Skip to main content

Full text of "Some Economic Aspects of the New Long and Short Haul Clause"

See other formats


Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World 

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in 
the world by JSTOR. 

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other 
writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the 
mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. 

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this 
resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial 

Read more about Early Journal Content at 
journal-content . 

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people 
discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching 
platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit 
organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please 



Early interpretation of this clause, 323. — I. Cases in which relief is 
granted; the general policy, 325. — Roundabout lines, 327. — Cross- 
lines, 328. — Market competition, 330. — The parallel of a protective 
tariff, 332. — II. Extent of relief granted, 333. — Recent trans-conti- 
nental rate cases, 334. — The zone method criticised, 335. — Conclusion : 
the margin of tolerance and the Commission's ideal, 336. 

When a statute has been suddenly revived after a 
sleep of twenty years, we cannot help wondering 
whether it has, like Rip Van Winkle, been much 
changed in the interval. In the early days of struggle 
for existence, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
was waging a losing fight in the mere attempt to give 
to the " long and short haul clause " some meaning 
and force. Now it feels free to give the clause what 
meaning and force it will, subject only to constitutional 
limitations and to the guiding principles of reasonable- 
ness expressed in the statute. 2 Then as now, the Com- 
mission had power in special cases to permit any carrier 
to charge less for a longer haul, and to " prescribe the 
extent to which such designated common carrier may 
be relieved from the operation of the section." But 
whereas at present this power to relieve is the central 
fact of the fourth section, previous to 1910 it was from 
force of circumstances a dead letter. 

1 For a general survey, see Ripley, Railroads: Rates and Regulation, pp. 473 
ff., 564-566, and chap. xix. The present study is more limited in scope, paying 
especial attention to the cases of 1912-13. 

» R. R. Com. of Nev. v. S. P. Co., 21 I. C. C. R. 329. 340. 



No sooner was the act of 1887 in operation than 
many carriers took the ground that competition of any 
sort at the more distant point was a substantially dis- 
similar circumstance, and entitled them, not to relief 
in the discretion of the Commission, but to complete 
exemption. If this sweeping claim could be made 
good, no special relief need be asked for, since all the 
cases in which it could be of moment, or in which there 
was any great probability of its being granted, would 
be already taken out of the hands of the Commission 
entirely. So the question of authority had first to be 
fought out. In defending its jurisdiction the Com- 
mission became more uncompromising than at the 
outset as to what were " substantially similar circum- 
stances." It held, for purposes of giving vitality to 
the act, that nothing but competition of water carriers 
or of rail carriers not subject to the act could remove 
any rate from its operation, 1 tho in the first case heard 
it had conceded that the roads might be entitled to 
exemption " in rare and peculiar cases of competition 
between railroads which are subject to the statute, 
when a strict application of the general rule of the stat- 
ute would be destructive of legitimate competition." 2 

Whether or not this change of front was a wise tacti- 
cal move, it probably had little effect on the outcome. 
In any case it is hard to see how the power to grant 
partial relief could have been anything but a dead letter 
in the incongruous setting of the original fourth section. 
The power could not be exercised arbitrarily, without 
reason given, for then the Commission would be open 
to the charge of exercising legislative powers which 
Congress could not constitutionally delegate to it. 
Only as it should follow the general rules of the act 

' R. R. Com. v. Clyde S. S. Co., 5 I. C. C. R. 324. Reviewed in 21 1. C. C. R 414. 
' Id re L. & N. R. R. Co., 1 I. C. C. R. 31. 


with regard to reasonableness and undue preference 
would it be acting clearly within its powers as an ad- 
ministrative body. But if some carriers were to be 
relieved wholly or in part from the operation of a 
section which applied to all alike, what reasonable 
ground could possibly be shown for doing so, other than 
some difference in the " circumstances and conditions " 
surrounding the long and short haul in those cases in 
which relief was granted ? If such difference were not 
admitted to be " substantial," it could hardly furnish 
reasonable ground for relief. But to admit that the 
difference was " substantial " would seem equivalent 
to admitting at once that this was a case to which the 
clause did not apply at all. 

It seems clear that the Commission could never have 
succeeded in prescribing the degree of relief to be 
allowed, even if it had made good its claim that the 
clause applied to cases of competition between domestic 
railways. This claim, however, the Supreme Court 
refused to sustain. 1 A final attempt was made to pre- 
scribe the degree of relief to be granted in cases where 
circumstances were admittedly dissimilar, but the Com- 
mission was again overruled. 2 The first chapter was 
thus closed. 

From this brief survey, one conclusion should stand 
out clearly. The original attitude of the Commission 
was not radical nor uncompromising. The rigid atti- 
tude commonly ascribed to it was wrought out under 
stress of combat, and expressed the Commission's ideas 
of the legal necessities of the struggle for jurisdiction, 
not a settled economic policy that would be followed 
out, once the fight for jurisdiction should be won. 

1 I. C. C. v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co., 168 U. S. 144. 
' E. T. V. & G. Ry. Co. v. I C. C, 181 IT. S. 1. 


I. Cases in which Relief is Granted 

In fact, the effect of the amendment of 1910 has not- 
been by any means to establish a rigid long and short 
haul policy for all cases in which the discrimination is 
due to competition of carriers subject to the act. In 
the general statements with which the Commission 
signalized the reviving of the fourth section, it went 
back to the tone of its very first decisions, made nearly 
a quarter of a century previous, before the opening of 
the struggle with the courts. It proposed to grant 
relief in situations beyond the carriers' control — in 
difficulties that he has not brought upon himself by 
his own competitive policy. " If at the more distant 
point it finds a competition to which it must conform 
under the imperious law of competition, if it would 
participate in traffic to that point, it may discriminate 
against the intermediate point without violating the 
law, provided it establishes such necessity before the 
Commission." ' 

The passage quoted sounds very like the " rare and 
peculiar cases " phrase of the original Louisville & 
Nashville decision. 2 Indeed the " rare and peculiar " 
case dealt with in this early ruling is the type of the 
most important class of exceptions granted in con- 
sideration of railroad competition under the new act; 
namely that of roundabout railroad lines which are in 
competition with more direct routes. These it is the 
settled policy of the Commission to relieve from the 
operation of the fourth section, provided always that 
the short line bases its charges on distance, and that 
the rates to intermediate points on the roundabout line 
are shown to be in themselves reasonable/' 

1 R. R. Com. of Nev. v. S. P. Co., 21 I. C. C. R. 341. 
' In re L. & N. R. R. Co., 1 I. C. C. R. 31, 81. 

' Wright Wire Co. et al. v. P. & L. E. R. R. Co. et al., 21 I. O. ('. R. 04; In re Rates 
on Salt. 24 I. C. C. R. 192, 195, and other eases. 


This might seem to make a rather large breach in the 
barrier of prohibition that was intended to be " well- 
nigh universal," but no one familiar with the history of 
the question will be surprised. The Commissioners are 
only following the original policy of their predecessors; 
they are in accord with foreign practice, and with a 
sound " cost " theory of charges. The essential thing, 
under such a theory, is that each locality should get 
the benefit of its location, as measured in the actual rela- 
tive costs of carriage. The circuitous route is, of course, 
ordinarily the more expensive, especially as the Com- 
mission has tentatively defined a circuitous route for 
this purpose as one at least 15 per cent longer than the 
direct line. 1 This is by no means a fixed rule, however; 
other disabilities than distance might have the same 
effect, even if the distance were the same. 2 The deci- 
sive thing is an economic disadvantage of some sort, 
that would of itself justify higher rates than those of 
the stronger (usually shorter) line. In view of more 
complex situations to come, the writer begs the reader's 
patience in a brief review of the economics of this simple 
and familiar case. s 

An intermediate point (C in diagram) on the longer 
route has a right to a reasonable joint rate through the 
common junction and on by the direct line (CAB), if 
it is so near the common junction that this is the least 
expensive way for the carriers to haul the goods. This 
means a rate higher than the junction pays by an 
amount approaching the local charges for the haul AC. 

To this rate, C is entitled on a cost basis and as a 
result of its location, no matter how the traffic moves; 

1 In re Rates on Salt, 24 I. C. C. R. 192, 195. Edwards & Bradford Lumber Co. 
v. C. B. & Q. R. R., 25 I. C. C. R. 93. 

> In re Rates on Salt, 24 I. C. C. R. 192, 196. In re Lumber Rates, 25 I. C. C. R. 
61. Grand Junct. Chamber of Com. v. D. & R. G. R. R. Co., 23 I. C. C. R. 115. 

* For a fuller discussion, going into some aspects of the situation not treated here, 
see Ripley, Railroads: Rates and Regulation, pp. 219 ff. 


and it is not entitled on a cost basis to any lower rate. 
If the route CAB were owned by one company and 
CDB by another, there would be no question raised of 
the fairness of the adjustment of charges. Why then 

Diagram I 

should the principles of justice, as based on cost, turn 
a somersault if we suppose the stretch of track AC has 
been sold by one company to the other ? In a closed 
circuit of this sort, the cost principle demands that to 
any terminus the economic mid-point should pay the 
highest rate, and it is only by chance that this mid-point 
could be identical with a junction of the lines of two 
separate companies. 

Now if the roundabout route chooses to compete for 
traffic between the common termini, so long as this 
does not result in unduly low rates from A to B direct 
(the Commission requires the direct line to observe the 
fourth section), it is a matter purely between the two 
companies, injuring no one, unless it results in wasteful 
carriage. This latter aspect is not to be neglected; x 
but such bidding for roundabout hauls is not likely to 
be very prevalent unless there is some unused capacity 
which can be employed at slight additional expense, so 
that the possible waste of the roundabout haul is not 
necessarily as great as would appear from a glance at 

1 See Ripley, op. cit., chap. viii. 


the map. If the direct line is unable to carry all the 
traffic between its termini, the roundabout haul be- 
comes the cheapest way to handle the surplus and avoid 
congestion; a condition which occurs, to be sure, only 

But even if the short line is not congested, to compel 
the granting of terminal rates to intermediate points 
would not prevent a discrimination but create one, and 
one that might just as logically be extended to an out- 
side point E. In fact, if it were not, the point E would 
have just cause of complaint. Thus, if a territory is 
divided into zones whose rates increase with distance, 
and one carrier happens to have a route that passes 
through a higher zone on the way to or from points in a 
zone of lower charges, it would not simplify matters to 
compel that carrier to observe the fourth section. 1 

Another interesting case is that of the independent 
cross-line forming the base of an isosceles triangle or 
one side of a rectangle, and able to divert in either direc- 
tion through freight from its own local stations — the 
type of a large class of problems with which Professor 
Ripley has made us familiar. 2 A case of this sort has 
been settled, not on the ground of preventing waste in 
roundabout carriage, but, like the general case of the 
circuitous route, on the sole basis of giving each station 
the benefit of the shortest route available by which its 
traffic might move. Carthage Junction :t is farther 
from various Ohio River crossings than are the points 
on either side of it, and it pays a higher rate. This is 
upheld, even tho " it often happens . . . that this 
carrier, . . . for purposes and reasons of its own, 
desires to haul traffic which originates west of Carthage 
Junction through Carthage Junction east to a connec- 

1 In re Lumber Rates, 25 I. C. C. R. 50. » Op. cit., pp. 282 ff. 

J In re Lumber Rates. 25 I. C. C. R. 50, 56. 


tion with the Louisville & Nashville at Harriman or the 
Southern Railway at Emory Gap, and conversely, it 
might desire to handle traffic originating to the east of 
Carthage Junction through that point west to a connec- 
tion with the Louisville & Nashville at Nashville or 
Clarksville, or the Illinois Central at Hopkinsville. In 




y / 




Carthage Junction 

Diagram II 

4* Harriman 
Emory Gap 

either case the traffic would pass through a point taking 
a higher rate than the point of origin." 

The Commission holds, in granting relief from the 
fourth section, that so long as the " rates are mani- 
festly constructed upon the proper plan ... it is en- 
tirely immaterial to the shippers upon that line whether 
traffic is handled by the Tennessee Central through its 


eastern or its western junctions." * The opinion in the 
case gives no hint whether the " purposes and reasons 
of its own " which give rise to the practice complained 
of are matters of transportation convenience, such as 
the balancing of its eastward and westward tonnage so 
as to reduce the haulage of empty cars, or whether they 
are concerned with getting the most favorable division 
of the through rate with the connecting carriers. But 
it seems plain that the question at issue is not to be 
settled on the basis which Professor Ripley suggests, 
of preventing roundabout shipments at lower rates than 
are granted to points on the way, through which the 
shipments pass. 

So much for the circumstances which will justify the 
granting of relief. The fact has already been mentioned 
that competition with other railroads will not of itself 
furnish a basis for the granting of relief to the shortest 
line, nor to any other of approximately equal length. '- 
Market competition falls almost in the same category. 
By itself, it is not enough to justify departure from the 
general rule, tho the Commission will not say that it- 
could never do so. 3 The writer may hazard the con- 
jecture that when exception is made, it will be to pre- 
serve the life of established industries and the value of 
invested capital which have been protected so long 
against the superior advantages of others that they 
have acquired a " vested interest " in such protection. 

The Commission argues, however, that if carriers 
make an extra low through rate to put Kansas salt into 
St. Louis in competition with salt from Michigan, the 
carriers of the Michigan salt could retaliate with equal 
justice, 4 and there would be no logical limit. " This 

i Cf. Ripley, op. cit., pp. 295, 296. 
» 24 I. C. C. R. 192, 25 I. C. C. R. 61. 
' In re Lumber Rates, 25 I. C. C. R. 50, 59. 
« In re Rates on Salt, 24 I. C. C. R. 192. 


form of discrimination is one which feeds upon itself, 
. . . and it ought to be snuffed out in its infancy before 
property rights and commercial conditions have inter- 
vened to render the thing aimed at difficult of accom- 
plishment." 1 It seems here to be implied that if 
another case of this same sort were to arise, in which the 
practice was not attacked until after property rights 
had grown up, the answer might be different. 

While agreeing entirely with the general view of the 
Commission, the writer has had some questionings as 
to the logical consistency of the policy. If we accept 
the idea that market competition may be something 
more than a mere " euphemism for railroad policy," 2 
we may draw some interesting comparisons. If the 
actual cost of making goods and carrying them to St. 
Louis from the east is less than from the west, but 
if the western carrier makes an extra low rate, low 
enough to meet the eastern competition, it is not at 
once obvious how this weak-line competition differs in 
principle from that of a roundabout route against a 
direct one joining the same termini. And if the western 
road makes the rate to St. Louis lower than to nearby 
intermediate points, have these points been robbed of 
anything to which their geographical situation entitled 
them ? By the terms of the problem, the lowest actual 
cost at which the goods can be made and laid down at 
their doors is more than the same goods need cost laid 
down at St. Louis. 

But the assumptions (expressed and implied) on 
which this case rests are such as would prove in practice 
both elusive and unstable. To ascertain with accuracy 
the point at which the combined cost of making and 
laying down the goods is the same from the east as 

' In re Lumber Rates, 25 I. C. C. R. 50, 60. See also Bluefield Shippers Assoc, v. 
N. & W. R. Co., 22 I. C. C. R. 519, 525. 
' 21 I. C. C. R. 367. 


from the west, we must know the relative costs of pro- 
duction at the different sources of supply, and must 
make allowance as well for any differences in quality 
which might enable one producer's goods to make way 
against another's even at a higher price. And if we 
were to base a rate policy on our findings, we ought to 
be sure that these relative costs and qualities would not 
change in the future. For if the western producers 
should become enough more efficient, the whole argu- 
ment would fall to the ground, and the case become one 
of obvious discrimination in favor of St. Louis and 
against the intermediate points. Such justice totters 
on a narrow pedestal. We should also make sure that 
the financial situation of the railway will not change, 
for if it does, the road may find itself no longer anxious 
to carry the traffic in question at such low rates, and yet 
unable to alter its policy without damage to " vested 

The essential difference between the two kinds of 
competition shows itself in facts like these. In any 
case like the one just described, capital and labor are 
being supported in a relatively unproductive locality, 
while in the competition of routes, so long as the rates 
of the strongest route are not twisted out of a reason- 
able adjustment, no industry is affected save the rail- 
roads themselves. And if the roundabout line should 
decide to cease bidding for competitive traffic, or to 
let part of it go, that is an affair between the traffic 
manager and his superiors, making no essential differ- 
ence to anyone outside. 

Railroad systems, like nations, are prone to protect 
their own infant industries; l but the regulator who 

1 The writer has elsewhere discussed more fully the parallel between railway rate 
theory and the theory of international trade. Columbia Univ. Studies, vol. 37, no. 1, 
pp. 125-135. The discussion of Commissioner Meyer's paper at the last session of 
the American Economic Association (held since the above was written) shows that 
economists recognize the fundamental identity of principle involved. 


seeks a nation's welfare is like an economist with a 
world-inclusive outlook viewing a protective tariff. 
He concedes it justifiable in certain cases, but he is 
likely to conclude that out of the great array of pro- 
tected industries, the infants whose special nurture has 
repaid its cost are few and far between. Hence the 
fact that the Commission will not allow market competi- 
tion, if unsupported by special considerations, to justify 
lower charges for the longer haul, may be regarded as a 
salutary check, making somewhat more expensive a 
policy which is likely in any case to be carried beyond 
the limits of gain for the country at large. 

II. Extent of Relief Granted 

It is in the exercise of its discretion to decide the 
degree and kind of relief to be granted that the most 
interesting questions arise, for the burden of proof is on 
the carrier to justify the rates he wishes to charge. " It 
must be affirmatively shown by the carrier seeking such 
exception that injustice will not be done to intermediate 
points by allowing lower rates at the more distant 
points." 1 This is a return to the principle of the 
Cullom Report of 1886, which proposed that a greater 
charge for a shorter distance should be " presumptive 
evidence of unjust discrimination." 

As to the extent of the Commissioners' discretion, 
they have maintained that confiscation is the only 
limit. 2 They may fix a maximum difference between 
the rates of the two points in question, or a minimum 
rate at the farther point (a rare thing in rate regulation). 
They may " define the territory from which a higher 
intermediate charge may be made," or fix a maximum 
rate at the intermediate point. In fact, they may 

» R. R. Com. of Nev. v. S. P. Co., 21 I. C. C. R. 341. 

* R. R. Com. of Nev. v. S. P. Co., 21 I. C. C. R. 329, 340. 


limit the discrimination " in any way that is definite 
and certain." l Within the limits set, it would seem 
that the Commissioners have a freer hand to work out 
their own ideas of relative reasonableness than ever 

By far the most striking rulings have been in the 
cases dealing with the rates from the eastern and central 
section to points near the Pacific coast. The questions 
at issue and the general features of the decisions are 
now familiar. On account of water competition, the 
rates from the eastern coast are highest to points some 
distance inland, and lower to Pacific ports. When the 
carriers serving Chicago and other points in the eastern 
half of the continent began the policy of putting these 
cities on a par with the seaports in competition for the 
western markets, they took the rates as they found them, 
discriminations and all. Under these rates, producers 
west of the Alleghenies have come to do more and more 
of the business, until now most of the traffic paying the 
rates is not subject to water competition that would of 
itself account for the discrimination. 2 It seems to have 
been true, however, that the ocean carriers did reach 
inland and draw cargoes to the Pacific coast via the 
Atlantic from as far west, at times, as Chicago, often 
themselves " absorbing " the cost of the eastward haul. 
The Commission met this situation 3 by dividing the 
country into zones, one where water competition ad- 
mittedly has full force, one where it has no force, and 
two intermediate zones where its effect is weak or inter- 
mittent. The amount by which the intermediate rates 
in question might exceed the through charges was 
limited to 25 per cent from the eastern zone, 15 per cent 

i City of Spokane v. N. P. Ry. Co., 21 I. C. C. R. 400, 415. 
' R. R. Com. of Nev. v. So. Pac. Co. et al., 19 I. C. C. R. 238, 247-251. 
» Intermountain Rate Case, 21 I. C. C. R. 355. City of Spokane v. N. P. Ry. 
Co., 21 I. C. C. R. 400, 423. 


from the next, 7 per cent from the next and none from 
the zone farthest west. 

At first sight the ruling seems logical. Yet here also 
disturbing questionings arise which make one doubt if 
this will prove a permanent solution of the problem. 
Indeed the Commission can hardly be said to regard 
it as such, since it held that it would be within its rights 
in refusing relief to all but the seaboard zone, as it had 
not been affirmatively shown that the coast-to-coast 
rates were unreasonably low in themselves if applied 
to the haul from the inland zones to the intermountain 
region. Such being the case, and the law placing the 
burden of proof on the carriers to establish the reason- 
ableness of their intermediate charges, the Commission" 
could legally have lowered all the intermediate rates to 
the level of those granted to the seaports. The fact 
that they gave the permission to charge more, repre- 
sented an attempt to be " extremely conservative in 
this, the first application of the new law." * Regarded 
as an attempt to set up the exact reasonable charge to 
the intermountain region (of which no pretense is made), 
the decision would surely be open to the objection raised 
by the Commerce Court in enjoining it, 2 namely, that 
the Commissioners cannot say whether the intermediate 
rates chargeable under their order are absolutely rea- 
sonable or not, for they do not know what those rates 
will be. Apparently, the Commission assumed that the 
coast-to-coast through rates would go no lower than 
they were at the time — a bold assumption in view of 
all the possibilities of the Panama Canal. If the deci- 
sion had used percentages of the coast-to-coast rates as 
they stood at the time, its position might have been un- 
assailable. Possibly the Commission had in mind its 
experience with the Texas Commission, in which its at- 

' R. R. Com. of Nev. v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 21 I. C. C. R. 329, 369. 
1 A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. IT. S., 191 Fed. 8.56. 


tempts to prevent a discrimination by lowering an inter- 
state rate were frustrated by lowering the competing 
intra-state rate still farther. Were the Commissioners 
afraid that an order that should merely lower these inter- 
mediate rates would be the signal for an orgy of rate cut- 
ting by the roads who are interested in seeing the Pacific 
seaports do as big a jobbing business as possible ? 

As to the logic of the competitive situation, it would 
seem that the straight path to the end desired would be 
to determine, if possible, what rates from the various 
zones are needed, bona fide, to meet the rail-and-water 
competition, and to order that the only rates exempt 
from the long and short haul prohibition shall be rates 
that are not lower than the competitive rates so found. 
The result would be quite similar to that of the rulings 
of the Commission: it would level off the summit of 
the mountain-peak of high rates which raises its bulk 
so forbiddingly to the western inland rate-payer, but 
the method would be more direct. A rate is either 
determined by water competition or it is not. If not, 
it is not entitled to exemption; but if it is so determined, 
what reason is there for putting a percentage limit on 
the relief granted ? If the method here suggested be 
practicable, it would seem to offer the simplest way of 
separating "business" reductions of rates (made neces- 
sary by direct competition of routes) from " charitable " 
ones (due to market competition), and enacting that 
charity must begin at home. 

In conclusion, a few general impressions present 
themselves. In the first place, all cases under the fourth 
section cannot but be witnesses to the wide margin of 
tolerance for different methods of constructing tariffs 
that exist in our regulative machinery. Strict mileage 
scales, tapering scales, blanket rates of wide extent, 


and combinations both forward and (with the permis- 
sion of the Commission) backward from a competitive 
terminal point, — all are allowed within the limits of 
this discretionary statute. All that is accomplished 
by rulings under the fourth section is to substitute 
blanket rates for rates that disregard distance still 
more violently. 

In many cases the Commission, acting under its 
general powers, has gone farther than this. It has 
limited the extent of single blanket rates when that 
seemed excessive, and has prescribed rates of its own 
making in the form of modified distance scales. But 
this work tho of the utmost interest, is beyond the 
bounds of the present study. 

Secondly, it seems that the Commission's ideal has 
much to do with the efficiency to be gained by placing 
the country's industries in the situations most favor- 
able for them, and less to do with preventing the losses 
in transportation efficiency that come directly from 
wasteful carriage, in ways made familiar by Professor 
Ripley's analysis. 1 And, thirdly, one cannot but 
wonder whether the shifting to the carriers of the bur- 
den of proving that rates to intermediate points are 
reasonable may not have been, during the months that 
are past, a more effective weapon in lowering these rates 
than it can ever be again. For the attorneys of the 
railroads cannot fail to learn better and better now to 
support this burden of proof, as the Federal Depart- 
ment of Justice in enforcing the Sherman Act had to 
learn, through the fiasco of the Knight case, how to 
prove to the courts that an illegal combination existed, 
and emerged at the end successful. 

J. M. Clark. 
Amherst College. 

1 Railroads: Rates and Regulation, as cited.