Sub-Saharan Africa Report

JPRS-SSA-84-062

1 June 1984

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

[FBIS] FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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JPRS-SSA-84-062

1 June 1984

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

CONTENTS
ANGOLA
Dos Santos Blames Portugal for Poor Relations
(Luanda Domestic Service, 13 May 84)......... Cobo beeen seees oa
BURUNDI
Briefs
Former Minister in Court 3
CAMEROON
‘Northern’ Responsibility for Coup Assessed
(Laurent Zecchini; LE MONDE, 14 Apr 84)......ccccccscccceees 4
Effect of Abortive Coup on Unity Examined
: (Laurent Zecchini; LE MONDE, 17 Apr 84).......... bteseossese F
CAPE VERDE
President Visits New Industrial Enterprises
(VOZ DI POVO, 14 Apr 60606666 0500060000 00000000% eeeeee#eeesees 10
Fishing Cooperation With Spain To Be Expanded
(VOZ DI POVO, 14 Apr SOP cecccceses eeeeee#*e*?s *@eeeenoseeaee*1en*wene*7eseseenee ese @ 12
Briefs
Boat From Iceland 13

CHAD

Agricultural Talks at Pala Cover Many Fields
CINFO TCHAD, 13, 17 Apr 84). .ccccccccccccccccces TYTTITTTTy 14

Yields Key to Self-Sufficiency
Crop Yield Discussed

-ae [III - NE& A - 120]

GUINEA

Swiss Investments Bolster Gold Production Effort

(Jean-Luc Lederrey; JOURNAL DE GENEVE,

2D BRE GR) ccccccceces

Preservation of Traditional Values Urged With Ongoing Reforms

(Editorial; Mody Sory Barry; HOROYA, 14

Open Letter to Information Services

(Nava Toure; HOROYA, 14 Apr 84)........

GUINEA-BISSAU

TASS, ANG Sign Techniczl Cooperation Agreement
Cie? FERSG, F BE GS) vccccssccecsceces

BOE GR) scccccccccecs

Council of Ministers Announces Price Rise of Basic Items

(NO PINTCHA, 7 Apr 84).........20ee0e- °

IVORY COAST

KENYA

LIBERIA

Economy, Debt Rescheduling Discussed
(Louis Guilain; AFRICA, No 159, Mar 84)

Coping With Drought in Kitui District

(Gideon Nzoka; THE KENYA TIMES, 27 Apr 84).......csceesecees

Moi Urges Reforestation
(Makokha wa Musebe; THE KENYA TIMES, 28

Meeting Strengthens Relations With Emirates
(Editorial; THE KENYA TIMES, 30 Apr 84)

ROE TA) ic cccvcccves

Training Facilities Available for Textile Industry
(Victoria Okumu; THE KENYA TIMES, 30 Apr 84)..........-e00.

Briefs
Fuel Shortage Reported
Bridge Is Swept Away

Friction Within National Muslim Council Reported

(THE NEW LIBERIAN, 10 Apr 84)..........

Country's Banking, Liquidity Crisis Discussed
(Lawrence Thompson; THE NEW LIBERIAN,

“we

23 Ane BB) ccccsaces

17

20

22

25

26

28

34

37

38

40

42

42

43

45

Peoples Redemption Council ‘Declares War' on Tax Evaders
we cance ud THE..NEW LIBERIAN,.. 24,. 26 Apr 84)... ccccccaeaccccacccecscee = 47.

Liquidity Problems, Corruption, Editorial
Firing Range Set up

"Tax Clearance’ for Travel

LAMCO-LMWV Agreement Gives Workers More Benefits
(THE NEW LIBERIAN, 27 Apr 84)........ WEETTTTITILILT TELL TT 50

MOZAMBIQUE

Increased Production of Coconut for Export Planned
SaRees RE GE DOP cesses csbcvesvseseoncsssecas seeueeeseses 52

Sweden To Train Electrical Substation Operators
CORPERGEME, AF BOE GR) oc ccccccccccccsscceces pebeeeeeeace bas 54

Urban Green Zones To Increase Food Production
(NOTICIAS, 18 Apr BA) ..ccccccccceces bs 6853666056046054058b8 56

Department for Training Meteorological Experts Planned
too) Pe 2 ee |} Peewee TTT TTT TTT ee eebaes TTT 58

Production School Planned for Salamanga
(NOTICIAS, 19 Apr 84) .ccsccccccccccsccccces Soceseeesesaere 60

NAMIBIA

Economic Prospects, Problems That Follow Liberation Viewed
(Dawid J. Vermeulen; DIE VOLKSBLAD, 4 Mar 84)............- 62

REPUBLIKEIN Comment on Political Development
(Editorial; DIE REPUBLIKEIN, 26 Mar, 3 Apr 84)....... oeees 64

Damara Departure From MPC

Savimbi Role

Attitudes of Namibia Leaders
SENEGAL

PDS General Secretary A. Wade on Future Plans for Governing
(Abdoulaye Wade Interview; WAL FADJRI, 27 Apr-1l Jun 84)... 68

SOUTH AFRICA

Detention Deaths; Editorial Policy Discussed
(BAG, FED Ga) coccvcccccccccccccssocers ceveoeceseevoeececees 74

Recruitment Strategies To Reserve, Allocate Labor Analyzed
(Marian Lacey; SASH, Feb 84) .cccccscccccccccsccssecescesesss 76

Sash Seen Facing Mounting Pressures, Challenges
ee ono (Jéil1-Wentzel> SASH, Feb 34) SSSC46ECTCECSCESESCEECCESCCESESTESEOECEECSES 6&3

Black Sash Affiliation With UDF Mooted
SED RMON We SUP 8665 o0seceesccccceseseeevencesese

Significance of ‘komati Accord Discussed
(FRONTLINE, Apr 84)........ $nbhn50eeeeeeseboseaes seneeeuenes 101

Realistic View of Bophuthatswana, Mangope Advanced
(Johann Graff; FRONTLINE, Apr 84).............. eesccces cooce Me

Analysis of Afrikanerdom Split Offered
(David Williams; FRONTLINE, Apr 84)............. ecoesceccecs Be

UPPER VOLTA

Recent Events Reviewed; Document Circulates on Campus
(Passek-Taale; L'OBSERVATEUR, 13-15 Apr 84).......... verre yr 111

ZiMBABWE

Convicts To be Put To Work on Rural Development Projects
( THE HERALD, 5 May 84) eeee#e#e#es:s: *eeeeeeneesesenre8eceeese8ee e828 eeee7#s1eeee#e#e#se# 114

ZNCC To Train Ex-Combatants Engaged in Co-op Ventures
( THE HERALD, 6 May OP 6666 60056000006606 6600006806008 e@eee#e ee 116

Minister of Information Scores South African Based Correspondents
( THE HERALD, 7 May BoP case eeeeee7nee#e7#e#8ee#e#es8e#ee# eee esee*eeeeee# eee7s#es: 118

New Food-for-Work Program in Buhera Benefits Drought Victims
(Munyaradzi Chenje; THE HERALD, 7 May 84)........eeeeeee005- 120

Mazowe Farm People Refuse To Be Evicted
(William Bango; THE HEKALD, 8 May 84).......ccececceeeeceeee 123

smn as ‘ ies — ray ey - —_ | wn

DOS SANTOS BLAMES PORTUGAL FOR POOR RELATIONS
MB141529 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 0700 GMT 13 May 84

[Text] Comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the president of the People's Republic
of Angola, has blamed the Portuguese Government for the deterioration of its
relations with the Angolan Government. In an interview with the Lisbon weekly,
O JORNAL, the Angolan head of state said that the attitude of the present
Portuguese Government with regard to activities by the Angolan counterrevolu-
tionaries in Portugal explains the present state of relations between the two
governments.

President Jose Eduardo dos Santos divided relations between Angola and Portugal
into three distinct phases. The first phase covers the period from the inde-
pendence of Angola in 1975 until 1978, which was characterized by an 170 percent
increase in trade between enterprises of both countries and by the good develop-
ment of political and solidarity relations between nongovernment organizations.
Despite these good relations during this phase, Portugal supported the puppet
gangsters in their activities, but this support lessened with the spirit of
Bissau resulting from a meeting between the late President Agostinho Neto and
General Ramalho Eanes, thus marking the beginning of the second phase.

The Bissau spirit, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos said, marked a very promis-
ing period for cooperation between Portugal and Angola. During this perio”, 2
financial agreement was signed between the Angolan Nationzl Bank and the Ban:

of Portugal. Also a cooperation agreement in the field of electricity was
signed. The Bissau spirit was affected by a lenient attitude of Portuguese
authorities toward the free movement and subversive activities of groups moun:-
ing armed terrorist attacks against the Angolan people and their legitimate
government from Lisbon, the Angolan president said.

The third period in Portuguese-Angolan relations began with the eighth Portu-
guese government led by Pinto Balsemao, during which the second joint commis-
sion session was held which reinvigorated cooperation between the two countries.
The session could not take place earlier due to hostilities against Angola
which caused a climate of distrust and tension. This was also the case with
regard to official contacts between both governments. Gen Ramalho Eanes" visit
to Angola in April last year was also considered by President Jose Eduardo dos
Santos as having immensely contributed to improving the climate of trust and
revitalizing economic and socioscientific cooperation between the two countries.

However, the president of the People's Republic of Angola deplored the present
Portuguese government of Prime Minister Mario Soares, which has upset the under-
_ standing as the, government is now permitting anti-Angolan activities in Lisbon.
This situation has forced Angola to protest strongly to the Portuguese Govern-
ment and to urge a reevaluation of bilateral relations.

With the regard to [the] situation in southern Africa, the Angolan head of state
believes that the diplomatic peace efforts undertaken in the region must be com-
plemented by efforts by the international community to effectively implement UN
Security Council Resolution 435/78 providing true independence for Namibia.

Only in a climate of peace can we increase t'ie regional cooperation within the
framework of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference to elimi-
nate the dependence which some countries of the region still have with regard

to South Africa and subsequently to end backwardness and to also ensure our
sovereignty in the economic field. This is what President Jose Eduardo dos
Santos said in conclusion,

CSO: 3442/365

BURUNDI

BRIEFS

FORMER MINISTER IN COURT--For the past four months, the Bujumbura Court of
Appeal has been conducting the trial pitting the Miniscry of Justice against
Alexis Ntibakiranya, formerly general director of the SRDI (Regional Develop-
ment Company of Imbo) and minister of agriculture and livestock raising and
the people's representative elected from Kayanza Province, who is now being
held prisoner in the central prison of Mpimba. Five hearings have already
been devoted to the very complex trial since the beginning of December 1983.
[Excerpt] [Bujumbura LE RENOUVEAU DU BURUNDI in French 5 Apr 84 p 2] 11,464

CSO: 3419/599

CAMEROON

"NORTHERN' RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUP ASSESSED
Paris LE MONDE in French 14 Apr 84 ppl, 5
[Article by Laurent Zecchini: "The Lost Wager of the Cameroonian Rebels"]

[Text] Yaounde--The municipal cemetery is strangely deserted. A few hundred
meters from the sports stadium, the site, which nature has taken over, is
peopled with sparse tombs flanked by headstones anc a few crosses leaning at
an angle. In the extension of the entryway, two unconcealed heaps of laterite
strike one's eye. Two common graves: One, 10 meters long and 4 meters wide,
is still empty. The other, covering some 20 meters, has been filled in and
one can easily detect the tracks of a mechanical excavator. It was here, on
Tuesday, 10 April, that part of the bodies picked up in the streets of the
capital following the 6 April confrontations were piled.

The city is calm, cvlorful, sunny, just as usual. The attempted coup d'etat
on Friday, 6 April, that shook the regime of President Paul Biya left few
traces on Yaounde and after a few hours spent crisscrossing the main dis-
tricts and seeking out the bomb craters and destroyed buildings, one almost
doubts it happened at all. The fighting with heavy weapons, the strafing

by the Fouga-Magister planes, the firing from the Gazelle helicopters: Where
aid it all take place? What city was under siege? By day, Yaounde betrays
its recent convulsions only by the presence of a few groups of soldiers in
strategic spots, but at nightfall, detachments of nervous soldiers take up
their posts nearly everywhere.

But let us look again. Aha! There indeed! At the Presidential Palace, that
monstrous birthday cake of a building cautiously overlooking the city and its
wooded hills. The main gate still stands agape. One bullet-riddled wing is
partially destroyed. A pile of crushed beams, the remains of two street lamps,
some debris on the ground. The Yaounde airport is intact, little affected by
the military presence and at the Douala airport, tiie economic capital, little
more than routine attention is paid to the passenger list, the baggage. Not all
the rebels are dead or in prison and the authorities do not want the remaining
few to slip through their fingers.

However, they believe they know where the fugitives can be found. La Briquet-
terie, the voor Haoussa (northern ethnic group) district adjoining the Pamoun
district, has been surrounded by the army. Several dozen soldiers are

assigned there or patrol the streets, their American M 16's over their arms
(unloaded, however). Armored AML vehicles equipped with machine guns or
20-mm canons control the area. One truck guards the entry to the National
Police Advanced Training School and, as the government daily CAMEROON TRIBUNE
(one of whose reporters, Bandolo, said to be dead, revealed the attempted
coup in a kind of lyric epic poem), "courageous, even reckless children,
several times helped the forces of law and order to track down the wutsiders
trying to mix with the civilian population." In short, the informing came
about quite naturally. But as the same daily writes: "In the hospitals,
particularly Central Hospital, another atmosphere reigns. The people are
there, silent, tense, looking hagard, trying to find their loved ones among
the dead in the morgue. And the bodies continue to pile up, of all ages and
types."

How many? On Thursday evening, 12 April. the Office of the President pub-
lished the official figures: 70 dead, including 4 civilians and 8 "loyalist"
elements; 52 wounded, 1,053 rebels arrested, 265 gendarmes "missing" and all
the leaders of the rebellion "known to date" captured, except for one low-
ranking officer, "being actively sought." Diplomatic sources agree that the
total number killed is clearly higher (without giving one any faith in the
fantastic figure of 6,000 given in Paris by the UPC [Union of Cameroonian
Peoples]). Will the exact number ever be known? The people bury their

dead quickly, almost furtively, especially those from the north, so that their
neighbors “will not find out.'’ The diplomatic corps has done its figures:

No Frenchman, no European was killed or wounced. Only one young Lebanese
about 20 years old, Schidiac, died uselessly for having stopped 20 meters
after the order of a soldiers’ barrier. One of them fired the fatal shot.

There were naturally stupid blunders against civilians or rebels who, despite
their surrender, were killed. But the page has nearly been turned on a trau-
matized Cameroon.

But for heaven's sakes, they are saying in Yaounde, let us not revive that
eternal quarrel pitting the southerners against the northerners! This slogan
has already been expressed by President Biya. "It is a tiny minority of
ambitious men hungry for power (LE MONDE, 12 April), who were trying their
luck. Furthermore, the forces participating in the restoration of the situa-
tion included Cameroonians of all origins, without distinction as to their
ethnic, regional or religious affiliation."

Above all, it is now 1 matter of calming things down. The rebels undoubtedly
believed -- wrongly -- that the people would immediately go over to them,
that the army would remain neutral in the beginning and then finally defect.
But no one did and the army, organized as a social body, did not join the
rebel elements of the Republican Guard and the gendarmerie.

Then who and why? Young norihern officers and junior officers of that veri-
table Pretorian guard of the Cameroonian president, powerfully armed (which
explains the time it took the "loyalists" to put down the rebellion) and

whom Biya, after taking power, made the mistake of not reorganizing as he did
for the army, even though he knew that the Guard had been set up by and for

his predecessor, Amadou Ahidjo -- in other words, essentially northerners?
During their trial, the leaders, "who will be tried without delay and pun-
ished,” will probably supply a partial answer. One can wager that Col Ibrahim
Saleh, commanding officer of the Republican Guard, Capt Awal Abassi, commanding
officer of the Guard Artillery Unit, Reserve 2d Lt Yaya Adoum (who read the
rebels’ proclamation on the radio), Issa Adoum, general director of FONADER
(National Rural Development Fund), Lieutenant Arouna, of the Koutaba Elite
Intervention Force, will be “asked” to admit the complicity they enjoyed,

even the names of those who were behind the abortive action.

An hour and a half, two hours, is more than enough time to bring off a coup.
However, the rebels wasted a great deal of that time, which could only work
against them. As the excessively scattered action went along, the troops
remaining loval to the regime moved on Yaounde. The outcome given the
disproportionate numbers involved, was inevitable. Fighting was limited to
a few sites, which explains why there are no signs of confrontations in the
capital except for a few blocks of houses: the headquarters of the Guard in
Obili in the Ndjong-Melen district, the Yeyap Camp, headquarters of the general
delegation of the gendarmerie, the residence of the chief of staff of the
armed forces, General Semengue. that of the deputy commander of the Yaounde
military area, Col Asso Emane, and finally, that of Minister of the Armed
Forces Andre Tsoungui.

What will be the consequences of the coup for Cameroon? What role was played
by those whom the Cameroonian press calls foreign mercenaries (there is a
great deal of talk of the "Moroccans," but since Ahidjo was received in Rabat
by the Royal Academy, are not favorably viewed in Yacunde)? It is too soon

to answer these questions. "The quake is over," one CAMEROON TRIBUNE editor-
ial noted, stressing that "the authors and protagonists involved in the opera-
tion are all from the former northern province." For Cameroon to dwell on the
reemergence of these old demons is not a wager of stability for the future.

11,464
CSO: 3419/599

CAMEROON

EFFECT OF ABORTIVE COUP ON UNITY EXAMINED

Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Apr 84 pp l, 4
[Article by Laurent Zecchini]

[Text] Cameroonian authorities have just put their finger on the person they
believe to have been the instigator of the bloody coup attempt that occurred
on 6 April in Yaounde. Actually, the news does not come as much of a surprise
since, according to the minister of the armed forces, the coup's author was
Ahidjo. The abortive coup was only, he added on 14 April, the extension of

a plot financed by "Northerners" denaunced in August 1983 and resulting in

the death sentence meted out to the former president for absconding. The
sentence was commuted to life in prison by his successor.

President Biya is now leaving it up to his close aides to resume the campaign
against his predecessor, who, from his Riviera retreat, immediately and categor-
ically denied any implication in the uprising of the presidential guard.

This attitude on the part of the current Cameroonian chief of state suggests
two possibilities for the time being: Either he has chosen to strengthen

his image as a rallier, leaving to others --- mainly the military -- the
thankless task of bringing the supporters of northern revenge into line.

Or, yielding to pressure from his entourage, mainly in the army, Biya may
have decided to break up a number of northern bastions, thereby announcing
demotions in order to weaken the political patronage on which Ahidjo had
mainly relied.

Whatever the case, President Biya did not duck the test. He affirmed that he
wanted to encourage mild changes, admitting that the obstacles to reform are

too great to enable him to avoid a confrontation with his adversaries. At
least, this is the version that Ahidjo's successor wants to make people believe.

Whatever the responsibilities on both sides, Cameroon has experienced very
disturbing events the past few months. One cannot help wondering about the
difficult unity of a nation whose importance in Central Africa is obvious.
Ahidjo was not able to get it going. Nor has Biya faced the challenge.
Brought forth in pain, Cameroon experienced quite exceptional expansion under
the iron hand of Ahidjo, but serious tensions again emerged not long after his
resignation.

In the immediate future, Cameroonians can mourn for the liberalization pro-
posed by Biya. Their country will continue to know difficult times because
it would be astonishing if the Northerrers -- even if the label stems from
a hasty simplification -- do not try to defend themselves. It is now
Cameroon's stability that is in question, which can only disturb its weaker
neighbors or those which face serious problems themselves.

Yaounde--Coming from any other person, the remarks may have appeared irrespon-
sible, but the man who spcke that Saturday, 14 April, Andze Tsoungui, minister
of the armed forces, played an essential role in ensuring the continuity of
the nation in the hours and days following the abortive 6 April coup. It

was therefore while weighing his words that Tsoungui made two serious accusa-
tions: On the one hand, it was the former president of Cameroon, Amadou
Ahidjo, who was the author of the abortive coup d'etat. Second, it was a
northern plot. In so stating, the minister could not have been unaware that
he was making a speech that is radically contrary to the statements by the
president of the republic, who, on 10 April in a message to the nation,
stated: "The responsibility for the abortive coup d'etat does not belong

to any given province or Cameroonian of a given religion."

Sea:ed near the minister, a short, fat, little man, dressed in military fa-
tigues without any particular insignias, occasionally spoke to confirm the
assertions. Div Gen Pierre Semengue, chief of staff of the armed forces,
echoed the statements of his minister: ("It was the former president who
trained the rebels, we are certain. That coup was but the extension of the
plot which the president of the republic denounced on 22 August.") "Without
being trained by the former president, I am sure they would not have attempted
the coup." If one is to believe Tsoungui, the leaders of the rebellion
("captains," according to General Semengue) "wanted to restore power to the
former supporters of Ahidjo."’ The Republican Guard, which made up most of

the rebel troops, was made up "of over 99.99 percent of people from the north,
said the minister. "All che rebels were from the north," General Semengue
agreed.

But the conspiracy, which made the Republican Guard the partner of civilians,
along with elements from the police, gendarmerie and the army, would probably
not have been possible without the aid of the "businessmen from the north who
financed" plans for the coup. "One of them," Tsoungui stated, "turned over
10 million francs to one of the organizers." These "few" northern businessmen
were "denounced" by the rebels taken prisoner, who "immediately admitted what
they had done." Of course, the guard close to the chief of state, which
contained the assault launched by the rebels on the Presidential Palace, was
not itself made up of a northern majority, but the Cameroonian Army, which
remained loyal to the regime, is also made up of soldiers from the northern
provinces who did not hesitate to fire on members of their own ethnic group.
On the staff, on the other hand, officers from the southern regions are
largely in the majority, even if, as General Semengue stated, "on my staff,

I have my 3d Bureau chief, who is a northerner."

Troubling Effectiveness

In addition, several elements enable one to assert that the imminence of an
attempted coup was perfectlv known to certain circles. "We had fragmentary
information indicating that something was afoot,'' Tsoungui said. On Thursday,
5 April, the eve of the action, a number of rich Cameroonians reportedly

made withdrawals of large sums of money from their bank accounts. These
"normal" withdrawals sometimes amounted to 100 million CFA francs (1 CFA franc =
.02 franc). According to unofficial sources, Cameroonian authorities reported-
ly intend to institute ceilings on the amount of liquid assets that can be
withdrawn, ceilings applying to private persons as well as companies.

General Semengue also confirmed that changes among the officers of the Repub-
lican Guard were about to come about. "That was no secret," he said. The
decision to move these measures up was reportedly made following reports
alerting the chief of state to the need to take measures concerning the Guard
and its security services (LE MONDE, 8-9 April). In the current stage of the
investigation, it would appear that colonels Ousmanou Daouda and Ngoura Bella
Belladji, respectively chief of staff of the chief of state and commanding
officer of the lst Military Region, who have just been removed from their
posts, are simply guilty of disturbing ineffectiveness. "No one saw them
before the situation was restored to normal," General Semengue emphasized on
Saturday, adding that "they knew very well what was happening and could have
alerted the troops."

The chief of staff of the armed forces believes that the attempted coup had
been planned far ahead of time, mainly because “orders had been issued (for
the Guard) for certain equipment." The investigative commission, made up of
both civilians and the military, began its work on Wednesday, 11 April,

and will make it possible to shed light on this last point: At what level of
responsibility, within the army and the government, could the decision to
order equipment (presumed to be military) have been taken without awakening
some suspicion somewhere?

This new intensification of the Cameroonian crisis (the accusation against the
northerners and President Ahidjo) once again creates the feeling that a certain
indecisiveness seems to mark the political decisions now being made in Yaounde.

11,464
CSO: 3419/599

CAPE VERDE

PRESIDENT VISITS NEW INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES
Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 14 Apr 84 pp 1, 3

[Text] The secretary general of the party and president of the republic,
Comrade Aristides Pereira, last Wednesday visited a number of industrial
enterprises installed in Pra a, accompanied by the minister of economy
and finances, Comrade Osvaldo Lopes da Silva. The Butane-Gas Filling
Station in Achada Grande was one of the units visited by the chief of
state.

The National Equipment and Vehicle Maintenance and Repair Company (SONACOR)
was the first stop in the visits to the industrial units made by the
president of the republic. It is a new enterprise already in the final
phase of completion and occupies an area of 2,619 square meters in Tira-
Chapeu. Its cost was estimated at about 150,000 contos and its
establishment is part of the country's dynamics of industrial develop-
ment and maintenance of the national automobile fleet. This company is
also responsible for the import and marketing of vehicles, equipment

and accessories and representation of the trade marks involved.

Its equipment, which is already in the final phase, as well as the specialized
training of technicians who are going to insure its operation in this

initial phase, is in charge of a specialized Swedish corporation SWEDEC,

with which SONACOR signed a contract.

The shops are divided into large specialized units: diesel motor section,
gasoline motor section, recapping section, electrical and auto mechanical
section, and a foundry shop. It appears that the recapping section will

be the company's most profitable unit in the immediate future because of
the guarantee that a recapped tire will operate as if it were new for about
half the cost.

At this enterprise Comrade Aristides Pereira learned about the company's
facilities as well as the condition of the workers from its director,
Pedro Burgo.

The president of the republic then visited the Butane-Gas Filling Station
in Achada Grande, also in the final phase, with the beginning of operation
scheduled for next May.

10

This station, with a capacity of 1,500 tons of gas, should put an end once
and for all to the problem of breaks in supplies of a market whose consump-
tion capacity is little more than 3,000 tons per year. This unit belonging
to the National Fuel and Lubricants Company (ENACOL) was built according

to the most modern safety conditions which a product of this nature requires,
the bottle-filling process being quite simple. It has a warehouse to

receive 3,780 empty bottles and 2,880 full bottles. The gas, which is
conducted by pipeline from the port of Praia to the pressure depots,

reaches the filling nozzles by an automatic system.

The last enterprise visited was the National Pharmaceutical Products Company
(EMPROFAC), where about 40 different types of medications are produced.

With the shops operating in the Praia Fospital, EMPROFACT already insures
the production of a varied spectrum of pills, ointments and medicated

syrups under the most modern technical and hygienic conditions. Operating
over these installations, the Directory General of Pharmacy has a

laboratory where it conducts strict control over the composition of all

the products manufactured by the company.

8711
CSO: 3442/354

11

CAPE VERDE

FISHING COOPERATION WITH SPAIN TO BE EXPANDED
Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 14 Apr 84 pp 1, 3

[Text] Development of the agreement established in 1981 between Cape
Verde and Spain was recommended by the delegations of the two countries,
which met in Praia from 7 to 10 April.

The two delegations, headed by the Cape Verdean secretary of state for
fisheries and the director general of the Spanish Foreign Ministry,
respectively, decided at the same time that there will be another
meeting this year to implement the actions to be carried out.

A memorandum which recommends development of the agreement established
in 1981 between Cape Verde and Spain in the fisheries area was signed at
the end of the meeting of the Spanish-Cape Verdean joint commission held
in Praia from 7 to 10 April.

The secretary of state for fisheries, Engineer Miguel Lima, who headed the
Cape Verdean delegation, speaking at the opening of the proceedings of

the joint commission, considered that its primary and principal objective
was to strengthen cooperation between the two countries in the area of
fisheries, both in the technical-scientific and material sectors, having
in view improving that cooperation from what it has been up to the present.

It should be noted also that it was stated in the final document that the
joint commission will hold another meeting, possibly this year to implement
strengthening the actions to be taken.

8711
CSO: 3442/354

12

CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

BOAT FROM ICELAND--The vessel "Fengur" offered to our country by the
Icelandic Government at the time of the official visit by the president

of the republic, Comrade Aristides Pereira to Iceland, should arrive in
Cape Verde on 6 May 6, "PV" learned from the Secretariat of State for
Fisheries. The "Fengur" is a vessel 27.3 meters in length with a beam

of 7.4 meters and a gross weight of 140 tons. Itw crew is made up of 20
men and it has a hold capacity of 50 to 60 tons of fish. This vessel will
also engage in fisheries scientific research. [Excerpt] [Praia VOZ DI
POVO in Portuguese 14 Apr 84 p 3] 8711

CSO: 3442/354

13

CHAD

AGRICULTURAL TALKS AT PALA COVER MANY FIELDS
Yields Key to Self-Sufficiency
N'Djamena TNFO TCHAD in French 13 Apr 84 p 3

[Excerpt | The pre-planting meeting ushering in the 1985-1985 farm
year, which began on 9 April, completed its work yesterday at Pala
in Mayo-Kebbi. For two days experts from all government depart-
ments concerned with rural-zone development, the top executives

of companies operating in the southern zone, the prefects of the
five southern-zone prefectures, and members of the CNC represent-
ing these prefectures surveyed the results of the 1983-1984 farm
year and took a long, hard look at development problems in an
attempt to find approaches and solutions to them.

The city of Pala was chosen for these meetings because of the
tremendous farming potential it contains and, in general, the no
less promising resources available in the Mayo-Kebbi. [In his
remarks opening the conference, the prefect of Mayo-Kebbi, Mr
Pofinet, voiced his pleasure at seeing the conference held in his
district. This gave him the opportunity to review the farm si-
tuation in Mayo-Kebbi. Mr Pofinet, who pays particularly close
attention to the human factor in all matters of economic develop-
ment, explained that despite the war and the abominable weather
last year, Mayo-Kebbi, thanks to its human potential, came through
it creditably at all levels. Even so, the agricultural situation
in this region is still cause for concern. A 2,000-hectare de-
cline in arable land, coupled with a shortage of rainfall, meant
a harvest that fell 210,000 tons below the preceding year's level.
That shortfall must be compensated for, and the Prefect believes
that Mayo-Kebbi must be provided with high-yield seed grain.

As for the cotton crop, the Mayo-Kebbi prefect is pleased: "We did
better than we have ever done before," he said. With its record
46,000-ton crop, Mayo-Kebbi produced 30 percent of the nation's
cotton crop, and that puts it out in front of all the prefectures
in the cotton belt. The prefect had high praise for the experts
from the National Rural Development Office (ONDR), but welcomed
the chance to call the government's attention to the things that
need doing to improve the quality of life in rural zones. First

14

on his list was the obsolescence of most farm equipment. Pofinet
cited the Sarh recommendation which called for a complete
rehabilitation of Chad's farm equipment construction company
(SOMAT). Getting that plant back into operation, says Mr Po-
finet, would create jobs and, most important, give the district's
farmers the tools they need to do their job. Most important of
all, though, in the prefect's view, is the need for government
to establish dialogue with the rural masses so that they can be
brought freely and willingly to accept the government's goals
as well as certain technical innovations that are incompatible
with their interests.

Crop Yield Discussed
N'Djamena INFO TCHAD in French 17 Apr 84 pp 8,9

[Excerpt | The preparation and planning meeting for the 1984-85
farm year, which began its deliberations on 9 April, adjourned
on Thursday after mapping out a comprehensive plan of action for
the farm year ahead.

The Pala meeting fits naturally into the mainstream of government
action on behalf of the rural world. At Sarh in 1983/84 the price
per kilo of unginned cotton went up 10 francs. Pala has gone
along with that trend: from 80 francs, the price per kilo has
risen here to 100 francs. Peanuts "en amande" have also gained

20 francs on the market, up from 70 to 90 francs per kilo.

This price rise across the board reflects the government's move
toward a fair-price policy in order to reward and provide new
incentive to the farmers' efforts. In an interview with the press
at Pala, the minister for agriculture and rural development said
that this action is designed to make room for the establishment

of large-scale agricultural operations. Once the farmers are get-
ting a fair price, they will redouble their efforts to produce
more, said Agriculture Minister Djindingar Dono Ngardoun.

The record for last year's planting has proved satisfactory. One
need only look at Mayo-Kebbi's example, so brilliantly presented
by district Prefect Pofinet, for all doubt on that score to van-
ish. Mr Pofinet made the point that Mayo-Kebbi, thanks to its
human potential and despite malign perversity in the weather, came
through with flying colors.

Third-ranked last year with a production of 22,012 tons, behind
Moyen-Chari's record-setting 30,460 tons and second-ranked Logone
with 23,752 tons, Mayo-Kebbi prefecture boosted its standards

to hit 46,000 tons, or 30 percent of total national output.

There has been marked progress in this prefecture from the 1982
level of 351 kilos per hectare and 811 kilos per hectare in 1983
to better than 900 kilos last year.

15

He also cited maintenance work on some tracks and waterways and
major repairs to the Bongor and especially the Ere ferries,
which are the only transportation available to the lawmen as-
Signed to guard the COTONTCHAD gins and mills in the Mayo-Kebbi.

The 1983/1984 farm year would have been even better, according to
Mr Djidingar, had it not been stunted by the early cessation of
the rains and by the malicious maneuvers of Libya, which tried
repeatedly to burn crops in this part of the country. The pre-
dicted crop, which had been estimated at 120,000 tons, turned
out to be a startling 150,000 tons. The recommendations of the
previous conference at Sarh, which were never implemented, are
still a major handicap, including recommendation 3 which called
for the reactivation of the Biliam Oursi "A" file and for pro-
viding the "B" file with the necessary resources to work its
developed acreage. As for the sorry state of farm equipment and
the shortage of spare parts, reactivation of SOMAT was unani-
mously urged.

In the area of food crops, the minister pointed out that the shor-
tages reported in some sectors and the demand in the major cities
are going to create a food shortage even in areas where the har-
vest was adequate. This is why outside help is going to be in-
dispensable again this year. This must not be allowed to be-
come an unhealthy habit, warned the minister. Meeting our own
food requirements must not make us dependent on others. To this
end, Mr Djidingar urged officials and dealers in food crops to
spur local production and achieve self-sufficiency in food,

which is still the prime concern of the government of the Third
Republic. The minister also stressed reclamation and irriga-
tion, because we cannot rely on rainfall to water our crops any
more: rainfall these days, he said, has become a random, capri-
cious thing, and we dare not gamble with our food supply.

As for the work of the several committees, we shall report only
the recommendations of the economic committee assigned to study
the financial, economic, and social aspects of rural development.
In order to get food production off to a new start, it advised a
general awareness Campaign, under the aegis of ONDR, to promote
food production. COTONTCHAD and the ONVSD [expansion unknown |
were instructed to offer optimum prices for these products,

while the National Cereal Grains Office (ONC) must be given the
necessary funds to play its regulatory role.

6182

CSO: 3419/615

16

GUINEA

SWISS INVESTMENTS BOLSTER GOLD PRODUCTION EFFORT
Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 25 Apr 84 p 4

[Article by Jean-Luc Lederrey: "Guinea Will Soon Be a Large-Scale Gold
Producer Thanks to Swiss Investments"™]

[Text] Guinea's vast gold reserves, to date unmined,
are beginning to be developed by Swiss interests through
the Omnium Investment Company based in Freiburg.

Guinea, which was recently the stage for a coup d'etat following the death of
President Sekou Toure, is one of the poorest countries in the world and has an
annual average per capita income of about $300. However, it has significant
potential wealth, particularly in the area of mining: this country has one-
third of world reserves of bauxite, about 2 billion tons of high quality iron
ore, diamonds and even gold. Guinea's gold-bearing deposits are currently be-
ing developed by Swiss interests.

The American firm Chevaning Mining and Exploration Ltd, headquartered in New
York and with a subsidiary in London, has two mining claims in Guinea with a
surface area equai to that of Switzerland. These claims cover one-fifth of
Guinean territory and contain 80 percent of the country's estimated gold re-
serves. Chevaning Mining is controlled by the Swiss Omnium Investment Com-
pany, headquartered in Freiburg. Laurent Butty, Freiburg's national repre-
sentative, heads the board of directors.

The Omnium Investment Company controls several service firms in the banking,
financial, real estate and maritime fields. In particular, it controls the
Geneva firm of Atlantis Consulting S.A. which provides service, management and
consulting in the areas of finance and investment; it is providing management
services for the gold mining project in Guinea. The omnium also controls the
Atlantis Bank (formerly the Banking Company for Industry) in Geneva, the
Zurich firm Fico S.A. (which is active in the area of maritime transport), the
firm Montreal Omnium (which finds and manages real estate investments in the
United States and Canada); it also has interests in mining and petroleum
companies in Africa, Brazil and the United States.

17

In its annual accounts as of 31 December 1983, the firm reported a balance sheet
total of 78 million francs, fiduciary operations of 190 million, receipts of
7.6 million and a profit of 1.5 million. The stockholders are a group of Swiss
and Dutch businessmen, with the Swiss in the majority.

Guinea's First Gold Mine in 1985

Chevaning Mining and its Swiss backers are currently completing a prospecting
phase and a feasibility study regarding the development of the country's gold
deposits. The firm recently decided to continue to the mining production phase--
the first mine will be operating in 1985. The firm spent about $5 million during
the prospecting phase and plans on investing about $10 to 12 million to construct
the first mine.

In all, $125 million must be invested in the next 3 to 5 years to open several
gold mines. In order to finance this development phase Chevaring Mining will
increase its capital in a few months by issuing public stock so as to interest
other investors in these Guinean projects. This firm's stock is already traded
on the unofficial market in New York.

In addition, Chevaning Mining is currently looking for other industrial partners
to jointly develop the gold resources in this region, which is too large for a
single company. It is currently negotiating with one of the largest American
mining companies.

No Industrial Development Until Now

Guinea's gold resources have been studied and partially identified since the
fifties by groups of French and Soviet geologists, but to date they have not
been developed on a large scale. Guinean gold is primarily placer gold, which
means that it is mixed in extremely small quantities (a few grams per ton) with
alluvial sand and gravel. Until recently (10 to 15 years ago), this type of
deposit was not mined on a large scale, only vein-type deposits were (in South
Africa, for example).

Until now Guinean ore has been used only on a small scale by the local population
which produces 1 or 2 tons per year according to estimates.

Large Reserves

The increase in the price of gold and advances in mining techniques have recently
made it profitable to extract placer type gold, of which Guinea has substantial
reserves. The prospecting studies have already identified resources of about
4.7 million ounces of gold (about 140 tons) on the claims held by Chevaning
Mining and estimated potential resources are much higher than that. This means
that Guinea could soon become one of the world's major gold producers.

18

The gold will be mined by a joint venture of which the Guinean government will
constitute one-half. The project, which was set up under Sekou Toure'’s regime,
has received the blessing of the new Guinean leaders who came to power following
the coup d'etat of last 3 April. The new leaders in Conakry have decided to
encourage the liberalization of the country's economy and to be more open to

the West, which had been tried by the old regime after a long flirtation with
the Soviet Union lasting from 1959 to 1976.

9720
CSO:3419/605

19

GUINEA

PRESERVATION OF TRADITIONAL VALUES URGED WITH ONGOING REFORMS
Conakry HOROYA in French 14 Apr 84 p l
[Editorial by Mody Sory Barry: "Change Without Alier tion]

[Text] The recovery which the CMRN [Military Committee for National Recovery]
is calling on us to carry out is a long, hard and patient fight, a fight to be
waged and won. To do this, there are many things that we must give up. First
of all, there is: apathy, laziness, absenteeism, quick solutions and other
subjective references that include nepotism, racism, regionalism, demagoguery,
favoritism, etc....

So that the recovery, which the CMRN urges us to achieve and which we enthusi-
asticaliy support, can be translated into actions, the first step in this
necessary leap requires a renunciation, a real repudiation of certain practices
that used to be identified with our daily lives of yesterday. For each and
every one of us, it is a matter of changing our thinking, habits and behavior
as well as our hierarchy of values.

But change does not mean alienation. Far from it! There are value standards
which are identified with character and which we must preserve as a people, as
the heirs of rich ancestral traditions and cultures that should be preserved

as a basis of our pride. It is not by embracing this or that trend, custom or
lifestyle that we will experience this regained freedom, which is dear to us.
Frenzied infatuation with everything that is foreign often leads to alienation,
and alienation has never favored the development of man, much less the develop-
ment of initiatives.

What must be avoided above all is the prostitution of our customs in the name
of a so-called freedom that would actually be only dangerous licentiousness.
This appeal is addressed in particular to our young people, who rust not abuse
their regained freedom by replacing yesterday's rigid rules of living with rules
that are harmful and paralyzing, rules that turn a nation's vital forces away
from the virtues of effort, honor and responsibility in dignity.

Change without alienation means that everyone should enjoy all his democratic
liberties without jeopardizing the harmony and cohesion of our people, our

20

country's future and our people's character, without allowing himself to drift
into degrading pleasures and enjoyments, and finally, without repudiating our
people's traditions and customs in favor of others that are alienating.

This is the first and essential step that will enable us to boldly confront

all the problems of recovery in all sectors of national life. It is this
approach, a source of harmony in effort, discipline, dignity and responsibility,
that will mobilize us in the various areas of reconstruction to achieve the
recovery sought. For as the chief of state pointed out, "The recovery, which
we urge with all our hearts, will not be achieved by a miracle."

11915
LSO: 3419/606

GUINEA

OPEN LETTER TO INFORMATION SERVICES
Conakry HOROYA in French 14 Apr 84 p 4
[Article by Nava Toure]

[Text] Without a doubt, the date of 3 April 1984 has, openly and unashamedly,
become part of Guinean history. Although it is more than premature to judge

the import of the action of the soldiers who took over the vacant government

on 3 April, after barely 24 hours there remained no doubt as to public support
for the reasons given and for the general goals proclaimed by the CMRN [Military
Committee for National Recovery], among which special emphasis was placed on

the right to free expression of personal opinion.

It is not my intention to review the deserved praise by the Guinean people for
the CMRN's action, which opened for them the way to a genuine resurgence that
began with public enthusiasm in 1958 and was quickly checked and then halted
between 1961 and 1962. My modest purpose here is to direct the attention of
everyone, and of the press in particular, to the prerequisit2s for translating
into social reality the necessity of justice, which cannot be dissociated from
the existence and actual practice of civil rights, among which freedom of ex-
pression is in the forefront.

The CMRN has played an historic role by resolving an apparent impasse that was
more or less secretly condemned by everyone, including the former regime's
officials. Now it is up to us to act, to channel (although any idea of control
and censure is far from my mind) and to use the energy and wealth of this
terrific effervescence of ideas and thoughts which the Guinean people have
never lacked, but which unfortunately have always been scorned, if not treated
ruthlessly, through their authors by the former regime, which paradoxically
always preached and urged, in its rhetoric, the people to make individual and
collective efforts in thinking and acting.

It is obvious that no regime has ever come to power with the express intention
of oppressing the people; the most noble aims and intentions are always loudly
proclaimed: liberty, dignity, justice, prosperity. It is in practice that the
regime's nature becomes clear, not only as a condition of the character of the
men who comprise it, but also as a result of general spinelessness, which pro-
duces and propagates hypocrisy. Everyone knows how vigorously the CMRN condemns
demagoguery in its communiques. Regardless of individual opinions as to the

22

longevity of the resolve to establish and guarantee freedom of expression, and
human rights in general, we must trust in the resolve of the CMRN's intentions.
Besides, can we do otherwise at the risk of ruining an historic chance, perhaps
the only chance for a long time to come?

Thus everyone, and the press in particular, has a great responsibility in the
resurgence which the CMRN ardently urges us to make, a resurgence which it
alone cannot achieve. The people's real resurgence must begin with each per-
son's self-reconciliation in order to have a chance for national reconciliation.
Each person's self-reconciliation means, first of all, abandoning the brazen
and unrestrained will to please the government, a will that kills any critical
spirit and any lucidity or, if not, forces someone to lead a double life filled
with duplicity: public life with its "truth" and private life with its "truth."
If demagoguery is a system of flattering the multitude, and thus the people,

it must be acknowledged that demagogic remarks are, in the final analysis,

less common among the average Guinean than the panegyric of those in power,

a modern but natural extension of backwoods shamanism.

Self-reconciliation is the active acceptance of criticism and argument, which
create a true public debate, the essential foundation of democracy.

In this process, the press (HOROYA, radio and television) have an extremely
important role to play. But HOROYA, radio and television are state-controlled
institutions, you might say. But this overlooks the long experience of Western
Europe's state-controlled newspapers, radio and television which, despite often
superficial criticism, have generally proved to be a positive experience that
has hardly stifled the free expression of opinion. The men of the press in
Guinea have an imperative transition to make in order to help the people and
the CMRN to democratize society and to eliminate the disinformation established
as a system by the former regime. For the democratic quality of information
directly contributes to the maturation of public opinion and national awareness.

Reporting does not mean singing the praises of those in power. Reporting does
not mean commenting enthusiastically on the actions and decisions of public or
private officials. Reporting does not mean reciting a litany of stereotyped
phrases in a wooden language composed of unsurprising statements whose purpose
is already apparent at the outset. Reporting does not mean getting children
to say the "statements" whispered to them in front of the microphone or the
camera. Reporting does not mean avoiding carefully asking officials at what-
ever level embarrassing questions. Reporting does not mean being merely a
sounding board without a soul or conscience.

Reporting means making it unnecessary for Guineans to have their ears glued to
foreign radio stations reporting on what is happening in their own country.
Reporting means lifting the doubts engendered by all of the more or less founded
rumors that our country attracts in such large numbers. Reporting means pre-
senting reports succinctly and soberly and allowing the various opinion groups
to express themselves. In short, reporting means intelligently promoting the
debate by abandoning a tone of harangue and speechifying, which detracts from
the message.

23

The CMRN has opened the door wide for us. Gentlemen of the Guinean press, help
us to prevent that door from closing again on us! Help the people of Guinea

to dismantle the mechanism of disinformation, which retards the development

of public opinion.

I am not an expert in communication. Perhaps these are some disorganized
ideas, but they surely express all the--still fearful--hopes hanging in the
minds of all Guineans who, beyond all of today's events, are attempting to
make out the country's future through the information system, whose nature
can serve or harm the cause of democracy.

I know that the transition for the members of the press will not be easy. It
is a process that is far from short and which needs the support of all those
who are good-willed. The Guinean press undoubtedly includes some members--
regardless of their sex--of great intelligence and definite competence who
are willing to change. I hope that they manage to overcome all obstacles.
The severity of my view, if it is severe, is not at all ill-intentioned. I
hope that the views of all Guineans will be stern with regard to themselves
and to others in a positive and constructive sense.

The press can and should help us, for it should not be forgotten that the
profession of journalism, when practiced with judgment, intelligence and
competence, is the noblest profession there is. But when practiced with
duplicity, lies, sycophancy or presumptuousness, the profession of journalism
becomes the worst of all.

Forward to true democracy!

11915
CSO: 3419/606

24

GUINEA-BISSAU

TASS, ANG SIGN TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT
Bissau NO PINTCHA in Portuguese 7 Apr 84 p 3

[Text] A technical cooperation agreement was signed at the end of Friday
morning at the headquarters of the Soviet News Agency (TASS) and the Guinea-
Bissau News Agency (ANG).

According to the agreement, TASS grants ANG the right to disseminate all
of TASS's news in Portuguese to its subscribers in the Republic of Guinea-
Bissau.

For that purpose, TASS will supply a copier to ANG and the teletypes for
the TASS news subscribers, as well as spare parts.

ANG will take care of all reception expenses.

At the same time, TASS will also guarantee to send an engineer to Bissau
to install the equipment and train ANG cadres. The two sides concur in
the continuation of the support rendered by TASS to ANG in the training
of cadres.

It should be recalled that up to this date TASS has already trained four
ANG technicians in the area of communication.

In the meantime, it is envisaged that one journalist and one technician
from ANG will go to the USSR this year for advanced and middle-level
training, respectively.

The present agreement was signed for the Guinean side by Comrade Francisco
Barreto, director of ANG, and for the Soviet side by Vladimir Zubkol, TASS
representative in Guinea-Bissau.

Present at the ceremony were Comrade Joao Quintino Teixeira, chief editor

of the newspaper NO PINTCHA, in addition to representatives of the NOVOSTI
and ANOP news agencies in Guinea-Bissau, Oleg Brichakov and Jorge Heitor,

respectively, and workers of our news agency.

8711
CSO: 3442/354

GUINEA-BISSAU

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ANNOUNCES PRICE RISE OF BASIC ITEMS
Bissau NO PINTCHA in Portuguese 7 Apr 84 p 3

[Excerpts] The Council of Ministers met on the 4th of this month under
the presidency of Comrade Major General Jaao Bernardo Vieira, secretary
general of the PAIGC and president of the Revolutionary Council.

Taking up the first item on the agenda pertaining to the organization of

a roundtable in Portugal, scheduled for 21-23 May of this year in Lisbon,
Comrade Bartolomeu Simoes Pereira, secretary of state for planning and
international cooperation, took the floor to present the introductory
report stressing the need to implement a combination of actions as quickly
as possible with the aim of finalizing the work leading to holding the
aforementioned roundtable, for which he proposed the creation of four

task forces.

As for the second item on the agenda, Comrade Carlos Correia, minister
of commerce and crafts, spoke about the new price schedule of some basic
products.

After listening to the detailed explanation of the minister of commerce
on the need to proceed with increasing the prices of those products, the
Council of Ministers discussed this problem, analyzing it objectively
and deciding that the new price schedule for the products listed below
will be as follows as of this date:

Rice - 29 Pg for wholesalers, 30 for retailers
Oil - 85 PG for wholesalers, 90 for retailers
Flour - 28 Pg for wholesalers, 30 for retailers
Sugar - 55 Pg for wholesalers, 60 for retailers
Soap - 130 Pg for wholeslaer, 150 for retailers.

In pursuance of that decision, the Comrade President called attention to
the need to let the goods circulate freely throughout the national
territory, taking into account the difficulties and the shortage of
basic products which force the citizens to go from one place to another.

26

He declared also that henceforth on supplementary tax can be charged on
goods intended for consumption, with the exception of the customs
legislation in effect on this subject which orders the collection of
general customs fees, coastwise transactions of entry and departure of
goods by sea, as for example: Bissau-Bolama, Tombali-Cacine and Bissau-
Farim, and vice-versa.

The aforementioned tax is 3 per 1,000 on the total value of the goods

intended for sale. The small amounts for consumption should not pay
the aforementioned tax.

8711
CSO: 3442/354

27

IVORY COAST

ECONOMY, DEBT RESCHEDULING DISCUSSED
Dakar AFRICA in French No 159, Mar 84 pp 75-78
[Article by Louis Guilain: ''The Ivory Coast's Foreign Debt"]

[Text] After long hesitation, the Ivory Coast has rescheduled its foreign
debt, a way for it to regain its strength and better attack the crisis. Nor
should the decision destroy its reputation as a prudent and pragmatic country
that meets its commitments to pay.

The members of the Political Bureau of the party, the PDCI-RDA [Democratic
Party of the Ivory Coast-African Democratic Rally], met in the presence of
members of the government, presided over by President Felix Houphouet-Boigny.

The telecaster making the announcement stated that "this meeting, whose purpose
was to examine the economic situation, enabled the party's top leaders to hear
a detailed report by the chief of state on the Ivory Coast's domestic and for-
eign debt and on measures to be taken to overcome the crisis."

The official bulletin published for the public announced protective measures
and in particular, the rescheduling of the foreign debt.

"The Political Bureau, aware of the need to preserve the storehouse of confi-
dence enjoyed by our country with international financial circles careful to
avoid any halt in our development, passed the measures to reschedule the
government's debt and ask the government to undertake the negotiations needed

for the purpose."

One will agree that the tone of the bulletin is serious and in keeping with
the situation that is equally serious and also in keeping with the reflections
of the Yamoussoukro ram. With firm courage, he is facing an unlikely set of
circumstances designed to topple his remarkable undertaking, an object of
unanimous admiration not long ago.

Over 2 Trillion

In order to foil destiny, he once again appeals to his people, whose merits
one will recall:

28

"The members of the Political Bureau are pleased that the Ivorians have
demonstrated a heightened sense of civic duty and patriotism by accepting the
sacrifices imposed on them by the circumstances."

Once again, they are asked to understand the government's decisions, as cruel
as they might be to their pride, and courageously accept the consequences

of the situation in order to "emerge from the impasse" and "pursue our develop-
ment in the higher interest of the country." "To emerge" is the blunt phrase.
The times are not right for a flowery style.

As soon as one speaks of figures -- the nitty gritty, after all -- only clear,
concise, dry mathematical language is suitable. We shall therefore speak here
about a figure equal to or slightly higher than 2.37 trillion CFA francs in
order to situate the debt, with the service on that debt costing some 405 bil-
lion CFA francs in 1983.

Ivorians could find some consolation in comparing their fate with that of most
developing countries. In 1983, their foreign debt went from 321 trillion
CFA-francs to 340 trillion.

Mrs Krueger, vice president of the World Bank, announces an imminent increase
in the receipts of the developing countries (from 10 to 12 percent a year,
counting from 1984-1985). In the meantime, like the Ivory Coast,over 30 coun-
tries have reshceduled their debt between 1982 and 1983 for a total amount of
42 trillion CFA francs.

The Ivory Coast's foreign debt more than doubled from 1978 to 1982: 1978,
968.6 billion CFA francs; 1982, 2,195.200 trillionCFA francs.

It is interesting to compare these figures with those on the gross naticnal
product (in billions of CFA francs). These are contained in the table below.

On 31 December 1983, the Ivory Coast's foreign debt amounted to 2.37 trillion
CFA francs, including 1.79 trillion for the secured debt. Service on the for-
eign debt, along with the debt itself, regularly increased: 1978, 38.7 bil-
lion CFA francs; 1979, 53.2 billion; 1980, 74.1 billion; 1981, 108.3 billion;

and 1982, 162.5 billion.

In 1983, service on the debt amounted to 405 billion CFA francs, while reim-
bursement of interest and commissions totaled 207 billion. Capital reimburse-
ments totaled 198 billion.

Repayment

Given these figures, the regime's critics, the very persons who so highly
praised it in good times, use no euphemisms to put another nail in the coffin.

For them: foreigners and nationals alike, the Ivorian debt is the direct
result of poor management of public affairs.

What is one to think of their judgment?

29

Actually, for nearly 15 years, borrowing has constituted one of the essential
sources of development financing.

Prices for basic export products, especially coffee and cacao, provided all
the necessary guarantees for the policy.

Starting in 1980, the sudden and vertiginous drop in these prices no longer
permitted the Ivory Coast to meet its obligations without outside help and it
therefore began to borrow money to pay the service on its own debt.

As long as it could, the Ivory Coast tried to maintain its course in order to
save at any cost the flattering reputation it had acquired abroad.

However, the deterioration in the terms of trade were joined by more destabil-
izing factors making all efforts to keep one's head above water futile.

In chronological order, there was first the international crisis affecting

all countries that do not produce oil, followed by the rising cost of the dol-
lar. Nearly 50 percent of the Ivorian foreign debt was contracted for in

that currency, meaning that when the Ivory Coast borrowed 1 billion CFA francs
in 1980 (in U.S. dollars), it must now pay back 2 billion, with service on the
debt increasing in the same proportions.

Year Debt Percent GNP Percent
1978 968.6% + 4.5 1,825 + 18.5
1979 1,074.5 + 10.2 2,050 + 12.3
1980 re. + 17.7 2,220 + 8,3
1981 1,826.8 + 44,4 2,300 + 3.6
1982 2,195.2 + 20.2 2,500 + 8.7

* The previous year, the total debt (debt plus commitments) amounted to under
500 billion francs.

Structure of the Debt (percent)

U.S. dollar 44.77
French francs 26.82
German marks 7.02
Swiss francs 3.07
Belgian francs 4.52
Ecus 3.3%
Misc. 10.72

But this is not the whole story of the country's financial problems. In fact,
the country depends on France economically. Being dependent on the franc

area was for a long time a considerable advantage, but that is no longer the
case. The continuous depreciation of the French currency compared with other
foreign currencies does not facilitate the task of the Ivorians.

Finally, there was the drought and its harmful effects. The drought, the
most catastrophic in the past 25 years, has delayed eacao production and

30

marketing, resulting in "losses which Minister Sery Gnoleba said were particu-
larly damaging to the financial equilibrium of the public sector at the end of
1983."

Speaking before the London Club, Gnoleba emphasized certain aspects of the
Ivory Coast's misfortune:

"The substantial drop in the level of public and parapublic investments, due
to the increasing difficulties in obtaining the planned foreign credits to
finance those investments; the very marked drop in activity linked to the
decline in investments of the public sector, on the one hand, and to the grow-
ing difficulties with funding of the different partners of the Ivorian eco-
nomy; and the decline in tax income during the second half of 1983, due to

the decline in economic activity."

Domestic Debt

The drop in tax revenue is explained by the funding difficulties of the pri-
vate sector, difficulties partially due to the government's domes ic debt. It
amounts to over 200 billion CFA francs, based on optimistic estimates. In
fact, since the Ivory Coast has granted priority to repaying the foreign
debt, there is local stagnation of enterprises of which the government had
been a traditional customer.

Building and public works were the first victims of government austerity and
were all the harder hit because the government delayed the repayment of debts
it had contracted with them from month to month.

Since it is impossible to please all the people all the time, it was difficult
for the Ivory Coast to satisfy all its foreign and local debtors. The choice
made led locals to sacrifice themselves for foreigners. With the government
no longer being what it had once been, a major generous financial backer, the
public sector went to the banks, which themselves soon grew tired of the red
ink and turned off the water. Then came the layoffs, wage freezes, failures,
and so on.

The crisis was not immediately apparent and it took some time for people to
become concerned. In 1982-1983, Ivorian industry was content to exceed the

1 trillion figure in turnover. Nevertheless, there were signs that the machine
was flagging.

Draconian Measures

The government quickly became aware of the gravity of the situation and as
early as 1980, in agreement with and with the help of the Economic Cooperation
Fund and the World Bank and with the backing of the International Monetary Fu
Fund, took measures aimed at setting up a rigorous rehabilitation program so
as to restore the financial equilibrium without compromising national develop-
ment.

31

Among these measures is the liquidation or reorganization of national compan-
ies and parapublic organizations that were often the subject of scandal because
of their incompetent management.

Regular and investment exz,enditures of the government were substantially re-
duced in order to bring about increased public spending.

It should be recognized that the Ivorian readjustment program did not respond
to all the hopes placed in it because of the external factors already described
(deterioration in coffee and cacao prices, spiraling cost of the dollar and
excessively high interest rates, weakness of the franc).

On the domestic plane, the death blows stemmed from the stagnation of the
economy, partially due to the government's austerity policy. One must again
mention the debt to economic partners established in the Ivory Coast, the
drought, brush fires, the sometimes scanty harvests and the oil resources
that fell below initial hopes.

Rescheduling of Debt

As a result, it was essential to reschedule the debt, with financiers compar-
ing the operation with a breath of fresh air.

One must understand that the debt rescheduling does not involve the multilater-
al debt (the debt contracted with the World Bank, for example), but only

95 percent of the bilateral debt. The request officially made to the Club of
Paris would suspend reimbursement of the principal and interest.

The results of the IMF work on the Ivory Coast's recovery plan are already
known. Its conclusions will be presented to Washington by the Fund's board
of directors. The final report will be passed on to the Club of Paris. In
particular, it mentions the problems of modifying reimbursement dates and
the establishment of banking commissions.

The financial balance can finally be restored on new foundations, making it
possible to repay the domestic debt and will thereby embark the country upon
a new path favorable to productive investments.

In order to achieve this good result, the government is now imposing a budget
of strict austerity and is preparing to breathe new life into the economy,
particularly industry, by granting total aid (export privileges in countries
outside the CEAO, investment code, improved taxation for companies established
locally, customs tariffs, and so on).

The mere fact of recognizing the possibility of future economic success would
tend to prove that the Ivory Coast was not "KOed" by the heavy blows it has
suffered. Hunkering down, it is regaining its strength.

Confidence of Business Circles

The "Old Man" built upon a rock the image of a wise, pragmatic, far-sighted and
reliable Ivory Coast. It is the fable of the ant, in a sense, and with the

32

help of fate, it would turn into a cicada "in order to subsist until the next
season.”

Nevertheless, in the world of finance, they do not reason as they do in the
world of Aesop or La Fontaine and one does not get rich by paying off one's
debts too quickly! In this, we join the French moralist, who in careful terms
warns that too great a haste in paying off one’s debts to others would involve
a certain amount of ingratitude....

The Ivory Coast is not ungrateful, first of all, and it is guarding its
chances for a new and better start, second. Other countries have confidence

in it because of what it has already done in the past and also because of the
Draconian measures it has imposed on itself in order to remedy its afflictions.

The Ivory Coast's private sector has also faced the facts by providing concrete
proof of its support for the government, which still has a remarkable technical
infrastructure in all the fields of activity in the country. It is therefore
not a matter of starting from scratch, but only of pausing, falling back in
order to regroup.

Then there is the oil.

It is true that it did not respond to the expectations of the country's
leaders, but its contribution is not negligible. There is talk of 2 million
tons in 1985, without counting the gas from the "Espoir" deposit. It is not
Peru, much less Saudi Arabia, but in these times of crisis no profits can
be neglected.

We thus come to the conclusion, in response to the claims of the eternal de-
tractors of the Ivory Coast, accused of mismanagement by them. In truth, we
could not situate it in time. It would be difficult to place it in the period
of the "Ivorian miracle." The nation had to handle a crisis that befell it
from the outside and it is indeed a miracle that it did not succumb to the
heavy blows.

CSO: 3419/619

33

KENYA

COPING WITH DROUGHT IN KITUI DISTRICT
Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 27 Apr 84 pp 9, 14
[Article by Gideon Nzoka]

[Text] The hot sun glares mercilessly over the already scorched earth,
Slowly and painfully destroying the pitifully little vegetation still
remaining.

The rivers have long turned into vast stretches of sand-filled trenches
that one finds hard to believe ever contained water.

The few remaining starving cattle have to be driven long distances in
search of the meagre and continually diminishing supplies of water and
pasture.

These are just a few of the manifestations of the 18-month-long drought

that has hit Kitui district, which has a long history of droughts, so much
so that quite a number of the older people in the area can pin their dates
of birth and other important events down to such-and- such a drought, all

of which are appropriately named. (No one has as yet, however, come up with
a name for the current drought).

Kitui district is mostly made up of land that is only marginally productive
agriculturally and this--and the continued lack of rain--has dealt a severe
blow to the district's farmers, most of whom are only small-scale subsistence
farmers without any other source of income. Though the drought has affected
the district as a whole, the southern parts are the worst hit.

Fears

David Kyalo wa Mutisya, in his late 80s, a farmer in Ikutha location of
southern Kitui has since last year lost more than 150 sheep and over 80
head of cattle to the drought at his Matikoni farm. This has drastically
reduced the number of his livestock (h: now has less than 20 sheep) and
he fears that he will soon have none left as no end to the drought seems
to be in sight.

The livestock and his crop farms are his only source of income, on which
he has to support a large extended family. He says that during previous
droughts he was able to move his livestock to better areas and save them
but now "better places" simply don't exist.

Kyalo's is not an isolated case. Most farmers in Southern Kitui have lost
and continue to lose a lot of their livestock to the drought. Compared to
the rest of the district, the area is one of the most productive agricul-
turally but is also one of the most vulnerable to the ravages of drought.
Many a family has to make do with the fruit of the widely grown Muamba tree
for supper and little else.

The drought has even made some farmers im the area become poachers. They
hunt--or send their children out to hunt--the small, starving population

of dik-dik and other small game, mainly from the nearby Tsavo National Park.
They use catapults, arrows and other traditional weapons. Said one man

who requested anonymity: "We know it is against the law and punishable to
hunt, but then, what else can we do? We have to find some food for our
families..."

Others have to make do with food sent to the area by the government.
According to the assistant chief of Ndili sub-location, Mr Justus Nzou Mwan-
zaku, since October last year people have been given free food four times,
the period between two consecutive hand-outs varying between four months

and three weeks. For the food to be enough, he adds, it has to be given

out at least twice a week. The adults in every family are given a kilogramme
of maize and a kilogramme of beans each. Only those who have been certified
by the Food Distribution Committee as not having another source of food are
given the food assistance.

But Mwanzaku is of the opinion that virtually everybody in the area is in
need of free food. He also adds that if this year's expected April to June
rains don't result in high yields for farmers, the Kitui people might need
government food aid up to April 1985.

In the past few months the government has given thousands of bags of maize
and beans to be issued free to drought-stricken wananchi. However, the
distribution of the food aid has not been very efficient. It has left many
people complaining of unfairness and corruption. Whereas the District
Officer, Northern Division, Mr J.A. Kamau says that there was enough food

to feed all the affected people, the method of distribution in certain
areas such as Ikutha location, with irregularly long periods of time elapsing
between the subsequent hand-outs, has left a lot of the locals dissatisfied.
Kamau points out that the food given to the district by the government "was
enough" to facilitate weekly handing-out.

Some locals have also charged that some of the chiefs were asking for two
shillings from each of the persons receiving food, claiming that they were
for "transport cost." Gideon Ulembwa, a hides and skins dealer at Migwani
Market in northern Kitui wonders when these "costs" were incurred since the
food was taken by government lorries to the affected areas.

35

People in Ikutha have also complained of being asked to pay two shillings
before they got any food. Observers point out that the cost of transporting
several bags of maize to even the remotest areas of the district, if not
done by the government, would not cost much more than Sh 200, and wonder

why chiefs should allegedly demand two shillings from each of the usually
over 250 recipients of the food aid in any one area. There have also been
claims that some chiefs were actually selling the food to the residents

but these reports have not been confirmed.

The government, in its food aid programme, has also tried to deal with the
situation by relaxing regulations restricting the buying of maize at whole-
sale prices from the National Cereals Board to licensed traders, thus allow-
ing individuals or groups of individuals to buy the maize directly from the
board depots in the district.

But there's hope. Already, the long-delayed seasonal rains have started
falling in some parts of the district and it is the hope of all in the
district that the rains will grant Kitui farmers at least a iarvest. They
are in need of one.

CSO: 3400/974

36

KENYA

MOI URGES REFORESTATION
Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 28 Apr 84 p 1
[Article by Makokha wa Musebe]

[Text ]

PRESIDENT Daniel
arap Moi yesterday
urged Kenyans to pre-
vent desertification for
the benefit of future
generations.

President Moi made the call
when he led thousands of Ke-
nyans on the National Tree
Planting Day at Kiserian
plains, Kajiado District, where
thousands of trees were
planted.

‘“*Centuries ago, places like
Misri (Egypt) had plenty of
trees and rivers and as a result,
people who died could not rot
due to natural medicines pro-
vided by trees,’’ he said.
**Now that there are no such
trees and the world is turning
into a desert, people who die
rot.

He banned the commercial
harvest of timber in Rift
Valley except for local con-
sumption only.

He directed the ministry of
Natural Resources to ensure
that trees which did not sur-
vive were replaced. He also

CSO: 3400/974

told them to continue planting
trees in the remaining area at
Kiserian. He told the ministry
Officials not to wait for the
Tree-Planting Day to plant
trees but to carry on with the
exercise throughout the rainy
season.

Moi cited with disappoint-
ment the destruction of in-
digenous trees in Kakamega
forest. He asked where those
cutting down the trees would
get others as the lifespan of
trees was longer than of a
human being.

He urged farmers not to
cultivate along river banks as
this would cause more fertile
soil to be washed into the
rivers. He cited the Sagana
river which, he said, had
washed away a lot of fertile
soil from Murang’a and part
of Nyeri. ar

He said Nairobi University
students had left a big land-
mark at Kiserian by planting
thousands of trees. He
directed that the site be called
‘*University Forest — Ngong”’
in memory of the good work
dene by the students.

37

The president said that one
of these days he will join
students in building gabions to
prevent soil errosion, to which
the students shouted ‘‘tomor-
row, tomorrow’’, meaning to-
day. However the president
said they needed a rest before
embarking on gabions.

About outside loans and
grants, the president said
Kenya was a self-reliant coun-
try,.

He also directed that the 50
goats he had been given by the
area’s residents be given to
Nairobi University students

Welcoming the president,
the Minister for Environment
and Natural Resources, Mr.
Eliud Mwamunga, said his
ministry’s target was to plant
200 million trees per year. He
said more Meru oak will be
planted around Mt. Kenya
and other hardwood trees in
Kakamega.

President Moi arrived at the
site at 12.45 p.m., accom-
panied by the vice-president
and Minister for Home Af-
fairs, Mr. Mwai Kibaki.

MEETING STRENGTHENS RELATIONS WITH EMIRATES
Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 30 Apr 84 p 6
[Editorial: "Another Boost for Afro-Arab Unity"]

[Text ]

THE three-day state visit last week by the presi-
dent of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), His
Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, fur-
ther strengthens Afro-Arab unity and boosts the
relations between Kenya and the Emirates. Seen
in an even wider context, the visit has been a prac-
tical illustration of Kenya’s determination to co-
exist with other countries of the world on a non-
2ligned basis.

Both Kenya and the UAE are already
culturally linked by Islam. They have in common
the characteristic of ethnic diversity and unity. The
UAE is made up of Arabs, Iranians, Pakistanis
and Indians. They speak different languages, such
as Arabic, Persian, English, Hindi and Urdu. Fur-
thermore, as was expressed in the joint communi-
que issued at the end of the visit, the two coun-
tries hold similar views with regard to South
Africa’s apartheid regime, the future of Namibia,
the Middle East crisis, the escalation of super
power rivalry in the Indian Ocean, current world
economic problems and the need for meaningful
North-South dialogue.

It was, therefore, only logical and appropriate
for the two countries to have agreed to set up a
joint ministerial commission headed by their
foreign ministers to strengihen Afro-Arab unity
and examine more closely other issues of bilateral
interest. Such a commission could become a
valuable instrument for developing the ties of
friendship and co-operation between the two
countries.

38

CSO:

3400/974

One of the possible areas of meaningful co-
Operation between the two countries is in research
on dry land farming and agriculture. The
Agricultural Trials Station at Digdagga in the
Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, established in 1955,
has been engaged in continuous research into
methods of dry land cultivation and livestock rear-
ing. As a result it is now possible to grow a great
variety of fruits, vegetables, animal fodder and
tobacco for local consumption around oases and
irrigated areas. The UAE department of
agriculture pays a lot of attention to educating
farmers in the newly developed methods of
cultivation.

Very similar effort is being made in Kenya as
part of the government’s land reclamation policy.
No doubt a cross-fertilisation of research findings
and agricultural discoveries between the two coun-
tries would boost food production and thus
facilitate greater co-operation. Areas such as Bar-
ingo, Kitui, Elgeyo-Marakwet, Taita-Taveta and
others which have been earmarked for arid and
semi-arid land development programmes stand to
benefit from such mutual exchange.

The quickest and easiest way in which Kenya
could benefit economically from her ties with the
United Arab Emirates would be through direct
financial assistance. The Emirates, so richly en-
dowed with oil, are in a strong position to offer
such aid. Abu Dhabi, one of the Emirates, is pro-
bably the richest country in the world in terms of
income per capita, so we hope that the republic
will consider increasing financial aid to Kenya to
catalyse greater economic development and im-
prove the living conditions of our people. The re-
cent state visit by the UAE head of state did, in
fact, indicate the likelihood of such assistance.

39

TRAINING FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR TEXTILE INDUSTRY

Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 30 Apr 84 p 9

[Article by Victoria Okumu]

[Excerpt ]

FOLLOWING an incubation
period of over a decade,
Kenya Textile Training In-
stitute (KTTI) is now in full
operation having enrolled the
first thirty students early this
month.

The pressure for trained
personnel in the textile in-
dustry which is one of Kenya’s
largest industrial sectors hav-
ing over 20,000 employees has
been so great that in 1973 the
Federation of Kenya
Employers (FKE) requested
the government to set up train-
ing facilities for the textile
industry.

Skills

Employees have always
been forced to get their train-
ing abroad or learn the skills
on the job through experience
from the already trained.

Following the request,
Kenya Government made a
survey for training re-
quirements and approached
the Netherlands Government
for support.

By 1978, an agreement was
reached with the Netherlands
promising to finance training
of KTTI staff including
machinery and equipment for
—— , Pon nen

A supplier of machinery
instruction was to be identified
with an aim to have training
facilities at KTTI that would

40

equip students with knowledge
in a field full of diverse
management principles and
machinery.

Says KTTI general manager
Mr. P. K. Kapur, ‘‘each in-
dustry had what they thought
to be the best for their com-
panies and what we really
wanted to achieve with the
establishment of KTTI is a
pniformity to get one certific-
ate for all that would be
recognised by all textile
industries.”

Kapur explained that
although textile employees had
been getting trained it was at
an institution and level decid-
ed by the employer.

The overseas training also
proved expensive as the
government had to refund
training expenses through the
industrial training levy fund
programme.

Star Industrial and Textile
Enterpnses Limited, Bombay,
India was appointed to pro-
cure and install the machinery.
Star is a group of companies
ranked among the top textile
machinery manufacturing and
consultancy organisations in
India, with a turn-over of over
130 million US dollars per

year.

Star has in the past built up
and commissioned textile mills
in Sudan, Tanzania and
Algeria among many other
African countries.

KENYA

CSO:

At the KTTI, Star group
has not only installed
machines but were commis-
sioned to provide advisory
technical services relating to
architecture, civil and struc-
tural design of the Institute.

_ KTTI has a spinning, weav-
ing and processing department
in addition to a laboratory for
quality testing. Arrangements
are being made to include
facilities for knitting machines
to be part of the training

programme.

KTTI’s spinning depart-
ment is equipped fully with
various models of machines
that a student is likely to en-
counter in any industry
around the country. A cone
winding machine sets the fac-
tory chain of activities by con-
verting the incoming cotton
into cones.

Machines to twist the cones
of cotton are installed into two

‘gets, the old models and the

newest variety being made
available for the student to
use.

3400/974

41

There are also smaller
models of the factory
machines ‘‘for students to ex-
periment on’’ if they wish and
from the models students will
have some _ ‘‘spinning
geometry”’ according to Star
Group’s regional manager Mr.
C. P. Kainth.

The machines are not all
from India; an assortment has
been made and there is for ex-
ample a sophisticated cone
winding machine from West
Germany.

The spinning section also
has a variety of warping
machines, combers, draw
frames, right frames, beams
and looms, and has facilities
to offer the latest technology
in spinning called open-end
spinning.” ;

KENYA

BRIEFS

FUEL SHORTAGE REPORTED--Nairobi is experiencing a shortage of kerosene and
wananchi are scrambling for the little that is available in a few petrol
stations. Long queues of wananchi waiting for kerosene could be seen in
several parts of Nairobi. Petrol stations visited by The Kenya Times said
they had not received their supply of kerosene although they had placed
orders. One petrol station in Eastlands had not received its supply since
April 15 and customers had to be turned away. Another petrol station along
Ngong road drained its supply within minutes on receiving it because of the
many customers who went to buy it. A random survey carried by The Kenya
Times showed that hundreds of wananchi had to travel long distances carry-
ing jerricans in search of kerosene. Kerosene was among other petroleum
products whose prices went up a few days ago. The price hike was attributed
to procurement, distri ution aid marketing problems as a result of the
devaluation of the Kenya shilling against the World Bank's Special Drawing
Rights (SDRS) and other major currencies such as the US dollar which is the
official oil trading currency. The price hike was announced by energy and
regional development minister Nicholas Biwott last week in a press statement.
[Text] [Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 30 Apr 84 p 24]

BRIDGE IS SWEPT AWAY--A bridge connecting Kitale Town and Kwanza-Namanjalala
was swept away following a heavy downpour. Communication between the centre
and the town is now cut off. Rural access roads in the area are also becoming
impassable because of the rain. The councillor for area, Mr William Wanyama
Walukhu said flat areas were becoming flooded. He said the situation could
become dangerous if a solution was not urgently found. Walukhu thanked the
government for containing security in the area which had been under constant
attack by cattle rustlers. [Text] [Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English

28 Apr 84 p 3]

CSO: 3400/974

42

LIBERIA

FRICTION WITHIN NATIONAL MUSLIM COUNCIL REPORTED
Monrovia THE NEW LIBERIAN in English 10 Apr 84 p 16

[Text] The National Muslim Council of Liberia has reacted sharply to what
it termed as the unilateral dissolution of the National Muslim Council and
the setting up of an interim committee to run the affairs of the council.

In the 13-page document, issued here recently, the council noted that the
dissolution action by a handful of council members was inconsistent with
the constitution of the Council and added that on a two-third majority the
executive committee of the National Muslim Council has the power to make
decisions affecting the organization.

The Council said the action was an effort on the part of its opponents to
"paint us black in the eyes of the Muslim and the public in general."

Accordingly, the council said this clique of council members recently
called a meeting at the Executive Pavilion here aimed at mis-presenting
and mis-interpreting the objectives of the National Muslim Council.

The council in its reaction contended that its opponents were not "clothed
islamically or legally with authority to dissolving a duly established
organization."

It then called on all its affiliate members to make every effort and to
resolve "this unfortunate situation in the spirit of islamic justice and
fair play."

The council said despite such "provocative action" it remains committed
to its objectives of maintaining peace and unity among all M slim organiza-
tions in the country.

The National Muslim Council of Liberia founded in 1974 is aimed at coordi-
nating and monitoring the affairs of member organizations, as well as
representing them at national and international forums.

The organization chaired by Alhaji Vamunya Corneh comprises various Muslim
organizations in the country including the Muslim Congress of Liberia,

the Muslim League of Salafiya and the Muslim Community of Liberia, among
others.

43

However, since April 1980, Alhaji Corneh has been unable to carry out the
functions of chairman of the Council due to ill health.

The organization has been chaired by the first vice chairman of the council
Sekou Bility.

The council in its reaction said since then, Alhaji Corneh has never informed
either the acting chairman of the executive committee of his recovery and
readiness to resume official duty.

It noted that the cause of agitation has been on the "over-ambitiousness of
some Council members for the leadership of the Council who have resorted to
inviting outside forces against the council in order to accommodate their
personal whims or notions."

The Council then explained that a candidate for council executive leadership
should possess "a commendable character and conduct consistent with Islamic
ethics."

It pointed out that this quality would not only enable a candidate to know

the details of Islamic injunction and their application, but also help him
to appreciate "the basic principles of Islamic laws and its objectives."

CSO: 3400/976

44

LIBERIA

COUNTRY'S BANKING, LIQUIDITY CRISIS DISCUSSED
Monrovia THE NEW LIBERIAN in English 23 Apr 84 p l
[Article by Lawrence Thompson]

[Text] The Governor of the National Bank of Liberia (NBL), Mr Thomas

D. Voer Hansen, has challenged any of the commercial banks in the country
to provide evidence that an increase in NBL's reserve requirement was
responsible for their inability to lend out money.

Governor Hansen threw the challenge last Thursday during a Chamber of
Commerce luncheon for banking, insurance and business executives at
which time the executives demanded that he put in proper perspective the
current banking and liquidity crisis in the country.

Many of the banking executives attributed their inability to lend out money
as well as their refusal to accept government cheques and cheques from
counterpart banking institutions to the increase in the National Bank
reserve requirement from 15 percent to 30 percent.

In his clarification of the matter, Governor Hansen said when the national
legislature created the national bank the reserve requirement was then 15
percent.

"But when the 15 percent reserve requirement was increased to 30 percent
by the People's Redemption Council in February 1983, government felt that
the increase was enough during that particular period," said Mr Hansen.

He said "if there had been no such increase commercial banks would have
felt the financial pinch much harder two years back.”

The governor attributed the liquidity crisis to the decline in exports on
the one hand, and interest payments on foreign debts on the other. For
instance, he said exports declined from $600.4 million in 1980 to $430.8
million in 1983.

Interest payments on foreign debts according to the governor increased
from $23.9 million to $50.9 million during the same period.

"While there are no definite figures to indicate capital flight, the residual
item in capital outflows of the balance of payments does indicate substantial
magnitude ranging from $20 million to $40 million per year since 1979," Mr
Hansen said.

He said that the Liberian government has been financing heavy deficits
ranging between $90 million to $99.5 million during the last three years,
thus, heightening the crisis.

The governor, however, intimated that discussions were being held between
the appropriate government ministries and authorities of commercial banks
to find solutions to the problems.

Although he declined to disclose the contents of said discussions, he, how-
ever, promised to inform banking executives as well as the public as to
the results of those discussions.

Speaking at the occasion, the president of the Bankers’ Association of
Liberia, Mr David Vinton, said that government's deficit at the end of
1970 was $2.6 million as compared to $77.5 million in 1983.

Mr Vinton who is also president of the Liberia Bank for Development and
Investment observed that the current liquidity crisis should be tackled

from the root causes which he said were both national and international.

He said by all indications government was spending more money than it
generated.

One of the panelists, Mr Dexie Peters, President of the Association of
Insurers in Liberia, expressed concern over certain provisions contained
in the decree creating the National Insurance Corporation.

CSO: 3400/982

46

LIBERIA

PEOPLES REDEMPTION COUNCIL "DECLARES WAR’ ON TAX EVADERS
Liquidity Problems, Corruption

Monrovia THE NEW LIBERIAN in English 24 Apr 84 pp 3, 6

[Editorial: "PRC Declares War on Tax Dodgers"]

[Text] The recent decision of the Executive Council of the People's
Redemption Council (PRC) to summarily execute any member or members of the
Special Tax Collection Force caught soliciting or accepting bribes not
only shows the gravity of the nation's liquidity problems, but also the
depth of Government's frustration over tax-doggers and corrupt officials.

At stake is $26 million due the Government of Liberia in taxes ranging
from real estate tc corporate, income and excise taxes.

The deadline has been set for April 28, 1984; and, slowly but surely a
process that might have an indelible mark on Liberians' sense of honor,
responsibility and accountability is being put into motion.

Whatever the end result, if this is made a standard practice or a standing
order, Government would have assured the redemption of our lost honor and
patriotism from those who are tempted to sell national interests for piece-
meals and personal aggrandisements.

To understand the situation that led to this decision would require an exami-
nation of the various efforts and measures by the Government in general,

and the Ministry of Finance in particular, adopted to ensure prompt and
effective collection of taxes.

Despite the best of these measures and efforts, some Liberians directly
and indirectly connected with the collection of taxes have still found ways
to evade, help foreign residents and businesses evade taxes and thwart
Government's efforts. A great disservice to the nation.

Based on the unpatriotic attitude of these corrupt officials and individuals,
certain groups of foreign residents and businessmen have beer encouraged to
flout government's regulation with impunity. These have gone as far as
paying patronages to these individuals to ensure effective and continuous
perpetration of this act. Understandably, some Liberian businessmen have
also joined the ranks of tax-doggers.

47

Government's decision relative to the collection of her collectable is indeed
most welcome, even though to some it may be too hard a line. However, it
is known that a chronic disease deserves a drastic cure.

In this regard, Government would do well to look keenly at the myriad of
stores both LPA and non-LPA, both foreign and local. In the Monrovia City
alone there are over one thousand of these stores owned by the Lebanese,
Indians, Fullahs, and Nigerians in addition to the Liberian-owned stores
and shops. Most of these are not paying. If they are, to who?

Another area to look at would possibly be beer booths and parlors that are
either not paying any taxes or paying for a shop while practically running

a regular club to all intents and purposes. These are areas that either have
been neglected, overlooked or wilfully left out of the tax-paying sphere.

The declaration of war on tax-doggers by Government is, however, a short-
term high effect program. While it is going on, it is also high time that
the tax-collection machinery of this country be overhauled. If necessary,
let's discard the old system and develop a system that would be effective
and conducive to our particular situation.

We also need to take a closer look at the issue of rural taxes. True, the
Hut Tax was abolished because it contained many flaws, but it has become
imperative at this point in our history that every Liberian has to take
some responsibility in the running and maintenance of the country.

The rural masses have on several occasions signified their interest and
desire to pay some sort of tax towards the upkeep and maintenance of the
nation. Let's give them a chance. After all, the Republic of Liberia is
not limited to the City of Monrovia nor are her citizens only in Monrovia.

A tax of $5.00 per head per month for every eligible citizen of voting age
would not be out of place. Rather, it would make them have a sense and
feeling of being part of the system. More than IT IS THEIR CIVIC DUTY TO
THE NATION.
Keep up the good work.

Firing Range Set Up
Monrovia THE NEW LIBERIAN in English 24 Apr 8&4 p 1

[Text] The Liberia Electricity Corporation (LEC) yesterday erected utility
poles where tax evaders or those found receiving bribes would be executed.

Last Friday, the Liberian leader constituted an ll-member committee of
senior PRC members including 200 military and paramilitary officers to
collect taxes owed government amounting over $26,000.

The nationwide tax collection campaign which started yesterday will last
until Saturday, April 28.

48

The Liberia Electricity Corporation erected nine utility poles at the
Barclay Training Center beach site to constitute the firing range fc. the
execution of tax evaders and their accomplices.

The Head of State's directive followed a meeting Sunday of the Executive
Committee of the ruling people's Redemption Council (PRC), and the special
task force at which time the Liberian leader stated that anyone found
accepting bribe during the tax collection campaign will be executed by
firing squad without delay.

The decision, according to an Executive Mansion release, applies to council
members, police officers, soldiers, as well as revenue and custom officers
of the finance Ministry and Liberian businessmen. It said that foreign
businessmen found in the act would be deported and their properties confis-
cated.

"Tax Clearance’ for Travel
Monrovia THE NEW LIBERIAN in English 26 Apr 84 p 8

[Text] Liberians and foreign residents wishing to travel will now have to
obtain a tax clearance before being allowed to leave the country, the
Ministry of Finance announced yesterday.

A press release issued late yesterday evening signed by Finance Minister
G. Alvin Jones said "failure on the part of any individual to obtain said
clearance will leave the appropriate authorities with no alternative but
to deny such individual exit visa to travel."

The release attributed the decision to "the ensuing tax collecting drive"

which was recently Launched by the PRC Government.

CSO: 3400/976

49

LIBERIA

LAMCO-LMWV AGREEMENT GIVES WORKERS MORE BENEFITS
Monrovia THE NEW LIBERIAN in English 27 Apr 84 pp 3, 12

[Text] A collective bargaining agreement was Wednesday signed between the
Lamco Joint Venture Operating Company and the LAMCO Mine Workers' Union
(LMWU) at the Ducor Intercontinental Hotel in Monrovia.

Among several benefits to be enjoyed by the workers as a result of the
agreement are wage increment, improved medical facilities and improvement
in annual leave.

Other terms of the agreement also centered around better housing facilities
which include the construction of 40 additional housing units for the workers
at the Buchanan operation, and the renovation of workers' dwelling houses

at the Yekepa operations.

Under the agreement which will last for two years, there has also been an
increment of twenty seven cents in labourers' wages and vacation travel
allowance of $25.00, while the retirement pension benefit has increased by
ten percent.

Signing on behalf of the LMWU was its president, Mr Aloysius S. Kie while
the General Manager of LAMCO Mr John Pervola signed for the company.

In remarks, Mr Pervola hoped the signing of the agreement would create an
atmoephere of mutual respect between management and workers.

He said such gesture would pave the way for cooperation between them so as
to make things easier and better for both parties.

For his part Mr Kie said that the aims and objectives of the union was to
create and preserve a balance in industrial relations in order to maintain
industrial peace.

Among other objectives of the union, he said it was to coliect and dissemi-
nate information regarding problems which they face in connection with
labor-management relations.

50

Deputizing for the Minister of Labour John G. Rancy, the Deputy Minister
of Labour Ayun Cassell said the revolution can only be a success when
there was understanding between management and the workers. He assured
both parties that law and order will be maintained in the management-
workers relations.

CSO: 3400/982

51

MOZAMBIQUE

INCREASED PRODUCTION OF COCONUT FOR EXPORT PLANNED
Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Apr 84 p 3

[Text] Raising the production and productivity indices and consequently
achieving the financial recovery of the SOCOCO Plant in the province of Zam-
bezia are the immediate tasks assigned by the FRELIMO Party Central Committee
member and provincial secretary of the party organization for Zambezia to the
recently appointed board of directors of that enterprise, which produces and
exports grated coconut. The appointment of Cassam Gulam Hussein, according
to the provincial secretary, is a part of a party and state strategy to
strengthen the leadership on the production front in the province of Zambezia.

The SOCOCO plant, built in 1970, has experienced successive financial crises
since 1976, when state intervention took place, as a result of poor manage-
ment and the now ancient equipment with which it was operating.

These two factors, linked with low production and the constant breakdowns of

the factory equipment, forced the enterprise to undertake numerous debts with
the bank to guarantee its survival. By the end of 1979, SOCOCO had a deficit
of 6,144,500 meticals.

If indeed the reason for contracting this volume of debt was the factors
mentioned, the lack of good sense and a proper economic and financial
approach contributed to the size of the debt total reached.

Use of the Old Equipment

As the secretary of the provincial committee of the party in Zambezia
stressed at the installation of the new board, there has previously been no
concern at that enterprise for the full utilization of all of the capacity of
the factory equipment and the raw material, coconuts, as well.

Another factor contributing to the fact that the SOCOCO has until the present
been in a difficult financial situation was the market price of grated coco-

nut, which never allowed the enterprise a profit margin sufficient to offset

production costs.

In order to produce 1 ton and 700 kilograms of grated coconut (the capacity
of the factory at the time), the production unit needed to process 20,000
coconuts per day. This volume cost the enterprise 50,000 meticals, while the
market price for grated coconut ran about 30 meticals per kilogram.

52

Financial Recovery of the Enterprise

At present, thanks to the rise in the price of the product to 50 meticals per
kilogram, the profit margin of the SOCOCO has increased to 25,000 meticals.
However this has not as yet enabled the enterprise to pay off all its debts,
with the deficit totaling currently more than 5,000 contos.

The secretary of the Central Committee of the party organization defined the
financial recovery of the enterprise, an increase in production and produc-
tivity and utilization of the full installed capacity of the plant, as the
immediate tasks to be carried out by the new board.

"We must seek immediate measures which will lead us to full utilization of
the coconut,'' Omar Luis Francisco said at the installation of the new SOCOCO
board.

According to the outgoing plant director, the installed capacity is 30 tons
of grated coconut per month. However at the present time, the daily produc-
tion of the SOCOCO is estimated at a ton and a half of grated coconut.

This level could only be achieved thanks to the improvements made on all the
factory equipment between 1977 and 1979, during which period the factory was
shut down for repairs. Even with the completion of this work, the SOCOCO
only succeeded in producing 50 percent of its total capacity.

In the view of the new enterprise director, the repair of the equipment is
one of the prior conditions for guaranteeing a good production rate, and thus
the financial recovery of this unit, the only one of its kind anywhere in the
country. Another fact which hinders the harmonious development of enterprise
activities, we were told, is the lack of production means.

At this time, the enterprise is faced with enormous difficulties in getting
the coconuts from the purchase area to the plant. "The lack of transporta-
tion is one of the difficulties the enterprise encounters," the outgoing
director commented.

In fact, the SOCOCO does not have a single vehicle for the pursuit of its
productive activities. To bring the coconuts from the purchase area to the
plant, the enterprise has had to use rented trucks, which pushes production
costs up.

5157?
CSO: 3442/344

53

MOZAMBIQUE

SWEDEN TO TRAIN ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION OPERATORS
Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Apr 84 p 8

[Text] A group of five students in the specialization course for Electric
Power Company of Mozambique (EDM) substation operators are to travel to
Sweden in the middle of May, where they will complete their training. After
their return, they will engage in a practical apprenticeship in the substa-
tions of this enterprise in the northern part of the country, a source in the
vocational training sector of that body informed NOTICIAS.

The specialized training of these future EDM cadres began last 20 March, 2
days after the conclusion of the English course which served as a basis for
the beginning of the specialization phase.

The students had completed various stages of training, specifically orienta-
tion and integration, in addition to the basic training in the electrical
sector.

While the five to be chosen from among the best students will continue their
training in Sweden, others will be assigned to the substations and still
others will work in the underground cable sector.

Apprenticeship in the North of the Country

"Thirty days is the scheduled period for completing the specialized training
of the five students. During this period, they will deepen their knowledge
in this sector, and after their return they will work for some time at the
Caia, Alto-Molocue, Mocuba, Nacala, Quelimane and Nampula substations," the
Same source explained further.

This same official informed our reporter that at the present time, an equal
number of workers who completed the first specialization course are employed
at those substations. According to the schedule set by the EDM training
sector, they will attend another training course on the maintenance of sub-
station equipment.

Aid From NORAD

The training programs being implemented there have the support of the NORAD.

As a specific example, the dispatch of the five best students at present to
take the substystem operators specialization course is cited as an example. All
of the expenditures will be covered by this agency (NORAD). The decision to
send them there, moreover, was the result of an offer by that agency.

54

Underground Cable Sector Course

Another course, for underground cable operators, is also planned for this
year. It is scheduled to begin within the next few months. It is designed
for enterprise workers only, and financing will be provided by the ENEL
[National Electric Power Agency], an Italian enterprise in the electrical
sector.

As the EDM source explained, this enterprise proposes to provide aid ranging
from materials to advisers and other requirements.

The training of cadres for this sector is regarded as of primary importance,
based on the fact that at present only the city of Maputo has trained workers
for the sector, and in limited numbers even so.

It is with this in mind that the workers who will take the course will be
selected throughout the country.

It is hoped that by the middle of May, the documents for acceptance in this
course will be ready. The course is scheduled to begin immediately after the
end of the specialization course for substation worker-technicians.

Smoothing the Edges

The training of cadres in the EDM through programs conceived for the purpose
began in 1981, with the first operation of the center for the purpose. From
then until the present, clearly defined goals have been achieved thanks to
the efforts made by the leadership in the sector, in particular where the
organizational aspects are concerned.

"We have been following the training process step by step, and there is even
efficient coordination between us and a project official on the level of the
support bodies, as is the case with the NORAD,” our interlocutor told us in
this connection. He noted however that the greatest difficulty faced by the
Vocational Training Center is, on the one hand, the lack of teaching mater-
ials and, on the other, space, which is increasingly inadequate as the need
augments.

5157
CSO 3442/344

55

MOZAMBIQUE

URBAN GREEN ZONES TO INCREASE FOOD PRODUCTION
Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Apr 84 p l

[Text] In order to intensify the organization process in the green zones
sector and guarantee that the urban districts will be used as a basis for
planning and the production of foodstuffs to supply the city, the agrarian
institutes have just been strengthened with technical cadres capable of
dynamizing crop and small animal species production in the capital of the
country. This measure was announced yesterday at a meeting Maputo City
Executive Council President Alberto Massavanhane had with the administrators
of the urbandistricts and the new cadres assigned during this process.

The majority of these cadres are individuals with higher agrarian training
and individuals with experience and a reasonable approach to farm production
in the cooperative, family and private sectors. Their appointment comes
within the current stage of reorganization of the green zones as such, with a
view to ensuring the harmonious development of the sector.

Combatting Hunger

As Alberto Massavanhane stressed at the meeting, this action comes within the
general process of urban development organization based on the new adminis-
trative division. It is designed to involve the green zones more actively
and to equip them better so that, through intensified support of the agrarian
institutes, they can more effectively direct the productive units, thus
making it possible to derive the maximal yield from the resources available
in the urban districts.

Alberto Massavanhane spoke of the need to reactivate production of truck
garden crops, fruits, grain and beans and the raising of small animal
species, in order to raise the protein content of the diet of the people
within the process of combatting hunger.

"On this matter, the concern of the party and the government isto raise the
organizational level of the green zones such as to be able to involve all of
the urban districts in our city more actively in this process of producing
food to reduce hunger," this official said.

On the basis of this concern, the present priority is to guarantee that the
existing potential can be realized in tangible fashion in terms of more food
for the people produced by the people themselves on the basis of the urban
districts, either in the cooperative, family or private sectors.

56

Reorganization of the Green Zones

All of this effort is based on the reorganization of the green zones them-
selves, the director of this body, Jorge Tembe, stressed when he spoke at the
meeting: "On the central level of the green zones' office, it has become
necessary to create a strong, dynamic and functional structure capable of
guaranteeing all of the support needed by the agrarian institutes," Jorge
Tembe emphasized.

As a means of promoting production activity in the urban districts, follow-
ing the bad weather phenomena (drought and floods) Maputo has suffered, a
survey has become necessary, to be jointly coordinated with the recovery
activities to be carried out immediately. Another later measure to be
adopted, in coordination with the districts themselves, should be a survey of
the potential to be found in each zone, in order to determine to what point
rational utilization can be effected.

New Cadres

On the basis of the new administrative division, the city of Maputo has a
total of eight urban districts, covering the Inhaca, Catembe, Matola,
Laulane, and Mahotas districts and others around the city.

With the exception of the urban and suburban areas, where in addition to the
raising of small animal species, the type of crop production to be intensi-
fied will be studied, but not until later, the activity now being pursued is
limited to the surrounding areas.

In this connection, the following directors of agrarian institutes were
appointed:

Urban District No 1 (Catembe)--Agronomical Engineer Gertrudes Mavie; Urban
District No 4 (Laulane and Mahotas)--Agronomical Engineer Maria do Ceu; Urban
District No 4 (Jardim)--Mario Alves; Urban District No 6 (Benfica)--Dionisio
Mavie; Urban District No 7 (Machava)--Agronomical Engineer Marina Pancas; and
Urban District No 8 (Matola)--Liuzi Domenico.

5157
CSO: 3442/344

57

MOZAMBIQUE

DEPARTMENT FOR TRAINING METEOROLOGICAL EXPERTS PLANNED
Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Apr 84 p 8

[Text] A study with a view to the establishment of a vocational training
department has just been drafted by the Meteorological Service of Mozambique,
in order to be able to meet the qualifaction levels required for the sector
on the international level. This project will only be viable if, because of
its importance, it wins support from information bodies.

On the basis of information provided to NOTICIAS by Sergio Ferreira, an
official of the Meteorological Service of Mozambique, what is wanted with the
establishment of the vocational training department, the executive vehicle
for the process of training meteorological technicians, is the definition of
an overall and permanent training policy, duly structured.

The main concern in connection with this goal is the pursuit of training and
qualification activities for cadres in this sector, while guaranteeing peri-
odic retraining of the technical cadres for the Meteorological Service of
Mozambique.

On the other hand, Sergio Ferreira said, the curricula should be oriented
toward training on various vocational levels, standardizing the guidelines of
the Secretariat of State for Technical Education with those of the World
Meteorological Organization, so that the technicians will be trained in
accordance with international standards.

"In order to improve the capacity of the Meteorological Service of Mozambique
to respond to the need, this project will be oriented toward training based
on the vocational profiles for the sector in terms of the curricula of the
World Meteorological Orbanization. We also plan to introduce vocational
training courses linking the technical with the practical such as to be able
to train cadres with the internationally required qualification levels,"
Sergio Ferreira said.

NOTICIAS further learned that within this framework, only specific training
for the careers of meteorology and geophysics will be provided. The training
of cadres for the administrative technical support sector will be provided by
other bodies pursuing activities in this field.

58

Adapting Training to National Development

By the end of this decade, the Meteorological Service of Mozambique wil! need
200 employees at secondary level stations in the meteorological sector (ele-
mentary level) and !.: weather observers (middle level). On the higher
level, the enterprise needs 50 working meteorologists (baccalaureate level)
and 15 meteorologists with diplomas.

"In the geophysical sector, we need 42 geophysical observers on the middle
level and 10 working geophysicists on the higher level (baccalaureate), as
well as four geophysicists with diplomas," Sergio Ferreira said.

We were also informed that general training in meteorology will be provided,
with orientation toward certain fields assigned priority, such as aviation
meteorology, climatology, aerology and agrometeorology.

Sergio Ferreira said that, in a second phase, the possibility of some
specialties will be contemplated. On the basis of the priority assigned, the
training of cadres specializing in agrometeorology will be pursued. Only
observers with 2 years’ experience or more will qualify for the specializa-
tion courses.

According to this source, courses will be offered every 2 years between 1984
and 1988, and beginning in that latter year, regular courses will be offered
in accordance with the need, not only to maintain the qualification of the
cadres but also to keep up with the development of the sector.

5157
CSO: 3442/344

59

MOZAMBIQUE

PRODUCTION SCHOOL PLANNED FOR SALAMANGA
Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Apr 84 p 8

[Text] Construction work is scheduled to begin soon on the production school
planned for the Salamanga zone in the district of Matutuine. Currently,
preparations are already rather well advanced, and plans call for the drill-
ing of a well to supply the future school with water. According to Brigit
Holm, the representative of the People to People Aid and Development Organ-
ization (ADPP), the institution sponsoring the project, the materials needed
for the main project will be prepared simultaneous with the drilling of the
well.

In a project begun about a month ago, 2 hectares for the growing of tomatoes
were prepared and planted, and preparations are planned for the planting of 8
hectares of kale. Part of both the tomato and kale production will be sold
since, Brigit Holm said, the school will need to purchase various materials.
The money obtained from the sale of these commodities will go basically to
cover these expenditures.

The preparations for the construction of the school were begun about a month
ago. At that time, a team of 20 Danes from the People to People Aid and
Development Organization paid a visit to the site where the school will be
built. Together with another group of 20 future students, they launched the
production activities.

The ADPP representative informed us that another group of 20 Danes from that
organization has already arrived in Maputo. This group will remain in our
country for 6 months, the period during which construction of the schools
should be completed.

Meanwhile, the selection of students for the future school has been begun.
This activity is being coordinated by the OJM [Mozambique Youth Organiza-

tion] structures in the city of Maputo and the party committee on the city
level.

"The number of students who will attend the school is 30, half of them from
the OJM in the capital, while the other half will be selected by the district
structures," this same source said.

60

Construction Along With Study

The production school, which will be located at the Salamanga State Farm
Enterprise, our interlocutor reported, will train cadres in four specialties:
construction, carpentry, mechanics and agriculture.

The fact that the school will be built in connection with one of the study
phases merits special mention. Brigit Holm explained that this means that
"the future students--those pursuing the carpentry specialty, for example--
will work alongside the teachers in this area in producing the window frames
and sashes, doors, etc.

"The same will be the case with the construction students, because it is they
who will do the building. Where the students in mechanics are concerned, the
Salamang@ Farm Enterprise has some inoperative tractors. Thus the future
mechanics will work on the repair of this and other machinery, obviously,”
Brigit Holm said.

Also in connection with the initial work of preparation, we learned that
ground is being prepared for raising tomatoes, sweet potatoes and lettuce.
Some difficulties, mainly caused by the recent rains, are being encountered
in the production work. In the view of the ADPP representative, "the soil is
rather heavy, but despite this we are proceeding with the work.”

5157
CSO: 3442/244

61

NAMIBIA

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, PROBLEMS THAT FOLI.OW LIBERATION VIEWED

Bloemfontein DIE VOLKSBLAD in Afrikaans 4 Mar 84 p 13
[Article by Dawid J. Vermeulen: "“SWA in its Dilemma of Liberation"”]

[Text] South Africa is working purposefully at beginning
to extricate its hands economically from SWA. This results
in heavy demands on the area's own means, and considerable
development is thus of great importance. A civil engineer
from SWA, Mr Dawid J. Vermeulen, looks in this article at
particular stumbling blocks in the road to development.

An engineer and an architect were sitting on the same airplane, on their way
to the same construction project in the backveld of SWA. The engineer was
going in order to inspect the headway made in laying piping to a block of
washrooms. The architect was going in order to present plans for the expansion
of the complex of buildings. A part of these plans included the demolition
of these very washrooms.

This type of contradiction characterizes tke development of SWA rather well.
Such situations arise due to the lack of coordination between the various
agencies involved in the development campaigns.

On the eve of its liberation, SWA is already entrapped in the dilemma into
whici a number of countries fall only after independence. The development
possibilities of the area are intertwined in contradictory planning campaigns
which are being pursued by the multitude of second-level institutions.

Moreover, SWA has developed out of balance over a specific period of time
because the emphasis has been on civil engineering work at the expense of
developments in the social needs of the population. It was not until around
1980 that a turmaround took place and the emphasis began to fall on creating
schools, hospitals, sewage disposal works and water rirveyance, projects
that are more labor intensive than the highly mechanized construction of
roads and airports.

Because of the shift in emphasis, heavy engineering equipment at a value of
some 24 million rands is practically unused, but the government has nonethe-
less budgeted for the acquisition of heavy engineering construction equipment.

By renting out the available unused equipment to the private sector, consider-
able savings could be effected, while this could greatly help the construction
industry, which is going through a crisis.

A further problem is the lack of routine maintenance of completed projects.
Black Africa is full of monumental projects which do not work because there
has not been proper maintenance. Disrepair is the order of the day in Africa,
even with less sophisticated assets, such as roads.

Overloading

In SWA, the north-south lifeline is subjected to excessive axle weight, as

if its carrying capacity is unlimited. The replacement value of SWA's asphalt
roads is today approximately a billion rands and it will cost approximately
300,000 rands to build one kilometer of asphalt road. Because of the over-
loading of the raods, large amounts will be necessary to keep the north-

south lifeline in reasonable condition for use.

Better maintenance is necessary, and SWA can benefit from it greatly if the
transiti.n is made early to contract maintenance, rather chan doing it through
government departments. If this is not seized upon early, it may develop into
the area's Archille's heel.

Unemployment

The vested interest of the fragmented population in maintajning small ethnic
authorities with their own administrations also provides stumbling blocks

in the road to proper development, development in which use is made of labor
intensive methods, not only to involve the community in development, but
also to combat unemployment and to increase skills through on-the-job
training.

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63

NAMIBIA

REPUBLIKEIN COMMENT ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Damara Departure from MPC
Windhoek DIE REPUBLIKEIN in Afrikaans 3 Apr 84 p 4
[Editorial: "Stays Offsides"}

[Text] The more the Damara Council tries to give reasons for its withdrawal
from the VPK [Multi-Party Conference], the more blurred the affair becomes.

Mr Justus Garoeb says that his party has no quarrels with the VPK, but he
had to withdraw from it because the VPK has infringed upon the mandate of
the Damara Council.

This may well be, but why did Mr Garoeb not issue warnings within the VPK

in time? As long as he sat there @greeing, everyone must have indeed been
under the impression that it was in accordance with the "mardate" of the Damara
Council. Isn't it so? The VPK leaders certainly cannot read minds:

SWAPO did not attack the Damara Council, because that organization saw that
the Damara Council is fighting a fair fight, Mr Garoeb said.

{fs SWAPO fighting just such a "fair fight?" And is it fair to say one week
that there is no talk of a breakaway from the VPK, and then the following to
turn to such a step?

We are afraid that Mr Garoeb is playing out the game in an offsides position!
Savimbi Role

Windhoek DIE REPUBLIKEIN in Afrikaans 3 Apr 84 p 4

[Editorial: "Right Note’

[Text] Dr Jonas Savimbi unmistakeably did not hit a false note when he

pointed out over the weekend that the independence of SWA/Namibia is most

closely connected with a settlement in Angola.

It is simply a fact that the Cubans are in Angola for ideological reasons.
They form a part of the Russian attack on Angola. And in addition, SWAPO,

64

which is an organization connected with SWA, is likewise under the thumb of
the Russians.

Where does the assertion of free will for the people of SWA enter in? And this
is what is at stake since the days of the Mandate Agreement.

The exercise of South-West Africans' right to self-determination is not pos-
sible as long as there is a new colonial danger assembling at our borders.
For that reason, Angola must come clean--clean of Cubans and Russians and
also clean of terrorists.

The MPLA government of Angola will have to recognize quite clearly one truth,
and that is that its only chance for survival is together with Savimbi, and
not against Savimbi.

The MPLA is welcome to learn this lesson from the SWA people, parties and
leaders.

In this country, it has long since become clear that the population groups
and the political parties are one another's best allies; there can be no
friends better than those tied to you by blood and soil.

But the MPLA apparently does not yet grasp this essential truth. And this
is the basis of Dr Savimbi's appeal that negotiations with UNITA must be
carried out for the sake of the Angolan people.

Savimbi's vision includes a double process of peaceful negotiation: one in
SWA/Namibia and one in Angola. And in neither of these two countries is

there room for military intervention from outside.

It is indeed crystal clear that no democracy can be achieved unless intimi-
dation and domination through violence are done away with.

However, the irony of the matter, as has often been pointed out, is that Angola,
which was an important factor in a peaceful settlement in SWA, has itself
never had a free election. Wherever it talks about a free election in Namibia,
it is speaking out on a matter which it fears as much as the devil.
South-West Africans cannot count on such a cloudy judgment.
Attitudes of Namibia Leaders
Windhoek DIE REPUBLIKEIN in Afrikaans 26 Mar 84 p 6
[Editorial: "Leadership"]
[Text] Moses Katjiuongua and Andreas Shipanga have [word or words missing]
last week as it befits political leaders, and this is to say candidly what

must be said. Fearlessly. And without first looking to see whether someone
else's sensitive toes are accidently being stepped on.

65

As opposed to this candor, which makes politics into a rough game, there were
also in SWA politics the guack politicians, who always tried to patch every-
thang up. And that is no good.

A leader who strongly and forthrightly marks a course runs the risk that he
sometimes loses some of his people. Sometimes it is necessary for him, for the
sake of his convictions, to even break away from the old-established world in
which he has long been living.

It was not many years ago that a certain Dirk Mudge had to take such a step.
It would certainly not be easy. But it was necessary; it was for the sake of
SWA/Namibia of the utmost importance.

And so there are several other leaders in our SWA politics who at a particular
moment had to pursue a course different from the one on which they had long
been moving.

Take, for example, the late Clemens Kapuuo.

When he saw that new circumstances bring new hope, he did not hesitate to
make an adjustment and to help in the building of something that this country
had never had before.

Perhaps this attitude among our political leadership is the biggest reason
for the successes which have been achieved in rebuilding the political struc-
tures of the country. Perhaps this is also one of the most important reasons
why changes in our community life were able to take place so quickly over

the last 10 years.

It is indeed a bloodless revolution which has taken place here; things have
happened that quickly.

And where the times again demand rapid progress, there is no getting around
the fact that political leaders often must move quickly where other people
would be afraid to even budge an inch.

What gratifies the people of SWA/Namibia the most is that their leaders
are not open to bribery or threats. No political leader who is trusted by
his people needs to beg from another political figure, or depend on his
charity.

Sam Nujoma and company are welcome to take note of this.
We will provide for our own leaders; they need not depend on second-hand
money smuggled in here by the Marxists, the World Council of Churches or

the UN via Nujoma.

We know only too well that that little stream of money will very quickly dry
up after the radicals have achieved their goal.

Why then have so many other African states become impoverished?

66

Why are Angola and Mozambique not swimming in money? Why do their leaders
no longer have the foreign wealth that Nujoma has?

When poverty arrives, it hits hardest the man who has eaten out of Russia's
hand.

We and our leaders would rather be, as Katuutire Kaura put it, thin and free
than fat and enslaved.

Moreover, Nujoma's slaves will not be fat, nor will they be free.

As long as SWA's leaders are strong and honest, they can be sure that they
have the power of the people behind then.

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67

SENEGAL

PDS GENERAL SECRETARY A. WADE ON FUTURE PLANS FOR GOVERNING
Dakar WAL FADJRI in French 27 Apr-1 Jun 84 pp 12-15

[Interview with PDS General Secretary Abdoulaye Wade by Hassan Toure with the
assistance of Ruben Biyick (BINGO) and Sidi Lamine Niasse (WAL FADJRI); date
and place of interview not specified]

[Text] The political climate of today's Senegal is highly agitated. With the
balance of trade still showing a large deficit, plus the drought, the keenest
anxieties have gripped every Senegalese. All opposition political groups
agree that a change is necessary, but what kind of a change?

To learn more about what these various parties propose, we are starting a new
section: "It Is up to You, Gentlemen, To Govern." The purpose of this new
section is to establish the policy of the party invited to express its views,
if its leader were elected president of the Republic of Senegal.

In this setting, we interviewed Mr Abdoulaye Wade, national general secretary
of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), as he was the first to respond to
our invitation,

[Question] Abdoulaye Wade, if you were elected president, what would be the
primary concerns of your government?

[Answer] Feeding the people, thus bringing in rice and selling it much cheaper,
and at the same price in both Dakar and the interior of the country. I will
eliminate the 20 percent tax per kilogram of peanuts formerly levied on farmers.
I will also abolish the poll tax on farmers, since the farmer's real income
should be taxed. My government will implement these measures within 2 months.

[Question] Can we expect a major change from the present government's domestic
policy and the one that you will establish?

[Answer] First of all, the conditions should be created for the recovery of
Senegal, which is on its knees and overindebtec; we have had to make a third
rescheduling of payments within the Club of Paris and another rescheduling of
the private debt of the Club of London.

68

I will assemble all political parties for a roundtable discussion, for above
all, my government's recovery plan is political rather than economic, in view
of the fact that 40 percent of annual export revenues must be spent for the
foreign debt, which is 650 billion CFA frances.

I should nevertheless tell you that the criterion for a political party is not
only the people, but the nature of the party and what it wishes to do. Discus-
sion with other parties does not mean that my government does not have the
solution; on the contrary.

I will establish a national commission for recovery, which will have the
mission of providing all of the parties participating in the discussion with
a recovery plan, which shall lead to a government program affecting all sectors.

I will appeal to some political parties in my future government, and to others,
to support the overall program. Indispensable measures include those having
to do with the life of political parties and trade unions.

I intend to reestablish the conditions of democracy. Thus a national commis-
sion for formulating an election code will be established so that there will
be no more election disputes.

In the process, I will help the political parties contributing to the expres-
sion of national opinion and which are liaisons between the government and the
people. Political practices must be cleaned up.

I have no intention at all, for example, of imprisoning those who have diverted
public funds, quite simply because circumstances must be taken into account.

On the other hand, I will take future measures for administrative control,
which will make such diversions of funds impossible.

[Question] You plan to work together with all parties and even with the
current government's party. Considering the famous plan of the Front of
Rejection, however, don't you think that could revive that unsuccessful
situation?

[Answer] As I see it, it is my party's duty to call on others to support my
government's policy, although with the agreement that we will have formulated
the government's program together. And in doing so, my government will be
obliged to apply that program strictly, otherwise the endorsing parties will
be free to withdraw.

The Front of Rejection was comprised of 11 parties right after the elections
and they made postelection political demands; this is in no way comparable to

the present situation.

[Question] Does this mean that you are going to establish a government of
national union?

[Answer] Absolutely.

69

[Question] In exactly what context are you going to appeal to the other
parties? Isn't that a sign of weakness?

[Answer] When you ask a nation to sacrifice, you have to come to terms with
the largest possible number of citizens.

Let us suppose that I form a homogeneous government and we make decisions,
of course, but we cannot expect those decisions to be supported by other
parties which could oppose us.

But since we have assured all political parties of a fair and democratic fight,
I think that we can obtain some sort of consensus, some sort of social peace
(social contract). The problem is that we have to make sacrifices to pay our
debts.

[Question] Will the constitution remain unchanged, in particular with the
defunct Article 35 and the law reducing the term of office of the president
of the assembly?

[Answer] In this regard, we have included a constitutional revision in my
government's plans. I will have to again consult with the other parties and
submit this new constitution to a public referendum. There are fundamental
issues on which Senegalese do not agree, just to mention Article 35 as an
example. Consultation with the people on a number of problems is necessary.

[Question] Do you plan to change the law on the secularity of the government?

[Answer] There is a great deal of confusion surrounding the notion of secular-
ity. Secularism is a christian notion: that is, the government must not be
dependent on religion. Today, separation of church and state is what is meant
by secularism.

Secularism is not an antireligious concept. Nor is it a concept that is
totally neutral on religion. It is a notion that evolved from a religious
and sectarian concept. If we have gotten to the point of secularity, it is
because it was demanded by an historic evolution (the Revolution of 1789).

This does not mean that the theoretical existence of an Islamic state must be
rejected: that is, ruling out the possibility for Moslems to arrive at a
notion of secularity by starting out from an Islamic concept, a notion of
secularity that is comparable to the secularity derived from christianity,
that is, comparable to the concept of a state that is dependent on a religious
denomination.

However, christian secularism must not be carried over to the level of an
Islamic state, but it must be acknowledged that the concept of an Islamic state
could evolve to arrive it that notion. As for me, I share that philosophy.

Otherwise we will arrive at a situation in which the marabout will necessarily
be the "chief of state” because his conduct is necessarily preferable as a
chief of state. If that situation occurs in Senegal, the chief of state will
be the ore who interprets the religion best.

70

As for me, my government and I will construct a secular state guaranteeing
the independence of the state and religion. Of course, that will not prevent
me from giving my children a religious education, just as others will do.

[Question] [by] BINGO (a monthly published in Paris): What do you think about
the rise of religious fundamentalism, especially in Senegal?

[Answer] I draw a distinction between mysticism and fundamentalism. I have

a lot of respect for mysticism, which is a valid refuge with God. All of the
Senegalese people's current problems are favorable to the development of
mysticism. As for fundamentalism ... I ask myself this question: does funda-
mentalism really exist in Senegal? The more I note that there is a development
of mysticism, the more uncertain I am that fundamentalism, as it is defined,
exists in Senegal.

[Question] Isn't it time to establish a reconciliation with the people on whom
secularity has been imposed and who firmly believe in Islam as a plan of society?

[Answer] I wasn't elected on the basis of an Islamic platform, but rather on
the platform of the PDS. I was elected because I am a layman and that is very
significant. A distinction must be made between Islam and the "Islamic church,"
that is, a distinction between Islam as a religion and as a philosophy, which,
in its pure state, is a repository of fundamental, reliable values, of certain
social institutions that are very debatable, as are their sociological features
in the Islam of Senegal or elsewhere. Islam's sociopolitical trappings vary
according to the country.

[Question] Islam is not only a collection of cultural practices: it is also
a plan of society, the best suited for mobilizing the masses in Senegal and in
strongly Islamicized countries. It has rigid rules, on one hand, and on the
other it has others that are flexible and change according to time and space.
But if we understand you correctly, it is this Islamic plan of society which
you question, as does the current president, who has his own definition of
secularity. Yet your concerns with regard to a multidenominational society

in Senegal are resolved by Islam, which is a tolerant religion by nature.

In view of all that, what is your idea of secularity and do you think that
institutions can be Islamicized in order to conform to the will of the people?

[Answer] I don't believe that it is necessary to Islamicize institutions.

I am the first one in all of Africa to have tried to draw inspiration from
religion as a philosophy of development. I wrote an economic brochure on
Mouridism, being a member of that religious brotherhood and a believer in its
values ... thus I am obliged to draw inspiration from religion.

The peoples who are mainly Moslem must be mobilized, but going from there to
the Islamicization of institutions is a big step! And then Senegal is a multi-
denominational country; there aren't only Moslems, even if they are the most
numerous--we represent 95 percent, perhaps more--but I don't believe that is
a reason....

71

I still adhere to Bamba's message, that people must be convinced through per-
suasion rather than imposing a religion on them from above! Setting up an
Islamic state and obliging the christians, the animists and all the rest to
conform isn't right, first of all, I think....

[Question] I think that you are well aware of Islam's view on this issue.
Your secularity does not differ from that of the present government, which
has its own concept of it.

[Answer] Listen, it's possible that I agree with or that I support the same
view of secularity as the government of Abdou Diouf or of Senghor. It's also
possible that my views coincide with their on other issues ... since these are
things that they did not invent. All that dates back very far, to the 18th
and 19th centuries.

[Question] What are the main features of your foreign policy?

[Answer] In the case of foreign policy, my government will support African
nationalist policy. For us, nationalism and pan-Africanism mean belief in

and priority for African values. We must first rely on our own resources,

on what we have, on our people and on Africa. In our foreign policy, there
are priorities, the first of which remains African unity, for which we will
sacrifice everything.

We want a confederation of united African states and from today on I will strive
to convince my counterparts in West Africa to bring this about. It won't be
like the Malian Federation, either in form or composition.

The presidency of this federation will be filled in an alternating fashion in
its initial stage and we will establish three or four joint ministries. Among
others, a ministry of information, telecommunications and education.

This is the only reliable foundation that we can leave to our children. I will
recommend to the OAU chairman the creation of a number of structures on the
continental scale, in particular certain professional schools or certain
services of a continental nature.

I will make everything subordinate to strengthening the CEAO and ECOWAS. With
regard to Europe, my government will seek to reduce dependence on all countries
that dominate us politically or economically.

Of course, we can be independent only by paying our debts. My government is
in favor of increasing trade on a basis of respect and equality with all coun-
tries of Europe, America and elsewhere.

{Question} Do you plan to revise your policy concerning Europe?
[Answer] The government that I will establish will be a regime whose main aim

in foreign affairs will be independence and control of our economy and our
resources.

[Question] What will happen to bilateral relations between Dakar and Paris?

[Answer] It is essential that we stop thinking of Paris as the capital of
Senegal or of Africa. Progress toward African unity requires the construction
of road infrastructures and the development of telecommunications.

It is misleading to talk about African unity when you can't get in a car and
travel to Bamako, Conakry or elsewhere in Africa. I urge all African chiefs
of state to build roads up to the border of each of our adjacent countries and
to develop trade.

[Question] What are the main axes on which your economic program will hinge?

[Answer] My government will carry out a revolution in this regard. Senegal's
development has been based on industry that encourages further borrowing and,
naturally, creates some jobs. Full employment for Senegalese lies in agri-
culture. My government will tackle the problem of finding enough water for
irrigation and to enable farmers to grow crops at all times, which will make
it possible to assure food self-sufficiency as well as food independence.

Only agricultural development can reduce economic dependence. We will create
national industries. We will deliberately give preference to national corpora-
tions. We will take measures so that 80 percent of our capital is held in
Senegal and by Senegalese.

[Question] What solution do you recommend concerning Senegal's indebtedness?

[Answer] There aren't several ways to pay off the foreign debt; it can only
be paid by producing and exporting. We must develop export crops.

[Question] What would be the best strategy?

[Answer] The foreign debt must be reduced. Mv government will simply halt
foreign borrowing. We import 400,000 tons of rice from abroad; by promoting
this crop, we can reduce our rice imports by 25 to 75 percent, which will save
us money. We will also have to vary our diet, which is based particularly on
rice.

We will take the country's trade balance and reduce all major imports. We
will terminate relations with the IMF.

PDS Press Conference: Four PDS Proposals Concerning Situation in Casamance

On 18 April at the party's headquarters in Dakar, Mr Abdoulaye Wade met with
the domestic and international press. Once again the Casamance problem was
brought up, this time with the proposals of the PDS, which believes it can
restore peace in Casamance.

The party's proposals hinge on four points: the surrender of arms to authori-
ties by independence advocates, total amnesty, the withdrawal of law enforcement
forces and maintaining them at a normal level, and guarantees that the will of
the majority will be respected in parties and on the national level.

11915 73
CSO: 3419/627

SOUTH AFRICA

DETENTION DEATHS; EDITORIAL POLICY DISCUSSED

Johannesburg SASH in English Feb 84 p 1

[Editorial ]

[Text ]

ince Dr Neil Aggett died on February 5, 1982, four others have died in detention:
Ernest Dipale, Simon Tembuise Mndawa, Paris Malatje and Samuel Tshikudo.

Public outrage is minimal when little-known people die in detention and when this hap-
pens it is our duty to protest that much more vigorously.

Already there are different lists, all over the place, of those who died in detention. This
would not be so if proper attention, and, may we say, proper respect, had followed each
eerie and horrible detention death. We have all been remiss in that there are no published
photographs or biograpies of many of the 56 men who have died since the 1962 amendment
to the General Laws Amendment Act.

We are grateful to the Rand Daily Mail for sending a reporter to Venda to interview the
family of Samuel Tshikudo who died there in January. We hope other newspapers will in
future follow this example; for as long as detention exists there will be death in detention
and those who are thus martyred should never be insulted with the kind of negligence
which turns them into mere statistics.

While remembering those who died in detention, let us never forgot those who are cur-
rently in detention, and therefore at risk.

owards the end of last year an American professor wrote to Sash to say that he had

been worried for some time about the direction the Black Sash was taking; that he
thought Solveig Piper’s article ‘Recession: capitalism to blame’ (vol 26 no 1, May 1983)
should never have been published in our magazine; true, there had been a replying article
but this had only been perfunctory: surely there was an editorial board which vetted Sash
articles, and would we take his name off our subscription list.

We believe the Professor’s criticism would have been more valid had he stood it on its
head, for we should be publishing much more of this sort of controversy.

The capitalist/socialist debate has many permutations and perhaps the greatest and most
significant point of stress is between social democrat and neo marxist. It has debilitated
political parties and human nghts organizations all over the world and we would be a poor
and half-dead lot if it didn’t affect us too. But it 1s unlikely to debilitate us. Fortunately we
don’t have the time to waste trying to resolve a possibly unresolvable argument (have a
look at Koestler’s theory of the ‘withering away of the dilemma’ on page 19) and in any case
we have become quite amiably expert at consensus over the years -— by not concealing dis-
agreemenis within our ranks.

74

CSO:

We haven't got an editorial board and only the editonal has to be approved by the na-
tional committee. Most articles flow directly from Black Sash activities but there are often
others which we believe will interest our readers but which by no means reflect ‘Black Sash
thinking’.

Recently we have encouraged debate in our columns, believing this should re-enforce
our habit of consensus: and although the more thoughtful articles are obviously the most
valuable, the present editor has a weakness for the odd slanging match, which she doesn’t
think does any harm but rather livens up the magazine.

There is, however, one issue that we do have to resolve at this year’s conference from
March 15—18 in Johannesburg. We shall have to define our relationship with the United
Democratic Front. Helen Zille has outlined the arguments for and against affiliation in a
careful article on page 21. Please read it before the conference.

Inevitably, whatever conference decides, many members will disagree. We ask of them
neither silence nor acquiescence, but just the usual hard work.

3400/978

RECRUITMENT STRATEGIES TO RESERVE, ALLOCATE LABOR ANALYZED

Johannesburg SASH in English Feb 84 pp 7-13

[Article by Marian Lacey:

[Text ]

There are no jobs here. What must we do? Our children
are starving... before we could look for work for
ourselves and then come back and join. We can’t do this
anymore since this independence thing. Some of us have
been waiting now for over a year... Things are getting
worse and worse... the only hope is for work on the
farms, not even the mines want us now.

(Interview: workseeker, Herschel district, October 1981)

n October 1981, when this interview was conducted,

South Africa was experiencing an unprecedented but
short-lived boom, a boom which barely affected recruii-
ment in the bantustans. If anyihing the position had wor-
sened. In the space of five years recruitment had drop-
ped by well over 850 000 registrations.

By mid 1982 a recession had set in leading to the re-
trenchment of tens of thousands of workers. An inestim-
able number found that when their contracts enced
these were not renewed. Retrenchments and dismissals
became the order of the day across the countrv and in al-
most all sectors.

Particular sectors hit were those employing large
numbers of contract workers. A brief survey of selected
headlines in 1982 gives a stark picture: Slump hits metal
workers; Sats (South African Travel Services) cuts no of
workers by 7 000 — thousands will loose jobs as reces-
sion takes its toll; Sats cutback on 20 000 jobs; East Rand
foundry to retrench 200; Benoni plant retrenches 600
workers; Lay offs sweep East Rand industry; 2 000 af-
fected in Anglo American coai mines; Iscors’ cream
souring — 10 000 workers to be slashed; 5 000 reduction
m Metal industry — unions fighting lay-offs; 1 000 work-

7s at Highveid steel; Union lashes motor plant over re-
trenchments — 800 Sigma men sacked; 39 workers re-
trenched Good-Year, Ford 507 workers in June, 1982;

SOUTH AFRICA

"Feudalism in the Age of Computers”]

Volkswagen retrench 315 workers ——- April 1982; 250
Leyland workers laid-off; Giant Chemical Group to re-
trench 500; 10 500 textile workers soon jobless; Garment
workers unite; Emplovees sacrifice jobs to save col-
leagues.

Add to this, the massive crackdown on ‘illegals’, the
continued and rising number of pass law arrests since the
moratorium in 1979; and the ruthless brutality used
against people said to be squatting illegally in urban
areas and a picture very different from the much
heralded ‘liberal reform era’ can be painted.

Essentially, what I hope to show in this paper, is that
Riekert’s proposed reforms with regard to urban blacks,
which occur alongside the continued mass relocation
scheme and the present tightening-up of labour recruit-
ment and control of bantustan residents, are not con-
tradictory, but part of a process of adapting the system of
labour control to meet specific interests and changing
economic, political and ideological circumstances.

Furthermore, I hope to show that the large reservoir
or reserve army of labour, which has been built up in the
bantustans, is and must be seen as an integral part of the
workforce and not a marginal category of unemployable
people beyond it. The streamling and tightening-up of
the labour allocation and recruitment system, as de-
scribed in this paper, must therefore be seen as part of
the State’s present concern to incorporate all workers
into a single integrated system of control.

The Riekert commission was appointed to carry out
this task. As Riekert in his Report has shown in great de-
tail and as subsequent steps taken have proved, what is
required is a far more complex and coercive system of al-
locating and reserving a supply of labour to different
categories of employer — defined variously by sector,
industry and location.

THE CONTRACTION AND RELOCATION OF
TRADITIONAL LABOUR POOLS

In the past decade an urgent need to devise new labour
strategies arose in response to increasing labour mili-
tancy and changed conditions for capital expansion in
Scuth Africa. This, along with both a massive cutback in
recruitment from South Africa’s neighbouring states
and the uprootal and removal of some 31/2 million Afn-
cans (SPP estimate) from so-called ‘white’ rural areas
and towns, served to disorganise capital’s traditional re-
serve army of labour. All sectors were equally affected
by the contraction and relocation of their traditional
labour pools as the following discussion makes clear.

a) Revised recruitment strategies in the mining
sector

The mines, in the wake of the withdrawal of 100 000
mineworkers by the Malawian government after the air-
crash in 1974 and the establishment of an avowedly Mar-
xist government ‘n Mozambique the following year, saw

77

a massive reduction in their recruitment of foreign inde-
ntured workers. Recruitment of foreign workers for all
sectors in 1974 dropped from a total of 763 674, of whom
231 666 and 227 619 were from Malawi and Mozambique
respectively, to 301 758 in 1981, of whom only 30 602
were Malawians and 59 391 Mozambicans. The Cham-
ber of Mines recruitment statistics for the period
1973-1979 illustrate the cutback in recruitment of
foreign indentured mineworkers, and the urgent need,
particularly between 1974 and 77, to replace those lost,
with local workers. The number of foreign workers on
the mines fell from just over 80% of the workforce in
1973 to barely 40% in 1979.

The urgency of the mines’ position was realised in
1976, when, despite the substantial wage increases after
1973 and accelerated unemployment in the wake of the
world-wide recession in 1974/75, the mines found they
were unabie to attract local workers. Only 4 000 novices
presented themselves in 1974 to replace the 100 000
Malawians ordered to leave by Banda in that year, while
overall recruitment suffered a shortfall of over 58 000
workers.

To break down traditional resistance of local workers
to minework, state intervention was essential. This took
various forms, the principal ones being: manipulation of
nationality, citizenship and immigration laws so as to
create an internal reserve of legally designated ‘foreign’
workers. As ‘foreigners’ they could be denied free access
to certain categones of work and so be channelled into
mining. In addition to this the state could also zone
labour supply areas from mine recruitment only, and in

so doing, build-up a reservoir of labour for the mines to
draw on. Once a district was unofficially zoned in this
way, categorization of workers in zoned districts became
possible and overtime, wastage, associated with the
training of novices, would be greatly reduced.

A variation on this method in use was through the
selective distribution of requisitions. Areas where the
mines recruited heavily were by-passed in the distribu-
tion of requisitions on the grounds, as one labour officer
in the Transkei put it, that, ‘we have to give all districts a
fair chance, so as requisitions are short we leave out min-
ing areas’. (Interview: labour officer Butterworth Oc-
tober 1981).

Over and above these measures, the Chamber of
Mines has also tightened-up on its own recruitment prac-
tices. In a bid to stabilize the local workforce, ‘bonus
cards’, pioneered by the Anglo American Group in the
60s, have been extended throughout the industry; all
mineworkers have been brought under a highly cen-
tralized system of computerized control enabling the
mines to determine the level of skill, experience and
work record of every worker in its employ.

With the steady implementation of these revised
strategies, Theba officials report that today they have
more than a 101% compliment and more in reserve.
‘Fences are being flattened’ and ‘gates are kept locked’
to keep out the hundreds of workers clamouring for
minework. (Giliomee 1982). As one senior Theba offi-
cial described the position:

Gone are the days of hectic active recruitment still

seen in '76. We are building up our local reservoir

of workers. They are accepting longer contracts, with

shorter rest periods between... In fact to be a mine

worker in the Transkei today, you are considered a

privileged person.

(Interview: Theba official Butterworth October 1981)

There is little doubt that the destitute conditions in the
bantustans, accelerated unemployment and better
wages on the mines, have helped to break down earlier
resistance to minework. But above all, it is argued, it is
the real absence of any choice, even in boom times,
which acts to secure an inexhaustible supply of labour
for the mines.

b) Revised recruitment strategies in the farming
sector

Not only the mines’ foreign reserve army was disor-
ganised by these events. In 1970, farmers were still re-
cruiting 45 000 workers from outside South Africa. By
1977 this number had dropped to 16 000 and with step-
ped-up security in the wake of increased ANC activity,
at the end of 1982 only 9 000 Mozambicans were given
permission to return to work on the farms.

Within South Afr:ca itself, the mass resettlement
scheme executed over the past two decades, has resulted
in the removal of an estimated 660 000 Africans from
white farms, while steady expropriation of ‘black-spot’
and ‘badly situated areas’, has resulted in the relocation
of a further 450 000 people from the ‘white’ areas. With
this mass relocation of former labour and cash tenants
and their families, farmers have had to shift from main-
taining the largest possible labour supply on the farm to
meet their variable labour requirements, to one of rely-
ing on a smaller core of permanently settled skilled
workers, supplemented by extensive recruitment of
casual/seasonal labour from the bantustans.

With the present oversupply of unskilled workers in
the bantustans, the farmers too have an inexhaustible
supply from which to draw on. If given the choice how-
ever, workseekers from the bantustans continue to resist
farm work. Resistance to low wages still paid by many
farmers and the fear of permanent classification in the
farm worker category were suggested as reasons why
some farmers still experience difficulty in securing a
steady supply of seasonal workers.

79

But many thousands more are gradually being denied
this choice. Evidence collected during extensive re-
search in the eastern Cape and Transvaal bantustans re-
vealed that a high correlation exists between the level of
destitution in a particular area and the type, and often
the absence of requisitions sent to those areas. In some
instances areas remote from either the labour bureau or
town were declared unofficially ‘closed’ to all recruit-
ment bar farming. The farmers have a field day in such
areas. They, or their private recruiting agents, are able
to move into such areas to pick up men, women and chil-
dren, and are assured of their suppiy. A worker whose
reference book was still endorsed ‘farm labour only’, de-
spite the fact that he had been relocated 10 years earlier
to Sada, described his position thus:

Before some of us here always worked on farms in
this area (Queenstown-Whittlesea)... then we were
moved here over ten years ago. We were forced to sell
our cattle and land to plough... In the first few years

after the farmers were finished with us, many of us
would get work for cash on the roads or the govern-
ment... now not even those jobs are for us... we must
just starve for the six months after they throw us back
here.

(Interview: Hewu labour office, February 1980)

Even workers relocated from the farms find them-
selves still tied to farm work, but immeasurably worse
off. Dispossessed of land, stock and wage contributions
from more than one member of the household under the
former labour tenancy system, once relocated, they re-
turn to the farms as ‘single’ workers and become sepa-
rated from their families, trapped as they are in the mig-
rant labour system. Seasonal work lasts only from a
three to six month period, so casual farm employees re-
main severely under-empioyed. Those who commute
daily to farms, as an ever increasing number do, are no
better off. Competition for jobs is intense in many areas
SO wages are low, some are even being forced to accept
payment in kind for their services. As one woman who
commutes daily to a tomato farm bordering the Lebowa
bantustan explained:

We women here and even our children are forced to
go and pick tomatoes on the farms nearby. What can
we do, there is ne other work for our men and even
the farmer doesn’t want them. If we work on the
farms we will maybe get some food and then we can
sell the tomatoes that the farmer uses to pay us.
Without this little bit our children wall starve.
(Interview Moketsi distnct, Lomondokop resettle-
ment area April 1982)

The Farm Labour Project in their submission to the
Manpower Commission reported conditions similar to
this in other commuter farm areas. As found elsewhere

casual workers were being paid a derisory wage of any-
thing from 50c to R1 a day. Men on the whole continue
to resist being forced into farm work, but for women,
trapped in the bantustans, who in the majority of in-
stances have no other source of income, there is no other
option but farm work. |
Clearly farmers have benefitted from the creation of
resettlement areas remote from towns or border indust-
rial growth points. This, alongside the trend to zone
labour supply areas for farm recruitment only, and the
more recent practice of setting up assembly points run by
administration board officials in mobile vans, rather
than widely dispersed tribal labour bureaux, has meant
that even fewer requisitions than in the past will ever
reach remote bantustan districts. In time, the farmers
too will be assured a steady stream of seasonal workers.

Attempts however, to secure a permanent core of
fuiltime wage labourers on the farms has proved far
more difficult. Although desertion to the towns has all
’ but stopped as a result of strict influx controls which pre-
vent farm workers from moving from non-prescribed (ie
rural) to prescribed urban areas, farmers complain that
many thousands more eventually get to the towns by first
relocating themselves to the bantustans. As early as 1964
attempts were made to solve this problem by creating a
separate rural and industnal stream along a non-pre-
scribed/prescribed divide. But as the Deputy Minister of
Bantu Administration and Development made clear in
1968, it was not the solution that was at fault, but the far-
mers’ failure to register all their employees. Opening the

Agricultural show at Middleburg he stated:

It is not only government policy that Bantu labourers
may not move from the farms to the urban areas to
work there, it is also clearly laid down in the relevant
regulations. The greatest difficulty, however, lies in
the execution of these regulations and here I fear large
sections of the farming community are making their
own labour positions more difficult as well as
complicating our task to prevent illegal infiltration
into the cities.

He then went on to detail how the system operates in
practice:

A record of every registered Bantu farm labourer in
your service is kept in a central register in Pretoria,
and the position is that the labourer cannot be
employed in the urban areas, because as soon as his
service contract must be registered, it will be estab-
lished that he is a farm labourer, and then he cannot
legally be taken into service. The whole control
machinery with reference to Bantu farm labourers
revolves therefore around the single cog of the
registration of each labourer in your service at your
local Bantu Affairs Commissioners’ office.

81

This exact system is still in operation today, but far -
more efficiently run. Not only have farmers been com-
pelled to expel all surplus workers, labour tenant and
Squatters thus simplifying the registration procedure,
but all workers have now been brought under com-
puterized control. So even farm workers who try to get
to the towns via the bantustan escape route could find in
the future that their former ‘farm labour only’ classifica-
tion is a bar to other work. Far more research in this area
will have to be done to establish this trend with any cer-
tainly, but as far as fulltime farm workers are concerned,
it is suggested that with their numbers rapidly shrinking
attempts will be made to ‘Riekertize’ their position in a
bid to stabilize a permanently settled core of more skil-
led farm workers needed on highly mechanized and agri-
business farms.

c) Revised recruitment strategies in the manufac-
turing sector

Revisions in the labour system have also been demanded
by the manufacturing sector — especially its most capital
intensive multi-national component with its growing de-
mand for a skilled and stabilized workforce.

Thus, combined with growing worker militancy and
popular struggles against the degraded living and work-
ing conditions of urban workers, necessitated a revised
strategy towards Africans who qualify for permanent re-
sidence rights.

The revised strategy, embodied in Riekert’s propos-
als, aimed firstly to reduce rigidities in the labour supply
by allowing section 10 rights to be exercised throughout
urban areas as Jong as employment and housing are av-
ailable and secondly to move away from a system based
on race and control via the police, blackjacks and pro-
secution of pass offenders, to one based on citizenship
and control by employers and registered house owners/
tenants. An extension of these controls will be the con-
tinued deprivation of citizenship via ‘independence’ of
the bantustans; and critical to these moves is the need to
bring all workers inder computerized control. Hence
the crackdown on ‘i'legals’ through the 1979 moratorium
which put the onus on employers to ‘register’ workers as
section 10d workers on contract under threat of a R500
fine.

Similarly the Crossroads ‘concessions’ brought people
under control since they had to register to claim entitle-
ment to jobs and housing. Nyanga shows the other side
of the coin, as immigration laws were invoked to expel
those who were said to be ‘foreigners’ from the ‘indepen-
dent’ bantustan in the Transkei.

Further, the use of housing as an instrument of control
has been refined by the decision to make house-owner-
ship under 99-year leasehold a condition of urban sec-
urity. Proof of approved accommodation is thus being

selectively used in various ways: first to shunt the poor
and the economically inactive (in state parlance the
‘superflous appendages ) out of the urban areas; second
as a means to further reduce social costs by shifting the
cost of reproducing labour-power away from the wage
packet to workers and their families living in the bantus-
tans. Third, to further reduce the number qualifying for
section 10 rights by transforming as many people as pos-
sible into ‘frontier commuters’; and last, by encouraging
house-ownership. Not only is the state trying to foster the
growth of a stable ‘middle class’, but a docile working
class as well. In the case of the latter, once in occupation
of houses built, subsidized or financed by loans by their
employers, their dismissal could mean eviction and then
endorsement out of town. The government’s current
programme to sell off 500 000 housing units, will win

much sought-after secunty for the more affluent urban
resident, but for the homeless and poor the consequ-
ences will be disastrous.

These proposed reforms are to be extended to a mere
5 300 000 urban Africans who qualify for section 10
rights and who can afford to maintain them. Equally im-
portant, they must be seen as being inextricably linked
to measures geared to ensure the efficient exploitation
and control of bantustan dwellers who have been denied
even these few concessions. Urban gains are thus at the
expense of the majonity of Africans condemned to live in
destitute bantustans.

The manipulation of citizenship and immigration
laws as an instrument for allocating and reserving
labour

By December 1981, with the granting of ‘independence’
to the Ciskei bantustan, all Xhosa-Tswana and Venda-
speaking people had been deprived of their South Afn-
can citizenship. In the space of five years, eight million
South African were declared legal ‘foreigners’ — aliens
in the country of their birth.

The numbers game has undoubted political and
ideological advantages for the white minority in South
Africa, whose fear of black majority rule ts legion. This
deprivation of millions of South Africans of their citizen-
ship must also be seen as a ‘non-negotiable’ aspect of
South Africa’s present policy which aims to create an
ethnically based pe)litical partition of South Africa along
either federal or confederal lines. (H Zille, Sars, 1982).
Connie Mulders’ classic formulation in 1978 spells out
the ultimate fate of all Afncans in South Afnmica. In this
he stated: ‘If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion
as far as black people are concerned there will be not one
black man with South African citizenship... Every black
man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in
some independent new state in this honourable way and
there will no longer be a moral obligation in this Parlia-
ment to accommodate these people politically.’ (quoted
in Zille ibid.)

83

But what of the State’s economic and social obliga-
tions? How does the loss of citizenship and the manipu-
lation of immigration laws have any bearing on the re-
vised system of labour reservation and allocation?

Winterveld may be characterised as a squatter/com-
muter camp housing more than half a million ‘internal
refugees’ of the apartheid system. Sited within the ‘inde-
pendent’ Bophuthatswana border these refugees have
been deprived of their South African citizenship. But
the majority living there are non- Tswanas who have re-
jected that bantustan’s ‘citizenship’. This renders them
‘stateless’ in the legal non-sense.

Their removal to their putative ethnically appropnate
bantustan has been stalled, as most families living there
have one person or more in their household working and
commuting daily to the PWV and surrounding areas.
Between the South African state and the Bophuthats-
wana bantustan administration a conflictual, but still
happy marriage of convenience has been consummated.
In this, neither partner will take responsibility for the
health, welfare, education or housing of the Winterveld
refugees spawned by the system. While both sides drag
their feet millions of rand are being saved the taxpayer.
But the real and immediate beneficiaries of this
partnership are the profit-minded capitalists who at pre-
sent reap enormous benefits from having a highly vul-
nerable and docile reservoir of commuter labour to draw
from — without the social costs involved in reproducing
labour power.

The mushrooming of similar squatter camps on the
borders of all bantustans within commuting distance of
towns and growth points is significant in another way: it
proves the success of influx control via the bantustan ‘in-
dependence’ policy. In the long term, these vast squatter
slums could become potential hotbeds for political vio-
lence. But segregated far out of sight and mind of whites
in South Afmnca, they can be effectively and easily
policed and controlled. Ironically, even apartheid’s
most virulent critics ignore the plight of these ‘internal
refugees’ — because they happen to be living in an ‘inde-
pendent’ bantustan which the international community
refuses to recognise.

As declared ‘foreigners’ they .re subject to new con-
trols. Entry into ‘white’ South Africa of ‘foreigners’ will
be more strictly policed. Freedom of ‘foreign’ workers to
choose jobs or mines on which they wish to work can be
severely restricted. As ‘foreign’ workers they can be
forced to accept jobs shunned by local workers — these
are usually the lowest paid menial tasks for which safety
and health conditions are poor and often dangerous;
where hours, especially in the case of shift work, are not
congenial for men settled with their families in the
towns. Similarly, industnes such as agriculture, clo-
thing, textiles, building etc, highly vulnerable to cyclical
and seasonal demands, will benefit from this system.

84

They will be able to recruit workers as ‘foreigners’, then
hire and fire them at will.

A policy of assimilation or integration would destroy
this mobility — ie :he workers’ re-exportability and dis-
pensability. To sum up then, the ruthlessness with which
workers from the Transkei were deported from the
Nyanga bush site in Cape Town; the abrogation of finan-
cial responsibility towards squatters living within ban-
tustan borders; the massive reductions of the migratory
labour force during the present economic down-swing
and the crackdown and expulsion cf ‘illegals’, is proof

that the influx control system, refined via the logic of
bantustan ‘independence’, functions as it is meant to.

As the remaining ‘self-governing’ bantustans are
forced to take ‘independence’, so the state’s capacity to
control and police the entry and repatriation of migrants
will become easier. In the meantime, the state has re-
sorted to other mechanisms of controlling and allocating
labour to which we now turn.

Job categorization and the zoning of labour supply
areas

In the pre-Riekert era, it was the workseeker from the
bantustan who had a far wider choice of jobs than the
urban dweller. The latter was tied to jobs within the ad-
ministration board area in which he resided. Employers
moreover were encouraged to recruit widely for their
additional labour needs.

This position is now being reversed. Today, with the
greater mobility of urban workers, combined with the
enforced local labour preference policy and the zoning
of labour supply areas. the numbers of workers recruited
from the bantustans is being massively reduced. In addi-
tion the category of jobs open to bantustan workers Is
being steadily narrowed.

As a direct consequence of these strategies, the urban
unemployed countrywide have become the principal
source of industnes reserve army. Hence the massive
cutback in bantustan recruitment. Once the computers
in the 14 Administration Board areas are aligned to one
another, greater mobility of this urban reservoir will be
effected. The local labour preference option will operate
more efficiently, and the number of bantustan requisi-
tions for urban employment can be expected to drop
even more dramatically.

To enforce the local labour preference policy, the
power of ABs to decide who, and for whom a work-
seeker may or may not work has been greatly enhanced.
This, together with the high unemployment and deepen-
ing recession have made it easier for ABs to push
through their plans to restructure the workforce along
an urban/bantustan divide.

Their first step in this process, was to crackduwwn on ‘il-
legals’ through the moratorium in 1979. This brought all
unregistered workers under computerized control.

Once this was achieved, the ABs moved to close certain
jobs to contract workers. Local workers in turn were
coerced into taking jobs normally shunned by them, by
the soaring costs of basic necessities, transport and ser-
vices — just as Riekert in his report predicted would
happen.

On top of this, the housing shortage is being used as
one of the chief instruments of control to enforce the
local labour preference policy. ABs, on the grounds that
no ‘suitable’ accommodation is available, have in-
structed employers to recruit locally. As a result, some
workers recruited annually under the automatically re-
newable call-in-card system have reported that their
contracts have been cancelled. This accounts for some of
the cutbacks in bantustan recruitment.

The key to efficient computerized control of all work-
ers is their registration. The R500 imposed on employers
of ‘illegals’ has undoubtedly curbed the practice of en-
gaging unregistered workers. As a consequence more
and more workers are being forced back to the bantus-
tans where they have to wait to be officially recruited, at-
tested and computenzed.

This crackdown on ‘illegals’ and the containment of
workseekers within the bantustan boundaries has,
moreover, opened the way for a far more efficient sys-
tem of zoning labour supply areas. Workers in the re-
mote bantustan areas are beinz shored-up to be channel-
led into the mining and farmir g sectors.

A more recent and sophisticated trend in zoning
labour supply areas is emergirg however. This appears
to be based on the strategy that ethnicity will eventually
become a fundamental organising principle in the canali-
sation of labour. Such a trend is well illustrated in the
emerging pattern of recruitment by the Drakensburg
and Port Natal ABs over a three-year penod.

As the table below shows, there Ks been a steady cut-
back of workers from beyond Natal.

Seen in a political context, this rezoning of labour sup-
ply areas along ethnic lines fits in well with Prof Lom-
bard’s belief, that the successful launching of a federal
scheme will depend on the state:’s ability to regulate the
demographic distribution of its workers. He argues, that

iabour must be allocated in a way that would ‘keep the de-
scendants of the different major African chiefdoms living
in and around their original areas of settlement.’ (Zille,
Sars, 1982)

Moreover, as the regional decentralization prog-
ramme, foreshadowed in both the Carlton and Cape of
Good Hope Conferences, is elaborated to coincide with
the political decentralization of metropolitan areas, so
the trend to channel labour within zoned AB areas could
be extended further

The zoning of labour supply areas was however first
used to stabilise the labour supply in border areas. The
relocation of entire urban communities to dormitory
towns within bantustan borders was one of the main
mechanisms used to reduce the number of people qual-
ifving for section 10 nghts. The scale of such relocation
can be seen from the rapid growth of bantustan towns
and the concomitant increase in the number of ‘frontier
commuters’. According to Smit and Booysen, there
were only three towns within the bantustan borders in
1900. These had a total population of 33 468. By 1970
this number had grown to 594 420. Eight years later in
1978, the population had more than doubled reaching an
estimated 1,5 million people.

Alongside the growth of these towns the number of
people commuting daily to work also grew phenomen-
ally. Mastouroudes, in his report commissioned for Unit
for Futures Research. estimated that in 1981 almost
740 000 people commuted daily to work. Assuming all
these commuters were in registered employment it
would mean that out of a total of 1 161 494 jobs regis-
tered in 1981. less than half, viz 420 794 were for non-
commuter labour. In both the Ciskei and KaNgwane
there were proportionately a far higher number of com-
muters than migrant workers — 37 100 commuters and
only 9 288 registrations for Ciskeians countrywide. In
KaNgwane more than half the number of registered
workers were commuters, while KwaZulu was able to
boast a commuter population of 400 600 out of a total of
492 131 recruited (from an analysis of figures supplied by
Sheena Duncan: HAD May 1983).

-
Drakensbu | Port Natal
as 1979 1980 1981 | 1979 1980 1981
LODOWS oecececcseseseseeeseeeeee | 712 766 18
I i cecinasnsiciecininneniinl 642 625 -
aaa 1168 283 503 2518 2904 3
Ka Ngwane ...............000+ 703 366 302 1020 1144 96
eee 172154 225372 255 120 282 220 303 297 348 285
Kwa Ndebele .................. 419 114 165 68 47 16
SE reo 34 18 73 = hk.
huthatswana ............ 24 388 501
row ae 379 1752 1526 573 460 16
a 14310 20 026 25 807 47 980 34 358 21731
189 191 248 319 284 003 335 841 348 680 368 336

CSO:

3400/978

When dormitory towns were first created to serve bor-
der industrial growth points, workers relocated were
guaranteed a preferential access to jobs in the towns
from which they were removed. This guarantee has
back-fired. Today, with the more sophisticated and sys-
tematic zoning system, these same workers are im-
mobilized as trapped pools of labour to serve the needs
of employers zoned in their area. The example of It-
soseng illustrates the fate of these workers.

Itsoseng was established as a commuter area for towns
in the western Transvaal. It lies 40km west of Lichten-
burg on the main Mafikeng road. Population estimates
vary between 30 and 50 thousand and unempioyment
stands at over 50 per cent. Competition for jobs 1s in-
tense, and wages, traditionally low in platteland towns,
are depressed even further. As Itsoseng 1s zoned to sup-
ply labour to towns and farms which fall within the west-
ern Transvaal ABs area only, workseekers are tied to
yobs in these towns. There ts no escape as requisitions for
other areas are nnt distributed in Itsoseng. Employers in
turn stand to reap enormous benefits, to say nothing of
profits, from having an inexhaustibie, but stabilized re-
servoir of labour to draw from. The creation of these
zoned pools is being duplicated throughout the country.

To sum up then. In the post-Riekert era, a far more
complex and coercive system of allocating and reserving
a supply of labour has been devised. This has ensured a
steady supply of low-cost labour to different categones
of employer — defined variously by sector, industry and
location. In devising various strategies, the state’s prior-
ity has been to incorporate al! workers into a single com-
puterized system of labour allocation and control.

What the above analysis has shown is, that, despite
the declarations made by arartheid apologists that
South Africa has entered into a new era of ‘liberal re-
forms’, there is little doubt that workers from the ban-
tustans and the associated reserve army, are being far
more effectively manipulated and controlled. So much
so, that it can be argued instead, that South Afncan ra-
mal capitalism can stil! be characterized as a forced
labour system — a new ‘feudalism’ in the age of the com-
puter.

88

SOUTH AFRICA

SASH SEEN FACING MOUNTING PRESSURES, CHALLENGES
Johannesburg SASH in English Feb 84 pp 18-19

[Article by Jill Wentzel: "Avoiding Intellectual Fascism--The Dream of Orwell
and His Contemporaries” ]

[Text ]

A S we prepare for our 1984 National Conference in

ohannesburg on March 15 facing the same issues
which worned George Orwell and his contemporaries,
we might in many ways be guided by them. Some of us
might be heartily sick of Animal Farm and 1984, for al-
legory can be tedious, once it has made its point. We
should now look at the rest of Orwell’s most delightful
writing, and the works of men like Kafka, Thomas
Mann, Huxley, Malraux, Koestler, Camus.

Their warnings, their misery and their tentative hope
for humanity were spawned by circumstances similar to
ours and we as a human mghts organization can learn
perhaps some wisdom from this intensely humanist gen-
eration of authors. Wnting in the aftermath of the Rus-
sian revolution they saw human freedom diminished and
threatened on two fronts: by the post revolutionary ter-
ror in Russia and by the menace of fascism in Spain, Italy
and Germany. Similarly, while living with the Orwellian
controis of the Nationalist Government, particularly in
relation to labour manipulation (see Manan Lacey’s ar-
ticle on page 7) we are already, on the other hand, bom-
barded by the liberatory language of Animal Farm.

Especially relevant to us, now, as we find ourselves in
the midst of the capitalist/socialist debate in all its per-
mutations, and as we face the problem of having to de-
fine our relationship with the United Democratic Front
and the rest of the liberatory movement, is Camus’ The
Rebel and Koestler’s essay, The Right to say No.

Camus in The Rebel expounds the contradition at the
core of our work, the point at which we feel restless
about simple protest, somehow static and isolated and
incomplete unless we move towards a closer association
with the liberatory movement

Qc
BY

Camus expiains that within our NO to injustice is a
YES to a better order of things. The suthoritarian
dangez lurks in the YES. Within the highly individualis-
tuc act of rebellion against an unjust order is contained a
conforming affirmation of an alternative and perfect
scheme of things, carrying with it the desire to subject,
and compel others to subject, all individuality to the
needs of the new order. *

We cannot avoid this dilemma, for it is a schizophrenic
contradiction at the core of our work and our thinking,
but by recognizing it we can with rationality control the
excesses to which it might otherwise lead us. The solu-

tion, Camus believes, is consciously to chose rebellion,
which he connects with outrage, protest and a limitation
of objective in order to keep in touch with reality, mod-
eration and ordinary life, and shun revolution, which he
connects with romanticism, utopianism and ultimately
the feeling that one is justified in killing some and forc-
ing the rest into an ideological framework for their own
future good.

Camus’ injunction, his theory of limitation, is to settle
for imperfection and limited objectives and not to lose
touch with ordinary people. The Black Sash is well
placed to do this, for our work in the advice offices and
among rural communities is grounded in individual suf-
fering and anxiety. Also, because the Black Sash, as well
as the UDF, manages to accommodate people with dif-
ferent political «'2as, it may be said that a significant
number of people seek to avoid the pitfalls of blind
ideology.

There is another sense in which progressive organiza-
tions in South Africa practice the discipline of limitation
— and that is by means of an almost fanatical insistance
on internal democracy, especiaily within their educa-
tional programmes. (And one might argue that Samora
Machel has done the same thing by seeking some kind of
accommodation with South Afmca for the sake of the
economic well-being of his people).

To the totalitarian threat and its fanaticel creed we
oppose an absolute and unconditioned No. But our
Yes to the civilisation which we are defending leaves

Koestier, The Right to Say No.

*The Freedom Charter represents this yearning for affirmation, and
criticism of ‘bourgeois individuality’ the yearning for conformity.

The great question is, can this sober discipline survive
the pressures already generated by our society? The
Black Sasti will be increasingly subjectec to these pres-
sures. We are used to confronting white South Africa
with the effects of apartheid. Can we confront liberatory
South Africa, including the much fiercer overseas liber-
tory movement, with the pessible effects of its ideology
on ordinary people? Are we prepared to examine cniti-
cally the effects of sanctions and boycott in all its forms?
Are those leaders who over-use ‘the oppressed masses’
running the risk of turning people into proles? Do ordi-
nary people really believe their best interests are served

by boycotting elections? Do they properly discuss the al-

ternative » or are they increasingly afraid to do so? Does
the Freedom Charter express the will of the people or
seek to entrap the will of the people (so that one day they
will be told, ‘this ts your will, now you've got it and it
must be consolidated within a one-party sate, sO no
more of the kind of elections that will allow you to
change your mind’)? If we don’t know the answers, or if
we think we do know some of the answers, will we insist
on the discipline of continuously reassessing strategies?
O: will we, through romanticism on the part of some
mem!.2rs and fear of opprobr‘um on the part of others,
fail to do so?

Far from being a form of romanticism, rebellion on
the contrary, takes the part of true realisan. If it
wants a revolution, it wants it on behalf of life and
not in defiance of it. That is why it relies primarily on
the most concrete realities — on occupation, on the
country village, where the living heart of things and
of men are to be found. Politics, to satisfy the demands
of rebellion, must submit to the eternal verities.
Finally, when it causes history to advance and
alleviates the sufferings of maakind, it does 0
without terror, if not without violence, and in the
most dissimilar political conditions.

Camas, The Rebel

Are we prepared to acknowledge the integrity of men
like Alan Paton, Dennis Beckett and John Kane-Ber-
man together with many of our leader-writers and jour-
nalists who, like the Orwellian writers, are prepared to
face the opprobrium of orthodox leftist opinion by
acknowledging limitation and reality, and who are not
afraid to explore the unspectacular, imperfect yet possi-
bly significant advantages of piecemeal reform? Or
would we prefer to keep such people at arms length?

Camus wrote, ‘The logic of the rebel is to want to
serve justice so as not to add to the injustice of the

91

beyond a certain point negates itself, there is in effect
a measure by which to judge evens and men.
‘Camus, The Rebel

human condition, to insist on plain language so as not to
increase the universal falsehood, and to wager, in spite
of human misery, for happiness.’ Are we in the Black
Sash, sitting on platforms at mass meetings, going to in-
sist on plain language so as not to increase the universal
falsehood?

The Black Sash cannot ignore the economic debate in
all its forms, from capitalist/socialist through to socialist/
marxist. It might be, as Koestler claimed, anachronistic,
but it is nevertheless still alive in the conflict between
west and east and the third world, and within the western
world of Thatcher, Reagan and Tony Benn. The signific-
ant point of stress seems to be between social democrat
and neo-marxist, which is most vividly played out in the
British labour party and which debilitates political par-
ties, civil rights and protest organizations all over the

world. Within the Black Sash we might guard against
getting bogged down by it, remembering Koestler’s
theory of the withering away of the dilemma:

‘It is a further fact that some of these great idealogical
conflicts are never decided; they end in a stalemate.
In successive centuries it looked as if the whole world
would either become Islamic or Christian, either
Catholic or Protestant, either republican or monarch-
ist, either capitalist or socialist. But instead of a
decision there came a deadlock and a process which
one might call the withering away of the dilemma.
The withering or draining of meaning always seems
to be the result of some mutation in human con-
sciousness accompanied by a shift of emphasis to an
entirely different set of values — from religious
consciousness to national consciousness to economic
consciousness and so on.’

In the meantime, the great question is, can both sides
reacting on each other mutate creatively? That this is
possible, and that the results will be vastly important for
mankind, was the great prophetic hope of the Orwellian
writers. This is what Koestler was talking about when he
wrote:

92

‘The real content of this conflict can be summed up in
one phrase: total tyranny against relative freedom.

~ Sometimes | have a feeling in my bones that the
terrible pressure which this conflict exerts on all
humanity might perhaps represent a challenge, a
biological stimulus as it were, which will release the
new mutation of human consciousness; and that its
content might be a new spiritual awareness, born of
anguish and suffering. If that is the case, then we are
indeed living in an interesting time.’

And Camus had the same dream:

‘Then, when revolution in the name of power and of
history becomes that immoderate and mechanical
murderer, a new rebellion is consecrated in the name
of moderation and of life. We are at the extremity
now. However, at the end of this tunnel of darkness,
there is inevitably a light, which we already divine
and for which we only have to fight to ensure its
coming. All of us, among the ruins, are preparing a
renaissance beyond the limits of nihilism. But few of
us know it.’

If the Black Sash can hold on to its consensus during the
coming conference and the challenges of the next few
years we might find by muddling through somehow we
might have made some contribution, and maybe even a
unique one, to that light at the end of the tunnel.

2 Rome me

Authentic acts of rebellion will only consent to take

up arms for institutions which limit violence, not for
those which codify it. A revolution is not worth dying
for unless it assures the immediate suppression of the

Camus, The Rebel
e
This is an individual article. It does not represent Black
Sash thinking.

cso: 3400/978

93

SOUTH AFRICA

BLACK SASH AFFILIATION WITH UDF MOOTED
Johannesburg SASH in English Feb 84 pp 21-24

[Article by Helen Zille: "UDF--Affiliate or Cooperate?"]
[Text ]

hould the Black Sash affiliate to the UDF? This is one
of the ‘cutting-edge’ issues in the Sash at present —
and has been for the best part of eight months.

This is not particularly remarkable. Much the same de-
bate has taken place within several other organisations
opposed to the government’s attempted restructuring of
apartheid through the new constitution and ‘Koornhof
Bills’.

And they have reached widely divergent conclusions.
Some believe it is time to pool their strength and re-
sources with other groups under the umbrella of the
broadest anti-apartheid front since the nationalists came
to power. Others believe their effectiveness lies in their
independence, without which they cannot fulfill their or-
ganisational objectives.

Within the Sash, the ‘UDF debate’ has been particu-
larly long and intense. It has sparked off deep feeling on
both sides in what has become one of the most controv-

ersial issues in the Sash’s history.

This article is an attempt to draw out the arguments on
both sides, to air and circulate the issues before the na-
tional conference in March when a decision is likely to be
made. (According to the Sash constitution a two-thirds
majority is needed for the Sash to affiliate to the UDF.)

No doubt by that time fresh arguments and considera-
tions will have arisen and new compromises forged. In-
deed, it is the purpose of this article to stimulate further
debate, as the lengthy, healthy and sometimes painful
process of internal democracy runs its course.

94

Arguments for affiliation

Many Sash members are strong proponents of affilia-
tion. The Natal Coastal region has already made the
move — with the majority support of its regional mem-

bers.
Many supporters of affiliation make the following

points:

South Africa has reached a political watershed. Over
the past decade, the National Party, sensing an impend-
ing political crisis ou all fronts, devised a sophisticated
plan to restructure apartheid, drawing in coloureds and
Indians as its junior partners while entrenching the polit-
ical exclusion of Africans.

- At the same time, through the three Koornhof Bills, it
is attempting to divide a relatively privileged group of
African urban ‘insiders’ from the majority in the home-
lands who will face tightened influx control and increas-
ing unemployment.

This political strategy demar.ds an effective and or-
ganised counter strategy. Indeed, it has made such an or-
ganisation a pressing necessity — now, while the govern-
ment is still trying to win legitimacy for its plans and im-
plement them bit by bit. Individuals are isolated, vulner-
able and incapable of effective opposition on their own,
and so are organisations. Unless a unified front can
mobilise its forces and pool its resources to oppose the
implementation of restructured apartheid, the govern-
ment will have a clear run, assisted by isolated and di-
vided opposition groupings each doing its own thing.

The Sash has a unique opportunity to become part of a
non-racial opposition movement that could influence
the government’s attempts at restructuring apartheid,
simultaneously symbolising the alternative to apartheid:
a process of non-racial, democratic co-operation and de-
cision-making.

Indeed, this would be a logical step for the Sash to
take, having played a pivotal role in analysing the shift
from traditional to neo-apartheid, exposing the myths of
reform, teasing out the real intentions of constitutional
change and the Koornhof Bills.

Nor need the Sash sacrifice its autonomy and internal
democracy. It is part of the very nature of the Front that
affiliated organisations retain their own identity, policy
and objectives — while co-operating on a limited
number of issues of mutual concern. If this were not tiie
case, the Front would collapse within a very short time
because many organisations besides Sash would not tol-
erate interference in their internal affairs.

Mindful of the dynamics within its affiliate organisa-
tions, the UDF attempts to take decisions by consensus
— and if consensus cannot be reached the issue is refer-
red again to the individual organisations for discussion.
This is what happened at the recent National General
Council where the UDF failed to reach consensus on
whether to participate in a possible referendum to test

95

‘coloured’ and ‘Indian’ opinion of the new constitution.

Of course, absolute unanimity may be unattainable,
and therz are times when decisions must be taken on
common objectives. It is also conceivable that the Sash
may not concur with the position adopted. But the very
nature of democracy means abiding by a majority deci-
sion.

Nor is it valid to argue that the UDF has no specific
constitutional and economic policy. As a Front, it
shouldn’t have. It consists in a number of different or-
ganisations with a range of policies, supporting a shared
set of principles embodied in the UDF declaration. Yet
it is inevitable that economic and constitutional issues will
be discussed by the UDF in pursuing common objec-
tives. If the Sash wishes to make an input into the de-
velopment and growth of the non-racial opposition

movement, it can best do so from within. Moreover, af-
filiation would bring to a wider circle of Sash members a
heightened awareness of (and participation in) the ongo-
ing debate on economic and constitutional issues beyond
the confined circle of white, middle-class women. This is
an essential complement to the Sash’s service role —
particularly as the initiative of political opposition is in-
creasingly centred in the organisations of the oppressed.

Finally, at a time when many young people have left
the country, seeing armed struggle as the only remaining
option for change in South Africa, it is remarkable that
so broad an organisation could be launched committed
to peaceful, non-racial methods of working for political
transformation. As the Sash’s primary objective is the
non-violent struggle against apartheid, its logical place is
in the UDF.

Arguments against affiliation

Many Sash members have indicated their opposition to
affiliation — for a wide variety of reasons. They do not
all necessarily subscribe to every reason listed below.
But they all believe that the disadvantages of affiliation
will outweigh the advantages.

The arguments run as follows:

The Black Sash’s effectiveness is rooted in its indepen-
dence. It has jealously guarded this independence since
its inception, refusing to becom< tied to any political or-
ganisation or movement. This has given the Sash the
freedom to co-operate with any political grouping on
specific projects; to criticise their decisions a:id actions
when necessary; and to serve as an independent catalyst
for people of differing political views. Most significantly
it has given Sash a high level of credibility in performing
its essential service functions through its advice offices
and its analysis of legislation ana political trends.

During the past years this independence has become
all the more important due to the deepening differences
between Black opposition movements. The Sash would

96

jeopardise its role and its credibility if it sided with one of
them — particularly as some (such as Inkatha) are
excluded from affiliation even though they also oppose
the constitution and Koornhof Bills. Such exclusivism
prevents the UDF from being a genuine Front of organi-
sations with differing policies and strategies. It indicates
that the UDF is not primarily concerned with promoting
unity around common principles, but of laying down the
line on the goals and tactics of different organisations.

Nor has it been necessary to affiliate to the UDF to
support particular campaigns and objectives. During the
referendum the Sash played a leading role in the ‘No’
vote campaign — as did Nusas, a prominent affiliate of
the UDF, to the mutual benefit of both organisations.
However, had the UDF advocated abstention (as ini-
tially seeined likely) the Sash, following its own internal
democratic decision, would have found itself advocating
a different strategy. Had it been a UDF affiliate, severe
problems would have arisen.

It is entirely probable that similar situations could
arise in the future. The UDF has its own internal struc-
tures and office bearers through which decisions are
taken, implemented and announced via the Press. This
process may well take place democratically — but this
cannot prevent a contradiction arising between the in-
ternal democracy of Sash and that of the UDF. If Sash
were to affiliate, it could easily find itself unable to iden-

tify with a UDF decision or statement. This would give

Tise to an untenable position: either Sash would have to
publicly dissociate itself, to the severe detriment of both
organisations, or remain silent, risking the loss of a sub-
stantial number of members. While Sash, as a small or-
ganisation, could not hope to influence the decision-
making process in the UDF it would run the risk of im-
pairing its own internal democracy.

Another problem concerning the UDF is its lack of a
clearly defined constitutional and economic policy
(beyond its widely worded declaration.) Inevitably in
the course of time, UDF congresses will adopt more de-
tailed resolutions on these issues. As a UDF affiliate, the
Sash would automatically be associated with these deci-
sions and statements, whether or not it supported them
or had any part in their formulation. To rush into a polit-
ical organisation without a clearly defined constitutional
and economic policy would be as naive as signing a con-
tract without reading it.

It is no secret that many of the UDF’s leading affiliates
subscribe to the Freedom Charter, giving the organisa-
tion strong Charterist leanings. This has unavoidably re-
sulted in symbolic associations with the African National
Congress. It also gives the movement a socialist flavour,
as the Charter advocates the nationalisation of certain
industries and banks as well as the transfer of agricul-
tural land to public ownership. This identification by as-
sociation could cause internal problems for Sash — par-
ticularly amongst its liberal members who would resist
such implications.

97

In short, by affiliating to the UDF, Sash would run the
severe risk of undermining its own membership base, in-
dependence and credibility. As a crippled organisation,
it could add little to the strength of the UDF.

The compromise position

A compromise position is rapidly developing on both
sides of the debate. There are proponents of affiliation
who baulk at the possibility of splitting Sash or evoking
mass resignations. They are working ‘or a compromise
that would involve endorsing the UDF’s declaration of
principles, and pledging co-operation in fighting the
constitution and Koornhof Bills — but stopping short of
affiliation.

On the other side there are opponents of affiliation
who don’t want to place themselves in opposition to the
UDF. They believe a straight YES/NO answer on affilia-
tion would have the same implications as the ‘Do-you-
still-beat-your-wife’ question. They also favour a com-
promise that would involve endorsing the UDF declara-
tion and pledging co-operation, while maintaining
Sash’s independence.

Then there are those who don’t fall into either camp.
They are genuinely convinced by certain arguments on
both sides and believe that only time can provide the
right answer. This group also favours a compromise for
the present.

Sure, it’s an attempt at having your cake and eating it.
But then, as someone put it: ‘Who would want to have a
cake and not eat it?’

W..: is the United Democratic Front?

It is a Front of some 400 widely divergent organisa-
tions (ranging from trade unions and community or-
ganisations to sports clubs) that have come together
in a common commitment to resist the implementa-
tion of the new constitution and the ‘Koornhof Bills.’

The most notorious of these Bills is the Orderly
Movement and Settlement of Black Person’s Bill,
currently undergoing revision, that seeks to intensify
influx control.

According to Mr Popo Molefe, national secretary
of the UDF, there are two conditions for an organisa-
tion to affiliate to the Front.

It must:

* Support the UDF declaration
* Work outside government created structures

98

The UDF declaration:
This is a widely-worded document consisting primar-
ily of a rejection of apartheid in its traditional and re-
structured forms. It commits the UDF to work to-
wards unity in opposing restructured apartheid, par-
ticularly as it is manifest in the constitution and
Koornhof Bills. The declaration sets as its goal a ‘un-
ited, democratic South Africa based on the will of the
people’ and an end to ‘economic and other forms of
exploitation.’ "

The UDF has not formulated a detailed constitu-
tional and economic policy.

Working outside govarnment-created struc-
tures: 7

The phrase ‘Government-created structures’ refers to
homeland governments, community councils, Parlia-
ment etc. UDF officials have described this condition
as ‘flexible.’ It is not a hard and fast rule that would be
used to exclude, for example, community leaders in
rural areas who had traditionally used official struc-
tures, such as village councils, to resist forced remov-
als.

‘Our criteria are that an organisation must not, in
its use of platforms and structures, become part of the
oppressive system,’ said Mr Molefe. Each case, he
said, would have to be evaluated on its merits.

However it seems clear that the UDF will not ac-
cept participation in homeland governments or in
central government structures created under the new
constitution.

The structure of the UDF

The UDF has a decentralised federal structure with five
established Regions: Transvaal, Natal, Border, Western
and Eastern Cape. Plans are also afoot to escablish reg-
ional structures in the Northern Cape and Orange Free
State.

Affiliation to the UDF is open to organisations only.
Individuals who wish to join can only do so by becoming
involved in ‘area committees,’ which, together with or-
ganisations, are represented on a Regional General
Council.

All regions are linked by a National General Council
consisting of representatives from different regional or-
ganisations. Area Committees are not represented on
the NGC, giving organisations a significantly stronger
role in the highest decision-making structures.

It is also the stated intention of the UDF to give grea-
ter weight to larger affiliated organisations, known as
‘main-line’ organisations. However a formula to give ef-
fect to this decision is still to be finalised.

99

CSO:

3400/978

A national conference will be held every two years at
which executive members will be elected. The first na-
tional cor.ference co-incided with the official launching
of the UDF on August 20, 1983.

Would the Black Sash be weicome in the UDF?

There has been some debate within the UDF, particu-
larly in the Western Cape, over whether the Sash, ‘a
middle-class organisation of white women’ should be ac-
cepted as an affiliate. However it appears likely that a
majority of regions would support Sash’s affiliation.

Said Mr Molefe: The history of the Black Sash shows
that it is an organisation that has played a significant role
in the struggle against injustice in South Africa. It has
been shown to have a very profound insight into legisla-
tion affecting black people, and has demonstrated a
strong commitment in defending the victims of these
laws. The Black Sash has also played a significant role in
squatter and relocatio. :ssues. We regard the Black Sash
as one of the most informed organisations and it has won
itself a place in the hearts and minds of the majority of
South Africans opposed to injustice.’

Mr Molefe was well aware of the present debate
within Sash on affiliation to the IiDF.

He said the UDF had been formed as a wide Front to
oppose the constitution and Koornhof Bills as effec-
tively as possible. ‘Of course we would like organisations
to affiliate to strengthen this objective. But we under-
stand that different organisations have different internal
dynamics and that for this reason they may not see their
way Clear to affiliating at this stage.’

Affiliation, he said, was noi a pre-requisite for partici-
pation in UDF campaigns. ‘While affiliation would be an
advantage, the UDF does not regard it as a priority. Our
major priority is co-operation with various organisations
in our campaigns.’

100

SIGNIFICANCE OF NKOMATI ACCORD DISCUSSED

SOUTH AFRICA

Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English Apr 84 p 11

[Text ]

HOTGUN or not, and no matter

ow unequal the contracting
parties, it is unequivocally in the
interests of all in Southern Africa that
none of its states be prey to bands of
marauding saboteurs. Nkomati is good.

However, this apparently platitudinous
observation is less representative of South
African opinion than a reading of the
media would suggest.

The Accord, we are told, is a great
political triumph for Mr P.W. Botha. In
the broad view, yes. And perhaps also in
the judgement of the history books, even
though more detached analyses are likely
to view the way the Accord was achieved
more harshly than is common here and
now. The principle that clandestinely
destabilising a puny neighbour into
despair will make him come forth with
the olive branch may be tactically excel-
lent, but it does not promote ideal
international relationships.

But it is worth noting that in hard
electoral terms Nkomati does not hold
out roses all the way for Mr Botha. In his
own party, as well as among the Con-
servatives who also officially supported
the Accord, let alone the HNP which did
not, there are rumblings. All three parties
contain people who quite seriously see
“communists” as irredeemably villainous
and as virtually a separate species from
th. human race, with whom no dealings
other than outright combat can be enter-
tained. Some senior Nationalist office-
bearers have evidently been taken aback
by the extent of grassroots disaffection.

101

Confident after having run into less of
this than they expected over the consti-
tution, here they anticipated hardly any
and have encountered much. One
possible explanation of this is that white
South Africa’s level of private gut racism
is not as high as the public structure
suggests, whereas the assiduously incul-
cated anticommunist hysteria of many
years has sunk in deeper than some of its
architects thought.

This disaffection has hardly been
exposed to the light of day, but this may
say more about the attitude of the media
towards recognising a groundsweil
opinion which none of its members have
an interest in promoting than about the
significance of the groundswell itself.

Then there is the reaction of many
blacks. It is rare to hear black people
speak in favour of the agreement, and
even then it is usually in a tone of regret.
Machel had to do it, they'll say sorrow-
fully, because Mozambique was being
beaten into a pulp.

Far more common is the attitude that
this is a betrayal of the liberation move-
ments. As Azapo has put it: “We admit
that Mozambique had big problems with
destabilisation, but the liberation of the
sub-continent is a major priority which
should not be jeopardised.” This line
finds a firm echo in the attitudes of the
ordinary black people in the street, and
any white South African who cares to
inquire as to those attitudes is likely to
be taken aback by the extent to which
the euphoria in verligte/opposition circles

is matched by upset in black ones.

Which raises questions. First; how
realistic is this upset?

Very little. The “liberation move-
ments” may provide psychological solace
to blacks, but stand no chance of actually
achieving their aims for a very long time
to come. White respect for a viable, suc-
cessful, Mozambique will do more to
facilitate liberation here than any amount
of ANC forays. Angry blacks need to
draw a distinction between what serves
the interests of the liberation movements
as such and the more modest processes
which serve the cause of real liberation.

Second; if blacks reject a development
which moderate whites as self-
evidently beneficial, are ‘they being
simply bloody-minded?

Not at all. It is natural that biacks
should pin their faith on the hope of a
sudden transformation. The white people

who see this as despicable treason would
do the same in the same circumstances.
To SA blacks Frelimo meant a neigh-
bour committed to the principle of un-
diluted black citizenship. Children were
named after Machei. A rally to welcome
his accession precipitated the arrest and
lengthy imprisonment of several people.
Now those people see their erstwhile hero
signing treaties with the government
which took such offence at their support-
ing him; 2 government from which they
are as far excluded as ever. The disap-
pointment is understandable. It should
not be misread by whites as grounds for
abandoning hope of rapport. The
prospects of achieving effective rapport
are fine, once we surmount our fixation
with the idea of our security depending
on denying democracy. e

CSO: 3400/978

102

SOUTH AFRICA

REALISTIC VIEW OF BOPHUTHATSWANA, MANGOPE ADVANCED

Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English Apr 84 pp 22-23

[Article by Johann Graff: "Outgrowing the Pigeon-holes"]

[Text ]

OPHUTHATSWANA gets widely
varying reactions these days. To
some BophuthaTswana’s president,
L.M. Mangope, is a man who has sold his
(and his countrymen’s) birthright for a
mess of pottage. He is a sell-out, a corrupt
puppet of the Pretoria regime, a traitor to
his people. To others BophuthaTswana is
an island of racial peace, economic
development and democratic justice in a
sea of oppression, exploitation and a
string of other no-no’s for which SA has
become famous.

To others still, BophuthaTswana is
puzzling. It seems to be dislodging some
important cornerstones of the apartheid
system. The New York Times correspond-
ent, for example, was surprised to find six
copies of Frantz Fanon’s “Wretched of
the Earth” in the University of Bophutha-
Tswana’s library — on open shelf. (There
are a lot more suprising things than that
in the library if he hed only cared to
look.) In 1982 the BophuthaTswana
courts threw out Section 6 of SA’s Ter-
rorism Act as being incompatible with its
Bill of Human Rights. The constitution
prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sex, race, colour or creed. An ombuds-
man has been appointed to inv stigate
bureaucratic irregularities in the govern-
ment service. (People actually do get dis-
missed for corruption and inefficiency as
a result of his activities.) Group Areas,

103

Immorality, Prohibition of Mixed Mar-
riages and Separate Amenities are all SA
horrors that have been eliminated. The
Thumber of appointed (as opposed to
elected) chiefs sitting in parliament has
been halved. At Mafikeng and Sun City
casinos and pale blue movies run even on
Sundays. And so the list could continue.

And it is not only Eugene Terre
Blanche’s AWB who are traumatised by
such developments. The farmers, mine-
workers and dominees of the Western
Transvaal along BophuthaTswana’s
borders are also finding their necks get-
ting red and itchy at the thought. Can
Mangope be a puppet if he is irritating
such bastions of the “system’’?

The truth is that Mangope is a shrewd
man who plays his cards cautiously (some
would say, far too cautiously). Within the
present SA context he has delivered
tangible goods for his people which few
others, Black or White, can match. With-
out being a Tutu on the one hand, nor a
Sebe, on the other, he is playing off one
part of the “system” against the otxers
and making patient but remarkable head-
way.

But let’s start from the beginning.
There is no denying that Bophutha-
Tswana is a creation of the apartheid
system. It is intended to make so many
million Blacks political foreigners i.e.
non-voters, in the land of their birth, and

it does. It is intended to be a dumping
ground for the unemployed, the “‘idle’’,
“surplus appendages” and residents of
“Black spots’’, and it ir. It is intended to
be a labour reservoir for the PWV-
complex, and it is.

At the same time, it is not very helpful

to call Mangope a puppet of the SA
regime. Machel is also a puppet. So is
Quett Masire. Their freedom of decision
is substantially limited by Pretoria’s wish-
es. What is interesting is how Bophutha-
Tswana’s position has changed since
independence, how a puppet has become
less of a puppet (and done a whole lot of
things that weren't intended). Before
independence, Mangope and his Tswana
Territorial Authority were faced with the
notoriously verkrampte Department of
Bantu Administration (BAD). Today,
Mangope flanked by some very shrewd
advisers, negotiates with the notoriously

Department of Foreign Affair:.
Given the distance between these twc
wings of the National Party, that is “co
small gain.

The same explanation lies behind
BophuthaTswana’s agricultural, industrial
and TV enterprises. In the bad old days
of BAD, these things would simply not
have been permitted. In short, Mangope
has been using the verligte wing of the
National Party plus certain sectors of
private enterprise to by-pass the ver-
kramptes.

Now that doesn’t get him to Utopia or
Azania. But it puts him three lengths
ahead of most Black leaders and about
2% ahead of van Zyl Slabbert. It does a
lot more than waiting in the sidelines
developing ulcers of frustration (like
Motlana), getting shot by SA police (Saul
Mkhize), being blown up by letter-bombs
(Abram Tiro, Ruth First), dying of
“natural causes” in Secvtity Branch cells
(too many to name), or being raided by
SA paratroops. It is difficult to think of
anyone, Black or White, who has achieved
as much for his people in concrete tang-
ible terms as Mangope.

It is, of course, not only Mangope who
gets accused of being a sell-out, of helping
the “boere’’ (maburu) to oppress the
Blacks. Anyone living and working in a
homeland today is liable to be attacked.
Students at some Black universities refuse
to have contact with those at the Univer-
sity of BophuthaTswana (UNIBO), be-
cause UNIBO students, so they say, are
part of the cpartheid system (while,

104

amazingly , Turfloop is not, so they say!!).
Staff at the university have also been
refused access to overseas universities on
the same grounds “You are part of the
formal state structure of apartheid,” sc
they said.

The irony of it (and the frustration) is
that the University of BophuthaTswana is
the only Black university in the country
which is not directly or indirectly con-
nected to Bantu Educaion. A great
number of the staff are there precisely to
escape the apartheid system — some be-
cause their marriages are mixed, some
(Whites) because they have adopted Black
children, some because they have been
refused entry to SA, most of them simply
because they detest the whole “formal
state structure of apartheid”. Sure, you
could say UNIBO is an institution put
there by an institution (the Bophutha-
Tswana government) which was put there
by Pretoria. Bu! that is two steps remov-
ed from Pretoria. You couldn’t say as
much for Wits, UCT or even FOSATU.

Look at it another way, radicals from
Soweto are scathing adout Mangope
and BophuthaTswana. But Soweto has no
political say and no tax-base. Mangope
has quite a bit of both. Soweto falls
under WRAB cnd Bantu Education and,
to date. has a say over only the most
mundane affsiss. BophuthaTswana has re-
designed its whoie education system and
exclusively controls the allocation of
funds for its own development. (In 1983
it relied on Pretoria for only 6% of its
funds.) In Soweto you can buy a house
only on 99-year lease, but not the land.
You can get arrested for not carrying a
dompas, etc. etc. Coming into Pretoria/
Johannesburg from Mafikeng is quite a
shock , even for a White.

And if, one day, the charade of
sovereign independent “national states”
becomes too ponderous even for Pretoria
to sustain, (and to me, that seems in-
evitable) and homelands are re-integrated
into the SA political system in some
federal form, in other words, if “foreign-
ers’”’ become SA citizens again, what will
have been the use, then, of waiting in the
wings?

Of course, there are problems. One
might have liked to see far more public
sympathy from Mmabatho for the Black
opposition cause in SA. One hears too
often of people dismissed or promoted
sideways for belonging to the wrong
political party or for other doubtful

CSO:

reasons (the Ombudsman notwithstand-
ing). Also Mercedes Benz and BMW are
thriving companies in Mmabatho.

At the same time, one hears other
stories of Mangope personally intervening
on behalf of the little man, even down to
government drivers.

One personal experience of mine
shows some of the complexity, the
humanity of the man. The university
course which I teach offered a block of
lectures on Black Consciousness during
the 1980 academic year, the first year of
the university’s existence. A number of
more conservative government members
reacted strongly to this. After all, the
BophuthaTswana government buildings
had been burnt down during the 1976
riots. Many felt this topic, even the whole
department, should be excised from the
university. Mangope’s reaction was intri-
guing. He invited a number of university
staff (myself included) and government
members to his house for dinner where he
initiated a round-table discussion on the
topic of Black Consciousness and the
relevant department, Development

Studies.

When, towards the end of the evening,
someone remarked, “But, Mr President,
you can’t stop a department from being
critical. That is in the nature of a univer-
sity,” Mangope turned on him quite
abruptly. “If that is the case, we'll close
the university,” he replied. On that
ominous note we all left, not knowing
whether we were due for dismissal or
what. Two weeks later, however, we were
again invited for dinner and further
round-table discussion. After a long even-
ing in which views of quite astonishing
frankness were aired, Mangope signalled
to bring the meeting to a close. He had
hardly spoken all evening. Just sat and
listened intently.

He explained in a quiet voice how
some of his own children had rejected
him on the grounds of the Black Con-
sciousness ideology. That had affected
him deeply ‘“‘as a father’. But, he said, he
had been convinced by the arguments put

3400/978

105

in favour of Development Studies. They
should continue with what they were
doing. And, anyway, this was a university
matter. It had nothing to do with the
government.

As an expression of the principles and
practice of democracy and academic free-
dom, the whole episode was an impressive
one. It made us forget that Mangope had
intervened in the first place although pro-
bably under pressures that we were un-
aware of.

Some critics say Mangope has
abandoned his Black brothers to suffer
alone the humiliations and violence of
apartheid. But, then, suffering in itself
never changed anything — much less an
oppressive regime. Others say, home-
lands entrench ethnic identity, put
Black against Black, and play into the
Whites’ divide-end-rule strategy. The
available research does not support this.
Blacks don’t forget their brothers so
easily. Others again would say, by taking
independence Mangope threw away the
one mejor bargaining card left to a Black
leader. A man who holds out longer
against independence could negotiate a
far better deal for his people. Past experi-
ence shows, however, that Pretoria quite
easily forgets, breaks or sidesteps pro-
mises made at independence. (Remember
that the Minister of Plural Affairs at the
time of BophuthaTswana’s independence,
Dr Connie Mulder, was himself unaware
of what his own civil servants were up
to.) Mangope’s negotiating power has
been increased far more by the compet-
ence and efficiency of his own advisers
and by the fact that CAD has been re-
placed by Foreign Affairs. Refusing to
take independence has, in fact, meant
peanuts to the Pathudis and Buthelezis of
the world. Relocation, harrassment and in-
flux control have all continued unabated.

To repeat, all this does not mean that
BophuthaTswana and Mangope are with-
out faults. It does mean they are not as
easy to write off or pigeon-hole as some
people would have liked. e

ANALYSIS OF AFRIKANERDOM SPLIT OFFERED

SOUTH AFRICA

Johannesburg FRONTLINE in English Apr 84 pp 28-31

[Article by David Williams:

[Text ]

is classless. They have skilfully put

it about over the years that no

member of the tribe regards himself as

better or worse than any other. And we

English, consistently ignorant of the ways
of other South Africans, believe them.

I abruptly stopped believing them
when I wes up in the Soutpansberg,
listening to the Conservative Party victory
chants on polling night. Standing next to
me was a top Cape Nat who’d been
imported for the campaign. He was appal-
led at the crowd’s behaviour — appalled, I
realised, because of a class difference, not
merely one of opinion. Perhaps it was the
old Cape/Transvaal rivalry; maybe he
thought he was better dressed (he was):
the point is that he simply felt superior to
other Afrikaners.

This set me thinking. In fact, the
Afrikaners display considerable class
awareness, The differences between them
are just as great ac those found amongst
the English — only more subtle. For a
start, spoken Afrikaans is not all the same.

Cape Afrikaans is the sparkling white
wine, Northern Afrikaans is the Castle
Milk Stout, and in Bloemfontein they
speak brandy-and-coke. The voice slips
deeper and deeper the further north you
go. The Cape Afrikaner speaks from the
front of his mouth: this make the voice
high-pitched, seldom going below a light
tenor. The lips are tight, and the jaw is
mobile because it does all the work. The
throat and chest are hardly used. Words

A FRIKANERS like to think the volk

106

"North and South Are Poles Apart]

don’t come from far down, so they flow
quickly. This gives the impression that
Cape Afrikaners think faster, which is
why the Transvalers resent them.

At the other extreme, up in the
Bosveld, all expression starts below the
ribcage. Perfect exponents are ex-Minister
Fanie Botha and newsreader Nic Swane-
poel. The words have a long way to travel,
so they pick up richness and body on the
way. Just before ejection, they rumble
the jowls with their weight, and then roll
off the lips, which are well-developed to
weather the force. Northern sentences are
full of moss and boulders. Up there, they
say things like Soutpansberg in a way that
makes broody crags loom before you.

This is why the far-northerners frown
so much: their eyes crinkle and their
brows furrow with the gravity of the
utterance. Cape Afrikaners have clear
faces because they don’t have to delve
about in the chest, disturbing the dust of
the Great Trek; Cape Afrikaners also have
less manly maturity, because they never
had to get ox-wagons over the mountains.
Fanie Botha looks like your uncle; Dawie
De Villiers like a nephew.

So much for the general trend. On the
local level, language is closely linked with
social habit and status, especially in the
Cape peninsula which has been lived on
so long that things have had time to settle.

Uppercrust suburbs like Oranjezicht
and Tamboerskloof encourage a very
refined accent. French and Dutch
influence has disappeared, of course, but

it’s nice to remember and pretend. The
vowel sounds are light and airy, and when
they clear the palate for the scrape in
words like gaan, it’s quite gentle — more
like kaan with a tickle in the K. Take a
sentence like “Ons gaan hardloop by die
see”. Ons avoids the northern weight of

Oaarns!, and hardloop has no vigorous
rolls. In the north, they say harrhdlooerp!
but in the Cape it’s more like haadloep —
light and whippy. By die becomes bayrie,
and see is pronounced sie, unlike the
northerns who buck and veer through
their words — see-yer! So: “O’s karn
haadloep bayrie sie.” Dis gawrf, ne!

The man you hear speaking like this is
probably a well-educated professional of
18th Century stock, or thinks he is. He
spells his name Pierre De Villiers and pro-
nounces it Pee-yeah Diffelyeer — never
Pierrie, as in boxers. The Diffelyeer sons
go to the Paul Roos Gimnasium, the
daughters to the wine belt to be married
off. The whole family is found chatting
to the Province players after matches at
Newlands. Diffelyeer drives an avocado-
green Mercedes. His wife Susan(ne) looks
after the bulbs she found at Kirstenbosch
and pampers the twin German watchdogs
(Hans and Fritz) and the Jack Russell
terrier (Jack). Susan(ne) also prepares
terribly elegant dinner parties, where she
displays rare Estate reds — the kind that
don’t get the three thin stripes on the
bottleneck because they’re too good.
Good names to have on the invitation list
are Graaff and Barnard; possibly a Botha
from the Transvaal if he’s a Deputy
Minister. This is what is left of the Cape
liberal tradition, whatever that’s worth.

The Diffelyeers have their counterparts
in Waterkloof and Randburg, of course
but these are less easily identified — all
Transvaal Afrikaners sound the same.
Refinement is not achieved simply by
speaking correctly, so the posh Transvaal
Afrikaners try harder. To get class you
need: a doctorate from UNISA; a son
who’s got a BA from UNISA and is a
rising star in Foreign Affairs; and a
daughter whose idea of liberation is her
job at Navy headquarters. (Only in South
Africa could Navy HQ be 60 km from the
sea.)

Status in Pretoria is complicated and
subtle, and depends very much on your
uniform. The trouble is that the status
accorded by the uniform to its wearer is
evident only to others who wear it. Navy
officers really swank it up, proud of their

107

individuality and tradition; everyone else
thinks their white shorts and bare knees
rather immature — apart from resentment
at the way Navy officers insist on confus-
ing the rest in winter by wearing their
rank at the end of the sleeve instead of on
top of the shoulder. Below the Navy men
come the rest of the SADF, and the SAP;
and in third place the green of the Railway
Police and the khaki of the Prison
Officers. A long way behind them are the
men who wear the green suit/yellow tie
combination which identifies the Civil
Service. In some cases, the suit is not
green, but it is invariably shiny. No-one is
quite sure where the traffic cops fit in,
but they are more powerful and more
macho than the rest put together.

A house in Waterkloof is a guarantee
of status, unless it’s on the air base side.
True distinction is if your address book
includes an ambassador’s unlisted number.

Another Pretoria residential rule is to
be somewhere where you cannot smell or
see the pollution from Iscor. There is a
massive shortage of accommodation. This
is because young professional Pretorians
have become liberated enough to move out
of their parents’ homes but not liberated
enough to live with their girlfriends,
which would halve the demand. So a flat
of your own in the city centre is a big
status symbol, Pretorians are not only
over-crowded — they have an inferiority
complex because they know the capital
of South Africa is really Johannesburg,
and the pretence is a strain.

The Randburg Afrikaners are more
exclusive, simply because they’re in the
minority in greater Johannesburg. This
gives them an automatic start, but there
are drawbacks — the only career advance-
ment is at RAU or the SABC. If you’re an
academic, the minimum is a doctorate,
preferably with 2 professorship. At the
SABC, real status is only achieved if
“Direkteur” appears somewhere in your
title — surrounded with Adjunks and
Assistents if necessary. You also have to
be high enough to tell Cliff Saunders
what to do.

The Transvaal Afrikaners who want
class have to work harder, because
academics and motor mechanics have the
same accent and motor mechanics earn
more. The Cape Afrikaner of good stock
knows he was born superior, so he can do
without a doctorate in Traffic Manage-
ment.

Transvaal class allocations have also
been thrown out by computerised
numberplates. Before, those with
pretensions could always jeer at cars from
TDK and TK. Now you could be from
Alberton and no-one would know if it
wasn’t for the dashboard decoration. On
the other hand, you could be a Sanlam
executive living in Sandton and no-one
would be any the wiser if you sneaked
south to see Charles Bronson at the Top:
Star Drive-In. Motoring in the Cape is not
deceitful — pass a CY car and you know
it’s a cowboy from Bellville.

Bloemfontein is the only city where
Afrikaners are never irritated by uni-
lingual shop assistants. There are English-
speaking people who claim to come from
Bloemfontein, but no-one believes them.
Here the spoken word is a happy medium
— it originates in the throat, not the teeth
or the stomach. There is only one real
status symbol in Bloem: to have dinner
with an Appeal Court judge. A doctorate
in Township Administration can some-
times serve as a consolation as long as its
a KOVSIE degree. If you got it from
UNISA nobody will even talk to you.

Doctorates are important because they
demonstrate advancement. Sometimes
they also demonstrate learning. For a
doctorate from Leyden or Heidelberg
(anyone over 60 ) or Oxbridge ( 30 to 60)
all the rules bend. That’s status. Local
universities are fighting valiantly to
achieve the same status among under-30s
with the BA (Communications/Kommu-
nikasieleer), which is for students on
rugby scholarships and aspirant news-
readers.

Out in the urban satellite towns and
suburbs, a doctor is what you see when
you’re sick. North and South, they are
very similar. The only difference between
Bellville and Krugersdorp is again the
voice-source — “Belil” is said rapidly in a
whiny cackle, whereas ‘“Krewersdoarp”
a stony rasp. There is more crude swearing
than in Linden, with great reliance placed
on one particular word whose versatility
is astonishing. More important, if an
English word comes to the lips naturally,

it is used without guilt. At the Station
Bar in Langlaagte or the Railway Hotel in
Salt River, the discusssion covers the
winning numbers for the jackpot and the
tjerrie who will be taken to the Ladies’
Bar on }*riday night.

Women are important out there in
Boksburg and Parer-Goodood. Someone

108

has to look after the car keys while the
men are playing darts, and someone has
to drink Babycham or Advokaat-and-
Lemonade. After an evening at the
Hotel, it’s off in the Fairlane and home
to Ma and coffee on the lounge suite
from Lubner’s. The furniture is homely
and comfortable, thanks to the attentions
of fox terriers called Stompie and
Alsatians called Wagter.

Kempton Park is the blasted heath of
Afrikanerdom. The inhabitants have well-
paid jobs at Atlas Aircraft, Jan Smuts
Airport and Modderfontein dynamite
factory. The houses are neat and new, but
there are no trees; the subuids are
bordered by dry veld and the dogs bark
all night. This area is only noticed by
people who fly over it on the way to
Europe. Women’s Lib in Kempton Park
means a girlfriend who doesn’t have to
wash the car on Sunday, and she can
choose which dress she’ll wear.

Moving out to the Platteland, where
so many — Afrikaner tribal myths
Originated, there are some intriguing local
variations. There’s Karakul Afrikaans in
SWA — hard, metallic and guttural,
spoken by teenagers who have never seen
rain; the breigh of Malmesbury and Piker-
berg, with the throat very prominent; and
the curiously soft bilingualism of the
Eastern Cape in places like Graaff-Reinet.
In the Groot Marico, it’s still possible to
notice the life which gave Herman Charles
Bosman his stories, even though there are
now more cigarette reps on the roads
than farmers. You can still sit in the dark
on the stoep, beer in hand, and listen to
the farmer tell you how the Government
is neglecting him, and how he knows how
to evade the speedtraps.

But the Platteland has lost much of
its character. All the small towns look the
same. Every main street now has its
Edgar’s, Foschini, CNA, Russell’s,
Checkers — they have taken over from
the Algemene Handelaar and the Slaghuis.
The Post Office has proudly installed
direct dialling in most places, so people
can’t keep in touch by listening in on the
party line. The dorps that aren’t worth
modernising are left alone, and their
populations are dwindling. Local
character is not handed on, and the oom
who sits on the stoep in his vest while the
crickets chirp will not often be replaced.

Afrikaners still maintain outposts in
Natal. But they’re cross because their pre-
sence there is always a surprise to every-

one else, who torget they have been there
since the Trek. They are also upset with
all the Zulu names and the anglicisation
of Maritzburg (which sounds as if it was
named after anyone but a Voortrekker).
So they’ve retreated to Newcastle (Iscor)
and Ladysmith (big railway town), and
for the rest are found in pockets like
Amanzimtoti and the Bluff, and South
Beach in season.

The opposite applies in Port Elizabeth.
It used to be strictly English, but has
been invaded by car workers who have
seen to it that Uitenhage is no longer
pronounced Yootenhaig. As for East
London — if there are any white people
left in East London they are presumably
taking courses in Xhosa.

Engelsing. You can tell how far an
Afrikaner has verEngelsed by how
vehemently he denies it.

Afrikaners still left differ from one
another far more than they used to, or
would like to pretend. The Nationale
Party no longer means what it says: it is
now a faction which seeks alliances out-
side the volk. The drift from the farms to
the cities, the second Great Trek, has
divided Afrikaners into groups like
workers and managers and bureaucrats.
Their sentimental ties and traditions are
no longer threatened, the language and
the people are firmly established. The
paradox now is that confidence means
disintegration. With nothing left to work
for, the speech and habits of the volk

The Afrikaner population is constantly

reflect a ing i irections. It’
dwindling, through the pr at ier scattering in new directions. It’s

a fascinating process. @

How Toothless Gums Boosted Brandy Shares

The reason bottle-stores are closed on election day is that otherwise the volk
would fight and throw chairs; or forget to vote, or vote for the wrong Botha
on the ballot paper. Or all three, depending on the constituency and if a
dominee is one of the candidates, (Dominees always inflame passions more than
advokate or doktors). With English voters, these problems do not arise. They
just get tanked up at home and don't bother about voting.

One Afrikaner drinking habit that has to be explained is the preference for
brandy-and-coke. (Although a sporting minority always liked brandy-and-
Orange juice--a taste acquired at Ellis Park and Loftus when it used to be
necessary to inject the oranges to get the liquor past the police).

The Volkskas director will take a whisky; the heroes at the cricket will
guzzle dozens of Castles so they can crush the cans and howl at the girls;
but your actual barfly likes brandy-and-coke. The tradition began in the days
when many Station Hotel patrons had no teeth. This made intelligible ordering
difficult, especially as the evening drew on. After a time of pointing at

the upside-down bottles and slurring feebly across the gums, they discovered
it was easiest to pronounce brandy-and-coke. Try it--wrap your lips around
your teeth, and say "branny-n-co."" Only a new young barman wouldn't under-
stand the first time. Now try saying "Cane, Passionfruit and Lemonade,
please, barman," and you'll see what I mean. The barman will either throw
you out or just give you a brandy~and-coke.

A common Afrikaner attitude to drink is revealed in the language used to
describe consumption--you "use" alcohol. For example, SADF Chief Constand
Viljoen once wrote in Paratus that he never "uses" alcohol. Even though
this is a direct translation of gebruik the word implies a serious intent

unbeknown to English.

109

A curious footnote here is that an Afrikaner seldom orders a drink in
Afrikaans, and has never shown any desire for beers called KASTEEL or
LEEU. It's probably tied up with the total absence of any racehorses
with Afrikaans names. Is this an ancient puratinism? If the vices of
gambling and drinking are expressed in another language, do they somehow
remain foreign and unwelcome, present only as temporary coruptions? The
Afrikaans word for "jackpot" is "boerpot''--but you never hear anything
except "jackpot" at Turffontein. When the manne are chalking their cues
at the snooker saloon in Bok Street, there's no Afrikaans equivalent for
"black ball game." Why? This needs further investigation--now there's
a thought for a UNISA thesis...

CSO: 3400/978

110

UPPER VOLTA

RECENT EVENTS REVIEWED; DOCUMENT CIRCULATES ON CAMPUS
Ouagadougou L'OBSERVATEUR in French 13, 14, 15 Apr 84 pp 10-11
[Column by Passek-Taale: "A Letter for Laye"]

[Excerpts] Dear Wambi,

Age quod agis. Alea jacta est.

The government daily SIDWAYA, whose launching was one of the high points of
the International Information Seminar held in Ouaga from 2 to 6 April 1984,
made its appearance on Thursday.

"For a first attempt, it was masterful!"

Monsignor Anthyme Bayala, bishop of the Diocese of Koudougou, was taken from
us on 3 April 1984. He was 59. May he rest in peace.

Beginning on 1 April as a prelude to Warld Health Day, the National dealth
Seminar came to close on Saturday, 7 April.

As part of Revolutionary Customs and Merchants Month a Customs Political
and Ideological Seminar began in Ouaga on Monday.

A group of volunteers from Guebwiller in Alsace (France) visited Monomtinga
in the Department of Kombissiri from 23 March 1984 to 11 April 1984. They
financed construction of an out-patient and maternity clinic there. Labor
was supplied by the local population.

The Boeing 707 P. Air that has been much in the news made its first loading
on Friday, 6 April 1984. On board were ten (10) tons of mangos and ten (10)
of green beans.

These Upper Voltan products were shipped to Lyon, France. With this plane,
which will later bear the name "Naganagani,'' Upper Volta now has adequate
transportation for its foreign trade and our production.

As .a result, the entire world will probably be able to enjoy the products of
Upper Voltan peasants, for "Naganagani" is within reach of all those interested
in commerce.

111

Green beans, mangos and other products will never again spoil in Upner Volta.
Point Air Volta 'Naganagani" is a great instruuent to open up our regions.

Let us move on to the National Trade Union of African Teachers in Upper
Volta (SNEAHV). No need to remind you that the members of that union have
gone out on strike. No need to tell you either that they were simply laid off.

What I am writing to you now is the list published by the government daily
SIDWAYA in its edition of Thursday, 12 April 1984:

Bourkina 216 Zoundweogo 31
Houet 195 Sahel 17
Yatenga 138 Ghagna 17
Oubritenga 132 Kenedougou 14
Sissili 93 Passore 7
Sourou 83 Gourma 1
Namentenga 80 Bam 0
Sanmatenga 78 Tapoa 0
Boulgou 60 Soum 0
Kossi 56 Poni 0
Comoe 55 Nahouri 0
Bougouriba 53 Ganzourgou 0
Moun-Houn 45

Total 1,380

Naturally, this list is disputed by SNEAHV. The fight is on.

On this same subject, Kone Batiemoko, member of the SNEAHV National Bureau,
was detained and questioned at the Gendarmerie on Tuesday, 3 April. He was
still there yesterday.

According to BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN No 622 of 12 April 1984, a fatal accident
occurred Wednesday evening at around 1900 hours on National Highway 5 (Upper
Volta-Ghana, via PO).

A 504 Break transport vehicle registered in Upper Volta ran into a group of
soldiers crossing the road coming out of the CNEC [expansion unknown}.

One person was killed outright and another has been hospitalized in Po.

A total of 11 persons were wounded seriously and 9 were taken to Ouagadougou
that same night.

Among those wounded -was the driver of the 504, Liliou Adoui and one of his
four passengers. The two dead are Mahamoudou Zongo, from the Revolutionary
National Guard, and Kossi Ouattara, from the Engineers and Firemen's Battalion.

The group of soldiers had arrived in Po that very evening for training. The

accident occurred as they were leaving the CNEC for a maneuver, scarcely two
hours after their arrival from Ouaga.

112

Dear Wambi, like everyone else, you have probably heard that the members of
the old regimes have been called before the Revolutionary People's Tribunals.
The hearings will only take place in Po. It is truly a trial in the right
place, especially since it will take place in the hotbed of the Upper Voltan
revolution.

Dear cousin, let me tell you that I have heard about a document being distri-
buted openly on the Ouagadougou University Campus.

Among other things, that document calls for the establishment of a Revolution-
ary Trade Union Confederation and comes out against any reduction in the pur-
chasing power of workers and any questioning of democratic and trade union
freedoms!

Who signed it? The following trade unions: the SNAID (Taxes and Public
Lands); the SNTER (National Education and Research); the SNTSHA (Human and
Animal Health); the SNTGMIH (Geology and Mines); and the UGEV (Students).
There you have it! That's life! See you soon.

Your cousin,

Passek-Taale

11,464
CSO: 3419/619

113

ZIMBABWE

CONVICTS TO BE PUT TO WORK ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
Harare THE HERALD in English 5 May 84 p 3

[Excerpt] Three major themes of Zimbabwe's development process emerged
at yesterday's session of the provincial governors’ seminar in Harare.

The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Dr Eddison
Zvobgo, announced that prisoners would be made available to work on
provincial development schemes; the Minister of Home Affairs, Dr Simbi
Mubako, announced that Government was considering establishing more border
posts to control movement in and out of the country; and the Minister of
Youth, Sport and Culture, Dr Simba Makoni, said his ministry regarded
unemployment among thousands of young Zimbabweans as its major problem.

Cde Zvobgo told the second seminar of provincial governors, heads of
ministries and Ministry of Local Government and Town Planning provincial
administrators that if any governor with other local authorities came up
with projects which could be carried out by prionsers, he should forward
these to Cde Zvobgo's ministry.

Prisoners should work very hard and a prison term had to be an experience
which no Zimbabwean would want to repeat, Cde Zvobgo said.

The whole exercise had to be systematically organised. One of the most
important issues was to ensure that prisoners did not escape whie working
on these development projects.

"We must combine our offices to have prisoners routinely on public works,"
Cde Zvobgo said.

He said his ministry had initiated a brick-moulding programme by all
prisoners which had already started at Chikurubi and Khami prisons. The
programme would be expanded to cover other prisons.

The bricks would also be made available for construction projects recom-
mended by the governors but they would be sold at the "cheapest price in
the country.”

114

Cde Zvobgo said they would be sold because his ministry would have put the
initial capital for the purchase of cement and other equipment necessary
for the moulding, and needed to recover some of this money.

Dr Mubako told the seminar there were insufficient border stations to deal
adequately with people entering from neighbouring countries.

Cde Mubako singled out the eastern border as needing more stations. Funds
were available to set up additional border posts.

The minister also said Government intends to increase the number of police
in rural areas.

CSO: 3400/980

115

ZIMBABWE

ZNCC TO TRAIN EX-COMBATANTS ENGAGED IN CO-OP VENTURES
Harare THE HERALD in English 6 May 84 p 4

[Text] The Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce is stepping up its efforts
to give training in basic business methods to ex-combatants engaged in
co-operative ventures.

After nearly a year's delay the ZNCC has received confirmation from the
Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare and the Demobilisa-
tion Directorate that Government departments will assist in recommending
ex-combatants for attendance at regular basic business courses held by the
ZNCC at regional centres throughout the country.

Mr Ambrose Chikukwa, chairman of ZNCC's training committee, said the chamber
last year responded to a call by the then Minister of Labour, Cde Kumbirai
Kangai, to help introduce demobilised ex-combatants to business practices.

The call was made at the May business forum at Victoria Falls and a
training sub-committee was formed to draw up proposals for approval by the
ministry which would have cleared individual co-operatives for assistance
and pinpointed areas where advice and expertise was most needed, Mr Chikukwa
said.

The Government's approval was not received until recently and in the interim
some co-operatives faced collapse because of depressed economic conditions,
drought and the lack of management skills to meet their difficulties.

Although the sub-committee was now moribund the ZNCC hoped that under the
auspices of the ministry and the Demobilisation Directorate ex-combatants
would take full advantage of the free weekend courses given by ZNCC volunteer

members.

"The many difficulties facing emerging enterprises are shared by all those
who venture into business--lack of starting capital, lack of assets to

raise loans, lack of working capital to raise loans and, above all, the lack
of experience to understand the processes and methods of business," Mr

Chikukwa said.

116

The ZNCC committee's programme of seminars offered training in basic
bookkeeping, records, stores and stock control, costing, price control,
cash flow and budgeting and the management of finance and working capital.

Courses this month are to be held in Chinhoyi, Masvingo and in Victoria
Falls to coincide with this year's ZNCC business forum there.

"The courses are nowhere near comparable to full-time business courses,
but they can be of great service to new enterprises, many of which even
have no books and, therefore, no way of telling whether they are making a
profit or loss," said Mr Chikukwa.

The courses include instructions on sales tax, income tax and other revenue
regulations.

While drawing up its training proposals for ex-combatants last year, the
ZNCC held several meetings with the Demobilisation Directorate.

Under the proposals the ZNCC would appoint advisers to co-operatives where
needed, with Government approval. "We did not hear from the ministry until
recently which is rather late, as some co-operatives of ex-combatants are
in bad shape," he said.

Mr Chikukwa said the ZNCC was now appealing to retired businessmen to step
forward to help the committee run more courses throughout the country.

"There is a lot of goodwill among Zimbabweans and I am hopeful a good number
sill volunteer for this noble cause."

CSO: 3400/980

117

ZIMBABWE

MINISTER OF INFORMATION SCORES SOUTH AFRICAN BASED CORRESPONDENTS
Harare THE HERALD in English 7 May 84 p 1

[Text] Harare-based foreign correspondents have enerally done a good

job of reporting the Zimbabwe scene--unlike thei: south African counterparts
who have been guilty of distortion, lies and sensationalism, the Minister
of Information, Posts and Telecommunications said yesterday.

Dr Nathan Shamuyarira, who was speaking at a cocktail reception and lunch
for 14 visiting West German journalists and representatives of tne Harare-
based Reemtsma tobacco company, said:

"There are 22 registered foreign correspondents here. We don't censor what
they send out. There is no censorship in the country. The only time we
see what they have written is when our representatives overseas send us
clippings.

"We have few problems with local foreign correspondents. Our problem is
with the corps of South African-based correspondents who engage in sensa-
tionalisn.

"Generally we have had a bad Press overseas. The overseas Press has not
shown the progress we have made in integrating the three armies, in recon-
ciliation, in economic progress."

South African-based foreign journalists preferred to come to Zimbabwe for
a few days and then return to their bases where they seem to delight in
writing negative stories. He said they liked to write stories claiming
that Zimbabwe was on the verge of economic collapse, that the country's
ethnic groups were at each other's throats or that whites were being
oppressed.

In spite of these negative stories Zimbabwe had left the offending journalists
alone--except for banning a West German couple and an American magazine
correspondent.

Cde Shamuyarira said the Government had been annoyed by the tendency of some

Western reporters to refer persistently to the North Korean-trained Five
Brigade without pointing out that the other four brigades were British-based.

118

Even Five Brigade, he said, had received British training.

"The army does a good job. It is a professional army. But if there are
unjust incidents we investigate them," he said.

The minister said the army had been successfully integrated with 10 to 12
percent of its members being former Rhodesian soldiers, about 30 percent
being former Zipra combatants while the rest were former Zanla guerillas.

The only reason there were more ex-Zanla combatants in the Zimbabwe National
Army than other groups was "because Zanu had a larger guerilla army," said
Cde Shamuyarira.

The reception was also addressed by Mr Anthony Taberer, chairman and
managing director of Tabex, who said tobacco was Zimbabwe's most important
single industry.

Tobacco accounted for about 25 percent of gross domestic product, supported
over 400 000 people, earned about 23 percent of the country's gross foreign
exchange (more than $200 million a year), and accounted for 40 percent of
Zimbabwe's total agricultural export.

"Tobacco makes a very significant contribution to the national fiscus and,
although it is not possible to decipher tax data, excise revenue on cigarette

and pipe tobaccos alone results in duties of approximately $24 to $25 million
per annum."

CSO: 3400/980

119

ZIMBABWE

NEW FOOD-FOR-WORK PROGRAM IN BUHERA BENEFITS DROUGHT VICTIMS
Harare THE HERALD in English 7 May 84 p 5
[Article by Munyaradzi Chenje]

[Text] The Government's new food-for-work scheme is meeting an enthusiastic
response where it matters most--from the people on drought relief in Buhera,
where the plan is being piloted.

The scheme was launched at the beginning of this month and already some of
the 54 300 people on drought relief in Buhera are working on community
projects.

And the rest are raring to go. Those interviewed by The Herald in Buhera
last week said the programme was long overdue.

Cde David Mukosi of Buhera said: "We thank the Government for giving us
this chance to work for our country. Drought relief only gave us food,
but now we can get money to send children to school, buy soap, sugar and
bread.

People expressed their satisfaction at being able to do socially-useful work
and being rewarded, instead of just "fellowing beer" as one of them put it.

"We are very happy with this new scheme and we hope the Government will
continue with such programmes," Cde Mukosi said.

The scheme--the Rural Public Works Programme--was launched on Tuesday by
the Minister of Local Government and Town Planning, Cde Enos Chikowore.
It pays those who have been on drought relief $4 a day for working on
community projects.

"We don't want our people to develop some kind of beggar posture or concept
where they just get things free," said Cde Chikowore about the programme.

And the drought relief scheme has proved costly for Zimbabwe's coffers.

In October last year, the Department of Social Services in the then Ministry
of Labour and Social Services, said in a statement: "Drought relief food
has so far been handed to about 2,1 million people in Zimbabwe's communal

lands."
120

Between April 1 last year and April 30 this year, the Government had
estimated that it would need $120 million for the drought relief programme
but only $45 million could be allocated to it.

To meet such a massive budget, Government had to divert money earmarked
for other projects to drought relief, and some projects did not even get
off the ground because of this.

The scheme not only benefits the affected people but will bring a greater
circulation of money to the rural areas, strengthening the "provo's"
buying power.

Shops, butcheries, grinding mills and beer halls will now have a wider
market thereby strengthening their viability. In many communal areas
such businesses survive from hand to mouth.

By upgrading facilities like roads, clinics, schools, dams and irrigation
schemes, the local population in each area will help raise its living
standards.

The people will also acquire skills which should benefit them as and when
the food-for-work scheme is no longer necessary. Although most of the
technical work will be done by experienced people, the workers will learn
basic trades.

By introducing this scheme, the Government will create employment in rural
areas and indirectly stem the urban drift.

Since independence, communal people have been involved in self-reliance
projects designed to develop their areas on a voluntary basis, and it is
feared by some that the new project may kill this voluntary spirit.

Others argue that $2 per day is not enough and that people may prolong
projects so that they can get more money.

Two dollars a day for a person, who works for 20 days a month, can bring
him about $40, and by rural standards, this is considered a lot of money.
If in a family, two people were to work on this programme, the family would

have $80 a month.

The basic food ration for a family of five for a month has been calculated
as 5 kg of beans ($7,200), 75 kg of mealie-meal ($14,70) and 2,5 litres of
cooking oil ($3,98) totalling $25,88. So if a family gets $80 each month
and spends $25,88, it would be left with $54,12. This family would still
end up being the winner.

To avoid the people from delaying their projects for their own benefit, the
District Development Fund, which is administering the exercise, must assess
the period a particular project takes to ensure that workers complete the
job in the laid-down period.

121

DDF'S past record and achievements speak well of its capabilities, and it is
no surprise it has been chosen to administer these projects.

"Both the ministries of Local Government and Town Planning and of Labour,
Manpower Planning and Social Welfare will ensure that there is no corruption,"
said Cde Chikowore when he outlined the plans for the scheme last week.

"Stringent measures will be taken to ensure that only people on the drought
relief register are employed and paid.”

If all goes well, the Government will have saved its people and the people
themselves will be proud of their own newly-acquired capabilities.

CSO: 3400/980

122

ZIMBABWE

MAZOWE FARM PEOPLE REFUSE TO BE EVICTED
Harare THE HERALD in English 8 May 84 p 1
[Article by William Bango]

[Text] More than 150 families, some of whom have been living on a Mazowe
farm since 1934, have vowed to resist any attempts to evict them.

The families claim that farmers in the area have allowed them to stay
"for all this time after realising that we have the right to this land."

The original owner of the farm, a Major Pilkington (who has left the country)
sold the property soon after independence in 1980 to Mr John Mathews. Mr
Mathews has since been battling to evict the families.

He told The Herald yesterday: "All those people do not work here. They
must move so that we can grow food for the country.”

The ZANU (PF) political commissar for Mazowe district, Cde Daison Banda
said he came to live on the farm in 1953 and had had no problems with the
owners.

"It is unfortunate that this place was bought by Mr Mathews. He no longer
wants to see us here although most of the people have lived here since 1934.

"We are going to resist any attempts to move us out because this is our land,"
said Cde Banda.

He said only a few residents were employed in the area. Most were either
self-employed or worked in other tcwns and cities.

Mr Mathews said arrangements were being made to accommodate those residents
working in Mazowe. "But the rest must go. We plan to develop the 220 acres
they are occupying illegally," he said.

The families, who were meant to leave at the end of April, have set up a
committee to deal with anyone who wants to evict them, and to negotiate
with the farmer and Government about their future.

Last week, said Cde Banda (the committee chairman), they went to the Ministry
of Local Government and Town Planning which told them they should move out
soon because they were on private property.

"We also saw officials from the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural
Development but they told us the same thing." Alternative accommodation
should be found “otherwise the problem will not be solved,"' said Cde Banda.
Mr Mathews refused to say what his plans were if the families refused to

be evicted. He said the matter had been reported to the police and any
further problems would be referred to the ZRP at Mazowe.

CSO: 3400/980 END

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