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THESIS

LOGISTICAL IMPLICATIONS

OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA

Mark W. Beddoes

March, 1997

Thesis Advisor:

Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.

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ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

The U.S. Marine Corps concept for the projection of naval power ashore is Operational Maneuver From
the Sea (OMFTS). OMFTS calls for movement of Marines from ships at sea directly to objectives deep inland
without requiring a pause to build-up combat power on the beach. Support for ground forces is expected to
come from the sea, and be delivered primarily by air. This demands that sea-based logistics assets remain
sufficiently close to shore to allow air assets to conduct resupply operations directly to the battlefield. The
implication of this is that Navy ships may sacrifice operational and perhaps tactical mobility while sustaining
the Marine operation.

This thesis determines the distance from the coastline sea-based Combat Service Support (CSS) assets will
be able to maintain and still support operations of a given magnitude, and how tactically constrained Navy ships
will be in order to support this concept of expeditionary warfare. It focuses on the time-distance-weight/volume
relationships involved, and takes into account characteristics of the resupply assets, such as aircraft availability
capacity, method of employment, and the effects of combat attrition. Three methods of employing a Marine
Expeditionary Unit are studied, ranging from a traditional force mix to the use of small infestation teams. The
analysis shows that the available CSS assets will not support a traditional ground force mix at the distances
envisioned, but will support the use of small teams. To fully realize OMFTS and still allow ships to maintain
the desired standoff from shore will require a shift to more lethal Marine forces with much smaller logistical
demands. Until such a force is feasible, the Navy should plan on providing support to Marines from close to
shore.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Amphibious Operations, Combat Service Support, Littoral
Warfare, Operational Logistics, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, Sea-Based
Logistics, Sea Dragon, Ship to Objective Maneuver

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LOGISTICAL IMPLICATIONS

OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA

Mark W. Beddoes

Lieutenant, United States Navy

B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1988

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March, 1997

CA 93943-510)

ABSTRACT

The U.S. Marine Corps concept for the projection of naval power ashore is
Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS). OMFTS calls for movement of Marines
from ships at sea directly to objectives deep inland without requiring a pause to build-up
combat power on the beach. Support for ground forces is expected to come from the sea,
and be delivered primarily by air. This demands that sea-based logistics assets remain
sufficiently close to shore to allow air assets to conduct resupply operations directly to the
battlefield. The implication of this is that Navy ships may sacrifice operational and
perhaps tactical mobility while sustaining the Marine operation.

This thesis determines the distance from the coastline sea-based Combat Service
Support (CSS) assets will be able to maintain and still support operations of a given
magnitude, and how tactically constrained Navy ships will be in order to support this
concept of expeditionary warfare. It focuses on the time-distance-weight/volume
relationships involved, and takes into account characteristics of the resupply assets, such
as aircraft availability, capacity, method of employment, and the effects of combat
attrition. Three methods of employing a Marine Expeditionary Unit are studied, ranging
from a traditional force mix to the use of small infestation teams. The analysis shows that
the available CSS assets will not support a traditional ground force mix at the distances
envisioned, but will support the use of small teams. To fully realize OMFTS and still
allow ships to maintain the desired standoff from shore will require a shift to more lethal
Marine forces with much smaller logistical demands. Until such a force is feasible, the
Navy should plan on providing support to Marines from close to shore.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

A. OBJECTIVE OF THESIS 1

B. SHIP TO OBJECTIVE MANEUVER (STOM) 2

C. SEA DRAGON 3

D. NAVY LITTORAL CONSIDERATIONS 4

II. ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 5

A. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 5

B. METHODOLOGY 5

III. DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS 7

A. IDENTIFY FORCES TO BE SUPPORTED 7

B. IDENTIFY SUPPORTPNG ASSETS 8

1. Shipping 8

2. Aircraft 8

3. Surface 9

4. New Technologies 10

C. DETERMINE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 10

1 . Force Mixes 10

2. Calculation of Requirements 12

D. SPECIFY HOW SUPPORT ASSETS WILL BE USED 12

1. MV-22 12

2. CH-53E 13

3. Daily Lift Requirements 14

IV. SUPPORTABILITY ANALYSIS 15

A. DETERMINE MAXIMUM DISTANCE AT WHICH ASSETS CAN
SATISFY SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 15

1 . Equations 15

2. Inputs 19

3. Baseline Results 20

B. ASSESS EFFECTS OF AIRCRAFT ATTRITION ON MAXIMUM
SUPPORT DISTANCE 20

1 . Approach 20

2. Equations 22

3. Results 23

4. An Example from the OMFTS Concept Paper 24

V. CONCLUSIONS 27

A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 27

B. RECOMMENDATIONS 27

LIST OF REFERENCES 29

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 31

VI n

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. Marine Corps concept for the projection of naval power ashore is
Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS). Like Forward ... From the Sea, it
emphasizes the world's littoral regions as areas for potential conflict, and the role of the
Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) in those conflicts. The availability of inexpensive
advanced weapons and sensors to potential adversaries will make traditional amphibious
methods of ship-to-shore movement and lodgement ashore more risky. To reduce this
vulnerability, OMFTS calls for movement from ships at sea directly to objectives inland
without requiring a pause to build up at a beachhead. To accomplish this, assault forces
must be lighter and faster, and a great deal of command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence (C4I), combat service support (CSS), and fire support (Naval Surface
Fire Support and Close Air Support) must be sea-based.

The U.S. Marine Corps Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory was established in
October, 1 995 to develop and test advanced technologies and operational concepts to support
OMFTS. The developmental process is known as Sea Dragon. One of the concepts under
development envisions small, highly mobile teams dispersed over a battlefield up to 200 x
200 nautical miles in size. These teams would infest an area, identify critical targets, and
engage selected targets by calling in precision fires. The desired capability is to achieve the
combat power of a large force spread over the entire battlefield while not presenting a large,
fixed target to retaliate against. Major support for these units, in the form of command and
coordination, fires, and sustainment, will all remain at sea.

One of OMFTS's goals is to reduce the buildup of forces and equipment ashore.
Delivery and sustainment of ground forces is expected to come directly from the sea.
primarily by air. This demands that sea-based logistics assets remain sufficiently close to
shore to allow air assets to conduct resupply operations directly to the battlefield. One
implication of this is that Navy ships may have to sacrifice operational and perhaps tactical
mobility to sustain the Marine operation.

The thesis determines the distance from the coastline that sea-based CSS assets will
be able to maintain and still support MEU-sized OMFTS operations using either traditional

forces or small infestation teams. It focuses on the time-distance-weight/volume
relationships involved in the delivery and sustainment of forces ashore, and takes into
account characteristics of the resupply assets, such as aircraft availability and capacity, and
the effects of attrition. The objective is to provide pragmatic quantitative estimates as to
how tactically constrained the Navy ships will be while supporting this new form of
expeditionary warfare under a wide variety of circumstances.

The analysis shows that when OMFTS is conducted using traditional forces, the
envisioned amphibious ship standoff of 50+ NM is difficult, and is not possible in a non-
permissive air environment. Shifting to a non-mechanized force does not ease the problem
because of the increased airborne troop movement requirements. Shifting to the use of
infestation teams helps somewhat. However, the current practice of sending a two-aircraft
section severely limits the possible range capability, because their payload is so light. If
only one aircraft is sent to resupply or move a team, there is a huge increase in range.
Increased capability could be achieved by a number of different measures, such as increasing
the number of aircrews, increasing the number of aircraft, reducing the number of aircraft
used per mission, and exploiting the combat power of an accompanying carrier battle group.

To realize the full value of OMFTS, there must be a shift to more lethal forces with
smaller logistical demands, or a sizable increase in airlift capability. To maintain a safe
standoff from shore, maintain operational flexibility, and still support OMFTS, the Navy will
need to push development of inshore combat tactics through means similar to those
undertaken by the Commandant's Warfighting Lab. Influencing events ashore is more than
being able to strike deep inland with precision weapons and aircraft. It is the ability to affect
the campaign deep inland with forces on the ground. Until a lighter, more lethal Marine
force is feasible, the Navy should plan on providing support to Marines from close to shore.

I. INTRODUCTION

A campaign plan that cannot be logistically supported is not a plan at all, but simply an
expression of fanciful wishes. John F. Meehan III (Meehan, 1993).

And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more
perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction
of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done
well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the
new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side,
and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they
have had a long experience of them. Nicollo Machiavelli (Machiavelli).

A. OBJECTIVE OF THESIS

The U.S. Marine Corps Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory was established in
October, 1 995 to develop and test advanced technologies and operational concepts to support
OMFTS. The developmental process is known as Sea Dragon. One of the concepts under
development envisions small, highly mobile teams dispersed over a battlefield up to 200 x
200 nautical miles in size. These teams are referred to by several different names. One that
is commonly used is reconnaissance assault platoons (RAPs). and this will be used in this
thesis. The RAPs would infest an area, identify critical targets, and engage selected targets
by calling in precision fires. The desired capability is to achieve the combat power of a large

force spread over the entire battlefield while not presenting a large, fixed target to retaliate
against. Major support for these units, in the form of command and coordination, fires, and
sustainment, will all remain at sea (Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory, 1997).

One of OMFTS's goals is to reduce the buildup of forces and equipment ashore.
Delivery and sustainment of ground forces is expected to come directly from the sea,
primarily by air. This demands that sea-based logistics assets remain sufficiently close to
shore to allow air assets (CH-53E, MV-22) to conduct resupply operations directly to the
battlefield. One implication of this is that Navy ships may have to sacrifice operational and
perhaps tactical mobility to sustain the Marine operation.

The thesis will determine the distance from the coastline that sea-based CSS assets
will be able to maintain and still support MEU-sized OMFTS operations using either
traditional forces or RAPs. It will not explore the validity of the RAP concept itself, or the
other issues (prominently C4I and fire support) involved with its employment. The thesis
will focus on the time-distance-weight/volume relationships involved in the delivery and
sustainment of forces ashore. It will take into account characteristics of the resupply assets,
such as aircraft availability and capacity, and the effects of attrition. The objective of this
thesis is to provide pragmatic quantitative estimates as to how tactically constrained the
Navy ships will be while supporting this new form of expeditionary warfare under a wide
variety of circumstances.

It must be remembered that the Marine Corps will continue to be prepared to conduct
traditional amphibious operations, Sustained Operations Ashore (SOA). and Operations
Other than War (OOTW), as well as Operational Maneuver from the Sea. But, some forms
of OMFTS are drastic departures from traditional operations in the demands placed on
logistics, C4I, and fire support in return for the greatly expanded area of influence of a
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). For this reason, OMFTS is the focus of this
thesis.
B. SHIP TO OBJECTIVE MANEUVER (STOM)

Traditional amphibious maneuver from the sea is a three-step process: (1) maneuver
in ships; (2) transition ashore; (3) maneuver ashore. Step (1) allows much more flexible

positioning of forces than can be achieved by forces ashore. While the defending forces

must cover all possible avenues of entry, the sea-borne forces may choose when and where

to attack. Step (2) is the movement of land combat units ashore, and requires an assault to

secure a lodgement on the beach from which to execute step (3). The time required to

complete step (2) often offsets the advantage gained by step (1). By the time sufficient

combat power is on the beach, a support area secured, and units are ready to commence

maneuver on land, the enemy often will have had time to prepare a defense or counter attack

(Lyons and Magwood, 1994). OMFTS, using STOM, seeks to eliminate step (2), the

transition ashore. This will be made possible by technological advances in mobility- as well

as advances in fire support and C4I.

The goal of Ship-to-Objective Maneuver is to apply the principles and
tactics of modem land maneuver to amphibious battlefields. Specifically, we
will conduct combined arms penetration and exploitation operations from
over the horizon at sea directly to the accomplishment of objectives ashore,
without stopping to seize, defend, and build up beaches, landing zones, or
other penetration points (U.S. Marine Corps, 1995).

C. SEA DRAGON

Sea Dragon is the development process for new, high-risk concepts to support
OMFTS. The Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory (CWL) is tasked with field testing
advanced technologies and concepts in order to identify those with promise as well as those
that should be pursued no further at present. One of the concepts to emerge from this
process is the use of light, dispersed, foot mobile teams empowered with advanced C4I and
remote, on-call fire support to engage an adversary indirectly. The intent is to provide the
massed weapons effects of a large force while not presenting a massed target. These units
have very little combat power of their own, and rely on improved, timely fire support more
than do traditionally organized units executing STOM. The dispersion and size of these
units require that they be stealthy and mobile in order to survive and be effective. This
requirement for speed and stealthiness also applies to their means of deliver}' and support.
The CWL is exploring resupply methods that will enable an aircraft to deliver support

without compromising the location of the supported units (Commandant's Warfighting

Laboratory, 1997).

D. NAVY LITTORAL CONSIDERATIONS

OMFTS requires C4I/fires/logistics to be based at sea to the maximum extent
possible. Thus, Navy vessels must remain close enough to supply the just-in-time support
entailed. This task is complicated by dangers associated with the littorals:

• Mines. The inability to rapidly detect and clear mines forces ships to remain
further away from shore.

• Anti-ship missiles (ASMs). Low-observable, high speed ASMs leave a very
small time window in which to defend. Even with Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC), depth of fire is required for safety.

• Diesel submarines. These operate close to shore, and shallow-water
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is difficult.

• Small coastal craft. The U.S. Navy is comprised of blue water warships and is not
well suited for defending against small craft.

Traditional amphibious operations require amphibious shipping to approach within
10.000 yards of the beach. STOM envisions a minimum standoff of 25 NM for deployment
of AAAVs, 40 NM for LCAC operations, and 50 NM or greater for aircraft operations (U.S.
Marine Corps, 1995). Ideally, capital ships (CVN, LHD/LHA, and Arsenal ship) would
remain more than 100 NM from shore.

II. ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

A. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

This analysis is limited to a Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable
(MEU(SOC)) Marine force, the Navy ships and aircraft present in a typical Amphibious
Ready Group (ARG), and a 15-day duration of operations with no external support. Only
the logistical aspects (Combat Service Support) of OMFTS are considered. The required
advances in C4I and fire support have not yet been achieved, but a sufficient capability is
assumed for the time frame of this study, 2010-2015.

Combat Service Support has six functional areas: Supply, Maintenance,
Transportation, General Engineering, Health Services, and Other Services (U.S. Marine
Corps, 1993). This analysis is concerned primarily with the supply and transportation
functions, with some consideration to the transportation requirements for health services.
The other areas are assumed to remain at sea and are not considered.

B. METHODOLOGY

This analysis is broken into two main components: the determination of support
requirements and an analysis of the ability to satisfy those requirements. Chapter III deals
with the determination of requirements, and has three steps:

• Identification of the forces to be supported.

• Identification of the supporting assets and their characteristics.

• Determination of support requirements based on this information.

Chapter IV details the supportability analysis, which has two steps:

• Determine the maximum distance at which assets can satisfy force delivery 7 and
support requirements.

• Assess the effects of aircraft attrition on maximum support distance.

III. DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS

A. IDENTIFY FORCES TO BE SUPPORTED

The Marine Corps deploys its combat assets as a MAGTF, a combined arms force
consisting of a Command Element (CE). an Air Combat Element (ACE), a Ground Combat
Element (GCE). and a Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). A Marine Expeditionary
Unit Special Operations Capable (MEU(SOC)) is the smallest MAGTF, with the following
typical composition:

• CE - Has detachments of the following:

Force Reconnaissance Company

Radio Battalion

Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)

Communications Battalion

Intelligence Company

• ACE - A reinforced helicopter squadron and a Marine Air Control Group
detachment consisting of:

12 CH-46E medium lift helicopters
4 CH-53E heavy lift helicopters

3 UH-1N light utility helicopters

4 AH-1 W light attack helicopters

6 AV-8B VTOL fixed-wing light attack aircraft

2 KC-130 tankers (on standby in CONUS)
5+ Stinger missile teams

• GCE - A Battalion Landing Team (BLT) consisting of a reinforced infantry-
battalion:

3 Rifle Companies

1 Weapons Company

1 Artillery Battery with six Ml 98 155mm Howitzers

1 Light Armored Reconnaissance Platoon with seven LAVs

1 Assault Amphibian Platoon with 12 AAVs

1 Combat Engineer Platoon.

B. IDENTIFY SUPPORTING ASSETS
1. Shipping

A MEU(SOC) deploys embarked on an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). An ARG
may have three to four ships, but usually consists of an LHD or LHA, an LPD, and an LSD.
Table 1 summarizes the Landing Craft-Air Cushion (LCAC) and aircraft capacities of these
ships (Betaque, 1995).

Ship

Number of Aircraft*

Number of LCACs

LHD

LHA

LPD- 17

LSD-41

LSD-49

* CH-46 equivalents
Table 1. ARG component LCAC/aircraft capacities

The LHA or LHD is the primary aviation ship and carries the Command Element
of the MEU. The LPD has both a well deck and limited aircraft capability. LPD- 17 is
currently under development. It will be more survivable and stealthy than current
amphibious ships and will be the best suited member of the ARG to come in close to shore,
if needed. The LSD is primarily a well-deck ship. All of the ships will carry some
components of the embarked MEU(SOC).

2. Aircraft

The medium-lift aircraft in 2010-2015 will be the MV-22 tiltrotor. It replaces the
CH-46E and CH-53D. It doubles the speed of the CH-46 and quadruples the range. The
MV-22 has an internal capacity of 10,000 pounds at a radius of up to 500 NM (Turley,
1989). While the MV-22 has a substantial external lift capability (15,000 lbs. vs. 4,000 lbs.
for the CH-46E), it comes at the expense of speed. The MV-22 cruises at 240 knots with an
internally carried load, while external load operations require an airspeed of 150 knots or
less. 1

'This is not due to the flight characteristics of the MV-22, but of the external load.

The USMC heavy lift helicopter is the CH-53E. With an external load capacity of
32.000 lbs., it is the only helicopter that can transport the LAV or the M198 155 mm
howitzer. The CH-53E can also provide a forward refueling capability using the Tactical
Bulk Fuel Delivery System, CH-53E (TBFDS, CH-53E). This is a quick install and uninstall
fueling system which is carried internally. It can provide up to 2,400 gallons of fuel and has
the necessary fueling equipment to act as a forward refueling site for aircraft or land vehicles
(U.S. Marine Corps, 1997). Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the MV-22 and
CH-53E.

Aircraft
Type

Radius

(NM)

Internal Load
Airspeed (Kts)

External Load
Airspeed (Kts)

Troops

Payload
(pounds)

Average
Availability

Spot
Factor

MV-22

500

240

150

15,000

85%

1.7

CH-53E

250

150

130

32,000

60%

2.5

Table 2. Aircraft Characteristics 2

The projected ACE composition for 2010-2015 has the CH-46Es replaced one-for-
one by MV-22s. This results in a footprint of 48 CH-46E-equivalent spots. This equals the
maximum spots available in an LHA-based ARG, and only leaves three extra spots in an
LHD-based ARG.

3. Surface

The LCAC is designed primarily to cany wheeled or tracked vehicles, artillery, and
heavy equipment. It can carry up to 60 tons at more than 40 kts, and has a range of 300 NM
at 35 kts (Naval Surface Warfare Center, 1997). Although highly mobile, the LCAC is fairly
large and is unarmored. It would be difficult to use in the face of a defending force, and
would generally come ashore after the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAAVs).
An ARG will have six to eight LCACs

The AAAV will enter service around 2006. It replaces the AAV7A1, and offers a
greatly increased capability. It will travel over water at 25 kts vs. 6-8 kts, providing a truly
over-the-horizon capability. Over land it will move at more than 45 kts. which will allow as

2 The information in this table was compiled from a number of sources:
Magwood. Lyons, and Nance 1995, Turley 1989, and Morgan 1996.

much mobility as the M1A1 tank. The AAAV will carry 18 fully-equipped Marines or up
to 5,000 pounds of cargo, and will be armed with a 25 mm Bushmaster gun and a 7.62 mm
machine gun (General Dynamics Land Systems, 1997). A typical MEU will have twelve
AAAVs (Ashinhurst, 1997).

4. New Technologies

The Guided Parafoil Air Delivery System (GPADS) is a GPS-guided Parafoil capable
of delivering loads of up to 42,000 pounds from altitudes of up to 25,000 feet. The parafoil
has a 2.5 to one glide ratio to allow up to 12 miles of offset from the delivering aircraft
(Kean, 1995). Smaller versions of this could be deployed from the MV-22.

The Semi-Rigid Glider is a semi-rigid deployable wing and has been field tested by
the CWL. The system resembles a hang glider and has a 30' wingspan. Weighing 1,200
pounds, it can carry a payload of 500 pounds out to 20 NM from its launch point. Using
GPS, it is accurate to within 100 meters (Evans, 1996). This system would allow some
degree of stealth to the supported unit and also put the delivering aircraft at less risk. This
system, as well as the GPADS, would allow resupply in weather precluding landing or direct
ground delivery.
C. DETERMINE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

1. Force Mixes

For a MEU(SOC) conducting OMFTS, three schemes of employment are analyzed,
two using STOM and one using the Sea Dragon concept of RAPs.
a. STOM Air and Sea Mix

The first is an Air- and Sea-borne assault. The air component consists of two
of the Battalion Landing Team's three rifle companies inserted by MV-22. The sea
component consists of a Light Armored Reconnaissance platoon deployed by LCAC. and
an AAAV platoon deployed directly from the ARG, carrying the remaining rifle company.
The rifle companies would each be augmented by two Weapons Company HMMWVs,
inserted by air.

A notional deployment scheme for this mix would have the main body of the
ARG close to 40 NM offshore to deploy LCACs and aircraft, while an LPD came to 25 NM

to deploy the AAAVs. Once surface units had been deployed and LCACs recovered, the
ARG could withdraw to 50 NM or more offshore, possibly leaving an LPD or other flight
deck capable ship to act as a Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP). The artillery
battery would remain at sea, to be inserted and extracted by CH-53E for raids as needed.
Implicit in this type of operation is that there would be no CSS area established at a
beachhead. Because of this, the of the LCACs' heavy lift capacity could be used to move
forces ashore, but not for the sustainment of those forces once deployed. Substantially all
sustainment would be delivered by air. In addition, since two of the rifle companies are foot
mobile only, there is a requirement for enough airlift to move at least one company up to 25
NM per day. The daily support requirements of this force would be for the sustainment of
the three individual rifle companies and the two armored units, and sufficient troop lift to
move one of the rifle companies up to 25 NM (Blasiol, 1997).

The high speed and mobility of the AAAV will see AAAV employments that
resemble helicopter operations. FARPs will support AAAVs as well as helicopters
(Ashinhurst, 1997). The scheme is for a MEU(SOC)s Battalion Landing Team, and for this
force size, FARPs and other CSS areas will not be based ashore. Sustainment for AAAVs
and LAVs will be delivered directly to the units, and aircraft fuel and ammunition support
will come from the LHA or LHD, or from a sea-based FARP, such as an LPD brought closer
to shore than the main body of the ARG.

b. STOMAirMix

The second scheme is an entirely air-inserted assault. The three rifle
companies are inserted by air, with no mechanized component or HMMWVs. This scheme
could be driven by lack of safe surface delivery routes, or an objective requiring too great
a standoff from the beach. As in the first scheme, artillery would remain at sea and be
delivered by CH-53E on demand. The support requirements for this force would be to
sustain the three individual companies and provide airlift to move at least two of them per
day.

c. Sea Dragon RAP Mix

The third case is the most drastic departure from traditional operations and
makes most use of the new Sea Dragon concepts. In this case the BLT organization would
consist of 27 reconnaissance assault platoons and a mobile combined arms company
(MCAC), made up of LAVs, AAAVs, and HMMWVs, as required. The RAPs are squad-
sized units which would engage critical targets with remote fires. Fires could come in the
form of naval surface fire support, close air support, or artillery raids. Nine of these units
would be ashore at any time, with the remainder either preparing for insertion or recovering
from the field. The MCAC would remain at sea and come ashore as needed, then quickly
return to the ARG. The support requirements for this force assume that each of the nine
teams will require one MV-22 movement or resupply action daily. 3

2. Calculation of Requirements

The supply requirements of each unit are for Class I (Food and Water), Class III
(Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants), and Class V (Ammunition). Class I (Food) is based on
three Meals, Ready-to-eat (MREs) per Marine per day, weighing 1 .46 pounds per MRE.
Class I (Water) is based on five gallons per Marine per day. Requirements for Classes III
and V are obtained from the AAAV program office and a Center for Naval Analyses study,
Project CULEBRA: Sea-Based Combat Service Support for Ship-to-Objective Maneuver
(Supply and Transportation Analysis) . Table 3 summarizes the supply requirements for each
of the GCE components (Adapted from Magwood, Lyons, and Nance, 1995 and Ashinhurst,
1997).
D. SPECIFY HOW SUPPORT ASSETS WILL BE USED

1. MV-22

As the medium-lift replacement aircraft, the MV-22's primary mission will be the
movement and sustainment of troops. The preferred method used to resupply units in the
field is to carry cargo externally, which allows for easy pickup and drop-off. and minimizes

3 Note that this is a conservative estimate of RAP support requirements. These
units are expected to be capable of operations for several days without resupply. Also, in
some scenarios, some aircraft could resupply more than one unit per sortie.

Unit

People

Class I
(Food)

Class I
(Water)

Class III (POL)

Class V

Total
Weight

Rifle Company

182

806

7,644 (910 gal.)

230 (30 gal.)*

842

9,292
9,522*

LAR Platoon

154

1,470 (175 gal.)

3,430 (490 gal.)

2,243

7,297

AAAV Platoon

205

1,974 (235 gal.)

14,280 (2,040 gal.)

3.259

19.718

RAP

546 (65 gal.)

60**

663

* For Rifle Company augmented with two Weapons Company HMMWVs.
**At Rifle Company rates. RAPs, as envisioned, would avoid direct combat.

Table 3. Daily sustainment requirements of MEU(SOC) GCE units (in pounds)

the time the aircraft is at risk to enemy fire. While this requires that the aircraft fly slower
than it could without an external load, in the past the added time was usually offset by the
speed of loading and unloading. For the MV-22, however, the speed penalty for external
loads is much larger (90 knots vs. 20 knots for the CH-53E). Unfortunately, unless materiel
handling equipment or a large landing zone is available, large internal loads are time
consuming to unload. In this analysis, only the small cargoes for the Sea Dragon RAPs are
treated as internal payloads. All others are external loads. 4 Food, water, and ammunition
are packaged on pallets, and fuel is transported in 500 gallon bladders, which the MV-22
can carry two of at one time.

Deception is a significant component of OMFTS (U.S. Marine Corps, 1996). In
addition to the required sustainment and troop movement missions, MV-22s will also be
used for decoy missions to deceive the enemy. This analysis looks at two cases: zero
deception missions and one deception mission for every three actual missions.

2. CH-53E

Due to the small number (4-8) of CH-53Es and their relatively low operational
availability (-60%), they would be dedicated to providing mobility' to the artillery battery
and any emergent heavy lift requirements (e.g., recover}' of an LAV). Although the TBFDS.

4 As a sensitivity analysis, supportability calculations were also performed using
all sustainment except fuel transported internally. The results differred by less than 6%.
While internally loaded cargo is preferred, it does not appear to be a driver for the forces
analyzed.

CH-53E provides a forward refueling capability, it is not considered in this analysis due to
the requirement for artillery movement.

3. Daily Lift Requirements

Tables 4 and 5 show the insertion and daily sustainment requirements for each of the
force mixes. In the first three mixes, a minimum of two aircraft are required per mission.
It is coincidental, but fortuitous, that the insertion and sustainment requirements are so
similar. The extra two sorties required to insert the Air mix have a negligible effect on the
results of the analysis.

Force Mix

Internal
Cargo

External
Cargo

Troop
Movement

Deception

Total
Sorties

Air/Sea

3 Rifle Companies
1 AAAV Platoon
1 LAR Platoon

Air

3 Rifle Companies

Sea Dragon

9RAPs

(Two aircraft/mission)

Sea Dragon

9RAPs

(One aircraft/mission)

Table 4. Day 1 MV-22 sortie requirements for insertion of MEU(SOC) force mixes

Force Mix

Internal
Cargo

External
Cargo

Troop

Movement

Deception

Total
Sorties

Air/Sea

3 Rifle Companies
1 AAAV Platoon
1 LAR Platoon

Air

3 Rifle Companies

Sea Dragon

9RAPs

(Two aircraft/mission)

18
(includes
resupply)

Sea Dragon

9RAPs

(One aircraft/mission)

(includes
resupply)

Table 5. Daily MV-22 sortie requirements of MEU(SOC) force mixes

IV. SUPPORTABILITY ANALYSIS

A. DETERMINE MAXIMUM DISTANCE AT WHICH ASSETS CAN SATISFY
SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

1. Equations

This section describes the formulas used to calculate the maximum separation
distance between units ashore and the sea-based sources of logistical support. The basic
equation to determine this distance is

D= c (1)

where D = round trip distance in nautical miles,
H = operational aircraft hours per day,

T = total unusable time (on deck, loading, unloading, or refueling) in hours,
V = aircraft speed in knots,
S = number of sorties (Edwards 1993, 173).

The following equations are used to take into account differing sortie types, times,
and airspeeds:

Number of available aircraft (N A ):

N.-iNxAJ-N,, (2)

where N = total number of a type of aircraft,

A = average operational availability of aircraft type.
N R = number of aircraft held in reserve.

Number of sorties required per aircraft per day (S):

S= 7 E M D {RoundedUp) (3)

where S, = total number of internal load sustainment sorties per day,
S E = total number of external load sustainment sorties per day,
S M = total number of troop movement sorties per day,
S D = total number of deception sorties per day.

(Rounding up prevents an aircraft from flying a fractional sortie.)

Total number of sorties required per day (S T ):

S T =S*N A (4)

Extra time required for particular missions:

Additional time per external load sortie (T E ), assuming one-way transport of
external load:

T - D - D - D -( l - l )

E 2V E 2Vj 2 V E V l ^

where D = round trip distance per sortie,

V E = aircraft speed with an external load,
V, = aircraft speed with an internal load.

Additional time per troop movement sortie (Tm):

T =° M

m v (6)

* i

where D M = average distance to transport troops.

Total time spent on deck plus additional time spent on troop movement and external
cargo transport for all aircraft (T T ):

WWWJHW) (7)

where T D = Average on-deck time per sortie.
Total operational aircraft hours per day (H T ).

H T =H*N A

(8)

where H = operational hours per aircraft per day.

To integrate the above equations, we start with the equation for round-trip distance
per sortie (D):

Expanding T T gives

{H T -(T D -S T )-{T^S M )-(T E -S E )yV I

D=-

Expanding T E gives

i3^

Reducing this gives

Oj~ O-p

D=-

(10)

(H T -(T D *S T ) -{T^Sjy V r ^(± -±)x v Vj

D= 2 V E V I (11)

D v i

{H T -{J D ^S T )-{T^S M )YV 1 1 XSeX( Y e ~ ]) (12)

Moving all D terms to the left side of the equation gives

1 S F V r {Hr-iTrXSJ-iTjxSjyV,

Solving for D gives

,s + -4x(_i-i) U4 '

r 2 v

The final step is to solve for the effective one-way distance from ship to supported
unit:

D'=(^)*E (15)

where E = Percentage of range that is effectively used. This allows for range
reduction due to different ingress/egress routes, flight paths to avoid air defenses, and any
other necessary maneuvering.

2. Inputs

This analysis uses the following as baseline inputs to the above equations, including
some variations:

• N A = 12 MV-22s. Present plans are to replace the CH-46E one-for-one on the
LHDs and LHAs.

• Aq= 0.85. This is the anticipated operational availability for the MV-22 (Morgan
1996).

• N R = 0, 2. At present, most MEU(SOC) operations do not hold back any aircraft
for contingency missions, such as Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel
(TRAP), MEDEVAC, or emergency extraction of ground combat units. A section
(usually two aircraft) is designated as the TRAP section, but will go about normal
operations until a mission requirement arises. The distances involved in OMFTS.
the lack of ground transport or facilities for casualty evacuation and treatment,
and the vulnerability of dispersed, small units provide some justification for a
dedicated, on-call section for emergent missions. 5 This analysis looks at both
cases, and 2.

• S,, S E , and S M are self-explanatory.

• S D = 0, (S ] +S E +S M )/3. OMFTS, especially the dispersed unit concept, advocates
the use of deception and feints. This analysis looks at two cases. The first has no
deception missions, as a baseline, and the second has one deception mission flown
for every three real sustainment or troop movement sorties.

5 In Vietnam. 8-10% of small reconnaissance patrols required some form of
emergency extraction (West 1996).

• T D = 30 minutes. The expected operational refueling time for the MV-22 is 10-15
minutes. External load pickup or release is approximately one minute. Internal
cargo times vary, but can range from five to 30 minutes. Troop loading and
unloading is approximately two minutes. We assume a notional 30 minute on-
deck time for turn around.

• H = eight hours per day per aircraft. This is a limit based primarily on the aircrew
maximum flight hours, but also reflects aircraft maintenance requirements.

• E = 80%. From interviews with Marine helicopter pilots, this figure was
considered a fair estimate of the amount of range lost due to flight path routing.

3. Baseline Results

Table 6 summarizes the results for the different force mixes. The distance shown is
the total separation distance possible between supporting ships and supported units. Three
cases are looked at for each mix: using all available aircraft for troop movement and
sustainment; holding two aircraft in reserve for TRAP or MEDEVAC; and adding deception
missions while holding two aircraft in reserve. Note that these figures assume a permissive
air defense environment.

B. ASSESS EFFECTS OF AIRCRAFT ATTRITION ON MAXIMUM SUPPORT
DISTANCE

1. Approach

The preceding section provides the maximum separation from sea base to ground
units in a permissive air environment. To examine the impact of a non-permissive
environment and the effects of aircraft attrition, a circulation model is used, shown in
Figure 1.

Force Mix

Distance (NM)

Air/Sea

3 Rifle Companies
AAAV platoon
LAR platoon

Using all available aircraft

289

Holding 2 aircraft in reserve

182

2 reserve + 1 deception / 3 actual missions

129

Air

3 Rifle Companies

Using all available aircraft

192

Holding 2 aircraft in reserve

188

2 reserve + 1 deception / 3 actual missions

132

Sea Dragon

9RAPs

(Two aircraft/mission)

Using all available aircraft

327

Holding 2 aircraft in reserve

201

2 reserve + 1 deception / 3 actual missions

201

Sea Dragon

9RAPs

(One aircraft/mission)

Using all available aircraft

711'

Holding 2 aircraft in reserve

331

2 reserve + 1 deception / 3 actual missions

331

* Distances > 500 NM require aerial refueling

Table 6. Supportable ship/unit ranges in a permissive air environment

Unit

ARG

Figure 1. Circulation Model

2. Equations

The following assumptions are made:

• There is a fixed probability of an aircraft being shot down for every 100 NM
flown over land, and the probability does not change with distance or time, i.e.,
the probability is the same crossing the beach as it is 200 NM inland, and is the
same on D+l as it is on D+15.

• Extra missions required to recover downed aircrew are not taken into account.

• The MEU(SOC) operation will not fundamentally change as a result of aircraft
losses.

• Aircraft losses are binomially distributed (ie., independent and identically
distributed) 6 with parameters n and/? 5 , where

n = Total number of aircraft sorties per day, and

p s = probability of shootdown per sortie.

p s =l-(l-pf' (16)

where p = Probability of shootdown per 1 00 NM traveled over land, and is
assumed to be .01.

D s = Average distance flown over land per sortie (100s of
NM). Fractional values of D s are used when appropriate.

The expected losses of all operating aircraft for the above equation each day are

E[A ircraftLosses] =np s ( 1 7)

6 Thus the effects of "hot spots*' of air defenses, operational attrition due to
sandstorms, torrential rain, snowstorms and the like are disregarded, although in such
cases p s tends to be higher than "on the average."

The expected losses are calculated for the end of each day, and the number of
aircraft available for the following day is decreased by this amount. This may be a fractional
number of aircraft because it is the expected number of aircraft remaining. The distance
calculations in the previous section are recomputed based on this number and the new
maximum separation distance determined. Figure 2 shows the decrease in operating
distance as aircraft losses increase.

uo - T 40%

35%
30%

<0
<D
CO

[ 25% o
- 20% .5

- 15% 2

"3
|

T 10% o

Distance

Cumulative Aircraft Losses 5 %

— I — ' 1 — i 0%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Days

Figure 2. Maximum Supportable Range in a Non-Permissive Environment

(Air/Sea Force Mix Variation 3)

3. Results

Table 7 summarizes the supportable distances for the different force mixes at day
one, seven, and fifteen of an operation.

Force Mix

Distance (NM)

Day

1 7 15

Air/Sea

3 Rifle Companies
AAAV platoon
LAR platoon

Using all available aircraft

296

184

Holding 2 aircraft in reserve

186

127

2 reserve + 1 deception / 3 actual missions

131

Air

3 Rifle Companies

Using all available aircraft

203

138

Holding 2 aircraft in reserve

201

137

2 reserve + 1 deception / 3 actual missions

139

Sea Drason

9RAPs

(Two aircraft/mission)

Using all available aircraft

327

200

Holding 2 aircraft in reserve

201

136

2 reserve + 1 deception / 3 actual missions

201

Sea Draaon

9RAPs

(One aircraft/mission)

Using all available aircraft

711*

330

327

Holding 2 aircraft in reserve

331

329

200

2 reserve + 1 deception / 3 actual missions

331

203

138

* Distances > 500 NM require aerial refueling

Table 7. Supportable ship/unit ranges in a non-permissive air environment

4. An Example from the OMFTS Concept Paper

The OMFTS concept paper gives an example of a hypothetical amphibious force
conducting STOM against the eastern seaboard of the United States. Based on 24 hours of
maneuvering at sea, the amphibious force requires the U.S. to defend the beaches from
Charleston, South Carolina, to New Jersey. Richmond, Virginia, is selected as the objective
and the force attacks the city directly from the sea (U.S. Marine Corps, 1996).

From the preceding calculations, Richmond, at 95 NM inland, would require the
ARG to stay within 45 NM of the Delaware/Maryland/Virginia coastline to conduct STOM,
while Sea Dragon units could be inserted from a distance of more than 100 NM at sea.
These distances apply only for a permissive air environment. In a non-permissive air
environment, neither of the STOM force mixes could even be supported from the beach itself
after one week of operations. The only force mix that could be sustained in this environment
is the Sea Dragon mix, and then only if the units are supported by individual aircraft instead

of flights of two. To support this mix for an additional week would require the supporting
ships to close from 1 00+ NM from the beach to within 43 NM.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

OMFTS, as envisioned, precludes surface resupply. Surface resupply over land
requires secure land lines of communication and ground transportation. The distances
involved require defense of these lines of communication, just as a beach CSS area would.
CSS must be provided by air. In this thesis we have measured the outer limits of airborne
CSS of a MEU(SOC) based on the airlift assets in a future MEU as it is now planned with
twelve MV-22s. CH-53Es will be used for heavy lift support, including vehicles and
artillery, in special circumstances. LCACs and AAAVs will be used for the delivery of
equipment and Marines only - not sustainment.

When OMFTS is conducted using traditional forces (without artillery permanently
ashore, moving troops by air and surface means and sustaining troops. LAVs, and AAAVs),
the envisioned amphibious ship standoff of 50+ NM is difficult if employing any deception
missions or holding any aircraft in reserve, and is not possible in a non-permissive air
environment.

Shifting to a non-mechanized force does not ease the problem because of the
increased airborne troop movement requirements.

Shifting to the use of RAPs helps somewhat. However, the current practice of
sending a two-aircraft section severely limits the possible range capability, because their
payload is so light. If only one aircraft is sent to resupply or move a team, there is a huge
increase in range. After 7 days of attrition (and the loss of 1/4 of the aircraft) it is still
possible to conduct operations more than 200 NM from the ship. But, this decreases to 1 38
NM by day 15.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Increased capability could be achieved by a number of different measures:

• Increase ACE aircrews. This would allow more than eight hours per day aircraft
utilization. However it is not certain how this would affect the operational
availability of the aircraft or whether more severe maintenance requirements
would result.

• Increase the number of MV-22s in the ACE. Making use of the spots on the LPD
would allow 3 additional aircraft. Replacing the UH-ls with an additional MV-22
would increase lift capacity, at the cost of not having a light helicopter capability.
While not as valuable in OMFTS as the MY -22, the UH-1 is still a useful aircraft
for sustained operations ashore or operations other than war.

• If a MEU is to sustain OMFTS operations for more than a week, anticipate the
need to replenish the ACE with additional MV-22s.

• Small units could be supported at greater distances if one MV-22 was sent on
each mission instead of the two-plane section that is the standard for helicopter
operations today. The analysis shows that two-plane sections suffer a particularly
onerous penalty in range because of their light load.

This thesis considers an amphibious ready group operating independently of a carrier
battle group (CVBG). A CVBG, whether part of a Naval Expeditionary Force or not, would:

• Reduce attrition to MV-22s by providing escort or suppression of enemy air
defenses.

• Provide some additional lift or reserve lift capability if some MV-22s were
assigned to the CV.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Ashinhurst. Joel. 1997. Telephone conversation with author, February 12. Alexandria.
Virginia: Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Program Office.

Betaque Jr.. Norman et al. 1995. Logistical Support of Operational Maneuver From the Sea
(Draft) . Mclean, Virginia: Naval Studies Board.

Blasiol, Leonard A. 1997. Telephone conversation with author, February 12. Quantico,
Virginia: Concepts Branch, Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory. 1997. Technology Exploration and Exploitation
Plan . Downloaded from http://ismo-wwwl.mqg.usmc.mil/cwl-main/html/
planchl.htm.

Edwards, John E. 1993. Combat Service Support Guide, 2 nd ed. Harrisburg. Pennsylvania:
Stackpole Books.

Evans, Rhys A. 1996. News Release: Resupply by Glider Tested at Camp Pendleton .
Washington, DC: Division of Public Affairs, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
Downloaded from http://ww r w.usmc.mil:80/mcnews/2ae6.htm.

General Dynamics Land Systems. 1997. Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle .
Downloaded from http://www.gdls.com:80/programs/aaav.html.

Kean. Thomas M. 1995. "Advanced Airdrop for Land Combat Advanced Technology
Demonstration/' Mobility News Bulletin 4 (July): 3-4.

Lyons, H. Dwight, and Janet R. Magwood. 1994. CRM 94-53. Project CULEBRA: Mini
Seminar . Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses.

Machiavelli. Niccolo. The Prince .

Magwood. Janet R.. H. Dwight Lyons, and John F. Nance Jr. 1995. CRM 95-144. Project
CULEBRA: Sea Based Combat Service Support for Ship-to-Obiective Maneuver
(Supply and Transportation Analysis) . Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval
Analyses.

Meehan III. John F. The Operational Trilogy . 15. Quoted in U.S. Marine Corps. 1993.
FMFM-4. Combat Service Support . Quantico. Virginia: Marine Corps Combat
Development Command.

Morgan, Paul. 1996. Telephone conversation with author, October 4. MV-22 Program
Office.

Naval Surface Warfare Center. 1997. Landing Craft Air-Cushion . Downloaded from
http://lpdl7_wr.nswc.navy.mil:80/character/baseline/vehicle/lcac.html.

Turley, Craig W. 1989. An Analysis of the V-22 in the Carrier Onboard Delivery and the
Vertical Onboard Delivery Roles. Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School.

U.S. Marine Corps. 1995. Ship to Objective Maneuver (Coordinating Draft) . Quantico,
Virginia: Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

U.S. Marine Corps. 1996. Operational Maneuver From the Sea . Quantico, Virginia:
Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

U.S. Marine Corps. 1997. USMC Factfile. Tactical Bulk Fuel Delivery System. CH-53E .
Downloaded from http://www.usmc.mil:80/factfile/2 13e.html.

West, F. J. 1996. Telephone conversation with author, October 10. Gama Corporation.

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