmail. Military bases have been used repeatedly by Washington for the 
direct armed support of local reactionary forces in struggle against progressive 
rces. In particular, this has taken place more than once in South Korea, the 
Philippines, Haiti and other countries. Finaliy, the halt a million U.S. 
servicemen stationed in other countries are the bearers of reactionary li- 


taristic itdeas and are helping spread the false beliefs about the "Sovi 
military threat’ and to create an atmosphere of war hysteria. 


Opposition to the aggressive policy line of the U.S. administration and the 
plans for the augmentation of the U.S. military presence is growing throughout 
the world. The mass antiwar movement has overtaken the United States’ West 


j 


64 








iropean allies. The withdrawal of U.S. troops and the dismantling of U.S. 
itary bases are being demanded by the public in many Asian, Atrican and 
Latin American countries. The antiwar and antinuclear movement is even growing 
within the United States itself. 


FOOTNOTES 
PRAVDA, 27 March 1983. 


vse and later data on the number of U.S. bases, personnel, the composi- 
tion of troops, aviation and naval forces are based on information pub- 
lished by the London Institute of Strategic Studies, "Military Balance 
1981/1982"; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 27 December 1982, pp 46-47; 
‘United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installa- 
tions,’ Wash., 1979; "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [The Origin of the 
ihreat to Peace], Moscow, 1982, pp 25-29. 


FORCE MAGAZINE, December 1981, pp 56-59; "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru,' 


AVDA, 12 July 1982. 


For more detail, see A. I. Petrenko, "The United States and North European 
security,'’ SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 2, pp 18-30. 


mo. “United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installa- 
A ) 
ions, p 2) 


Kozin, "The Buildup of American Military Presence in the Indian 
ean,’ SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No l. 


thepee + ' 


. N. Tarasov, "The Horn of Africa in Washington's Policico-Military Plans,’ 
HA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGLIYA, 1982, No 4. 


" , tar " “Th . | . . . . ai 
zdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya”, 








PLANS TO UPGRADE MLLITARY COMMAND-CONTROL=COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS SCORED 


Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 83 (signed 
to press 19 May 83) pp 116-121 


[Article by V. S. Frolov: "What Lies Behind the Modernization of C3") 


('ext] In the last 2 or 3 years a matter known simply as C3 (or "3c") has 
been the subject of intense debate in American military journals and in 
circles close to the Pentagon. This is an acronym consisting of the initials 
of three English words: command, control and communications. In concise 
terms, it signifies the information-communications infrastructure--the "nerve 
system" of the modern armed forces: command points and control and communica- 
tion centers. 


"Only vital C3 can ensure victory in a military conflict," DEFENSE ELECTRONICS 
commented.! "Communication centers and control points are the key component 
of all U.S. mobilization planning," W. Hillsman, the head of the Defense 
Department's communications office said.2 Some experts believe that the 
modernization of C3 is even more important than the deployment of the entire 
complex of MX missiles. 


fhe interest in C3 was revived in the United States after an interval of almost 
20 years. <A report by a group of researchers from Stanford University about 
the projected tactical and technical requirements of strategic control and 
ommunication systems up to 1975 had been completed by the beginning of the 
l9H0's, but it was ignored by the military-political leadership, which even 
"noted the absence of prospects in the report for the strategic planning of 
communication systems on the national level."3 Some specialists, however, 
articularly R. Foster, the general director of the Stanford University 

Center for Strategic Studies, believes that "this document is still pertinen 
today."% 


rhe heightened interest in C? is connected primarily with the more aggressive 
ind offensive nature of the current U.S. administration's military-political 
strategy and with the new doctrine of "limited nuclear war" in its short and 
protracted varieties. The Pentagon's policy-planning document on defense 
lirectives for fiscal years 1984-1988 assigns importance to, along with the 
ontinued augmentation and development of strategic offensive forces, timely 
measures aimed, according to the authors of this document, at heightening the 
"survivability of the nation," which essentially means the reinforcement of the 
naterial and technical facilities tor fighting a war. 


hh 











udget submitted for 1983, the main goal of the improvement of control 
nd tion ystems msists in securtt thi ffensive operations envis- 
loctrine of “limited nuclear war'': the objective of defense (or 
. ' to use the Pentagon's term) 1] secondary. lhe entire concept 
ibility’ is based on the possilt ilit I lelivering the tirst (pre- 
trike in order to catch the enemy's issiles in their silos, his 
their airtields and his nuclear submarines in their bases. It is 
reliance n the first strike that explains Washington's negative 
tl roposal that it follow the USSR’s example and also pledge not 


unication and control svstem as been reated to ensure the cent- 


iwement .S. armed forces deploved throughout the world. [t 
130 ¢ rovernment and military agencies, numerous main and 
' enters with antinuclear protection, airborne and surface 
1 point ind iin and reserve mmunication and control svstems. 


; 
re f i t l e ear wart ling , con= 
; rc] ilar systems 
t ised ICBM’ M’ re ted, as J. Collins 
ok tl t ler ' rest, along the 


‘ ’ . } ’ ] , ’ 0 y 4 
Ciant} ina t ] . idar untt nere Surve 


| [1] ea level t trie eT ¢ - is | ind-based control 


ents itellit« ini iti 
t r t iti etwork, a state Pi 
C j i r l } sed t 
trv, t ilso be used by 
‘ target l tj ) t functions of ( 3) 
limits. Thi tt ted to, in particular, by the 


f the television network by th 








holes" that modernization will have an impact only if these systems are given 
higher prior ity.° He is echoed by General D. Jones, former chairman of the 

hiefs of Staff: "Serious improvement is needed in the work on the 
survivability, reliability, redundancy and flexibility of the stratexvic warn- 
ing and control systems supporting the national command."? The same ideas 
were expressed by P, Bracken, head of the research sector of the Headstone 
Institute, who studied the possibilities of C3 in 1980 and 1981. 


loint | 


This deliberate emphasis on the shortcomings in control and communication 
‘ystems, just as in other areas of U.S. military organization, has been taken 
up by publications close to the Pentagon for the purpose of frightening unin- 
formed population strata and continuing the escalation of the arms race. 


Vlans tor the Modernization of Strategic Control and Communication Systems 


the "hawks" from the Pentagon, who are striving to obtain more and more new 
ippropriations for weapons, assert that when the budget for the development 

ind deployment otf weapon systems was discussed in previous years, not enough 
tunds were allocated for the modernization of the control and communication 
elements designed to serve these systems. They believe that at least 400 mil- 
lion dollars should be allocated for C3 for each billion used in the production 
ot weapon svstems. 


Pentagon "Communication and Intelligence” Budget Authorizations, 
in millions of dollars 
(estimate) (draft) 
Fiscal years 972 1976 1980 1982 1983 1984 








In current dollars 5,452 6,671 9,122 13,939 17,057 20,842 
In 1984 dollars 
(inflation-ad justed) 3, 39] 12,026 11,679 15,154 17,740 20,842 


Report of the Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger to the Congress on the 1984 


7 


Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and FY 1984-88 Defense Program, 


’ 


February 1983," p 320 


. 


urrent U.S. administration is eager to allocate these funds. It would 


litficult to determine all these allocations because they are distributed 
ne various budget items, including funds allocated for the needs of certain 
vilian departments. Nevertheless, if we examine the dynamics of allocations 
the functioning of “communication and intelligence" systems (they are 


ited in the "C3I" column), the dramatic growth of these allocations after 
, urrent President's arrival in the White House is striking (see table). 


retary of Defense Weinberger's report to the Congress on Pentagon authoriza- 

m requests for fiscal year 1984 and the next 5 vears said that in 1984-1988 

Pentagon intends to concentrate its efforts in the c3 field on the improve- 
ment and modernization ot control systems for strategic and non-strategi« 


LO 


es. & ;' 
l forces and battlefield forces; electronic weapons 


ear torces, tactical! 
ind ABM neutralization systems; all-encompassing information and communications. 


ich of these programs will make a significant conttribution to our defens« 


tential, the Pentagon chief said when he requested 31.5 billion dollars for 


, 





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’ 


Vherefore, the upgrading of C4 is not only aimed at the total supervision and 
control of strategic forces, but also has a clearly defined political aspect, 
consisting primarily in the fact that the guaranteed coincidence of abstract 
ind actual capabilies of strike forces can justify the development and imple- 
mentation of politico-military aims based on the ‘strategy of nuclear intimi- 
dation" and the "determination to use nuclear forces in support of this 
policy."!5 This premise indicates that the entire U.S. administration, and 

not only the “hawks” from the Pentagon, is counting on turning nuclear war into 
a policy instrument. 


Interaction with NATO 


rhe American leadership is trying to include the informational infrastructure 

ot the NATO allies, and not only the United States, in the plans for the 
upgrading of strategic C3. Some indicative tendencies have become apparent in 
this tield. One is the intensive "computerization" of C3, Foreign experts 
issociate the special merits of the computer as "an effective replacement for 
the human factor’ with several indisputable, purely technological advantages 

of computers used in C3 (high accuracy, reliability, invulnerability to jamming, 
reduced weight and dimensions, etc.).19 


Ihe growth of antimilitarist feeling in many West European countries, and even 
in the United States itself, and the probability of the inclusion of "unreli- 
ible elements" among the service personnel of various links of strategic C3 
have given the bloc's politico-military leadership cause for worry. In this 
context, the further automation of the process by which strategic command is 
provided with operational material on various levels and the exclusion of the 
“human factor” from this process are viewed by NATO experts as an additional 
rnivantage. 


But the leading NATO countries are creating their own digital c3 systems with 

1 View to national capabilities, resources and technology, 20 ind American 
experts are afraid that there will be unforeseen difficulties in the interaction 
3} systems. This is the reason for another trend in C3 upgrading: 
intensive measures to standardize the equipment and software of the entire 
infrastructure of the bloc and the creation of a single integral 

l 


of national C 


informational 
stem (NICS). 
he system would be designed mainly to ensure reliable interaction by civilian 
muithorities and the military command on the tactical and strategic levels 
throughout the NATO sphere of activity. NICS is supposed to ensure highly 
'fective, confidential telephone and telegraph communications, the efficient 
transmission of orders and other signals from information services with guaran- 
teed “survivability,” and the flexibility and safety of all its elements. 
fhere are four main elements: (1) sensitive (or informational) subsystems, 
sorving as pickup-accumulators of information about the location, movements 
ind other activity of enemy armed forces; (2) position indicator subsystems, 
informing the command of the current locatior of its forces; (3) command points 
ind communication posts, serving as centers for the collection, accumulation 


ind analysis of information about their own forces and enemy forces in order 
to facilitate the decisionmaking process on the command level; (4) lines of 





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FOOTNOTES 
DEFENSE ELECTRONICS, April 1982, p 59, 
SIGNAL, August 1982, p 64. 
NATLONAL DEFENSE, December 1981, p 48. 
Ibid., p 49. 


M. A. Mil'shteyn, "The Question of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons," 
SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 3. 


J. Collins and E. Severns, "U.S.-Soviet Military Balance. Book II. 
Strategic Nuclear Trends," Congressional Research Service, Wash., July 1980, 
pp 88-89, 

NATIONAL DEFENSE, December 1981, p 68. 

Ibid., p 50. 

Ibid., p 1. 

Some experts have pointed out the hypothetical nature of the division of 
C3} into strategic and tactical levels because the two are interrelated 
(DEFENSE, January/February 1982, p 64). 

"Report of the Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger to the Congress on the 
FY 1984 Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and FY 1984-88 Defense 
Program, | February 1983," Wash., 1983, p 242. 

DEFENSE, November 1980, p 10. 

NATIONAL DEFENSE, December 1981, p 68. 


Collins and E. Severns, Op. cit., p 97. 


AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, August 1982, p 72. 


NATIONAL DEFENSE, December 1981, p 69. 
Ibid. 
DEFENSE, January/February 1982, p 62 


ELECTRONICS, May 1982, p 50. 


NICS--NATO's Integrated Communications System. 


1) 


. "re . . " * : , : , Q 
R. Scheer, "With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, N.Y., 1982, 


RIGHT: [zdatel'stvo "N ruka", "SShA--ekonomika, pol itika, ideologivya ‘. 1983 








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