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ESUoctotxr 14, 1935-9 


You ’re Under Foreign Law 



“Pied Pipers of Babylon,” by 
Verl K. Speer, 342 pp., softcover, 
S15.00, from Liberty Library, 300 
Independence Ave., SE, Washing¬ 
ton, D.C. 20003. 


Review 



L\CI I SIVE TO THE J.POTI IGHT 

By Charlie O’Donald 
Verl K. Speer, who was raised on a 
Kansas farm, has contributed a 
remarkable book to the patriotic 
movement in his “Pied Pipers of 
Babylon.” 

The key discovery of Dr. Speer is that 
Americans have become subject to a 
foreign system of law—essentially a 
form of the Roman civil law. This juris¬ 
diction, he says, was imposed on our 


country by England. He contrasts this 
with the “other great system,” the com¬ 
mon law. 

“Common law,” as Speer defines it, 
is based on reason and the immutable 
laws of God and nature. It is the law of 
conscience—and as such, it cannot be 
written, only written about. 

REVOLUTION 

One of the first things of interest this 
reviewer learned from “Pipers” was the 
cause of the American Revolution. It 
was not, as most people think, the tax on 
tea or “taxation without representa¬ 
tion.” Rather, as is mentioned in two 
separate places in the Declaration of In¬ 
dependence, it was England’s attempt to 
subject Americans to the civil law. 

To quote from the Declaration: King 
George III had “combined with others 
to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to 
our constitution, and unacknowledged 
by our laws; giving his asset to acts of 
pretended legislation.” And, at another 
point: “Nor have we been wanting in at¬ 
tentions to our British brethren. We 
have warned them from time to time of 
attempts by their legislation to extend an 
unwarrantable jurisdiction over us.” 
‘ADMIRAL’ COMES’ASHORE 

Once again today Americans are the 
victims of an attempt to force this 
foreign law on them, whether you call it 
the law of merchants, maritime law, or 
equity—slightly different variations 
taken by the civil law. 

The importance of this little-publi¬ 
cized issue is highlighted by contrasting 
common law with maritime or admiralty 
law. Under common law, you have all 
your Constitutional rights. But when 
you are aboard a ship at sea, your cap¬ 
tain is legally a dictator. You have no 
“rights”; you have only privileges con¬ 
ferred by the captain. 

Today, says Speer, maritime law has 
come ashore and threatens to squeeze 
out all our rights. 

How then have Americans been 


tricked out of their common-law rights 
and into the admiralty courts, just as 
happened more than 200 years ago? 
Speer explains this in his book. Further¬ 
more, he examines the principles ap¬ 
plicable to the resolution of this dilem¬ 
ma, and how they may be invoked and 
implemented. 

Among the topics covered in great 
detail by Speer are the “malady of paper 
money” and the powers of the jury to 
judge the facts and the law, and to 
nullify the law where necessary—that is, 
whenever the law is unjust. Also covered 
at length is the subject of land patents 
and alodial land title. 

“Pipers” is a sizable book, running to 
more than 300 pages, and you should be 
forewarned that much of the content is 
heavy reading, with a lot of “legalese. ” 
But if you don’t wish to strain your 
brain with the point-by-point discussion 
of the convoluted ramifications of the 
famous “Erie” case and suchlike, you 
can garner the gist of the book by apply¬ 
ing some judicious skimming. Here 
Speer has helped the reader by highlight¬ 
ing the pearls and nuggets of informa¬ 
tion. 

A word is necessary to explain the title 
of the book. “Babylon” is a worldwide, 
corporate trust governed by the money 
power—the “Beast” of the Bible—the 
same conspiracy of bankers who are 
behind the imposition of an alien and 
unwarrantable jurisdiction on Amer¬ 
icans. 

And the “Pied Pipers” reference is to 
the technique used to lure Americans in¬ 
to submission to this alien jurisdiction: a 
meretricious deceit. You are lured back 
into slavery by the supposed “benefits” 
the Establishment would confer on you, 
such as Social Security and convenient 
checking accounts. 

This work will be of interest to all 
patriots who want to “come out of 
Babylon” and secure their freedom as 
our forefathers did. o 





Verl K. Speer 


1325 Airomotive Way 
Suite 220 

Reno, Nevada 89502 
Phone: 702-324-4269 




'S 



PIED PIPERS 

OF 

BABYLON 

BY 

Verl K. Speer, Doctor of Common Law (DCL) 

Assisted By 

George E. Hill, DCL 
David C. Chovanak, DCL 

Edited By 
Michael J. Pierson 

Cover Artist 


joe Alexander 



Published By 


Verl K. Speer 


1985, by Verl K. 
L rights reserved. 



_ '"V 


TO MY WIFE 
LUCILLE 

WITH LOVE AND AFFECTION 
ALWAYS 




PIED PIPERS OF BABYLON 


"Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people 
who mean to be their cwn governors must arm themselves with 
the power which knowledge gives." 

James Madison 


"My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge; because 
thou hast rejected knowledge, I will also reject thee, 

Hosea 4:6 


"All the perplexities, confusion and distress in America 
arise not from defects in their constitution or confedera¬ 
tion, not from a want of honor or virtue so much as down¬ 
right ignorance of the nature of coin, credit, and circula¬ 
tion." 

John Adams 


"... The merchants were the powers of the earth, and 
their sorceries deceived all nations." 

Revelation 18:23 


"How has it happened that we have not hitherto once 
thought of humbly applying to the Father of Lights to 
illuminate our understanding?" 

Benjamin Franklin, Constitutional Convention, June 28, 
1787 


"Cane out of her (Babylon) Lest you partake of 
and receive her plagues." 

Revelation 18:4 


her sins 



PIED PIPERS OF BABYLON 


Contents 

FORWARD. vi 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS - NOTES . vii 

PROLOGUE. ix 

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 

Part I: A Foreign And Unwarrantable Jurisdiction . 1 

Part II: Building The Case . 5 

Part III: Theory Of Cognitive Dissonance (TCD) . 6 

CHAPTER II: THE COMMON LAW - YOUR BIRTHRIGHT 
Part I: The Cannon Law 

Introduction: . 8 

Development Of The Cannon Law: 

The Old Testament . 8 

The Great Migrations . 11 

A Society Of Free Men . 15 

A Ccnmon Law Jury Of 12 . 20 

The Essence And Science Of The Cannon Law: . 20 

Part II: The Cannon Law Jury - Its Rights, 

Duties, And Purposes 

Selected Excerpts From Lysander Spooner's 

"Essay On Trial By Jury": . 21 

Cannon Law Jury Nullification - A Right And Duty 
At Cannon Law: . 26 

CHAPTER III: AUTHORIZED JURISDICTIONS IN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 

Part I: The Concept Of Jurisdiction 

Introduction: . 38 

Nature Of jurisdiction Of Subject Matter: . 39 

Concurrent Jurisdiction With State Courts: . 40 

Jurisdiction Created By Interpretation Or 

Acquiescence: . 41 

Part II: Article III, United States Constitution, 

And The Judiciary Act Of 1789 

Three Jurisdictions: . 42 

Comparison Of Principles, Rules And usages: . 45 

Procedural Mergers: 

Merger Of Law And Equity. 47 

Merger Of Law, Equity And Admiralty/Maritime .. 57 

Part III: The Civil Law jurisdictions 

Equity: . 58 

Admiralty/Maritime: . 63 

A Mechanism For Secretly Mixing jurisdictions: ... 66 

-i- 
























Torts . 66 

Torts Distinguished From Crimes . 67 

Torts Distinguished From Breaches Of Contract . 67 

A Delict. 68 

Contracts of Adhesion: . 69 

Contracts Implied In Law . 71 

Constructive Or Quasi-Contracts . 71 

Postscript. 74 

Part IV: Law Merchant 

Introduction: . 74 

History Of Negotiable Instruments: . 75 

Lex Mercatoria: . 78 

The Determination Of Jurisdiction 

Over Law Merchant: . 80 

Part V: Article I vs. Article III Courts 

Establishment Of Courts: . 81 

Legislative Courts: . 83 

Article III Judicial Power And 
The Eleventh Amendment: . 86 

CHAPTER IV: THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 

Part I: Introduction. 93 

Part II: Samuel de Puffendorf 

The Law Of Nature And Nations: . 94 

Part III: Emerich de Vattel 

The Law Of Nations Or Principles 

Of The Law Of Nature: . 100 

Part IV: physiocracy - The Rule Of Nature. 108 

CHAPTER V: THE COMPELLING REASONS FOR 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 

Part I: National vs. Federal Government.110 

Part II: The Malady Of Paper Money. 110 

History Of The First Issue Of Bills 
Of Public Credit (Inflation) In The 

American Colonies From 1690 To 1755-6: . Ill 

Paper Money (Inflation) In America Fran The 
Beginning Of The Seven Years War To The 
Constitutional Convention Of The United States 

From 1755-6 To my, 1787: . 116 

The Constitutional Convention, Philadelphia, 

May 14th To September 17th, 1787: . 123 

The Miracle Of A Stable Monetary Standard: . 126 

CHAPTER VI: THE ADMIRAL GOES TO WORK 

Part I: Development Of The Approach (1797-1825) ... 129 
Part II: Laying The Groundwork (1851-1913) 

Limited Liability Act (1851): . 131 

Fourteenth Amendment (1868): . 133 

Tontine Insurance (1868 - ?): . 134 


-ii- 






























Sixteenth Amendment (Feb. 3, 1913): 

The De Facto Sixteenth . 136 

Hie De jure Sixteenth (?) . 144 

Seventeenth Amendment (April 8, 1913): 

The De Facto Seventeenth . 145 

Hie De jure Seventeenth (?) . 146 

A Jurisdictional Defect . 148 

Part ill: The Federal Reserve Act - The 
Legislative Coup De Grace (Dec. 23, 1913) 

Background: . 150 

Key Provisions: .. 159 

Nature Of The Act: . 159 

On Trusts: . 166 

Nature Of Trusts . 166 

Classification Of Trusts . 167 

Public Or Charitable Trusts . 169 

Enforcement Of Public Or Charitable Trusts: ... 170 

A Corporation May Be A Trustee . 170 

Of Powers . 170 

Example Of A Charitable Public Trust 

Its Benefits - Explained. 171 

Price Of Hie Benefits - unexplained.171 

implementation Of Hie Power . 172 

The Public Pledge Of Reveune Assurance: . 172 

Basic Elements Of A Wager Policy: . 178 

Part IV: HJR-192 - Another Legislative Coup 

(June 5, 1933) . 179 

Part V: Erie Railroad v. Tompkins - The Judicial 

Coup De Grace (1938) 

Introduction: . 183 

Development Of Hie Erie Doctrine: 

Hie Erie Case. 185 

Further Development - Three Landmark Cases .... 187 

Hie Constitutional Basis? . 190 

Federal Common Law, Or "Specialized" 

Common Law. 192 

Part VI: Hie International Monetary Fund (1945) 

Introduction: . 197 

Birth Of Hie IMF: . 197 

Part VII: Public Law 95-147 (Oct. 28, 1977) . 200 

Part VIII: Synopsis: 

The Facts: . 203 

The Law: . 214 

CHAPTER VII: THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW OF NATIONS 
DEALING WITH WAGER POLICIES 

Part I: Introduction: . 216 

Part ll: Seme General Maritime Statutes: 

Statutes At Large From Hie 15th To Hie 20th Year 
Of King George II: . 218 


-iii- 


































219 


Halsbury's Statutes Of England: 

The Life Insurance Act, 1774 

(14 Geo. 3c. 48) . 

The Marine Insurance Act, 1906 

(6 Edw. 72. 41) . 219 

The Marine insurance (Gambling Policies) Acts, 

1909 (9 Edw. 7c. 12) . 220 

CHAPTER VIII: REVELATIONS, THE CITY OF BABYLON, 

MERCHANTS, AND TOE LAW CF TOE SEA 

Part I: The Beast Of The Sea. 222 

Power Of The Beast: . 223 

Part II: The City Of Babylon. 224 

Part III: The Merchants Of Babylon. 227 

Part IV: Synopsis . 229 

Part V: On Oaths . 230 

Part VI: The Relativity Syndrome. 234 

CHAPTER IX: LAND PATENTS AND ALLODIAL TITLES 

Part I: introduction. 238 

Part II: Color Of Title. 243 

Part III: Land Patents - Why They Were Created.247 

Part IV: The Power And Authority Of A Patent.251 

Part V: Treaties - The Substance Of 

Federal Land Patents .*. 252 

Part VI: The Land Acquisition Treaties 

Northwest Ordinance: . 253 

Treaty Of Peace, 8 Stat. 80 (1783): . 254 


Treaty of Cession, 8 Stat. 200 (April 20, 1803): . 254 
Treaty Of Ghent, 8 Stat. 218 (October 20, 1818): . 254 
The Oregon Treaty, 9 Stat. 869 (June 15, 1846): .. 254 
Treaty Of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922 (1848): . 254 
Gadsden Purchase, 10 Stat. 1031 (Dec. 30, 1853): . 255 


Cession Of Texas: .255 

Part VII: The Supremacy Clause . 255 

Part VIII: In Stannary. 257 

Part IX: Camion Law Liens . 257 

CHAPTER X: SOLUTIONS 

Part I: Introduction. 265 

Part II: A Satisfactory Judgment. 267 

Part III: Defending Your Judgment. 269 

As A Defendant: . 270 

Offense - The Best Defense: . 272 

Part IV: Where To Go For Help 

Universal Life University Cannon Law Program: .... 276 

REFLECTIONS CF TOE AUTHOR. 278 

BIBLIOGRAPHY . 279 


-iv- 































GLOSSARY 


292 


EXHIBITS 

Exhibit 1: Handbill Distributed By 

The populist Party. 311 

Exhibit 2: Letter Fran Ron Paul/Joe Cobb 

To Verl speer/George Hill (August 30, 1984) . 314 

Exhibit 3: Letter Fran Verl Speer/George Hill 

To Ron Paul/Joe Cobb (September 21, 1984) . 315 

Exhibit 4: Letter Fran Ron Paul/Joe Cobb 

To Verl Speer/George Hill (October 17, 1984) . 319 

Exhibit 5: Letter Fran verl Speer/George Hill 

To Ron Paul/Joe Cobb (November 5, 1984) . 322 

Exhibit 6: Letter Fran Ron Paul/Joe Cobb 

To Verl Speer/George Hill (November 21, 1984) . 327 

Exhibit 7: Letter Fran Verl Speer/George Hill 

To Ron Paul/Joe Cobb (January 12, 1985) . 330 

Exhibit 8: Letter From Ron Paul, M.D., 

To Verl Speer/George Hill (February 12, 1985) . 341 

Exhibit 9: Program Outline, "The Common Law," 

Universal Life University School of Law . 342 

FIGURES 

Figure III - 1: Judiciary Act, 1789, As Modified In 

1792 - Three Jurisdictions: . 47 

Figure III - 2: Procedural Merger 

Of Law And Equity: . 56 

Figure III - 3: Procedural Merger Of Law, Equity, 

And Admiralty/Maritime: . 57 

Figure III - 4: The Law Of Admiralty: . 63 

Figure III - 5: Admiralty/Maritime Jurisdiction: ... 69 

Figure III - 6: The Determination of Jurisdiction 

Over Law Merchant: . 82 

Figure III - 7: Judicial Power And The Eleventh 

Amendment: . 88 

Figure IV - 1: Obligations - And Rights Flowing 

Therefrom: . 103 

Figure IV - 2: The Law Of Nature And Nations: . 106 

Figure VI - 1: Origin And Types Of Trusts: . 167 























FORWARD 


I recall a bright January day in 1979 when I met the 
author of this book at the Sundial dining room in Modesto, 
California. With no specialized law training we met with 
others as representatives of the ccmnon person, the 
individual who finds himself overwhelmed by a sense of 
futulity and injustice. It was the day our energies were 
united through conscience and reason to create something 
lasting and easily available to the common person. The hope 
we saw in the ice-breaking crusades of the sixties had 
become frozen in the seventies. Our attempts to com bat the 
effects and not the cause resulted in the dissipation oF our 
constructive energies. Throughout the stillness of the 
seventies our actions were directed towards the understand¬ 
ing of the cause. Now in the eighties, over six years after 
that bright day, our efforts resulted in the creation of a 
program entitled the "THE C 0 W 10 N LAW." It provides an 
understanding for all individuals of the problem through 
which solutions are available at Law. Accepted internation- 
ally by way of enrolled students, the Common Law program saw 
one of its' students prevail at the u.S. Supreme Court when 
the legal profession offered and gave no hope. This was 
accomplished by means of a new look at the historical record 
going back nearly three-thousand-five-hundred years; main¬ 
taining conscience and reason is the "Law of Life," and 
principles cannot be compromised for expediency. Indeed 
many have been jailed for not going along with those who are 
thought to be custodians of the "basis of trust." If anyone 
walks - they walk here upon this earth. Forget concentrat¬ 
ing on the world's despair, let reason and conscience put 
you in touch with yourself; Discover that which is available 
and everlasting in you so that you may walk easily upon the 
earth. 

PIED PIPERS OF BABYLON, based on the foundation of the 
Common Law program, reveals the complex and fascinating 
story of conspiracy, intrigue, and venality behind the hy- 
pothecation of all assets of the united States of America; 
The usurpation of the government, and the consequent surrep¬ 
titious restructuring of our entire system of jurisprudence 
relating to jurisdiction over our private affairs. These 
revelations are undertaken by the author in which he care¬ 
fully offers an in depth analysis of the problem, and what 
may very well be the only solution to the present day plight 
of natural born persons. This book enlightens the individ¬ 
ual by allowing an avenue for understanding and Spiritual 
growth whereby one can rise above injustice and the over¬ 
whelming sense of futility. 

President of The Common Law Association 

David C. Chovanak 


-vi- 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 



After more than six years of research, and with the 
contributions and assistance of hundreds of concerned 
individuals, the author and his associates have produced an 
account, while not exhaustive, they hope will provide the 
general reader an understanding of the NATURE of a very 
esoteric subject: A subject which is designed to be 
understood by only a chosen few while direct! 


the life of every parson; A sub ject that must be understood 
before any individual has a chance of becoming his own 
governor. 

The author particularly acknowledges the following 
contributors to the unveiling of powers whose sorceries have 
indeed deceived all nations: 

Congressmen McFadden and Patman, whose herculean efforts 
to investigate the entire Federal Reserve System has made 
significant contributions toward exposing its true nature 
and operation. The late Bill Avery who, to my knowledge, 
was the first to lift a portion of the veil of secrecy 
surrounding an unwarrantable jurisdiction that has been 
imposed on the American people - results of His research 
efforts were published 
The late Merrill Jenkins, Monetary Realist, whose research 
and publications provided his readers with an understanding 
of the nature of "money" - coin, credit, and circulation. 
Lee Brobst a nd associates who continued the research of Bill 
Avery and Rave made substantial contributions to the 
identification and understanding of the true nature of this 
secret jurisdiction. Phillip Kenneth Sade who, via his book 
"The Tontine Government^ " shows his readers the direct 
relationship between Tontine and our present day dilemma. 
F. Tupper Saussy and Associates, whose detailed research 
into the formation of the Union provides the readers of F. 
Tupper's book "The Miracle on Main Street," and his monthly 
newsletter "The Main Street Journal," an essential and 
necessary understanding of the heritage our forefathers gave 
us. Red Beckman, Bill Benson and the Montana Historians for 


unveiling fundamental anomalies and fraud in the ratifica¬ 
tion process of certain key amendments to the U.S. Constitu¬ 
tion. staff of the Universal Life university School of Law, 
whose five year efforts resulted in a comprehensive self- 
study program in the Common Law, and all inter-related 
fields of law - providing essential knowledge for any in¬ 
dividual wanting to be a free sovereign and assume the 
responsibilities of being his own governor. 


-vii- 







NOTES 


Bibliography references in the text are used to 
cross-reference cites and authorities by chapter. Capital 
letters in brackets refer to a major source document. A 
bracked capital letter followed by a number in parantheses 
refers to sub-cites within that particular source document. 

Legal citations generally consist of three symobl groups 
(numbers or abbreviations). Numbers refer to a specific 
Volume, Title, Section, Chapter, Clause, Page, and the like; 
while abbreviations refer to specific Names of people, 
places, or things, which can be found in a legal dictionary 
(see for instance, Black's Law dictionary, 4th Ed., 
Abbreviations, page 1797, et seq., for the following: U.S., 
U.S.C., Cal., C.C.P., Y.B., Bl. Cam.,). For example: 28 
U.S.C. 1441(b); 3 Bl. Com. 295; Cal. C.C.P. 413.1; Y.B. 3 
Hen. VI 36 are citations to Title 28 of U.S. Code, Section 
1441, Subsection b; part Three of Black's Commentaries, page 
295; California Code of Civil Procedures, Section 413, 
Subsection 1; the Third Book of Henry the sixth, page 36; 
respectively. 

Case citations follow a similar scheme, except that the 
title of the case and the year on which it was decided 
precedes the citation. Thus Erie Railroad v. Tcmpkins, 
(1938) 304 u.S. 64, refers to the landmark case whereby the 
federal government of the United States disclaimed the 
general principles of federal ccrrmon law; the case was 
reported in Volume 304 of the United States Reports, at Page 
64. 


A glossary is provided to assist the reader in the 
understanding of various terms used in this work, terms 
which may be unfamiliar and, therefore, difficult; and/or 
terms which may be ambigious and require explanation of the 
specific meaning intended by the author. In other words, 
its purpose is to assure a path of canrtunication between the 
author and reader. The definitions cane from many sources - 
the definitions of "cannon law" and "cannon law system" are 
the author's cwn in order to hold on to the true meaning, 
the essence of the thought trying to be ccnmunicated. 


-viii- 





PIED PIPERS OF BABYLON 


PROLOGUE 

America, the land of the free - or is it? The general 
response to this question goes something like this: "Well, 
maybe not as much as it used to be, but it still is the best 
country in the world in which to live." End of conversation 
for, scmehow, to pursue the subject further snacks of being 
unpatriotic and maybe even subversive. The fact that the 
lesser of two evils is still evil, and could not be 
tolerated by a truly free person is never considered. 

I call this the "relativity syndrome" characterized by 
the total absence of absolutes: "I am standing in manure up 
to my waist, but I have no cause for complaint or corrective 
action because you are in it up to your chin." "I have been 
wrongly convicted and sentenced to six months incarceration 
but I should feel fortunate and never question the system of 
'justice' because my cellmate has been wrongly convicted and 
sentenced to a year of incarceration." etc., etc.. 

In retrospect, answers of this nature should be expected 
and predictable because we have been systematically 
programmed to accept such dogma without question. You see, 
in order to properly and intelligently address the question, 
one must have an understanding and knowledge of law. Law no 
longer taught in our schools and churches. > 

To understand the political significance of the question, 
one needs to examine our basic form or system of government. 
The word law itself suggests restraint and jurisdiction 
(i.e., lawful authority over the subject matter in contro¬ 
versy, over a thing within that subject matter, and over a 
person associated with the subject matter) and, therefore, 
suggests government. Government and law are closely re¬ 
lated. Governments owe their existence to the laws they 
observe, which in turn, determines the form or system of any 
particular government. 

This raises other questions of logic we may ask 
ourselves: What laws does our government observe? What is 
the jurisdiction imposed in order to enforce these laws? 
How, is this jurisdiction acquired over an artificial person? 
How is this jurisdiction acquired over a natural born 
person? 

First, the answers require an understanding of the sys¬ 
tems of law and their fundamental differences; and second, 
an understanding of the forms of government that can exist 
within these systems of law. 

There are fundamentally two systems of man-made law on 
planet Earth. One is called the Common Law, the other the 
Civil Law (or Roman Civil Law). Common Law is founded on 
reason and the immutable laws of God and Nature. In its 


-ix- 






purest form, it is the law of conscience; being the law of 
conscience, it cannot be written, only be written about. It 
is rooted in the reasoning and spiritual powers of man. The 
Civil Law is statutary or codified law and is only as new as 
writing and reading. Writing was put to use as a method of 
civil direction in Mesopotamia, where by 2100 B.C., the 
judgments of gods, revealed by their seers, began to be re¬ 
corded. About three centuries later. The code of Hammurabi, 
King of Babylon, probably the first statutary codification, 
made possible the theocratic unity of Mesopotamia and marked 
the beginning of governmental bureaucratic memoranda for 
communicating the wishes and commandments from above. 

The common Law and the Civil Law have since been in 


constant ideological war against each other for the control 


of societies (governments); 
understand the differences 


so it is extremely important to 
between the two. 




the law of the ruler. Common Law is the law of the 


Common Law is based solidly on the immutable laws 


Nature. Civil Law is changeable at the whim of the ruler. 
The former can only be preserved against the latter by con¬ 
stant vigilance on the part of the people, it is axiomatic 
that the people cannot possibly maintain this vigilance 
without knowledge and understanding of the law. 

J. Reuben Clark, a former Under-Secretary of State and 
Ambassador to Mexico, gives us the following analysis of 
these two competing systems of law: 


Briefly, and stated in general terms, the 
basic concept of these two systems is as oppo¬ 
site as the poles. In the civil law, the source 
of all law is the personal ruler, whether 
prince, king or emperor; he is sovereign. in 
the Common Law, certainly as finally developed 
in America, the source of all the law is the 
people. They, as a whole, are sovereign. 

During the centuries, these two systems have 
had an almost deadly rivalry for the control of 
society, the civil law and its fundamental con¬ 
cepts being the instrument through which ambi¬ 
tious men of genius and selfishness have set up 
and maintained despotisms; the common Law, with 
its basic principles, being the instrument 
through which men of equal genius, but wrlth love 
of mankind burning in their souls, have establi¬ 
shed and preserved liberty and free institu¬ 
tions. The Constitution of the united States 
embodies the loftiest concepts yet framed of 
this exalted concept. [A] 



The civil law has been passed down through the centuries 
under many different names, just as there has been many 
different names attached to governments functioning under 
its jurisdiction; but the nature of the system is always the 
same, just as the nature of all governments operating 
according to its principles, rules and procedures is the 
same. It is a police power jurisdiction, and by definition, 
governments operating thereunder are dictatorships. The 
degree of tolerability (evil) is at the whim and under the 
total control of the ruler. Under this jurisdiction there 
are no such things as rights, only privileges granted by the 
ruler - for a price. 

The signers of the Declaration of Independence and of the 
original Constitution were well aware of the fact there are, 
two fundamental systems of law, and consequently, two 
fundamental systems of government. Benjamin Franklin, when 
asked by a gentleman about the constitution, "What kind of 
government did you give us?" answered, "A republic, if you 
can keep it." In giving us a republic, they carefully 
delineated these two systems of government by the terms 
"National" and "Federal." The clearly stated purpose of the 
constitutional convention in 1787 was to eradicate a federal 
government and replace it with a national government: [B] 

The people expect relief from their present 
embarrassed situation, and look up for it to 
this national convention; and it follows that 
they expect a national government. [James 
Wilson, in Convention, June 16, 1787.] 

In a letter dated March 25, 1826, Madison wrote to Andrew 
Stevenson to correct Stevenson's confusion about the Nation¬ 
al purpose of the Constitution, as opposed to a Federal 
purpose : 


The term (National) was used, not in contra¬ 
distinction to a limited, but to a federal gov¬ 
ernment. As the latter operated within the ex¬ 
tent of its authority thro' requisitions on the 
confederated States, and rested on the sanction 
of State Legislatures, the Government to take 
its place, was to operate within the extent of 
its powers directly and coercively on individ¬ 
uals, and to receive the higher sanction of the 
people of the States. And there being no tech¬ 
nical car appropriate denomination applicable to 
the new and unique System, the tern national was 
used with a confidence that it would not be 
taken in a wrong sense, especially as a right 









one could be readily suggested if not suffic¬ 
iently implied by sane of the propositions 
themselves. Certain it is that not more than 
two or three members of the Body, and they 
rather theoretically than practically, were in 
favor of an unlimited Govt, founded on a consol¬ 
idation of the States .... [The Records of the 
Federal Convention of 1787, Farrand, Vol. Ill, 
p. 473 - Yale University Press.] 

In order to understand the significance of Madison's 
words, we must examine the definitions of the terms 
"Federal" and "National." Webster's 1828 Dictionary tells 
us that the term "federal," ccmes from the Latin "foedus" 
meaning a "league." Webster goes on to define "federal," to 
mean "pertaining to a league or contract," derived from an 
agreement or covenant between parties, particularly between 
nations. 

Foedal is pronounced "few-dal," and is the same as 
"feudal." "Feudalism" is a federal system in which 
servant, serf, is bound by a foedum or compact to his master 
or lord. 

The Declaration of Independence severed the hold of 
English feudalism over the colonists which, as will be shown 
in this work, was being administered and enforced upon the 
people under the jurisdiction of Admiralty/Maritime and 
pursuant to the principles, rules and usages of the Civil 
Law. The Articles of Confederation that followed was 
federal in nature and totally failed to work on a free and 
independant people - being free, they also rejected the 
lesser of the two evils (i.e., American federalism/ 
feudalism as compared to British federalism/feudalism). 
Thus, the purpose of the Constitutional Convention was 
stated to be: 


... for the purpose of revising the Articles 
of Confederation and perpetual union between the 
United States of America, and ... establishing 
in these states a firm National government. 
[Proceedings in Congress, February 21, 1787, 

House Document No. 398, 69th. Congress, pages 44 
and 45.] 

From its definition, we begin to see the reason for the 
careful avoidance of "federal." Not only did the people 
expect a "national" government, but any form of "federal" 
government is in direct violation of the Declaration of 
Independence, the First Organic Law of the United States 
(see Title I, United States Code, pages xxix and xxx), which 
abolished feudal systems in this country and upended an 


-xii- 



entire political order. At the Constitutional Convention, 
Governeur Morris reminded his colleagues that "On the 
Declaration of Independence, a Government is to be formed." 

So, what did they mean by "national?" As Madison said, 
"... there being no technical or appropriate denomination 
applicable to the new system, ...." How could they use this 
term "with a confidence that it would not be taken in a 
wrong sense?" Clearly, that confidence had to repose in the 
accepted definition of the term "national." According to 
Webster, the word "nature" canes from the Latin "nasci" 
meaning "be born"; and he defines the term "nation" to mean 
"a body of people inhabitating the same country, united 
under the same government," caning from the Latin "natus" 
meaning "born." 

Thus, there is a difference between the very roots of the 
words "federal" and "national", more than just academic. 
"Federal" has to do with contracts, agreements or compacts 
between parties; while "National" has to do with the inhabi¬ 
tants of one country, united under one government. As 
Madison said, "... in this new and unique system, government 
was to operate directly and coercively on individuals - ONLY 
WITHIN THE EXTENT CF ITS POWERS." 

This was the grand and noble experiment, an entirely new 
concept in the annals of government. The National Constitu¬ 
tion and the National government which it created, was lim¬ 
ited in its powers over natural born persons (individuals) 
to those expressly granted (i.e., beyond the extent of 
powers granted the natural born inhabitant was to be 
governed by the Laws of God and Nature, the Law of 
Conscience). 

The federal government, under the Articles of Confeder¬ 
ation, was a feudal compact between sovereign states and had 
unlimited powers over the individual, upon ratification of 
the Constitution, federalism/feudalisn was gone forever in 
the United States of America. But wait! In that case, why 
do we find the following in Black's Law Dictionary, Third 
Edition (1933)? 

The United States has been generally styled, 
in American political and juridical writings, a 
"federal government." The term has not been im¬ 
posed by any specific constitutional authority, 
but expresses the general sense and opinion upon 
the nature of the form of government..."Federal" 
is somewhat appropriate if the government is 
considered a union of the states; "National” is 
preferable if the view is adopted that the state 
governments and the Union are two distinct sys¬ 
tems, each established by the people directly, 
one for local and the other for national 


-xiii- 



purposes. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 US 
542; Abbott; Mills, Representative Government 
301; Freeman, Fed Gov't. 


HOw about that! According to Black's, by 1933, the 
United States had been generally styled a "federal govern¬ 
ment" with no specific constitutional authority to do so - a 
government whose nature is feudal, and operates outside of 
the Constitution! Being feudal in nature, this government 
also owes its existence to the Civil Law and, necessarily, 
functions pursuant to its principles, rules and usages. 

Sad to say, the 1933 Edition of Black's was absolute! 


correct and the year 1913 was the ■ 


subsequently followed by a iraior coup on June 5, 1933. 


These were giant steps toward what the perpetrators of this 
takeover intend to be a "fait acccrnpli" (a thing done that 
cannot be changed). 

Since March 9, 1933, the United States has been in a 
state of declared national emergency. In fact, there are 
now in effect four presidentially proclaimed states of 
national entergeny: in addition to the national emergency 
declared by President Roosevelt in 1933, there are also the 
states of national emergency proclaimed by President Truman 
on December 16, 1950, and the two declared by President 
Nixon on March 23, 1970, and August 15, 1971. 

These proclamations give force to 470 provisions of 
Federal Law. These hundreds of statutes delegate to the 
President extraordinary powers, ordinarily exercised by the 
Congress, which affect the lives of American citizens in a 
host of all-enccnpassing manners. This vast range of 
powers, taken together, confer enough authority to rule the 
country without reference to normal constitutional 
processes. 

Under the powers delegated by these statutes, the 
President may: seize property; organize and control the 
means of production; seize corrmodoties; assign military 
forces abroad; institute martial law; seize and control all 
transportation and conmunication; regulate the operation of 
private enterprise; restrict travel; and, in a plethora of 
particular ways, control the lives of American citizens. 

It was recently brought to the author's attention that 
the flag that is displayed in all our courtrooms today is 
not the flag of the united States as defined by law. 
Black's Law Dicationary, 4th Edition states: 


FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES. By the act entitled 
"An act to establish the flag of the United 
States," (Rev. St. Sections 1791, 1792), it was 
provided "that, from and after the fourth day of 
July next, the flag of the United States be 








thirteen horizontal stripes, alternate red and 
white; that the union be twenty stars, white in 
a blue field; that, on the admission of every 
new state into the Union, one star be added to 
the union of the flag; and that such addition 
shall take effect on the fourth day of July then 
next succeeding such admission. "See Act July 
30, 1947, c. 389, Sections 1, 2, 61 Stat. 641; 4 
U.S.C.A. Sections 1, 2. 

The flags being flown in all our courtrooms today have 
something added to the flag described above, and that 
addition is a YELLCW ERINGE ON THREE SIDES. Lets analyze 
this fringe to see if it has any significance to the subject 
matter previously discussed. From The National Encyclope¬ 
dia, Volume Pour: 

FIAG, an emblem of a nation; usually made of 
cloth and flown from a staff. FROM A MILITARY 
STANDPOINT flags cure of two general classes, 
those flown from stationary masts over army 
posts, and those carried by troops in formation. 

The former are referred to by the general name 
flags. The latter are called colors when 
carried by dismounted troops. COLCRS AND 
STANDARDS cure more nearly square than flags and 
are made of silk with a knotted FRINGE OF YELLOW 
ON THREE SIDES .... 

USE OF FIAG. THE MOST GENERAL AND APPROPRI¬ 
ATE USE CF THE FLAG IS AS A SYMBOL CF AUTHORITY 
AND POWER. It is used in ceremonial observances 
to denote the sovereignty of a state, and also 
its equality. Recognition of the flag, gener¬ 
ally reciprocal, is a mark of respect for the 
state which flies it. Improper use of a flag of 
truce or a national flag is forbidden by the 
Hague Conference agreements. It is generally 
contended that a man-of-war may under certain 
conditions make use of a false flag. By the 
Declaration of London, the enemy or neutral 
character of a vessel is governed by the flag 
she has the right to fly. By the same Declara¬ 
tion, the transfer of an enemy vessel to a 
neutral flag is valid, if effected before the 
breaking out of hostilities, and without intent 
to evade the consequences of enemy character. 

Such transfer after hostilities is generally 
void. 

And from Black's Law Dictionary: 


-xv- 



LAW OF THE FLAG. IN MARITIME LAW. The law 
of that nation or country whose flag is flown by 
a particular vessel. A SHIPOWNER WHO SENDS HIS 
VESSEL INTO A FOREIGN PORT GIVES NOTICE BY HIS 
FLAG TO ALL WHO ENTER INTO CONIRAOTS WITH THE 
MASTER THAT HE INTENDS THE LAW OF THAT FLAG TO 
REGULATE SUCH CONTRACTS, AND THAT THEY MUST 
EITHER SUBMIT TO ITS OPERATION CR NOT CONIRACT 
WITH HIM. [Rubstrat v. People. 185, Ill, 133, 

57 N.E. 41, 49 L. R. A. 181, 76 Am. St. Rep. 30. 

Thus, it appears that all our courts are flying military 
colors as their symbol of authority and power; and the law 
of that flag regulates all contracts entered into 
thereunder. we must either submit to its operation or not 
contract with the ship master, pursuant to maritime law. 

It is the major purpose of this work to apprise the 
reader of how this usurpation was accomplished, and what we 
as natural born persons can do to recoup what we have lost. 
The answer is the same as it has always been since time 
iitmemarial - effective application of knowledge and 
understanding of the law. 


-xvi- 




CHAPTER I 


INTRODUCTION 


Part is A Foreign And Unwarrantable Jurisdiction 

Many reasons inpelled the American colonists to separate 
from Great Britain, but the more obvious reasons were stated 
in the Declaration of Independence itself. Written in the 
style of a formal ccnplaint or action at law, it contains a 
Declaration, a Bill of Particulars or Counts, and a prayer 
to the Supreme Judge of the Universe; The stated purpose of 
the Declaration was to assume, among the powers of the 
earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of 
Nature and the Laws of God entitle them. Out of respect for 
the opinions of mankind, ' they should declare the "causes" 
which impel than to the separation. The fundamental cause 
was mentioned twice: 

He (King George) has combined with others to 
subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to cur 
constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; 
giving assent to their acts of pretended 
legislation .... and; 

Nor have we been wanting in attentions to our 
British brethren. We have warned them from 
time-to-time of attempts by their legislature to 
extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. 

The "foreign" and "unwarrantable" jurisdiction was the 
fundamental cause of the separation, because the colonists 
knew that as long as this jurisdiction went unchallenged, 
all other obscenities ccnplained of were perfectly legal. 
Until this jurisdiction was challenged and overturned, there 
was no lawful basis for redress of the acts complained of. 

What then, was this unwarrantable and foreign jurisdic¬ 
tion? Nowhere in the Declaration is it specifically identi¬ 
fied by name. Apparently the authors did not feel this was 
necessary, because they had previously done so in other 
declarations. In the Declaration of Rights of 1765, we 
find: 


8th. That the Late act of Parliament, en¬ 
titled "An act for granting and applying certain 
starrp duties, and other duties in the British 
colonies and plantations of America, etc.," by 
imposing taxes on the inhabitants of these colo¬ 
nies, and the said act, and several other acts, 
by extending the jurisdiction of the courts of 



admiralty beyond its ancient limits, have a man¬ 
ifest tendency to subvert the rights and liber¬ 
ties of the colonists .... 

Lastly, that is the indispensable duty of 
these colonies to the best of sovereigns, to the 
mother country, and to themselves ... to procure 
the repeal of the act for granting and applying 
certain stamp duties, of all clauses of any 
other acts of Parliament, whereby the jurisdic¬ 
tion of the admiralty is extended as aforesaid, 
and the other late acts for the restriction of 
the American Connerce. [Declaration of Rights 
in Congress, at New York, October, 19, 1765.] 

And, in the Declaration of Rights of 1774, they said: 

Whereas, since the close of the last war, the 
British Parliament claiming a power of right to 
bind the people of America, by statute, in all 
cases whatsoever, hath in sane acts expressly 
imposed taxes on them, and in others, under 
various pretenses, but in fact for the purpose 
of raising revenue, hath imposed rates and 
duties payable in these colonies, established a 
board of caimissioners with unconstitutional 
powers, and extended the jurisdiction of courts 
of admiralty, not only for collecting the said 
duties, but for the trial of causes merely 
arising within the body of a county...we cheer¬ 
fully consent to the operation of such acts of 
the British Parliament, as are bona fide, 
restrained to the regulation of our external 
cornierce, for the purpose of securing the com¬ 
mercial advantages of the whole empire to the 
mother country, and the commercial benefits of 
its respective members; excluding every idea of 
taxation, interned or external, for raising a 
revenue on the subjects in America, without 
their consent .... 

Resolved, N.C.D.5. That the respective colo¬ 
nies are entitled to the Cannon Law of England, 
and more especially to the great and inestimable 
privilege of being tried by their peers of the 
vicinage, according to the course of that Law. 
All and each of which the aforesaid deputies, in 
behalf of themselves and their constituents, do 
claim demand, and insist on, as their indubit¬ 
able rights and liberities; which can not be 
legally taken from them, altered or abridged by 


- 2 - 




any power whatever, without their own consent, 


The several acts (of King George) ... which 
impose duties for the purposes of raising a rev¬ 
enue in America, extend the powers of the admir¬ 
alty courts beyond their ancient limits, deprive 
the American subject of trial by jury, ... and 
are subversive of American rights. [Declaration 
of Rights In Congress, at Philadelphia, October 
14,1774.] 

Just what is this law and jurisdiction of admiralty that 
was subversive of American rights? How can it be extended 
to encompass the trial of causes merely arising within the 
body of a county , when its ancient limits were confined to 
the sea, and its ancient boundaries were the "ebb and flew , 
of the tide"? How can acts for imposing duties for purposes 
of raising a revenue serve as the vehicle for extending the 
powers of the Admiralty courts beyond these ancient limits? 
And, more inportantly, what is the relevance of these ques¬ 
tions to each and every one of us today? 

Admiralty law encompasses all controversies arising out 
of acts done upon or relating to the sea (i.e., all subject 
matter that is maritime in nature) and questions of prize. 
Prize is that law dealing with war, and the spoils of war 
such as capture of ships, goods, materials, property both 
real and personal, etc.. 

Maritime law is that system of law which particularly 
relates to ccnmerce and navigation. Admi ral ty/Mar i t ime 
jurisdiction can attach merely because the subject matter 
falls within the scope of maritime law and as our founding 
fathers fully understood, you do not have to be on a ship in 
the middle of the sea to be under admiralty jurisdiction. 

The jurisdiction of Admiralty depends, or 
ought to depend, as to contracts upon the 
subject matter, i.e., whether maritime or not, 
and as to torts, upon locality .... [De Lovio 
v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398] 

The colonists understood the law regarding revenue 
causes, as it was subsequently stated by the u.S. Supreme 
Court in the Huntress case in 1840: 

For more than a century before the formation 
of the constitution, that is, from the early 
part of the reign of Charles II, revenue causes 
had been heard and tried in the colonies by 
courts of vice Admiralty. [The Huntress, Case 
No. 6 , 914, 12 Fed. Cas. 984] 


- 3 - 



This is why revenue acts could be used to extend the 
jurisdiction of admiralty within the bodies of the counties. 
The more one's day to day personal transactions involve tax¬ 
ation, the more he is drawn into the jurisdiction of admir¬ 
alty and out of the jurisdiction of Ccrrmon Law. It is 
worthy of note that neither the Declaration of Independence, 
the Constitution, nor any subsequently enacted statute has 
modified the originally established jurisdictional bound¬ 
aries over revenue causes in this country. 

The colonists also understood the law relating to right 
of trial by jury, as subsequently stated by Justice Story in 
De Lovio v. Boit: 

... the right of trial by jury ... is exclu¬ 
ded in all cases of admiralty and maritime jur¬ 
isdiction. [De Lovio v. Boit, supra] 

Admiralty law grew and developed from the harsh realities 
and expedient measures required to survive at sea. It has 
very extensive jurisdiction of maritime causes, both civil 
and criminal. Because of its genesis, it contains a harsh 
set of rules and procedures where there is no right to trial 
by jury, no right to privacy, etc.. In other words, there 
are no rights under this jurisdiction - only privileges 
granted by the captain of the ship. 

For instance, in the jurisdiction of admiralty, there is 
no such thing as a right not to be ccnpelled to testify 
against yourself in a criminal case. However, the captain 
can, if he wishes, grant you the privilege against self¬ 
incrimination; There is no such thing as a right to use your 
property on the public highways, but the captain can grant 
you the privilege via license and registration, if he 
chooses; There is no such thing as a right to operate your 
own business, only a privilege allowed as long as you 
perform according to the captain's regulations. 

Just before the Revolution, when cannon law was practiced 
in the colonies, the King's men came over to collect their 
taxes. They did not use cannon law, they applied admiralty 
law on the colonists. They arrested people, held star 
chamber proceedings, and totally denied access to cannon law 
rights by way of this "unwarrantable jurisdiction." Under 
this jurisdiction, all of the acts complained of are 
sanctioned: taxation without representation, denial of 
right to trial by jury, placing colonists on ships and 
sending them down to the British West Indies where many died 
of fever in the holds of those ships and very few returned, 
etc.. Yes, this unwarrantable jurisdiction was the cause of 
the revolt. All things that followed its imposition were 
the natural and predictable effects. 


- 4 - 




What is the Common Law that was denied to the colonists 
by this unwarrantable jurisdiction? Historically, this law 
came by way of the Tribes of Israel to the Anglo-Saxons in 
Northern Germany, thence to England by way of the 
Anglo-Saxons. It existed and ruled the land of England 
prior to the reign of william the Conqueror, commencing in 
the year 1066, when he conquered the Anglo-Saxons and 
interjected Reman Civil Law into English law. This mixture 
of cannon law and civil law is what modern day textbooks 
"erroneously refer to as "the ccrrmon law" - a ludicrous 
statement to anyone who understands the fundamental 
distinctions between these two totally different systems of~ 
law. Common law and civil law are, as J. Reuben Clark said, 
‘‘as opposite as the poles," and are in constant ideological 
war against each other for the control of society. 

When William the Conqueror took England in 1066, he 
subjugated all the Saxons to his rule. But there was one 
part of England that he was not able to take, that was 
London Town. The merchants had a wall built around it; they 
could bring supplies with ships up to the palace, and unload 
them - and William's soldiers could not take the city. The 
outcome was an independent City of London, governed under 
the merchants law; they called it "Lex Mercantoria." Today 
it is called "Law Merchant". And to this day, the law of 
merchants governs the city of London. This is the law, and 
its jurisdiction, that was imposed on the colonists that 
caused the revolt. 

What we are going to examine in this work is how ws have 
been tricked out of access to our common law rights and into 
the admiralty courts, just as it occurred over 200 years 
ago. 

We will see that our heritage of freedom is a direct and 
proximate result of the Cannon Law, deriving its authority 
solely from Divine Providence and the Law of Nature. 

we will examine the means our founding fathers gave us 
for the purpose of assuring access to this law in the Con¬ 
stitution itself. 

We will see evidence that shows how certain portions of 
the Constitution, dealing with the jurisdiction of Admir¬ 
alty/Maritime law, has been used to bar our access to the 
Common Law. 

we will examine which laws are applicable to the reso¬ 
lution of this dilemma, and how they trust be invoked and 
implemented. 


Part II: Building the Case 

Our objective is to systematically present fact and law 
to enable the reader to build a winning case. The first 


- 5 - 















step in building any case that has a chance of winning is to 
analyze the problem. A cannon pattern for doing this is to 
recognize a problan that needs answering, define the problem 
by stating it, reach a satisfactory judgment, and then 
defend our judgment. 

In preparing our case, our legal research will be 
determined entirely by the facts of the case, for without 
provable facts, the law is meaningless. In marshalling our 
facts, we need to keep a few guiding principles in mind so 
we are not led astray. We must discount preconceptions and 
postpone judgments. We must observe for a purpose, know why 
we are observing and stick to relevant facts about the case. 
The case must be based on evidence, premises and 
inferences. 

Man has a great propensity to concentrate on effects and 
treat them as cause. In so doing, he quite often mitigates 
undesireable effects which, in turn, leads him to believe he 
has properly and adequately marshalled his facts about the 
case and resolved the problem. 

The key to causation is in the effects. This, for us is 
the known world. It has been wisely said: "If you would 
know the unknown, observe carefully the known." 

So let us observe the known and, by a process of 
inference and extrapolation, apply what we know about the 
known to the unknown. When an unknown becomes known, we 
reiterate the process in our search for truth while 
continually checking and testing our premises. 

By this process we will arrive at a CAUSE in keeping with 
the effect or effects. This should result in two 
prerequisites of the future in order to meet our objective: 
Correct orientation of the mind with Reality, and a new 
dimension of consciousness, knowledge to give us the power 
and wisdom to be our own governors. 


Part III: Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (TOD) 

As computers go, the human brain is without parallel or 
parity, when compared to even the most sophisticated man¬ 
made computer. Nevertheless, it is a computer and like all 
computers, it can be programmed. 

There is a theory known as the Theory of Cognitive 
Dissonance (TCD) which holds that the mind involuntarily 
rejects information not in line with previous thoughts and/ 
or actions. 

Leon Festinger may have been the first person to document 
the law of cognitive dissonance, but he was certainly not 
the first to observe it. Since the most ancient times, 
mind-controllers have been enticing free people into servi- 


- 6 - 




tude (piping them on board, so to speak) by taking advantage 
of man's tendency to generate cognitive dissonance. 

In his book, A THEORY CF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE, (Stanford 
University Press, 1957), Festinger says that new events or 
new information create an unpleasantness, a dissonance with 
existing knowledge, opinion, or cognition concerning behav¬ 
ior. When this happens, pressures naturally arise within 
the person to reduce the dissonance. Not reconciling the 
new information with the old, but reducing the dissonance. 

Festinger further stated that strength of the pressures 
to reduce the dissonance is a function of the magnitude of 
the dissonance. Dissonance acts in the same way as a state 
of drive, need or tension. The greater the dissonance, the 
greater will be the intensity of the action to reduce the 
dissonance and the greater the avoidance of situations that 
would increase the dissonance. 

A person can deal with the pressure generated by the 
dissonance by changing the old behavior to harmonize with 
information. But if the person is too committed to the old 
behavior and way of thinking, he simply rejects the new in¬ 
formation. A simple "I don't believe it" thought or word is 
the easy cop out. For if you are unaware, you are unaware 
of being unaware. 


- 7 - 



CHAPTER II 


THE COWON LAW - YCUR BIRTHRIGHT 


Part Is The Cannon Law 
Introduction: 

The Cannon Law is the law which cannot be written by man; 
it is mankind's conscience. (See Glossary definitions of 
"Cannon Law" and "Cannon Law Systems.") All of us have 
experienced instances when we are moved by deep human 
emotions: good or evil, love or hate, sadness or happiness, 
tragedy or comedy. Our anotions, however, are not allowed 
to soar on the wings of imagination. Cannon sense and 
reason contain them within the bounds we have set for 
ourselves, when the limits of reason are exceeded by our 
fellow human beings, we say they are unreasonable or 
irrational, with little regard for the reasons for this 
"irrationality." we "know" the truth from our own 
perspective, and we occasionally forget that truth is all- 
sided. If we could understand "Truth" from the varied per¬ 
spectives of mankind, we would be able to understand the 
total sum of human reason and achieve the highest level of 
conscienceness. We would then possess understanding and 
knowledge of the Common Law of man. The Common Law is the 
process of human reasoning for the purpose of spiritual 
growth. It is man's ccnmunions with God and Nature, his 
guiding light. Common Law is "that" which is. It is the 
substance from which form is constructed. All too often 
this form is the barrier, or seaming barrier between man and 
nature. More understanding of that which is can dissolve 
the barrier. The late great scientist-biologist, Edward 
Sinnott wrote: 

Life is the center where the material and 
spiritual forces of the universe seem to meet 
and be reconciled. Spirit is born in life. 

Development of the Ccrtmon Law: [A] 

The Old Testament 

The Common Law originated in the Laws of God and Nature. 
It is rooted in antiquity, a beautiful history of men 
becoming free. The words were coined from observations made 
within the Catholic Church of old England. These people had 
among than a cannon notion of an unwritten law expressed as 
conduct. They had rules enforced by a responsibility borne 


■ 8 - 



by each person to know what was right or wrong and to apply 
that knowledge in their dealings with one another - a 
"cannon law." Its principles were nurtured, preserved, 
eventually set forth in our Declaration of independence. 
Hie essence of the unwritten law, need not be put into 
print, as it was "written" explicit enough in the cannon 
knmcwledge of the sovereigns - the Freemen of America! 

The ancestry of early English settlers can be traced 
through migration of the ten "lost" tribes of Israel des¬ 
cribed in the Old Testament. The principles and concepts 
found in these ancient documents give record of a new spirit 
in human affairs. Although the greater histories of Egyp¬ 
tian, Syrian, Assyrian and Phoenician kingships make the 
Hebrew kingship a mere incident, out of this history arose a 
moral and intellectual consequence [such as, "why do we do 
these things?"] of primary importance; and a system of law 
that made these consequences into a custom of the tribes. 

Somewhere between the Nile and Euphrates rivers, there 
lived a group of Nomad tribes who had fled from cultured 
Egypt; a land where they could neither live as a group nor 
practice their spiritual beliefs. After a dramatic escape, 
they reached Kades in the desert. Hie name of their God was 
Yahweh, or Jehovah, which is as close as we can get because 
the name, a repetition of the verb "to be," or "eternal," 
has four consonants and no vowels, so no one really knows 
the pronunciation. Hie people were struggling between going 
on or returning to Egypt. Their struggles gave rise to 
events, which in turn led to words about these events, which 
finally became the books that form the Old Testament. 

Hie Old Testament may be distinguished in three phases: 
1) under Judges, the dominant interest was cannon loyalty 
and the welfare of the nation, 2) under the Prophets, indi¬ 
vidual life and personal conscience were foremost, 3) after 
the second exile and there was a sense of fellowship with 
all men, the expectation of a deliverer was to be sent by 
God. However, this does not include the ten lost "tribes" 
of the first exile. 

Phase 1, 1800-1200 B.C.: The basic laws expressing 
spiritual and moral life together were given to Moses by 
Yahweh and thence to the people; the Ten Carmandments, one 
caiplete law with ten points; if one was broken, they were 
all broken in principle. The first three dealt with the 
vertical relationship to God; the last seven with the hor¬ 
izontal relationship to one's fellow Man. 

Phase 2, 1200-1000 B.C.: After Moses's time, the tribes 
entered the fertile land of Canaan; it was a savage time, as 
the Old Testament clearly shows. Each tribe was assigned a 
specific area within the Land of Canan in which to dwell 
(Numbers 33: 54,55 and Chapters 34, 35, 36), their only bond 
being their relationship with their God and the cannon laws 


- 9 - 



with respect to this relationship. Because they were united 
by their spiritual beliefs in Yahweh and His laws there was 
a concern over "covenants," a word which implied fellowship 
between members of the tribe and specifically between the 
people and their God; they lived with faith, loyalty and 
goodness. To serve God meant to be kind to the oppressed, 
the widows and the orphans. At the same time, they began to 
take an interest in other people as having a conscience. 
Ultimately, "well-being" was not seen as material prosper¬ 
ity, but as goodness and justice. 

Justice means that organized law had to exist; and it did 
exist as the explicit conscience of the people. In the law, 
the people encountered the Eternal. 

This is your wisdem and your understanding in 
the sight of the nations which shall hear all 
these statutes, and say, "Surely this great 
nation is a wise and understanding people." For 
what nation is there so great who has God so 
nigh as the Lord our God is to us ... And what 
nation is there that has statutes and ordinances 
so righteous as all this law .... [Deut. 4:6-8] 

The commandments of the law are, 

not in heaven, that you should say, who will go 
up for us to heaven, and bring it to us? But 
the word is very near you; it is in your mouth 
and in your heart. [Deut. 30:12-14] 

The law supported the concept of responsibility not only 
to loved ones, but to neighbors. With such a concept in 
their midst, the people were unobstructed in ruling their 
own lives as they chose. Freedom, not yet existing 
elsewhere at that time, was possible. 

Phase 3, 1000-587 B.C.: A high place was reached when 
the people became a kingdom. According to the ordinary laws 
of comparative religion, a state religion should have 
developed in which the Godhead was the personification of 
the State. But when Israel became a monarchy. Eternal Law 
became the God of king and nation; Life and religion were 
one. The passing on of God's law to England began with the 
Israelite migrations out of Assyria around 671 B.C.. In 740 
B.C. the warring Assyrians invaded the Northern kingdom of 
Israel, with Samaria as its capital, and the tribes were 
subsequently swept off into captivity and utterly lost to 
history by 710 B.C. (II Kings 15:19-38 and Chapters 
16,17,18) It will be of interest to find that they are not 
lost, thanks to Russian research in the nine- teenth 
century. They were held in captivity until the fall of 


- 10 - 




Assyria, around 605 B.C., then allowed to escape over the 
Caucasus mountains to the Steppes of Russia just north of 
the Black Sea. During the following centuries, it appears 
that at least three waves of these Isralite people migrated 
into Europe. The first of these was the Cimmerians or 
Celts, the second was the Scythinas, and the third was later 
to become known as the Anglo-Saxons. 

The Great Migrations 

Tradition as well as historical sources indicate that the 
people who later became known as Anglo-Saxons were one of 
three major migrations which came from the vicinity of the 
Black Sea to Europe. Other migrations of lesser proportions 
occurred, but for our purposes these three deserve primary 
consideration. They are the Cimmerians (often referred to 
by their language indentification as Celts), the Scythians, 
and the Anglo-Saxons. 

The Cimmerians or Celts: This group is identical with 
the Cimbri who attacked Rome and the "Cymry" from whom the 
Welsh claim descent. They are also the same people who 
settled Brittany and from whom the so-called "Brettons" of 
early English history emanated. These are also the 
ancestors of the Gaelic Scots and the Gaelic Irish. Many of 
the Cimmerians settled in Scandinavia when the climate was 
mild and far more attractive to new settlers than in our 
time. 

The Scythians: Herodotus, the earliest Greek historian, 
described an ancient group of nomadic people whom he called 
"Scythians." They occupied the area from which the 
Cimmerians had departed. Both people were of the same basic 
culture and built mounds for their dead. It is by means of 
these mounds that we are able to trace the migrations of 
these people from the Crimea into Europe. The Cimmerians, 
Scythians and Anglo-Saxons were all mound builders, and we 
shall have more to say about this later. One branch of the 
Scythians was known as the Sakae. It is believed these are 
identical with the Saxons in Northern Germany with whom the 
Engles intermingled to form the Anglo-Saxons. 

The Anglo-Saxons: The Saxons were already in northern 
Europe when they were conquered in the first century B.C. by 
a new migration of people called the Yngling or Engles, and 
the two people thereafter became known as the Anglo-Saxons 
(Engle-Saxons). It is therefore to the Engles or Yngling 
migration that we new turn our attention. Since this is the 
ancestral line of all Anglo-Saxon Americans, this migration 
is of particular interest. 

The Yngling people originally occupied a large territory 
north of the Black Sea, then made their way through western 
Russia, across Gothic Germany, and finally settled in the 


- 11 - 



northwest corner of Europe which is new Jutland of 
continental Denmark. 

The tremendous influence of the Yngling migration into 
northern Europe is borne out by the fact that their 
institutes and their fierce love of freedom and independence 
were impressed upon nearly every people with whom they came 
in contact. The "people's law" (ccrrmon to all the people, 
hence the "caimon law") was universally accepted in Northern 
Europe. The early German tribes called themselves the 
"Deutsch," which means "The people." 

Although the west German tribes as well as the Scandi¬ 
navians retained many of their original institutes, these 
eventually became dominated by the concepts of the Reman 
Civil Law which acknowledged all power as emanating from the 
king or emperor. Fortunately, however, before this happened 
the institutes of freedom under the "people's common law" 
had been transplanted to England where it continued its 
development quite independent of Roman civil law in the 
continent. 

Shortly after the Romans left the British Isles in the 
fourth century A.D., certain Celtic tribes invited the 
Engles, Saxons and Jutes (who had previously raided the east 
coast of England as pirates) to bring their bands over to 
England to help defeat other Celts. These Nordic tribes 
responded with exuberance but later refused to return heme. 
They established permanent settlements in England and 
gradually imposed their power over whole regions formerly 
occupied by the Celts. In due time,the Danes decided their 
Anglo-Saxon cousins had such a good thing that they came 
over and conquered much of England. Thus, through these 
various invasions from Europe, the institutes of the Anglo- 
Saxons took root in the British Isles just in time to escape 
the full impact of the oppressive Roman civil law which ms 
moving northward from Rome and Constantinople. 

One of the most puzzling aspects of the institutes of the 
Anglo-Saxons (as well as the more ancient Cimmerian and 
Scythian cultures) is the fact that they are almost 
identical with many of the unique institutes of the 
Israelites in the Bible. How could this be? The answer has 
been found in the burial mounds of these people which are 
scattered from the Crimea to Sweden. 

It will be recalled that in 922 B.C. the ten northern 
tribes of Israel broke off from the House of Judah to form a 
nation of their own. The Assyrians carried away these ten 
tribes and held them captive for over a century. However, 
when Assyria was conquered by Babylon at the battle of 
Carchemish in 605 B.C., the Israelites were able to escape 
and fled over the Caucasus mountains into the region of the 
Crimea and the prairie likeness of present day Russia. The 
Book of Tobit makes reference to Tobit, 721 B.C., a wealthy 


- 12 - 



Israelite of the northern tribe who advocates leaving 
Nineveh, the capitol of Assyria, and going to Medes which 
was close to this area. The burial mounds found in this 
area contain pottery, jewelry, trinkets and other artifacts 
which are "exactly similar" to those found in the mounds of 
Scandinavia. (Du Chaillu, The Viking Age, Vol. 1, p. 216, 
299). And the burial grounds in the Crimea and surrounding 
area re-identified with the Israelites. 

During the reign of the Tsars, Russian Archaeologists 
made extensive investigations into the mounds in the 
vicinity of the Crimea and the Kuban River. It is 
interesting that on the Crimean Peninsula there is a "Valley 
of Jehosaphat," and a place called "Israel's Portress," 
which is surrounded by hundreds of these tombs. 

The Russian Archaeological Society made extensive exca¬ 
vations into these mounds and unearthed a great many epi¬ 
taphs, some of than going back to pre-Christian times. The 
inscriptions are in Hebrew and many of these were taken to 
the Museum of Leningrad. Here are examples: 

I am Jehude, the son of Moses, the son of 
Juhudah the mighty, a man of the tribe of 
Naphtali, of the family of shimli, who wras 
carried captive in the captivity of Hoshea, king 
of Israel, with the tribe of Simeon, together 
with other tribes of Israel. 

To one of the faithful in Israel, Abraham-ben 
-Mar-Sinchah of Kertch, in the year of our exile 
682, which the envoys of the prince of Rosh 
Mesech came from Kou to our master Chazar, 

Prince David, from Halah, Habor and Gozan, to 
which places Tiglath Pilesar had exiled the sons 
of Reuben and Gad and the half Tribe of 
Manasseh, and permitted them to settle there, 
and from which they have been scattered 
throughout the entire East, even as far as 
China. 

This is the grave of Buke, the son of Izchak 
(Isaac), the priest. May his rest be in Eden at 
the time of the deliverance of Israel. In the 
year 702 of the years of our Exile. Rabbi Moses 
Levi Died in the year 726 of our exile. 

Zadok the Levite, son of Moses, died 4,000 
after creation, 785 of our exile. (This refers 
to the Karaite era of the creation, which makes 
that event 3911 B.C.. So this last date wrould 
be 88-89 A.D.) 

A summary of additional evidence identifying the mound 
builders of the Black Sea area wd.th the Israelites of the 


- 13 - 



Bible is presented in the "Utah Geneological and Historical 
Magazine," Vol. 25, pp. 6-10. Among other things it says: 

Professor A.D. Chwolson examined, in the 
Museum of St. Petersburg (Leningrad) from 1823 
to 1869, more than 700 tombstones and many 
tablets and other articles of historical value. 

He translated the contents of many of these 
which are readable and wrote sixteen or 
seventeen volumes with seme illustrated pages, 
which are now in the Library of Moscow, appear¬ 
ing under various titles, such as Pamiatnike 
drevnei pismennosti (Memorials of Ancient 
Records), St. Petersburg, 1892, Vol. 84; Drevnia 
Pamiatniki (Ancient Monuments). 

Only a few excerpts have been taken from these records of 
ancient Monuments and translated into the English language 
by Rev. Stern. 

These archaelogical records are the most 
direct proofs of the origin of the people who 
settled in Southern Russia around the Black and 
Caspian seas; and many other archaeological 
proofs found in Scandinavia and along the 
Dnieper river clear up to the Baltic Sea, 
contain the records of a people, covering more 
than 1,600 years of their sojourn in this 
country, and eventual separation into new groups 
and tribes. 

More or less authentic documents and convincing Russian 
authorities on history and exegesis have suggested that the 
ancient Russians came from the cities of the Medes and fran 
Assyria; and that they and the Scandinavians were originally 
one people for nearly a thousand years, known then as the 
Sakei, or Sacae, Saakha-suni, Gaeth, Messagete, vargians, or 
Northmen, also called "Rous" or Russ. For centuries there 
was a continuous cannon faith and belief among them and an 
exchange of ideas, as well as merchandise. Scandinavian 
Sagas and Russian bylines bear this out. (Russian Anti¬ 
quities, Bk. 1, Copenhagen 1850). Many Dano-Norwegian Sagas 
have Russian origin. For example, the Saga or Orvard Odd. 
Archaeological discoveries and runic inscriptions on the 
manorial stones found in Sweden confirm this ccmnon history 
of the people. Another proof of the closeness of Scandi- 
navian-Russian relationships is to be found in the great 
number of purely Russian proper names, the same as those 
which are generally to be read on the Russian monuments of 
the 3rd to 9th centuries of our era, deciphered among the 


- 14 - 




runic inscriptions and in various documents originating in 
the eastern provinces of Sweden: 

According to Israelitish custom the tribes 
that occupied the great plains of what is new 
known as Russia, left many suggestive 
geographical names behind them. For instance, 
the four rivers that empty into the Black Sea 
were thus named, Don, Dan-jeper (now Dnieper). 

Danube (in Russian Donajets). On the Donajets, 
they built the city of Ishmail; straight north 
of the Caspian sea they built the great city of 
Samaria, named after the capital city of their 
nativity. They built the city of Kiev, which is 
called the mother of Russian cities and had many 
ancient monuments which bear record of its 
Israelitish origin. The Isle of Kertch was named 
after one of the princes or leaders. 

The burial mounds of these people extend the length of 
Europe. In Sweden and along the Baltic they abound. In 
Tanum Parich, Bohuslon, alone there are more than 2,000 
mounds, the largest being over 300 feet in circumference; in 
Uppsala nearly 600; at Ultona 700. The greatest number 
found in any one spot is east of the ancient Birka Bjorka 
where there are over 1,000 of them. It is possible to trace 
the migration of these ancient peoples from the Black Sea up 
the valley of the river Dnieper in Russia to the Baltic and 
thence to northern Germany and Scandinavia. Since they 
belong to the same people it is no wonder that those as far 
away as Sweden contain ceramics and jewelry very much like 
those which are found in the mounds along the Black Sea. 

A Society of Free Men 

It seems particularly significant that the institutes of 
the Anglo-Saxons were of Israelite origin since this makes 
it possible to carpare them with the institutes of Moses in 
the Bible. 

The Israelites prided themselves in being free under 
God's law. The statutes given to Moses provided that every 
fifty years there should be a jubilee celebration to 
"Proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto ALL the 
inhabitants thereof." (Leviticus 25:10) No man was even 
allowed bo subject himself to bonded indebtedness or 
servitude in excess of six years. In the seventh year he 
had to be set free: "If thou buy a Hebrew servant, six 
years he shall serve: and in the seventh year he shall go 
out free for nothing." (Exodus 21:2) It was a great of¬ 
fense against heaven to ignore this concept of individual 


- 15 - 



freedom among the Israelites. A thousand years after Moses, 
the Prophet Jeremiah declared: "Therefore, thus saith the 
Lord: Ye have not hearkened unto me, in proclaiming lib¬ 
erty, every one to his brother, and every many to his 
neighbor: behold, I proclaim a liberty for you, saith the 
Lord ..." (Jeremiah 34:17) 

A similar emphasis on the rights and liberties of the 
individual is found to be a fundamental belief of the 
Anglo-Saxons. (Our principal source of authority for the 
Anglo-Saxon culture will be the well-known historian. Dr. 
Colin Rhye Lovell of the University of Southern California 
who wrote ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY in 1962). 
A large segment of the Anglo-Saxon population became known 
as "Franks" or "Freemen" and Dr. Lovell points out that this 
emphasis on the freedom of the individual characterized the 
Anglo-Saxon culture when it was transplanted to England. 

The social structure, while not rigid, had 
definite gradations. The bulk of the tribe, 
however, consisted of FREEMEN. All adult free 
males had the obligation of bearing arms and, 
therefore, the right to participate as EQUALS in 
the tribal assembly and to hold a share of the 
tribal land. [Lovell, p. 4] 

British historian John Richard Green emphasizes the same 
point when he says, "the basis of their society was the 
freemen." (Green, A Short History of England, p.2) 

In ancient Israel, all important decisions and appoint¬ 
ments had to have the approval of the whole people. Moses 
tells us that he was required by the Lord to ask the people 
if they were willing to accept the laws that God would 
reveal to them. The idea was not merely to get a majority 
vote, but to have the universal "common consent" on the 
entire body. Here is what we read in Exodus 19: 7-8: 

And Moses came and called for the elders of 
the people, and laid before their faces all 
these words which the Lord commanded him. And 
ALL THE PEOPLE answered together and said. All 
that the Lord hath spoken we will do. 

The attitude of the Israelites toward the divine origin 
of their law is seen in hundreds of passages. The following 
are selected as representative: 

Moses said: 

These words the Lord spake unto all your 
assembly in the mount out of the midst of the 


- 16 - 



fire, of the cloud, and of the thick darkness, 
with a great voice ... and he wrote them in two 
tables of stone, and delivered them unto me. 

[Deuteronany 5:22] 

Now these are the ccnmandments, the statutes, 
and the judgments, which the Lord your God 
commanded (me) to teach you .... [Deuteronomy 
6 : 1 )] 

Psalm 119 declares: 

Thou are near, 0 Lord, and all thy command¬ 
ments cure truth .... My tongue shall speak of 
thy word: for all thy commandments are right¬ 
eousness. [verses 151 and 172] 

This typifies the attitude of the Israelites concerning 
the divine origin of their law and it referred to all of the 
commandments of God whether they were moral precepts or 
civil statutes. 

The Anglo-Saxons held a similar view of their law. Dr. 
Lovell writes: 

To most Anglo-Saxons the law was either 
divinely inspired or the work of their 
ancestors, (Being) of such antiquity that it was 
unthinkable that it should be changed. Alfred 
the Great ... was one of the few rulers of the 
period who issued new laws, but he too regarded 
the body of traditional Anglo-Saxon law as 
sacred and God-Given. [English Constitutional 
and Legal History, p. 36] 

A unique system of government existed among the 
Israelites. When Moses (who had no governmental training 
except the pattern he had observed among the Egyptians) was 
unable to cope with the governing of three million 
Israelites, the high priest, Jethro, instructed him to 
follow God's pattern of government. Jethro said to Moses: 

The thing that thou doest is not good. Thou 
will surely wear away, both thou, and this 
people that is with thee: for this thing is too 
heavy for thee; thou are not able to perform it 
thyself alone. Hearken now unto my voice, I 
will give thee counsel, and God shall be with 
thee ... Thou shalt provide out of all the 
people able men, such as fear God, men of truth 
hating covetousness; and place such over than, 
to be rulers of THOUSANDS, and rulers of HUND- 


- 17 - 



REDS, rulers of FIFTIES, and rulers of TENS. 
[Exodus 18:17-21] 

Moses later refers to the accomplishment of this 
assignment. He told the Israelites: 

And I spake unto you at that time, saying I 
am not able to bear you myself alone .... Take 
you wise men, and understanding, and known among 
your tribes, and I will make them rulers over 
you.... So I took the chief of your tribes, 
wise men, and known, and made them heads over 
you, captains over THOUSANDS, and captains over 
HUNDREDS, and captains over FIFTIES, and 
captains over TENS, and officers among your 
tribes. [Deuteronomy 1:9-15] 

One of the most interesting aspects of Anglo-Saxon 
society was a similar division into an ascending hiearcy of 
self-governing units: 

The Tithing: It was so called because ten 
freeholders with their families composed one. 

It is said that they were all knit together in 
one society, and bound to the king for the 
peaceable behavior of each other. in each of 
these societies there was one chief or principal 
person, who, from his office, was called 
"Teething man," and "TTTHINS MAN." [Black's Law 
Dictionary, under "Tithing"] The territory 
occupied by a tithing was referred to as a vill 
(later village). 

The Tun (or town): Often referred to as an 
assembly of several vills and thereby comprising 
seme fifty or so families. 

The Hundred: This subdivision of the Saxon 
society consisted of "Ten tithings, or groups of 
ten families of freeholders or frankpledges. 

The hundred was governed by a high constable 
(called a hundrecknan), and had its own court; 
but its most remarkable feature was the 
corporate responsibility of the whole for the 
crimes or defaults of the individual members. 

The introduction of this plan of organization 
into England ... was probably known to the 
ancient German people, as we find the same thing 
established in the Frankish kingdom under 


- 18 - 




Clothaire, and in Denmark." [Black's Law 
Dictionary, under "Hundreds"] 

The Shire: This was a division of the realm 
originally comprising approximately ten 
"hundreds" (a thousand) families which had 
their own court, their own judicial officer, and 
their own executive officer or chief. The 
judicial officer was called the shire-reff or 
sheriff and the executive officer was called the 
"earldorment" or "earl." [See English Consti¬ 
tutional and Legal History, pp. 28-29] 

we have already seen how the Israelites were divided into 
groups of families with a judge or "captain" over each body 
of ten, fifty, a hundred, or a thousand families. Local 
self-government or the solving of problems within each group 
was therefore the pride and lifestyle of these people. 

As Moses had been told: 

and it shall be, that every GREAT matter they 
shall bring unto thee, but every SMALL matter 
they shall judge: so shall it be easier for 
thyself, and they shall bear the burden with 
thee. [Exodus 18:22] 

In Deuteronomy 1:13 we learn that the groups themselves 
suggested to Moses the identity of the men they wanted to 
serve them as their captains or judges. Thereafter, "the 
hard causes they brought unto Moses, but every small matter 
they judged themselves." (Exodus 18:20) The system had one 
judge for every ten people. Moses would handle the hardest 
cases unresolved at lower levels. 

Moses was promised that if he would inaugurate this 
system of local self-government the people would be able to 
"go to their place in peace" (Exodus 18:23), meaning that 
they would be satisfied because their problem had been 
handled. The reason usually put forth to justify the 
concentration of authority and the handling of all problems 
by the central government is the premise that it will be 
more "efficient" and therefore, more "economical." 
Experience demonstrates, however, that each problem should 
be handled on the level where it originates so that only the 
most profound and difficult problems filter up to the 
central authority. Otherwise, there is an inevitable 
clogging of government machinery to the point of total 
frustration both to the officials of the government and the 
long-suffering people. What turned out to be true and 
practical in the days of Moses is equally true today. Hie 


- 19 - 



more complex a people's way of life becomes the simpler mast 
be the controlling machinery. 

A Cannon Law Jury of 12 

Why a -Cannon Law Jury of 12? This question is of such 
paramount importance that it should be gone into in sane 
detail. As bo the number twelve (12), this is probably best 
explained by DUNCOMB'S TRIALS PER PAIS (1665) Eighth ed., 
London (1776) page 92. An account of the number 12: 

And first as to their (the jury's) number 12: 
and this number is no less esteemed by our law 
than by Holy Writ. If the twelve apostles on 
their twelve thrones must try us in our eternal 
state, good reason hath the law to appoint the 
number of twelve to try our temporal. The 
Tribes of Israel were twelve, the partiarchs 
were twelve, and Solomon's officers were twelve 
( I Kings IV 7). Therefore not only matters of 
fact were tried by twelve, but of ancient times 
twelve judges were to try matters in law, in the 
Exchequer Chamber there were twelve counsellors 
of state for matters of state; and he that 
wageth his law must have eleven others with him 
who believe he says true. And the law is so 
precise in this number of twelve, that if the 
trial be more or less, it is a mistrial. 

It is apparent from a study of the ancient Caimon Law 
System, and the principles emodied therein, that it is 
amazingly similar and in seme cases identical with the 
unique features of the Law of the Covenant concerning Moses 
on Mount Sinai. One or two of these provisions could be 
attributed to coincidence, but since the over-all pattern is 
virtually the same, it is nearly inpossible to escape the 
conclusion that the Caimon Law System is rooted in the 
substance of statutes of ancient Israel. 

The Essence And Science Of The Common Law: [B] 

Corrmon Law is the law of conscience - nothing more. All 
other attributes properly associated with "the caimon law" 
are, in reality, referring to a system devised by man for 
the sole purpose of allowing and encouraging this law of 
conscience to flourish. The caimon law jury of twelve, 
knowingly and intelligently exercising its rights and 
duties, is the cornerstone of this system of caimon law. 

The science of Caimon law is the science of God's Laws - 
Natural law and justice. Its essence is the golden rule: 


- 20 - 




It is the science of peace; and the only 
science of peace; since it is the science alone 
which can tell us on what conditions mankind can 
live in peace, or ought to live in peace, with 
each other. 

These conditions are simply these; first, 
that each man shall do towards every other all 
that justice requires him to do; and, for 
example, that he shall pay his debts, that he 
shall return borrowed or stolen property to its 
owner, and that he shall make a reparation for 
any injury he may have done to the person or 
property of another. 

The second condition is, that each man shall 
abstain from doing to another anything which 
justice forbids him to do; as, for example, that 
he shall abstain from committing theft, robbery, 
arson, murder, or any other crime against the 
person or property of another. 

The ancient maxim makes the sum of a man's 
legal duty to his fellow men to be simply this; 
"to live honestly, to hurt no one, to give to 
everyone his due." 

This entire maxim is really expressed in the 
single wards, to live honestly; since to live 
honestly is to hurt no one, and give to everyone 
his due. [The Science of Justice and Natural 
Law Contrasted with Legislation, by Lysander 
Spooner.] 


Part II; Hie Common Law Jury - Its Rights, Duties and 
Purposes 

Selected Excerpts From Lysander Spooner's "Essay On Trial By 
Jury"; [C] 

For more than six hundred years - that is, 
since Magna Carta, in 1215 - there has been no 
clearer principle of English or American con¬ 
stitutional law, than that, in criminal cases, 
it is not only the right and duty of juries to 
judge what are the facts, what is the law, and 
what was the moral intent of the accused; but 
that it is also their right, and their primary 
and paramount duty, to judge of the justice of 
the law, and to hold all laws invalid, that are, 
in their opinion, unjust or oppressive, and all 


- 21 - 



persons guiltless in violating, or resisting the 
execution of, such laws. 

Unless such be the right and duty of jurors, 
it is plain that, instead of juries being a 
"palladium of liberty" - a barrier against the 
tyranny and oppression of the government - they 
are really mere tools in its hands, for carrying 
into execution any injustice and oppression it 
may desire to have executed. 

But for their right to judge of the law, and 
the justice of the law, juries would be no 
protection to an accused person, even as to 
matters of fact; for, if the government can 
dictate to a jury any law whatever, in a 
criminal case, it can certainly dictate to them 
the laws of evidence. That is, it can dictate 
what evidence is admissible, and what 
inadmissible, and also what force or weight is 
to be given to the evidence admitted. And if 
the government can thus dictate to a jury the 
laws of evidence, it can not only make it 
necessary for them to convict on a partial 
exhibition of the evidence rightfully pertaining 
to the case, but it can even require them to 
convict on any evidence whatever that it pleases 
to offer them. 

That the rights and duties of jurors must 
necessarily be such as are here claimed for them 
will be evident when it is considered what the 
trial by jury is and what is its object. 

The trial by jury, then, is a trial by 
country - that is, by the people - as 
distinguished from a trial by the government. 

It was anciently called "trial per pais" - 
that is, "Trial by the country." And new, in 
every criminal trial, the jury are told that the 
accused 'has, for trial, put himself upon the 
country; which country you (the jury) are. 

The object of this trial "by the country," or 
by the people, in preference to a trial by the 
goverrment, is to guard against every species of 
oppression by the government. In order to 
effect this end, it is indispensable that the 
people, or "the country," judge of and determine 
their own liberties against the government; 
instead of the government's judging of and 
determining its own powers over the people. How 
is it possible that juries can do anything to 
protect the liberties of the people against the 


- 22 - 




government, if they are not allowed to determine 
what those liberties are? 

Any government, that is its own judge of, and 
determines authoritatively for the people, what 
are its own powers over the people, is an 
absolute government of course. It has all the 
powers that it chooses to exercise. There is no 
other - or at least no more accurate - defini¬ 
tion of a despotian than this. 

On the other hand, any people, that judge of, 
and determine authoritatively for the govern¬ 
ment, what are their own liberties against the 
government, of course retain all the liberties 
they wish to enjoy. And this is freedom. At 
least, it is freedom to them; because, although 
it may be theroetically imperfect, it, never¬ 
theless, corresponds to their highest notions of 
freedom. 

To secure this right of the people to judge 
of their own liberties against the government, 
the jurors cure taken, (or must be, to make them 
lawful jurors,) from the body of the people, by 
lot, or by seme process that precludes any pre¬ 
vious knowledge, choice, or selection of them, 
on the part of the government. This is done bo 
prevent the government's constituting a jury of 
its cwn partisans or friends; in other words, to 
prevent the government's packing a jury, with a 
view to maintain its own laws, and accomplish 
its cwn purposes. 

It is supposed that, if twelve men be taken, 
by lot, from the mass of the people, without the 
possibility of any previous knowledge, choice, 
or selection of them on the part of the govern¬ 
ment, the jury will be a fair epitome of "The 
country" at large, and not merely of the party 
or faction that sustain the measures of the gov¬ 
ernment; that substantially all classes of opi¬ 
nions, prevailing among the people, will be rep¬ 
resented in the jury; and especially that the 
opponents of the government, (if the government 
have any opponents), will be represented there, 
as well as its friends; that the classes, who 
are oppressed by the laws of the government, (if 
any are thus oppressed,) will have their repre¬ 
sentatives in the jury, as well as those clas¬ 
ses, who take sides with the oppressor - that 
is, with the government. 

It is fairly presumable that such a tribunal 
will agree to no conviction except such as sub- 


- 23 - 



stantially the whole country would agree to, if 
they were present, taking part in the trial. A 
trial by such a tribunal is, therefore, in ef¬ 
fect, "a trial by the country." In its results 
it probably canes as near to a trial by the 
whole country, as any trial that it is practi¬ 
cable to have, without too great inconvenience 
and expense. And as unanimity is required for a 
conviction, it follows that no one can be con¬ 
victed, except for the violation of such laws as 
substantially the whole country wish to have 
maintained. The government can enforce none of 
its laws, (by punishing offenders, through the 
verdicts of juries,) except such as substanti¬ 
ally the whole people wish to have enforced. 
The government, therefore, consistently with the 
trial by jury, can exercise no powers over the 
people, (or, what is the same thing, over the 
accused person, who represents the rights of the 
people), except such as substantially the whole 
people of the country consent that it may ex¬ 
ercise. In such a trial, therefore, "the 
country." or the people, judge of and determine 
their own liberties against the government, in¬ 
stead of the government's judging of and deter¬ 
mining its own powers over the people. 

But all this "Trial by the country" would be 
no trial at all "By the country," but only a 
trial by the government, if the government could 
either declare who may, and who may not, be 
jurors, or could dictate to the jury anything 
whatever, either of law or evidence, that is of 
the essence of the trial. 

If the government may decide who may, and who 
may not, be jurors, it will of course select 
only its partisans, and those friendly to its 
measures. It may not only prescribe who may, 
and who may not, be elgible to be drawn as 
jurors; but it may also question each person 
drawn as a juror, as to his sentiments in regard 
to the particular law involved in each trial, 
before suffering him to be sworn on the panel; 
and exclude him if he be found unfavorable to 
the maintenance of such a law. 

To show that this supposition is not an ex¬ 
travagant one, it may be mentioned that courts 
have repeatedly questioned jurors to ascertain 
whether they were prejudiced against the govern¬ 
ment - that is, whether they were in favor of, 
or opposed to, such laws of the government as 


- 24 - 




were to be put in issue in the pending trial. 
This was done (in 1851) in the united States 
District Court for the District of Massachu¬ 
setts, by Peleg Sprague, the United States 
district judge, in empaneling three separate 
juries for the trials of Scott, Hayden, and 
Morris, charged with having aided in the rescue 
of a fugitive slave from the custody of the 
United States deputy marshal. This judge caused 
the following question to be propounded to all 
the jurors separately; and those who answered 
unfavorably for the purposes of the government, 
were excluded from the panel. 

Do you hold any opinions upon the subject of 
the Fugitive Slave Law, so called, which will 
induce you to refuse to convict a person in¬ 
dicted under it, if the facts set forth in the 
indictment, and constituting the offence are 
proved against him, and the court direct you 
that the law is constitutional? 

A similar question was soon afterwards pro¬ 
pounded to the persons drawn as jurors in the 
United States Circuit Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, by Benjamin R. Curtis, one of the 
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in enpaneling a jury for the trial of 
the aforesaid Morris on the charge before 
mentioned; and those who did not answer the 
question favorably for the government were again 
excluded from the panel. 

The only principle upon which these questions 
are asked, is this - that no man shall be allow¬ 
ed to serve as juror, unless he be ready to en¬ 
force any enactment of the government, however 
cruel or tyranical it may be. 

What is such a jury good for, as a protection 
against the tyranny of the government? A jury 
like that is palpably nothing but a mere tool of 
oppression in the hands of the government. A 
trial by such a jury is really a trial by the 
government itself - and not a trial by the 
country - because it is a trial only by men 
specially selected by the government for their 
readiness to enforce its own tyranical measures. 

So, also, if the government may dictate to 
the jury what laws they are to enforce, it is no 
longer a "trial by the country," but a trial by 
the government; because the jury then try the 
accused, not by any standard of their own - not 
by their cwn judgments of their rightful lib- 


- 25 - 



erties - but by a standard dictated to thorn by 
the government. And the standard, thus dictated 
by the government becomes the measure of the 
people's liberties. If the government dictate 
the standard of trial, it of course dictates the 
results of the trial. And such a trial is no 
trial by the country, but only a trial by the 
government; and in it the government determines 
what are its own powers over the people, instead 
of the people's determining what are their own 
liberties against the government. In short, if 
the jury have no right to judge of the justice 
of a law of the government, they plainly can do 
nothing to protect the people against the op¬ 
pressions of the government; for there are no 
oppressions which the government may not auth¬ 
orize by law. 

The jury are also to judge whether the laws 
are rightly expounded to them by the court. 

Unless they judge on this point, they do nothing 
to protect their liberties against the oppres¬ 
sions that cure capable of being practised under 
cover of a corrupt exposition of the laws. If 
the judiciary can authoritatively dictate to a 
jury any exposition of the law, they can dictate 
to them the law itself, and such laws as they 
please; because laws are, in practice, one thing 
or another, according as they are expounded. 

[An Essay On The Trial By Jury by Lysander 
Spooner.] 

A word to the wise, however: These rights, duties and 
purposes only apply to a Jury functioning within the 
Jurisdiction of the Ccmmon Law. Juries functioning within 
the Jurisdictions of Equity or Admiralty/Maritime are merely 
advisory - and have none of the rights, duties and purposes 
described above. 

Comnon Law Jury Nullification - A Right and Duty at Ccmmon 
Law: [D] 

The history of DUE PROCESS is essentially the history of 
the cannon law jury. Lysander Spooner did humanity a great 
service in laying down the historical foundations of Trial 
by Jury. As Spooner saw it, the jury, as a democratic 
institution, was being substituted by the summary 
jurisdiction of the Chancellor, the King's Conscience. 

Alan W. Scheflin, an Associate Professor of Law at 
Georgetown University, has continued the fine work initiated 


- 26 - 




by Spooner in JURY NULLIFICATION - THE RIGHT TO SAY NO. 
Following are excerpts from this work: 

Only one of the countless historical trials held at the 
Old Bailey in London is ccrmemorated by a memorial, in the 
present building on a plaque near court No. 5 are inscribed 
these words: 

Near this site William Penn and William Mead 
ware tried in 1670 for pleading to an unlawful 
assembly in Gracechurch Street. 

This tablet carmcmorates the courage and 
endurance of the Jury. Thomas Vere, Edward 
Bushell and ten others who refused to give a 
verdict against than, although they were locked 
up without food for two nights and were fined 
for their final verdict of Not Guilty. 

The case of these jurymen was reviewed on a 
Writ of Habeas Corpus and Chief Justice Vaughan 
delivered the opinion of the court which 
established the Right of juries to give their 
verdict according to their conviction. 

All of the jurors in that celebrated case were fined and 
jailed until they paid their fines in full. Pour of them 
spent months in prison and all were locked up without meat, 
drink, fire and tobacco for three days in an attempt to 
force them to change their verdict. Their courage, 
fortitude and dedication to the spirit of liberty has been 
institutionalized in our legal system under the doctrine of 
jury nullification. 

According to this doctrine, the jurors have the inherent 
right to set aside the instructions of the judge and to 
reach a verdict of acquittal based upon their own 
consciences, and the defendant has the right to have the 
jury so instructed. The jury nullification concept did not 
develop as a pure question but instead was intermixed with 
other issues. Thus, seme of the ensuing discussion deals 
with the right of the jury to decide questions of law as 
well as of fact. This issue raises the question of whether 
the jury can rule on the constitutionality of statutes for 
the sake of them. However, the jury nullification concept 
advanced here is the right of the jury to be told by the 
judge that they my refuse to apply the law, as it is given 
to them by the judge, to the defendant if in good conscience 
they believe that the defendant should be acquitted. 

There was a time when "conscience" played a legally 
recognized and significant role in jury deliberations. Lord 
Hale, discussing the function of the jury in 1665, stressed 
the fact that "... it is the conscience of the jury, that 


- 27 - 



must pronounce the prisoner guilty or not guilty." In 1680, 
Sir John Hawles defended the right of jurors to judge both 
law and fact in a criminal case: 

To say that they are not at all to meddle 
with, or have respect to, law in giving their 
verdicts, is not only a false position, and 
contradicted by every day's experience; but also 
a very dangerous and pernicious one; tending to 
defeat the principal end of the institution of 
juries, and so subtly to undermine that which 
was too strong to be battered down. 

The increased use by the English government of prose¬ 
cutions for seditious libel in the 18th century as a means 
of silencing political foes gave rise to a great debate as 
to the extent to the role of juries in those cases. [D](1). 
Under the law of libel as it then existed, truth was not a 
defense. In addition, judges left to the jury only the 
issue of whether there was a publication by the defendant. 
With this view of the power of the jury, prosecutions for 
seditious libel provided an excellent device for repression 
of dissent. With an agreeable, or at least neutral, judge, 
with truth not a defense, and with a jury rubber-stamping 
the fact of publication, which was usually not contested by 
the defendant anyway, convictions were routine. Ware it not 
for sane courageous jurors who were willing to put their 
lives on the line and decide political cases upon their own 
consciences, the law of seditious libel might have prevented 
the birth of our constitutional Republic by silencing all 
voices raised in protest. Certainly freedom of speech and 
press would only have meant the inalienable right to 
publicly agree with the government. 

Consider the courage of the jury that tried William Penn. 
[D]<2). Penn and Mead were indicted in 1670 for preaching 
before an unlawful assembly. After hearing the evidence, 
the jury retired to consider its verdict. Within an hour 
and a half, eight jurors returned to convict but four 
refused to return to court until ordered to do so. The jury 
was threatened by the court and sent back for further 
deliberations. When they returned they found Penn guilty of 
speaking at Gracechurch Street but refused to say whether he 
had been addressing an unlawful assembly. Sent back again, 
they returned with a verdict of not guilty for Mead and 
guilty of preaching to an assembly for Penn. The Recorder 
then addressed them: 

Gentlemen, ycu shall not be dismissed til we 
have a verdict that the court will accept; and 
you shall be locked up, without meat, drink. 


- 28 - 



fire, and tobacco; you shall not think thus to 
abuse the court; we will have a verdict by the 
help of God, or you shall starve for it. 

Penn: My jury, who are my judges, ought not 
to be thus menaced; their verdict should be 
free, and not compelled; the bench ought to wait 
upon them, but not forestall them. I do desire 
that justice may be done me, and that the 
arbitrary resolves of the bench may not be made 
the measure of my jury's verdict. 

Recorder: Stop that prating fellow's mouth, 
or put him out of the court. 

Once again the jury was sent out and once again they 
returned with the same verdict. After threats by the court 
failed to move them, Penn spoke up: 

Penn: It is intolerable that the jury should 
be thus menaced: is this according to the 
fundamental laws? Are not they my proper 
judges by the Great Charter of England? What 
hope is there of ever having justice done, when 
juries are threatened, and their verdicts 
rejected? I am concerned to speak, and grieved 
to see such arbitrary proceedings. Did not the 
lieutenant of the Tower render one of them worse 
than a felon? And do you not plainly seem to 
condon such for factious fellows, who answer not 
your ends? Unhappy are those juries who are 
threatened to be fined, and starved, and ruined, 
if they give not in verdicts contrary to their 
consciences. 

Recorder: My Lord, you must take a course 
with that same fellow. 

Mayor: Stop his mouth; gaoler, bring 
fetters, and stake him to the ground. 

Penn: Do your pleasure, I matter not your 
fetters. 

Recorder: Till new I never understood the 
reason of the policy and prudence of the 
Spaniards, in suffering the inquisition among 
them; and certainly it will never be well with 
us, till something like unto the Spanish 
Inquisition be in England. 

When the jury was ordered to retire one more time, 
Bushell, the foreman, objected by saying: "We have given in 
our verdict, and we all agreed to it; and if we give in 
another, it will be a force upon us to save our lives." 


- 29 - 



Nevertheless, they ultimately acquitted both defendants even 
though the Court polled them individually. 


Recorder: I am sorry, gentlemen, you have 
followed your own judgments and opinions, rather 
than the good and wholesome advice which was 
given you; God keep my life out of your hands; 
but for this the court fines you 40 markes a 
nan; and imprisonment till paid. 

Upon this Penn came forward, and said: 

I demand my liberty, being freed by the jury. 

Mayor: No, you are in for your fines. 

Penn: Fines, for what? 

Mayor: For contempt of Court. 

Upon a habeas corpus petition for release from prison. 
Bushell and his fellcw jurors were vindicated by a decision 
concurred in by all of the judges of England, except one, 
abolishing the practice of punishing juries for their 
verdicts. [D] (3). Chief Justice Vaughan of the Court of 
Common Pleas made it clear that: 

They (the jury) resolve both law and fact 
carplicately, and not the fact by itself; so as 
though they answer not singly to the question of 
what is the law, yet they determine the law in 
all matters, where it is joined and tried in the 
principle case, but where the verdict is 
special. 

Vaughan felt that if the jury returned a verdict contrary 
to their consciences they would be in violation of their 
oaths: 


A man cannot see by another's eye, nor hear 
by another's ear; no more can a nan conclude or 
infer the thing to be resolved by another's 
understanding or reasoning; and though the 
verdict be right the jury give, yet they, not 
being assured it is so from their own 
understanding, are forsworn, at least from 
conscience. 

The Penn and Mead jury stand as a hallmark of a cannon 
law jury exercising its rights and performing its duties; a 
popular check on governmental tyranny and judicial 
servility. 


-30 




Continuing this development, over a century later in 
1783, was the case of William Davis Shipley, Dean of St. 
Asaph's. Shipley was charged with seditious libel. His 
attorney, Thomas Erskine, in a brilliant sunmation to the 
jury, argued that the rulings of the court (that the jury 
could not consider justification but could only decide 
whether there was in fact a publication, as to which there 
was no dispute) should not be obeyed: 

They therefore call upon you to pronounce 
that guilt, which they forbid you to examine 
into. Thus without inquiry into the only 
circumstance which can constitute guilt, and 
without meaning to find the defendant guilty, 
you may be seduced into a judgment which ycur 
consciences may revolt at, and your speech to 
the world deny - I shall not agree that you are 
therefore bound to find the defendant guilty 
unless you think so likewise. [Dean of St. 
Asaph's Case, 21 HOWELL'S 847 (1783).] 

Erskine's position became the law of the land nine years 
later when Fox's Libel Act gave the jury the authority to 
decide questions of both law and fact. 

As new attempts to control jury verdicts developed, 
greater acts of conscience were demanded. Three trials of 
William Hone were held on three consecutive days in 
December, 1817, for publication of three works alleged to be 
blasphemous and libelous. [D](4). Three tines, three 
different juries refused to convict despite the Court's 
instructions. One juror during the first trial openly 
challenged the judge's ruling that a certain item of 
evidence was irrelevant. A juror in the third trial stated 
that he was prepared to die, if need be, "rather than 
pronounce a man 'guilty' who was manifestly persecuted, not 
for blasphemy or sedition, but for exposing abuses which 
were eating into the very heart of the nation." 

In the British colonies, the role of the jury in criminal 
trials underwent similar development. a New York jury in 
1735, at the urging of Andrew Hamilton, generally considered 
to be the foremost lawyer in the Colonies, gave John Peter 
Zenger his freedom by saying "no" to governmental repression 
of dissent. Zenger was the only printer in New York who 
would print material not authorized by the British mayor. 
He published the New York Weekly Journal, a newspaper 
designed bo expose seme of the corruption among government 
officials. All of the articles in the papers were unsigned; 
the only name on the paper was that of its printer, Zenger. 
Although a grand jury convened by the government refused to 
indict Zenger, he was arrested and charged by information 


- 31 - 



with seditious libel. Although Zenger did not write any of 
the articles and it was not clear that he even agreed with 
their content, had the jury followed the instructions of the 
court they would have had to find him guilty. 

Against this obstacle, Hamilton insisted that 
the jurors: ... have the right beyond all 
dispute to determine both the law and the facts, 
and where they do not doubt of the law, they 
ought to do so. [J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF 
NARRATION OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER 
ZENGER (1963).] 

He urged the jury "to see with your own eyes, to hear 
with their own ears, and to make use of their consciences 
and understanding in judging of the lives, liberties or 
estate of their fellow subjects." The closing words of his 
summation to the jury are as vital today as they were when 
they were uttered over 200 years ago: 

[T]he question before the Court and you 
gentlemen of the jury, is not of small or 
private concern, it is not the cause of a poor 
printer, nor of New York alone, which you are 
now trying: No! It may in its consequence, 
affect every freeman that lives under a British 
government on the main of America. It is the 
best cause, it is the cause of liberty; and I 
make no doubt but your upright conduct this day 
will not only entitle you to the love and esteem 
of your fellow citizens; but every man who 
prefers freedom to a life of slavery will bless 
and honor you as men who have baffled the 
attempt of tyranny; and, by an inpartial and 
uncorrupt verdict, have laid a noble foundation 
for securing to ourselves, our posterity, and 
our neighbors that to which nature and the laws 
of our country have given us a right - the 
liberty - both of exposing and opposing 
arbitrary power (in these parts of the world) at 
least, by speaking and writing truth. 

In the united States, colonial juries regularly refused 
to enforce the navigation acts designed by the British 
Parliament to channel all Colonial trade through the mother 
country. Ships impounded by the British for violating the 
acts were released by colonial juries, often in open 
disregard of law and fact. In response to this process of 
jury nullification, the British established COURTS OF 
VICE-ADMIRALTY to handle maritime cases, including those 


- 32 - 




arising from violations of the navigations acts. The 
leading characteristic of these courts was the absence of 
the jury; this resulted in great bitterness among the 
colonists and was one of the major grievances which 
ultimately culminated in the American Revolution. [D](5) 

In the period immediately before the Revolution, jury 
nullification in the broad sense had become an integral part 
of the American judicial system. The principle that juries 
could evaluate and decide questions of both fact and law was 
accepted by leading jurists of the period. [D](6). 

John Adams, writing in his Diary for February 12, 1771, 
noted that the jury power to nullify the judge's 
instructions derives from the general verdict itself, but if 
a judge's instructions run counter to fundamental 
constitutional principles: 

Is a juror obliged to give his verdict 
generally, according to his direction or even to 
the fact specially, and submit the law to the 
court? Every man, of any feeling of conscience, 
will answer, no. It is not only his right, but 
his duty, in that case to find the verdict 
according to his own best understanding, 
judgment, and conscience, though in direct 
opposition to the direction of the court. [2 
LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 253.55 (C.F. Adams 
ed. 1856).] 

Adams based this reasoning in part on the democratic 
principle that "the cannon people ... should have as 
complete a control, as decisive a negative, in every 
judgment of a court of judicature" as they have in other 
decisions of government. At the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution, this view of jury nullification prevailed. 
[D](7). without jury nullification, as the Founding Fathers 
well knew, government by "judge" (or through the judge by 
the rulers in power) became a distinct possibility and had 
in fact been a reality. In the Zenger case, two lawyers 
were held in contempt and ordered disbarred by the judge 
when they argued that he should not sit because he held his 
office during the King's "will and pleasure." The Court of 
Star Chamber was not too distant in memory for the colonists 
to have forgotten the many perversions perpetrated there in 
the name of justice and law. [D](8). It was likely, 
therefore, that the once unchecked, unresponsive power of 
the judge would have been limited by the Founding Fathers 
through sane method of public control. One method chosen 
was the jury function most closely guarded by the colonists: 
the power of a cannon law jury to say NO to oppressive 
authority. 


- 33 - 



After the adoption of the Constitution, the concept of 
the jury as one of the people's most essential vanguards 
against political oppression continued as an underlying 
principle in the American judicial system. In a civil trial 
held in 1794 under the original jurisdiction of the united 
States Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Jay, after 
instructing the jury on the law and advising than that, as a 
general rule, they should take the law from the court, went 
on bo say: 

[i]t must be observed that by the same law, 
which recognised the reasonable distribution of 
jurisdiction, you have, nevertheless, a right to 
take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to 
determine the law as well as the fact in 
controversy. [Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S., 3 
Dali. 1 (1794)] 

Even the politically repressive Sedition Law of 1798 
provided that in persecutions for seditious libels "the jury 
who shall try the cause shall have a right to determine the 
law and the fact, under the direction of the court, as in 
other cases." [D](9). 

At the trial of John Fries for treason in 1800, Justice 
Chase instructed the jury that in criminal cases juries were 
to judge both the law and the facts. [Dl(10). justice 
Chase appended this charge to the jury to his answer in his 
own impeachment trial where he was accused of, among other 
things, usurping the function of the jury by denying them 
the right to decide the law. [D](ll). 

As the 19th century dawned, juries continued to display 
the independence that had established their libertarian role 
under colonial rule. In 1808, for example, resistance to 
the hated Embargo Law led to the acquittal of a defendant in 
Massachusetts clearly guilty under the terms of the act 
after a dramatic trial in which Samuel Dexter persisted in 
arguing the uncontitutionality of the law to the jury 
despite the court's order not to do so. [D](12). After 
Judge Davis had decided that the law was constitutional. ... 
Mr. Dexter persisted in arguing the question of 
constitutionality to the jury, nothwithstanding the 
remonstrances of the Bench. At length, Judge Davis, under 
same excitement, and after repeated admonitions, said to Mr. 
Dexter, that if he again attempted to raise that question to 
the jury, he should feel it his duty to commit him for 
contempt of Court. A solemn pause ensued, and all eyes were 
turned towards Mr. Dexter. With great calmness of voice and 
manner, he requested a postponement of the cause until the 
following morning. The Judge assented. ... On the following 
morning, there was a full attendance of persons; anxious to 


- 34 - 



witness the result of this extraordinary collision between 
the advocate and the Judge. ... Mr. Dexter rose, and facing 
the bench, oarmenced his remarks by stating that he had 
slept poorly and had passed a night of great anxiety. He 
had reflected very solemnly upon the occurrence of 
yesterday. ... No man cherished a higher respect for the 
legitimate authority of these tribunals before which he was 
called to practice his profession; but he entertained no 
less respect for his moral obligations to his client. ... He 
had arrived at the clear conviction that it was his duty to 
argue the constitutional question to the jury. ..., and that 
he should proceed to do so, regardless of any consequences. 
[D](13). 

In 1850 Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Law making it 
a crime to provide assistance to runaway slaves. Resistance 
to the law on moral grounds was open and widespread among 
the most "respectable" elements of society. [D] (14). Judge 
Theophilus Harrington of Vermont said that the only evidence 
of slave ownership he would accept was a bill of sale from 
God Almighty. Benjamin Wade an Ohio judge in 1850, publicly 
declared he would never enforce the fugitive law. (Id. at 
47). Prosecutions under the law were largely unsuccessful 
because of the refusal of juries to convict. [D] (15). 

There is agreement among many commentators that the right 
of the jury to decide questions of law and fact prevailed in 
this country until the middle 1800's. [D](16). By the end 
of the century, however, the power of the jury had been 
thoroughly decimated by a jealous judiciary eager to 
exercise tighter controls over lay participants in the 
administration of justice. As one commentator has noted, 
"The jury at the outset of the century had been regarded as 
a mainstay of liberty and an integral part of democratic 
government. But by the end of the century the jury had cane 
to be seen as an outmoded and not-too-reliable institution 
for resolving disputed questions of fact." [D](17). 
Indirect emasculation of the jury's right to nullify through 
procedural devises such as the directed verdict, special 
interrogatories, detailed jury instructions and a restricted 
reading of the law-fact dichotomy, occurred during this 
period thereby effectuating a redistribution of legal power. 
The specific demise of the nullification right, however, 
can be traced to four highly influential cases which 
virtually changed the law across the country: (United 
States v. Battiste in 1835; Commonwealth v. Porter, in 1845; 
United States v. Morris, 1851; And Sparf and Hansen v. 
United States in 1895. [D](18). 

Sparf and Hansen is the most significant of these four 
cases, which involved two sailors accused of murder on the 
high seas, under applicable federal laws, the jury was 
given the power to find the defendants guilty of any lesser 


- 35 - 



included offense than the one charged in the indictiment. 
However, the judge instructed the jury that there was no 
evidence in the case to support a lesser charge and if they 
found a felonious killing, they must find it to be murder. 
The jury interupted its deliberations to get further 
instructions from the judge: 

Juror: If we bring in a verdict of guilty, 
that is capital punishment? 

Court: Yes. 

Juror: Then there is no other verdict we can 
bring in except guilty or not guilty? 

Court: In a proper case, a verdict for 
manslaughter may be rendered ...; and even in 
this case you have the physical power to do so; 
but as one of the tribunals of the country, a 
jury is expected to be governed by law, and the 
law it should receive from the court. 

Juror: There has been a misunderstanding 
amongst us. Now it is clearly interpreted to us 
and no doubt we can now agree on certain facts. 

[156 U.S. at 62 N.I.] 

It appears that the jury was seeking to avoid the harsh 
penalty from a guilty-of-murder decision by returning a 
verdict of manslaughter. The Supreme Court has recently 
pointed out how jury nullification can have a profound 
influence on the law. The Court noted that, historically, 
juries refused to convict where the death penalty was deemed 
to be too harsh. In order to meet the problem of jury 
nullification, legislatures did not try, as before, to 
refine the definition of capital homicides. Instead they 
adopted the method of forthrightly granting juries 
discretion which they had been exercising in fact. [D](19). 
But this they were forbidden to do by the judge. The 
Supreme Court, in sustaining the trial judge’s ruling, based 
its conclusion on a iruch broader framework than 
nullification: 

Public and private safety alike would be in 
peril, if the principle be established that 
juries in criminal cases may, of right, 
disregard the law as expounded to them by the 
court and become a law unto themselves. under 
such a system, the principle function of the 
judge would be to preside and keep order while 


- 36 - 



jurymen, untrained in the law, would determine 
questions affecting life, liberty or property 
according to such legal principles as in their 
judgment were applicable to the particular case 
being tried. If because, generally speaking, it 
is the function of the jury to determine the 
guilt or innocence of the accused according to 
the evidence, of the truth or weight of which 
they are to judge, the court should be held 
bound to instruct them upon a point in respect 
to which there was no evidence whatever, or to 
forbear stating what the law is upon a given 
state of facts, the result would be that the 
enforcement of the law against criminals and the 
protection of citizens against unjust and 
groundless prosecutions, would depend entirely 
upon juries uncontrolled by any settled, fixed, 
legal principles. And if it be true that jurors 
in a criminal case are under no obligation to 
take the law from the court, and may determine 
for themselves what the law is, it necessarily 
results that counsel for the accused may, of 
right, in the presence of both court and jury 
contend that what the court declares to be the 
law applicable to the case in hand is not the 
law, and, in support of his contention, read to 
the jury the reports of adjudged cases and the 
view of elementary writers. [156 U.S. at 
101 - 02 .] 

What the court, and the commentators, failed to tell u s 
is that Sparf (and Battiste, and Morris) were prosecuted in 
Admiralty courts (.within the exclusive Jurisdiction of 
admiralty/maritime. Thi juries were not cannon law Juries, 
but merely served as an advisory panel to the chancelor; a 
perfectly proper procedure in admiralty. Therefore, the 
juries' role in the particular case was properly within the 
discretionary powers of the "Judge," as the court(s) ruled. 
The problem is that these "admiralty precedents" were 
subsequently allowed to be, and were, used as precedents at 
common law. 


- 37 - 










CHAPITER III 


AUTHORIZED JURISDICTIONS IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 


Part I: The Concept Of Jurisdiction 
Introduction: 

There is a wide range of definitions of the word 
"jurisdiction" as applied in our courts. We here are not 
only interested in the term as a simple determinant of 
whether a court has the power to hear and decide a 
particular cause, but also in how it is required to proceed 
when it has the right to hear and decide. For California 
jurisdiction this is well summarized in Whitkins 
Jurisprudence: 

Jurisdiction is often defined as "the power 
to hear and determine" the cause. 

In the sense ... in which the term ordinarily 
is used jurisdiction may be concisely stated to 
be the right to adjudicate concerning the 
subject matter in a given case. 

It is in truth the power to do both or either 
- to hear without determining or to determine 
without hearing. 

Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental 
or strict sense means an entire absence of power 
to hear or determine the case, an absence of 
authority over the subject natter or the 
parties. 

The jurisdiction sufficient to sustain a 
record is jurisdiction over the cause, over the 
parties, and over the thing, when a specific 
thing is the subject of the judgment. ... 

The foregoing definition, though traditional and not 
incorrect, is of little value in the solution of problems 
involving a court's power. It is new recognized that the 
term "jurisdiction" does not have a single, fixed meaning, 
but has different meanings in different situations. The 
practical approach to the subject, therefore, is by 
classification rather than definition; i.e., the scope and 
meaning of the term will best be discovered by an 
examination of the situations in which problems of 
jurisdiction are involved. As the court observed in the 
Abelleira case, ... 

The term, used continuously in a variety of situations, 
has so many different meanings that no single statement can 


- 38 - 




be entirely satisfactory as a definition. At best it is 
possible to give the principal illustrations of the 
situations in which it may be applied, and then to consider 
whether the present case falls within one of the classi¬ 
fications. [17 C.2d 287.] 

The Abelleira opinion sums up the matter as follows: 
"The concept of jurisdiction embraces a large number of 
ideas of similar character, sane fundamental to the nature 
of any judicial system, sane derived from the requirement of 
due process, sane determined by the constitutional or 
statutory structure of a particular court, and sane based 
upon mere procedural rules originally devised for 
convenience and efficiency, and by precedent made mandatory 
and jurisdictional ... And, as a practical matter, accuracy 
in definition is neither cannon nor necessary. Though 
confusion and uncertainty in statement are frequent, there 
is a surprising uniformity in the application of the 
doctrine by the courts, so that sound principles may be 
deduced from the established law by marshalling the cases 
and their holdings in this field." [1 Whitkin 527] 

Nature Of Jurisdiction Of Subject Matter: 

Jurisdiction of the subject matter is sometimes referred 
to as jurisdiction "in the fundamental or strict sense," or 
the "power to hear or determine the case." 

For subject matter jurisdiction there must be 
jurisdiction of the state, and jurisdiction of the court 
over the amount in controversy or the type of case. 

But even when these elements are present, there may be 
certain basic defects in the proceeding which deprive the 
court of power to determine it. In Californa, particularly 
in recent years, there has been a considerable expansion of 
this class of fundamental "jurisdictional defenses." Seme 
are a result of the broadened concept of constitutional due 
process of law, and sate cure a result of attributing greater 
importance to statutory procedural requirements or 
limitations on the power of the courts. This development 
has been aided by the fact that many of the cases involved 
direct attack on the proceedings by writs of prohibition or 
certiorari, rather than collateral attack. [1 Whitkin 534] 

The term is also used to describe the range of power to 
apply remedies in various fields of substantive law, such as 
the following: 

(a) "Equity Jurisdiction." In California, 
the distribution of jurisdiction among the su¬ 
perior and inferior courts makes jurisdiction in 
equity relate to the competency of the court 
(subject matter jurisdiction), and, even where 


- 39 - 



the court is competent, an equitable remedy 
granted on an insufficient showing my be con¬ 
sidered "in excess of jurisdiction. 

(b) "Probate Jurisdiction." Though the 
phrase is sometimes used to refer to the sub- 
stantitive law governing probate of wills and 
administration of estates, it also my relate to 
the carpetency of the probate court to hear pro¬ 
bate mtters, or to the limitations on the power 
of the probate court to act in proceedings over 
which it has subject mtter jurisdiction. [1 
Whitkin 527] 

Concurrent Jurisdiction With State Courts: 

In seme instances a federal statute creating a right of 
action expressly gives concurrent jurisdiction to federal 
and state courts to enforce the right. Illustrations are 
relatively few, but include the following types of cases: 

(1) Naturalization proceedings. (8 U.S.C., Sec. 701; 
see 3 Summary, Constitutional Law, Sec. 50.) 

(2) Actions under Federal Bnployers' Liability Act. (45 
U.S.C., Sec. 56; see 2 Summary, Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 
26.) 

(3) Action on bonds executed under federal law. (28 
U.S.C., Sec. 1352.) 

(4) ADMIRALTY EXCEPTION. The exclusive grant of 
admiralty jurisdiction to the federal court contains an 
exception formerly phrased as follows: "saving to suitors 
in all cases the right of a ccnmon-law remedy where the 
common law is carpetent to give it." (28 U.S.C., Title 
1333.) _ 

It was subsequently revised so as to save "all other 
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled," THUS 
ELIMINATING ANY POSSIBLE OBJECTION TO AN "EQUITABLE," AS 
DISTINGUISHED FROM A "COMMON IAW" REMEDY. [Cal Jur III, 
Jurisdiction Sec. 56.] 

... State tribunals ... have concurrent jurisdiction with 
the Federal District Courts over maritime cases. 

Whether a civil case is "of Admiralty or Maritime 
jurisdiction" depends upon the nature of the transaction 
giving rise to it if the claim is in contract, and upon the 
locality if the claim is in tort. 

... A right sanctioned by the maritime law my be 
enforced through any appropriate remedy recognized at cannon 
law. Thus the state must follow the substantive maritime 
law, although it can enforce such law through any ccmmon-law 
remedy. Accordingly, the State has jurisdiction to 
entertain proceedings in personam against one who has 


- 40 - 




violated a maritime contract or ccranitted a maritime tort, 
since ccranon-law courts have traditionally entertained such 
proceedings. 

A State court has jurisdiction where the suit is in 
personam against an individual, auxiliary attachment against 
a particular thing or against the property of the defendant 
in general. [Cal practice. Volume 2, part 1, Section 8:183] 

Generally, the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction 
with the Federal courts in federal civil matters, unless the 
United States Constitution or an act of Congress provides 
otherwise. Federal and State courts are expressly given 
concurrent jurisdiction in seme matters by federal statute, 
including ... LIABILITY ACT ACTIONS [Cal Practice, Volume 
2, Part 1, Section 8:184] 

Hie General Principle is that jurisdiction Cannot be 
Conferred by Consent. 

The very nature of subject matter jurisdiction, as a 
required element distinct from that of jurisdiction of the 
parties, indicates that it cannot be conferred by consent, 
waiver or estoppel. ... 

Neither a party, nor both parties, can vest a court with 
a jurisdiction to which it is a stranger. [Cal Jur III, 
Jurisdiction, Sec 10] 

Jurisdiction Created By Interpretation Or Acquiescence: 

Although the three primary classifications of 
jurisdiction which interest us here (Admiralty, Equity and 
Law) are susceptible to precise definition and subject to 
precise rules of procedure, it appears that neglecting to 
define them or to require that the courts observe them 
precisely caui create new or uncontrollable situations. It 
is well known, that if a court follows incorrect rules of 
procedure, it may constitute reversible error and this 
safeguard may be lost by failing to raise and argue the 
question in the court below. 

There are several California cases in which, by 
acquiescence or a liberal construction of legal acts, 
jurisdiction was, for all practical purposes, actually 
created, i.e., conferred on a court which did not otherwise 
have it. 

Hartnett v. Hull, illustrates one situation. Plaintiff 
filed a complaint in the justice court (then limited to 
$300), on a bill with various items, one of which was 
$107.66 due on a note, and this brought the total to over 
$300. After judgment for plaintiff, defendant raised the 
jurisdictional objection by appeal to the superior court, 
which refused to dismiss the action. Held, the refused was 


- 41 - 



proper because the carplaint was uncertain as to whether the 
$107.66 was claimed as principal (part of amount in 
controversy) or interest (excluded from caiputation). 
Where: 


all parties to the action apparently adept 
and acquiesce in an interpretation that sustains 
the jurisdiction of the court as to the subject 
matter of the action, the losing party in such 
court should not be allowed upon appeal for the 
first time to insist upon a different 
interpretation of the pleading - one that will 
oust the court of its jurisdiction. [(1912) 19 
C.A. 91,94; 124 p. 885] 

A similar attitude appears in Holbrook v. Phelan. 
Plaintiff sought equitable relief beyond the jurisdiction of 
the municipal court, was awarded only a money judgment, and 
appealed. Held, the denial of equitable relief was correct, 
but the money judgment should stand. The trial court 
entirely lacked jurisdiction over the action, which was 
equitable in nature: 

but no appeal being taken by defendants, we 
cannot reverse the judgment against defendants. 
[(1931) 121 C.A. Supp.781, 6 P. 2d 356]. 

Thus, lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter, usually 
deemed so fundamental a defect as to open the judgment to 
collateral attack was here considered merely an error. 


Part II: Article III, United States Constitution And The 
Judiciary Act Of 1789 

Three Jurisdictions: 

The various jurisdictions of the United States, 
Constitutional, Courts are specified in Article III, Section 
2, of the United States Constitution: 

The judicial power shall extend to all cases 
in law and equity, arising under this Constitu¬ 
tion, the laws of the United States, and Trea¬ 
ties made, or which shall be made, under their 
authority; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls; to all cases 
of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; .... 





Congress further defined these jurisdictions, in terms of 
prescribed modes and proceedings, in the Judiciary Act of 
1789. Section 9 of this Act dealt with equity, admiralty 
and maritime jurisdictions of cur courts. Congress said 
that: 


The forms and modes of proceeding in causes 
of equity and of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction shall be "according to the course 
of Civil Law." 

Section 34 dealt exclusively with the Common Law 
jurisdiction of the federal courts wherein Congress said: 

That the laws of the several states, except 
where the Constitution, treaties car statutes of 
the United States shall otherwise require or 
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision 
in trials at Cannon Law in the courts of the 
United States in cases where they apply. 

By Congressional action in 1792, the form and inodes of 
proceeding in such cases were directed to be: 

According to the principles, rules and usages 
which belong to courts of equity and to courts 
of Admiralty, respectively, as contradistin¬ 
guished from courts of cannon law. 

Thus, in 1792, Congress recognized three separate and 
distinct jurisdictions of courts created pursuant to the 
authority granted in Article III, Section 2, of the 
Constitution. There are only three jurisdictions, no morel 

Those (courts) established under the specific 
power given in section 2 of article 3 are called 
constitutional courts. They share in the exer¬ 
cise of the judicial power defined in that sec¬ 
tion, can be invested with no other- jurisdic¬ 
tion, ... [Ex Parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 
U.S. 438 (1929)] 

In defining the meaning of the phrase "cannon law" as 
used in the seventh amendment to the Constitution, Justice 
Story said that the phrase "cannon law" found in this clause 
is used in contradistinction to "equity and admiralty and 
maritime jurisprudence." [Parsons v Bedford, 28 U.S. 452, 3 
Pet. 452, 7 L. Ed. 732], These fundamental distinctions 
are: 


- 43 - 



It is well known that in civil causes in 
courts of equity and admiralty, juries do not 
intervene, and that courts of equity use the 
trial by jury only in extraordinary cases to 
inform the conscience of the court. When, 
therefore, we find the amendment requires that 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved in 
suits at comnon law, the natural conclusion is 
that this distinction was present in the minds 
of the framers of the amendment. By common law 
they meant what the Constitution denominated in 
the third article law; not merely suits which 
the caimon law recognized among its old and 
settled pro- cedings but suits in which legal 
rights were to be ascertained and determined in 
contradistinction to those where equitable 
remedies were administered, or where, as IN THE 
ADMIRALTY, A MIXTURE OF PUBLIC LAW AND MARITIME 
LAW AND EQUITY WERE OFTEN FOUND IN THE SAME 
SUIT. [Klever v. Seawall, Ohio, 65 F. 393, 395; 

12 C.C.A. 661] 

The Supreme Court analyzed these two sections of the 
Judiciary Act, Sections 9 and 34, in the Huntress case in 
1840. This case was a libel in personnam against the owners 
of the steamship Huntress, in which the Court said: 

In these, and an analagcus cases, the only 
question that can be considered as an open one 
is, whether they came within that clause of the 
constitution which says, the judicial power of 
the United States shall extend to "all causes of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." If they 
do, then the original cognizance of them is by 
the Ninth section of the Judiciary Act, given to 
the district court. ... 

The argument, that this clause is controlled 
by the seventh amendment, which secures the 
right of trial by jury in all suits at Comnon 
Law, where the value in controversy exceeds 
twenty dollars, has no application to the 
constitutional grant; because these are not 
suits at cannon law; [The Huntress, Case No. 

6,914, 12 Fed. Cas. 984] 

And in the De Lovio case. Justice Story said: 

And the ground is made stronger by the 
consideration, that the right of trial by jury 
is preserved by the constitution in all suits at 


- 44 - 



common law, where the value in controversy 
exceeds twenty dollars; and by the statute 
(Judiciary Act), this right is excluded in all 
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 

[De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398] 

Thus, it is clear that there is no access to a common law 
Jury trial in courts of equity or admiralty/maritime. 

In 1832, the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania 
very ably addressed the meaning and intent of the 7th 
Amendment as follows: 

... by attempting to introduce the admiralty 
jurisdiction of the civil law, ... a foundation 
is laid for interminable conflicts of 
jurisdiction between the courts of the state and 
the union. 

It is vain to contend that the seventh 
amendment will be any efficient guarantee for 
the right, in Suits at Common Law, if an 
admiralty jurisdiction exists in the united 
States commensurate with what is claimed by the 
claimant in this case. Its assertion is, in my 
opinion, a renewal of the contest between 
legislative power and royal perogative, the 
cannon and the civil law, striving for mastery; 
the one to secure, the other to take away the 
trial by jury, ... judicial power must first 
annul the seventh amendment, or judicial subtley 
transform a suit at common law into a case of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, before I 
take cognizance of such a case as this without a 
jury. [Bains v. The Schooner James and 
Catherine, Pennsylvania, October Term 1832] 

Comparison Of Principles, Rules And Usages: 

All three jurisdictions have cognizance over civil 
matters, as contradistinguished from criminal matters, 
depending on the subject matter and nature of the cause in 
controversy. Equity, however, has no cognizance over 
criminal matters: 

"Equity jurisdiction." in its ordinary 
acceptation, as distinguished on the one side 
from the general power to decide matters at all, 
and on the other from the jurisdiction "at law" 
or "common-law jurisdiction," is the power to 
hear certain kinds and classes of civil causes 


- 45 - 



according to the principles of the method and 
procedure adopted by the court of chancery, ... 

Cause, n. (Lat. causa.) ... A reason for an 
action or condition. A ground of a legal 
action. ... 

Civil. Of or relating to the state or its 
citizenry. Relating to private rights and 
remedies sought by civil actions as contrasted 
with criminal proceedings. ... 

In the great majority of states which have 
adopted rules or codes of civil procedure as 
patterned on the Federal Rules of Civil Pro¬ 
cedure, there is only one form of action known 
as a "civil action." The former distinctions 
between actions at law and suits in equity, and 
the separate forms of those actions and suits, 
have been abolished. Rule of Civil Proc. 2; New 
York CPLR Section 103(a). [Black's Law 
Dictionary, 5th Edition] 

Therefore, in criminal cases there are only two 
jurisdictions. Every criminal case nust be prosecuted 
either in the jurisdiction of cannon law car that of the law 
of admiralty (Figure III-l). 

The judiciary Act directed that separate principles, 
rules and usages be applied in courts of equity and admir¬ 
alty according to the course of the Civil Law. These 
principles, rules and usages, were contradistinguished from 
those of the cannon law. Briefly, here are sane key and 
distinctive differences between the principles, rules and 
usages of ocmnon law and civil law: 


COWON LAW 

CIVIL LAW 

* Right to trial by Cannon 

* No right to trial by 

Law Jury 

jury 

* 12 Judges who control the 

* 1 "Judge" (chancellor) 

the trial and: 

controls trial and: 

Judge Justice of the law 

Jury (if there is one) is 
advisory to the chancelor. 

Determine admissibility 

Chancelor Determines 

of The Evidence 

Admissibility of the 
Evidence. 

Apply Law to the Facts 

Jury is sworn to take the 
law as the chancelor 
gives it 

Render verdict according 

Jury renders verdict 

to their individual 

according to law dictated 

consciences. 

and evidence allowed by 
chancelor. 


- 46 - 








JUDICIARY ACT CF 1798, AS MODIFIED IN 1792- 
THE THREE JURISDICTIONS 


| CIVIL MATTERS I 

* 



1 COWON LAW 1 


CIVIL IAW ] 

* . 


9 - 

COWON LAW 
JURISDICTION 




ADMIRALTY/MARITIME 

+ 

♦ 

* 

PRINCIPLES, RULES 




PRINCIPLES, RULES 

AND USAGES CF 

THE COWON LAW 




AM) USAGES CF 
ADMIRALTY/MARITIME 




I CRIMINAL MATTERS I 

i 


v 

| COMMON LAW 

| 

1 CIVIL LAW. 1 

' + 


-f- 

COWON LAW 
JURISDICTION 

I 

ADMIRALTY/MARITIME 

JURISDICTION 

-^- 


i 

PRINCIPLES, RULES’ 
AND USAGES CF 

THE COWON LAW 


PRINCIPLES, RULES 

AM) USAGES CF 
ADMIRALTY/MARITIME 


FIGURE: III-l 


Procedural Mergers: 

Merger of Law and Equity [A] 

Tine movement for the procedural merger of law and equity 
had its chronological beginning in the United States with 
the activities of the New York Catmissioners on Practice and 
Pleading. Their report of 1848 proposed that the 
distinction between law and equity be abolished, and this 
proposal was embodied in the Code of Procedure adopted by 
the legislature of New York in that year and widely copied 
in many other states within a relatively brief period. A 
little later, as a result of the investigations of two Royal 
Commissions, substantial legislative changes were made in 
the English practice which brought about some degree of 
fusion but of a less complete character. The English 


- 47 - 

































legislation, unlike that of New York and the states which 
copied the New York code, did not purport to combine law and 
equity, but did not permit equitable defenses and seme 
degree of equitable relief in actions at law and extended 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery bo decide 
questions of law. Later English legislation (1858) gave the 
courts of law a limited jurisdiction to grant equitable 
relief in seme cases. Legislation of somewhat similar 
character has been enacted in many of the non-code states. 
In 1875, England made effective a ccnpletely unified 
procedure. In 1915, Congress for the first time permitted 
equitable defenses in actions at law in the federal courts 
and allowed the transfer of causes from law to equity or 
from equity to law. In the provision as to transfer of 
causes. Congress followed the lead of a number of non-code 
states. 

In studying the procedural merger of law and equity, four 
main types of legislation came into consideration. 

1. Equitable defenses and counterclaims at law. The 
English legislation of 1854, the Federal legislation of 
1915, and the statutes of most non-code states permit the 
defendant in an action at law to set up what are commonly 
denominated "equitable defenses." The main purpose of the 
earlier legislation of this character seems to have been to 
deal with cases where the defendant in an action at law 
could secure in equity a perpetual and unconditional 
injunction against the prosecution of the action. For 
example, where the plaintiff sued in covenant on a sealed 
instrument obtained by fraud in the inducement, in a 
jurisdiction where such fraud was not a legal defense. 
Later these statutes were extended in many jurisdictions to 
allow equitable counterclaims or sometimes equitable relief 
at law in seme cases. 

By the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Viet. c. 
125 Sections 83-86, it was provided that where in an action 
at law the defendant would be entitled on equitable grounds 
to relief against the judgment. He might plead the facts 
which entitle him to such relief as a defense in the action 
at law. But if the court is of the opinion that any such 
equitable plea cannot be dealt with by a court of law as to 
do justice between the parties, it may order the plea to be 
struck out on such terms as to costs and otherwise as to it 
may seem reasonable. 

By the United States Judicial Code, Section 274b, as 
inserted in 1915, it was provided that in all actions at law 
equitable defenses may be interposed by answer, plea, or 
replication, without the necessity of filing a bill on the 
equity side of the court. This provision which was formerly 
28 U.S.C. Section 398 has been repealed, since the distinc- 


- 48 - 




tion between actions at law and suits in equity has been 
done away with in the federal courts. 

Under the code system of unified procedure it would 
appear that no special statutory authorization of equitable 
defenses of counterclaims was necessary but doubts which 
arose under the pioneer New York Code of Procedure led to 
its amendment to include the following provisions. 

The defendant may set forth by answer, as 
many defences and counterclaims as he may have, 
whether they be such as have been heretofore 
denariinated legal or equitable or both. 

Similar sections are contained in most of the codes of 
civil procedure in the states which have adopted code 
practice. 

2. Expansion of the power of equity. Under the 
classical English practice, the powers of the Court of 
Chancery were limited by three self-imposed restrictions: 
(1) The Court was reluctant to decide questions of legal 
right or title in suits to enjoin torts; (2) it was 
sometimes reluctant to decide questions of law and was in 
the habit of stating cases for the opinion of one of the 
courts of cannon law on such questions; (3) it would not 
give damages in lieu of specific performance or damages in 
cases where equitable relief turned out to be impracticable 
or was refused for sane other reason not affecting the 
merits. The first two of these limitations were removed by 
statute in 1852, the third by statute in 1858. 

By the Chancery Amendment Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Viet. c. 86, 
Sections 61, 62, it was provided that the Court of Chancery 
should not direct a case to be stated for the opinion of any 
court of cannon law. It should have full power to determine 
any questions of fact which in its judgment should be 
necessary to be decided previously to the decision of the 
equitable question at issue between the parties. And the 
Court of Chancery might itself determine the legal title or 
right of the parties without requiring than to proceed at 
law. 

By Lord Cairns' Act. 21 & 22 Viet. c. 27 (1858), it was 
provided that where the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction 
to enjoin a breach of contract or any wrongful act or to 
grant specific performance of a contract, it may, if it 
should think fit, award damages either in addition to or in 
substitution for such injunction or specific performance and 
that such damages may be assessed in such manner as the 
court should direct. 

The difficulties met by this English legislation have not 
been so serious in the United states and there is little 
legislation of similar character in this country. 


- 49 - 



3. Transfer of causes from law to equity or from equity 
to law. Under the old practice a plaintiff who failed in a 
suit in equity because he was found to have an adequate 
remedy at law or for sane other reason not affecting the 
merits such as impracticability of the remedy in equity had 
to begin a new action at law. Similarly, a plaintiff who 
sought relief at law which could be given only in equity had 
to bring a new suit in equity. According to the better view 
he was not precluded from so doing by any election of 
remedies. 11113 resulted in substantial and unnecessary 
expense in every such case and in sane cases the statute of 
Limitations had run on the plaintiff's cause of action 
before he found out that he had sued in the wrong court. 
Where law and equity are administered in the same court but 
by different procedures, as in a considerable number of the 
United States, these difficulties could readily be met by 
providing that an action or suit brought on the wrong side 
of the court might be transferred to the other side of the 
court with appropriate amendment of the pleadings. Such 
statutes have been enacted in a number of the non-code 
states. 

By the United States Judicial Code, Section 274a, as 
inserted in 1915, it was provided that: 

in case any of said courts shall find that a 
suit at law should have been brought in equity 
or a suit in equity should have been brought at 
law, the court shall order any amendments to the 
pleadings which may be necessary to conform them 
to the proper practice, ... the cause shall 
proceed and be determined upon such amended 
pleadings. (This section is now repealed.) 

In those states which still have separate courts at law 
and equity, this procedure of transfer seems unavailable, 
although there would seem to be no reason why some statutory 
provision for removal from one court to the other of actions 
or suits brought in the wrong court might not be provided 
for. 

4. Unification of legal and equitable procedure. None 
of the methods heretofore discussed eliminates all the 
difficulties resulting from corporate law and equity 
procedure. In consequence, the most used form of 
legislative change to meet these difficulties has been some 
kind of unification of legal and equitable procedure. 

Two somewhat different techniques have been used to bring 
about the procedural unification of law and equity which may 
be described for the sake of brevity as the New York method 
and the English method. 


■ 50 - 




(1) The New York method involves the formal abolition of 
the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity. 
The New York Code of Procedure of 1818 provided in Section 
62 that: 


The distinctions between actions at law and 
suits in equity, and the forms of all such 
actions and suits, heretofore existing, are 
abolished; and, there shall be in this state, 
hereafter, but one form of action for the 
enforcement or protection of private rights and 
the redress of private wrongs, which shall be 
denominated a civil action. 

The New York Code and most of the other codes distinguish 
between a civil action and special proceeding. Special 
proceedings include such judicial proceedings as habeas 
corpus, quo warranto, mandamus, prohibition, enforcement of 
mechanics' liens, applications to punish for criminal 
contempt in a civil action, and a considerable number of 
other proceedings of a rather miscellaneous character. 

(2) The characteristics of the English method of unified 
procedure have been well stated by Millar: 

The English statute proceeded differently. 

It explicitly faced the fact that, owing to the 
manner of the law's growth, the distinction 
between legal and equitable rules, though purely 
artifical had so embedded itself in the fabric 
of the law as to be insusceptible of any 
outright abolition, and that what really was 
being aimed at in speaking of fusion was the 
concurrent administration of the two kinds of 
rules in the same suit when the circumstances so 
required. Resultingly, it enacted that "in 
every civil cause or matter ... law and equity 
shall be administered" according to a series of 
detailed provisions which followed, covering the 
various contingencies calling for that con¬ 
current administration. To this was added a 
session regulating certain special situations 
involved in the change, which concluded with the 
significant declaration that "generally in all 
matters not hereinbefore particularly mentioned, 
in which there is any conflict or variance be¬ 
tween the rules of equity and the rules of the 
common law, with reference to the same matter, 
the rules of equity shall prevail." Thus 
equity, as before, was to have the last word, 
but new that word was to be spoken in time to 


- 51 - 



foreclose the adverse word of the common law. 

This difference between the two statutes in the 
manner of approach accounts in seme measure, at 
least, for the smoother working of the English 
system in the present regard. 

The Illinois Civil Practice Act of 1933 follows the 
English model to a considerable extent. Section 31 of that 
Act provides in part as follows: 

... there shall be no distinctions respecting 
the manner of pleading between such actions at 
law and suits in equity, other than those 
specific in this Act and the rules adopted 
pursuant thereto; but this section shall not be 
deemed to affect in any way the substantial 
averments of fact necessary to state any cause 
of action either at law or in equity. 

A rule of court adopted pursuant to the statute requires 
that every complaint shall contain in the caption the words 
"at law" or "in chancery," and it may be doubted how far 
there is under this rule even the degree of procedural 
unification accomplished by the English statute. 

When Congress authorized the Supreme Court of the United 
States to prescribe rules of procedure of the district 
courts in 1938, the Act provided: 

The court may at any time unite the general 
rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with 
those in actions at law so as to secure one form 
of civil action and procedure of both; provided 
however, that in such union of rules the right 
to trial by jury as at cannon law and declared 
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution 
shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. 

The first two rules adopted by the Supreme Court in 
pursuance of the authority thus conferred upon it are as 
follows: 

Rule 1. Scope of Rules 

These rules govern the procedure in the 
United States district courts in all suits of a 
civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law 
or in equity, .... They shall be construed to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action. 


- 52 - 




Rule 2. One Form of Action 

There shall be one form of action bo be known 
as "civil action." 

However, as matters stand in the federal and state 
courts, preserving the right bo trial by jury in cases at 
law raises serious problems for a unified procedure, as 
brought out by Professor Chaffee of Harvard University: 

There is only one genuine reason today for 
distinguishing an action at law from a suit in 
equity - the constitutional right to a jury 
trial in civil cases. 

In the federal courts the right to trial by jury is 
stipulated by the Sixth-Amendment "in all criminal 
prosecutions." And by the Seventh Amendment "in suits at 
cannon law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars." This is confirmed by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedures (FRCP), Rule 38 (a): 

The right of trial by jury as declared by the 
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as 
given by statute of the United States shall be 
preserved to the parties inviolate. 

The right exists in actions at law but not in suits in 
equity. For purposes of ascertaining whether a litigant is 
entitled to a jury trial, a reading of even the most recent 
cases reveal that no effective merger of substantive law and 
equity has been achieved and the distinction between 
"Actions at Law" and "Suits in Equity" retrains, as supported 
by the following: 

In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover the Supreme Court 
stated: 


Since the right to a jury trial is a 
constitutional one, however, while no similar 
requirement protects trials by the court, that 
discretion is very narrowly limited and must, 
wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury 
trial. As this court said in Scott v. Neely, 
140 U.S. 106, 109-110, 11 S. Ct. 712, 714, 35 L. 
Ed. 358; 'In the Federal courts this (jury) 
right cannot be dispensed with, except by the 
assent of the parties entitled to it; nor can it 
be impaired by any blending with a claim, 
properly cognizable at law, of a demand for 


- 53 - 



equitable relief in aid of the legal action, or 
during its pendency.' This long-standing 
principle of equity dictates that only under the 
most imperative circumstances, circumstances 
which in view of the flexible procedures of the 
Federal Rules we cannot new anticipate, can the 
right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost 
through prior determination of equitable claims. 
[(1959) 359 U.S. 500; 79 S. Ct. 948] 

Another equitable opinion by the Supreme Court in Dairy 
Queen v. Wood, 1962, 369 U.S. 469, 82 S. Ct. 894, stated: 

In Scott v. Neely, decided in 1891, this 
Court held that a court of equity could not even 
take jurisdiction of a suit "in which a claim 
properly cognizable only at law is united in the 
same pleadings with a claim for equitable 
relief." ... When the procedure was modernized 
by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1938, 28 U.S.C.A., it was deemed 
advisable to abandon that part of the holding of 
Scott v. Neely which rested upon the separation 
of law and equity and to permit the joinder of 
legal and equitable claims in a single action. 

Thus Rule 18(a) provides that a plaintiff "may 
join either as independent or as alternate 
claims as many claims either legal or equitable 
or both as he may have against an opposing 
party." And Rule 18(b) provides; "Whenever a 
claim is one heretofore cognizable only after 
another claim has been prosecuted to a 
conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a 
single action; but the court shall grant relief 
in that action only in accordance with the 
relative substantive rights of the parties." 

The Federal Rules did not, however, purport 
to change the basic holding of Scott v. Neely 
that the right to trial by jury of legal claims 
must be preserved. Quite the contrary ... (See 
Rule 38(a)). 

This procedure finally came before us in 
Beacon Theatres v. Westover ...That holding, of 
course, applies whether the trial judge chooses 
to characterize the legal issues presented as 
"incidental" to equitable issues or not ..., the 
sole question which we must decide in the action 
now pending before the District Court is whether 
it contains legal issues...But the constitu¬ 
tional right to trial by jury cannot be made to 


- 54 - 




depend upon the choice of words used in the 
pleading ... the legal claims involved in the 
action must be determined prior to any final 
court determination of respondent's equitable 
claims. [369 U.S. 469; 825. Ct. 894] 

In Shubin v. United States District Court the United 
States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit opined: 

Validity and infringement are ultimate facts 
on which depends the question of liability. In 
actions at law they are to be decided by the 
jury. (United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 299 
U.S. 201 at 205, 7 S. Ct. 159, at 161, 81 L. Ed. 

123). We recognize that no longer can a jury 
trial be denied a litigant because the legal 
issues presented are "incidental" to equitable 
issues. As long as any legal cause is involved 
the jury rights it creates control. This is the 
teaching of Beacon Theatres as we construe it. 
[(1963) 313 F. 2d. 250] 

In Carter J., in Gillespie v. Hynes, a Nebraska Court 
stated: 

When the trial court determined that the 
interveners were not entitled to equitable 
relief, the court was without power to determine 
the legal action without the intervention of a 
jury ... The general rule stated in 19 Am Jur., 
Equity, Sect. 132, p. 132, is as follows: "The 
rule which permits the court of chancery to 
retain jurisdiction of litigation and finally 
dispose thereof is limited in its application to 
cases in which equitable relief has been 
administered pursuant to the prayer of the bill 
or in which the jurisdiction of the court has 
been rightfully invoked. If the facts which are 
relied on to sustain equity jurisdiction fail of 
establishment, the court may not retain the case 
for the purpose of administering incidental 
relief, it is said that an equitable right must 
be both averred and proved as a prerequisite to 
the determination of adjudication of purely 
legal right. The prevailing view is that where 
jurisdiction has not been established, the court 
may not award damages or award any other decree 
except for costs. If the rule were otherwise, 
it has been argued, a litigant, by pretended 
claim to equitable relief, might deprive his 


- 55 - 



opponent of advantages incident to an action at 
law - for example, the constitutional right of 
trial by jury." 

Cases from jurisdictions supporting this 
principle are legion...We hold to the rule 
announced in Reynolds v. Warner, supra, and the 
authorities cited in support of it. [168 Neb. 

49, 50-54, 95 N.W. 2d 457, 458-60 (1959)] 

In Indianhead Truck Line, Inc. v. Hvidsten Transport, 
Inc., a Minnesota Court decided: 

In actions for the recovery of money only, or 
of specific real or personal property, or for a 
divorce on the ground of adultery, the issues of 
fact shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury 
trial be waived ...[268 Minn. 176, 128 N.W. 2d 
334 (1964)] 

Be that as it may, it is clear that the procedural merger 
of law and equity eliminated the procedural distinctions of 
substantive differences between these two jurisdictions. 
The natural propensity of man to place form over substance, 
and then forget the substance, resulted in the foregoing 
cases. This merger effectively modified the Judiciary Act 
as depicted in Figure III-2. 



FIGURE II1-2 


- 56 - 












Merger of Law, Equity and Admiralty/Maritime 


On February 28, 1966, the Supreme Court rescinded the 
former Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 
promulgated by the Supreme Court on Decenter 6, 1920, and 

merged these rules into the general Rules of Civil Procedure 
for the United States District Courts with the exception of 
certain "distinctively maritime remedies" that were 
preserved in the "Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty 
and Maritime Claims." These Supplemental Rules apply to the 
procedure in admiralty and maritime claims within the 
meaning of Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
with respect to the following remedies: 

(1) Maritime attachment and garnishment; 

(2) Actions in rem; 

(3) Possessory, petitory, and partion actions; 

(4) Actions for exoneration from or limitation 

of liablity. 

The general Rules of Civil Procedure for the United 
States District Courts are also applicable to the foregoing 
proceedings except to the extent that they are inconsistent 
with these Supplemental Rules. 

This merger effectively modified the Judiciary Act as 
depicted in Figure III-3. 



FIGURE: III-3 


- 57 - 
















As we shall see, these procedural mergers were a de facto 
implementation of prior congressional acts that changed the 
nature of the subject matter and right being enforced in 
nearly all controversies brought before the courts; i.e., 
the ccranonality of procedures matched the commonality of 
substantive rights which were created from a common source 
by congressional action. 


Part ill: The Civil Law Jurisdictions 
Equity: [B] 

The basic function of any court is to protect the rights 
of the litigants appearing before it. Equity Courts render 
decisions based upon the opinions of chancellors, the King's 
conscience. Cannon Law courts render judgment based upon 
the opinion of twelve good-and lawful men, judgment by the 
people themselves acting through representatives chosen by 
the litigants. Equity courts are biased by the 
self-interest of the chancellor and prejudiced by the 
interest of the ruler; Jurors cure also individually biased 
and prejudiced but their consensus of opinion tends to be 
towards healthy public opinion and subject to the veto of 
any one member who dissents. 

Equity in its most general sense means justice. In its 
most technical sense it means a system of law or a body of 
connected legal principles which have superseded or 
supplemented the Common Law on the ground of alleged 
intrinsic superiority. Aristotle defines equity as a better 
sort of justice which corrects legal justice where the 
latter errs through being expressed in a universal form and 
not taking account of particular cases. 

When the law speaks universally and something happens 
which is not according to the common course of events, it is 
right that the law should be modified in its application to 
that particular case as the lawgiver himself might do. 
Accordingly the equitable man is he who does not push the 
law to its extremes but having legal justice on his side is 
disposed to make allowances. Equity as thus described would 
correspond to the judicial discretion which modifies the 
administration of the law rather than to the antagonistic 
system which claims to supersede the Law. 

The part played by equity in the development of law is 
admirably illustrated in the well-known work of Sir Henry 
Main on Ancient law. Positive law, at least in progressive 
societies, is constantly tending to fall behind public 
opinion and the expedients adopted for bringing it into 
harmony therewith are three: legal fictions, equity, and 


- 58 - 




statutory legislation. Equity here is defined to mean "any 
body of rules existing by the side of the original civil 
law, founded on distinct principles, and claiming 
incidentally to supersede the civil law in virtue of a 
superior sanctity inherent in these principles." It is thus 
different from legal fiction, by which a new rule is 
introduced surreptitiously and under the pretense that no 
change has been made in the Law, and from statutory 
legislation in which the obligatory force of the rule is not 
supposed to depend upon its intrinsic fitness. The source 
of Reman equity was the fertile theory of natural law, of 
the law cenmon to all nations. Even in the Institutes of 
Justinian there is a carefully drawn distinction in the laws 
of a country. Those peculiar to itself and those natural 
reason appoints for all mankind. The agency introducing 
these principles was the edicts of the praetor, an annual 
proclamation setting forth the manner in which the 
magistrate intended to administer the law during his year of 
office. Each successive praetor adopted the edict of his 
predecessor and added new equitable rules of his own, until 
the further growth of the irregular code was stopped by the 
Praetor Salvius julianus in the reign of Hadrian. 

The place of the praetor was occupied in English 
jurisprudence by the Lord High Chancellor. The real 
beginning of English equity is to be found in the custom of 
handing over to that officer, for adjudication, the 
complaints addressed bo the king praying for remedies beyond 
the reach of the Common Law. Over and above the authority 
delegated to the ordinary councils or courts, a reserve of 
judicial power was believed to reside in the King, invoked 
by the suitors who could not obtain relief from any inferior 
tribunal. 

These petitions were referred to the chancellor, already 
the head of the judicial system, although he was not at 
first the only officer through whom the prerogative of grace 
was administered. In the reign of Edward III, the equitable 
jurisdiction of the court seems to have been established. 
Its constitutional origin was analagous to that of the star 
Chamber and the Court of Requests. The latter, in fact, was 
a minor court of equity attached to the Lord Privy Seal as 
the Court of Chancery was to the chancellor. 

The successful assumption of extraordinary or equitable 
jurisdiction by the chancellor caused similar pretensions to 
be made by other officers and courts. Not only the Court of 
Exchequer, whose functions were in a peculiar manner 
connected wuth royal authority, but the Counties Palatine of 
Chester, Lancaster, and Durham, the Court of Great Sessions 
in wales, the universities, the city of London, the Cinque 
Ports, and other places silently assumed extraordinary 
jurisdiction similar to that exercised in the Court of 


- 59 - 



Chancery. Even private persons, lords and ladies, affected 
to establish in their honours courts of equity. 

English equity has one marked historical peculiarity that 
it established itself in a set of independent tribunals 
which remained in standing contrast to the ordinary courts 
for many hundreds of years. In Reman law, the judge gave 
the preference bo the equitable rule; In English law the 
equitable rule was enforced by a distinct set of judges. 
One cause of this separation was the rigid adherence to 
precedent on the part of the Common law Courts. Another was 
the conflict between common law principles and the 
principles of the Reman Law on which English equity to a 
large extent was founded. 

When a case of prerogative was referred to the chancellor 
in the reign of Edward III, he was required to grant such 
remedy as should be consonant with honesty. And honesty, 
conscience, and equity were said to be the fundamental 
principles of the court. The early chancellors were 
ecclesiastics and under their influence not only moral 
principles (where these were not regarded by the Common Law) 
but also the equitable principles of the Reman Law were 
introduced into English jurisprudence. Between this point 
and the time when equity became settled as a portion of the 
legal system, having fixed principles of its own, various 
views of its nature have prevailed. For a long time it was 
thought that precedents could have no place in equity, 
inasmuch as it professed in each case to do that which was 
just, and we find this view maintained by Common Lawyers 
even after it had been abandoned by the professors of 
equity. Mr. Spence, in his book, Equitable Jurisdiction of 
the Courts of Chancery, quotes a case in the reign of 
Charles II: 

Chief Justice Vaughan said, "I wonder to hear 
of citing of precedents in matter of equity, for 
if there be equity in a case, that equity is a 
universal truth, and there can be no precedent 
in it, so that in any precedent which can be 
produced, if it be the same with this case, the 
reason and equity is the same in itself, and if 
the precedent be not the same case with this, it 
is not to be cited." 

But the Lord Keeper Bridgman answered: 
"Certainly precedents are very necessary and 
useful to us, for in them we may find the 
reasons of the equity to guide us, and besides 
the authority of those who made them is nuch to 
be regarded. We shall suppose they did it upon 
great consideration and weighing of the natter 
and it would be very strange and very ill if we 


- 60 - 



should disturb and set aside what has been the 
course for a long series of times and ages." 

Selden's description is well known: "Equity is a rougish 
thing. Tis all one as if they should make the standard for 
measure the chancellor's foot" Lord Nottingham in 1676 
reconciled the ancient theory and the established practice 
by saying that the conscience which guided the court was not 
the natural conscience of the man but the civil and polit¬ 
ical conscience of the judge! The same tendency of equity 
to settle into a system of law is seen in the recognition of 
its limits, in the fact that it did not attempt in all cases 
to give a remedy when the rule of the common Law vras con¬ 
trary to justice. Cases of hardship, which the early chan¬ 
cellors would certainly have relieved, were passed over by 
later judges simply because no precedent could be found for 
their interference. The point at which the introduction of 
new principles of equity finally stopped is fixed by Sir 
Henry Maine in the chancellorship of Lord Eldon, who held 
that the doctrines of the court ought to be as well-settled 
and made as uniform almost as those of the Common Law. Fran 
that time equity, like Cannon Law, has professed to take its 
principles wholly from recorded decisions and statute law. 
The view, traceable no doubt to the Aristotelian definition 
that equity mitigates the hardships of the law where the law 
errs through being framed in universals, is to be found in 
seme of the earlier writings. Thus in Doctor and Student it 
is said: 


Law makers take heed to such things as may 
often ccme, and not to every particular case, 
for they could not though they would; therefore, 
in sane cases it is necessary to leave the words 
of the law and follow that reason and justice 
requires, and to that intent equity is ordained, 
that is to say, to temper the rigor of the law. 

And Lord Ellesmere said: "The cause why 
there is a chancery is for that men's actions 
are so diverse and infinite that it is impos¬ 
sible to make any general law which shall aptly 
meet with every particular act and not fail in 
sane circumstances." 

During the early centuries following the Norman conquest, 
it was common for subjects of the English Crown to present 
to the King petitions requesting particular favors or relief 
that could not be obtained in the ordinary courts of law. 
The extraordinary or special relief granted by the 
chancellor, to whan the King referred such matters, was of 
such a nature as was dictated by bureaucratic principles of 


- 61 - 



justice and equity. This body of principles was called 
equity. Justice could not be obtained in the courts for 
very obvious reasons. A claimant had to wait until he had 
been damaged before he could obtain relief at law. 
Consider: "B" is driving his cattle across "A's" land 
without his consent. At common law, "A" could not demand 
relief until "B's" cattle had somehow damaged his property, 
and then, and only then could "A" file an action at law 
against "B" for damage done to his property. "A" was 
helpless at ccmnon law unless he took the law into his own 
hands and put a fence around his property. If he did put a 
fence up to stop "B", then he had a remedy at law if "B" 
broke his fence, "A" could file suit for money damages at 
common law. 

Suppose that "A" could not put up a fence and could find 
no other way of stopping "B" from trespassing his land, what 
recourse did he then have? His only recourse would be to 
seek relief in a court of Equity by way of injunction. The 
equity court could enjoin "B" pendente lite (pending outcome 
of Litigation) from trespassing upon "A's" prcperty. In the 
early days of our court systems when law and equity were 
still tried separately, the courtroom was still the same 
courtroom but actions at "law" were tried on the "law side" 
of the court, while suits in equity were tried on the 
"equity side" of the same court. Equity and law were tried 
under different rules. 

Ordinarily, law actions have for their object the 
assessment of damages but a court of equity goes farther and 
attempts to prevent the wrong itself. Among the more cannon 
equity actions cure injunction suits, specific performance, 
partition suit, recission and reformation of contracts, and 
all matters relating to trusts and trustees. With a 
common-law action, the form of the action is significant as 
a rule. It is important to determine for example, whether 
the action is brought in the "law side" or the "equity side" 
of the court. Ihe word "legal" is a fictitious name for 
"law", therefore, the use of the word "legal" prop>erly means 
"law", hence, the "law side" of the court. 

Many states say in effect that the distinction between 
actions in law and suits in equity has been abolished but 
that the substantive rules governing legal actions and 
equitable actions are preserved. Actions of legal nature 
include, among others, recovery of a money judgment, 
recovery of specific property, breach of contract where 
money is involved, and damages for personal injuries. 
Actions of an equitable nature include, among others, 
accounting (this includes business accounting for state 
taxes, fees, etc.), specific performance of a contract, 
trust enforcement, and injunctions. 


- 62 - 




Admiralty/Mar itime: 

The admiralty courts were originally es¬ 
tablished in England and other maritime coun¬ 
tries of Europe for the protection of commerce 
and the administration of the venerable law of 
the sea, which reaches back to sources long an¬ 
terior even to those of the civil law itself; 
which Lord Mansfield says is not the law of any 
par- ticular country, but the general law of na¬ 
tions, and which is founded on the broadest 
principles of equity and justice, deriving, 
however, much of its ccnpletness and symmetry, 
as well as its modes of proceeding, from the 
Civil law, and embracing altogether a system of 
regulations embodied and matured by the combined 
efforts of the most enlightened nations of the 
world. [New England Marine ins. Co. v. Dunham, 

78 U.S. 1, 23; 11 wall. 1, 23; 20 L. Ed. 90.] 

Admiralty law encompasses the law of prize and Maritime 
law (Figure III-4). Admiralty/prize is that law dealing 
with war, and the spoils of war, which is not relevant to 
the purposes of this work. Admiralty/Maritime jurisdiction 
has cognizance over maritime contracts, maritime torts and 
maritime crimes; and, as we will see, one does not have to 
be on a ship in the middle of the sea to be under this jur¬ 
isdiction (just as in the case of our forefathers). 


I THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY > 

If < ' 

[ MARITIME | | PRIZE ~1 


FIGURE: III-4 

In English Law, the Court of the Admired, was erected by 
Edward III. It was held by the High Lord Admiral or before 
his deputy the Judge of the Admiralty, by which latter 
officer it has for a long time been exclusively held. It 
sits as two courts with separate canmissions known as the 
Instance Court and the Prize Court, the former of which is 
commonly intended by the term admiralty. At its origin the 


- 63 - 




jurisdiction of this court was very extensive, embracing all 
maritime matters. By the statutes 13 Rich. II. C. 5, and 15 
Rich. II. C. 3, especially as explained by the ccranon-law 
courts, their jurisdiction was much restricted. A violent 
and long-continued contest between the admiralty and 
cannon-law courts resulted in the establishment of the 
restrictions which continued until the statutes 3 and 4 
Viet. C. 65 and 9 and 10 Viet. C. 99 materially enlarged its 
powers. The civil jurisdiction of the court extends to 
torts cannitted on the high seas including personal 
batteries, restitution of possession from a claimant 
withholding unlawfully, cases of piratical and illegal 
taking at sea and contracts of a maritime nature including 
suits between part owners, for mariners' and officers' 
wages, pilotage, bottomry and respondentia bonds, and 
salvage claims. The criminal jurisdiction of the court 
extended to all crimes and offenses committed on the high 
seas or within the ebb and flow of the tide and not within 
the body of a county. 

In American Law, the admiralty court is a tribunal having 
a very extensive jurisdiction of maritime causes, civil and 
criminal. It exercises jurisdiction over all maritime 
contracts, torts, or offenses (2 Parsons, Marit. Law. 508). 
The court of original admiralty jurisdiction in the United 
States is the United States District Court. Fran this court 
causes may be removed, in certain cases, to the Circuit and 
ultimately to the Supreme Court. After a somewhat 
protracted contest, the jurisdiction of admiralty has been 
extended beyond that of the English admiralty court and is 
said to be coequal with that of the English court as defined 
by the statutes of Rich. II, under the construction given 
than by the contemporaneous or immediately subsequent courts 
of admiralty. 

Its civil jurisdiction extends to cases of salvage, bonds 
of bottomry, respondentia or hypothecation of ship and 
cargo, seaman's wages, seizures under the laws of impost, 
navigation or trade (commerce), cases of prize and ransom, 
contracts of affreightment between different states or 
foreign ports, etc.. 

Its criminal jurisdiction extends to all crimes and 
offenses cannitted on the high seas or beyond the 
jurisdiction of any country. 

In the case of De Lovio v. Boit, Justice Story addressed 
the full scope and meaning of the "admiralty and maritime" 
jurisdiction clause of Article III, Section 2: 

What is the true interpretation of the clause - 
"all cases of admiralty and maritime juris¬ 
diction?" If we examine the etymology, or re¬ 
ceived use of the words "admiralty" and "mari- 


- 64 - 



time jurisdiction," we shall find, that they 
include jurisdiction of all things done upon or 
relating to the sea, or, in other wards, all 
transactions and proceedings relative to com¬ 
merce and navigation, and to damages or injuries 
upon the sea. In all the great maritime nations 
of Europe, the terms "admiralty jurisdiction" 
are uniformly applied to the Courts exercising 
jurisdiction over maritime contracts and con¬ 
cerns. We shall find the terms just as famil¬ 
iarly known among the jurists of Scotland, 
France, Holland, and Spain, as of England, and 
applied to their own Courts, possessing sub¬ 
stantially the same jurisdiction, as the English 
admiralty in the reign of Edward the Third. 

The clause however of the constitution not 
only confers admiralty jurisdiction, but the 
word "maritime" is super added, seemingly ex 
industria, to remove every latent doubt. "Cases 
of Maritime jurisdiction" must include all mar¬ 
itime contracts, torts and injuries, which are 
in the understanding of the ccntnon law, as well 
as the admiralty, ... 

The admiralty from its highest antiquity, has 
exercised a very extensive jurisdiction, and 
punished offenses by fine and imprisonment. The 
celebrated inquisition at Queensborough, in the 
reign of Edward III, would alone be decisive. 
And even at ccntnon law it had been adjudged, 
that the admiralty might fine for contempt ... 

... appeal, and not a writ of error, lies 
from its decrees; ... 

Yet it is conceded on all sides, that of 
maritime hypothecations the admiralty has 
jurisdiction ... 

The jurisdiction of the admiralty depends, or 
ought to depend, as to contracts upon the 
subject matter, i.e., whether maritime or not; 
and as to torts, upon locality, ... 

Neither the judicial act nor the consti¬ 
tution, which it follows, limit the admiralty 
jurisdiction of the District Court in any res¬ 
pect to place, it is bounded only by the nature 
of the cause over which it is to decide. 

On the whole, I am, without the slightest 
hesitation, ready to pronounce, that the dele¬ 
gation of cognizance of "all CIVIL CASES of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" to the 
Courts of the United States comprehends all 
maritime contracts, torts, and injuries. Hie 


- 65 - 



latter branch is necessarily bounded by local¬ 
ity; the former extends over all contracts, 
(wheresoever they may be made or executed, or 
whatsoever may be the form of the stipulations) 
which relate to the navigation, business or 
ccnmerce of the sea. 

The next inquiry is, what are properly deemed 
"maritime contracts." Happily in this particu¬ 
lar there is little room for controversy. ALL 
civilians and jurists agree, that in this appel¬ 
lation are included, among other things, ... 
marine hypothecations, ... and, what is more 
material to our present purpose, policies of in¬ 
surance ... 

My judgment accordingly is, that policies of 
insurance are within (though not exclusively 
within) the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 
of the United States. [De Lovio v. Boit, 2 
Gall. 398 (1815)] 

A Mechanism For Secretely Mixing Jurisdictions: 

... in the admiralty, a mixture of public law 
and maritime law and equity were often found in 
the same suit. [Reiver v. Seawall, Ohio 65 F. 

393, 395; 12 C.C.A. 661] 

If the claim is cognizable only in admiralty, 
it is an admiralty or maritime claim for those 
purposes whether so identified or not. [Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. Rule 9 (h)] 

How it is possible that an unidentified and unspecified 
"mixture" of law can "often" be "found in the same suit," 
with principles, practices and procedures, of Civil and 
Criminal matters apparently intermixed? 

Torts 

As we have seen, cases of maritime jurisdiction include 
all maritime torts. Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines a tort 
to be: 

A private or civil wrong or injury. A wrong 
independent of contract. 1 Hilliard Torts, 1. 

The camussion or emission of an act by one 
without right whereby another receives seme 
injury, directly or indirectly, in person, 
property, or reputation. 


— 66 — 




The word "tort" has been borrowed from the French and 
literally means a wrong. The French word "tort" was in turn 
derived from the Latin "torquerer," meaning to twist or 
bend. In its legal meaning, however, "tort" is not used to 
include everything which the law treats as a wrong. For 
exanple, a crime or breach of contract is a legal wrong, but 
they are both to be distinguished from a tort. 

No satisfactory definition of a tort has ever yet been 
framed. Another definition frequently given is: 

A tort is a wrong arising independently of 
contract for which the appropriate remedy is a 
ccninon law action. 

However, this distinction is too broad because it 
includes obligations in quasi contract. It is too narrow 
because it does not include maritime torts. The definition 
is an inadequate attempt, in a negative way, to distinguish 
a tort from a crime on the one side and from a breach of 
contract on the other. 

Torts Distinguished From Crimes 

A crime is an offense against the state and is punished 
by the state pursuant to the principles, rules, and usages, 
of the Reman Civil Law as modified by the United States 
Constitutions. A tort is an offense against the individual 
and under the ccrnnon law is redressed by making the party 
who conmits the tort corrpensate the party whose rights have 
been infringed. 

A crime generally involves a tort. That is, an act which 
injures society in general is usually also a wnrong to a 
private individual as well. On the other hand, many torts 
are not crimes because they are not considered to be of such 
serious character as to be designated a crime. Torts can 
only be elevated to the status of a crime in the Reman Civil 
Law. 


Torts Distinguished Fran Breaches Of Contract 

One of the essentials of a contract is an agreement and 
the breach of a contract is the failure to carry out the 
agreement. Liability in tort is not based upon any 
agreement between the parties; it is imposed by law wdthout 
the assent of either party. A common characteristic of all 
torts is that the rights protected by the law of torts are 
those which are enjoyed against all the world. The most 
important rights protected by the law of torts are those of 
personal security, of property, of reputations and of social 
and business relations. 


- 67 - 



However, a tort may grow out of, make part of or be 
coincident with a contract; And attachment, arrest and 
imprisonment are allowed on claims arising under contracts 
(1 Hilliard, Torts 3). For example, the wrong of fraud 
almost necessarily implies an accompanying contract. In 
these cases the law often allows the party injured an 
election of remedies; That is, he may proceed against the 
other party either as a debtor or contractor, or as a 
wrongdoer. (10 Hilliard, Torts; 10 C.B. 83; 24 Conn. 392) 

In the Civil Law, a tort may consist in the violation of 
a statute (2 Ld. Raym. 953) or the abuse of a privilege 
given by a statute (10 Ill. 425), which may be elevated to 
the status of a crime. 


A Delict 

Torts can fall within the jurisdiction of either Common 
law or Admiralty/Maritime law. The proper jurisdiction is 
determined by whether or not the right to be protected is 
maritime in nature. If it is maritime, the claim is within 
the jurisdiction of admiralty/maritime, whether so 
identified or not. Within this jurisdiction, a tort can be 
elevated to the status of a crime, called a "delict." 

Delict. In the Civil Law (Roman Civil Law) 

... in its most enlarged sense, this term 
includes all kinds of crimes and misdemeanors, 
and even the injury which has been caused by 
another either voluntarily or accidently, 
without evil intention. But more commonly by 
delicts are understood those small offenses 
which are punished by a small fine or a short 
imprisonment. [Bouvier's Law Dictionary] 

Delict, Criminal offense; tort; a wrong. In 
Reman law this word, taken in its most general 
sense, is wider in both directions than our 
English term "tort." On the one hand, it 
includes those wrongful acts which, while 
directly affecting seme individual or his 
property, yet extend in their injurious 
consequences to the peace or security of the 
comnunity at large, and hence rise to the grade 
of crimes or misdemeanors. These acts were 
termed in the Reman law "public delicts;" while 
those for which the penalty exacted was 
ccrrpensation to the person primarily injured 
were denominated "private delicts." [Black's 
Law Dictionary] 


- 68 - 



Thus, we see that only in the Reman Civil Law can a tort 
be elevated to the grade of a crime or misdemeanor. This 
means that pursuant to the United States Constitution and 
the Judiciary Act, the only possible authorized 
jurisdictions over such a "crime or misdemeanor" is 
Admiralty/Maritime since Equity has no jurisdiction over 
criminal matters whatsoever, meaning they must arise from a 
maritime tort. (Figure III-5) 



Torts can only be elevated to the status of crimes in the 
Civil Law (Reman). Equity Jurisdiction having no cognizance 
of criminal matters - the only jurisdiction within which 
this can be accomplished, under the Constitution and 
Judiciary Act of 1789, is Admiralty/Maritime (regardless of 
what it is called). 


Figure: III-5 

These delicts (public or private) may grow out of, make 
part of, or be coincident with, a contract and may consist 
in the violation of a statute or the abuse of a privilege 
given by a statute. Therefore, under the jurisdiction of 
Admiralty/ Maritime, a civil matter can be designated as a 
criminal matter inviting the mixture of Civil and Criminal 
procedure in the same cause. Further obfuscation is a 
natural result of the procedural merger of Law, Equity and 
Admiralty/ Maritime. 

Contracts Of Adhesion: [C] 


- 69 - 








The term "Contract of Adhesion" was first used in the 
United States in 1919. [C](l). It wes coined by Raymond 
Saleilles as "Contract d'adhesion" to describe contracts: 

... in which one predominate unilateral will 
dictates its law to an undetermined multitude 
rather than to an individual ... as in all 
employment contracts of big industry, 
transportation contracts of big railroad 
companies and all those contracts which, as the 
Remans said, resemble a law much more than a 
meeting of the minds. [Saleilles, De la 
Declaration de Volonte 229 (1901)] 

It was popularized in the United States by scholars who 
were educated on the continent of Europe and who later 
taught in this county. [C]<2). 

Contracts of Adhesion have at least three indicia, which 
may appear in combination: 

1. Bargaining over berms may not be between equals. One 
party may have such a strong economic power that it can 
dictate its terms to the weaker party. 

2. There may be no opportunity to bargain over terms at 
all. This Contract of Adhesion may be a, take it or leave 
it, preposition in which the only alternatives are adherence 
or rejection. 

3. One party may be totally familiar with the terms or 
have the advantage of time and expert advice in preparing 
it, while the other may have no real opportunity to study 
it. This could even be compounded by the use of fine print 
and convoluted clauses. 

Analyzing the above, it can be concluded that: 

1. The state and the individual are not equals. 
Although the individual is sovereign, the state has the 
power position as it exercises executive, legislative and 
judicial powers: And LCRDS them over the individual. The 
state dictates all terms to its feudal serfs through 
statutory legislation and administrative regulations. 

2. There is no opportunity to bargain over the terms of 
any contractual legislation. The individual is left with a 
vote between two evils: The lessor of which is still evil. 
Citizen input during legislative sessions is usually 
ignored. The majority of the ccmnittee members hold the 
individual who attempts to influence legislation, by and 
through ccmnittee action in general contempt and scorn. 
Sometimes the individual is even ridiculed and scolded by 
the committee chairman for the attempt. 



3. Hie majority of people are not even aware that any 
contractual liability exists from statutes. The state is a 
corporate entity engaged in business and the individuals of 
a state are the customers. The state has been perfecting 
its business rules for years while the individual simply 
bends like a reed shaking in the wind. 

Where is the consent Whereby a statute becomes a 
contractual agreement? It is implied, created by a fiction 
of law. 


Contracts Implied In Law 

A contract "implied in law" is but a duty imposed by law 
and treated as a contract for the purposes of a remedy only. 
[C](3). Examples of duties imposed by law, are marriage 
license, building permit, drivers license, etc.. Any 
statute requiring specific performance. 

Contracts "implied in law" implies a promise to pay, 
whether or not any promise was made or intended. [C](4). 

When the individual fails to perform a duty imposed by 
statute there is a breach of quasi-contract and the State is 
entitled to a remedy at law. Since there is an implied 
contract intent need not be proven. A promise implied in 
law is one in which neither the words nor the conduct of the 
party involved are promissory in form or justify an 
inference of a promise. The term is used to indicate that a 
party is under a legally enforceable duty, as he would have 
been if he had, in fact, made a premise. [C](5). 

Constructive or Quasi-Contracts 

Contract "implied in law" is however, a term 
used to cover a class of obligations, where the 
law, though the defendant did not intend to 
assume an obligation, imposes an obligation upon 
him, notwithstanding the absence of intention on 
his part, and, in many cases in spite of his 
actual dissent. Such contracts...may be termed 
quasi-contracts and are not true contracts. 

They are generally ... statutory, official, or 
customary duties... [Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 

1914 vol I. p. 661. Clark on Contracts, 
Quasi-Contracts, 531.] 

Quasi Contracts are only found in the civil law and are 
defined as: 

An obligation similar in character to that of a 
contract, but which arises not from an agree- 


- 71 - 



ment of parties but from some relation between 
than, or from a voluntary act from one of them. 
[Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1914 Vol. Ill, p. 

2781.] 

Could there be a relationship between the state and the 
individual? Notice that it only requires the voluntary act 
of one of the parties. The voluntary act of one may well be 
the act of the state passing statutory legislation. 

Quasi-contracts were a well defined class 
under the civil law. By the civil code of 
Louisana they are defined to be "the lawful and 
purely voluntary acts of man," from which there 
results any obligation whatever to a third 
person and sometimes a reciprocal obligation 
between parties. In quasi-contracts the 
obligation arises not from consent, as in the 
case of contracts, but from the law or natural 
equity. [Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1914 Vol I, 
p. 2781.] 

The "lawful and purely voluntary acts" of an individual 
consummates a quasi-contract and failure to perform the 
resulting obligation constitutes a breach. This obligation 
arises from the "law or natural equity," not from the cannon 
law. 


According to Professor Ames (lect on Leg. 

Hist. 160) the term was not found in the cannon 
law, but it has been taken by writers of the 
cannon law from the Reman law. [Bouvier's Law 
Dictionary, 1914 vol I, p. 2781.] 

It need only be added here that quasi¬ 
contracts were in the Roman law of almost 
infinite variety, but were divided into five 
classes: 1. Gegrotirorum gestio, the man¬ 

agement of the affairs of another, without 
authority .... [Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1914 
Vol I, p. 2781.] 

Constructive / quasi-contracts are created by statute on 
the pranise that they are needed as a matter of reason and 
justice and are allowed to be enforced ex contractu. 
[C](6). Ex contractu is a form of action under the civil 
law, whereas catmon law remedies arise from actions of case, 
replevin, trespass, or trover. Ex contractu actions are 
enforced by actions in personam. [C](7). 

Constructive / quasi-contracts are based solely upon a 
legal fiction or fiction of law. Since there is no 


- 72 - 




agreement and a remedy is desired, they are treated as a 
contract and include obligations founded upon statutory 
duties. [C](8). 

A debt resulting from a normal agreement or contract has 
always been the result of a premise to pay, invoking a 
remedy in the form of Assumpsit. However, an assumpsit 
cannot be applied to actions of debts where there is no 
agreement unless the court does so by means of a fiction. 
In order to support assumpsit, it is necessary to allege a 
premise and without ag reorient there is no promise. 
Historically, the courts have adopted the fiction of a 
promise and it was declared that a promise was implied in 
law. [C](9). 

What this amounts to is: 

For the convenience of the remedy, they "have 
been made to figure as though they sprung from 
contract, and have appropriated the form of 
agreement." [Anson, Contracts, (8th Ed.) 362.] 

Any obligation created by law, implied by law or quasi 
contract is: 


... not only unscientific, and therefore 
theoretically wrong, but is also destructive of 
clear thinking, and therefore vicious in 
practice. It needs no argument to establish the 
proposition that it is not scientific to treat 
as one and the same thing an obligation that 
exists in every case because of the assent of 
the defendant, and an obligation that not only 
does not depend in any case upon his assent, but 
in many cases exists notwithstanding his 
assent. [Keener, Quasi Cont, 3.] 

IN ORDER FOR A QUASI-CONTRACT TO ATTACH, A BENEFIT MUST 
BE CONFERRED on the defendant by the plaintiff. Hie 
defendant must have displayed an appreciation of that 
benefit, and accept and retain that benefit so that it is 
inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment 
for the value of the benefit. [C](10). 

A person confers a benefit upon another, as respects 
liability in quasi-contracts for restitution, if he gives to 
another possession of, or seme other interest in: money, 
land, chattels, or choses in action, performs services 
beneficial to, or at the request of the other, or in any way 
adds to the other's security or advantage. He confers a 
benefit not only where he adds to the property of another, 
but also where he saves the other from expense or loss. 
[C](11). 


- 73 - 



Postscript 


Corporate activities and juristic persons all receive a 
benefit from the state and have the obligation to pay the 
penalty for breaches of contract. The natural individual 
functioning as a matter of right receives no benefit from 
the state and, therefore, is not subject to a penalty for 
not specifically performing. [C](12). 

The natural person is not created by the state and cannot 
canmit any crime where there is no loss or damage to the 
life, liberty or property of another person. This means the 
natural person can only be charged with common law crimes 
unless he has consented or volunteered into a contract, 
corporate charter or sane other licensing scheme. 


Part IV: Law Merchant [D] 

Introduction: 

Law Merchant is a name often used in law to denote the 
customs which have grown up among merchants in reference to 
mercantile documents and business, such as bills of 
exchange, bills of lading, etc.. 

It is a system consisting largely of the usages of trade 
and applied by the courts to the contracts and dealings of 
persons engaged in mercantile business of any kind. 
Blackstone classifies it as one of the "customs" of England 
and so a part of the common law, but it is not properly a 
custom. It is neither restricted to a single community nor 
is it a part of the municipal law of a single country but 
regulates commercial contracts in all civilized countries. 
The body of mercantile usages which compose this branch of 
law, having no dependence on locality, does not need to be 
established by witnesses, but judges are bound to take 
official notice of it. The principal branches of the law- 
merchant are the law of shipping, the law of marine insur¬ 
ance, the law of sales and the law of bills and notes. The 
feudal law, which grew up in a tine when property consisted 
chiefly of land upon whose alienation were laid great re¬ 
strictions, was found inadequate for the needs of mercantile 
classes caning into prominence. The courts, when commercial 
contracts were brought before them, adopted from merchants 
the rules regulating their business dealings and made them 
rules of law. Many of these rules were in great contra¬ 
diction to the ccmnon law. Magna Charta contained a special 
provision guaranteeing to merchants, among other things, the 
right "to buy and sell according to their ancient customs," 
and many later statutes were erected for their special 
protection. As the custom of merchants began to encroach 


- 74 - 



upon the cannon law, there was a determined effort on the 
part of lawyers to resist it. It was attempted to make the 
custom of merchants a particular custom peculiar to a pe¬ 
culiar ccmmunity and not a part of the law of the land. It 
was finally decided in the reign of James I to be a part of 
the law of the realm. An attempt was then made to restrict 
the application of the Law-Merchant to persons who were 
actually merchants. The courts, after considerable var¬ 
iance, held that "it applied to the same contracts between 
parties not merchants." 

History of Negotiable Instruments: 

Negotiable instruments were known in the Middle Ages but 
by the fifth century their use in Europe had ceased. The 
Reman law did not deal with the subject. The reason for the 
failure of early European law to develop negotiable credit 
instruments was the entrenched idea that a chose-in- action 
was not assignable, having no physical form it was deemed 
incapable of delivery. The debtor/creditor relationship was 
considered too personal to permit one creditor to substitute 
another in his place. 

In time a static rule of law ultimately yields to the 
pressure of events. Sales of goods were facilitated by the 
assignment of choses in action and in the eighth and ninth 
centuries some attempts to circumvent the rule of nonassign¬ 
ability of centnercial instruments succeeded. 

The immediate ancestor of the bill of exchange was one 
form of the medieval contract of cambium; a contract to 
transport money of one country and to exchange it for the 
money of another country. Italian merchants are given the 
credit for the origination of this instrument. As commerce 
developed, the need for exchanging money increased and this 
business fell into the hands of specialists who knew the 
money values of the various countries. They became exchang¬ 
ers of money. The customers of the exchangers were the 
merchants who owed money abroad or who had claims against 
foreign merchants. Exchangers formed connections such that 
each became the correspondent of other exchangers. The 
great Fairs of the Middle Ages were convenient places for 
the settlement of debts and here the exchangers met and 
settled accounts; the fairs thus became the original clear¬ 
ing houses. The modern bill of exchange is the descendant 
of these contracts by means of which the merchants of the 
13th centuries paid and collected foreign debts through the 
agency of the exchanger. 

Disputes with reference to such instruments were settled 
in the Fair Courts by juries composed of merchants. Hence, 
the law of ccnmercial instruments, as well as seme other 


- 75 - 



branches of the law which grew out of business transactions, 
is spoken of as the "Law Merchant." 

The practice of endorsement had been introduced by the 
close of the 17th century and the bill of exchange was sub¬ 
stantially in its present form. The development of banking 
followed the development of the bill of exchange. The Bank 
of Barcelona was established in 1401, that of Genoa in 1407, 
of Venice in 1587, of Hamburg in 1619, of Stockholm in 1688, 
and the Bank of England in 1694. 

Because of various obstacles in the substantive and pro¬ 
cedural law, as enforced in the cannon law courts of England 
prior to 1600, the law of caimercial paper developed outside 
the duly constituted law courts. The Fair Courts of England 
were the custodians of the Law Merchant from their beginning 
in the 12th century until their decadence near the close of 
the reign of Elizabeth. Overlapping this period and 
beginning in 1353 with the enactment of the Statute of 
Staples, 27 Edward III. Stat 2, the courts of the Staple 
took over much of the caimercial law business of the time. 
The Staple courts exercised jurisdiction over the growing 
body of mercantile law for 200 years. 

This tribunal had cognizance of all questions which 
should arise between merchants, native or foreign. It was 
composed of an officer called the mayor of the staple, 
re-elected yearly by the native and foreign merchants who 
attended the particular staple, two constables appointed for 
life, also chosen by the merchants, a German and an Italian 
merchant, and six mediators between buyers and sellers of 
whom two were English, two German, and one Lombard. The Law 
administered was the lex mercatoria and there was a provis¬ 
ion that causes in which one party was a foreigner should be 
tried by a jury one-half of whom were foreigners. The most 
important legislative content of the staples were the 
Statute of Acton Burnel (11 Edward I) by which merchants 
were enabled to sell the chattels of their debtor and attach 
his person for debt, 5 Edw. 1, c. 3, and 27 Edw. Ill, c. 2, 
called the Statute of the Staple. One object of which was 
to remove the staple formerly held at Calais to certain 
towns in England, Wales and Ireland. With the growth of 
cannierce, the staple became more and more neglected and at 
last fell together into disuse under its name. 

Other aspects of the Staple are provided by sane of the 
old laws cited below: 

By the St. 27 Edw. III. 2, if any by color of 
his office, or otherwise, take anything of 
merchants against their agreement, he shall be 
arrested by the mayor and baliffs of the place, 
if out of the staple, or by the mayor and 
minister of the staple if within the staple; and 


- 76 - 




speedy process shall be against him from day to 
day according to the law of the staple, and not 
of the ccmnon law. 

And therefore, he shall have advantage of the 
law merchant, tho it be not conformable to the 
ccnmon law. [13 Edw. IV, 9.6; 2 Rol. 114.] 

And therefore, where a merchant stranger 
delivers his goods to a carrier to be carried to 
a port, which are by him feloniously embezzled, 
he may sue in Chancery for relief, when there 
shall be speedy dispatch, and need not proceed 
at the ccmnon law. [13 Edw. IV 9.6.] 

Several excerpts from Ccmyn's Digest of the Lavra of 
England (1800) have a remarkable content. 

By the statutes 11 Edw. I de Acton Burnel, a 
merchant may cause his debtor to come before the 
mayor of the staple, &c., and make recognizance 
of his debt, which shall be entered on the roll, 
wath the seal of the debtor and the king, in 
custody of the mayor, &c. 

By the stat. de Mercatoribus, 13 Edw. I, he 
shall cane before the mayor, &c or other 
sufficient men sworn thereto, if the mayor &c. 
cannot attend, and acknowledge his debt and day 
of payment; and the recognizance shall be 
enrolled, and the roll double; one part to 
remain with the mayor, &c., the other with the 
clerk thereto named; and the clerk shall make an 
obligation, to which the seed of the debtor 
shall be put with the king's seal, &c., of which 
the one part shall remain with the mayor, &c., 
the other with the clerk. 

By which statutes the mayor, with the 
constables of the staple, may take recognizance 
of merchants of the staple for merchandise only 
of the same staple, and not of others. Stat. 23 
Hen. VIII, 6. 

By the Stat Act. Burnell 11 Edw. I and de 
Merc. 13 Edw. I, if the debtor does not pay, 

&c., the creditor shall bring his obligation to 
the mayor &c., who shall incontinent cause the 
moveables of the debtor, to the amount of the 
debt, to be sold and delivered to the creditor 
by the praisement of honest men, and the king's 
seal shall be put to the sale &c.. 

And if the mayor find no buyers, he shall 
deliver the said moveables to the creditor at a 
reasonable price, &c. 


- 77 - 



And the mayor may cause the body of the 
debtor (if lay) to be committed to the prison of 
the town till he agree the debt. 

And therefore the mayor nay make execution, 
where the conusee lives, and has lands and goods 
within his jurisdiction. 

By the Stat. Act. Burnel 11 Edw. I, & Merc. 

13 Edw. I, if the debtor have no moveables, of 
which the debt may be levied, or cannot be found 
within the jurisdiction of the mayor, he shall 
send the recognizance under the king's seal into 
the Chancery, and the Chancellor shall direct a 
writ to the Sheriff to seize the moveables, or 
the body of the debtor (if lay), and make him 
agree the debt in the same manner as the mayor, 
if he had been in his power. 

So by the Stat. de Merc., 13 Edw. I, if the 
debtor agree not the debt in a quarter of a 
year, by sale of his goods and lands, all his 
lands shall be delivered to the merchants by 
reasonable extent, to hold till the debt be 
levied. 

Lex Mercator ia: 

Later, from the time of Henry VIII to Elizabeth lex 
mercatoria jurisdiction was turned over to the Court of 
Admiralty. The Law Merchant, therefore, developed a mari¬ 
time flavor and it became natural for parties concerned with 
mercantile law to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Admiralty. However, the cannon law courts did not view this 
jurisdiction expansion of the Admiralty Court over commer¬ 
cial matters with acquiescence and succeeding in their 
opposition began to take over the Law Merchant around 1600. 
Incorporation of the Law Merchant into the system of common 
law proceeded slowly. Initially, Bills of Exchange were 
extended only to foreign merchants trading with the British, 
then to all merchants, and lastly to all persons whether 
traders or not. 

In 1756, Lord Mansfield, Chief justice of the King's 
Bench, incorporated vast additions of Civil Law into the 
system of Common Law and moved the action of assumpsit from 
law into equity, thereby denying trial by jury on writs of 
assistance. Arbitrary acts of mercantilism, under the 
jurisdiction of this civil law, sparked the American 
Revolution. 

By the close of the 1700's, the basic principles of 
negotiable instruments had been defined by the decisions of 
the English courts which subsequently amplified and applied 
these principles to such an extent that by 1850 this branch 


- 78 - 




of the law had reached a fair state of maturity. The suc¬ 
ceeding stage in the development of the law of negotiable 
paper was its codification. 

Judge M. D. Chalmers was largely responsible for the co¬ 
dification of the law of bills of exchange, notes and 
cheques in England when he published a digest of this sub¬ 
ject in 1878. Two years later. Judge Chalmers delivered an 
address before the institute of Bankers on the theme of co¬ 
difying the law of negotiable instruments. The Associated 
Chambers of Commerce joined the Institute in requesting 
Chalmers to prepare the draft of such a bill for introduc¬ 
tion in Parliament. The Bills of Exchange Act became law in 
1882 and was subsequently adopted throughout the British 
empire. 

One of the avowed objects of the American Bar Associa¬ 
tion, organized in 1878, was to promote the enactment of 
uniform laws in the several states. In 1895, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law directed 
its Committee on Commercial Law to draft a bill on commer¬ 
cial paper, based upon the English Bills of Exchange Act of 
1882. In 1896 this act was approved by the Commissioners 
and recommended to the several states for adoption. Within 
two years after the Uniform Negotiable Law was recommended 
for adoption, it became law in fourteen states. It was 
later enacted in all states by 1924. This, the first of a 
series of uniform commercial acts, has worked its way deeply 
into our legal system. 

Thus, out of the Law Merchant, developed cur Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) which states that, "unless dis¬ 
placed by the particular provisions of this Act, the prin¬ 
ciples of law and equity, including the Law Merchant, ... 
shall supplement its provisions." (U.C.C. 1103) 

The Pulling in Littel's Law Library, appearing in the 
American edition, Philadelphia (1847) gives us an insight 
into the debtor-creditor relationship. 

The most general comprehensive relation in 
which parties can stand with regard to each 
other, so as to create an account between them, 
is that of debtor and creditor, which, in fact, 
embraces all the other relations giving rise to 
matters of account. 

The parties to this account are properly de¬ 
nominated debtor and creditor, for every debt 
legally implies a credit given by the party 
entitled to the money, no matter for how short 
or how long a period it may be (see Cornforth v. 
Rivett, 2 M. & S. 510), and no such account can 
therefore be said to arise in case of mere ready 
money transactions; for there the consideration 


- 79 - 



and the payments are prima facie deemed to be 
contemporaneous (See Bassey v. Barnett, 9 M & W 
312. in cases of goods sold for ready money, 
and taken possession of by the purchaser without 
payment, the seller may, if he pleases, insist 
upon a return of the goods; Howse v. Crowe, R & 
M 414; Bateman v. Elman, Cro. Eliz. 867; but he 
may of course elect to treat the transaction as 
a sale on credit, and sue the purchaser immedi¬ 
ately for the price). 

Before considering the case of debtor and 
creditor accounts in the proper sense of the 
term, viz., where there are mutual credits or 
mutual payments, let us here see what are the 
general rights and duties arising from the bare 
relation of debtor and creditor. These consist 
in the first place in the payment or offer or 
tender of payment, by the former, and the 
receipt in the amount due in discharge or 
acquittance by the latter; but un- til this 
takes place, the creditor is entitled at any 
moment to enforce payment by legal pro- cess, 
which right can only be defeated by actual 
payment, or by accord and satisfaction by the 
debtor, or by the voluntary discharge or release 
of the debt by the creditor, or a compulsory 
discharge by operation of law. 

The Determination Of jurisdiction Over Law Merchant: 

From a book entitled THE LAW OF BILLS, NOTES, 

CHEQUES: 


we are concerned in this book with a branch 
which deals with the law of bills, notes, and 
cheques. This branch of the Law Merchant has 
retained throughout its life, to the present 
day, its essential characteristics, clearly 
marking it off from the common law .... 

The term Law Merchant at the present time 
usually suggests the law of bills, notes, and 
cheques .... 

Admiralty had already been exercising juris¬ 
diction over instruments in the nature of bills 
of exchange and promissory notes pertaining to 
contracts in the commerce of the high seas;.... 

The Law Merchant is not even a modification 
of the common law; it occupies a field over 
which the common law does not and never did 
extend. [E] 


AND 


- 80 - 




So we see Common Law has no jurisdiction over Law 
Merchant - Law Merchant is part of the Civil Law system and, 
therefore, must be cognizable either under the jurisdiction 
of Equity or Admiralty. 

The determination of which of these jurisdictions has 
cognizance over a particular controversy is governed by the 
subject matter and nature of the contractual right being 
enforced (see figure III-6). 

If the subject matter and nature of the cause is 
exclusively maritime it is cognizable only in admiralty. 

If the claim is cognizable only in admiralty, 
it is an admiralty or maritime claim for those 
purposes whether so identified or not. [28 
U.S.C., Rule 9(h)] 

A pleading or count setting forth a claim for 
relief within the admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction that is also within the 
jurisdiction of the district court on some other 
ground may contain a statement identifying the 
claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for 
purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), 82 and the 
Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and 
Maritime Claims. [28 U.S.C., Rule 9(h)] 

The Law Merchant is founded on expediency and subject to 
changes with the "customs" of merchants. Our courts are 
bound by constitutional clauses and treaties, to take notice 
of these customs of merchants and all debtor/creditor 
relationships are within either the jurisdiction of equity 
or admiralty/maritime. And, if the subject matter and 
cause of action is exclusively mritime in nature it is an 
admiralty/maritime claim whether so identified or not! The 
supreme rule of this law Merchant is: he who trades with a 
merchant becomes a merchant for purposes of that 
transaction. Further, it makes any debtor liable on a 
summary judgment to any merchant who may bring a charge of 
default. The rule can also carpel what is called an "action 
of account" on the debtor/creditor basis. Hence, the 
requirement of a debtor to keep and disclose records. 


Part V: Article I vs. Article III Courts 
Establishment Of Courts: 

Article III, Section 1, of the United States Constitution 
states that the judicial power of the United States shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court and in "such inferior courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish"; 


- 81 - 



THE DETERMINATION OF JURISDICTION OVER TOE LAW MERCHANTS 



Figure: III-6 


- 82 - 










and prescribes in Section 2, that this power shall extend to 
cases and controversies of certain enumerated classes. 

It was necessarily left to the legislative 
power to organize the Supreme Court, to define 
its powers consistently with the Constitution, 
as to its original jurisdiction; and bo distri¬ 
bute the residue of the judicial power between 
this and the inferior court which it was bound 
to ordain and establish, defining their respec¬ 
tive powers, whether original or appellate, by 
which and how it should be exercised. [Rhode 
Island v. Massachussets, 12 Pet. 657, 721 
(1838); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dali. 419, 432 
(1793).] 

It was further stated by justice Story: 

It would seem ... that Congress are bound to 
create seme inferior courts, in which to vest 
all that jurisdiction which under the Constitu¬ 
tion, is exclusively vested in the United 
States, and of which the Supreme Court cannot 
take original cognizance. They might establish 
one or more inferior courts; they might parcel 
out the jurisdiction amongst such courts, from 
time to time, at their own pleasure. But the 
whole judicial power of the united States should 
be, at all times, vested, either in an original 
or appellate form, in seme courts created under 
its authority. [Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 
330-331 (1816)] 

"Inferior courts" contemplated under Article III, Section 
1, are "inferior" only in the technical sense that they are 
courts of special and limited authority erected on such 
principles and proceedings that must show their jurisdic¬ 
tion, their judgments being entirely disregarded for this 
purpose, and whose judgments are subject bo revision by an 
appellate court. Their jurisdiction depends exclusively on 
the Constitution and the terms of the statutes passed in 
pursuance thereof, and most appear of record. [F] 

Legislative Courts: 

It long has been settled that Article III does not 
express the full authority of Congress to create courts, and 
that other articles invest Congress with powers in exertion 
of which it may create inferior courts and clothe them with 


- 83 - 



functions deemed essential or helpful in carrying those 
powers into execution. 

In the case of Ex parte Bakelite Corporation this issue 
was brought before the Supreme Court on a jurisdiction 
challenge to the Court of Customs Appeals on grounds: 

(1) That the Court of Customs Appeals is an 

inferior court created by Congress under 

section 1 of article 3 of the Constitution, 
and as such it can have no jurisdiction of 
any proceeding which is not a case or contro¬ 
versy within the meaning of section 2 of the 
same article; and 

(2) That the proceeding presented by the appeal 
from the Traffic Commission is not a case in 
controversy in the sense of that section, but 
is merely an advisory proceeding in aid of 
executive action. 

Following are pertinent excerpts from the Supreme Court 
decision: 


But there is a difference in the two classes 
of courts. THOSE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE SPECIFIC 
POWER GIVEN IN SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE 3 ARE CALLED 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS. THEY SHARE IN THE EXER¬ 
CISE OF TOE JUDICIAL POWER DEFINED IN THAT SEC¬ 
TION, CAN BE INVESTED WITH NO OTHER JURISDIC¬ 
TION, and have judges who hold office in good 
behavior, with no power in Congress to provide 
otherwise. On the other hand, those created by 
Congress in the exercise of other powers are 
called legislative courts. Their functions al¬ 
ways are directed to the execution of one or 
more such powers; and are prescribed by Congress 
independently of section 2 of article 3; and 
their judges hold for such term as Congress 
prescribes, whether it be a fixed period of 
years or during good behavior.... 

The jurisdiction with which they are inves¬ 
ted, is not a part of that judicial power which 
is defined in the 3rd article of the Constitu¬ 
tion, but is conferred by Congress, in the exe¬ 
cution of those general powers which that body 
possesses ... 

Legislative courts also may be created as 
special tribunals to examine and determine var¬ 
ious matters, arising between the government and 
others, which from their nature do not require 
judicial determination and yet are susceptible 


- 84 - 




of it. The mode of determining matters of this 
class is completely within congressional con¬ 
trol. Congress may reserve to itself the power 
to decide, may delegate that power to executive 
officers, or may ccrrmit it to judicial tri¬ 
bunals. 

Conspicuous among such matters are claims 
against the United States. These may arise in 
many ways ... They all admit of legislative or 
executive determination, and yet from their 
nature are susceptible of determin- ation by 
courts; but no court can have cogni- zance of 
them except as Congress makes specific provision 
therefor. Nor do claimants have any right to 
sue on them unless Congress consents; and 
Congress may attach to its consent such con¬ 
ditions as it deems proper, even to requiring 
that the suits be brought in a legislative court 
specifically created to consider than. The 
Court of Claims is such a Court.... 

The nature of the proceedings in the Court of 
Claims and the power of Congress over them are 
illustrated in McElrath v. United States, 102 
U.S. 426, 26 L. Ed. 189, where particular atten¬ 
tion was given to the statutory provisions auth¬ 
orizing that court, when passing on claims 
against the government, to consider and deter¬ 
mine any asserted setoffs or counterclaims, and 
directing that all issues of fact be tried by 
the court without a jury. The claimant in that 
case objected that these provisions were in con¬ 
flict with the Seventh Amendment to the Consti¬ 
tution, which preserves the right of trial by 
jury in suits at cannon law where the value in 
controversy exceeds $20. The Court disposed of 
the objection by saying: 

"There is nothing in these provisions which 
violates either the letter or spirit of the 
Seventh Amendment. Suits against the government 
in the Court of Claims, whether reference be had 
to the claimant's demand, or to the defence, or 
to any set-off, or counterclaim which the gov¬ 
ernment may assert, are not controlled by the 
Seventh Amendment. They are not suits at common 
law within its true meaning...." 

A duty to give decisions which are advisory 
only, and so without force as judicial judg¬ 
ments, may be laid on a legislative court, but 
not on a constitutional court established under 
article 3. 


- 85 - 



And in support of the argument it is said 
that in creating courts Congress has made it a 
practice to distinguish between those intended 
to be legislative by making no provision respec¬ 
ting the tenure of judges of the former and 
expressly fixing the tenure of judges of the 
latter. But the argument is fallacious. IT 
MISTAKENLY ASSUMES THAT WHETHER A COURT IS OF 
ONE CLASS OR THE OTHER DEPENDS ON THE INTENTION 
OF C0N3RESS, WHEREAS THE TRUE TEST LIES IN THE 
POWER UNDER WHICH THE COURT WAS CREATED AND IN 
THE JURISDICTION CONFERRED... 

As it is plain that the Court of Customs 
Appeals is a legislative and not a constitu¬ 
tional court, there is no need for now inquiring 
whether the proceeding under section 316 of the 
Tariff Act of 1922, new pending before it, is a 
case or controversy within the meaning of sec¬ 
tion 2 of article 3 of the Constitution, for 
this section applies only to constitutional 
courts. Even if the proceeding is not such a 
case or controversy, the Court of Customs 
Appeals, being a legislative court, may be 
invested with jurisdiction of it, as is done by 
section 316. [Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 

279 U.S. 438 (1929)] 

Thus, we see that legislative courts are created by 
Congress in the exercise of powers outside Article III and 
invested with jurisdiction as specifically conferred by 
Congress; while Constitutional courts are created by 
Congress, pursuant to the power granted in Article III, and 
are invested with no other jurisdiction than the judicial 
power defined in Section 2 of Article III. 

Many cases dealing with the character and distribution of 
judicial power and citing both section 1 and section 2 of 
Article 3 are noted under section 1 "Judicial power". 

Article III Judicial Power And The Eleventh Amendment: 

The Eleventh Amendment was proposed March 4, 1794; 
ratified February 7, 1795; and declared ratified January 8, 
1798. The original version of Article III Section 2 of the 
Constitution read as follows: 

The Judicial power shall extend to all cases 
in law and equity, arising under this Constitu¬ 
tion, the Laws of the United States, and the 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their authority; to all cases of admiralty and 


- 86 - 




maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which 
the United States shall be a party; to contro¬ 
versies between two or more States; between a 
State and citizens of another State; between 
citizens of different States; between citizens 
of the same States claiming lands under grants 
of different States, and between a State, or 
citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens 
or subjects. [Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, 

United States Constitution] 

As modified by the Eleventh Amendment this 
clause prescribes the limits of the Judicial 
power of the Courts. [United States v. 
Louisana, 123 U.S. 32, 35 (1887)] 

Article III, Section 2, clause 1, was modified as 
follows: 

The Judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend bo any suit in law or 
equity, ccnmenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by citizens of another state, 
or by citizens or subjects of any Foreign State. 
[Eleventh Amendment, United States 
Constitution] 

This modification, and its wording, is depicted in Figure 
III-7. The force and effect of this Amendment was 
subsequently decided in numerous case decisions by the 
United States Supreme Court: [G] 

Purpose of Amendment. 

It is a part of our history, that, at the 
adoption of the Constitution, all the States 
were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that 
these debts might be prosecuted in the Federal 
courts formed a very serious objection to that 
instrument. Suits were instituted; and the 
court maintained its jurisdiction. The alarm 
was general; and, to quiet the apprehensions 
that were so extensively entertained, this 
amendment was proposed in Congress, and adopted 
by the State legislatures. [G](1). 

The Eleventh Amendment was proposed, almost 
unanimously, at the first meeting of Congress 
after the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, which 
held that a State was liable to be sued by a 
citizen of another State or of a foreign 
country. "This amendment, expressing the will 
of the ultimate sovereignty of the whole 


- 87 - 




THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT MODIFIED 
THIS JUDICIAL POWER AS FOLLOWS: 


"ONE OF THE UNITED STATES" | 

jJudicial power severed 
1 in SUITS in Law and Equity 
by these "citizens" AGAINST 
one of the u.S. 


NOTES: (1) "Controversy" is a civil and not a criminal 
proceeding. It differs from "case," which includes all 
suits. Criminal as well as civil. 


(2) "Suit" includes not only a civil action, but 
also a criminal prosecution, as indictment and 
information. 


FIGURE II1-7: JUDICIAL POWER AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 



"Citizens of another State" 
and "Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State" 


- 88 - 



















country, superior to all legislatures and all 
courts, actually reversed the decision of the 
Supreme Court." [G] (2). 

The very object and purpose of the Eleventh 
Amendment were to prevent the indignity of 
subjecting a State to the coercive process of 
judicial tribunals at the instance of private 
parties. It was thought to be neither becoming 
nor convenient that the several States of the 
Union, invested with that large residium of 
sovereignty which had not been delegated to the 
United States, should be summoned as defendants 
to answer the complaints of private persons, 
whether citizens of other States or aliens, or 
that the course of their public policy and the 
administration of their public affairs should be 
subject to and controlled by the mandate of 
judicial tribunals without their consent, and in 
favor of individual interests. [G](3). 

in Law or Equity: 

While the amendment speaks only of suits in 
law and equity, that language is the natural 
result of the intention to overrule the Chisholm 
case, which was a suit at law; the amendment 
cannot with propriety be construed to leave open 
a suit against a state in the admiralty juris¬ 
diction by individuals, whether its cwn citizens 
or not. [G](4). 

The recognized primary purpose of the amend¬ 
ment, viz, to over-rule the Chisholm case, can¬ 
not be regarded as restricting the scope of its 
express terms. It necessarily embraces demands 
for the enforcement of equitabel rights. [G](5). 

What Cases unaffected by the Amendment. 

While the amendment took from the Supreme 
Court all jurisdiction, past, present, and 
future, of all controversies between States and 
individuals; it left its exercise over those 
between States as free as it had been before. 
It does not comprehend controversies between a 
State and a foreign State. Nor did the amend¬ 
ment, though limited in terms to suits by citi¬ 
zens of other or foreign States, operate to 
authorize suits against a State (without its 
consent) by its own citizens. Those who deal in 
bonds of a sovereign State are aware that they 
must rely altogether on the sense of justice and 
good faith of the State, and the courts of the 


- 89 - 



United States are expressly prohibited from 
exercising jurisdiction. [G](6). 

It remains the duty of the courts of the 
United States to decide all cases brought before 
them by citizens of one State against citizens 
of a different State, where a State is not 
necessarily a defendant. [G](7) 

Suit Commenced or Prosecuted. 

Prosecution of a writ of error to review a 
judgment of a state court claimed to be in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, does not "caimence or prosecute a 
suit against the State. [G](8). 

Record Not Conclusive as to Parties in Interest. 

It must be regarded as a settled doctrine of 
this court, established by its recent decisions, 
that THE QUESTION WHETHER A SUIT IS WITHIN THE 
PROHIBITION OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IS NOT 
ALWAYS DETERMINED BY REFERENCE TO THE NOMINAL 
PARTIES ON THE RECORD, BUT IS DETERMINED BY A 
CONSIDERATION OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE AS 
PRESENTED ON THE WHOLE RECORD. [G](9). 

A suit nominally against individuals, but 
restraining or otherwise affecting their action 
as State officers may be in substance a suit 
against the State which the Constitution 
forbids. [G](10). 

Suits Against State Officers Not Upheld. 

A suit against the governor solely in his 
official capacity, to recover moneys in the 
State treasury, was considered a suit against 
the State. [G](ll). 

Where it was sought affirmatively to carpel 
the performance of a State's contract by man¬ 
damus against its officers requiring the appli¬ 
cation of funds in the State treasury, and the 
collection of a specific tax authorized by law 
for the retirement of State bonds, it was held 
to be a suit against the State, and an attempt 
to secure judicial interference with political 
activities. [G]{12). 

Where the State was nominally a party on the 
record, but examination of the pleadings showed 
it was suing for the use and on behalf of cer¬ 
tain of its citizens to carpel an officer to pay 
out public money in his possession on the 
State's obligations, the suit was held within 


- 90 - 




the inhibition. EG](13 >. 

The Court will refuse to take jurisdiction of 
a suit to compel an officer to exercise the 
State's power of taxation, when it is clearly 
seen upon the record that the State is an 
indispensable party. [G](14). 

A suit filed by aliens against the auditor, 
attorney general, and other officials of Vir¬ 
ginia to enjoin the prosecution of suits in the 
name for the use of the State, under a State 
act, against taxpayers who had tendered in pay¬ 
ment of taxes tax-receivable coupons cut from 
bonds of the State, was a suit against the State 
and within the meaning of the Eleventh Amend¬ 
ment. [G](15). 

A suit against commissioners appointed under 
a state law to wind up the affairs of the state 
dispensary system, is also prohibited. [G](16). 

A suit by a depositor in an Oklahoma bank 
against members of the State Banking Board and 
the Bank Commissioner to carpel payments from 
the Depositors' Guaranty fund, is likewise with¬ 
in the prohibition. [G](17). 

Suits Against State Officers upheld. 

Suits by individuals against defendants who 
claim to act as officers of a State and, under 
color of an unconstitutional statute, to recover 
for injury to property; or to recover money or 
property unlawfully taken from them in behalf of 
the State; or, for compensation for damages; or, 
in a proper case, for an injunction to prevent 
such wrong and injury; or, for a mandamus to 
enforce the performance of a plain legal duty, 
purely ministerial; are not, within the meaning 
of the amendment, suits against the State. 
[G](18). 

Generally suits to restrain action of State 
officials can, consistently with the constitu¬ 
tional prohibition, be prosecuted only when the 
action sought to be restrained is without the 
authority of State law or contravenes the 
statutes or Constitution of the United States. 
EG](19). 

Uimunity from suit is a high attribute of 
sovereignty which cannot be availed of by public 
agents when sued for their own torts. The 
Eleventh Amendment was not intended to afford 
them freedom from liability in any case where, 
under color of their office, they have injured 


- 91 - 



one of the State's citizens. "The many claims 
of immunity from suit have therefore been un¬ 
iformly denied, where the action was brought for 
injuries done or threatened by public officers. 
If they were indeed agents, acting for the 
State, they - though not exempt from suit - 
could successfully defend by exhibiting the 
valid power of attorney or lawful authority 
under which they acted. * * * But if it appeared 
that they proceeded under an unconstitutional 
statute their justification failed and their 
claim of inniunity disappeared on the production 
of the void statute * * * In such cases the law 
of agency has no application - the wrongdoer is 
treated as a principal and individually liable 
for the damages inflicted and subject to injunc¬ 
tion against the commission of acts causing ir¬ 
reparable injury." [G](20). 

The Eleventh Amendment, which denies to the 
citizen the right to resort to a Federal court 
to ccnpel or restrain State action, does not 
preclude suit against a wrongdoer merely because 
he asserts that his acts are within an official 
authority which the State does not confer. 
[G](21). 

Waiver of Immunity. 

The immunity from suit belonging to a State, 
which is respected and protected by the Consti¬ 
tution within the limits of the judicial power 
of the United States, is a personal privilege 
which it may waive at pleasure; so that in a 
suit, otherwise well brought, in which a State 
had sufficient interest to entitle it to became 
a party defendant, its appearance in a court of 
the United States would be a voluntary submis¬ 
sion to its jurisdiction; while, of course, 
those courts are always open to it as a suitor 
in controversies between it and citizens of 
other States. Such waiver of immunity from 
suit, however, does not extend to a surrender of 
any essential attribute of sovereignty. [G](22). 

It is elementary that even if a State has 
consented to be sued in its own court by one of 
its creditors, a right would not exist in such 
creditor to sue the State in a court of the 
United States. [G](23). 


- 92 - 



CHAPTER IV 


THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 


Part i: introduction 

I mean the study of the Law of nations ... is 
at all times the duty, and ought to be the pride 
of all, who aspire to be statesmen; and, as many 
of our lawyers becane legislators, it seems to 
be the study to which, of all others, they 
should most seriously devote themselves. 

Upon the general theory of the law of na¬ 
tions, much has been written by authors of great 
ability and celebrity. At the head of the list 
stands that most extraordinary man Grotius, 
whose treatise "Dejure Belliet Pacis," was the 
first great effort in modern times to reduce 
into any order the principals belonging to this 
branch of jurisprudence, by deducing them from 
the history and practice of nations, and the 
incidental opinions of philosophers, orators, 
and poets. His eulogy has been already pro¬ 
nounced in terms of high commendation, but so 
just and so true that it were vain to follow or 
add to his praise. 

Puffendorf, in a dry, didactic manner, has 
drawn out, in the language of the times, the 
sagacity of Barbeyrac, in his luminous Ccratten- 
taries, has cleared away many obscurities, and 
vindicated many positions. Wolfius, who is 
better known among us in his elegant abridger. 

Vattel, has more elaborately discussed the the¬ 
ory with the improved lights of modern days. 

Yet, how few have mastered the elementary 
treatises on this subject, the labors of Alber- 
icus Gentilis, and Zouch, and Grotius, and Puf¬ 
fendorf, and Bynkershoek, and Wolfius, and Vat¬ 
tel? ... How few have aspired, even in vision, 
after the comprehensive researches into the law 
of nations, .... [From "Miscellaneous writings 
of Joseph Story" - 1852] 

The latter part of this quote from Justice Story's 
writings was a sad commentary on our legislators and those 
"who aspire to be statesmen" (Many of whom are lawyers). 
According to Story, within 76 years after the Declaration of 
independence, few contemporaries had mastered even the ele¬ 
mentary treatises on the subject. And yet, this was the 


- 93 - 



law, and its principles, upon which this country was 
founded. It was the authority for the Declaration of 
Independence, and its principles are onbodied in that 
Declaration, the First Organic Law of the United States. 
The authors and signers of the Declaration were avid stu¬ 
dents of the teachers and writers of the Law of Nations: 

Thus, may the first principles of sound pol¬ 
itics be fixed in the minds of youth ... 
Grotius, Puffendorf, and sane other writers of 
the same kind may be used.... [Benjamin 
Franklin - 1749] 

I am much obliged by the kind present you 
have made us of your editions of Vattel. It 
came to us in good season, when the circum¬ 
stances of a rising State make it necessary 
frequently to consult the law of nations. Ac¬ 
cordingly, that copy which I kept (after depo¬ 
siting one in cur own public library here, and 
sending the other to the College of Massachu¬ 
setts Bay, as you directed) has been continually 
in the hands of the members of our Congress now 
sitting, who are much pleased with your notes 
and preface, and have entertained a high and 
just esteem for their author. [Benjamin 
Franklin "Letter to Dumas" Philadelphia, 
December 19, 1775.] 

Thus, if we are to understand our First Organic Law, we 
must first have an understanding and mastery of the ele¬ 
mentary treatises on the Law of Nations. Selected excerpts 
from various writers on the subject follows: 


Part II: Samuel de Puffendorf "The Law of Nature and 
Nations," London -1729: 

"The Law of Nature and Nations" was written by Puffendorf 
and translated into French by Barbeyrac. The English tran¬ 
slation was made from the French by Basil Kennett for the 
1729 edition: 

Many Authors do farther rank under the Title 
of the Law Of Nations, several Customs mutually 
observ'd by tacit Consent, amongst most people 
pretending to civility; .... 

However, these Reasons not being general, 
cannot constitute any Law of an universal Ob¬ 
ligation. Especially since as to any Restraints 
which depend on tacit Agreement, it seems rea- 


- 94 - 




sonable that either Party should have the Lib¬ 
erty of absolving themselves from them; BY 
MAKING EXPRESS DECLARATION THAT THEY WILL BE 
HOIDEN BY THEM NO LONGER, AND THAT THEY DO NOT 
EXPECT TO REQUIRE THE OBSERVANCE OF THEM FROM 
OTHERS ... Neither have those Men any good 
reason of Complaint, who censure this Doctrine 
as a Notion by which the security, the Interest, 
and the Safety of Nations are robb'd of their 
surest Guards and Defence. For the Ensurance of 
these Advantages and Blessings doth not consist 
in the Practice of such mutual Favours, but in 
the Observance of the Law of Nature; a much more 
sacred Support; .... 

As for those persons who rank under the Law 
of Nations, the particular Compacts of two or 
more States, Concluded by Leagues and Treaties 
of Peace, to us their Notion appears very incon¬ 
gruous. For although the Law of Nature, in that 
part of it concerning the keeping of the Faith, 
doth oblige us to stand to such Agreements; yet 
the Agreements themselves cannot be call'd Laws, 
in any Propriety of Speech or of Sense .... 

Of all the Divisions of Natural Law, that 
seems to us most accurate and most convenient, 
which considers, in the first place, a Man's Be¬ 
haviour towards himself, and then towards other 
Men. Those Precepts of the Law of Nature which 
bear a Regard to other Men, may be again divided 
into Absolute and Hypothetical, or Conditional. 
The former are such as oblige all Men in all 
States and Conditions, independent from any 
human Settlement or institution. The latter 
presuppose some publick Forms and civil Methods 
of Living to have been already constituted and 
received in the world. Which distinction 
Grotius hath thus express'd in other Words; "The 
Law of Nature is concern'd, not only about such 
things as exist antecedent to human Will, but 
likewise about many things which follow upon 
seme Acts of that Will." .... 

Wherefore Man, in his Endeavours to fulfull 
the Laws of Society, to which he is by his 
Creator directed and designed, hath good Reason 
to inplpy his first Pains and Study on himself; 
since he will be able to discharge his Duty 
towards others with so much more Ease and Suc¬ 
cess, the more diligent he hath been in advanc¬ 
ing his own Perfection. Whereas he who is un¬ 
useful to himself, and idle in his proper Con- 


- 95 - 



cerns, can give other Men but little Reason to 
expect Advantage from his Pains .... 

Amongst the Opinions then which highly con¬ 
cerns all Men to settle and to embrace, the 
chief are those which relate to Almighty GOD, as 
the Great Creator and Governor of the Uni¬ 
verse... That this Eternal Being exercises a 
Sovereignty not only over the whole World, or 
over Mankind in general, but over every indi¬ 
vidual Human Person: Whose Knowledge nothing 
can escape: who, by virtue of his Imperial 
Right, hath enjoin'd Men such certain Duties by 
Natural Law, the Observance of which will meet 
with his Approbation, the Breach or the Neglect, 
with his Displeasure: And that he will for this 
Purpose require an exact Account from every Man, 
of his proceedings, without Corruption and with¬ 
out Partiality .... 

Nay, there are not wanting Persons, who from 
the Experience of Long Travels, pretend to af¬ 
firm, that Christianity hath not been able to 
alter the cannon dispositions of some Nation To¬ 
wards particular Vices; and that 'tis not easy 
to discover the Truth of that Holy Religion, 
from the Manners and Practices of those who 
profess it. Though I should imagine the Reason 
of that Unhappiness to be chiefly this, because 
the Christian Doctrine and Worship, being rece¬ 
ived by most Men, not upon their own Choice and 
Judgment, but from the Custom of the State in 
which they happen to be born, resides rather in 
their Mouth than in their Heart; .... 

To Self-Preservation, which not only the 
tenderest passion, but the exactest Reason 
recarmends to Mankind, belongs Self-Defense, or 
the warding off such Evils or Mischiefs as tend 
to our Hurt, when offer'd by other Men ... For 
the Obligation to the Exercise of the Laws of 
Nature and the Offices of Peace, is mutual, and 
binds all Men alike; neither hath Nature given 
any Person such distinct Privilege, as that he 
may break these Laws at his Pleasure, towards 
others, and the others be still oblig'd to main¬ 
tain the Peace towards him. But the Duty being 
mutual, the Peace ought to be mutually observ'd. 
And therefore when another, contrary to the 
Laws of Peace, attempts such things against me, 
as tend to my Destruction, it would be the high¬ 
est Impudence in him to require me at the same 
time to hold his Person as Sacred and Inviolate: 


- 96 - 




that is, To forego my own Safety, for the sake 
of letting him practice his Malice with Impun¬ 
ity. 

But Since in his Behaviour towards me he 
shows himself unsociable, and so renders himself 
unfit to receive from me the Duties of Peace, 
all my Care and Concern ought to be how to ef¬ 
fect my own Deliverance from his hands; which if 
I cannot accomplish without his Hurt, he may im¬ 
pute the Mischief to his own Wickedness, which 
put me under his Necessity. For otherwise, all 
the Goods which we enjoy either by the Gift of 
Nature, or by the Procurement of our own Indus¬ 
try, would have been granted us in vain, if it 
were unlawful for us to oppose those in a forc¬ 
ible manner, who unjustly invade them. And hon¬ 
est Men would be expos'd a ready Prey to Vil- 
lians, if they were never allow'd to make use of 
Violence in resisting their Attacks. So that 
upon the whole, to banish Self-defense though 
pursued by Force, would be so far from promoting 
the peace, that it would contribute to the Ruin 
and Destruction of Mankind. Nor is it to be im¬ 
agin'd that the Law of Nature, which was insti¬ 
tuted for a Man's Security in the World, should 
favour so absurd a Peace, as must necessarily 
cause his present Destruction, and would in 
fine, produce any Thing sooner than a sociable 
Life .... 

Since then Human Nature agrees equally to all 
Persons, and since no one can live a social Life 
with another, who does not own and respect him 
as a Man; it follows as a Command of the Law of 
Nature, that every Man esteem and treat another 
as one who is Naturally his Equal, or who is a 
Man as well as he .... 

The next office of Humanity mention'd by 
Grotius, is that we allow every Man the Privi¬ 
lege of procuring for himself, by Money, Work, 
exchange of Goods, or any other lawrful Contract, 
such things as contribute to the convenience of 
Life; and that we do not abridge him of his Lib¬ 
erty, either by any Civil Ordinance, or by any 
unlawful Combination, or Monopoly. For that as 
Trade and Commerce highly promote the Interest 
of all Nations, by supplying the unkindness of 
the Soil, which is not every where alike Fer¬ 
tile, and by making those Fruits seam to be born 
in all places of the World, which are to be 
found in any one: So it cannot be less than In- 


- 97 - 



humanity to deny any "Son of the Earth" the use 
of those good Things, which our cannon Mother 
affords for our support; provided our peculiar 
Right and Propriety be not injured by such a 
Favour .... 

If upon seme particular Reason we are unwil¬ 
ling to be obliged to a certain Person, in this 
Case it is lawful for us to refuse the Benefit 
he offers. But then great Care must be taken to 
do this without giving the least Suspicion of 
Contempt; since otherwise, to reject a voluntary 
Favour, carries in it a manifest Affront. 

When Men have once engaged themselves by 
Pacts, their Nature obliges them as sociable 
Creatures, most religiously to observe and per¬ 
form them. For were this Assurance wanting 
Mankind would lose a great part of that common 
Advantage, which continually arises from the 
mutual Intercourse of good Turns .... 

Take away Covenants, and you disable Men from 
being useful and assistant to each other.... 

WE ARE THEREFORE TO ESTEEM IT A MOST SACRED 
COMMAND OF TOE IAW OF NATURE, AND WHAT GUIDES 
AND GOVERNS, NOT ONLY TOE WHOLE METHOD AND OR¬ 
DER, BUT TOE WHOLE GRACE AND ORNAMENT OF HUMAN 
LIFE, THAT EVERY MAN KEEP HIS FAITH, OR WHICH 
AMOUNTS TO TOE SAME, THAT HE FULFILL HIS CON¬ 
TRACTS, AND DISCHARGE HIS PROMISES .... 

Prudence will advise us, that we rely not too 
on the bare Faith of others; but that we believe 
the Observations of all Compacts to be then best 
ascertain'd, when either they are grounded on 
the mutual Advantage of the parties, or when 
1 tis in our Power to force those with whom we 
treat, to be just and honest. But where Perfid¬ 
iousness is encouraged by Hopes of Profit, and 
not restrain'd by Fear of Punishment, there it 
were Madness to think, that bare Covenants 
should be able to warrant our safety .... 

To conclude: The last Dispute upon his Head 
commonly is, concerning the Excellency of par¬ 
ticular Forms of Government, and which ought to 
be preferr'd to another: whether that under 
which the pxiblik welfare may with more Expe¬ 
dition, and more Certainty be procured, or that 
where the Sovereign Authority is less exposed to 
Corruption and Abuse. Now as to the Point of 
Comparison, thus much in the first place is ev¬ 
ident, that no Frame of Civil Constitution can 
be so exactly model'd, and so well guarded by 


- 98 - 




Laws, but that either through the Negligence or 
the wickedness of those who bear Rule, the same 
Government which was instituted for the Security 
of the Subjects, may turn to their Prejudice and 
Mischief. The Reason of which is, because Gov¬ 
ernment was first establish'd as a Defence 
against those Evils, which Men cure capable of 
bringing on each other. But at the same time, 
they who were to be invested with this Gover¬ 
nment were likewise Men, and consequently not 
free from those Vices which are the Spurs to 
mutual Injury. [Samuel de Puffendorf, "The Law 
Of Nature And Nations," London - 1729] 

John Locke had the following bo say about the Law of 
Nature, and how it relates to societies, the individual and 
the Will of God: 

The Obligations of the Law of Nature, cease 
not in Society, but only in many Cases are drawn 
closer, and have by human Laws known Penalties 
annexed to them, to enforce their Observation. 

Thus the Law of Nature stands as the Eternal 
Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as others. 

The Rules that they make for other Men's Ac¬ 
tions, must, as well as their own, and other 
Men's Actions, be conformable to the Law of 
Nature, i.e., to the Will of God .... 

The Natural Liberty of Man is to be free from 
any superior Power on Earth, and not to be under 
the Will or legislative Authority of Man, but to 
have only the Law of Nature for his Rule. The 
Liberty of Man, in Society, is to be under no 
other legislative Power, but that established, 
by Consent, in the Commonwealth; nor under the 
dominion of any Will, or restraint of any Law, 
but what that Legislative shall enact, according 
to the Trust put in it ... This Freedom from ab¬ 
solute, arbitrary Power, is so necessary to, and 
closely joyned with a Man's Preservation; that 
he cannot part with it, but by what for- feits 
his Preservation and Life together. For a Man, 
not having the Power of his own Life, can- not, 
by Compact, or his own Consent, enslave himself 
to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, 
arbitrary Power of another, to take away his 
Life, when he pleases. NO body can give more 
Power than he has himself; and he that cannot 
take away his own Life, cannot give another 


- 99 - 



Power over it. [John Locke "Of Civil- 
Government" - 1689] 


Part III: Qnerich de Vattel "The Law of Nations or 
Principles of the Law of Nature" 

"The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature" 
was translated from the French and printed at Northhairpton, 
Massachussets in 1805: 

To establish on a solid foundation the obli¬ 
gations and laws of nations, is the design of 
this work. The Law of Nations is the Science of 
the Law subsisting between Nations and states, 
and of the obligations that flow from it .... 

IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE LAW OF NATURE, THAT 
ALL MEN BEING NATURALLY FREE AND INDEPENDENT, 

THEY CANNOT LOSE THOSE BLESSINGS WITHOUT THEIR 
OWN CONSENT. Citizens cannot enjoy than fully 
and absolutely in any state, because they have 
surrendered a part of these privileges to the 
sovereign. But the body of the nation, the 
state, remains absolutely free and independent 
with respect to all men, or to foreign nations, 
while it does not voluntarily submit to than. 

Men being subject to the laws of nature, and 
their union in civil society not being suffi¬ 
cient to free them from the obligation of obser¬ 
ving these laws, since by this union they do not 
cease to be men; the entire nation, whose cannon 
will is only the result of the united wills of 
the citizens, remains subject to the laws of na¬ 
ture, and is obliged to respect them in all its 
proceedings. And since the law arises from the 
obligation, as we have just observed, the nation 
has also the same laws that nature has given to 
men, for the performance of their duty. 

We must then apply to nations the rules of 
the law of nature, in order to discover what are 
their obligations, and what are their lavra; con¬ 
sequently the law of nations is originally no 
more than the law of nature applied to nations 
• • • 

we call that the necessary law of nations 
that consists in the application of the law of 
nature to nations. It is necessary, because 
nations are absolutely obliged to observe it - 
This law contains the precepts, prescribed by 
the law of nature to states, to whom that law is 


- 100 - 



not less obligatory than to individuals; because 
states are ccrnposed of man, their resolutions 
are taken by men, and the law of nature is ob¬ 
ligatory to all men, under whatever relation 
they act. This is the law Grotius, and those 
who follow him, call the internal law of na¬ 
tions, on account of its being obligatory to na¬ 
tions in point of conscience. Several term it 
the natural law of nations. 

Since the necessary law of nations consists 
in the application of the law of nature to 
states, and is immutable, as being founded on 
the nature of things, and in particular on the 
nature of man; it follows, that the necessary 
law of nations is immutable. 

This is the principle by which we may distin¬ 
guish lawful conventions or treaties, from those 
that are not lawful; and innocent and rationed 
customs from those that are unjust and censur¬ 
able ... ALL THE TREATIES AND ALL THE CUSTOMS 
CONTRARY TO WHAT THE NECESSARY IAW CF NATIONS 
PRESCRIBES, OR THAT ARE SUCH AS IT FORBIDS, ARE 
UNLAWFUL .... 

The first general law, which the very end of 
the society of nations discovers, is that each 
nation ought to contribute all in its power to 
the happiness and perfection of others. 

But the duty towards ourselves having incon- 
testibly the advantage over our duty with re¬ 
spect to others, a nation ought in the first 
place, preferably to all other considerations, 
to do whatever it can to prenote its own hap¬ 
piness and perfection. (I say whatever it can, 
not only physical, but in a moral sense, that 
is, what it can do lawfully, and consistently 
with justice and integrity.) When therefore it 
cannot contribute to the welfare of another, 
without doing an essential injury to itself, the 
obligation ceases on this particular occasion, 
and the nation is considered as under an impos¬ 
sibility of performing that office. 

Nations being free and independent of each 
other, in the same manner as men are naturally 
free and independent, the second general law of 
their society is that each nation ought to be 
left in the peaceable enjoyment of that liberty 
it has derived from nature. The natural society 
of nations cannot subsist if the rights each has 
received from nature, cure not respected. None 
would willingly renounce its liberty; it would 


- 101 - 



rather break off all commerce with those that 
should attempt to violate it. 

Frcm this liberty and independence it fol¬ 
lows, that every nation is to judge of what its 
conscience demands, of what it can or cannot do, 
of what is proper or improper to be done; and 
consequently to examine and determine whether it 
can perform any office for another, without be¬ 
ing wanting in what it owes itself. In all 
cases then, where a nation has the liberty of 
judging what its duty requires, another cannot 
oblige it to act in such a manner. For the at¬ 
tempting this would be doing an injury to the 
liberty of nations. 

A right to offer constraint to a free person, 
can only be invested in us, in such cases where 
that person is bound to perform seme particular 
thing for us, or from a particular reason that 
does not depend on his judgment; or, in a word, 
where we have a complete authority over him. 

In order to perfectly understand this, it is 
necessary to observe that the obligation, and 
the right correspondent to it, or flowing frcm 
it, is distinguished into external and internal. 
The obligation is internal, as it binds the 
conscience, and as it comprehends the rule of 
our duty: it is external, as it is considered 
relatively to other men, and as it produces seme 
right between them. Hie internal obligation is 
always the same in nature, though it varies in 
degree: but the external obligation is divided 
into perfect and imperfect, and the right that 
results frcm it is also perfect and imperfect. 
The perfect right is that to which is joined the 
right of constraining those who refuse to fulfil 
the obligation resulting from it; and the imper¬ 
fect right is that unaccompanied by this right 
of constraint. The perfect obligation is that 
which produces the right of constraint; the im¬ 
perfect gives another only the right to demand. 

It may new be comprehended without diffi¬ 
culty, why the right is always imperfect, when 
the obligation which it answers to it depends on 
the judgment of another. For in this case, was 
there a right of constraint, it would no longer 
depend on the other to resolve what ought to be 
done in order to obey the laws of conscience. 
Our obligation is always imperfect in relation 
to another, when the decision of what we have to 
do is reserved in ourselves, and this decision 


102 - 




is reserved to us on all occasions where we have 
a right to be free .... (See Figure IV-1) 



PERFECT 


IMPERFECT 


Accompanied by right of 
constraint. The perfect 
obligation produces the 
perfect right of 
constraining those who 
refuse to fulfill the 
obligation. The obligation 
arises from a decision 
reserved to ourselves, 
which is all cases where 
we have a right to be free. 


Unaccompanied by right of 
constraing. The imperfect 
obligation gives another 
only the right to demand. 
Obligation depends on the 
judgment of another. 


FIGURE IV-1 


Every one in fact pretends to have justice on 
his side in the differences that may arise, and 
neither one nor the other ought to interest 
itself in forming a judgment of the disputes of 
other nations. The nation that has acted wrong, 
has offended against its conscience; but as it 
may do whatever it has a right to perform, it 
cannot be accused of violating the laws of 
society .... 


The laws of natural society sure of such 
importance to the safety of all states, that if 
they accustom themselves to trample them under 
their feet, no people can flatter themselves 


- 103 ' 










with the hopes of self-preservation, and of 
enjoying tranquility at home, whatever wise, 
just and moderate measures they may pursue. 
[Emerich de Vattel, "The Law of Nations or 
Principles of the Law of Nature" - 1758.] 

As we have seen, Puffendorf treated the Law of Nature and 
the Law of Nations as one and the same in all respects. In 
the application to subjects thereof, we can substitute indi¬ 
viduals for nations, and vice-versa, in all cases. Vattel 
recognizes the cannon source, but distinguishes these laws 
by way of the nature of the subjects to which they are 
applied: 


But as the application of a rule cannot be 
just and reasonable, if it be not made in a 
manner suitable to the subject; we are not to 
believe that the law of nations is precisely, 
and in every case, the same as the law of na¬ 
ture, the subjects of them only excepted; so 
that we need only substitute nations for indi¬ 
viduals. A state or civil society is a subject 
very different from an individual of the human 
race; whence, in many cases, they follow, in 
virtue of the laws of nature themselves, very 
different obligations and rights; for the same 
general rule applied to two subjects cannot 
produce exactly the same decisions, when the 
subjects are different; since a particular rule 
that is very just with respect to one subject, 
is not applicable to another subject of a very 
different nature. There are then many cases in 
which the law of nature does not determine be¬ 
tween state and state, as it would between man 
and man. We must therefore know how to accom¬ 
odate the application of it to different sub¬ 
jects, and it is the art of applying it with 
justness founded on right reason, that renders 
the law of nations a distinct science. [vattel 
(supra)] 


On this subject, James Wilson, signer of the Declaration 
of Independence and Delegate from Pennsylvania to the Con¬ 
stitutional Convention subsequently wrote: 


Puffendorf thought that the law of nature and 
the law of nations were precisely the same, he 
has not, in his book on these subjects, treated 
of the law of nations separately, but has every¬ 
where joined it with the law of nature, properly 


- 104 - 




so called. His example has been followed by the 
greatest part of succeeding writers. But the 
imitation of it has produced a confusion of two 
objects, which ought to have been viewed and 
studied distinctly and apart. Though the law of 
nations, properly so called, be a part of the 
law of nature; though it spring from the same 
source; and though it is attended with the same 
obligatory power; yet it must be remembered that 
its application is made to very different 
objects. The law of nature is applied to 
individuals: the law of nations is applied to 
states. [James Wilson, "Study of Law in the 
United States", 1790-1791.] 

Vattel further distinguished aspects of the law of 
nations originating frc*n other sources than the natural or 
internal law of conscience. These he called the 
"conventional" and the "customary" branches of the law of 
nations, which were voluntary in nature as contra¬ 
distinguished from the internal law of conscience: (See 
Figure IV-2) 

The several engagements into which nations 
may enter, produce a new kind of the law of 
nations, called conventional or of treaties. As 
it is evident that a treaty binds only the 
contracting parties, the conventional law of 
nations is not an universal but a particular 
law. All that can be done on this subject in a 
treatise on the law of nations, is therefore to 
give the general rules that ought to be observed 
by nations in relation to their treaties. That 
the particulars of the different agreements, 
relate to what passes between certain nations; 
but the law and the obligations resulting from 
it, is matter of fact, and belongs to history. 

Certain maxims and customs consecrated by 
long use, and observed by nations between each 
other as a kind of law, form the Customary law 
of nations, or the custom of nations. This law 
is founded on tacit consent, or if you will, on 
a tacit convention of the nations that observe 
it with respect to each other. Whence it 
appears, that it is only binding to those 
nations that have adopted it, and that is not 
universal, any more than conventional laws .... 

... if that custom is in its own nature 
indifferent, and much more if it be a wise and 
useful one, it ought to be obligatory to all 
those nations who are considered as having given 


- 105 - 



THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 


LAW CF NATURE 


COMMON LAW 


LAW CF NATIONS 


The Natural, 
Internal, Law 
of Conscience, 
Universal and 
Founded in 
Nature 



GENERAL AND 
COMMON LAW CF 
NATIONS 


Natural Law. 
Universal and 
Pounded in 
Nature. 

Proceeds from 
General Consent 


CONVENTIONAL 

IAW OF NATIONS 

CUSTOMARY 

LAW OF NATIONS 

Arises from 
express consent 
e.g. Treaties 

NOT universal. 

But a 

Particular Law. 

Arises from 
tacit consent 
or tacit 
convention. 

NOT Universal, 
But a 

Particular Law. 


Binding on 
INDIVIDUALS 
obligatory 
with 

respect to 
conscience. 


Binding on all 

Binding on 

Binds those 

NATIONS 

contracting 

NATIONS 

obligatory 

parties 

that have 

with 

NATIONS 

adopted the 

respect to 


particular 

conscience. 


custom 
between 
each other. 


"But if that custom (or convention, or treaty) contains 
anything unjust or illegal, it is of no force; and every 
nation (or individual) is under an obligation to abandon it, 
nothing being able to oblige or permit a nation (or indi¬ 
vidual) to violate a natural law." Vattel 

FIGURE IV-2 


-106- 




















their consent to it. And they are bound to 
observe it with respect to each other, while 
they have not expressely declared that they will 
not adhere to it. But if that custom contains 
any thing unjust or illegal, it is of no force; 
and every nation is under an obligation to 
abandon it, nothing being able to oblige or 
permit a nation to violate a natural law. 

These three kinds of the law of nations, 
voluntary, conventional, and customary, together 
compose the positive law of nations. For they 
proceed from the volition of nations; the 
voluntary law, from their presumed consent; the 
conventional law, from an express consent; and 
the customary law, from a tacit consent: and as 
there can be no other manner of deducing any law 
from the will of nations, there are only these 
three kinds of the positive law of nations .... 

To give at present a general direction, in 
relation to the distinction between necessary 
and voluntary laws, we shall observe, that the 
necessary law being always obligatory with 
respect to conscience, a nation ought never to 
lose sight of it, when it deliberates on the 
part it is to take, in order to fulfil its duty; 
but when it is requisite to examine what it may 
require from other states, it ought to consult 
the voluntary law, the maxims of which are 
consecrated to the safety and advantage of 
universal society. [Vattel, supra] 

Proof that early members of our judiciary were students 
of Vattel is found in the 1796 Supreme Court case of Ware v. 
Hylton, et al: 

The law of nations may be considered of three 
kinds, to wit: general, conventional, or 
customary. The first is universal, or estab¬ 
lished by the general consent of mankind, and 
binds all nations. The second is founded on 
express consent, and is not universal, and only 
binds those nations who have consented to it. 

The third is founded on tacit consent; and is 
only obligatory on those nations who have 
adopted it. [ware. Administrator of Jones v. 
Hylton, et al (1796), 3 Dali. 197] 

Few, if any, of our present day legislators, attorneys, 
and Judges have mastered even the rudiments of the princi¬ 
ples of the Law of Nature and Nations; And this should give 


-107- 



us cause to pause. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution 
states: 


This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; 
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing 
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding. 

How is it possible to Legislate and Adjudicate laws "made 
in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties ... under the 
Authority" with intelligence and competence, while lacking 
knowledge of even the rudiments of these principles? 


Part IV: Physiocracy-The Rule of Nature: [A] 

The physiocrats were scientists of the natural order who 
embraced the principles of the Law of Nature and Nations. 
The natural order, they observed, was compulsory upon all 
living things, and worked to the happiness of man. It was 
superior to the artificial order, which was compulsory upon 
all persons agreeing to what Jean-Jacques Rousseau called 
the "Social Contract." 

First stated by Francois Quesnay in 1756, the Rule of 
Nature held that all social facts are linked together in the 
bonds of inevitable laws, and that individuals and 
governments would obey these laws if they only knew them. 
The physiocrats boldy declared that solutions to societal 
problems had always been at hand. All social relations 
between men, far from being haphazard and in need of 
management by government, are admirably regulated and 
controlled by nature. 

Physiocrat Dupont de Nemours wrote: 

There is a natural society whose existence is 
prior to every other human association. 

These self-evident principles, which might 
form the foundation of a perfect constitution, 
are also self-revealing. They are evident not 
only to the well-informed student, but also the 
simple savage as he issues from the lap of 
nature. 

Said Mercier de la Riviere: 

Property, security, and liberty constitute 


-108- 



the whole of the social order. 

ITS LAWS ARE IRREVOCABLE, PERTAINING AS THEY 
DO TO TOE ESSENCE OF MATTER AND TOE SOCJL OF 
HUMANITY. THEY ARE JUST THE EXPRESSION OF TOE 
WILL OF GOD ... All our interests, all our 
wishes, are focused on one point, making for 
harmony and universal happiness. We must regard 
this as the work of a kind providence, which 
desires that the earth should be peopled by 
happy human beings. 

The Physiocrats regarded private property to be the 
perfect product of the natural order and believed if 
artificial governments were removed, the natural order would 
resume its usual course at once. 

La Physiocrasie became popular in Europe, and many of the 
European royalty began auditing the physiocrats. Seme even 
attempted to convert their foedums into physiocracies, but 
they soon discovered that achieving natural order in their 
realms meant dissolving their hold and power over their 
subjects; an unacceptable proposition to those accustomed to 
ruling by way of the Civil Law. 

Francois Quesnay died in 1774, and soon thereafter, 
physiocratic literature ceased to be published on the 
continent of its origin. Even the word "physiocrat" was 
eliminated in schools and press and replaced with the word 
"economist" as Rousseau's doctrine of the "social contract" 
swept Europe, resulting in the socialization of the entire 
European continent under Reman Civil Law. 

Only one pupil of the Physiocrats was able to return to 
his country, dissolve the crown-servant bondage, and 
establish a nation based on the science of natural order. 
The Law of Nature and Nations, the self-evident laws of 
Nature and nature's God. TOAT PUPIL WAS THOMAS JEFFERSON! 
Architect of the Declaration of Independence! And contrary 
to the teachings of our "educators," the principles of law 
this nation was founded upon, did not ccme from England, but 
came from France. What was imported from England was a 
feudal system functioning under the Civil Law, a system 
imposed on England in the year 1066 by William the 
Conqueror, which rules that country to this day under the 
illusory and fictitious nomenclature of "the Carmon Law of 
England", and was transplanted within our system of 
jurisprudence under the same fictitious name. And so, "The 
constant ideological conflict" between these two systems of 
law continues down through the ages. 


-109- 



CHAPTER V 


THE COMPELLING REASONS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
Part Is National v. Federal 

As shown in the prologue, the major reasons for the 
constitutional convention were stated to be: 

... for the purpose of revising the Articles 
of Confederation and perpetual Union between the 
United States of America, and ... establishing 
in these states a firm National government. 

This "National" government was specifically established 
along side of, and in contradistinction to, a "Federal" 
government pursuant to the principles of the Law of Nature 
and Nations. In convention on June 8, 1787, James Wilson 
stated: 


Federal liberty is to States what civil lib¬ 
erty is to private individuals. And States are 
not more unwilling to purchase it, by the neces¬ 
sary concession of their political sovereignty, 
than the savage is to purchase civil liberty by 
the surrender of his personal sovereignty, which 
he enjoys in a State of nature. 

In this regard Madison said: 

It remained for the British Colonies, now 
United States of North America, to add to those 
examples, one of a more interesting character 
than any of them: which led to a system without 
a precedent ancient or modern, a system founded 
on popular rights, and so combining a federal 
form with the forms of individual Republics, as 
may enable each to supply the defects of the 
other and obtain the advantages of both. 
[Madison, Preface to the Debates in Convention 
of 1787.] 


Part II: The Malady of Paper Money 

In addition to establishing, "a firm National govern¬ 
ment," delegates to the convention recognized another pro¬ 
blem of paramount importance that required a revision to the 
Articles of Confederation; the problem was the "havoc" 
caused by paper money. When the constitutional convention 


-110- 




was convened in Philadelphia on May 14, 1787, Randolph, 

governor of Virginia, drew attention to paper money in his 
opening speech by reminding his hearers that the patriotic 
authors of the confederation did their work "In the infancy 
of the science of constitutions and confederacies, when the 
havoc of paper money had not been foreseen." [A] 

So, what provisions were made in the Constitution to 
solve this problem? The answer is in Article I, Section 8, 
and Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, but first a little 
background: Beginning as long ago as 1690, the colonies had 

periodically experimented with credit and unbacked paper as 
a form of public money. The documented effects of these 
experiments deserves our study and analysis: 

History Of The First Issue Of Bills Of Public Credit 
(Inflation) In The American Colonies From 1690 To 1755-6: 

Massachussets: 

Dec. 1690 - Issued "seven thousand pounds of printed 

bills of equal value with money." [A](1) 

my, 1691 - Issued thirty thousand pounds of printed 

bills. [A] (2) 

July, 1692 -Made "all" these "bills of public credit 
current within this province in all payments equivalent 
to money, excepting specialties and contracts made before 
the publication" of this new law. (Legal Tender Law) 
[A] (3) 

As a result, almost immediately all coin then in Massa¬ 
chusetts was exported to England and new stock followed as 
fast as it came in from abroad. Trade and cornierce declined 
and hard times came upon the people. 

Dec. 1697 - passed legislation prohibiting "the export of 
coin, silver money or bullion." [A](4) 

June, 1700 - Established a ccnxnittee to consider how to 
revive trade, and to find out some equitable medium to 
supply the scarcity of "money." [A](5) 

NOTE: The word "money" in all colonial legislation was used 
exclusively for gold and silver coin. 

Nov., 1702 -First issue of bills of credit of Massachu¬ 
setts after it became a royal province for ten thousand 
pounds, in value "equal to money." [A],(6) 

South Carolina: 


-111- 



May, 1703 - Enacted that not only its new emission of 
paper bills for six thousand pounds should be a "good 
payment and tender in law," but that whoever should 
refuse them should "forefeit double the value of bills so 
refused." For a short time, from June 1716, the fine was 
"treble the value." (Legal Tender Law) [A] (7) 

Great Britain: 

1709 - Made a sudden requisition on the American col¬ 
onies to aid in the conquest of the French possessions in 
North America. To meet this, all the New England colon¬ 
ies emitted paper bills, and the paper of each one of 
them found seme circulation in the others. 

New Hampshire: 

1709 - Original act by which New Hampshire emitted its 
first paper money was destroyed by fire; a supplemental 
act of the following year sears to show that they were 
left to find their own way into circulation. [A](8) 

Connecticut: 

June, 1709 - Made its first emission of bills for eight 
thousand pounds, soon followed by eleven thousand more 
which were to "to be in value equal to money, and to be 
accordingly accepted in all public payments." 

New York: 

Nov., 1709 - Had entered into the defense of its northern 
frontier and for the first time involved itself in the 
use of bills of credit. [A](9) 

Rhode Island: 

July, 1710 - First emitted bills of credit, declared them 
equal in value to "money," and made them receivable in 
all public payments. [A](10) 

Nov. 1711 - Discharged a claim by a loan of its bills of 
credit to the amount of three thousand pounds for four 
years, free of interest. [A] (11) 

South Carolina: 

July, 1712 - Gave a wider development of this new form of 
using paper. Its legislature, on the pretext of creating 
a fund to sink former bills of credit and to encourage 
trade and ccrtmerce, ordered fifty-two thousand pounds in 
new bills of credit to be stamped and put out at interest 
in loans. 

Massachussets: 


-112- 




1712 - The terms of issue of Massachussets, which was 
delayed until 1710, corresponded with those of Connecti¬ 
cut; but in 1712 the statute book complains that "money," 
which in those days meant only coin, "was not to be had"; 
and it was enacted that for any debt contracted within 
ten years after the last day of October, 1705, no debtor, 
after tendering payment of his full debt in lawful bills 
of credit on the province, should be disturbed in person 
or estate. 

The law punishing counterfeiters of its own bills was 
courteously extended to the bills of other New England 
colonies; but the emissions of one colony were never made a 
tender in any of the other. [A](12) 

The intercolonial circulation of each other's bills 
brought a new uncertainty in prices, for which the currency 
of each one of the four was steadily declining; it declined 
in each with unequal speed. 

Massachussets: 

Nov., 1714 - Ordered fifty thousand pounds to be let out 
by trustees of the inhabitants of the province for five 
years on real security at five pounds per cent per annum, 
to be paid back in five annual installments. [A] (13) 

The passion for borrowing spread like wildfire. The loan 
of bills of credit was managed at the seat of government. 
Rationalization went semething like this: Why should Boston 
be favored? "that the husbandry, fishery, and other trade 
of the province might be encouraged and promoted". [A](14). 

Massachussets: 

1716 - Bills of credit on the province to the amount of 
one hundred thousand pounds were ordered to be distrib¬ 
uted through a loan office in each county. 

More rationalization: But why should borrowers in the 
smaller townships be forced to travel to their shire town? 
Let a public moneylender be near every nan's door. 

Massachussets: 

March, 1721 - Fifty thousand pounds were distributed 
among borrowers in each several town according to its 
proportion in the last province tax. [A] (15) 

1728 - Again, sixty thousand pounds in bills of credit 
were proportionately loaned among the several towns. 
[A] (16) 


-113- 



Of course, "money" disappeared from the province of 
Massachussets. Not even a silver penny was to be had; the 
small change became of paper. [A](17) 

New Hanpshire: 

1717 - Remained one of the most cautious of the colonies 
but did issue fifteen thousand pounds of paper money by 
loans.[A](18) 

Connecticut: 

1718 - To prevent oppression by the rigorous exaction of 
"money" declared its bills of credit legal tender for 
debts contracted between the twelfth day of July, 1709, 
and the twelfth day of July, 1727. Hie time for the 
operation of this law was subsequently extended to 1735. 
(Legal Tender Law). [A](19) 

1733 - Loaned interest bearing bills for nearly fifty 
thousand pounds. May, 1740 - Issued thirty thousand 
pounds of a new tenor. [A](20) 

Pennsylvania: 

March, 1723 - Issued bills of credit for loans to 
individuals, and not only compelled creditors to receive 
the bills at par or "lose their debts," but ordered 
sellers to receive them at their nominal value in the 
sale of goods or lands or tenements, or "forfeit a sum 
from thirty shillings to fifty pounds." (Legal Tender 
Law). [A] (21) 

This law, so wrote Adam Smith, "bears the evident mark of 
a scheme of fraudulent debtors to cheat their creditors 


Maryland: 

1733 - Brought ninety thousand pounds in its bills of 
credit into circulation by loans at four percent. 

Hie next development of the colonial system of paper 
money was a partial repudiation and recognition of the evils 
of such a practice. The people of South Carolina had al¬ 
ready recorded their sense of mistake in the statute of the 
eleventh of December, 1717, in which they said: "It is 
found by experience that the multiplicity of the bills of 
credit hath been the cause of the ruin of our trade and 
commerce and hath been the great evil of this province, and 
that it ought with all expedition to be remedied." [A](22) 

On the ninth of January, 1739, the General Court of Mas¬ 
sachussets made this confession: "The emission of great 
quantities of bills of public credit without certain provis- 


-114- 




ion for their redemption by lawful money in convenient time, 
hath already stript us of all our money and brought them 
into contempt to the great scandal of the government; for 
the remedy thereof, this province hath fixed the value of 
their bills in lawful money and the time of their redemption 
in 1742." [A](23) 

But that year went by and relief had not been found. In 
1744, James Allen, the preacher of the annual election ser¬ 
mon addressed the governor from the pulpit thusly: 

Be the means of delivering us from the per¬ 
plexing difficulties we are involved in by an 
unhappy medium uncertain as the wind the land 
mourneth, and the cries of many cure going up 
into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth. [A] (24) 

In February, 1748, Massachussets invited the governors of 
Connecticut, New Hampshire and Rhode Island to join in 
abolishing the use of bills of credit; but as no one of the 
three gave effectual heed to the summons, the people of 
Massachussets proceeded alone. 

Massachussets: 

Jan. 1749 - Passed act redeeming the bills of the old 
tenor at the rate of 45 shillings, those of the new tenor 
at the rate of 11 shillings and 3 pence, for one Spanish 
silver dollar. Hie bills of credit of New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut were excluded by most 
stringent laws. [A](25) 

Massachussets, with its quickened industry and 
established credit, subsequently "sat as a queen among the 
provinces." 

Great Britain: 

Jan. , 1751 - Enacted that "no paper currency, or bills of 
credit of any kind issued in any of the said colonies or 
plantations, shall be a legal tender in payment of any 
private dues whatsoever within any of them." [A](26) 

"No law," wrote Adam Smith, "could be more equitable." 
[A](27) 

In his work, "A Caveat Against Injustice, or an Inquiry 
into the Evil Consequences of a Fluctuating Medium of 
Exchange." Roger Sherman, the great statesman frcm 
Connecticut, wrote the following in 1752: 


-115- 



Money ought to be something of certain value, 
it being that whereby other things are to be 
valued ... And this I would lay down as a prin¬ 
ciple that can't be denied, that a debtor ought 
not to pay any debts with less value than was 
contracted for, without the consent of or again¬ 
st the will of the creditor ... If what is used 
as a medium of exchange is fluctuating in its 
value, it is no better than unjust weights and 
measures, both which are condemned by the laws 
of God and man; and, therefore, the largest and 
most universal custom could never make the use 
of such a medium either lawful or reasonable ... 

But so long as we part with our most valuable 
commodities for such bills of credit as are no 
profit, we shall spend great part of our labor 
and substance for that which will not profit us; 
whereas if those things were reformed we might 
be as independent, flourishing and happy a col¬ 
ony as any in the British "dominions." [B] 

Paper Money (Inflation) In America From The Beginning of The 
Seven Years War To The Constitutional Convention Of The 
United States From 1755-6 To May, 1787: 

Connecticut: 

Nov., 1756 - Excluded the bills of paper money of Rhode 
Island and redeemed every nine shillings of its paper 
money with one shilling in specie. 

Virginia: 

April, 1757 - Involved in measures of rar from May, 1755, 
as a result of the establishment of a post by France at 
the junction of the rivers which form the Ohio, issued 
paper bills which from the beginning were made a lawful 
tender for private debts. It was further ordered that 
any seller who should demand more for his goods in notes 
than in gold or silver coin, should "forfeit twenty per 
cent of their value." (Legal Tender Law) [A](28) 

The treaty between England and France, which was ratified 
in the early part of 1763, left the middle and southern 
colonies under extreme embarrassment from their issue of 
paper. Massachussets had stood firm by the sole use of 
coin. Rhode Island put on its statute book: "Lawful money 
of this colony is, and shall hereafter be, silver and gold 
coin; and nothing else." [A](29) 

New Hampshire fixed 1771 as the limit for its paper, 
which in that year totally disappeared. [A] (30) 


-116- 




Connecticut went through the French war without issuing 
bills of credit; but in 1770 relapsed into the old abuse. 
[A](31) 

In 1770, New York passed an act emitting one hundred and 
twenty thousand pounds in bills of credit to be put out on 
loan. The King promptly gave it his negative, but it was 
successfully re-enacted in February of the following year. 
[A](32) 

The war for independence exhibited a new development of 
the system of credit by the reckless disregard of its 
bounds. Premises of money were scattered over the land 
alike by the states and by the united States, until "bills," 
to use the wards of John Adams, "became as plenty as oak 
leaves." The paper currency of the congress was printed in 
such exorbitant amounts that wages and prices skyrocketed, 
forcing the Legislature to enact harsh wage and price con¬ 
trols. When these failed, moral sounding laws reeking of 
piety and patriotism were enacted in an attempt to chain the 
people under pencilty of violence to the government's absurd 
money, such ass 

If any person shall hereafter be so lost to 
all virtue and regard for his Country as to re¬ 
fuse to accept its notes, such person shall be 
deemed an enemy of his Country. [C](l) 

The depreciation of paper currency relative to coin 
followed the same sickening course our paper currency fol¬ 
lows today. (Have you ever thought about the fact that a 
silver dime will buy as much, or more, gas today as it would 
forty or fifty years ago?) In 1779, the paper Continental 
Dollar depreciated from 8 to 1 to over 38 to 1 against the 
Spanish Milled Dollar. In January, 1781, these notes were 
redeemable 100 to 1. In May 1781, they ceased passing as 
currency and quietly died in the hands of their owners. 
Repeatedly, new series were issued, only to follow a similar 
pattern. [C](2) 

A contemporary of the Revolution, Peletiah Webster, 
records it this way: 

It ceased to pass as currency (in May, 1781), 
but was afterwards bought and sold as an article 
of speculation, at very uncertain and desultory 
prices, from 500 to one thousand to one. 

Paper money polluted the equity of our laws, 
turned them into engines of oppression, corrup- 
ted the justice of our public administration, 
destroyed the fortunes of thousands who had con¬ 
fidence in it, enervated the trade, husbandry. 


-117- 



and manufactures of our country, and went far to 
destroy the morality of our people. tC](3) 

Another contemporary writer, Breck, gives us this 
ridiculous aspect of inflation's effects in the 1780's: 

The annihilation was so complete that barber 
shops were papered in jest with the bills; and 
sailors, on returning from their cruises, being 
paid off in bundles of this worthless money, had 
suits of clothes made of it, and with character¬ 
istic light-heartedness turned their loss into a 
frolic by parading through the streets in decay¬ 
ed finery which in better days had passed for 
thousands of dollars. [C](4) 

Meanwhile, to continue with the saga of the state's 
folly: 

North Carolina: 

1780 - Directed the emission of more than a million 
pounds, and such further sums as the exigencies of the 
state might require. [A](33) 

1781 - Gave authority to issue twenty six and a quarter 
millions of paper dollars, being six per cent interest. 
[A] (34) 

Virginia: 

March, 1781 - Directed the emission of ten million 
pounds, and authorized five millions more. Made the 
continental paper and its cwn legal tender in discharge 
of all debts and contracts, except contracts which 
expressly premised the contrary. (Legal Tender Law) 
[A](35) 

The experience of the Revolution completed the instruc¬ 
tion of our fathers on the wastefulness and injustice of 
attempting to conduct affairs on the basis of paper prem¬ 
ises, indefinite as to their time of payment. In less than 
a month after the surrender of Cornwallis, Virginia enacted 
that the paper issues of the state shall, from the passing 
of this act, cease to be a tender in payment of debt. 
[A](36) 

South Carolina: 

Feb., 1782 - After declaring that "laws making bills of 
credit legal tender are found inconvenient," enacted 
"that from and after the passage of this act, no bill or 
bills of credit or paper currency whatever shall be con- 


-118- 





sidered, taken, or received as a legal tender, payment, 
or discharge of any debt, or demand whatsoever." [A] (37) 

Rhode Island: 

Nov., 1782 - Ordered all bills and notes to be brought 
into the treasury. They were struck out of circulation, 
and new notes, bearing interest, given in their stead. 
The increase of paper money in the state was arrested for 
the coming four years. [A] (38) 

Washington, in his circular letter of June, 1783, to the 
governors of the several United States wrote that "honesty 
will be found on every experiment to be the best and only 
true policy," being convinced that "arguments deduced from 
this topic could with pertinency and force be made use of 
against any attempt to procure a paper currency." [A](39) 

In June, 1783, Alexander Hamilton, in resolutions for a 
new constitution of the United States of America, set forth 
explicitly; "To emit an unfunded paper as the sign of value 
ought not to continue a formal part of the constitution, nor 
even hereafter to be enployed; being, in its nature, preg¬ 
nant with abuses, and liable to be made the engine of 
imposition and fraud; holding out temptation equally 
pernicious to the integrity of government and to the morals 
of the people." [A](40) 

These temptations were still being succumbed to in sane 
of the states at the time Hamilton made his observations: 

Pennsylvania: 

1783 - Issued three hundred thousand dollars in what is 
called treasury notes. 

1785 -Issued one hundred and fifty thousand pounds. 

North Carolina: 

1783 - Emitted one hundred thousand pounds. [A](41) 

1785 - Emitted one hundred thousand more. [A] (42) 

South Carolina: 

1785 - Lent among its constituents one hundred thousand 
pounds in paper bills of the state. [A](43) 

New York: 

1786 - placed an emission of two hundred thousand pounds 
in bills of credit with loan officers, to be loaned on 
mortgage security; and they were bo be made a legal 
tender in any suit for debt or damages, and the costs of 
the suit. The bills were further to be received at the 
port of New York by the state. (Legal Tender Law) [A] (44) 


-119- 



New jersey: 

1783 - Issued thirty-one and a quarter thousand pounds. 

In 1786, in New Jersey, an attempt was made to issue a 
larger amount. William Paterson, subsequently a member of 
our Supreme court, resisted the proposal with words as 
follows: 

An increase of paper money, especially if it 
be a tender, will destroy what little credit is 
left, will bewilder conscience in the mazes of 
dishonest speculation, will allure seme and con¬ 
strain others into the perpetration of knavish 
acts, will turn vice into a legal virtue, and 
sanctify iniquity by law. Men have, in the or¬ 
dinary transactions of life, temptations enough 
to lead them from the path of rectitude; why 
then pass laws for the purpose, or give legis¬ 
lative sanction to positive acts of iniquity? 

Lead us not into temptation is a part of our 
Lord's prayer, worthy of attention at all times, 
and especially at the present. [A](45) 

In the sunnier of 1785, Richard Henry Lee, then president 
of Congress, warned Washington of a plan for issuing a large 
sum of paper money in the next assembly of their state, 
adding as his opinion: 

The greatest foes in the world could not 
devise a more effectual plan for ruining Virgin¬ 
ia. I should suppose every friend to his coun¬ 
try, every honest and sober man, would join 
heartily to reprobate so nefarious a plan of 
speculation. [A](46) 

Washington answered in August: 

I have never heard, and hope never shall hear 
any serious mention of a paper emission in this 
state. Yet ignorance is the tool of design, and 
often set to work suddenly and unexpectedly. 

[A](47) 

In the same year, George Mason wrote: 

They may pass a law to issue paper money, but 
twenty laws will not make the people receive it. 

Paper money is founded upon fraud and knavery. 

[A](48) 


-120- 





On the first of August, 1786, Washington wrote to 
Jefferson: 

Other states are falling into very foolish 
and wicked plans of emitting paper money. 

[A](49) 

Later in the year the proposal to issue paper money was 
brought up in the house of delegates of Virginia. Madison 
spoke as follows: 

Paper money is unjust; to creditors, if a 
legal tender; to debtors, if not a legal tender, 
by increasing the difficulty of getting specie. 

It is unconstitutional, for it affects the right 
of property as much as taking every equal value 
in land. It is pernicious, destroying confi¬ 
dence between individuals, discouraging com¬ 
merce, enriching sharpers, vitiating morals, 
reversing the end of government, conspiring with 
the examples of other states to disgrace repub¬ 
lican governments in the eyes of mankind.[A](50) 

To Jabez Bowen, of Rhode Island, Washington wrote on the 
9th of January, 1787: 

Paper money has had the effect in your state 
that it will ever have, to ruin centnerce, op¬ 
press the honest, and open the door to every 
species of fraud and injustice. [A](51) 

Stone, a member of the senate of Maryland, appealed to 
Washington to allow his opinion on the case as it stood in 
Maryland to be publically known. Just three months before 
the opening of the constitutional convention in Philadel¬ 
phia. Washington answered: 

I do not scruple to declare, that if I had a 
voice in your legislature, it would have been 
given decidedly against a paper emission upon 
the general principles of its utility as a rep¬ 
resentative, and the necessity of it as a medium 
... The wisdom of man, in my humble opinion, 
cannot at this time devise a plan, by which the 
credit of paper money would be long supported; 
consequently depreciation keeps pace with the 
quantity of emission, and articles for which it 
is exchanged rise in a greater ratio than the 
sink- ing value of the money. Wherein, then, is 


-121- 



the fanner, the planter, the artisan benefited? 

An evil equally great is, the door it 
inmediately opens for speculation, by which the 
least de- signing, and perhaps most valuable, 
part of the ccmnunity are preyed upon by the 
more knowing and crafty speculators. [A](52) 

Across the whole country its best men were seeking 
remedies for what Madison called "the epidemic malady of 
paper money". Among the evils for which the new constitu¬ 
tion should provide a remedy, Madison enumerated the "fam¬ 
iliar violation of contracts in the form of depreciated 
paper made a legal tender". [A](53). In his notes for his 
own guidance in the federal convention he laid down the 
principle that: "paper money may be deemed an aggression on 
the rights of other states". [A](54). Just five weeks be¬ 
fore the time for the meeting of the convention, he wrote 
from congress in New York to Edmond Randolph: "There has 
been no moment since the peace, at which the federal assent 
would have been given to paper money." [A](55) 

These were strong statements and opinions expressed by 
renowned statesmen and individuals who subsequently had a 
decisive input into the writing of the United States Consti¬ 
tution. It appears, that after many experiments with paper 
(artificial money), these thinkers had finally connected the 
elusive cause and effect relationship of inflation; i.e. 
the cause being compelled acceptance of artificial money via 
Legal Tender Laws and the effects, in the extreme, as fol¬ 
lows: 


Blood running in the streets. Mobs of rioters 
and demonstrators threatening banks and legisla¬ 
tures. Looting of shop and home. Credit ruin¬ 
ed. Strikes and unemployment. Trade and dis¬ 
tribution paralized. Shortages of food. Bank¬ 
ruptcies everywhere. Court dockets overloaded. 
Kidnappings for heavy ransom. Sexual perver¬ 
sion, drunkenness, lawlessness rampant .... [C] 
p.ll 

Washington wrote to Madison in 1786: 

The wheels of government are clogged, and we 
are descending into the vale of confusion and 
darkness. No day was ever more clouded than the 
present. We are fast verging to anarchy and 
confusion. [C](5) 

to February 3, 1787, Washington wrote to Henry Knox: 


-122- 




If any person had told me that there would 
have been such a formidable rebellion as exists, 

I would have thought him fit for a madhouse. 

EC](5) 

The Constitutional Convention, Philadelphia, May 14th To 
September 17th, 1787: 

The convention was organzied by electing George Wash¬ 
ington as its president. Randoplh, governor of Virginia, 
drew attention to paper money in his opening speech by re¬ 
minding his hearers that the patriotic authors of the con¬ 
federation did their work, "in the infancy of the science of 
constitutions and of confederacies, when the havoc of paper 
money had not been foreseen." [A](56) 

The eighth clause of the seventh article, in the first 
draft of the constitution, was as follows: 

The legislature of the United States shall 
have the power to borrow money and emit bills on 
the credit of the United States. 

In convention, August 16th, the following discussion and 
action occurred - as documented by James Madison: [D] pp. 
556, 557. 


MR. GOVERNOUR MORRIS moved to strike out "and 
emit bills on the credit of the United States" - 
If the United States has credit such bills would 
be unnecessary: if they had not, unjust and 
useless. 

MR. BUTLER, seconded the motion. 

MR. MADISON, will it not be sufficient to 
prohibit the making of them a tender? This will 
remove the temptation to emit them with unjust 
views. And promissory notes in that shape may 
in seme emergencies be best. 

MR. GOVERNOR MORRIS, striking out the words 
will leave room still for notes of a responsible 
minister which will do all the good without the 
mischief. The monied interest will oppose the 
plan of Government, if paper emissions be not 
prohibited. 

MR. GHCJRUM was for striking out, without in¬ 
serting any prohibition. if the words stand 
they may suggest and lead to the measure. 


-123- 



COL. MASON had doubts on the subject. Con¬ 
gress he thought would not have the power unless 
it were expressed. Though he had a mortal hat¬ 
red of paper money, yet he could not forsee all 
emergencies, he was unwilling to tie the hands 
of the Legislature. He observed that the late 
war could not have been carried on, had such a 
prohibition existed. 

MR. GHORUM. The power as far as it will be 
necessary or safe, is involved in that of bor¬ 
rowing. 

MR. MERCER was a friend to paper money, 
though in the present state & temper of America, 
he should neither propose nor approve such a 
measure. He was consequently opposed to a pro¬ 
hibition of it altogether. It will stamp sus¬ 
picion on the Government to deny it a discretion 
on this point. It was impolitic also to excite 
the opposition of all those who were friends to 
papier money. The people of property would be 
sure to be on the side of the plan, and it was 
impolitic to purchase their attachment with the 
loss of the opposite class of Citizens. 

MR. ELSEWORTH thought this a favorable moment 
to shut and bar the door against papier money. 
The mischiefs of the various experiments which 
had been made, were now fresh in the public mind 
and had excited the disgust of all the 
respectable part of America. By with- holding 
the power from the new government more friends 
of influence would be gained to it than by 
almost anything else. Paper money can in no 
case be necessary. Give the Government credit, 
and other resources will offer. The power may 
do harm, never good. 

MR. RANDOLPH. Notwithstanding his antipathy 
to paper money, could not agree to strike out 
the words, as he could not forsee all the oc¬ 
casions which might arise. 

MR. WILSON. It will have a most salutary 
influence on the credit of the United States to 
remove the possibility of paper money. This 
expedient can never succeed whilst its mischiefs 


-124- 




are remembered, and as long as it can be resort¬ 
ed to, it will be a bar to other resources. 

MR. BUTLER. Remarked that paper vras a legal 
tender in no Country in Europe. He was urgent 
for disarming the Government of such a power. 

MR. MASON was still averse to tying the hands 
of the Legislature altogether, if there was no 
example in Europe as just remarked, it might be 
observed on the other side, that there was none 
in which the Government was restrained on this 
head. 

MR. READ, thought the words, if not struck 
out, would be as alarming as the Mark of the 
Beast in Revelations. 

MR. IANGDON had rather reject the whole plan 
than retain the three words "(and emit bills)" 

On the motion for striking out: N.H. ay Mas. 
ay Ct. ay N.J. no Pa. ay Del. ay Md. no va. ay 
N.C. ay S.C. ay Geo. ay. 

The clause for borrowing money, agreed to nem 
con. 

So the convention, by a vote of 9 to 2, refused to grant 
the legislature of the United States the power "to emit 
bills on the credit of the united States." Madison wrote: 
"Striking out the words cut off the pretext for a paper 
currency, and particularly for making the bills a tender 
either for public or private debts." [A](57) 

By refusing to the United States the power of issuing 
bills of credit, the door was shut, but not barred, on paper 
money by constitutional law. Although Congress was not au¬ 
thorized to issue notes of the United States, the borrowing 
clause, thought absolutely necessary for anergencies, left 
an easy out for friends of paper money to borrow notes of 
another entity into circulation. For example, notes of a 
private banking corporation, on the credit of the united 
States. The result of the above action appears in Article 
I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution: 

The Congress shall have power ... to borrow 
money on the credit of the United States; ... to 
coin money, regulate the Value thereof, and of 
foreign coin, and Fix the Standard of weights 
and Measures. 


-125- 



The first draft of the constitution had forbidden the 
states to emit bills of credit without the consent of the 
legislature of the united States; in convention on the 28th 
of August, the following discussion occurred: [D] pp. 627, 
628. 

MR. WILSON & MR. SHERMAN moved to insert 
after the words "coin money" the words "nor emit 
bills of credit, nor make any thing but gold & 
silver coin a tender in payement of debts" mak¬ 
ing these prohibitions absolute; instead of 
making the measures allowable (as in the XIII 
art:) with the consent of the Legislature of the 
U. S.. 


MR. GHORUM thought the purpose would be as 
well secured by the provision of art: XIII which 
makes the consent of the Gen Legislature neces¬ 
sary, and in that mode, no opposition would be 
excited; whereas an absolute prohibition of pa¬ 
per money would rouse the most desperate opposi¬ 
tion from its partisans. 

MR. SHERMAN thought this a favorable crisis 
for crushing paper money, if the consent of the 
Legislature could authorize emissions of it, the 
friends of paper money, would make every exer¬ 
tion to get into the Legislature in order to li¬ 
cense it. 

The question being divided; on the 1st part - 
"nor emit bills of credit" N.H. ay Mas. ay Ct. 
ay Pa. ay Del. ay Md. divided Va. no N.C. ay 
S.C. ay Geo. ay. 

The remaining part of Mr. Wilson's & Mr. 
Sherman's motion vras agreed to nem con: 

The result of this action appears in Article I, Section 
10, Clause 1, of the united States Constitution. Its most 
salient feature is "NO State shall make any thing but gold 
and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; ...." meaning 
that no State has authority and jurisdiction to compel any 
citizen to pay a debt with any thing but gold and silver 
coin, regulated in value by Congress pursuant to its author¬ 
ity found in Article I, Section 8. 

The Miracle Of A Stable Monetary Standard: 

After the constitutional convention, it book nearly a 
year for the states to ratify the Constitution and then 


- 126 - 



another to set up the new government. The most immediate 
relief brought about by the Constitution was economic. The 
cause of this economic relief was Article I, Section 10, 
prohibiting the states from enforcing payment in anything 
but gold and silver coin. Citizens could use anything they 
wanted as a medium of exchange between themselves, but when 
it came to the state's participation in anyone's economic 
life, such as enforcing fines, taxes, judgements, etc., the 
medium had to be gold and silver coin. 

The results (effects) were literally astounding: 

June 3, 1790, Washington wrote to the Marquis de 

LaFayette; 

You have doubtless been informed, from time 
to time, of the happy progress of our affairs. 

The principle difficulties seem in a great mea¬ 
sure to have been surmounted. Our revenues have 
been considerable more productive than it was 
imagined they would be. I mention this to show 
the spirit of enter- prise that prevails. 

[C](6) 

The December 16, 1789, edition of the Pennsylvania 

Gazette exclaimed; 

Since the federal constitution has removed 
all danger of our having a paper tender, our 
trade is advanced fifty percent. 

March 19, 1791, Washington again wrote to LaFayette; 

Our country, my dear sir, is fast progressing 
in its political importance and social happi¬ 
ness. [C](7) 

July 19, 1791, Washington wrote bo Catherine Macaulay; 

The united States enjoys a sense of 
prosperity and tranquillity under the new 
government that could hardly have been hoped 
for. [C](8) 

July 20, 1791, Washington wrote to David Humphreys; 

Tranquillity reigns among the people with the 
disposition towards the general government which 
is likely to preserve it. Our public credit 
stands on that high ground which three years ago 


- 127 - 



it would have been considered as a species of 
madness to have foretold. [C](9) 

Thus, the compelling need for the constitutional 
convention was to establish a government in pursuance of our 
First Organic Law - The Declaration of Independence. The 
Principles of which are founded in the Law of Nature and 
Nations. This required: (1) A totally new experiment in 
the history of formally established governments. As Madison 
said, "There being no technical or appropriate denomination 
applicable to the new and unique System, the term 'National' 
was used with a confidence that it would not be taken in a 
wrong sense"; and (2) A stable monetary standard devoid of 
paper money having the effect "it will always have, to ruin 
ccttmerce, oppress the honest, ... open the door to every 
species of fraud and injustice," and pollute the equity of 
our laws, turning them into "engines of oppression." 


- 128 - 



CHAPTER VI 


THE ADMIRAL GOES TO WORK 


Part I: Development Of The Approach (1797-1825) [A] 

Almost before the ink was dry on the Constitution, 
mercantile interests were busily at work to~subvert the new 
"National" Constitution and subject the inhabitants of the 
United States of America, once again, to a federal/feudal 
system under the jurisdiction of Admiralty/Maritime. On 
September 1, 1797, Thcmas Jefferson wrote to Colonal Arthur 
Campbell: 


It is true that a party has come up among us 
which is endeavoring to separate us from all 
friendly connection with France, to unite our 
destinies with those of Great Britain, and to 
assimilate our government to theirs. Ourlenity 
In permitting the return of the old tories, gave 
the first body to this party; they have been in¬ 
creased by large importations of British mer¬ 
chants and factors, by American merchants deal¬ 
ing on British capital, and by stock dealers and 
banking companies, who by the aid of a ipaper 
system, are enriching themselves to the ruin of 
our country and SWAYING THE GOVERIsMENT BY THEIR 
POSSESSION OF THE PRINTING PRESSES. AND OTHER 
MEANS not always honorable to the character of 
our countrymen. 

On December 19, 1801, Jefferson wrote to John Dickerson: 

The federalists have retired into the judi- 
‘ciary as a stronghold. There the remains of 
fed- eralism are to be preserved and fed from 
the treasury, and from that battery, all the 
wnrks of rgmiblicanis m are to be beaten down and 
eras- ed. By a fraudulent use of the Constitu¬ 
tion, which has made judges irremovable, they 
have multiplied useless judges merely to 
strengthen their phalanx. 

And on October 10, 1802, Jefferson wrote to Robert 

Livingston: 

THE FEDERALISTS SAY WE LIED THEM OUT OF POW- 

_ffiu_ AND OPENLY AVCW THEY WILL DO THE SAME TO US, 

But it was no lies or arguements on their part 


- 129 - 































which dethroned them, but their own foolish 
acts, sedition laws, taxes, extravagences and 
heresies. Every decent man among them revolts . 
at their filth ... 


The semi-direct approach failed miserable and the 
federalists resorted to lies and total deception as 
promised. On April 16, 1804, Jefferson wrote to Gideon 
Granger: 


The federalists know, that eo ncmine they are 
gone forever. Their object, therefore, is how 
to return to power under some other form. ' un- 
doubtedly, they have but one means, which is to 
divide the republicans, join the minority, and 
barter with them for the cloak of their name ... 
f The minority, having no other means of ruling 

the majority, will give a price for auxiliaries, 
and that price must be principle. THUS A 
BASTARD SYSTEM OF FEDEHCHREPUBLICAN!SM WILL RISE , 
ON THE RUINS OF THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF OUR 
REVOLUTION. 


On January 20, 1809, Jefferson wrote to Washington Boyd: 

... These elements of explanation, history 
cannot fail of putting together in recording the 
crime of combining with the oppressors of the 
earth to extinguish the last spark of human 
hope, that here, at length, will be preserved a 
model of government securing to man his rights 
and the fruits of his labor, by an organization 
constantly subject to his own will. 

The crime indeed, if accomplished would 
immortalize its perpetrators and their names 
would descend in history with those of Robes¬ 
pierre and his associates, as the guardian genii 
of despotian, and demons of human liberty. I do 
not mean to say that all who are acting with 
these men are under the same motive. I know 
sane of them personally to be incapable of it. 

Nor was that the case with the disorganizers and 
assassins of Paris. Delusions there, and party 
perversions here, furnish unconscious assistants 
to the hired actors in these atrocious scenes 


Jefferson to General Henry Dearborn, August 14, 1811: 


- 130 - 




Backed by England, they (the federalists) 
never lose hope that their day is to ccme when 
the terrorist! of their earlier power is to be 
merged in the more gratifying systems of 
deportation and the guillotine. 

Jefferson to william Johnson, June 6, 1823: 

... The original objects of the federalists 
were, 1st, to warp our government more to the 
form and principles of monarchy, and 2d, TO 
WEAKEN THE BARRIERS OF STATE GOVEREMENT AS 
COORDINATE POWERS. In the first they have been 
so completely foiled by the universal spirit of 
the nation, that they have abandoned the enter¬ 
prise, shrunk from the odium of their old appel¬ 
lation, taken to themselves a participation of 
ours, and under the psuedo-republican mask, are 
now aiming at their second object, and strength¬ 
ened by unsuspecting or apostate recruits from 
our ranks, are advancing fast towards an ascend¬ 
ency .... 

Jefferson to Samuel H. Smith, 1823: 

The federalists in their schemes to monar- 

chise us, have given up their name ... taken 
shelter among us under our own name. But they 
have only changed the point of attack. On every 
question of the usurpation of State powers by 
the foreign General Government, the same men 
rally together, force the line of demarcation; 
and consolidate our government. The judges are 
at their head as heretofore, and are their en¬ 
tering wedge .... 

Jefferson to william Short, January 8, 1825: 

Monarchy, to be sure, is now defeated, and 
they wish it should be forgotten that it was 
ever advocated. They see that it is desperate, 
and treat its imputation to them as a calumny; 
and I verily believe that none of them have it 
new in direct aim. 

Yet the spirit is not done away. The same 
party takes new what they deem to be the next 
best ground, THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE GOVERN¬ 
MENT, by unlimited constructions of the Consti¬ 
tution, A CONTROL OVER ALL TOE FUNCTIONS OF TOE 


- 131 - 



STATES, AND CONCENTRATION OF ALL POWER ULTI¬ 
MATELY IN WASHINGTON. 

Thus, Jefferson identified the objectives and general 
plan for the ccnmission of high crimes against the American 
people, and against humanity itself, by mercantile interests 
"the guardian genii of despotism, and demons of humanity." 
These crimes were to be accomplished via fraudulent use of 
the Constitution, lies and subterfuge, with the assistance 
of recruits from our own ranks (dupes and pawns in the 
game). 


Part II: Laying The Groundwork (1851-1913) 

\Limited Liability Act (1851): 

On March 3, 1851, Congress enacted the Limited Liability 
Act (Codified at 46 USC 181-189). The purpose of this Act 
was to limit the liability for the payment of debts of 
persons who were ship owners involved in Maritime Commerce. 
This act was the result of a u.S. Supreme Court decision 
titled The New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. vs. The Merchants 
Bank, 6 Howard 342 (1848). 

In the New Jersey steam Navigation case, the high court 
ruled that under the Cannon Law, if a party were to ship 
goods on board a ship and something happened to the goods 
such as being destroyed or damaged by the perils of the sea, 
the ship owner was responsible to the owner of the goods. 
The ship owner must pay to the owner of the goods the amount 
the goods were worth, if the ship owner did not pay the 
debt, the owner of the goods could sue the ship owner and 
collect. If the ship owner failed to pay, the creditor 
could then file a lien on the ship, which does not require 
possession of the object, called a maritime lien. This Act 
specifically gives limited liability on shipments of "bills 
of any bank or public body." 

The Congress decided, in 1851, that as a result of the 
New Jersey steam Navigation case, persons would no longer be 
drawn into ownership of ships because of the liability in¬ 
volved. Shipping on the high seas is very risky, and was 
especially so at that period in time. 

After the Limited Liability Act was enacted, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in the case of Butler vs. Boston & Savannah 
Steamship Co., 130 U.S. 527 (1889), ruled as follows: 

But it is enough to say that the rule of lim¬ 
ited responsibility is new our maritime rule. 

It is the rule by which through the Act of Con¬ 
gress we have announced that we propose to ad- 


- 132 - 




minister justice in maritime cases. The rule of 
limited liability prescribed by the Act of 1851 
is nothing more than the old maritime rule ad¬ 
ministered in courts of admiralty in all 
countries except England from time inmemorial 
and if this were not so, THE SUBJECT MATTER 
ITSELF IS 0® THAT BELONGS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF 
MARITIME LAW. 

\ The Fourteenth Amendment (1868): 

Since federalism mist function within the jurisdiction of 
Civil Law and a federal government (the crown) must have 
subjects in order to exist and flourish, a subject popu¬ 
lation had to be created in the United States. Those 
sovereign individuals running about, minding their cwn 
business, had somehow, to be induced to ccme aboard the 
federal ship-of-state. 

One of the foremost preliminary steps in accomplishing 
this objective was the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti¬ 
tution of the United States of America. Proposed by reso¬ 
lution on June 13, 1866; ratified July 9, 1868; certified 
July 29, 1868, this Amendment stated: 

All persons born or naturalized in the united 
States, AND SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION THEREOF, 
are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. . . 

Article IV, Section 2, of the "National" Constitution 
acknowledges only state citizenship. Now ccmes the Four¬ 
teenth Amendment, stated in a way that conceals its real 
consequences. Those consequences are: If you are born or 
naturalized in the United States, you can have United States 
citizenship if you will subject yourself to the jurisdiction 
of the United States federal government! 

The distinction between citizenship of the United States 
and citizenship of a State is here clearly recognized and 
established. 


Not only may a man be a citizen of the United 
States without being a citizen of a State, but 
an important element is necessary to convert the 
former into the latter. He must reside within 
the state to make him a citizen of it, but it is 
only necessary that he should be born or natura¬ 
lized in the united States to be a citizen of 
the Union. It is quite clear, then, that there 
is a citizenship of the United States, and a 
citizenship of a State, which are distinct from 


- 133 - 






each other, and which depend upon different 
characteristics or circumstances in the indi¬ 
vidual. [Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 74 
(1873).] 

While the amendment did not create a national 
citizenship it has the effect of making that 
citizenship "paramount and dominant" instead of 
"derivative and dependant" upon State citizen¬ 
ship. [Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 427 
(1935).] 

So, how does a sovereign individual become subject to the 
jurisdiction of the federal government? One way is to vi¬ 
olate a law that the government is authorized, and granted 
jurisdiction, to prosecute (treason, counterfeiting and 
crimes against the Law of Nations); another way is to be in 
its employ; the third my, least known and understood by 
trusting inhabitants of the various states, is by applying 
for its privileges and/or partaking of its benefits. 

THE PHRASE "SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION" 
RELATES TO TIME OF BIRTH, and one not owing 
ALLEGIANCE AT BIRTH cannot become a citizen save 
by subsequent naturalization, individually or 
collectively. The words do not mean merely 
geographical location, but "COMPLETELY SUBJECT 
TO THE POLITICAL JURISDICTION." [Elk v. Wilk¬ 
ins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884), holding that an 
Indian born within the United States in a rec¬ 
ognized tribe, although he surrender his tribal 
relations, if that SURRENDER is not accepted by 
the United States, does not become a citizen of 
the united States by virtue of the first sent¬ 
ence of the 14th Amendment.] 

With incredible success, the federal pied pipers 
subsequently played their tune, "Something for Nothing" 
until the shipmates were firmly bound to the ship by their 
feudal bonds. 

S. 

Tontine Insurance (1868 - ? ) [B] 

In order to evade the usuary laws which had prevented the 
growth of a funded system of national insurance, governments 
had frequently resorted to the issue of annuities and child 
endowments as a means of raising funds. The tontine was a 
somewhat later development, having been put into operation 
in France during the year 1689. It took its name from its 
originator, Lorenzo Tonti, a Neopolitan by birth, who was 


- 134 - 



attracted to Paris by the regime of Mazarin. In its orig¬ 
inal form the tontine was a loan in which the premium was 
never to be repaid, but the entire interest on the loan was 
to be divided each year among the survivors or the original 
subscribers. The chief characteristic, and trademark, of 
the tontine is the pool of assets that is divided among the 
survivors at the options of those subscribers who dropped 
out, or did not survive until the time for distribution had 
arrived. The Equitable Life Insurance Company, in 1868, 
introduced the deferred dividend system, which was really an 
application of the tontine principle. The most serious flaw 
in the deferred dividend system was the inability of the 
insured to ccnpel an accounting. The general rule is the 
policy holder is not entitled to carpel the carrpany to 
account for dividends. Nor can the policy holder "carpel 
the distribution of the surplus fund in other manner car at 
any time, or in any other amounts than that provided for in 
the contract." 

As stated in the report of the Armstrong Committee, "the 
plan of deferring dividends for long periods...has undoubt¬ 
edly facilitated large accumulations, providing apparently 
abundant means for doubtful uses on the one hand, while 
concealing on the other the burden imposed upon the policy 
holders..." [B](l). According to George L. Armhein, 
Instructor in Insurance at the University of pennyslvania, 

... deferred dividends were prohibited by law 
in the legislation (Pa.) of 1906 and subsequent 
years. Thus came to an end a system which in 
1898 had superseded to a very large extent that 
of annual dividends, and which in 1915 seemed 
antiquated. [B](2). 

Qiestion: What made it "antiquated" in 1915? According to 
Mr. Armhein, it was outlawed in 1906 but did not seem 
antiquated until 19151 

John K. Tarbox, The Ccnmissioner of Insurance for the 
State of Massachusetts had this to say about tontine in his 
annual report: 

The false idea of life insurance as invest¬ 
ment begat the equally false conception of life 
insurance as a bet, and the latter gave birth to 
the modern tontine, which is a wager. 

... In the tontine the forefeitures go to 
enrich the individual survivors of the special 
class of policy holders who enter the compact, 
constituting a company liability instead of a 
company asset, for the protection of its policy 
obligations ... The stake played for, rather 


- 135 - 



than the game itself constitutes the chief of¬ 
fense. Our law condemns, forbids, and makes 
void the contract of forefeiture. 

As was truly testified before the ccrrmittee 
of the New York assembly, in 1877, ... the ton¬ 
tine policy is taken for purposes of investment 
by a set of men who would not insure their lives 
at all The inducement to the investment is ... 
the expected profits from forefeitures .... 

Aside from the moral quality of the matter, 

- concerning which I waive controversy, - the 
considerations which the public aspect seems to 
me principally to invite are these: First, 
whether it is prudent to make of our insurance 
companies great banking establishments. ... and, 
second, whether an institution organized as the 
life insurance system was, for a benevolent and 
unselfish use, shall be combined with enter¬ 
prises of selfish speculation as the tontine 
undeniably is. 

I AM STRONGLY PERSUADED OF THE IMPOLICY AND 
POSITIVE DANGER OF MAGNIFYING THE BANKING FEA¬ 
TURE OF LIFE INSURANCE INSTITUTIONS, TO AC¬ 
COMODATE MODERN PLANS OF TONTINE SPECULATION AND 
ENDOWMENT INVESTMENT. [B](3). 

John Tarbox was clearly saying that, at that time, there 
were modern plans to make insurance companies (specifically, 
tontine insurance companies) great banking institutions. 

The Sixteenth Amendment (1913): 

The De Facto Sixteenth 

Proposed by resolution July 2, 1909; ratified February 3, 
1913; certified February 25, 1913; the Sixteenth Amendment 
specified that Congress shall have the power bo: 

... lay and collect taxes on incomes, FROM 
WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED, without apportionment 
among the several states, and without regard to 
any census or enumeration. 

Insight into the intent, force and effect of this Amend¬ 
ment can be gleaned from House of Representatives Report No. 
416, dated March 14, 1912. This report addressed the need 
for an interim excise tax while preparing "the public mind 
for a fuller appreciation of the justice and desirability of 
an income-tax law": 


- 136 - 



The Committee on ways and Means, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 21214) to extend the 
special excise tax, new levied with respect to 
doing business by corporations, to persons, and 
to provide revenue for the Government by levying 
a special excise tax with respect to doing busi¬ 
ness by individuals and copartnerships, having 
had the same under consideration, report it back 
to the House without amendment and recotmend 
that the bill do pass. 

WHY EXCISE TAX IS NEEDED NOW. 

The legislative action proposed by H.R. 21214 
is prompted at this time by the desire of the 
oenmittee to place sugar on the free list, evi¬ 
denced by H.R. 21213, and to provide for any 
resulting loss to the revenue of the Nation. 
The action of the committee concerning sugar has 
been taken in deference to a very general and 
persistent public demand. With the earnest 
desire to assist the peqple in acquiring this 
important food product at reduced prices, the 
committee has been compelled to seek another 
source from which to provide for the consequent 
loss in revenue. After a thorough investigation 
of the entire field of revenue possibilities, 
the most just and practicable solution of the 
problem appeared to be extend the operation of 
the corporation-tax law of 1909 to individuals, 
firms and copartnerships, and this the ccrmittee 
is doing by favorably reporting H.R. 21214. ... 

COMMITTEE FAVORS INCOME-TAX LAW. 

The committee desires to go on record as fa¬ 
voring an income-tax law, but does not report 
such a measure at this time for the following 
reasons: (1) The Supreme Court has declared a 
general income-tax law unconstitutional for lack 
of apportionment, and provision has been made 
whereby the states are new considering the ac¬ 
ceptance or rejection of the proposed sixteenth 
amendment to the Constitution giving to Congress 
the undisputed authority to impose such a gen¬ 
eral tax, and (2) through the decision of the 
Supreme Court in upholding the constitution¬ 
ality of the existing corporation-tax law the 
ccrmittee has concieved the idea of extending 
the provisions of this law in the manner pro- 


- 137 - 



posed in H.R. 21214, and to secure in this way 
the practical results of an inccme-tax law 
without violating the ruling of the Supreme 
Court in rejecting the income-tax law of 1894. 

According to information obtained from the 
Department of State, the adoption of the pro¬ 
posed inccme-tax amendment has been favorably 
voted upon by 28 States, leaving only 8 States 
yet required for its approval. The enactment of 
H.R. 21214 will serve the valuable purposes of 
meeting the immediate revenue requirements and 
at the same time aid in preparing the public 
mind for a fuller appreciation of the justice 
and desirability of an inccme-tax law. 

TOE LEGAL ASPECT. 

As heretofore stated, the legislation pro¬ 
posed by H.R. 21214 is an extension of the 
special excise tax levied by the act of August 
5, 1909, with respect to doing business by cor¬ 
porations, joint-stock companies or associa¬ 
tions, and insurance companies, firms or copart¬ 
nerships and individuals. In other words, it is 
proposed to take certain provisions and admini¬ 
strative features both from section 27 of the 
excise tax act of 1898 and the corporation act 
of 1909, which have been held valid in all 
respects by the Supreme Court, and carbine and 
embrace the same in one act applying to 
individuals and copartnerships. The constitu¬ 
tionality of the act thus preposed is undoubt¬ 
edly sustained by the corporation-tax cases, 
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (220 U.S. 107); it is 
in no sense an incane tax, and its validity is 
in nowise affected by the decision of the 
Supreme Court in the inccme-tax cases. Pollock 
v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company (157 U.S., 
420; s. c., 158 U.S. 601). 

On the contrary, this decision plainly indi¬ 
cates that if the act of 1894 had been drawn in 
the form of the law now proposed, and had levied 
an excise tax upon business measured by income, 
it would have been sustained, as clearly shown 
by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, who said, in the 
opinion after reargument: 

"We have considered the act only in respect 
of the tax on incane derived from real estate 
and from invested personal property, and have 


- 138 - 



not commented on so much of it as bears on gains 
or profits from business, privileges, or employ¬ 
ments, in view of the instances in which taxa¬ 
tion on business, privileges, or arployments has 
assumed the guise of an excise tax and been sus¬ 
tained as such." (158 U.S., p. 635.) 

Nowhere in the books has the taxing power of 
the Government under the Constitution been more 
accurately and concisely stated than by Mr. 
Chief Justice Chase in the license tax cases (5 
Wall., 471), when he said: 

"Congress can not tax exports, and it must 
impose direct taxes by the rule of apportion¬ 
ment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uni¬ 
formity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reach¬ 
es every subject, and may be exercised at dis¬ 
cretion." 

The constitutionality of the proposed tax 
therefore becomes apparent if these two propo¬ 
sitions can be sustained: 

1. The proposed tax is not a direct tax upon 
the property, real or personal, of the copart¬ 
nerships of individuals, but a special excise 
upon the carrying on or doing business by such 
copartnerships or individuals, and it, there¬ 
fore, needs no apportionment among the States 
according to population as required by the 
Constitution with reference to direct taxes. 

2. The proposed tax is uniform throughout 
the United States. 

If it be true that the tax is an excise, its 
indirect character is at once established. 
(Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall., 433; 
Springer v. United States, 102 U.S., 585; Sprec- 
kles Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192, U.S., 
397.) 

While it has been in the past a subject for 
considerable argument, it is now well settled 
that the terms "duties, imposts, and excises" 
must be treated as embracing all the indirect 
forms of taxation contemplated by the Consti¬ 
tution. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller stated the 
conclusion from all the cases when, in the 
Pollock case, (157 U.S., 557), he said: 

"Although there have been from time to time 
intimations that there might be seme case which 


- 139 - 



was not a direct tax, nor included under the 
words duties, imposts, and excises, such a tax 
for more than 100 years of national existence 
has as yet remained undiscovered, nothwith- 
standing the stress of particular circumstances 
has invited thorough investigation into sources 
of revenue." 

The proposed tax is an excise because, 

(a) The tax is legislatively intended as an 
excise, as shown by the plain language of the 
bill. 

(b) The subject of the tax is the conduct or 
transaction of business which, according to a 
uniform line of decisions by the Supreme Court 
of the United States, is a proper subject of 
excise tax. 

(c) The fact that the tax is to be measured 
by the net income of the taxable person or firm 
does not change its real character. 

B. THE SUBJECT OF THE TAX IS THE CONDUCT OR 
TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS WHICH, ACCORDING TO A 
UNIFORM LINE OF DECISIONS BY THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, IS A PROPER SUBJECT OF 
EXCISE TAX. 

As before stated, the bill itself plainly 
declares the subject of the tax as the "carrying 
on or doing business." In many cases the Su¬ 
preme Court has held that the carrying on or do¬ 
ing business of a particular kind is a proper 
sub- ject of an excise tax. The only step which 
that court must take in order to sustain the 
proposed law is one which is perfectly logical, 
if not absolutely irrestible, for IT WILL ONLY 
BE NECESSARY TO HOLD THAT A LAW WHICH LAYS AN 
EXCISE UPON THE CARRYING ON CR DOING BUSINESS 
NOT ONLY OF A PAR- TICULAR ' KIND, BUT OF ALL 
KINDS, designates a proper subject of excise 
tax. The question seems to be settled by Sprec- 
kles Sugar Refining Company v. McClain (192 
U.S., 397), construing the act of 1898, which 
provided "that every person, firm, corporation, 
or company, carrying on or doing the business of 
refining petroleum, or refining sugar, or owning 
or controlling any pipe line transporting oil or 
other products, whose gross annual receipts 
exceed $250,000, shall be subject to pay annual¬ 
ly a special excise tax equivalent to one- 


- 140 - 



quarter of 1 per cent on the gross amount of all 
receipts of such persons, firms, corporations 
and companies in their respective business," 

etc t • • • 

The Income Tax cases, Pollock v. Fanners Loan 
& Trust Co., (157 U.S., 429 s. c., 158 U.S., 
601), do not weaken but rather strengthen the 
force of the decisions heretofore quoted. The 
Pollock case expressly noted the difference be¬ 
tween a general income tax and a tax on business 
income. The Chief Justice said: 

"We do not mean to say that an act, laying by 
apportionment a direct tax on all real estate 
and personal property, or the income thereof, 
might not also lay excise taxes on business, 
privileges, employments, and vocations (p. 
637)." 

If the question had been before the court, 
there can be no doubt that the court would have 
even more expressly differentiated between a 
general income tax and a tax on the transaction 
of business which is merely measured by either 
business income or general income. To interpret 
the Income Tax cases correctly, the safest plan 
is doubtless to accept the subsequent interpre¬ 
tation of the Supreme Court itself. 

In Kncwlton v., Moore (178 U.S., 81) the 
Supreme Court said: 

"Undoubtedly in the course of the opinion in 
the Pollock case, it was said that, if a tax was 
direct within the constitutional sense, the mere 
erroneous qualification of it as an excise or 
duty wculd not take it out of the constitutional 
requirement as to apportionment. But THIS LAN¬ 
GUAGE RELATED TO THE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER CON¬ 
SIDERATION, and was but a statement that a tax 
which was in itself direct, because imposed upon 
property solely by reason of its ownership, 
could not be changed by affixing to it the 
qualification of excise or duty." 

Under the proposed law the citizen is not 
taxed upon his income nor is any tax measured by 
his income unless it be first shown that he is 
doing business within the meaning of the act. 
The very fact that seme citizens, possessing 


- 141 - 



large means, would under the proposed law escape 
taxation measured by their incomes, because they 
are not engaged in business, while unfortunate 
in its effect upon the revenues, is an added 
circumstance to show that this tax is an excise 
upon a business and not a tax upon income. 

It may be contended that the corporation tax 
cases do not justify the position here taken, 
because the court held the subject of taxation 
in those cases to be the distinctive privilege 
which comes from the advantages which inhere in 
the corporate capacity of those taxed and which 
are not enjoyed by private firms or individuals. 

The thing taxed is not the mere dealing in 
merchandise in which the actual transaction may 
be the same Whether conducted by individuals or 
corporations, but THE TAX IS LAID UPON THE PRIV¬ 
ILEGES WHICH EXIST IN CONDUCTING BUSINESS with 
the advantages which inhere in the corporate 
capacity of those taxed, and which are not en¬ 
joyed by private firms or individuals. Those 
advantages are obvious, and have led to the 
formation of such ccnpanies in nearly all 
branches of trade. The continuity of the 
business without interruption by death or 
dissolution, the transfer of property interests 
by the disposition of shares of stock, the ad¬ 
vantages of business controlled and managed by 
corporate directors, the general absence of in¬ 
dividual liability, these and other things in¬ 
here to the advantages of business thus conduc¬ 
ted, which do not exist when the same business 
is conducted by private individuals or partner¬ 
ships. IT IS THIS DISTINCTIVE PRIVILEGE WHICH 
IS THE SUBJECT OF TAXATION, not the mere buying 
or selling or handling of goods which may be the 
same, whether done by corporation or individ¬ 
uals. 

C. THE FACT THAT THE TAX IS TO BE MEASURED 
BY THE NET INCOME OF THE TAXABLE PERSON CR FIRM 
DOES NOT CHANGE ITS REAL CHARACTER. 

This proposition is amply sustained by the 
decisions of the Supreme Court in both the 
Spreckles case and the corporation-tax cases. 
In the latter, Mr. Justice Day, after reviewing 
the decisions, said: 


- 142 - 




"There is nothing in these cases contrary, as 
we shall have occassion to see, to the former 
rulings of this court, which held that where a 
tax is lawfully imposed upon the exercise of 
privileges within the taxing power of the State 
or nation, the measure of such tax may be the 
income from the property of the corporation al¬ 
though a part of such income is derived from 
property in itself nontaxable. The distinction 
lies between the attempt to tax the property as 
such and to measure a legitimate tax upon the 
privilege involved in the use of such property." 

While the bill H.R. 21214 embodies a new ap¬ 
plication of taxes it carries all the modern 
philosophy of taxation. It proposes to oblige 
the citizen to contribute annually a fair and 
just portion of his net gains to the maintenance 
of the Government. As already stated, this 
bill, if enacted into law, will accomplish in 
the main all the purposes of a general income- 
tax law and at the same time escape the disap¬ 
proval of the Supreme Court, as it keeps well 
within the principles laid down by that court in 
sustaining the consti- tutionality of the corpo¬ 
ration-tax law. As defined by the Supreme Court 
in the corporation-tax case, the term "business" 
embraces everything about which a person can be 
employed and all activities which occupy the 
time, attention, and labor of persons for the 
purpose of a livelihood or profit. ... [House of 
Representatives, 62d Congress, 2d Session, 
Report no. 416, March 14, 1912] 

The alleged purpose of the sixteenth amend¬ 
ment was to remove the necessity of apportioning 
such "income taxes" as direct: [C] 

This amendment permits Congress to levy in¬ 
come taxes without the necessity of apportion¬ 
ment among the States according to population. 
Prior to its adoption, Congress had power to 
levy income taxes without apportionment, 
provided they were indirect. But, in Pollock v. 
Farmers' Loan & T. Co. [C] (1) the Supreme Court 
had held that a tax on income from property was 
direct, and subject to apportionment under 
article I, section 2, clause 3. Therefore, the 
purpose of this amendment (adopted in 1913) is 
to remove the necessity of apportioning such 


- 143 - 



inccme taxes as are direct. THE AMENDMENT DOES 
NOT EXTEND THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO TAX INCCME 
WHICH, PRIOR TO 1913, IT HAD NO POWER TO TAX. 
[ 0 ( 2 ). 

So, why the sixteenth Amendment? was it really an 
exercise in futility and redundancy? NOT AT ALL! The 
phrase: "from whatever source derived," while not creating 
any new taxing powers of Congress, removed any, and all, 
restrictions and limitations on the subject matter and 
nature of the source of income from which congress could 
levy an excise tax. The abolition of all restrictions was a 
significant and necessary step in the implementation of 
federalist plans, as will become apparent later on in our 
story. 


The De Jure Sixteenth? 

M.J. "Red" Beckman and the Montana Historians have 
unveiled sane rather astounding facts relative to the de 
jure aspects of the sixteenth amendment: 

The Montana Historians proceeded with their 
investigation (into ratification background of 
the 16th Amendment) and the first thing they 
found was Senate Document 240 ... This document 
was put together and printed in 1932. It is 
supposed to be the official canvass of the rat¬ 
ification to the United States Constitution. 

This document gave the historians a starting 
point, which itself indicated that fraud was 
involved. Over a period of many months and a 
great many letters to the forty-eight states 
(year 1913), a picture began to emerge. The 16th 
amendment was a fraud and the evidence was in 
our hands .... 

... A report created by the Department of 
State in regard to the ratification of the 16th 
amendment is the most damning document you have 
ever seen. It was put together by the legal 
staff for the Department of State. You will 
read in this report how they used assumptions to 
arrive at seme very important conclusions. They 
determined that 38 States had ratified even 
though 11 of these states changed the wording of 
the amendment. These lawyers assumed these 
changes to be errors. The record (shows) how 
those 11 States used deliberate process to 
change the amendment. [D] 


- 144 - 



It appears that the Montana Historians have accumulated 
conclusive evidence that the 16th amendment was never 
ratified pursuant to the constitutional amendment process. 
Such being the case, the amendment is VOID from its incep¬ 
tion - meaning Congress was never given lawful authority to 
levy an income tax "from whatever source derived." The 
legal force and effect of failure to comply with the amend¬ 
ment process as specified in the constitution is further 
discussed in reference to the seventeenth amendment. 

\The Seventeenth Amendment (1913): 

The De Facto Seventeenth 

The federalists were advancing rapidly with minimal 
opposition. Proposed May 13, 1912; ratified April 8, 1913 
and certified May 31, 1913, the Seventeenth Amendment had 
cleared the constitutional obstacles to the planned con¬ 
version of a once proud Republic into a Democracy (the 
"bastard system of federo-republicanism," as Jefferson 
foretold). It converted the members of the Senate from 
being representatives of the states as provided for in 
Article I, Section 3, of the original Constitution, to being 
representatives of the people: 

The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each state, 
elected by the people thereof, .... 

The intent of a Senate elected by the State legislatures 
was specifically to guard against "the evils we experience 
(that) flew from the excess of democracy," as Elbridge Gerry 
said: 

The people do not want virtue, but are the 
dupes of pretended patriots. In Massts; it has 
been fully confirmed by experience that they are 
daily misled into the most baneful measures and 
opinions by false reports circulated by design¬ 
ing men, and which no one on the spot can re¬ 
fute. 

This Amendment gave less than 100 representatives of the 
people as much power as more than 400 representatives of the 
people in the other House. 

It abolished representation of State interests in the, 
soon to be, all powerful federal government centralized in 
Washington, D.C.. It made possible for monied interests, 
the super-merchants of the world, to control the legislative 


- 145 - 



power within our national borders by merely gaining influ¬ 
ence and/or control over a handful of Federal Senators. 

This Amendment set the stage for "the usurpation of state 
powers by the foreign General Government" in accordance with 
federalist "schemes to monarchise us," as Madison forwarned. 


The De Jure Seventeenth (?) [E] 

As a result of the Seventeenth Amendment we have a de 
facto (in fact and deed) popularly elected Senate. The 
question new presented for discussion and analysis is 
whether this Senate is a de jure one (sitting lawfully and 
of right)? 

The intent of the founding fathers was clearly stated in 
Federalist Paper No. 39 (38): 

The House of Representatives will derive its 
powers from the people of America; ... The Sen¬ 
ate, on the other hand, will derive its powers 
from the States ... 

This intent was incorporated into Article I, Section 3, 
of the United States Constitution: 

1. The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each State, chosen 
by the Legislature thereof, for six years; and 
each Senator shall have one vote. 

On May 31, 1913, William Jennings Bryan certified the 
seventeenth amendment as being a valid change to the consti¬ 
tution. This declaration was made in the exercise of the 
Duties of Secretary of State which: 

Consist of knowing how many States there are 
... and of being able to count them correctly. 
[E](l). 

The significance of a correct count of the number of 
states in the authorized amendment process is specified in 
Article V, U.S. Constitution: 

... amendments ... shall be valid to all 
intents and purposes, as part of this Constitu¬ 
tion, when ratified by the Legislatures of 
three-fourths of the several States, or by con¬ 
ventions in three-fourths thereof, ... provided 
that ... no State, without its consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. 


- 146 - 



The exception was a result of the fears expressed by 
Roger Sherman on September 15, 1787, two days before the end 
of the Constitutional Convention: 

Mr. Sherman expressed his fears that three- 
fourths of the States might be brought to do 
things fatal to particular states, by abolishing 
them entirely or depriving than of their equal¬ 
ity in the Senate. [Madison's Notes. (2 
Farrand, pp. 629-631)] 

Thus, an amendment ratification by a three-fourths 
majority of the states is permissible except for this one 
permanent exception, as explained in Columbia Law Review: 

As chief Justice Marshall said in Gibbons v. 

Ogden, "it is a rule of construction, acknowl¬ 
edged by all, that the exceptions from a power 
mark its extent; for it would be absurd, as well 
as useless, to except from a granted power, that 
which was not granted ...." It is clear, there¬ 
fore, that ratification by three-fourths applies 
to every amendment except the one specifically 
excepted. [(COL LR 20.515)] 

Any change in suffrage of the state legislatures via 
constitutional amendment requires the consent of all states. 
The last clause of Article V is called the "EXCEPTION" to 
the amending process in Federalist Paper # 43: 

The exception in favor of the quality of 
Suffrage in the Senate was probably meant as a 
palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the 
States, implied and secured by that principle of 
representation in one branch of the legislature; 


and it is well settled that: 

(the) Federalist papers are considered by the 
Courts as a great authority "and as" a ccnplete 
cannentary on our Constitution. [Cohen v. 
Virginia, 19 US 264] 

William Jennings Bryan's declaration as to the validity 
of the Seventeenth Amendment was apparently, made from the 
false premise that the exception to the amendment process 
had no application to this amendment and a mere three- 
fourths majority was required for ratification. Even from 


- 147 - 



this premise his declaration was flawed. Bryan counted 
thirty-six (exactly three-fourths of forty-eight) states at 
the time as having consented to giving up their proxy in the 
Senate. One of these states was Ohio which was not admitted 
\into the Union until August 7, 1953:. 

OHIO_STATEHOOD - Observed date: March 1, 

1803; Rank: 17th; (Because of an oversight, the 
admission of Ohio to the Union was not formally 
approved by Congress and the President until 
August 7. 1953. which would rank 48th. A suit 
was filed this week seeking to prevent Ohioans 
from voting, it calls the 1953 admission action 
unconstitutional); Buckeye State: Ohioan [USA 
Today, July 5, 1984] 

Thus, the actual count status at the time of the 
so-called "ratification" of the Seventeenth Amendment was: 

(1) Thirty-five states had given their consent. 

(2) Ohio had given its consent and was counted 
as a state; However Ohio had not been duly 
admitted into the Union. 

(3) Two states were on record as objecting (Utah 
and Delaware) and nine states withheld their 
consent by simply failing to act. [Senate 
Document No. 240] 

Louisana subsequently gave its approbation one year 
later, June 11, 1914. 

A Jurisdictional Defect 

Clearly the Seventeenth Amendment was not ratified 
pursuant to the amendment process specified in ARTICLE V of 
the Constitution. 

The United States is entirely a creation of the Con¬ 
stitution. Its powers and authority have no other source. 
It can only act in accordance with all the limitations im¬ 
posed by the Constitution. [Reid v. Covert, 354 u.S. 1; 77 
S. Ct. 1222] 

Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, u.S. Constitution, 
states that the President: 

... shall have power, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, ... 
and by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public 


- 148 - 




ministers and consuls. Judges of the supreme 
Court, and all other officers of the United 
States, whose appointments are not herein other¬ 
wise provided for, which shall be established by 
law: 

And it was early stated: 

(The judicial power) is to be exercised by 
courts organized for the purpose and brought 
into existence by an effort of the legislative 
power of the Union. [E](2). 

The jurisdictional implications and ramifications of a 
Senate functioning without sanction of the Constitution are 
far reaching: 

Their jurisdiction, ("inferior courts") de¬ 
pends exclusively on the Constitution and the 
terms of the statutes passed in pursuance there¬ 
of, and must appear of record. [E](3). 

This means: No lawful treaties have been made since 
1913; There is no supreme court Judge lawfully appointed by 
the President and confirmed by the Senate; There are no Ap¬ 
pellate or District courts lawfully in session; And there 
are no lawful Article III judges in the United States: 

This case presents a question of substantial 
constitutional importance: whether a person 
lacking the essential attributes of an article 
III judge - life tenure and protection against 
diminution of ccnpensation - may none the less 
exercise the judicial power of the United States 
• • • 

... only those judges enjoying article III 
protections may exercise the judicial power of 
the United States ... 

HISTORICAL ACCEPTANCE AND GOVERSMENTAL 
EFFICIENCY ARE NOT UNIMPORTANT. THEY WILL NOT, 
HOWEVER, SAVE (A PRACTICE) IF IT IS CONTRARY TO 
THE CONSTITUTION. [United States of America v. 

Janet Woodley, 726 F. 2d 1328 (1983)] 

It means there are no lawful legislative (article I) 
Courts in session. It means there has been no federal 
statute passed in pursuance of the Constitution since April 
8, 1913. And it means this condition extends down through¬ 
out all state courts. 


- 149 - 



One reason that lack of legality of the federal court 
system brings down the integrity of everything below was 
stated by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper #82: 

Agreeable to the remark already made, the na¬ 
tional and State systems are to be regarded as 
ONE WHOLE. 

Later we will see that this "ONE WHOLE " is now gover ned 
by the Law of Merchants under the nomenclature of "Federal 
Law Merchant." and by "specialized federal common law" 
created by federal judges; Judges whose appointments have 
never been confirmed by a lawful Senate and who, therefore 
lacking the essential attributes required by Article III of 
the Constitution,, have no authority at law to exercise the 
judicial power of the United States. We will see this 
"Federal Law Merchant" and "specialized federal carmon law" 
has the force and effect of being binding on all courts. 

In conclusion, the so-called seventeenth amendment dis¬ 
abled the entire legislative process. The powers of the 
Senate have no other source outside the constitution and 
this body can only act in accordance with all limitations 
imposed by the Constitution. Our popularly elected Senate 
is incapable of performing any lawful act , and has been so 
incapacitated since April 8, 19131 

For this and other reasons yet to be examined, no court 
in the land has jurisdiction conferred by law over any indi¬ 
vidual, thing or subject matter. These courts can only 
acquire jurisdiction by express or iirplied consent of the 
parties involved, i.e., for failure of the parties to 
properly and timely challenge the jurisdiction being 
asserted by the court: 

(The Judicial) power is capable of acting 
only when the subject is submitted to it, by a 
party who asserts his rights in the form pre¬ 
scribed by law. [E](4). 

Conversely, a jurisdictional challenge to the exercise of 
the judicial power itself must be made by a party who 
asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law. 
Jurisdiction, when properly and timely challenged, must be 
proved as a matter of fundamental law. 


Part III: The Federal Reserve Act-The Legislative coup de 
gras (December 23, 1913). 

Background: [F] 


- 150 - 



















The evils inherent in private control of the nation's 
monetary system came to a head in 1907. The Standard Oil 
group, owners of "Amalgamated Copper," had set about to 
break one Mr. Heinze, central figure in the rival "Union 
Copper Company." They drove down the price of Union Copper 
stock from 60 to 10. Depositors became uneasy and began 
withdrawing money from banks in which Heinze was heavily 
involved. Morgan publically declared one of those banks 
weak (Knickerbocker Trust Company), causing the crash of 
this bank with many others following, plunging the country 
into a severe depression. 

Morgan reappeared on the scene, raised funds here and 
abroad and, through President Theodore Roosevelt, secured 
$35 million from the u.S. Treasury. He saved the last 
Heinze bank, the Trust Company of America, in consideration 
for the right to purchase, below value, the bank's control¬ 
ling stock in the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company (Birming¬ 
ham, Alabama). Its potential value was enormous. Morgan's 
agent in Washington persuaded the President that economic 
conditions made it necessary to allow Morgan to add this 
company to his own United States Steel Company, not-with- 
standing anti-trust laws. [F](1). 

Morgan then secured the president's approval to print and 
issue over $200 million in Clearing House Certificates, in 
the name of the New York Banker's Clearing House Associa¬ 
tion, secured solely by the banker's premise to pay. In a 
slightly different form, the certificates were paid out at 
the teller's windows and functioned as money. Ihe depres¬ 
sion was under control and a privately owned clearing house 
had acquired a gift of the right to create paper money and 
pass it on. 

The possibilities of the scheme were limitless and the 
bankers exerted all possible pressure toward the goal of 
making this innovation a permanent policy of the government. 
First, they secured passage of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 
1908, a continuation of the clearing House scheme to serve 
until they could get the bill they wanted. 

Several other steps were required to achieve their goal. 
It was necessary to create a popular demand for a change in 
the monetary system. For this purpose, the bankers spon¬ 
sored article after article in the press, and a clamor for 
reform spread throughout the land. 

In 1908, Congress authorized a National Monetary Com¬ 
mission to study the problem, and Senator Nelson Aldrich 
secured the position of chairman, who had already used his 
position to sponsor a series of laws favorable to moneyed 
interests. 

The Ccmnission went to Europe for their answer and re¬ 
turned with mare than twenty massive volumes on European 
banking. Typical of these works is the thousand-page his- 


- 151 - 



tory of the Reichbank, the central bank which controlled 
money and credit in Germany, and whose principal stockhold¬ 
ers were members of the Warburg family. 

Ostensibly as a partner of the Rothschild dominated bank 
of Kuhn, Loeb and Company in New York, Paul Warburg arrived 
on the scene from Germany. He devoted much of his time 
writing and lecturing on money and banking, and advocating 
reform of the American system. These activities brought him 
recognition as an expert in his field. His seeming passion¬ 
ate desire to clip the banker's wings prepared the people's 
minds for what was to follow. 

On the night of November 22, 1910, Senator Aldrich slip¬ 
ped out of New York to board a train in Hoboken, New Jersey. 
With Senator Aldrich was A.P. Andrews, professional econo¬ 
mist and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, who had trav¬ 
eled with Aldrich in Europe. Coming separately to the train 
were Frank Vanderlip, president of the National Bank of New 
York City, Harry P. Davidson, senior partner of J.P. Morgan 
Company, Charles D. Norton, President of Morgan's First 
National Bank of New York, Paul Warburg, partner of the 
banking house of Kuhn, Loeb and Company of New York and 
Benjamin Strong of J.P. Morgan Company. The train rolled 
out of the yard on the way to J.P. Morgan's estate at "Mil¬ 
lionaires Club," Jekyll's Island, Georgia. They went to 
write a new monetary bill for Senator Aldrich to present to 
Congress. 

After nine days at Jekyll's Island the plan had been 
perfected with Paul Warburg as the chief architect. Over 
Warburg's objections, the bill was to be presented to Con¬ 
gress as "The Aldrich Plan." Warburg had argued in vain 
that use of the Aldrich name would disclose the fact the 
bill represented the great wall Street interests and would 
make the bill hard, if not impossible to pass. 

The next problem was to sell it to the American people. 
The national banks contributed five million dollars for pro¬ 
paganda. The great universities to which the financiers 
contributed served as centers from which to mislead the 
nation. 

Congressman Patman's "A Primer on Money," states: 

The main reform proposed was a central bank 
with power to regulate. The central bank was to 
be privately owned and privately controlled. 

[F](2) 

A presidential election was just ahead. The Republican 
Party incorporated the Aldrich Plan into its platform and 
pledged to enact it into law. However, an independent in¬ 
vestigation by the House of Representatives disclosed the 
fact that a few wall Street tycoons controlled almost all 


- 152 - 



the financial power of the nation, and public aversion to 
the Aldrich Plan set in. As a result of the prior propa¬ 
ganda, there persisted a wide public demand for a Central 
Authority to regulate all banks and to maintain reserves for 
them. With this demand, there was new the determination 
that all should be under the ownership and control of the 
United States Government. This suggested a new avenue for 
the bankers. If the Republicans could not pass the bill as 
the Aldrich Plan, could it be renamed "The Federal Reserve 
Act", a name suggesting that it is part of the government, 
and be passed into law by the Democrats? Of course it 
could! And Woodrow Wilson was the man to do it. 

Woodrow Wilson was a minister's son, an educator, a man 
the people trusted. One who had spoken so idealistically of 
the people's ownership of their monetary system. Yet, one 
already in the banker's camp, and beholden to them. The 
bankers checked again. Frank Vanderlip who had helped write 
the Aldrich Plan invited Wilson to luncheon with James 
Stillman, president of the National City Bank. Subse¬ 
quently, Wilson was nominated. The bankers could not lose. 
The Republicans carried the bill as the "Aldrich Plan", the 
Democrats carried it as "The Federal Reserve Act." Woodrow 
Wilson premised the people a money and credit system free 
from wall Street influence and was elected President of the 
United States in 1912. Wilson's campaign had been almost 
entirely financed by Cleveland H. Dodge of Kuhn, Loeb's 
National Bank, Jacob Schiff, senior partner in Loeb's 
National Bank, Henry Morganthau, Sr., Bernard Baruch, and 
Samuel Untermyer. An intimate associate of these bankers, 
Edward House, was assigned to Wilson as "advisor." He stood 
always by Wilson's side and seemed to direct every important 
move of that administration. 

The Federal Reserve Act was passed into law on December 
23, 1913, under pressure of adjournment and was signed into 
law immediately. Further details of all this can be found 
in H.S. Keenan's The Federal Reserve Banks. [F](3). The 
foregoing scenario was addressed by Congressman McFadden in 
the House of Representatives on June 10, 1932 as follows: 

In 1912 the National Monetary Association, 
under the chairmanship of the late Senator Nel¬ 
son W. Aldrich, made a report and presented a 
vicious bill called the National Reserve Associ¬ 
ation bill. This bill is usually spoken of as 
the Aldrich bill. Senator Aldrich did not write 
the Aldrich bill. He was the tool, but not the 
accomplice, of the European-born bankers who for 
nearly 20 years had been scheming to set up a 
central bank in this country and who in 1912 had 


- 153 - 



spent and were continuing to spend vast sums of 
money to accomplish their purpose. 

Hie Aldrich bill was condemned in the plat¬ 
form upon which Theodore Roosevelt was ncminated 
in the year 1912, and in that same year, when 
Woodrow Wilson was ncminated, the Democratic 
platform, as adopted at the Baltimore conven¬ 
tion, expressly stated: "We are opposed to the 
Aldrich plan for a central bank." This was 
plain language. The men who ruled the Democrat¬ 
ic party then premised the people that if they 
were returned to power there would be no central 
bank established here while they held the reins 
of government. Thirteen months later that prem¬ 
ise was broken, and the Wilson administration, 
under the tutelage of those sinister Wall Street 
figures who stood behind Colonel House, estab¬ 
lished here in our free country the worm-eaten 
monarchist institution of the "king's bank" to 
control us from the top downward, and to shackle 
us from the cradle to the grave. The Federal 
Reserve Act destroyed our old and characteristic 
way of doing business; it discriminated against 
our one-name ccnmercial paper, the finest in the 
world; it set up the antiquated two-name paper, 
which is the present curse of this country, and 
which has wrecked every country which has ever 
given it scope; it fastened down upon this coun¬ 
try the very tyranny from which the framers of 
the Constitution sought to save us. 

One of the greatest battles for the preserva¬ 
tion of this Republic was fought out here in 
Jackson's day, when the Second Bank of the 
United States, which was founded upon the same 
false principles as those which are exemplified 
in the Federal Reserve Act, was hurled out of 
existence. After the downfall of the Second 
Bank of the United States in 1837, the country 
was warned against the dangers that might ensue 
if the predatory interests, after being cast 
out, should come back in disguise and unite 
themselves to the Executive, and through him 
acquire control of the government. That is what 
the predatory interests did when they came back 
in the livery of hypocrisy and under false 
pretenses obtained the passage of the Federal 
Reserve Act. 

The danger that the country was warned again¬ 
st came upon us and is shown in the long train 
of horrors attendant upon the affairs of the 


- 154 - 




traitorous and dishonest Federal Reserve Board 
and the Federal Reserve banks. Look around you 
when you leave this chamber and you will see ev¬ 
idences of it on all sides. This is an era of 
economic misery and for the conditions that 
caused that misery, the Federal Reserve Board 
and the Federal Reserve banks are fully liable. 
This is an era of financial crime and in the 
financing of crime, the Federal Reserve Board 
does not play the part of a disinterested spec¬ 
tator. 

It has been said that the draughtsman who was 
employed to write the text of the Federal 
Reserve bill used the text of the Aldrich bill 
for his purpose. It has been said that the 
language of the Aldrich bill was used because 
the Aldrich bill had been drawn up by expert 
lawyers and seemed to be appropriate. It was 
indeed drawn up by lawyers. The Aldrich bill 
was created by acceptance bankers of European 
origin in New York City. It was a copy and in 
general a translation of the statutes of the 
Reichsbank and other European Central Banks. 

Half a million dollars was spent on one part 
of the propaganda orgainzed by those same Euro¬ 
pean bankers for the purpose of misleading pub¬ 
lic opinion in regard to it, and for the purpose 
of giving Congress the inpression that there was 
an overwhelming popular demand for that kind of 
banking legislation and the kind of currency 
that goes with it, namely, AN ASSET CURRENCY 
BASED ON HUMAN DEBTS AMD OBLIGATIONS instead of 
an honest currency based on gold and silver val¬ 
ues. Dr. H. Parker Willis had been employed by 
the wall Street bankers and propagandists and 
when the Aldrich measure came to naught and he 
obtained employment from Carter Glass to assist 
in drawing a banking bill for the Wilson admin¬ 
istration, he appropriated the text of the Aid- 
rich bill for his purpose. There is no secret 
about it. The text of the Federal Reserve Act 
was tainted from the beginning. 

Not all of the Democratic Members of the Six¬ 
ty-third Congress voted for this great decep¬ 
tion. Seme of them remembered the teachings of 
Jefferson; and, through the years, there have 
been no criticisns of the Federal Reserve Board 
and the Federal Reserve banks so honest, so out¬ 
spoken, and so unsparing as those which have 
been voiced here by Democrats. Again, although 


- 155 - 



a number of Republicans voted for the Federal 
Reserve Act, the wisest and most conservative 
members of the Republican Party would have noth¬ 
ing to do with it and voted against it. A few 
days before the bill came to a vote. Sen. Henry 
Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts wrote to Sen. John 
W. Weeks as follows: 

"New York City, December 17, 1913." 

"MY DEAR SENATOR WEEKS: *** Throughout my 
public life I have supported all measures de¬ 
signed to take the government out of the banking 
business *** This bill puts the government into 
the banking business as never before in our his¬ 
tory and makes, as I understand it, all notes 
government notes when they should be bank notes. 

The powers vested in the Federal Reserve 
Board seem to me highly dangerous, especially 
where there is political control of the board. 
I should be sorry to hold stock in a bank sub¬ 
ject to such domination. The bill as it stands 
seems to me to open the way to a vast inflation 
of the currency. There is no necessity of dwel¬ 
ling upon this point after the remarkable and 
most powerful argument of the senior Senator 
from New York. I can be content here to follow 
the example of the English candidate for Par- 
liment who thought it enough "to say ditto to 
Mr. Burke." I will merely add that I do not 
like to think that any law can be passed which 
will make it possible to submerge the gold 
standard in a flood or irredeemable paper cur¬ 
rency. 

I had hoped to support this bill, but I can 
not vote for it as it stands, because it seems 
to me to contain features and to rest upon prin¬ 
ciples in the highest degree menacing to our 
prospierity, to stability in business, and to the 
general welfare of the people of the United 
States. 

Very sincerely yours, 

Henry Cabot Lodge." 

In the 18 years which have passed since Sen¬ 
ator Lodge wrote that letter of warning all of 
his predictions have ccme true. The government 
is in the banking business as never before. 
Against its will it has been made the backer of 
horsethieves and card sharps, bootleggers, smug- 


- 156 - 




glers, speculators, and swindlers in all parts 
of the world. Through the Federal Reserve Board 
and the Federal Reserve banks the riffraff of 
every country is operating on the public credit 
(debit) of the United States Government. 
Meanwhile, and on account of it, we ourselves 
are in the midst of the greatest depression we 
have ever known. Thus the menace to our pros¬ 
perity, so feared by Senator Lodge, has indeed 
struck hone. From the Atlantic to the Pacific 
our country has been ravaged and laid waste by 
the evil practices of the Federal Reserve Board 
and the Federal Reserve banks and the interests 
which control them. At no time in our history 
has the general welfare of the people of the 
United States been at a lower level or the mind 
of the people so filled with despair. 

Recently in one of our states 60,000 dwelling 
houses and farms were brought under the haitmer 
in a single day. According to the Rev. Father 
Charles E. Coughlin, who has lately testified 
before a ccrrmittee of this House, 71,000 houses 
and farms in Oakland County, Mich., have been 
sold and their erstwhile owners dispossessed. 
Similar occurrences have probably taken place in 
every county in the United States. The people 
who have thus been driven out are the wastage of 
the Federal Reserve Act. They are the victims 
of the dishonest and unscrupulous Federal 
Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve banks. 
Their children are the new slaves of the auction 
block in the revival here of the institution of 
human slavery. 

In 1913, before the Senate Banking and Cur¬ 
rency Committee, Mr. Alexander Lassen made the 
following statement: 

"But the whole scheme of a Federal Reserve 
bank with its commercial-paper basis is an im¬ 
practical, cumbersome machinery, is simply a 
cover, to find a way to secure the privilege of 
issuing money and to evade payment of as much 
tax upon circulation as possible, and then con¬ 
trol the issue and maintain, instead of reduce 
interest rates. It is a system that, if inaug¬ 
urated, will prove to the advantage of the few 
and the detriment of the people of the United 
States. It will mean continued shortage of ac¬ 
tual money and further extension of credits: 
for when there is a lack of real money people 
have to borrow credit to their cost." 


- 157 - 



A few days before the Federal Reserve Act was 


ssed Sen. Elihu Root denounced the Federal Re¬ 



made the followi 


before we wake 


throuqh an inflated curren 


ich alone cculd have kept us from 


trophe. will have vanished and no rate of inte¬ 


rest will 


_ If ever a 


It vies impossible, however, for those luminous 
and instructed thinkers to control the course of 
events 

serve bill became law, and that niqht Colonel 


House wrote to his hidden master in 







d ha 


ite certain fair men will 


s the President had stood as firm as he did 


The bill is a good one in many respects 
qood enouqh to start with and to let 


teach us in what direction it needs 


In any 

event you have personally good reason to feel 
gratified with what has been accomplished." 

... The foregoing letter affords striking 
evidence of the manner in which the predatory 
interests then sought to control the Government 


of the United States by surroundi 


tive with the personality and the influence of a 



erocious usurers in New York throuqh their 


hireli 












































































international bankers, Kuhn, Loeb & Co., sent 
one of their partners here to run it. , 
[CongressmanMcFadden,Congressional Record, 
pages 12596-12603, June 10, 1932] 

Key Provisions: 

The Act provided for 12 Federal Reserve Banks, with 
branches, "to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means 
of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more ef¬ 
fective supervision of banking in the United States, AND PC® 
OTHER PURPOSES." [Federal Reserve Act, Sixty-Third Con¬ 
gress, Sess. II, Ch. 6, December 23, 1913 (H.R. 7837, Public 
Law No.43) ] 

Congressman Charles A. Lindberg, Sr. warned the people, 
to no avail, what "other purposes" were on December 22, 
1913: [A], 


TOCS ACT ESTABLISHES TOE MOST GIGANTIC TRUST 
ON EARTH. When the President signs this bill, 
the invisible government by the Monetary Power 
will be legalized. Hie people may not know it 
_______ immediately, but the day of reckoning is only a 

few years removed. Hie trusts will soon realize 
that they have gone too far even for their own 
good. TOE PEOPLE MUST MAKE A DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE TO RELIEVE THEMSELVES FROM TOE 
* MONETARY POWER. ____ 

Seme key provisions of the Act that enabled the es¬ 
tablishment of this gigantic trust, and legalized in-, 
visible government by the Merchants of the Earth (the-. 
Monetary Power) were: 

(1) Hie Federal Reserve Bank Corporation was chartered 
as a private corporation; 

(2) Hie Federal Reserve Banks were exempt from audit 
by the u.S. Government; 

(3) Hie private banking corporation was authorized to 
CREATE credit and "lend" its credit creation to the 
U.S. Goverrment; 

(4) Interest was to be paid to the Federal Reserve 
Corporation in gold; and 

(5) Federal Reserve Notes were designated debt obli¬ 
gations of the United States (i.e. an asset cur¬ 
rency) . 

Nature of the Act: 


- 159 - 


















'Rcsarv* S/J-?e# /; > 

Teh/T)t<£ Ttff* n At/C £ CC-ttEtA €{ 


The Federal Reserve Act was nothing more than a Tontine 


Insurance scheme, dressed m new garb, for a 


The "beneficiaries" of the trust had no say in its manage¬ 


ment that was 


mercanatile, corporation, owned and operated 


merchants of the world 



m 


nJcina Pomoration: 


Seme people think the Federal Reserve Banks 


aure United States Government Institutions. The 


are not government institutions. They are 


vate credit mon 


le of the United States for the benefit of 


themselves and their foreign customers 


They should not have foisted that kind of 
currency, namely an ASSET CURRENCY on the United 
States Government. They should not have made 
the government liable on the private d 



m^wzu 



The Federal Reserve Notes, therefore, in form 
have seme of the qualities of government paper 
money, but, in substance, are almost purely 
ASSET CURRENCY POSSESSING A GOVERNMENT GUARANTY 


NST WHICH CONTINGENCY THE GOVERNMENT HAS 


MADE NO PROVISION WHATEVER. 

Mr. Chairman, there is nothing like the Fed 


eral Reserve pool of confiscated 


in the world. It is a public trough of American 
wealth .... I see no reason why the Amer ican 
taxpayers should be hewers of wood and dra 


of water for the European and Asiatic customer 


of the Federal Reserve Banks 


• had an audit of 
the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Re¬ 
serve Banks and an examination of all our gov¬ 
ernments bonds and securities and public moneys 
instead of allowing the corrupt and dishonest 
Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve 
Banks to speculate with those securities and 
this cash in the notorious open discount market 
of New York City? 

Every effort has been made by the Federal 


serve Board to conceal its 


is the Federal Reserve Board has us 


Government of the united States 




2HS 










































I Mr. Chairman, when the Federal Reserve 

was passed the people of the United States didi 
"not perceive that a vrorld system was being set N l 
up here that the united States was to be lowered 1 
to the position of a coolie country..and was to 1 (Yy 
supply financial power to AN INTERNATIONAL SUP- I 
ERSTATE ~ A SUPERSTATE CCWIROLLED BY IN1ERNA- / 
TIONAL BANKERS AND INTERNATIONAL IMXJSTRIALISTS / 
ACTING TOGETHER TO ENSLAVE 1HE WORLD FDR THEIR 
OWN PLEASURE. [McFadden, supra] ~/*\ 

ngressman Wright Patman, of the House Banking and 
ncy Ccnmittee said in 1952: [G](l). 

In fact there has never been an independent 
audit of either of the 12 banks of the Federal 
Reserve Board that has been filed with the Con¬ 
gress where a Member would have an opportunity 
to inspect it. The General Accounting Office 
does not have jurisdiction over the Federal 
Reserve. 

Question: why does not the General Accounting of the United 
States have jurisdiction over the Federal Reserve to 
demand an accounting? 


The answer is accountability of the Federal Reserve is. 


not in the contract, the Federal Reserve Act, lust as it was 


ntme insurance 






We may ask ourselves another question at this point: 
Question: Is the Federal Reserve a maritime lender or is it 


an insurance underwriter to the United States? 


Sane additional information from an Essay on Maritime 
Loans, may help us to decide this question: 

The contract of maritime loan approaches more 


























with the premium which is paid on the other 
[H] 


So we see that it really is inmaterial under maritime law 
whether the Federal Reserve is thought of as a maritime 
lender or as in insurance underwriter to the united States. 
In either case the lender or underwriter bears the risks and 
the maritime laws ccttpelling performance in paving the 
interest or premium are one and the same. 

Also, in either case, assets can be hypothecated as se¬ 
curity for the price of the peril,! Speaking of risk, what 
risk is the Federal Reserve incurring as lender or under¬ 
writer to the United States in exchange for United States^ 
Securities? 

Mariner Eccles, former chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board, held the following exchange with Congressman Patman 
before the House Banking and Currency Cormittee on September 
30, 1941: [G](l). 


Congressman Patman: Mr. Eccles, how did vou get 
the money to buy those two billions of 
government securities? 

Mr. Eccles: We created it. 

Patman: Out of what? 

Mr. Eccles: Out of the right to issue credit 
money. 


And, from further testimony from the Federal Reserve 
Board itself: In a publication from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, entitled "Two Faces of Debt, Readings in 
Economics and Finance": 




Currency is so widely accepted as a medium 


exchange 

asbi: ■ 


that most people do not think of it as 



In another Chicago bank publication entitled "Modern 
Money Mechanics, a Workbook on Deposits, Currency and Bank. 
Reserves": 


Neither paper currency nor deposits have 
value as ccnmodities. Intrinsically, a dollar, 
bill is lust a piece of pape r. Deposits are" 
merely book entries. Coins do have seme intrin-_ 
sic value as metal, but for less than their face*i 
amount- 

What, then makes these instruments - checks. - 
paper money, and coins - acceptable at face .. 
value in payment of all debts and for other non- . 
etary uses? Mainly, it is the confidence people , 


- 162 - 







































































have that they will be able bo exchange such 


money for real goods and services whenever the 


choose to do so. 

these forms of money also seems 


to be tied in seme way to the fact that assets 
exist on the books of the government and the 
banks equal to the amount of the money out- 
standinq. even though most of these assets ar 


leces o 





/MAT MONEY IS NOT REDEEMABLE IN THEM. 

Deposits are merely book entries . .. demand 
deposits are liabilities of commercial banks. 
The banks stand ready to convert such deposits 
into currency or transfer their ownership at the 
request of depositors. 

From the Federal Reserve bank of St. Louis Review: 


But what induces the nonbanking public to 
accept liabilities of private, profit-making 
institutions such as banks? 

ed 


to the issurers of money ..... 

The gains which accrue to issurers of money 
are derived from the difference between the 
costs of issuing money and the initial purchas¬ 
ing power of new money in circulation. Such, 
gains are called "seigniorage," If the goods 
and services for which the issuer exchanges 
money have a market value greater than that of 
resources used to produce the money, then the 
issurer receives a net gain 



In the Federal Reserve Bank 
entitled "The National Debt" O' 


Philadelphia publication 


Open market operations are one of the Federal 
Reserve's most important tools for influencing 
bank lending. 

In effect, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BUYS GOVERN¬ 
MENT SECURITIES AND PAYS OUT OF SPECIAL MONEY 
the banks can use as reserve to increase their 
lending capacity ... 

Used recklessly, it (debt) has the power to 
make us slaves. 


From a book entitled "The Federal Reserve System - its 
Purposes and Functions": 


- 163 - 

















FEDERAL RESERVE BANK CREDIT resembles bank 
credit in general, but under the law it has a 
limited and special use - as a source of member 
bank reserve funds. IT IS ITSELF A FORM OF MON¬ 
EY AUTHORIZED FOR SPECIAL PURPOSES, convertible 
into other forms of money, convertible there¬ 
from, and readily controllable as to amount. 

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK CREDIT, therefore, as 
already stated, does not consist of funds that 
the Reserve authorities "get" somewhere in order. 
to lend, but CONSTITUTES FUNDS THAT THEY ARE EM¬ 
POWERED TO CREATE. [I], " 

In his notes entitled "A Primer on Money", Congressman 
Patman tells that upon hearing that Federal Reserve Banks 
hold a large amount of cash, he went to two of its regional 
banks. He asked to see their bonds. He was led into vaults 
and shown great piles of government bonds upon which the 
people are taxed for interest. Mr. Patman then asked to see 
their cash. The bank officials seemed confused. When Mr. 
Patman repeated the request, they showed him seme ledgers 
and blank checks. Mr. Patman warns us to remember that; 

The cash, in truth, does not exist and never 
has existed. What we call "cash reserves" are, 
simply bookkeeping credits entered upon the 
. ledgers of the Federal Reserve Banks. These 
credits are created bv the Federal Reserve Banks 
and then passed along through the banking . 

..SYStern. If], 

So, by the testimony of the Federal Reserve itself, we 
see: 

(1) .The Fed creates "special" money out of thin 
_air - at no cost or risk to the Federal 

Reserve System - from its right to create 
credit, granted in the Federal Reserve Act. 

(2) .The Fed gains from the inflation it creates. 

(3) .Money is not redeemable in Federal Reserve 
liabilities. . 

(4) .Federal Reserve vaults are full of govern-^ 
ment bonds, obligations of the United States 
for which the people are taxed for interest. 

These bonds are purchased with its "special" 

~~ money which constitutes funds they are empow¬ 
ered to CREATE in order to LEND.. 

*~(5).The currency provided bv the Federal Reserve 
System for the people to use is DEBT. . 


- 164 - 










































(6).The Federal Reserve gains, as issurers of 
credit money, are the difference between the 
cost of creating that credit (essentially, 
nothing) and the intitial purchasing power 
when the new money is put into circulation. 


In a reprint of the book "The Federal Reserve System - 
its Purposes and Functions," [I] S.W. Adams, uses the 
Federal Reserves own published fixtures to give us an example , 
of how lucrative this no risk scheme is to the Federal 


Reserve: 


0 


/ 


1 

' The pauper (the Federal Reserve System) with 

assets of only $52 billion with no productive 

know-how, with no productions of goods and less 

than 100.000 stockholders. loaned(?) the rich 

man (The United States of America) with a tril- 

"lion in productive capacity and know-how with 

well over $500 billion in assets and 170 million 

stockholders, including the aforesaid 100.000 

bank stockholders, $250 billion bo fight World 

'war II. 

Can you imagine the greatest corporation on 

earth. The Government of the U.S., with 170 

million alert full-of know-how stockholders, and 

assets running over $600 billion, turning to a 

. small segment of its population, with less than 

100.000 stockholders and assets of only $52 

billion to borrow money? “] 

Can you conceive of Rockefeller saying to his 






0 


4 $/ 

v 

0 


chauffeur, "Tcm, I am transferring my personal 
bank account which is well over $1 billion, to 
your account. You may spend it as you please; 
provided as often as I ask for money, you will 
let me have it. Of course, I will give you my 
note for cash I receive, and try to rustle from 
my children enough money to pay you interest on 
the borrowed money. (A hypothetical trust is 
created) 

Well, that is exactly what Congress did in 
1913 when it passed the Reserve Act. To fig Et" 
World War II, we gave the~Eankers of the Uni 


__ we ga 

_Sfcates_—S250 . billion in U.S. Bonds th at we might 
use cur own, the Nation's credit. In addition, 
we permitted them to take credit 


qht 

& 


in 


their' 


reserve accounts for $250 billion. This gave 


them $1 trillion 250 billion bank credit. 

They. newT'want. fao make It douSIiT These 
credits are to the bankers what your deposits 


- 165 - 



are to you. They can lend it, or use it to buy 
investment obligations - it is cash to than! 

So adding the $250 billion in U.S. Bonds we 


absolutely gave to them their $1 trillion 250 


j billion bank credit, and we find that 

the bank- I 

1 ers (the then paupers) came out 

of World War II | 


rich man) I 

the United States Government 

came 

■SEEMHfll 

billion in debt to the bankers 

(the 


1 thanks to the stupidity and/or venalitv of our 1 

1 Congressmen, newspapers, -journals 

and 



people of the nation. 


Clearly, by their cwn testimony, the Federal Reserve, as 
a maritime lender or insurer, has nothing at risk; i.e., 
nothing to lose in the maritime venture for profit. This is 
the same formula used by the tontine insurance schemes, a 

sure bet wlth no accounta bility” ^ 


On Trusts: 


The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve were given 


[ control of our 


| the invisible government of the Monetary Power was legalizedl 

| and 



"the most gigantic trust on earth. "J 


BsS3P3?35T0i 


United States had. indeed, been! 


usurped (sy the Federal Reserve Board. 


Nature of Trusts [J], [K] 


When trusts first appeared in English law they were known 
as uses, from the fact that the person in whose hands the 
property was placed held the same for the use of others and 
not for himself. The first legal records we have of these 
uses shows than to be a result of established and well known 
usage. [K](l). For a long time during the development of 
the law of uses, the courts refused to recognize that the 
beneficiary, or cestui que use, had any rights enforceable 
in court. After a time, however, the chancellor in Equity 
began to recognize the duty of the "feoffee to uses" (the 
trustee) to do as he had agreed. 

The recognition by equity of the rights of the cestui did 
not in any way affect the legal ownership of the feoffee to 
uses, in other words, the rights of the cestui que use were 
not an estate in the lands themselves, but only.a personal 
right against the trustee that he should do his duty by 
keeping his agreement. 

k Modern trusts are in reality nothing but a development 
and lineal descendant of the old use, and partakes of the 
same fundamental characteristics. The trustee owns the 


- 166 - 













































property, both at law and in equity, in spite of loose lan¬ 
guage used at times by the courts seeming to indicate the 
contrary. The only right of the cestui (beneficiary) is, in 
essence, to have the chancellor, by acting in personam, can- 
pel the trustee to perform his conscientious obligation. 

Classification of Trusts 

Fundamentallv all trusts were, as to origin, of two 
kinds: Lu trusts based upon the expressed intention of the 
parties; trusts based not upon any intention or agree¬ 
ment of the parties, but imposed or constructed by equity 
upon the principle that no one shall unjustly enrich himself 
at the expense of another; and class (1) is then divided 
into (a) express trusts and (b) trusts implied in fact 
(Figure: VT-1). 



FIGURE: VI-1 








Express trusts can be created either in writing (e.g., a 
will), or orally. To create a trust, it is not necessary 
the word "trust" be used but if the language fairly inter¬ 
preted means that the one to whom the property is transfer¬ 
red or who is alleged to have made a declaration of trust is 
to be legally bound to use it for the benefit of others, a 
trust arises. 

Trusts implied in fact are sometimes called "resulting 
trusts," which are based upon an intention of the parties. 
This intention, however, is not expressed in words, at least 
not directly so, but is inplied from the acts of the parties 
and the surrounding circumstances. In such cases, the trust 
arises because of an intention that is shall arise, expres¬ 
sed however, not in words but in acts. Indeed, in this sit¬ 
uation, "actions speak louder than words." 

Trusts created on the principle of unjust enrichment are 
called "constructive trusts." A direct analogy can be drawn 
between the classification of trusts and the classification 
of contracts, viz.(l) contracts and (2) quasi-contracts, the 
former being divided into: (a) express contracts and (b) 
contracts implied in fact. The quasi-contract corresponds 
to the constructive trusts as here defined: 

Quasi-contracts. The usual classification of 
contracts is objected to by Prof. Keener in his 
law of Quasi-contracts. A true contract exists, 
he says because the contracting party has 
willed, in circumstances to which the law at¬ 
taches the sanction of an obligation, that he 
shall be bound. His contract may be implied in 
fact, or, express. Which of the tvro it is, is 
purely a question of the kind of evidence used 
to estab- lish the contract. In either case the 
source of the obligation is the intention of the 
party. "Contract inplied in law" is, however, a 
term used to cover a class of obligations, where 
the law, though the defendant did not intend to 
assume an obligation, imposes an obligation upon 
him, notwithstanding the absence of intention on 
his part, and, in many cases, in spite of his 
actual dissent. Such contracts, according to 
the work cited, may be termed quasi-contracts, 
and are not true contracts. They are founded 
generally: 

1. Upon a record. 

2. upon statutory, official, or customary 
duties. 

3. Upon the doctrine that no one shall be 
allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the 


- 168 - 



expense of another. The latter is the 
most important and numerous class. [See 
also ADS. Contr. 6th ed. 7; 2 Harv. L. 

Rev. 64; Louisana v. New Orleans, 109 U.S. 

285.] 

Public Or Charitable Trusts 

Another kind of trust exists when property is vested in 
trustees for the benefit of a class of persons; The individ¬ 
ual members of which are not specifically named or described 
in the instrument creating the trust. Such trusts are known 
as public or charitable trusts in which no specific cestui 
is necessary. The matter of charitable trusts is largely 
affected by the statute 43 Elizabeth, c.4, which describes 
many of the purposes for which such trusts may be created 
but as Mr. Justice Gray said in one of the leading cases on 
the subject: 

A precise and complete definition of a legal 
charity is hardly to be found in the books. The 
one most carmonly used in modern cases, origin¬ 
ating in the judgment of Sir William Grant, 
confirmed by that of Lord Eldon, in Morice v. 

Biship of Durham, 9 Ves. 299, 10 Ves. 522 - that 
those purposes are considered charitable which 
are enumerated in St. 43 Eliz. or which by anal¬ 
ogies are deemed within its spirit and intend¬ 
ment - leaves something to be desired in point 
of certainty, and suggests no principle. 

Later on in the same case the learned justice attempts a 
definition of a charitable trust as follows: 

A charity, in the legal sense, may be more 
fully defined as a gift, to be applied consist¬ 
ently with existing laws, for the benefit of an 
indefinite number of persons, either by bringing 
their minds or hearts under the influence or ed¬ 
ucation or religion, by relieving their bodies 
from disease, suffering, or constraint, by as¬ 
sisting them to establish themselves in life, or 
by erecting or maintaining public buildings or 
works, or otherwise lessening the burdens of 
government. It is immaterial whether the pur¬ 
pose is called charitable in the gift itself, if 
it is so described to show that it is charitable 
in its nature. 


- 169 - 



The reader who desires to obtain a more detailed dis¬ 
cussion of the purposes and objects for which these trusts 
may be created is referred to this case (Marice v. Bishop of 
Durham) as containing an exhaustive discussion of the whole 
subject with an elaborate review of the cases. 

Enforcement Of Public Or Charitable Trusts 

Inasmuch as the beneficiaries of the public 
or charitable trust are an indefinite number of 
unidentified persons, the due administration of 
the trust obviously must be enforced at the suit 
of someone else. The government is regarded as 
being interested in such cases, and the suit is 
brought by the appropriate law officer of the 
government, i.e., usually the attorney-general. 

If it is not a charity, the government has no 
interest in the matter and so the attorney- 
general cannot be a plaintiff. 

A Corporation May Be A Trustee 

Originally, it seems it was held that corporations, 
although they could hold prqperty, could not be trustees for 
others. The idea back of this seems to have been that a 
corporation was a "dead body, although it consists of nat¬ 
ural persons; and in this dead body a confidence cannot be 
put, but in bodies natural." [K](2). But as early as 1743 
it was held that corporations could be trustees and the rule 
thus established is universally recognized. [K](3). 

Of Powers 

The powers with which we are most familiar in 
this country are the cannon law authorities, of 
simple form and direct application; such as a 
power to sell land, to execute a deed, to make a 
contract, or to manage any particular business; 
and wri-th instructions more or less specific, 
according to the nature of the case. But THE 
POWERS NOW ALLUDED TO, ARE OF A MORE LATENT AND 
MYSTERIOUS CHARACTER, and they derive their ef¬ 
fect from the statute of uses. They are declar¬ 
ations of trust, and modifications of future 
uses; and the estates arising from the execution 
of them have been classed under the head of 
contingent uses.... 

ALL THESE POWERS ARE, IN FACT, POWERS OF 
REVOCATION AND APPOINIMENT. Every power of 
appointment is strictly a power of revocation; 


- 170 - 



for it always postpones, abridges, or defeats, 
in a greater or less degree, the previous uses 
and estates.... 

The use arising from the act of a person 
nominated in a deed or settlement, is a use 
arising from the execution of a power. It is a 
future or contingent use until the act be done, 
and then it becomes an actual estate by the op¬ 
eration of the statute. By means of powers the 
owner is enabled either to reserve to himself a 
qualified species of dominion, distinct from the 
legal estate, or to delegate out of the trustee, 
and give it a new direction. The power operates 
as a revocation of the uses declared or result¬ 
ing, by means of the original conveyance, and as 
a limitation of new uses.... 

A power is usually defined to be an authority 
whereby a person is enabled to dispose of an in¬ 
terest vested either in himself or in another. 
The exercise of these powers usually depends 
upon the discretion of the donee of the power, 
and NO PERSON CAN TAKE BY VIRTUE OP THE PCWER 
UNLESS TOE DONEE THEREOF CHOOSES TO EXERCISE 
THIS DISCRETION. [Kents' Commentaries, 12 Ed. 
1889, Lecture LXI, of Powers.] 

Example Of A Charitable Public Trust [L] 

Its Benefits - Explained 

Hie good white father recognizes their (the 
Lakota, Sioux, Indian's) hunting grounds and 
intends to act in a manner that protects the 
whole ... 

Your white father will reach out with acts of 
kindness. He will send traders for your conven¬ 
ience ... 

Your white father will ... (not) permit any 
whiteman to molest you or interfere with your 
ways. This talking-leaf (treaty) says so. 

For a long while none had reached for the 
marker which the speaker held out to the lead¬ 
ers. But, finally, one by one, they had 
touched-the- stick. 

Price Of The Benefits - Unexplained 

And wherever they raise this flag, ... they 
take hold. Even new they speak saying that all 
Lakota hunt on ground that belongs to the white- 


- 171 - 



man. They say that frcrn this day forward the 
whites shall protect the Lakotah and for good 
reason: the Lakotah accepts the whiteman as his 
superior, as his PROTECTOR as his father and 
grandfather .... 

For certainly this leaf recorded the response 
of a confused tribe who (unknowingly) had 
pledged to permit strangers to decide the 
Lakotah good. 

Implementation Of The Power 

By virtue of the powers granted in this compact the "good 
white father," as trustee of this charitable public trust, 
decided all matters relating to the "Lakotah good." The 
Lakotah had no say in these matters. 

Thus, for the "good of the whole," the lakotah were 
herded onto reservations whereon the trustees could more 
efficiently discharge their obligation to protect the ben¬ 
eficiaries. Those Lakotah who refused were either forceably 
kept on the Reservation car exterminated - pursuant to the 
Law of trusts. The trustees merely performed their duty and 
obligation to protect the whole, and exercised their power 
to enforce obedience of the beneficiaries to that end: 

According to tradition and logic, the state 
gives protection to all men within its confines, 
and in return exacts their obedience to its 
laws; and the process is reciprocal, when men 
within the confines of the state are obedient to 
its laws they have a right to claim its protec¬ 
tion. It is a maxim of the law, quoted by Coke 
in the sixteenth century, that "PROTECTION DRAWS 
ALLEGIANCE, AND ALLEGIANCE DRAWS PROTECTION." 

It was laid down in 1608, by reference to the 
case of Sherley, a Frenchman who had ccme to 
England and joined in a conspiracy against the 
King and Queen, that such a man "owed to the 
King obedience, that is, SO LONG AS HE WAS WITH¬ 
IN THE KING'S PROTECTION." ["The New Meaning Of 
Treason," by Rebecca West: New York, The Viking 
Press, 1964, p. 128.] 

The Public Pledge Of Revenue Assurance For The Public 
Debt: 


... And for the Support of this Declaration, 
with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine 
Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our 


- 172 - 




Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor. [Dec¬ 
laration of Independence, 1776] 

This mutual pledge served notice to all the world that 
the new United States of America would honor its public 
debts. In effect, it was an introductory statement of a 
Public Pledge of Revenue Assurance for the Public Debt of 
the United States of America. This Public Pledge was sub¬ 
sequently, and more specifically, expressed as follows: 

All bills of credit emitted, monies borrowed 
and debts contracted by, or under the authority 
of Congress, before the assembling of the united 
States, in pursuance of the present Confedera¬ 
tion, shall be deemed and considered as a charge 
against the United States; and the Public Faith 
are hereby solemnly PLEDGED. [Articles of Con¬ 
federation, Article XII] 

It is agreed that CREDITORS on either side 
shall meet with no lawful Impediment to Recovery 
of the Full value in Sterling Money of all bona 
fide DEBTS heretofore contracted. [Treaty of 
Peace, September 3, 1783] 

All debts contracted and engagements entered 
into before the adoption of this Constitution, 
shall be as valid against the United states 
under this Constitution as under the 
Confederation. [United States Constitution, 
Article VI, Section 1] 

The validity of the Public Debt of the united 
States AUTHORIZED BY LAW, including debts incur 
red for the payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in supressing insurrection or rebellion 
shall not be questioned. [United States 
Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 4] 

Of paramount importance is an understanding of the sig¬ 
nificance of this public pledge for Revenue Assurance to 
service the Public Debt of the United States, as it relates 
to the people of the United States and the private Federal 
Reserve Bank Corporation. Recall that Congressman McFadden 
described Federal Reserve Notes as ASSET currency for which 
the united States Government had made no provision whatever 
to meet its obligations created thereby. First, we need to 
understand what Mr. McFadden meant by "Asset Currency." 

ASSETS: All the stock in trade, cash, and 
all available property belonging to a merchant 
or company. The property belonging to a mer¬ 
chant or company. The property in the hands of 


- 173 - 



an heir, executor, administrator, or trustee, 
which is legally or equitable chargeable with 
the obligation which such heir, executor, admin¬ 
istrator, or other trustee is, as such, required 
to discharge. 

LEGAL ASSETS: Such as constitute THE FUND 
FDR PAYMENT OF DEBTS according to their legal 
priority. [Bouvier's Law Dictionary] 

/ In his address to the House of Representatives on Junt^ 
10, 1932, Congressman McFadden gives us further insights 

into this relationship and it effects on the American people 
(Congressional Record, pages 12596-12603):, ~j 

I believe that the nations of the world would 
have settled down after the World war more 
peacefully if we had not the standing temptation 
here - this pool (fund) of our bank depositor's 
money given to private interests and used by 
them in connection with illimitable drafts upon 
the public credit (debt) of the United States 
Government.... 

The Federal Reserve Board and the Federal 
Reserve banks have been international bankers 
from the beginning, with the United States 
Government as their enforced banker and supplier 
of money... . ' 

Federal Reserve Notes are taken from the 
United States Government in unlimited quan¬ 
tities. Is it strange that the burden of 
supplying these inmense sums of money to the 
gambling fraternity has at last proved too heavy 
for the American people to endure? ... 
j They are putting the United States G overnment 
rin debt to tEe~~lgxtent o f $100, 0 0 0^ 000 a week 
\(year 1932 ) L and with this money they are buying 
”' t up our government securities for themselves and 
their foreign principals ... 

In 1930, while the speculating banks were 
getting cut of the stock market at the expense 
of the general public, the Federal Reserve Board 
and the Federal Reserve banks advanced them 
$13.02^.782.000. This shows that when the banks. 
were gambling on the public credit (debt) of the 


by the Federal Reserve Board and the Federa 
Reserve b anks., when the swindle began to fail 
the banks knew it in advance and withdrew frc 


-174 - 




le of the United States to 





have been 


overnment and the signature 


ernment (as trustees??) to the swind 


ators of all nations. This is what ha 


ns when a countryforsakesItsConstitution 


ives its sovereignty over 


lie currency to private interests... 

A few days ago tne President oF the united 


with a white face and shaking hands 


e sentate on 


interests and asked the Senate to le 


the people so that foreigners might know 


the united States would 


Most Americans thought it was the other wa 


around. What does the United States owe to 


oreiqners? WHEN AND BY WHOM WAS THE DEBT 




ETEEI3E 





e ba 


led the signature of this government to 


foreigners for a price, vIt is what the Unit 


vernment has to pay to redeem the obli- 


ations of the Federal Reserve Board and the 


Federal Reserve Banks 


Mr. Speaker, it is a monstrous thi 


reat Nation of people to have its destinies 


esided over by a traitorous government 


It! I 



usurers^ Every effort has been made by the 
Reserve Board to conceal its power but 


II I M II ■ III 


ernment of the United States. 


he man who deceives the people isatraito 


e man who knows car sus 


ts that a crime has been carmitted and who 




to it 


le have a valid claim against the 


Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve 


. If that claim is enforc 


will not need to stand m breadlines or to 


starvation in 


a w .m ' Tar snrci 





175 - 













































































Here is a Federal Reserve Note. Immense num¬ 
bers of theese notes are now held abroad. They 
constitute a claim against our gover nment and 
likewise against the money our people have de-». 
posited In the member banks of the Federal Re¬ 
serve System. 

THROUGH THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD AND THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS, THE PEOPLE ARE LOSING THE 
RIGHTS GUARANTEED TO THEM BY THE CONSTITUTION 
(National). THEIR PROPERTY HAS BEEN TAKEN FROM 
THEM WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW_ ASSET CUR¬ 

RENCY, the device of the swindler should be done. 
away with. 


So, our currency is "asset currency," created by the 
Federal Reserve out of its "right" to create credit as * 
provided for in the Federal Reserve Act. This credit is 
created at no cost or risk to the private Federa l Reserve 
Bank Corporation and becomes debt obligations of the United. 
States. The Federal Reserve does not back its credit cre¬ 
ations with anything - THAT is the obligation of the United 
.States Government and the "ben jf jerries " of this w ond erful 
money making machine. Being an asset currency with no pro¬ 
vision whatever specified in the Federal Reserve Act to meet 
the obliga tions flowing from the acceptance and use of this-. 
private bank credit. WHAT, do you suppose, becomes the back¬ 
ing (security) for this currency ?m 

SECURITY: Seme thing given as a pledge of re¬ 
payment; bonds, stocks, etc.. [Webster's New 
World Dictionary] 

SECURITY: That which renders a matter sure; 
an instrument which renders certain the perfor¬ 
mance of a contract. [Bouvier's Law Dictionary] 

Enclosure 2 to Exhibit 7 is the full text of a letter 
from Russel L. Munk, Assistant General Counsel (Inter¬ 
national Affairs) for the Department of the Treasury in 
response to questions posed by a colleague of the author 
about the money of the United States. Following are pert¬ 
inent quotes for discussion from the viewpoint of our pre¬ 
sent context: 

Federal Reserve Notes are legal tender cur¬ 
rency (31 U.S.C. 5102). They are issued by the 
twelve Federal Reserve Banks pursuant to Section 
16 of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (12 U.S.C. 

411) ... 

In addition to being liabilities of the Fed¬ 
eral Reserve Banks, Federal Reserve notes are 


-176 - 































obligations of the United States Government (12 
U.S.C. 411). Congress has specified that a Fed¬ 
eral Reserve Bank must hold collateral (chiefly 
gold certificates and united States securities) 
equal in value to the Federal Reserve notes 
which the Bank receives (12 U.S.C. 412). The 
purpose of this section initially enacted in 
1913, was to provide backing for the note issue 
• • • 

Federal Reserve notes are not redeemable in 
gold or silver or in any other conmodity. They ~ 
have not been redeemable since 1933 ... 

In the sense that they are not redeemable. 
Federal Reserve notes nave not been backed by 
anything since 1933 .. 

IN ANOTHER SENSE, BECAUSE TOBY ARE LEGAL 
TENDER. FEDERAL RESERVE NOTES ARE "BACKED" BY„ ‘ 
ALL THE GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE ECONOMY. 


So, just what is Mr. Munk telling us? 

First: The Fed must hold, chiefly, gold certificates and 
United States securities equal in value to the Federal Re¬ 
serve notes received. Congressman Wright Patman described 
seeing huge Federal Reserve Bank vaults filled with united 
States securities (instruments rendering certain the per¬ 
formance of a contract - a pledge of repayment) whereupon 
the people pay interest to the Federal Reserve Banks. Ac¬ 
cording to Patman, these securities are the chief collateral 
held by the Fed. 

Second: Mr. Munk savs the notes are a "first lien" on 
all the assets of the Federal Reserve Banks - but then goes 
on to say they cure not redeemable in anything and have nolT 
been since 1933.' Clearly, then, they are neither redeemable^ 
in, nor backed by, any real assets of the Federal Reserve 
Banks - further proof that the Federal Reserve has no vested. 
interest, no risk, in this public credit/debt venture. 

Third: Mr. Munk finally tells us how WE are to fulfill 
our obligations to redean these "liabilities" of the Federal 
Reserve Banks; And that is with backing of "ALL TOE GOODS 
AND SERVICES IN TOE ECONOMY:" 

GOODS: In Contracts. The term ... applies 
to inanimate objects, and does not include an¬ 
imals or chattels real, as a lease for years of 
house or land ... In a more limited sense, goods 
is used for articles of merchandise. 

SERVICE: In Contracts. The being employed 
to serve another. 

In Feudal Law. That duty which the tenant 
owed to his lord by reason of his fee or estate. 


- 177 - 




































In Civil Law. A servitude. 

SERVITUDE: In Civil Law. The subjection of 
one person to another person, or of a person to 
a thing, or of a thing to a person, or a thing 
to a thing ... A personal servitude is the sub¬ 
jection of one person to another: if it con¬ 
sists in the right of property which a person 
exercises over another, it is slavery, when the 
subjection of one person to another is not slav¬ 
ery, it simply consists in the right of requir¬ 
ing of another what he is bound to do or not to 
do: THIS RIGHT ARISES FROM ALL KINDS OF CON¬ 
TRACTS CR QUASI-CONIRACTS. [Bouvier's Law Dic¬ 
tionary] 

Thus, the nature of the obligations of the U.S. Gov¬ 
ernment is revealed to us. For the privilege of using the 
private bank credit creation of the Federal Reserve (the 
life blood of a mercantile public trust), we are bound by 
the public pledge of revenue assurance to make good on the 
public debt to the Federal Reserve. Not only are all our 
goods pledged as backing for this debt currency, but our 
SERVITUDE via contracts or quasi-contracts; hence, "it is 
not slavery." This scheme is in direct violation of the 
Necessary and Positive Law of the Law of Nations. 

By way of the Federal Reserve Act, a Charter vras granted 
to the private Federal Reserve Bank Corporation whereby the 
Fed acquired a hypothecation in the public pledge of revenue 
assurance for the Public Debt. The Federal Reserve Act, and 
acts amendatory thereof, is nothing more than a modern Ton¬ 
tine policy dressed up in the garb of a revenue policy. In 
other words, a pretended assurance, founded on an ideal 
risk, where the Federal Reserve Bank Corporation has no 
interest in the Public Debt underwritten; and, in consid¬ 
eration of premiums collected from the American people can 
therefore sustain no loss by the happening of any of the 
misfortunes assured against. 

Basic Elements Of A wager Policy: 

1. Indemnification is sought for a loss that was not 
suffered. 

2. The contract is based upon an ideal risk (sure bet). 

3. An insurable interest is lacking between the insurer 
and the thing or person assured. 

4. The Contract operates to provide a double satisfac¬ 
tion. 

A parallel can be drawn between what the Federal Reserve 
Bank Corporation has done and what an arsonist accomplishes. 


- 178 - 



The arsonist, like the Bank, represents a false value in 
the insurance contract. Indent- nification is obtained by 
the arsonist for a loss not suf- fered. The arsonist gains 
a huge profit at the expense of the public cannon stock 
because he profits from the losses of those who risked a 
real consideration. 

Further, the arsonist policy is based on an ideal risk. 
It is a sure bet when the arsonist sets fire to the thing 
insured he will collect a handsome profit from the losses of 
others, UNLESS the fraud is discovered in time. 

Each and every essential element of a Wager Policy are 
present in the Federal Reserve operation. The contractual 
and or quasi-contractual duties and obligations imposed on 
its "beneficiaries" are founded on an HYPOTHECATION of the 
public pledge of revenue assurance for the public debt; a 
pledge to redeem the obligations of the Federal Reserve 
Board and the Federal Reserve Banks in consideration of a 
pretended assurance by the private Federal Reserve Bank 
Corporation - WHICH IS A WAGERING POLICY! 


Part IV: HJR-192, Another Legislative Coup (June 5, 1933) 

The Federal Reserve precipated the crash of '29 by in¬ 
flating the currency and then increasing the member bank 
reserve requirements, thereby forcing a huge liquidity 
squeeze. This set the stage for what was to follow in 1933 
by way of bankrupting the treasuries of the states and fed¬ 
eral governments. They could no longer pay their debts at 
law to the Federal Reserve. Drastic measures were obviously 
necessary, we had a "National Emergency" on our hands! 

On April 5, 1933, President Roosevelt issued an executive 
order calling for the return of all gold in private hiding 
to the Federal Reserve by May 1 under pain of ten years im¬ 
prisonment and $10,000 fine. Hoarders were hunted and pros¬ 
ecuted, Attorney General Cummings declared: 

I have no patience with people who follow a 
course which in war time would class them as 
slackers. If I have to make an example of seme 
people. I’ll do it cheerfully. 

On May 12, 1933, the California Assembly and Senate 
adopted Assembly Joint Resolution No. 26. This resolution 
stated in part: 

Whereas, it would appear that, with proper 
use and control of modern means of production 
and distribution, it would be possible for prac¬ 
tically all persons to have and enjoy a fair 


-179 - 



share of material goods in return for services. 
Whereas, such use and control and appropriate 
economic planning are not feasible except 
through the direction and supervision of a sin¬ 
gle, centralized agency and the removal of cer¬ 
tain constitutional limitations; now, therefore 
be it Resolved by the Assembly and Senate, 
jointly, that the legislature of the State of 
California hereby memoralizes the Congress to 
propose an amendment to the constitution of the 
United States reading substantially as follows: 

"The Congress and the several states, by its 
authority and under its control, may regulate or 
provide for the regulation of hours of work, 
compensation for work, the production of com¬ 
modities and the rendition of services, in such 
manner as shall be necessary and proper to fos¬ 
ter orderly production and equitable distrib¬ 
ution, to provide remunerative work for the max¬ 
imum number of persons, to promote adequate 
compensation for work per- formed, and to 
safeguard the economic stability and welfare of 
the nation;" 

Resolved, that the legislature of California 
respectfully urges that, pending the submission 
and adoption of such amendment, the Congress 
provide for such economic planning and regu¬ 
lation as may be necessary and proper under pre¬ 
sent economic conditions and LEGALLY POSSIBLE 
UNDER TOE EXISTING PROVISIONS OF TOE CONSTITU¬ 
TION; and be it further Resolved, that the chief 
clerk of the Assembly is hereby instructed 
forthwith to transmit copies of this resolution 
to the President of the United States, and to 
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and each of the sena¬ 
tors and representatives from California in the 
Congress of the united States. 

Other state legislatures beseeched Congress in similar 
fashion. On June 5, 1933, Congress took steps, "legally 
possible under existing provisions of the Constitution" to 
"resolve" our economic crises by enactment of House Joint 
Resolution 192 to suspend the gold standard and abrogate the 
gold clause. 

This resolution declared: 

Whereas the holding or dealing in gold affect 
the PUBLIC INTEREST, and are therefore subject 
to proper regulation and restriction; and where- 


-180 - 



1QA • THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 19y5 • USA IUUAt 



By Mika Smith, Las Vegas Sun, for U! 


















as the existing emergency has disclosed that 
provisions of obligations which purport to give 
the obligee a RIGHT TO REQUIRE PAYMENT in gold 
or a particular kind of coin or currency ... ARE 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE DECLARED POLICY OF CON¬ 
GRESS IN THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS. 

This resolution also declared that any obligation 
requiring: 


... PAYMENT in gold or a particular kind of 
coin or currency, or in an amount in money of 
the united States measured thereby, IS DECLARED 
TO BE AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY; AND ... EVERY OB¬ 
LIGATION, HERETOFORE OR HEREAFTER INCURRED, 
SHALL BE DISCHARGED upon payment, dollar for 
dollar, in any coin or currency which at the 
time of payment is legal tender for public and 
private debts. ... 

And that: 


All coins and currencies of the United States 
(including Federal Reserve Notes and circulating 
notes of Federal Reserve banks and national 
banking associations) heretofore or hereafter 
coined or issued, SHALL BE LEGAL TENDER for all 
debts, public and private, public charges, tax¬ 
es, duties, and dues, ... [House Joint Resolu¬ 
tion 192, 73 d Congress, Sess. I, Ch. 48, June 
5, 1933 (Public Law No. 10)] 



Note that "payment of debt" is now against Congressional 
and "public"policy and henceforth, "Every obligation V.~ 


l 


Shall be_discharqed." 


'J 


In the case of Stanek v. White, 172 Minn. 390, 215 H.W. 
784, the court explained the legal distinction between the 
words "payment" and "discharge." 


A 

There is a distinction between a "debt dis- 

. 

charqed" and a "debt paid." when discharged the 

T 

debt still exists though divested ot its char- 

acter as a legal obligation during the operation 



of the discharge. Scmething of the Oriqinal 


/ 

r Vitality of the debt continues to exist, which 
may be transferred, even though the transferee 
takes it subject to its disability incident to 
the discharge. The fact that it carries some¬ 
thing which may be a consideration for a new 
y) 





premise to pay, so as to make an otherwise 
worthless premise a legal obligation, makes it 
the subject of transfer by assignment. 



Thus, as a result of HJR-192 and from that day forward 


(June 5, 1933), no one has been able to pay a debt. 


only thing one can do is tender in transfer 


debts. 


The 

and 


the debt is perpetual. The suspension of the gold standard, 
and prohibition against paying debts, removed the substance 
for our ccrrmon law to operate on, and created a void, as far 
as the law is concerned. This substance was replaced with a 
ftN j "public National Credit System" where debt is "Legal Tender " 
[A n money (the Federal Reserve calls it "monetized debt"). 

HJR-192 was implemented inmediately. The day after Pres¬ 
ident Roosevelt signed the resolution the treasury offered 
the public new government securities, minus the traditional 
"payable in gold" clause. 

Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, proscribes the states 
making any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in 
payment of debt, but this Article does not contain an ab¬ 
solute prohibition against the states making something else 
a tender in transfer of debt. 

HJR-192 prohibits payment of debt and substitutes, in its 
place, a discharge of an obligation. Thereby, not only sub¬ 
verting, but totally"bypassing the "absolute prohibition" so 
I carefully engineered into the Constitution. Perpetual debt, 
bills, notes, cheques, and credits fall within a totally 
different jurisdiction than that contemplated by Article I, 
\ Section 10, Clause 1. 

>, Absolved from the responsibility of paying our debts at 
law, we were placed in the position (like it or not) of 
having the "benefit" of limited liability for payment of 
1 debt under the jurisdiction of Admiralty/Maritime in all 
controversies involving this subject matter. 


G 


\\ 31 USC 315 (b) provided that; 


No gold shall after January 30, 1934, be 
coined, and no gold coin shall after January 30, 
1934, be paid out or delivered by the United 
States; provided however, that coinage may con¬ 
tinue to be executed by the mints of the united 
States for foreign countries .... 


This exception was necessary bec ause foreign countries. 


being recognized as sovereign, could not be h eld to the 


a q .1 internal "public policy" of the United States. HJR-192 was 
Vy) binding only upon those persons who were beneficiaries of 
the public charitable trust under the monetary powers of the 
Federal Reserve system. 


-182 - 










Furthermore, in the case of Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. 
Attorney General, 124 u.S. 581, the court said: 


The court will not pass 
tionality of a statute 
who has availed himself of 


upon the constitu- 7 
at the instance of one I 
its benefits. [124 \ 


[JJ.S.581] 




Thus, if one avails himself of any benefits of the public 
credit system he waives the right to challenge the validity 
of any statute pertaining to, and/or conferring "benefits" 
of this system on the basis of constitutionality. Two years 
after HJR-192, Congress passed the Social Security Act. 
This was subsequently upheld as a valid Act, imposing a 
valid tax by the Supreme Court in the case of Charles C. 
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). Anyone who 
applies for a Social Security Card is on record as being an 
expectant beneficiary of the public credit system; and 
therefore is bound by contract to pay the designated inter¬ 
est or premium. By virtue of this fact alone, such bene¬ 
ficiary is a "taxpayer" within the Internal Revenue Code and 
the IRS is the enforcing agency for the contracting parties. 
The "tax" is valid because the obligation to pay is volun¬ 
tarily incurred by the solicitation of benefits via the So¬ 
cial Security Application. The applicant binds himself to 
the coercive terms of the contract. 


Part V: Erie Railroad v. Tcmpkins - The Judicial ccup de 
grace (1938) [M] 

S 

Introduction: 

In 1938, the Supreme Court decided what a member of the 
Court quite justifiably called "one of the most important 
cases at law in American legal history." The case was Erie 
Railroad v. Tcmpkins, and since that decision there has de¬ 
veloped what is commonly called the "Erie Doctrine." 
[M](l). 

The core of the Erie Doctrine is the substantive law to 
be applied by the federal courts in any case is State law, 
EXCEPT when the matter before the court is governed by the 
United States Constitution, an Act of Congress, a treaty, 
international law, the domestic law of another country, or, 
in special circumstances, by "federal common law." 

The Erie decision, and the doctrine subsequently devel¬ 
oped, modified the conception of federal authority that 
prevailed prior to Erie under the doctrine of Swift v. Ty¬ 
son, 16 Pet. [M](2). The central issue in Swift v. Tyson 
and in Erie was the proper construction of Section 34 of the 


- 183 - 


Judiciary Act of 1789 - the famous Rules of Decision Act. 
This statute provided: 

The laws of the several states, except where 
the Constitution, treaties car statutes of the 
United States shall otherwise require or pro¬ 
vide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in 
trials at cannon law in the courts of the United 
States in cases where they apply. 

Although amended in 1948, the Rules of Decision Act has 
remained substantially unchanged to this day. 

The crucial question of construction, posed by the Act, 
is whether "laws of the several states" encotnpases not only 
state legislative enactments but also the decisions of state 
courts; and therefore, whether state court decisions are 
controlling at least in sane situations in the federal 
courts. Swift v. Tyson held that: 

... laws of the several states that the 
federal courts were bound to apply to the Rules 
of Decision Act included, in addition to state 
constitutions and statutes, only those state 
judicial decisions that either construed state 
constitutional or statutory provisions or dealt 
with questions of real property or other iirmov- 
able matters. The decisions of state courts on 
matters of Conner- cial law, however, could be 
disregarded by the federal courts in favor of 
the general principle and doctrines of 
cctnnercial jurispurdence. 

The Swift v. Tyson decision could have been limited to 
questions of commercial law, but was not so limited by the 
Court: 


In addition to questions of purely Commercial 
law, "general law" was held to include the obli¬ 
gations under contracts entered into and to be 
performed within a State, the extent to which a 
carrier operating within a state may stipulate 
for exenption from liability for his own negli¬ 
gence or that of his employee; the liability for 
torts committed within the state upon persons 
resident or properly located there, even where 
the question of liability depended upon the 
scope of a property right conferred by the 
State; and the right to exemplary or punative 
damages. Furthermore, state decisions constru¬ 
ing local deeds, mineral conveyance, and even 


- 184 - 



devises of real estate, were disregarded. [Erie 
R.R. v. Tompkins (supra) - The Court's footnotes 
11-19.] 

"General" law was also held to encompass determinations 
of conflict of lavra. Usually, state law was respected on 
questions of real property, but even on that subject the 
federal courts were allowed to take their own view if the 
existing state decisions were thought to be unsettled. 

Although the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson grew and 
flourished during the latter half of the Nineteenth Century, 
it was to cane under increasingly heavy attack both from 
within the Court itself and from scholars and lawyers. 
Accordingly, the Swift doctrine was subsequently narrowed, 
but the end did not cans until 1938 with the decision in 
Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins. 

Development Of The Erie Doctrine: 

The Erie Case 

The Erie case hardly appeared to be of much significance 
when it began. Harry Tompkins was walking along the right- 
of-way of the Erie Railroad at Hughestown, Pennsylvania. As 
a train came by he was struck by something that looked like 
a door projecting from one of the moving cars. Under at 
least one view of Pennsylvania law, the courts of that state 
would have regarded Tomkins as a trespasser and consequently 
held that the railroad would not be liable except for wanton 
or willful misconduct. The "general law", recognized by the 
federal courts under Swift v. Tyson, gave Tenpkins the 
status of a licensee, and imposed liability for ordinary 
negligence. Since the Railroad was a New York corporation, 
and Tompkins was a citizen of Pennsylvania, he was able to 
invoke diversity jurisdiction and bring suit in federal 
court. He eventually obtained a judgment for $30,000, which 
was affirmed by the Second Circuit on the theory that the 
question was not one of local but of general law. Hie 
railroad successfully petitioned for certiorari. in its 
brief to the Supreme Court the railroad said "we do not 
question the finalty of the holding of this Court in Swift 
v. Tyson/...," and the argument, both in the brief and 
orally, was that the Pennsylvania cases as to the duty owed 
someone in Tompkins' position declared a Pennsylvanian rule 
sufficiently "local" in nature to be controlling. Tenpkins 
argued that the issue was a question of "general" cannon law 
and therefore governed by the existing federal precedents. 
In other words, both sides relied on Swift v. Tyson; they 
simply disagreed on how it should be applied in the 
particular case. 


- 185 - 



NEVERTHELESS, when the decision was handed down on April 
25, 1938, Justice Brandeis began his opinion for the Court 
by stating: 

The question for decision is whether the oft- 
challenged doctrine Swift v. Tyson shall now be 
disapproved. 

Having posed this somewhat surprising question, justice 
Brandeis was quick to answer it in the affirmative by sum¬ 
marily announcing the new principle which was to become the 
heart of the Erie Doctrine: 

EXCEPT in matters governed by the Federal 
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to 
be applied in any case is the law of the state. 

And whether the law of the state shall be de¬ 
clared by its Legislature in a statute or by its 
highest court in a decision is not a matter of 
federal concern. There is no federal general 
cannon law. Congress has no power to declare 
substantive rules of cannon law applicable in a 
state whether they be local in nature or "gen¬ 
eral", be they catmercial law or part of the law 
of torts. And no clause in the Constitution 
purports to confer such a power upon the federal 
courts ... 

In disapproving (the doctrine of Swift v. 

Tyson) ... we do not hold unconstitutional 
section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 
or any other act of Congress. We merely declare 
that in applying the doctrine this Court and the 
lower courts have invaded rights which in our 
opinion are reserved by the constitution to the 
several states. [Erie (supra)] 

The case was remanded to the Second circuit to determine 
whether Pennsylvania law in fact was as restrictive as the 
railroad contended, and on remand Tompkins ended up without 
his $30,000 judgment. 

On the surface, the ruling appears innocuous enough. How 
then, did this decision change our entire system of juris¬ 
prudence, both state and federal, and create the federal 
giant we have today, while purportedly returning to the 
states a power that for nearly a century had been exercised 
by the federal government? 

Henry J. Friendly, Judge, United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second circuit subsequently gave us the following 
insights into the significance of this decision: 


- 186 - 




The clarion yet careful pronouncement of 
Erie, "There is no federal general caimon law" 
opened the way to what, for want of a better 
term, we may call SPECIALIZED FEDERAL COWON 
LAW. I doubt that we sufficiently realize how 
far this development has gone - let alone where 
it is likely to go. 

Since most cases relating to federal natters 
were in the federal courts and involved "general 
law", the familiar rule of Swift v. Tyson usu¬ 
ally gave federal judges all the freedom they 
required in pre-Erie days and made it unneces¬ 
sary for them to consider a MORE ESOTERIC SOURCE 
OF POWER ... BY FOCUSING ATTENTION ON THE NATURE 
OF THE RIGHT BEING ENFORCED, ERIE CAUSED THE 
PRINCIPLE OF A SPECIALIZED FEDERAL COMMON LAW, 
BINDING IN ALL COURTS BECAUSE OF ITS SOURCE, to 
develop within a quarter century into a powerful 
unifying force. Just as federal courts do not 
conform to state decisions on issues properly 
for the states, state courts nust conform to 
federal decisions in areas where Congress, 
acting within powers granted to it, has 
manifested, be it ever so lightly, an intent to 
that end .... The fed- eral giant ..., 
"Professor Gilmore" has written, "is just 
beginning to stir with his long-delayed entrance 
we are, it may be, at last catching sight of the 
principle character. [M] (3). 

So, by focusing attention on the nature of the right 
being enforced, federal judges acquired an esoteric source 
of power binding in all courts because of its source. Let 
us see if we can catch sight of the principle character 
involved in this metamorphisis and, more importantly, what 
jurisdiction he wanders in. 

Further Development - Three Landmark Cases 

The law has gone far beyond the simple holding of Erie, 
to the point at which one competent scholar refers to "the 
Erie jurisprudence that has developed a doctrine completely 
foreign to the decision that is its putative source." 
[M](4); and another to the "myth of Erie." [M](5). Three 
decisions of the Court following the Erie decision did more 
than simply explicate the developing Erie doctrine; rather, 
each of them redefined the scope and thrust of Erie in such 
a manner as to yield an entirely new conceptualization of 
it. These cases are: Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. 


-187 - 



York, 1945; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 
Inc., 1958 and Hanna v. Plunmer, 1965. [M](6). 

In Guaranty Trust, the Court stated the issue to be: 

This case reduces itself to the narrow ques¬ 
tion whether, when no recovery could be had in a 
State court because the action is barred aby the 
statute of limitations, a federal court in eq¬ 
uity can take cognizance of the suit because 
there is a diversity of citizenship between the 
parties. 

The imperative that federal court enforcement of state- 
created rights mirror state court enforcement also dictated 
that the classifications of "substance" and "procedure" must 
be applied in light of the purpose of Erie. The Guaranty 
Trust opinion recognized that Erie questions cannot be 
answered by adopting the distinctions between "substance" 
and "procedure" that have been drawn for other purposes. 
The court held that under the Rules of Decision Act state 
statutes of limitations are binding in diversity cases. But 
the significance of Guaranty Trust was much broader than its 
holding concerning the application of state statutes of 
limitations. The effect of the decision was to transform 
the carmand of Erie (and the Rules of Decision Act) that 
federal courts apply state law except in matters governed by 
the Constitution or by Acts of Congress into a policy of 
duplicating state court results in diversity cases according 
to an "outcome-determinative" test. 

The court struggled for thirteen years with the outcome- 
determinative test but there were inevitable difficulties. 
Applied literally, very little would remain of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in diversity cases inasmuch as 
almost EVERY PROCEDURAL RULE MAY HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT 
ON THE OUTCOME OF A CASE. 

The Erie question presented by the case of Byrd v. Blue 
Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. in 1958 was whether 
the factual issues raised by an affirmative defense were to 
be decided by the judge or by the jury. A South Carolina 
state court decision had held that it was for the judge 
alone to decide on the evidence whether a defendant was a 
statutory employer and entitled to immunity. Federal court 
practice, on the other hand, required that all disputed 
questions of fact be decided by the jury. In an opinion by 
Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court held that notwithstanding 
the contrary rule, the federal court practice was to be 
followed. The court conceded that were "outcome" the only 
consideration, a strong case might appear for saying that 
the federal courts should follow the state practice. But 


- 188 - 




the court went on to hold that "outcome" was not the sole 
consideration, and that, at least in the case before it, 
there were "affirmative countervailing considerations." 

In many respects, the opinion in Byrd is the most 
puzzling of the Supreme Court's major Erie Decisions. It 
rules out the more extreme interpretations of York that 
federal courts in the exercise of their diversity juris¬ 
diction must transform themselves into state courts. It 
provides at best an ambiguous guidance as to when, aside 
from the precise circumstances present in Byrd, federal 
rules will prevail in the face of contrary state rules. 

One ambiguity is precisely which federal interest, or 
"affirmative countervailing consideration," justified 
departure from the state rule in Byrd? was it "the in¬ 
fluence, if not the ccrrmand, of the Seventh Amendment? If 
so, the opinion might be given a narrow construction, lim¬ 
ited to cases in which the federal constitutional right to 
jury trial is implicated. Another possibility suggested by 
the court's opinion is the judge-jury relationship and prac¬ 
tice in the federal courts that provide a "countervailing 
consideration." Yet, a third possibility is "the federal 
system ... (as) an independent system for administering 
justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction." 
If this was the basis for theCourt's decision, Byrd can be 
given a very broad sweep indeed. [M] (7). 

The Erie question presented by the case of Hanna v. 
Plumer in 1965 was whether, in a federal diversity case, the 
adequacy of service of process was to be measured by state 
law car by Rule 4 (d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 

Broadly viewed, the question in Hanna was the same as 
that in Erie, York and Byrd; whether a federal court in a 
diversity case must decide an issue according to state 
decisions, the relevant federal law in Hanna was a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure, promulgated pursuant to the Rules 
Enabling Act. Enacted by Congress in 1934, the Rules En¬ 
abling Act provides, in pertinent part: 

The Supreme Court shall have the power to 
prescribe, by general rules, the forms of pro¬ 
cess, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the 
practice of the district courts of the United 
States in civil action .... 

Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or mod¬ 
ify any substantive right and shall preserve the 
right of trial by jury ... [28 U.S.C.A., Section 
2072] 

Chief Justice warren, writing for the Court in Hanna, 
found first that Rule 4(d)(1) was within the scope of the 


- 189 - 



7 


Rules Enabling Act, and then came to the heart of his 
opinion. Not only did the strict outcome-determinative 
argument for the application of state law, run counter to 
Erie and York as reconsidered by the court but it contained 
a "more fundamental flaw," "the incorrect assumption that 
the rule of Erie ... constitutes the appropriate test of the 
validity and therefore the applicability of a Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure. Rather, the Chief Justice explained 
when a Federal Rule is at issue, such as in Hanna, the 
question is controlled by the Rules Enabling Act. 

"Outcome determination analysis" is not repu¬ 
diated by Hanna; rather, it is refined by tying 
it to the policies of Erie, and is limited to 
those genuine Erie cases in which the choice-of- 
law question does not involve a Federal Rule. 

Although Hanna is the Supreme Court's last major con¬ 
tribution to the Erie doctrine, the other principle cases, 
Erie, York and Byrd certainly cannot be disregarded. The 
four decisions build upon and inform one another. None of 
than can be adequately understood in isolation. 

The Constitutional Basis (?) 

If only a question of statutory construction 
were involved, "Justice Brandeis wrote in the 
Erie decision," we should not be prepared to 
abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout 
nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality 
of the course pursued has new been made clear, 
and compels us to do so. 

Perhaps no aspect of the Erie decision has so perplexed 
the ccmnentators as this statement. For a decision over¬ 
ruling, on what purports to be constitutional grounds, a 
concept of federal court jurisdiction and power as important 
and long-standing as has the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. 
The constitutional discussion in Erie is remarkably abbrev¬ 
iated. It basically consists of but five sentences: 

Congress has no power to declare substantive 
rules of cannon law applicable in a state whe¬ 
ther they be local in nature or "general," be 
they catmercial law or a part of the law of 
torts. And no clause in the Constitution pur¬ 
ports to confer such a power upon the federal 
courts.... 

The doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. 
Justice Holmes said, "an unconstitutional as- 


- 190 - 




sumption of powers by the Courts of the United 
States...." In disaproving that doctrine we do 
not hold unconstitutional section 34 of the Fed¬ 
eral Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other act of 
Congress. We merely declare that in applying 
the doctrine this Court and the lower courts 
have invaded rights which in our opinion are re¬ 
served by the Constitution to the several 
states. [Erie, (supra)] 

A few of the puzzling features of this "constitutional 
discussion" are noteworthy. Although Justice Brandeis 
asserts in the first sentance that Congress has no power to 
declare substantive rules of cannon law applicable in a 
state, the Rules of Decision Act did not involve any attempt 
by Congress to do so. Indeed, Justice Brandeis apparently 
recognized this for he expressly disavowed holding as un¬ 
constitutional "Section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 
1789 (the Rules of Decision Act) or any other acat of Con¬ 
gress." Instead it was the Court's cwn conduct that was 
regarded as unconstitutional. But we are not told which 
provision of the Constitution was violated by the course 
pursued under Swift v. Tyson; instead, justice Brandeis 
states only that no clause in the Constitution purports to 
confer upon the federal courts the power to declare 
substantive rules of cannon law applicable in a state, and 
that the federal courts "have invaded rights which in our 
opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several 
States." Presumably this last reference is to the Tenth 
Amendment, but it is unusual to have a constitutional de¬ 
cision that avoids making specific reference to the consti¬ 
tutional provision thought to be involved. 

For 18 years after Erie the Court refrained from refer¬ 
ring again to the Constitution in an Erie context. This 
silence was perhaps most significant in Guaranty Trust 
Company of New York v. York. In the course of that major 
redefinition of the Erie doctrine. Justice Frankfurter re¬ 
ferred at three separate places to the "policy" of federal 
jurisdiction embodied in the Erie case. It is odd that what 
had seemed to Justice Brandeis a constitutional imperative 
(undefined) was reduced to a mere "policy", in the eyes of 
Justice Frankfurter and the Court for which he spoke. 

The first reference to the Constitution after Erie itself 
was in 1956 in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America, 
Inc., [M](8). The next reference to the Constitution was in 
Hanna v. Planner (supra). These two cases, like Erie, glos¬ 
ses over seme hard questions, particularly concerning the 
extent to which Article ill implies the general power in the 
federal government, and the Necessary and Proper clause of 
Article I warrants congressional implementation. 


- 191 - 



The only other "Erie" decision in which the Court has 
mentioned the Constitution is Prima Paint Corporation v. 
Flood and Conklin Manufacturing Company in 1967. [M](9). 
That case, like Bernhardt, was a diversity action involving 
the enforceability of an arbitration clause under Section 3 
of the United States Arbitration Act. But in Prima Paint 
the underlying contract clearly involved INTERSTATE COM¬ 
MERCE. As interpreted in Bernhardt, Section 3, therefore 
was applicable. But would it be constitutional to apply the 
Arbitration Act in these circumstances? The Court's answer, 
with Justice Fortas writing, was an affirmative one. 

... (Citing York) The question in this case, 
however, is not whether Congress may fashion 
federal substantive rules to govern questions 
arising in siirple diversity cases. See Bern¬ 
hardt ... and concurring opinion, ...Rather, the 
question is whether Congress may prescribe how 
federal courts are to conduct themselves with 
respect to SUBJECT MATTER over which Congress 
plainly has power to Legislate. The answer to 
that can only be in the affirmative. And it is 
clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitra¬ 
tion statute is based upon and confined to the 
INCONTESTABLE FEDERAL FOUNDATIONS OF "CONTROL 
OVER INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND OVER ADMIRALTY." 

[Prima Paint (supra)] 

So, what precisely was the constitutional question de¬ 
cided in Erie, and on what ground? Erie ultimately rests on 
the principle that the federal government as a whole, in¬ 
cluding Congress and the federal courts, has no more auth¬ 
ority than that given by the Constitution. Of course, the 
converse of this principle is that Congress and the federal 
courts may create rules of law if authorized to do so under 
the Constitution. 

First, consider the congressional power to declare sub¬ 
stantive rules of law. Under the Comnerce Clause of Article 
I, augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress 
undoubtedly could have passed a law declaring the duty of 
care owed by interstate railroads to those walking along 
their right-of-ways, thus bringing the issue in Erie within 
the ambit of federal law after all via "incontestable fed¬ 
eral foundations of control over interstate commerce and 
over admiralty." 

Are we, at last, beginning to catch sight of the 
"principle character" of the "Federal Giant?" 

Federal Common Law Or "Specialized" Common Law 


-192 - 




Although, since Erie, there is no "general" federal 
cannon law, it is now recognized that in certain narrowly 
defined but extremely important circumstances the federal 
courts may fashion "specialized" federal common law (Friend¬ 
ly in praise of Erie, supra.) - substantive rules of deci¬ 
sion not expressly authorized by either the Constitution or 
any Act of Congress that supplanted state law. Indeed, the 
very day the Court interred "federal general cannon law" in 
Erie, it announced in another case, with Justice Brandeis 
again writing for the Court, that: 

... whether the water of an interstate stream 
must be apportioned between ... two states is a 
question of "federal cannon law" upon which nei¬ 
ther the statutes nor the decisions of either 
State can be conclusive. [Hinderliter v. La 
Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 1938, 58 
S. ct. 803, 822; 304 U.S. 92, 110, 82 L. Ed. 

1202] 

The manifestations of this "Specialized" power of the 
federal courts are extremely diverse and the governing 
principles amarphous. By and large, however, they all share 
certain characteristics: [M] (10). 

1. The "federal cannon law" that has developed since Erie 
differs from the general federal cannon law applied by fed¬ 
eral courts under Swift v. tyson because it falls within an 
area of federal on national competence; indeed, the develop¬ 
ment of federal cannon law now must be supported by sane ex¬ 
press or implied affirmative grant of power to the national 
government. 

2. unlike the federal law developed under Swift, post- 
Erie federal cannon law is truly federal law in the sense 
that, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, it is binding on 
state courts as well as in the federal courts. 

3. Congress can override this post-Erie federal cannon 
law. Usually, federal cannon law is exercised only when 
Congress has not spoken to an issue. But when Congress does 
speak to the issue, its statement prevails over today's fed¬ 
eral common law. 

4. A case "arising under" federal cannon law presents a 
federal question and as such is within the original juris¬ 
diction of the federal courts and is not dependent upon the 
diversity of citizenship. 

Although categorization is always a risky business, it is 
possible to make the broad statement that federal cannon law 
has been developed in three contexts: 


-193 ~ 



First: There are those situations involving "signifi¬ 
cant" conflict between some FEDERAL POLICY OR in teres t and 
the use of state law. In these cases, a federal rule of 
decision is "necessary to protect uniquely federal inter¬ 
ests." [M](ll). 

Second: There are those "areas of judicial decision with 
which the POLICY of the law is so dominated by the sweep of 
federal statutes that legal relations which they affect must 
be deemed GOVERNED BY FEDERAL LAW." [M](12). 

Third: There are cases involving federal common law in 
areas in which there is a STRONG NATIONAL OR FEDERAL CON¬ 
CERN. The most significant groups of cases in this category 
involve controversies between states, ADMIRALTY MATTERS 
[M](13), and foreign relations. 

THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS TO CREATE A FEDERAL 
C0M40N LAW TO GOVERN ADMIRALTY SUITS WAS RECOGNIZED QUITE 
EARLY AND IS WELL ESTABLISHED. In Southern Pacific Company 
v. Jensen [M](14), the Supreme Court found that the consti¬ 
tutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction gave to the federal 
courts (and Congress) the power to construct A UNIFORM BODY 
OF SUBSTANTIVE FEDERAL MARITIME LAW APPLICABLE IN ADMIRALTY 
AND NON-ADMIRALTY COURTS ALIKE. Writing for the majority. 
Justice McReynolds stated: 

Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution 
extends the judicial power of the United States 
"to all cases of admiralty and maritime juris¬ 
diction;" and Article I, Section 8, confers upon 
the Congress power "to make all laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into execu¬ 
tion the foregoing powers and all other powers 
vested by this Constitution in the government of 
the United States or in any department or offi¬ 
cer thereof." 

Considering our former opinions, it must now 
be accepted as settled doctrine that, in conse¬ 
quence of these provisions. Congress has para¬ 
mount power to fix and determine the maritime 
law which shall prevail throughout the coun¬ 
try. ... And further that, in the absence of same 
controlling statute, the general maritime law, 
as accepted by the Federal courts, constitutes 
part of our national law, applicable to matters 
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 

THE APPLICATION OF FEDERAL COMON LAW IN ADMIRALTY CASES 
IS CONSISTENT WITH ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF THE ERIE DOCTRINE 
[M] (15). ADDITIONAL SUPPORT CAN BE POUND IN THE NATIONAL 


-194 - 



INTEREST IN UNIFORMITY AS TO THE LAW GOVERNING MARITIME COM¬ 
MERCE. [M] (16). 

It should be noted that in its 1981 decision in Northwest 
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL- 
CIO, the Supreme Court took pains bo emphasize that THE 
IAWMAKING ROLE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY IN ADMIRALTY SUITS 
WAS "SPECIAL," and it stood in contrast bo the general pre¬ 
sumption against lawmaking by courts of limited jurisdic¬ 
tion. The Northwest Airlines decision did recognize that 
admiralty law is judge-made to a great extent (an esoteric 
source of power?) but, in emphasizing the deference owed by 
federal courts bo the legislative branch, the Court said: 

Even in admiralty, however, where federal 
judicial lawmaking power may well be at its 
strongest, it is our duty to respect the will of 
Congress. [101 S. Ct. 1571; 67 L. Ed. 2d 750] 

The best known Supreme Court case that serves to illus¬ 
trate the operation of these principles is Clearfield Trust 
Company v. United States. [M](17). A check issued by the 
United States had been stolen and cashed on the basis of a 
forged endorsement. The United States sued a bank that had 
presented the check for payment and had guaranteed prior en¬ 
dorsements. The district court held that under the law of 
Pennsylvania, where the transaction had taken place, the 
delay of the United States in notifying the bank that the 
endorsement was forgery would bar recovery from the bank. 
The court of appeals reversed and the reversal was affirmed 
by a unanimous Supreme Court, which held that the rights and 
duties of the United States on its commercial paper are gov¬ 
erned by federal common law. This case is reported in the 
"Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts" as follows: 

... a unanimous court held that the rights 
and duties of the United States on commercial 
paper that its issues are governed by federal 
rather than local law. This does not mean that 
in choosing the applicable federal rule the 
courts may not occasionally select state law. 

But it was thought that such a course vrauld be 
singularly inappropriate in the Clearfield case. 

The issuance of commercial paper by the united 
States is on a vast scale and transactions in 
that paper from issuance to payment will com¬ 
monly occur in several states ... 

THE DESIREABILITY CF A UNIFORM RULE IS PLAIN. 

TO FIND SUCH A UNIFORM RULE THE COURT LOOKED TO 
THE FEDERAL IAW MERCHANT ... 


-195 - 



Federal courts have made similar decisions 
for themselves as to what the controlling rule 
is to be in other cases where the United States 
is a party and the suit involved camtercial pa¬ 
per, or bonds issued by the United States, gov¬ 
ernment contracts, or the effect of a federal 
lien ... 

IF AN ISSUE IS CONIROLLED BY FEDERAL COMMON 
LAW, THIS IS BINDING ON BOTH STATE ANC FEDERAL 
COURTS. A case "arising under" federal common 
law is a federal question case, and is within 
the original jurisdiction of the federal courts 
as such .... 

THE BURGEONING OF A FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
BINDING ON FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS ALIKE HAS 
OCCURRED AT TOE SAME TIME AS TOE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE ERIE DOCTRINE. ... 

It is frequently said that the Erie doctrine 
applies only in cases in which jurisdiction is 
based on diversity of citizenship. Indeed in an 
action for wrongful death caused by a maritime 
tort ccnmitted on navigable waters, the Court 
curtly dismissed Erie as "irrevelant", since the 
district court was exercising its admiralty jur¬ 
isdiction, even though it was enforcing a state- 
created right ... 

DESPITE REPEATED STATEMENTS IMPLYING TOE CON¬ 
TRARY, IT IS TOE SOURCE OF TOE RIGHT SUED UPON, 

AND NOT TOE GROUND, ON WHICH FEDERAL JURISDIC¬ 
TION IS POUNDED, WHICH DETERMINES TOE GOVERNING 
LAW. 

The Clearfield principle has also been applied in gov¬ 
ernment tort and property litigation: 

Although the Clearfield case applied these 
principles to a situation involving contractual 
relations of the Government, they are equally 
applicable ... where the relations affected are 
contractual or tortious in character. [U.S. v. 
Standard Oil Co., 1947, 67 S.ct. 1604, 1607, 332 
U.S. 301, 305, 91 L.Ed. 2067.] 

Have we just caught another view of the "principle char¬ 
acter" of the "Federal Giant" and the "esoteric" source of 
power of federal judges? Is it not absolutely clear that, 
if the source of the right sued upon is a creation of the 
Federal Reserve Act and/or House Joint Resolution 192 
(Rights, benefits and obligations via a gigantic public 
trust; contracts between the U.S. Government and a private 


-196 - 




corporation; trust cur- rency being Connercial paper, 
private bank credit, issued on a vast scale; bonds and 
obligations of the United States, held by the Federal 
Reserve who collects interest on these obligations; 
creditor/debtor relationship in all transae- tions; Limited 
Liability for payment of debts; etc.), that the controlling 
law in any controversy involving this sub- ject matter is 
the Federal Law Merchant? And that, because of the 
interstate and international ccmnercial nature of the 
rights, duties, benefits, and obligations arising out of 
these contracts, and adhesion contracts thereto, this Fed¬ 
eral Law Merchant is under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
Admiralty/Maritime? "IN THE ADMIRALTY, A MIXTURE OF PUBLIC 
LAW AND MARITIME LAW AND EQUITY WERE OFTEN POUND IN THE SAME 
SUIT." [Reiver v. Seawall, supra] 


Part VI: The International Monetary Fund (1945) [N] 
Introduction: 

Creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in¬ 
volved years of careful planning. The IMF and the system it 
epitomizes were developed bo replace the gold standard, 
which had been increasingly undercut and sabatoged by gov¬ 
ernment meddling. Over the centuries, governments had ac¬ 
quired a monoply over the minting of coins, passed legal 
tender laws, and resorted to the use of fiat paper money. 
They exempted banks from honoring their contractual obli¬ 
gations by permitting than to suspend the redemption of 
their notes in gold or silver upon demand and chartered 
specially privileged "central banks", which were granted a 
monopoly over the issuance of notes within each nation. 
With governments increasingly modifying and manipulating the 
gold standard and encouraging fractional-reserve banking, 
more and more paper credit was allowed to pyramid on top of 
gold and silver reserves. The 1913 creation of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve System, America's Central Bank, marked the 
beginning of the end of the gold standard. House Joint 
Resolution 192 terminated the gold standard within the 
United States in 1933 and placed all "United States cit¬ 
izens" in a perpetual sea of credit and debt under the 
absolute control of the Monetary Power via its legal tender 
clause. 

The purpose of the IMF is to accomplish the identical 
thing for the Monetary Powers by making a one-world currency 
"legal tender." 

Birth Of The IMF: 


-197 - 



Members of the Council on Foreign Relations (CHR) were 
busily engaged in planning the post-war world even before 
the Sunday-morning visit to Pearl Harbor by Japan in 1941. 
In several reccnmendations during the late 1930's and early 
1940's, the war and Peace Studies groups of the CFR preposed 
that several international institutions were required to 
"stabilize" the World economy after the cessation of hostil¬ 
ities. For example, reccnmendation of P-B23 of July 1941 
stressed the need for worldwide financial institutions to 
begin "stabilizing currencies and facilitating programs of 
capital investment for constructing undertakings in under¬ 
developed regions." 

The idea was to set up a system after the war which would 
launch a global redistribution of wealth from productive 
Americans, in pursuance of the internationalist's plans 
congressman McFadden warned us about in 1932. 

The Council's cwn records show that during the last half 
of 1941, and in the early months of 1942, the CFR was al¬ 
ready formulating plans for remaking the world. These 
reccnmendations were forwarded to President Roosevelt and 
the State Department, where CFR agents were already in top 
positions of authority. Treasury advisor and CFR operative 
Jacob Viner wrote a memo proposing what would later turn out 
to be the IMF and World Bank. The note stated: 

It might be wise to set up two financial 
institutions: one an international exchange 
stabilization board and one an international 
bank to handle short-term transactions not 
directly concerned with stabilization. 

A world meeting of bankers and government planners was 
called by President Roosevelt to convene in July 1944. 
Officially called the United Nation's Monetary and Financial 
Conference, this historic occasion is generally referred to 
as the Bretton Woods Conference because it took place at the 
famed New Hampshire resort in Bretton Woods. That was the 
birthplace of the International Monetary Fund and the post¬ 
war monetary system. 

The Bretton Woods Conference was dominated by two 
individuals, one from Great Britain and one from the united 
States. The American Banker for April 20, 1971, in a 
monograph history of the IMF, reported: 

The main architects of the (international 
Monetary) Fund were Harry Dexter White and John 
Maynard Keynes - later Lord (Candy) Keynes - of 
the American and British Treasuries ... Keynes 
had written about a world central bank as early 
as 1930, while White had been instructed by the 


- 198 - 




U.S. Treasury only a week after Pearl Harbor to 
start drafting plans for an international stab¬ 
ilization fund after the war. 


Keynes was the darling of the socialist British Fabian 
Society who promulgated a queer brand of economics which, 
among other things, strongly encouraged unrestrained gov¬ 
ernment spending and deliberate budget deficits as a cure 
for inflation-caused recessions. 

Harry Dexter White was a bird of an even more crimson 
hue. While all the standard histories of the IMF fail to 
mention it, Harry Dexter White was at once a member of the 
Council on Foreign Relations and a Soviet agent. Having 
taught economics at Harvard University, White had moved into 
various positions of importance in the U.S. Treasury Depart¬ 
ment where he carefully laid out plans for a new world mon¬ 
etary order. 

On November 6, 1953, Attorney Gneral Herbert Brownell 
revealed that Harry Dexter White's: 

Spying activities for the Soviet Government 
were reported in detail by the F.B.I. to the 
White House ... in December of 1945. In the 
face of this information, and incredible though 
it may seem. President Truman went ahead and 
nominated White, who was then Assistant Secre¬ 
tary of the Treasury, for the even more impor¬ 
tant position of executive director for the 
United States in the International Monetary 
Fund. 

In his 1954 book "The web of Subversion", professor James 
Burnham observed: 

From its beginnings, and before its begin¬ 
ning, the International Monetary Fund has been 
closely encompassed by the web of subversion.... 

For more than three weeks Keynes, White, and thirteen 
hundred delegates had labored in New Hampshire to hammer out 
the details for formation of the IMF. According the 
American Banker monograph: 

Keynes wanted his international central bank to 
have power to create its cwn money. 

While agreeing with Keynes that a centrally managed world 
fiat money was the ultimate goal. White was more cautious. 
He knew the dangers of going too far too fast, recalling how 
the Senate had kept the United States out of the League of 


- 199 - 



Nations in the aftermath of World War I. White was con¬ 
cerned the Senate would scuttle so obvious a move toward 
One-World Government. The proposals of the new internation¬ 
al institutions were made to seem moderate as White and his 
planners judged every proposal by its chances of gaining 
congressional approval. 

At the same time, massive amounts of propaganda to sup¬ 
port the Bretton Woods coup were disseminated via the mass 
media. Typical vas an article in Collier's for June 2, 
1945, modestly entitled "Bretton woods or world War III." 

In 1945, Congress bought the whole United Nations/IMF/ 
World Bank package. It is true that the internationalist 
bankers and industrialists did not get the full-blown world 
currency that they wanted; but they knew that, just as when 
they created the Federal Reserve in 1913, it was more impor¬ 
tant to establish the framework into which more power could 
be vested as it became available. 

In short, the IMF is a gigantic mechanism for doing to 
the world what the Federal Reserve has done to the United 
States. To make a one-world currency work, it is necessary 
to have a world political state and world legal tender laws 
to enforce the acceptance. Enforcement will be under the 
Law of Merchants and within the jurisdiction of admiralty/ 
maritime. 

The Monetary powers have certainly not forgotten their 
aim of a fiat currency for the world. They planned for the 
day when gold would be unlinked and replaced by the central¬ 
ly managed paper. In 1970, the IMF created out of thin air 
something called "Special Drawing Rights" (S.D.R.'s) as a 
step in that direction. The S.D.R. is an abstract unit 
based on a so-called "basket of currencies" which is a 
weighted average of several major fiat currencies. Neither 
have the Monetary Powers forgotten the necessity for a world 
political state, or authority, in the enforcement of this 
scheme. 


Part VII: Public Law 95-147 (October 28, 1977) 

In the case of Lewis v. United States, the united States 
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, verified the fact the Fed¬ 
eral Reserve Banks are privately owned corporations: 

Examining the organization and function of 
the Federal Reserve Banks, and applying the 
relevant factors, we conclude that the Reserve 
Banks are not federal instrumentalities for pur¬ 
poses of the FTCA (Federal Tort Claims Act), but 
are independent, privately owned and locally 
controlled corporations.... 


- 200 - 



The Banks are neither listed as "wholly 
owned" government corporations under 31 U.S.C. 

846 nor as "mixed ownership" corporations under 
31 U.S.C. 856. [680 F. 2d 1239 (1982)] 

It appears the Ninth Circuit was right on point with the 
possible exception of its conclusion regarding where the 
control of these corporations reside. Just who is in con¬ 
trol of these corporations was not at issue in this case. 
Apparently, fact finding was insufficient to expose the 
facade. The main thing to keep in mind is the Federal Re¬ 
serve System consists of privately owned corporations en¬ 
gaged in the business of banking, created and organized 
under the Federal Reserve Act and acts amendatory thereto. 
Its purported object is to perform as the Central Bank of 
the United States. 

Strangely enough, on October 28, 1977, House Joint Res¬ 
olution 192 was quietly repealed by Public Law 95-147, which 
stated: 


The joint resolution entitled "Joint Resolu¬ 
tion to assure uniform value to the coins and 
currencies of the United States" approved June 
5, 1933 (31 U.S.C. 463), shall not apply to ob¬ 
ligations issued on or after the date of enact¬ 
ment of this section. 

The reason for the repeal of RJR-192 is somewhat obscure. 
After 44 years of unchallenged implementation this public 
policy is clearly established by custom, usage and continued 
participation in the public credit system by the American 
public. Those of us operating on the privilege of limited 
liability, via the public credit created by the Federal Re¬ 
serve, are still bound by the rules of the governing law, 
the "Federal Law Merchant," under the jurisdiction of Admir¬ 
al ty/Maritime. 

But how about the Federal Reserve itself? It appears 
this repeal allows them to, once again, demand payment in 
gold for the interest on the public debt. The Federal Re¬ 
serve Act contains a provision made with respect to an obli¬ 
gation purporting to give the obligee a right to require 
payment in gold, and that provision appears to be back in 
effect. If this is the case, is it possible for the Federal 
Reserve to foreclose on the united States (as any other 
private banking institution wrould foreclose on its debtors 
in default) if they present their demands knowing that there 
would not be enough gold to meet them, and no hope of 
acquiring enough gold? 

This makes for interesting speculation. However, keeping 
in mind Congressman McFadden's warning that the Federal Re- 


- 201 - 



serve is a tool of international bankers and industrialists 
bent on establishing a world-wide, privately owned, mercan¬ 
tile superstate for their own benefit and selfish pleasure; 
an overt take over by foreclosure actions would not make 
much sense. It could serve to expose the powers behind the 
scenes, and this line of conduct is not in keeping with 
their modus operandi. 

With this in mind, a far more plausible explanation for 
the enactment of P.L. 95-147 can be gleaned from an analysis 
of its specific provisions, which incorporate certain pre¬ 
viously enacted public laws, to wit: 

First: The Federal Reserve Bank Corporation on or about 
October 28, 1977, together with other subscribers thereto, 
entered into and became a party to, and carried cut the 
following agreement: (a). Public Law 95-147, Stat. 1227, 
passed October 28, 1977, entitled "To Authorize the, Secre¬ 
tary of the Treasury to invest public moneys, and for other 
purposes", and the Acts amendatory thereof, incorporates; 
(b) Public Law 171, ch. 339, 59 Stat. 512, passed July 31, 
1945, entitled "To provide for the participation of the 
United States in the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development", and 
Acts amendatory thereof; and (c) Public Law 87, ch. 6, 48 
Stat. 337, passed January 30, 1934, entitled "To protect the 
currency system of the United States, to provide for the 
better use of the monetary gold stock of the United States, 
and for other purposes", and Acts amendatory thereof. 

Second: Pursuant to this agreement, the capital stock of 
the Federal Reserve Bank Corporation was transferred to "In¬ 
ternational Monetary Fund" and in lieu thereof Special Draw¬ 
ing Rights certificates were issued by the IMF Board of Gov¬ 
ernors. 

Third: Pursuant to this agreement such of the parties 
thereto as were not then depositories of public money became 
depositories of public money and fiscal agents of the united 
States in the collection of taxes and other obligations owed 
the United States Treasury at Accelerated premiums in con¬ 
sideration of floating money market interest rates. The 
greater part in number and value of these rates is regulated 
by the Board of Governors of the IMF. 

Fourth: The powers conferred upon the Board of Governors 
of the IMF by this government enables the said Board to 
monopolize the Faculty for Exchange of Debt Obligations in 
the United States, and is enabled to control at will the 
Exchange for Moneys that circulates in the United States. 


-202 - 



Fifth: In exercise of the powers conferred by the 
agreement, the IMF Board of Governors controls the action of 
the Federal Reserve Bank Corporation and other depositories 
of Public Money who are parties to the agreement in the 
conduct of their business; and, thereby, controls and reg¬ 
ulates the exchange for Moneys and Considerations of Debt 
Obligations in the United States. 


So, the Federal Reserve Act enabled the Federal Reserve 
Board to usurp the government of the United States; and this 
Monetary power was then transferred to, and consolidated 
within, the Board of Governors of the international Monetary 
Fund by enactment of Public Law 95-147 on October 28, 1977. 

Hiis agreement constitutes a ccmbination to do an Act in¬ 
jurious to trade and ccmnerce, to which the private Federal 
Reserve Bank Corporation is a party. It also constitutes a 
wager policy in favor of the Federal Reserve Bank Corpor¬ 
ation and International Monetary Fund. ^ 

S The author and his colleague. Dr. George E. Hill, have / 
been involved in a series of correspondence on this subject 
with the Honorable Ron Paul, House of Representatives, 
Congress of the united States and his assistant on the House 
Banking Committee, Joe Cobb. This correspondence is 
appended to this work as Exhibits 1 through 8. I especially . 
recommend the study and analysis of these exhibits to anyone \ 
inclined to believe that we can look to Congress alone for 
solutions. 


$ 


Part VIII: Synopsis 
The Facts: 

When Congress borrows money on the credit of the united 
States, bonds are legislated into existence and deposited as 
credit entries in Federal Reserve banks. United States 
bonds, bills and notes constitute "money" as affirmed by the 
Supreme Court Legal Tender Cases (110 U.S. 421). When de¬ 
posited with the Fed this "money" becomes collateral frcm 
whence the Treasury may write checks against the credit thus 
created in the account (12 U.S.C. 391). 

For example, suppose Congress appropriates an expenditure 
of $1 billion. To finance the appropriation. Congress cre¬ 
ates $1 billion worth of bonds out of thin air and deposits 
it with the privately-owned Federal Reserve System. Upon 
receiving the bonds, the Fed credits $1 billion to the 
Treasury's checking account, holding the deposited bonds as 
collateral. When the united States deposits its bonds with 
the Federal Reserve System, private bank credit is extended 
to the Treasury by the Fed. Under its power to borrow 


- 203 - 



money. Congress is authorized by the Constitution to 
contract debt, and whenever something is borrowed; it must 
be returned. When Congress spends the contracted private 
bank credit, each unit of credit is debt which must be 
returned to the lender or Fed. Since Congress authorized 
the expenditure of this private bank credit, the United 
States incurs the primary obligation to return the borrowed 
credit, creating a National Debt which results when credit 
is not returned. 

However, if anyone else accepts this private bank credit 
and uses it to purchase goods and services, the user vol¬ 
untarily incurs the obligation requiring him to make a re¬ 
turn of income, whereby a portion of the income is collect¬ 
ed by the IRS and delivered to the Federal Reserve bankers. 
Actually the federal inccme tax inparts two separate obli¬ 
gations: the obligation to file a return and the obligation 
to abide by the Internal Revenue Code. The obligation to 
make a return of income for using private bank credit is 
recognized in law as an irrecusable obligation which, ac- 
cording to Bouvier 1 s Law Dictionary(1914 ed.), Ts "a term 
used to indicate a certain class of contractual obligations 
recognized by the law which are imposed upon aperson without 
his consent and without regard to any act of his own." This 
is distinguished from a recusable obligation, which arises 
from a voluntary act by which one incurs the obligation im¬ 
posed by the operation of law. The voluntary use of private 
bank credit is the condition precedent which imposes the ir¬ 
recusable obligation to file a tax return, via a contract of 
adhesion. If private credit is rejected, then the operation 
of law which imposes the irrecusable obligation lies dormant 
and cunnot apply - there is no contract. 

In Brusbaber v Union Pacific RR Co. [240 U.S. 1 (1916)] 
the Supreme Court affirmed that the federal income tax is in 
the class of indirect taxes, which include duties and ex¬ 
cises. The personal inccme tax arises from a duty, i.e. 
charge or fee which is voluntarily incurred and subject to 
the rule of uniformity. A charge is a duty of obligation, 
binding upon him who enters into it, which nay be removed or 
taken away by a discharge or performance (Bouvier. p. 459) 

_ The Federal personal inccme tax is nob really a tax . in the 


ligation which the taxpayer voluntarily assumes. The burden 


of the tax falls upon those who voluntarily use private bank 




upon the privilege of using private bank credit where the 


amount of credit used measures the 


©vision of the Internal Reven 


Cede is private law rather than public la 


liTCi ■ i V *!<>: 


53153135 






























reveune code pertains to "taxpayers." A private law can be 
enforcedbya court of competent jurisdiction when statutes 
for its enforcement are enacted (20 Am Jur 33, pgs. 58-59). 

The distinction between public and private acts is not al¬ 
ways sharply defined when published statutes are printed in 
their final form [Case v. Kelly 133 U.S. 21 (1890)]. 

Statutes creating corporations are private acts, (20 Am 

Reserve Ac 


is privat e law.. Federal Reserve banks derive their exist- 
corporate power from the Federal Reserve Act 
[Armano v. Federal Reserve Bank 468 F: Supp. 674 (1979)]. A 
ivate act may be published as a public law when the qener- 


rtunit 


the operation of the 


le of private law which does not exclude the vo 


■sbsassksissi 


realr«s 


n enacted as substantive public law, conceding that 


Internal Revenue Code is private lay?,. Bouvier declares that 
private law "relates to private matters which do not concern 
the public at large." It is the voluntary use of private. 
bank credit which imposes upon the user the auasi.l ty 
lied obligation' to make a returno f 1 




re pugnant to the Constitution, h olding that taxation of 
wages and salaries must conform to the rule of appor- 
tionment . However, when this decision was rendered, there 
rivately owniri central bank issuing private tank 







ed is neit 


itable interest but denyi 




stem consisting o 



currency, an* 






all bills with coins and United States notes (i 


volun 


private credit system and thereby incur the obligation 
make a return of income. . | # 


Vll 





















































































d f?«R r r ef 

h J? is-c h'fry'ffiz # i* &-h & f>!i d ~*^ 

Under 26 U.S.C. 7609 the IRS has carte blanche authority 
to summon and investigate bank records for the purpose of 
determining tax liabilities or discovering unknown taxpayers 
[United States v. Berg 636 F.2d 203 (1980)]. If an investi¬ 
gation of bank records discloses an excess of $1000 in de¬ 
posits in a single year, the IRS may accept this as prima 
facie evidence that the account holder used private credit 
and is therefore a person obligated to make a return of 
inccme. Anyone who uses private bank credit 


it cards, mortgages. etc., voluntarily plugs 


himself into the system an 


On June 5, 1933 the day of infamy arrived. Congress on 


that day enacted House joint Reso. 


the "payment of debt" to be against public 


stituted a "discharge of an obligation" in its stead. This 


Resolution also made Federal Reserve Notes legal tender for 


the first time and prohibited payments in gold or the mea- 


hts of qol 


ook us off the gold standard and placed us in a 


ual debt/credit system wherein anyone tendering this debt in 


barge of an obligation was enioying the "privilege" of 


ision was design 


Mill i Ill'll 


353 


ligations. This debt/credit system was under the exclusive 


control and manipulation of private interests for their 


his Act consummated the delivery o: 


the people and their wealth to the bankers 







bank credit of the Fed gained suprema 


Ibis action made 


t fran 


federal inccme taxes (actually interest or 


the Federal Reserve), now liable for the 


of using this credit for profit or gains (or the mer 


tion of profit or gain).. The general public 


consuming and using large amounts of 


without perceiving the intolerable fraud bei 


against them and the incredible price they were to 


offered by the Pied Pipers to induce "vol- 


unta 


All the case law prior to 1933 affirms that income is a 
profit or gain which arises fran government granted priv¬ 
ilege. After 1933, however, the case law no longer emphat¬ 
ically declares that income is exclusively corporate profit 
or that it arises fran a privilege. So, what changed? 

Two years after HJR-192, Congress passed the Social Sec¬ 
urity Act, which the Supreme Court upheld as a valid act im- 







































































i ■ H H I 


posing a valid incane tax [Charles C. Steward Mac. Co. v. 
Davis, 301, U.S. 548 (1937)]. This, alone, makes every in¬ 
dividual who applies for, and receives, a Social Security 
card a "taxpayer" within the definition of the internal Re¬ 
venue Code. This is one of the more obvious adhesion con¬ 
tracts (among many) that binds one to the ship, under the 
jurisdiction of admiralty/maritime. 

In 1935, the Fed persuaded the Treasury to discontinue 
minting Dollars of Silver because the public preferred them 
over dollar bills (Federal Reserve "dollar" notes). In re¬ 
cent years the Eisenhower dollar coin received widespread 
acceptance, but the Treasury minted them in limited number 
which encouraged hoarding. The same fate befell the Kennedy 
half dollars, which circulated as silver sandwiched clads 
between 1965-1969 and were hoarded for their intrinsic 
value. Next came the Susan B. Anthony dollar, an awkward 


coin which was instant 


unit is the privately issued Feder 


interest to the federal Reserve, with no viable. 


titors 


A major purpose behind the 16th Amendment was to give 
Congress authority to enforce private law collections of 
revenue. It was absolutely necessary in order to implement 
what was to cane later - the Federal Reserve Act. Congress 
had plenary power to collect taxes arising from government 
granted privileges long before the 16th Amendment was rati¬ 
fied and, as the Supreme Court said, this Amendment did not 
grant Congress any additional taxing powers over and above 
those already granted, i.e., imposts, duties and excises. 
What it did do is allegedly give Congress the added power 


rivilege 


under private law: i.e., "income from whatever source 


derived"? And the "source" was to become the 


lvate bank credit. 


With the 16th Amendment giving Congress the power to en¬ 
force collections of taxes from whatever source derived , it 
also became the authorization to declare private bank credit 


al tender for all debts public and 


taxe s. Cong ress did this on June 5, 1933, with HJR 


wo very significant things for the 


It forbid payment of debtsandsubsti- 


ts of debt as our curre 


ationsi and c2h it declared these mstru- 


ments of debt (private bank credit ) to belegal tender, 
significance of these actions with regard to the SEsolute 
prohibition of Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, of the u.S. 
Constitution against states making any thing but Gold and 
Silver coin a tender in payment of debt was explained by the 
federal court as follows: 











































Congress has decreed that Federal Reserve 
notes shall be legal tender for all debts, pub¬ 
lic and private including taxes. (31 U.S.C. 

392). Because of the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution the state has no 
authority to alter this decree. [United States 
v. Rifen (8th Cir., 1978) 577 F. 2d 1111,1113] 

hus the states are enforcing federal law under the 


Supremacy Clause of the u.S. Constitution in all matters of 


and that is the Federal Law Merchant 


r 1 within the 

iurisdictio 

n of Admiraltv/Ma 

ritime 


' 1 ratified 16th Amendment 

is absolutely essential 

to a lawfu 




basis for this scheme.. 

According to Bouvier, public money is the money which 
Congress can tax for public purposes mandated by the 
Constitution. Private credit when collected in revenue can 


nt for purposes not cognizable b 


two 


overnment under the Constitution, the National Govern 


ment and the Federal Government. The first is the govern¬ 


ment of the people, whereas the latter is a feudal system 


founded in contract, or compact. Federal and state gov¬ 


ernments are. now, founded upon private law and funded 


bank credit, totally outside the Constitution 


there is not much left of our National Government. We are 


overned by private contracting parties who have usurped our 


lie. via contract, and cunningly coerced and enticed us 


-ivately owned Federal Ship - where there is no 




Federal agencies and activities funded by this private 
credit include Social Security, bail out loans to bankers 
via the IMF, bail out loan to Chrysler, loans to students, 
FDIC, FBI, supporting the U.N., foreign aid, funding unde¬ 
clared wars, etc., etc.; all of which would be unsusta inable 
if funded by taxes raised pursuant to the Constitution 


nt for 

13533 

ses 

unknown to 

383523 

se 

of 

5B5E51 

—r— 

or 


USaE eBBBSBEBlWi^SE 


loaning money to private business enterprises and individ 


uals is illegal (15 Am Re 




ESSS5S551 

or disbursi 


riva 


tution when 


collections. 

It is incorrect to say that the personal income tax is 


unconstitutional, since the tax code is 


resides outside the constitution by contract. 


Revenue Code is non-constitutional because it enforces an 


rivate law and 














































































obliqation which is voluntarily incurred, through acts of 

the individual who binds himself. This, of course, is all 


based on the Dremise that Congress was acting as a lawful 


States when it consummated the contracts with the Federal 

Reserve Bank Corporation. 


■ ih'i ii W« ' Hi W l|l|l■ Hi 1 1 1 

general cannon law," and that "Except in matters governed by| 


applied in any case is the law of the state." (Erie R.R. v.J 






law." In tracing the development of the Erie Doctrine, we| 
discovered that this "federal cannon law" is also known as 1 
the "federal law merchant" (the law of bills, notes and 
cheques at the federal level). Seeing that, as a result of 
HJR-192, private bank credit, borrowed into circulation by 
the U.S. government, was nearly our exclusive source of 
currency; we should now begin to understand what this es¬ 
oteric source of power for federal judges actually is, and 
what the nature of the right being enforced is, and why it 
is binding in all courts because of its source. (Friendly in 
Praise of Erie, supra) 

We have seen that such subject matters as hypothecation.1 

limited liability, and bills, notes and cheques (commercial 

paper) issued bv the n.S. Government are exclusively within 

the jurisdiction of admiraltv/maritime - whether so identi- 

fied or not. 

Eouallv significant is the jurisdiction governing private 

bank credit, which was succinctly stated bv the SuDreme 
Court in the case of The Bank of Columbia v. Okely. The 


Bank of Columbia was chartered by the Maryland legislature, 
and, in this charter, the bank president was granted certain 
summary powers in the collection of overdue debts. A cred¬ 
itor in default needed only to receive a 10 day notice from 
the bank; if he did not make good on the default by the end 
of the 10 day period the bank president could notify the 
local court clerk to foreclose, attach, and sell the credi¬ 
tor's property - which they did. 

Okely challenged this procedure on grounds that it vio¬ 
lated his right to due process of law. Here is what the 
court said: 


... The provisions of this Act are in deroga¬ 
tion of the ordinary principles of private 
rights, and, as such, must be subjected to 
strict construction, ... 

















































and here is the court's strict construction: 


But to constitute particular tribunals for 
the adjustment of controversies ^among than, to 
submit themselves to the exercise of sumnary 
remedies, or the temporary privation of rights 
of the deepest interest, are among the cannon 
incidents of life. Such cure submissions to 
arbitration, such are stipulation bonds, forth- 
ccming bonds, and contracts of service. And it 
was with a view to the voluntary acquiescence of 
the individual, nay, the solicited submission to 
the law of the contract, that this remedy was 
given. By making the note negotiable at Bank of 
Columbia . THE DEBTOR CHOSE HIS OWN JURISDICTION; 

IN CONSIDERATION OF THE CREDIT GIVEN HIM, HE 
VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED HIS CLAIMS TO THE 

ORDINARY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. AND PLACED 
HIMSELF ONLY IN THE SITUATION OF AN HY- . 

POMBO^X OR OF GOODS, with the power to sell on 
default. CR A STIPUljjQR TN~Lf!E~SiMIRALTY, whose 
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of that 
court subjects him to personal coercion. [4 
Fed. 559] 

The subject matter in any controversy involving our debt 
currency is private bank credit under the exclusive juris¬ 
diction of admiralty/maritime and: 1 

... If the claim is cognizable only in admir¬ 
alty, it is an admiralty or maritime claim for 
those purposes whether so identified or not. 
[Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule (h)] 

and, regarding the states: 

... A right sanctioned by the maritime law 
may be enforced through any appropriate remedy 
recognized at cannon law. thus the state mist 
FOLLOW THE SUBSTANTIVE MARITIME LAW, although it 
can enforce such law through any cannon-law 
remedy. [Cal Practice, Volume 1, Part 1, Sec¬ 
tion 8:183] 

How does that compute with the Erie Doctrine, which takes 
cognizance of the nature of the right being enforced that is 
binding in all courts because of its source? It is the un¬ 
derstanding of the facts presented thus far that enables us 
to discover our proper remedies at law. 
















Z/>iol 

As Congressma n Lindbergh. Sr.. yarn ed us, The Federal Re- , 
serve Act "establishes tne most gigantic trust on earth,/! 
jn.jgonsjj^ation ofjjrai^^ the Federal" 

Reserve acquired an h ypothecation of all assets of the peo¬ 
ple of the United States - and tne Federal Reserve Board in 
effect, became the trustees of this gigantic trust and all 
government employees became age nts of the Federal Reserve 
Board for the management of this ^rustT TTnisTs how the" 
Federal Reserve Board usurped the government of the United 
States. A trustee is defined as: 1 

A person holding property in trust; one in 
whcm an estate, interest, or power is vested, 
under an express or inplied agreement to admin¬ 
ister or exercise it for the benefit or to the 
use of another called the cestui que trust. 
[Reinecke v. Smith, Ill., 289 U.S. 172; 53 S.Ct. 

570; 776 L.Ed. 1109] 

In a strict sense a "trustee" is one who 
holds the legal title to property for the 
benefit of another, ... [State ex rel. Lee v. 
Satrorius, 344 Mo. 912; 130 S.W. 2d 547, 549, 

550]. 

The cestui que trust referred to above is: 

He for whose benefit another person is seised 
of lands or tenements or is possessed of person¬ 
al property. He who has a right to a beneficial 
interest in and out of an estate the legal title 
to which is vested in another. [2 Washburn, 

Real Prop. 163]. 

In this type of trust, the benefi ciaries have no say 
the management of the trust. The cestui que trust (you) is 
registered as a beneficiary via your Birth Certificate, 
which is registered in the Department of Centner ce/ * 
Washington, D.C.. You are, then f an official item of 
"merchandise" in the corporate "City of Babylon," body ancf. 
soul - piped on board by y our parent, guardian, doctor, or 
7mid-wife; whoever signed the Birth Certificate. 

As a recorded beneficiary in this trust, ail subsequent 
actions by you (or anyone having power of attorney to act in 
your behalf) which involve the application for benefits of 
this trust for profit or gain (or the mere expectation of 
profit or gain), or the proof of the receipt of a benefit, 
binds you to an obligation to perform and/or "pay your fair 
share." This is accomplished by way of "adhesion con¬ 
tracts," which are characterized by the fact that one party 


i 


in 















to the contract (you) has no input or say as to the terms of 
the contract. 

A classic example of one of these adhesion contracts is 
Social Security. Thus, the drive to have legal guardians 
apply for and obtain, a Social Security Card for all newborn 
infants. To my knowledge and understanding, all applica¬ 
tions for, or receipt of, federal and state granted pri¬ 
vileges (benefits) consuitmates an adhesion contract whereby 
the beneficiary of that privilege (or expected privilege) 
incurs the liability to perform on the contract, whatever 
its terms may be. The beneficiary has "voluntarily" re¬ 
linquished his claims to the ordinary administration of 
justice and has "voluntarily" subjected himself to the 
personal coercion dictated by the terms of the -contract. 
"Benefits" are the theme of every tune played by the pied. 
Pipers of Babylon, to entice you into its jurisdi ction or 
admiraltv/maritime where the phrase "God Given Rights" is. 
just a memory from the distant past. 

Dreamers and schemers have long pushed and pulled for the 
creation of a warId fiat money system.. The dreamers do not 
know better, but seme of the schemers do. A centrally man¬ 
aged fiat currency is a crucial One World Government Objec- 
tive. As Mariner Eccles, then governor of the Federal Re-, 
serve, declared in 1944. "An international currency is syn¬ 
onymous with international government." By way of a monoplv 
on inflation and contraction of the world's money supply, 
the Monetary Power would have the most profitable and power¬ 
ful control anyone might possess - the ultimate monoplv. 
Inflation, an increase in the supply of money substitutes, 
is just another name for counterfeiting of claims on real 
wealth. Counterfeiting is profitable for the counterfeiter 
because he gets something for nothing. 

This ultimate monoply would be in the form of a World 
Central Bank with the ability to issue its own fiat currency 
as a world money. And a single fiat currency for the entire 
world is the goal of the Money Power - the international 
bankers and industrialists bent on enslaving the world for- 
their own selfish interests and pleasures (as Congressman 
McFadden yarned us). They are of course anxious to have 
whatever stopgap measures they can obtain to move the world 
closer to their goal. As these schemes break down, calls 
for a cannon international or regional currency become more 
insistent. 

In an article entitled "A Monetary System For the 
Future," published in the Fall 1984 issue of the C.F.R. 
journal Foreign Affairs, Richard N. Cooper offers the 
following bold proposal on the opening page: 

A new Bretton Woods conference is wholly pre¬ 
mature. But is not premature to begin thinking 


- 212 - 

































about how we would like international monetary 
arrangements to evolve in the remainder of this 
century. With this in mind I suggest a radical 
alternative scheme for the next century. The 
creation of a cannon currency for all of the 
industrialized democracies, with a cannon mon¬ 
etary policy and a joint Bank of Issue to de¬ 
termine the monetary policy. 

This goal is no trivial pursuit on the part of the World 
Monetary Powers; and was not the first time their planners 
have cpenly advocated a world currency. In 1973, John P. 
Young, former director of the U.S. State Department's In¬ 
ternational Finance Division, offered a proposal at the 
Clairemont International Monetary Conference in which he 
claimed, "there is no satisfactory alternative" to a single 
world currency "to supplement and eventually replace" all 
national currencies, including the dollar. 

Another such scheme was advocated by Byron L. Johnson, an 
economics professor at the University of Colorado who had, 
as a member of the Eighty-Sixth congress, served on the 
House Banking and Currency Ccmnittee, and had previously 
worked with the Agency for International Development in the 
early Sixties. In the October 1971 issue of War/peace Re¬ 
port, Johnson wrote: 

A new world currency, which should be auth¬ 
orized by the U.N., should strengthen world 
institutions. Articles 57 and 63 of the U.N. 
Charter provides a legal basis by which the 
Economic and Social Counsel could begin the 
process, and invite alternative action by the 
General Assembly, to develop an agreement where¬ 
by the I.M.F. becomes, in effect, a central bank 
and a source of support for the U.N. and its 
specialized agencies. CONIROL OF TOE AMOUNT OF 
WCRLD CURRENCY MUST BE IN TOE HANDS OF TOE I.M. 

F. so that monetary reserves will be created for 
the purpose of promoting the orderly growth of 
world trade. 

And there have been many other serious world-money 
schemes, the Stamp plan, the Bernstein plan, the White plan, 
the Keynes plan, and others. All these proposals envision a 
world fiat currency that would be issu ed by a world central 
bank, a sort of Federal Reserve tor bne planet. in almost 
aTT^tnenucTeus of this bank is seen as the international 
Monetary Fund. 

The framework for establishment of this ultimate monoply 
was drafted at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, and 


- 213 - 








U.S. participation in the scheme was authorized by Congress 
in 1945. To date, the Monetary Powers still have not met 
their objective of a one world currency under absolute con¬ 
trol of the IMF. With the framework established, however, 
more power could later be poured into it, just as was done 
when they created the Federal Reserve Act in 1913. Public 
Law 95-147 was a giant step in that direction. The reader 
should now be able to recognize numerous other plans and 
proposals designed for that purpose. 


—J pow 

\ us. 


The Law 

The Federalists say we lied them out of 
power, and openly avow they will do the same to 
[Jefferson to Livingston, supra] 




The Federalists have, indeed, fulfilled their premise to 
lie the American people out of power. In so doing, their 
legislation and all presidential appointments, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, are null and void at 
law. As of April 8, 1913, the day they unlawfully stripped 
the State legislature of representation in the Senate, the 
judicial power of the United States could never lawfully be 
conferred upon any Judge appointed by a President; Likewise 
for any executive "officer" appointments.[0] The ramifi¬ 
cations are so diverse they affect every aspect of life 
within the fabric of our society. This ludicrous web of 
deceit is based upon false premises relating to a lawful 
constitutional basis. Of particular significance within the 
framework of the Erie Doctrine, all judge-made "federal 
Common Law" and/or "Specialized federal common law" based 
on: The Federal Reserve Act, and acts amendatory thereto. 
House Joint Resolution 192; Public Law 95-147; U.S. com¬ 
mitments to the IMF, etc. etc., are nullities pursuant to 
Constitutional law. 


Furthermore, research of Bill Benson, M.J. "Red" Beckman, 
and the Montana Historians has unlocked a Pandora's box of 
numerous criminal frauds perpetrated by public servants who 
have betrayed the trust of their masters. [P] 

Called "The Golden Key" by the authors of their new book 
entitled THE LAW THAT NEVER WAS, the most damning of this 
evidence is contained in a memorandum of the Solicitor, 
United States Department of State, dated February 15, 1913. 
Not only does this memorandum identify the fact that the 
Sixteenth Amendment was never lawfully ratified, bat the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as well. After exten¬ 
sive research. Bill Benson and "Red" Beckman have collected 
certified documents relating to the ratification of the 
Sixteenth Amendment from the forty-eight contiguous states 


- 214 - 




and the Capitol in Washington, D.C.. Thousands of documents 
were researched, copied and certified and are now available 
as "best evidence" proof that there is no Sixteenth Amend¬ 
ment pursuant to law. This nullity at law is being enforced 
on its victims at the federal level via Title 26, United 
States Codes. (Internal Revenue Code), and at the state 
level via state tax codes - all under the Supremacy Clause 
of the United States Constitution by way of "specialized 
federal cannon Law," the federal law merchant. Legal tender 
laws making private bank credit legal tender for all debts 
public and private enabled the states to fraudulently bypass 
the absolute prohibition against making any Thing but gold 
and silver coin a tender in payment of debt. The subject 
matter and nature of the right being enforced then became a 



General Maritime Law of Nations. We will now examine this 


premise within the Framework of the Necessary and Positive 


Law of the Law of Nature and Nations - specifically the 
general Maritime Law of nations. 


- 215 - 





CHAPTER VII 


THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW OF NATIONS 
DEALING WITH WAGER POLICIES 


Part I: Introduction 

Fran An Essay on Maritime loans, it is stated: 

The contract of maritime loan approaches more 
nearly to that of insurance. There is a strong 
analogy between them. In their effects they are 
construed on the same principles. In the one 
contract the lender bears the sea risks, in the 
other the underwriter. In the one the maritime 
interest is the price of the peril; and this 
term corresponds with the premium which is paid 
on the other... 


So, we see tha t it is immaterial whether we think of the 
Federal Reserve, and now the IMF, as a Maritime lender, or 


an insurance underwriter to the United States. They are 


their effects, construed on the same principles 


law is the same. And further: 


The Lender (of a maritime loan) was not 
prohibited from demanding pledges and hypoth¬ 
ecations as an additional security; providing it 
was not a pretext for exacting maritime interest 
after the sea risk should be at an end. 

IT IS ESSENTIAL TO THIS CONIRACT THAT THERE 
BE A RISK, AND THAT RISK BE INCURRED BY THE LEN¬ 
DER ... The stipulation interest or no interest 
is a real vager ... This is not permitted among 
us.... 

If the contract was void in its ccnmencement, 
the maritime interest is not chargeable, because 
no maritime dangers were borne by the lender. 

Difference between contracts of bottomry and 
those of Loan, Partnership and Insurance. Bot¬ 
tomry is different from the contract of loan be¬ 
cause: 

1. The peril of money, simply lent, concerns 
the borrower: whereas money lent at bottomry is 
at the risk of the lender. 

2. In a simple loan, interest is not due but 
by positive stipulation whereas maritime inter¬ 
est is implied in the contract itself. 


- 216 - 








3. In a simple lean, the interest, among 
merchants, could not exceed the rate fixed by 
the prince, or, at most the custom of the 
country; whereas bottomry may carry any 
interest. 

... Maritime interest is not subject to the 
limits of ordinary legal interest, but that it 
may be regulated by the degree of danger to 
which the lender exposes or believes he exposes 
his money. [An Essay on Maritime Loans from the 
French of M.Balthazard Marie Emerigon; Balti¬ 
more; published by Philip H. Nicklin Co., 1811] 


1 th 


Only maritime interest can be regulated by the lender, 
and only by way of a maritime contract can the private 
Federal Reserve regulate the interest rates in this country 
By their own admission, and other documented testimony 
the Federal Reserve has no risk carmensurate with its claims 


against the united States. It has acquired these claims by 
creating credit out of thin air, pursuant to its authoriza¬ 
tion to do so in the Federal Reserve Act itself, and "lend¬ 
ing" those creations to the United States government . This, 
by definition, makes the Federal Reserve Act a WAGER POLICY. 


1 / 


Tontine insurance policies were wager policies because 
the requisite risk element, on the part of the underwriters. 




x? 


L was non-existent. The Federal Reserve operation is nothing^ 


but a Tontine in disguise, the Social Security program is a 


Tontine within the Federal Reserve Act; and the IMF is vet 


another Tontine on a larger scale. 


In The Seneca Case, decided by the 
Pennsylvania in 1829, the court said: 


court of appeals in 


The jurisdiction of the district court, under 
the 9th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 
Stat. 76), embraces all cases of maritime na¬ 
ture, whether they be particularly of admiralty 
cognizance or not; and such jurisdiction, and 
the law regulating its exercise, are to be 
sought for in the general maritime laws of na¬ 
tions, and are not confined to that of England, 
or any other particular maritime nation. [The 
Seneca Case, NO. 12, 669; 12 Fed. Cas. 1081] 

So we see that our admiralty and maritime courts are 
bound by the general maritime laws of all nations. 

Now, let us look into seme of the general maritime laws 
dealing with wager policies and see if we can determine why 
such policies must be within the purview of the general, 
necessary, and positive law of the Law of Nations - binding 
on all nations. 


- 217 - 



























Part II: Sane General Maritime Statutes: 

The Statutes at Large from the 15th to the 20th year of 
King George II: 

That from and after the first day of August, 
one thousand seven hundred and forty six, no as¬ 
surance or assurances shall be made - interest 
or no interest, or without further proof of in¬ 
terest than the policy, or by way of gaming or 
wagering ... and that every assurance shall be 
null and void to all intents and purposes. 

The reason for this enactment was stated to be: 

Whereas, it has been found by experience that 
the making of assurances, interest or no inter¬ 
est, or without further proof of interest than 
the policy, hath been productive of many pernic¬ 
ious practices, ... and by introducing a mis¬ 
chievous kind of gaming or wagering, under the 
pretense of ... the institution and laudible 
design of making assurances, hath been per¬ 
verted; and that which was intended for the 
enccuragment of trade and navigation, has in 
many instances, become hurtful, and destructive 
to the same. [Vol. XVIII, by Danby Pickering, 
of Gray's-Inn, Esq; Reader of the Law-Lecture to 
that Honorable Society, Printed by Cambridge 
University, 1765] 

Here we have a clear and distinct statement that interest 
or no interest policies, and gaming and wagering contracts, 
are void because they are "productive of many pernicious 
practices." 

This principle of law (at least as far as it applies to 
the assured) is practiced to the present day. For example: 
Assume I took cut a $100,000 life insurance policy on a 
stranger embarking on a plane trip from Los Angeles to New 
York, with no vested interest in his life. If the plane 
goes down and his life is lost, the insurance company will 
not pay me a dime on that policy because my action was 
nothing more than a wager (or bet) that the plane would not 
make it. However, if we had not been strangers and the 
person taking the flight owed me $5000 - under the same 
circumstances of fate the insurance ccnpany would pay me 
$5000 on my $100,000 policy- the amount of my vested in¬ 
terest in the contract. 


- 218 - 




It is not difficult to see how the legalization of this 
kind of practice could lead to "many pernicious practices." 
Being legal, what is to stop me from going for a "sure bet" 
by taking steps to assure that the plane does not make it to 
New York? Would you say that it is in the Nature of Man to 
be tempted to perform such an unconscionable act? „ 

The general and necessary branch of the Law of nations is 
founded in point of conscience, and upon the nature of man. 
That is why wager policies are outlawed by all maritime 
countries in the world; and that is why these laws are 
binding on all nations. 

Equally pernicious practices of fraud, theft, etc. are 
involved when the maritime lender, or insurance underwriter, 
has no vested interest in the contract (i.e., no risk com¬ 
mensurate with the benefit he receives). 

Halsbury 1 s Statutes of England: 

The Life insurance Act, 1774 (14 Geo. 3c. 48) 

1. NO insurance to be made on lives, etc., by 
persons having no interest, etc. - From and af¬ 
ter the passing of this Act no insurance shall 
be made by any persons, politick or corporate, 
on the life or lives of any person or persons, 
or on any other event or events whatsoever, 
wherein the person or persons for whose use, 
benefit, or on whose account such policy or pol¬ 
icies shall be made, shall have no interest, or 
by way of gaming or wagering; and that every 
assurance made contrary to the true intent and 
meaning hereof shall be null and void to all 
intents and purposes whatsoever. NOTES: At 
common law, wager policies were legal contracts. 


The Marine Insurance Act, 1906, (6 Edw. 7c. 41) 

1. Marine Insurance Defined. - A contract of 
marine insurance is a contract whereby the in¬ 
surer undertakes to indemnify the assured, in a 
manner and to the extent thereby agreed, against 
maritime losses, that is to say, the losses in¬ 
cident to maritime adventure. 

4. Avoidance of wagering or gaining contracts. 
- (1) Every contract of marine insurance by way 
of gaming or wagering is void. (2) A contract 
of marine insurance is deemed to be a gaming or 
wagering contract - (a) where the assured has 
not an insurable interest as defined by the Act, 
and the contract is altered into with no 


- 219 - 




expectation of acquiring such an interest; or 
(b) Where the policy is made "interest or no 
interest," or "without further proof of interest 
than the policy itself," ... or subject to any 
other like term. 

5. Insurable Interest Defined. - (1) Subject 
to the provisions of this Act, every person has 
an insurable interest who is interested in a 
maritime adventure. (2) In particular a person 
is interested in a maritime adventure where he 
stands in any legal or equitable relation to the 
adventure or to any insurable property at risk 
therein, in consequence of which he may benefit 
by the safety or due arrival of insurable pro¬ 
perty, or may be prejuduced by its loss, or 
damage thereto, or by the detention thereof, or 
may incur liability in respect thereof. 

Disclosure and Representations 

17. ...A contract of marine insurance is a 
contract based upon the utcmst good faith, and, 
if the utmost good faith be not observed by 
either party, ...NOTE...if this good faith be 
not observed by either party, there being any 
concealment or non-disclosure of a material par¬ 
ticular, the contract may be avoided by the 
injured party; 

41. warranty of Legality. - There is an im¬ 
plied warranty that the adventure insured is a 
lawful one, and that, so far as the assured can 
control the matter, the adventure shall be car¬ 
ried out in a lawful manner ...NOTES:...it seems 
that the assured cannot hold the insurer to a 
waiver of illigality for ... only legal adven¬ 
tures can be insured. 

The Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act, 
1909, (9 Edw. 7 c. 12) 

1. Prohibition of gambling or loss by mar¬ 
itime perils. - (1) If-(a) Any person effects a 
contract of maritime insurance without having 
any bonafide interest, direct or indirect, ...or 
a bona fide expectation of acquiring such an in¬ 
terest; .. .the contract shall be deemed to be a 
contract by way of bambling on loss by maritime 
perils... 

Fran the Marine Insurance Act of 1906, Supra: 


- 220 - 



82. Enforcement of return - where the premium 
or a proportionate part thereof, is by this Act, 
declared to be returnable, - (a) If already 
paid, it may be recovered by the assured from 
the insurer; and (b) If unpaid, it may be re¬ 
tained by the assured or his agent.... 

84. Return for failure of consideration. - 
(1) Where the consideration for the payment of 
the premium totally fails, and there has been no 
fraud or illegality on the part of the assured 
or his agents, the premium is thereupon return¬ 
able to the assured ... (3) In particular - (a) 
Where the policy is void, or is avoidedby the 
insurer as from the ccrrmencement of the risk, 
the premium is returnable provided that there 
has been no fraud or illegality on the part of 
the assured; 


The disclosure and representation requirements are stated 
in the California Insurance Code, thusly: 


1900. Duty to disclose 


In marine insurance each party is bound to 
communicate, in addition to what is required in 
the case of other insurance: (a) All the infor¬ 
mation which he possesses and is material to the 
risk, except such as is exempt from such commun¬ 
ication in the case of other insurance, (b) The 
exact and whole truth in relation to all matters 
that he represents or, upon inquiry assumes to 
disclose. 


Perhaps we are beginning to see a light at the end of the) 

\tunnel, the light of knowledge and understanding. "x 

/ This entire mercantile superstructure, designed by in-/ 
Iternational bankers and industrialists to enslave us forL^~* 
^lftheir own interests and pleasures, is built on a foundationT 
I of quicksand, pursuant to the law of admiralty and maritime \ 
(_itself. 


- 221 - 



CHAPTER VIII 


REVELATIONS, THE CITY OF BABYLON, 
MERCHANTS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 


PART I: The Beast Out of The Sea (Rev. 13:1-10, 18) 

Let us first examine this passage to see what it has to 
say about the beast rising out of the sea. This is a symbol 
and must be treated as such. The sea is symbolic of peo¬ 
ples, and therefore, includes the laws governing peoples. 
(Dan. 7:2,3; Rev. 17:1,15). The beast in Revelations refers 
to the rise of a kingdom, and more particularly to the Anti¬ 
christ, the earthly head of the kindgcm (Rev. 13:18). It 
also symbolizes a supernatural spirit out of the abyss. 
Beasts in Scripture symbolize kingdoms and kings (Dan. 2:38, 
39; 7:2-7 with 7:17, 23), as well as supernatural powers 
which control the kingdoms. The personal Antichrist, his 
power, source of power, characteristics, mouth, titles, 
wars, exaltation, reign, etc., are the subject of this 
passage. For purposes of this work, we are specifically 
interested in the discovery of his source of power, the 
nature of his power; and hi§ characteristics relevant 
thereto; i.e., what laws and what jurisdiction, or juris¬ 
dictions, thereunder does he adhere to as his source of 
power and authority to impose his will upon nations, and the 
people of those nations? 

At the present, we cannot knew for certain just who the 
Antichrist is. The question is unanswerable and will be 
until the Antichrist personally makes the covenant with 
Israel for seven years (Dan. 9:27). How are we to knew what 
form this covenant is to be in, just who the signatory par¬ 
ties are to be, and just when it has actually been consum¬ 
mated? is the Antichrist going to announce to "all nations 
deceived" that "this is THE covenant" referred to in Daniel? 
Can we not logically expect that a series of covenants 
would have to be made by his agents prior to his appearance 
and recognition? 

Dan. 7:24 indicates that Antichrist cannot be revealed 
and be prominent in world affairs until after the ten 
kingdoms are formed inside the Reman Empire. According to 
the verse, the ten kingdoms must first be formed and exist 
for seme time as the seventh kingdom, or Revised Rare. The 
Antichrist will arise and gain the whole ten kingdoms in the 
first three and one-half years of the Week. By the middle 
of the week, he will be seen as the beast of Rev. 13 arising 
out of the sea (the power, authority and jurisdiction of the 
Law of the Sea?) already with the seven heads and ten horns, 
which he will have conquered before the middle of the week. 


- 222 - 




His coming out of the sea will sinply be the recognition of 
his power (already established) by the ten kingdoms and his 
acceptance of them from the ten kings and the dragon. (Rev. 
13:2-4, 17:12-17). This verse further teaches, that because 

of his rise out of the ten kingdoms, he is to come out of 
obscurity and that his rise to power (recognition and ac¬ 
ceptance thereof) will be quick. Daniel saw the "little 
horn" rising so suddenly among the ten that he was bewild¬ 
ered (Dan. 7:7-8, 19-24). 

The fact that there will be ten separate kingdoms with 
ten separate capitols, and ten separate kings in the first 
three and one-half years shows that, up to the end of this 
time, the Antichrist does not have one capitol where he 
reigns over the ten kingdoms. Babylon will be his place of 
reign until he has conquered the ten kingdoms. 

Power of The Beast: 

The power will ccrne from Satan, the spirit of the Abyss, 
and the ten kings who recognize and accept this power in the 
name of the people they represent. It is God who will 
permit Satan and his agents to give their power to the beast 
and inspire him in his evil designs (Dan. 8:24; 2 Thess. 

2:8-12; Rev. 13:1,2). It is God who will put it into the 
hearts of the ten kings to give him their power for the 
purpose of destroying Babylon (Rev. 17:12-17). It is the 
satanic prince out of the abyss (Rev. 11:7; 17:3) who will 

be the executive of Satan's power to the beast and his 
agents will administer that power pursuant to certain 
man-made laws. 

The power of the beast relevant to our specific purposes 
may be summarized as follows: 

(1) To conquer many nations (Dan. 7:8, 20-24; 11:36-45, 
Ezek. 38, 39). 

(2) To change times and laws (Dan. 7:25) 

(3) To control money and riches in his own realm (Dan. 
11:38-43). (**) 

(4) To cause great deceptions (2 Thess. 2:10-12; John 5:43; 
Dan. 8:25; Rev. 13: 1-18; Rev. 18:23). 

(5) To do according to his cwn will (Dan. 11:36). 

(6) To control religion and worship (Dan. 11:36; Thess. 2:4; 
Rev. 13: 1-18). 

(7) To control the lives of all men in his realm (Rev. 13: 
12-18). (**) 

(8) To control kings as he wills (Rev. 17: 12-17). 

(9) To make all other nations fear him (Rev. 13:4). 

** Translation from point of law: The individual must be 
in his realm to be under his jurisdiction and power. 


- 223 - 



... Cane, I will show you the punishment of 
the great prostitute, who sits on many waters. 

[Rev. 17:1]. 

... There I saw a woman sitting on a scarlet 
beast that was covered with blasphemous names 
and had seven heads and ten horns. [Rev. 17:3]. 

This title was written on her forehead: [Rev. 17:5] 

MYSTERY 

BABYLON TOE GREAT 
THE MOTHER OF FROSTITUTES 
AND THE ABOMINATIONS OF TOE 
EARTH 

The ten horns you saw are ten kings ... [Rev. 
17:12], 

They have one purpose and will give their 
power and authority to the beast. [Rev. 17:13], 

...The waters you saw, where the prostitute 
sits, are peoples, multitudes, nations and 
languages. [Rev. 17:15]. 

The "waters" are symbolic of the people who are within 
the realm and jurisdiction of the beast, and therefore, 
under his power and authority. Clearly we need to examine 
just how one can become subject to this jurisdiction, and 
just what is its nature. 


Part II: The City Of Babylon 

What constitutes a city? A city is traditionally defined 
as a corporate entity which is a division of local govern¬ 
ment possessing a state granted charter fixing its bound¬ 
aries and powers. It is a form of public trust governed by 
trustees for the benefit of the inhabitants of the city. 
The governors (mayor, city council, etc.) are trustees with 
a specified grant of powers and the inhabitants are the 
beneficiaries. 

Would you say a world-wide, corporate, trust governed by 
the world monetary power could fit within the definition of 
a "city?" Would you say that the "gigantic trust" set up 
within the United States by the Federal Reserve Act, 
governed by the Monetary Power, fits the definition of a 
"city?" Have we been unknowingly living in the City of 
Babylon, within the realm of the Beast since 1913? I 
believe we have been doing just that. I would expect this 
"city" to be ccnmercial in nature and governed in accordance 
with the Law of Merchants. I would also expect the inhab- 


- 224 - 



tants of a city of this size and character to be intimately 
involved in interstate, and international, commerce, and 
therefore, to be subject to the jurisdiction of admiralty/ 
maritime in most, if not all, aspects relating to their 
livelihood; especially if their only viable currency is 
itself, the proper subject of admiralty/maritime juris¬ 
diction. 

I believe this "city," created in 1913, has been thriving 
and growing since that time; although it has not yet evolved 
to the growth state described in Revelations, it is fast 
reaching maturity. 

For example, in Revelation 13:16-17, it is prophesied 
that everyone is forced to receive a mark on his right hand 
or on his forehead, so that no one could buy or sell unless 
he had the mark. 

MARK: Sign/seal/mark of approval or disapproval 
(Remans 4:11; Revelation 7:2, 3; Ezekial 9:4) 
FOREHEAD: Mind (ranans 7:25; Ezekial 3:8, 9) 

HAND: Symbol of work (Ecclesiastes 9:10) 


So, one whose MIND is captured and/or whose SERVITUDE is 
pledged to the Beast can expect to receive his sign, seal or 
mark of approval. All others can neither buy or sell within 
his realm. 

This is a clear statement that, within the realm, the 
Monetary Power is in absolute control at this time. Well, 
what do the world monetary powers openly dream about today? 
They dream of the "cashless society," an economy absolutely 


devoid of curren 


private credit. Once this 


s and regulations like nothing we have known in the 


V4 vm?* w Omi 






ression far beyond anythi 




It heralds a future of 


could presently imagine. 


The hardwire necessary for a truly cashless society is 
nearly here. The keys to making a cashless society work are 
capacity and speed of computers. Today's typical computer 
is capable of approximately seven million mathematical oper¬ 
ations a second and the most advanced machines are even 
faster. How long will it take to reach the technology re¬ 
quired for a total cashless society? Predictions are 10 
years or less! 

All the other elements needed for this brave new world 
exist now. Seme of these elements will soon be deployed 
while others have been around for years. 


How will this cashless society work on the individual 
level? In the future, the inhabitants of Babylon will make 
all purchases and sales via a "smartcard," The cestui que 


- 225 - 





















trust (you) will hand the clerk, if there is a clerk, your 
"smartcard" and the transaction will be completed in a 
matter of seconds, a very convenient benefit. This smart- 
card is a credit card that has a permanent memory containing 
vital financial and personal information about you. The 
secret of this card is a small carputer chip embedded within 
it. When the card is inserted into a terminal, it tells the 
terminal carputer who you are by providing your bank account 
number. This smartcard will also provide the information 
needed to identify you and this allows the merchant's 
terminal access to your account. 

The potential for this smartcard is virtually unlimited. 
By increasing its memory, it can not only function as a 
checkbook but also as a credit card, a savings passbook, 
security clearance card, drivers license and so on. perhaps 
the thing that will be the most impressive part of the 
smartcard system is security. The card will contain, in its 
permanent memory, seme information about a physical char¬ 
acteristic unique to you. A good example would be a finger¬ 
print. Several possible methods of identifying the legit¬ 
imate owner of the card have been proposed. The "retina 
scan" may become the standard means of identification. 

The retina is the light sensing tissue at the back of the 
eye. It can be viewed optically and used to identify people 
in much the same way as a fingerprint. Bach inhabitant of 
Babylon would have his unique retina pattern recorded in his 
smartcard's memory and also at his bank. Every terminal 
would have a retina scanner as one of its basic ccnponents. 
This identification system world work this way: You hand a 
merchant your card, he inserts it into the terminal. You 
are then asked to look directly at a small lens. This lens 
is the retina scanner and it reads your retina in a matter 
of seconds. 

As for personal transactions at hone, no need to worry. 
Laws will be enacted requiring all phones sold to be equip¬ 
ped with terminals, or you will be able to use a public 
terminal much like a pay phone. It is even possible that 
televisions will be outfitted so that you can conduct bus¬ 
iness via cable. The universal Product Code (UPC) will be 
able to tell the carputer s exactly what products you are 
buying, and how much. 

We can see the evolutionary stages leading to the totally 
cashless society all around us: Universal Product Code sys¬ 
tem in supermarkets; "direct deposit" of wages to the bank, 
and "automatic bill paying." Oil companies are now experi¬ 
menting with totally automated gas stations; and patrol cars 
in San Jose, California have been outfitted with carputer 
terminals. 

The creators of our nation knew very well that economic 
freedom and political freedom are indivisible, you can not 


- 226 - 




have one without the other. They also knew that an individ¬ 
ual with no privacy concerning his financial affairs had no 
economic freedom. 

Is it possible to have it both ways - to take advantage 
of the marvels of technology and still remain free? The 
answer is a most definite and emphatic, YES! All one has to 
do is get out of "his realm," and stay cut. 


Part III: The Merchants of Babylon 

The commercial nature of Babylon is described in the 
following passages: 

The merchants of the earth will weep and 
mourn over her because no one buys their cargoes 
anymore ... [Rev. 18:11] 

Cargoes of gold, silver, precious stones and 
pearls; fine linen, purple, silk and scarlet 
cloth; every sort of citron wood, and articles 
of every kind made of ivory, costly wood, 
bronze, iron and marble! [Rev. 18:12] 

Cargoes of cinnamon and spice, of incense, 
myrrh and frankincense, of wine and olive oil, 
of fine flower and wheat; cattle and sheep; 
horses and carriages; and BODIES AND SCULS OF 
MEN. [Rev. 18:13] 

... The kings of the earth committed adultry 
with her, and the merchants of the earth grew 
rich from her excessive luxuries. [Rev., 18:3] 

... Every sea captain, and all who travel by 
ship, the sailors, and all who earn their living 
from the sea will stand far off. [Rev. 18:17] 

They will throw dust on their heads, and with 
weeping and mourning cry out: 

"Wne! Woe, 0 great city, where all who had 
ships in the sea became rich through her 
wealth!" ... [Rev. 18:19] 

THE MERCHANTS WERE THE POWERS OF THE EARTH; 

AND THEIR SCRCERCIES DECEIVED ALL NATIONS. 

[Rev. 18:23] 

The merchants of Babylon were the powers of the earth, 
and their modus operandi was lies, deceit, and deception; 
and bodies and souls of men were items of merchandise and 
cargoes of merchants. How does anything become a legitimate 
item of merchandise and cargo of merchants? By contract of 
course! Merchants being the powers of the earth, what law 
must be the prevailing and governing law on earth? The Law 
of Merchants of course! 


- 227 - 



If the world-wide currency is private bank credit, be¬ 
stowing upon anyone who uses it the privilege and benefit of 
limited liability for payment of debt; if all property, both 
real and personal, has been hypothecated to a trust governed 
by the world monetary power; and if, the nature of rights 
and obligations created between the trustees and benefici¬ 
aries of this mercantile city are maritime, what juris¬ 
diction must be invoked in order to enforce these rights and 
obligations, this Law of Merchants? Admiralty/Maritime of 
course! 

Is it possible to sell your body and soul to Satan? Will 
God honor this contract when the time canes to determine the 
fate of your soul? 

Then I heard another voice from heaven say: 

"Came out of her, my people, so you will not 
share in her sins, so you will not receive any 
of her plagues; for her sins are piled up to 
heaven, and God has remembered her crimes." 

[Rev. 18:4] 

The formula of the Monetary Power for a world-wide 
program to deceive all nations has been stated thusly: 

The intensification of armaments, the in¬ 
crease of police forces - are all essential for 
the completion of the aforementioned plans. 

What we have to get at is that there should be 
in all the States of the world, besides our¬ 
selves, only the masses of the proletariat, a 
few millionaires devoted to our interests, po¬ 
lice and soldiers. Throughout all Europe, and 
by means of relations with Europe, in all other 
continents also, we must create ferments, dis¬ 
cords and hostility. Therein we gain a double 
advantage. In the first place we keep in check 
all countries, for they will know that we have 
the power whenever we like to create disorders 
or to restore order. All these countries are 
accustomed to see in us an indispensable force 
of coercion. In the second place, BY OUR IN¬ 
TRIGUES WE SHALL TANGLE UP ALL THE THREADS BY 
WHICH WE HAVE STRETCHED INTO THE CABINETS OF ALL 
STATES. BY MEANS OF THE POLITICAL, BY ECONOMIC 
TREATIES, OR LOAN OBLIGATIONS. In order to 
succeed in this we must use great cunning and 
penetration during negotiations and agreements, 
but, as regards what is called the "official 
language," we shall keep to the opposite tactics 
and assume the mask of honesty and compliancy. 


- 228 - 



In this way the peoples and governments (all 
nations) whom we have taught to look only at the 
outside whatever we present to their notice, 
will still continue to accept us as the benefac¬ 
tors and saviours (trustees) of the human race. 
We nust be in a position to respond to every act 
of op- position by war with the neighbors of 
that country which dares to oppose us: but if 
these neighbors should also venture to stand 
collect- ively together against us, then we must 
offer resistance by a universal war. The 
principal factor of success in the political is 
the se- crecy of its undertakings; the word 
should not agree with the deeds of the diplomat. 
We must compel the governments ... to take 
action in the direction favored by our 
widely-conceived plan, already approaching the 
desired consunmation, by what we shall represent 
as PUBLIC OPINION, SE- CRETELY PROMPTED BY US 
THROUGH THE MEANS OF THAT SO-CALLED "GREAT POWER 
- THE PRESS, WHICH, WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS THAT 
MAY BE DISREGARDED, IS ALREADY ENTIRELY IN OUR 
HANDS." [A] 


Part IV: Synopsis 


material 

E£S3££Si 


ialism. deception. 

and iqnorance of the Law.. He exercises 

this power under 

the Law of Merchants within the iurisdic- 



because 

of the Maritime Nature of Babylon itself. 


the sum of its qualities or characteristics. 

The account of her wealth in silver, gold, precious 
stones, fine raiment and, yes, even bodies and souls of Men; 
the merchant's fornication with her, and their consternation 
at her fall. All symbolic language that has its modern day 
correlate - the carmercialist, his absorption in matter and 
obsession with material things. He has read this many times 
but has never seen in it a warning. In fact, as far as he 


is concerned, the wise of all ages 




as well have never 


lived. And so he goes on his wav plundering and despoiling. 
His objectives are financial profit and power in further- 
ence of his own selfish interests. His power base is the 


"wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked" 
(the deceived ones). He has not intelligence enough to 
correct his own faults and weaknesses, therefore Nature 
must. Thus, we all become blind actors in a play we do not 
understand - we are indeed, deceived^ 


- 229 - 


































By succanbing to the materialistic lures and teachings of 
the Pied Pipers of Babylon, the true nature of Causation and 
the purpose of our own Being is hidden from us. So ignorant 
have we became under than, that we are now in the process of 
destroying what morality and virtue our forebears did de¬ 
velop; and from ignorance of the Law we give power to the 
beast. 

we proclaim that we are fighting to regain access to our 
Cannon Law Birthright - yet we ignore the essence of Common 
Law to "Live Honestly," which first requires knowledge and 
understanding of the science of common law - the "science of 
mine and thine." 

This is a natter of Conscience - we are what cur con¬ 
science is. Therefore, if we are "wretched, and miserable, 
and poor, and blind, and naked," it is because our con¬ 
science is likewise. THAT IS Common Law! 

What is the legacy we are going to leave to our poster¬ 
ity? Who is enlightened enough to LIVE AND TEACH THE LAW? 

I counsel thee to buy me gold tried in the 
fire, that thou mayest be (truly) rich; and 
white raiment (spirituality), that thou mayest 
be clothed, and that the shame of thy (material) 
nakedness do not appear; and anoint thine eyes 
with eyesalve, that thou mayest see. 
[Revelation 3:18] 

What can this "eyesalve" be but enlightenment? A "new 
dimension of consciousness" by which we may see the error of 
our ways and discern our false faiths? With this we will 
knew the truth that will set us free! Once we know the 
truth, we are on solid ground: 

Because thou has kept the word of my pa¬ 
tience, I also will keep thee from the hour of 
temptation, which shall came upon all the world, 
to try than that dwell upon the earth. 

Behold, I ccrne quickly: HOLD THAT Eft ST WHICH 
THOU HAST, THAT NO MAN TAKE THY CROWN. 
[Revelations 3: 10-11] 

Therein is the kingdom of the free, sovereign, individual 
at Common law! 


Part V: On Oaths 

Today's jurors are asked to take an oath to the effect 
that they will take the law as the court gives it to them 
and apply that law to the facts of the case. The jurors who 


- 230 - 



do so have not only agreed to be nothing but "advisors" to 
the court, but have voluntarily subjected themselves to the 
possibility of perjury charges if they, even in good con¬ 
science, subsequently refuse to do so. 

The oath serves to overtly subject them to an unwar¬ 
rantable jurisdiction wherein they have no rights and duties 
as a cannon law juror. By their cwn voluntary actions they 
automatically become advocates of the state and therefore, 
cannot function as a bulwark of liberty. They officially 
become agents of the merchants of Babylon for the duration 
of the trial. 

As in the case of other lures, snares and traps of the 
Pied Pipers; the solution to this dilemma can be found in 
the Holy Scriptures: 

Again, ye have heard that it hath been said 
by them of old time. Thou shalt not foreswear 
thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine 
oaths. [Matthew 5:33] 

Jesus changed the law of the Old Testament regarding the, 
taking of oaths. His new commandments were succinctly 
stated by Matthew and James: 


But I say unto you. Swear not at all; neither 
by heaven; for it is God's throne; Nor by the 
earth; for it is his footstool; neither by Jeru¬ 
salem; for it is the city of the great king. 
Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because 
thou canst not make one hair white or black. 

But let your communication be Yea, Yea; Nay, 

Nay: for whatever is more than these ccmeth of 
evil. [Matthew 5:34-37] 

But above all things, my bretheren swear not, 
neither by heaven, neither by the earth, neither 
by any other oath: but let your Yea be Yea; and 
your Nay be Nay; lest ye fall into condemnation. 

[James 5:12] 

It is well settled that no one can be ccttpelled to take 
an "oath" in violation of his spiritual training and be¬ 
liefs. Upon proper and timely objection to a request to 
take an oath, however, a believer and foilewer of the above 
scriptures can expect to be told: "You don't have to take 
the oath, ycu can affirm instead." Many believers will make 
an affirmation in lieu of the oath, thinking they are not 
disregarding these carmandments. BEWARE ALL YOU BELIEVERS! 
Satan's ways are indeed devious. How else can all nations 
be deceived? 


- 231 - 







Let us examine just what it means to "affirm" under pen¬ 
alties of perjury. From Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary: 

AFFIRM: To testify or declare by affirmation. 

AFFIRMATION: A solemn declaration made under 
penalties of perjury by a person who con¬ 
scientiously declines taking an oath. 

SOLEMN: Marked by the invocation of a religious 
sanction 

PERJURY: The voluntary violation of an oath or 
vow, either by swearing to what is untrue or 
by emission to do what has been promised 
under oath. False swearing. 

OATH: A solemn calling upon God or a god to wit¬ 
ness to the truth of what one says or to wit¬ 
ness that one sincerely intends to do what 
one says. 

VCW: To premise solemnly: Swear. 

SWEAR: To utter or take solemnly. 

According to Webster, an affirmation constitutes swearing 
in all respects; Thus the act of affirming violates the com¬ 
mandments of the Holy Scriptures. 

We are constantly being subjected to demands to sign 
various kinds of forms under penalties of perjury, to give 
depositions, to make certifications, to make affidavits, 
etc.. Analyze the implications of such actions in light of 
the commandments regarding oath taking. From Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary: 

DEPOSE: To testify to under oath or by affi¬ 
davit. 

DEPOSITION: Testimony taken down in writing 
under oath. 

TESTIFY: To make a solemn declaration under oath 
for the purpose of establishing a fact (as in 
court). 

ATTEST: To authenticate by signing as a witness; 
to put on an oath; to bear witness; Testify. 

CERTIFY: To attest authoritatively. 

All of the above are succinctly translated into present 
day practices and procedures of law, as quoted below from 
the California Penal Code: 

Section 118: Perjury defined. 

Every person who, having taken an oath that 

he will testify, declare, depose, or certify 

truly before any competent tribunal, officer or 


- 232 - 




person, in any of the cases in which such an 
oath may by law of the State of California be 
administered, willfully and contrary to such 
oath, states as true any material natter which 
he knows to be false, and every person who tes¬ 
tifies, declares, deposes, or certifies under 
penalties of perjury in any of the cases in 
which such testimony, declarations, depositions, 
or certification is permitted by law of the 
State of California under penalty of perjury and 
willfully states as true any material matter 
which he knows to be false, is guilty of per¬ 
jury.... 

Section 118a. False affidavit as to test¬ 
imony as perjury; subsequent contrary testimony. 

Any person who, in any affidavit taken before 
any person authorized to administer oaths, 
swears, affirms, declares, deposes, or certifies 
that he will testify, declare, depose, or cert¬ 
ify before any ccnpetent tribunal, officer, or 
person, in any ccnpetent tribunal, officer, or 
person, in any case then pending or thereafter 
to be instituted, in any particular manner, or 
to any particular fact, and in such affidavit 
willfully and contrary to such an oath states as 
true any ma- terial matter which he knows to be 
false, is guilty of perjury.... 

Section 119. Oath defined 

THE TERM "OATH" AS USED IN THE LAST TWO 
SECTIONS, INCLUDES AN AFFIRMATION AND EVERY 
OTHER MODE AUTHORIZED BY LAW OF ATTESTING THE 
TRUTH OF THAT WHICH IS STATED. 

According to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, before penalties, 
of perjury can attach. "THE OATH MUST BE TAKEN" AND "THE 
PARTY MUST BE LAWFULLY SWORN. " 

Thus, by definition, any statement, written or oral, 
under penalties of perjury constitutes the taking of an 
oath. Believers and followers of the Holy Scriptures should 
be aware of the fact and conduct themselves pursuant to the 
dictates of their consciences. Each should be very careful 
to find out and pursue his cwn way. A word of caution; One 
should never refuse to provide information on these grounds. 
He can, however decline to do so under penalties of perjury 
for reasons that his spiritual training and belief in his 
Supreme Being prohibits the taking of oaths. 

\ The modern oath is godless; the court requires that we 
swear "to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 


- 233 - 











the truth." merely on our "oath or affirmation" and the, 
coart 1 s demand. Such a court has placed itself and its oath 
outside of God and, thus, they are lies to begin with. The 
Christian in such a court DOTS swear, whether the court 
language includes it or not. He does so by God, not bv man, 
because he can recognize no other oath as anything but 
blasphemy. On the other hand, a godless court which still 
retains God in its oath is also guilty of taking the Lord's 
name in vain. An oath is God-centered. If state and/or 
church depart from God their use of the oath in any is pro¬ 
fanity. They do not believe in God's judgment or curse - 
only in man's, and their use of the oath is thus false 
usage. 

A godless oath is a personal affirmation in the name of 
the state. It constitutes swearing by a false god, Satan, 
clearly forbidden in Holy Scripture (Jer. 12:16; Amos 8:14). 
Perjury required the same penalty as in the case involved 
and the penalty against the accused would be the penalty 
against the false witness for or against him. (Deut. 
19:16-21). 

Whereas the oath is in the name of God to an agency of 
justice established by God, the vow is directly to God. 
Thus, neither oaths nor vows are to individuals. Our speech 
to men must be yea, yea, and nay, nay - straightforward and 
truthful. Because we are servants of God we cannot be ser¬ 
vants of men, we cannot serve two masters, and we cannot 
bind ourselves to men by a careless word. 


Part VI: The Relativity Syndrome [B] 

In an age when men deny God and His sovereignty, the 
world is torn between two conflicting claimants to the 
authority of God: The totalitarian state on the one hand, 
and the totalitarian, anarchistic individual on the other 
hand. The totalitarian state permits no dissent, and the 
anarchistic individual admits no possible loyalty outside of 
himself . When all the world is gray, no concept of gray is , 
possible. Everything being gray, there is no principle of 
definition and description left.. As everything moves to 
sameness the ability to define and recognize diminishes. 
Truth becomes more elusive. 

The basic principle of the law of society today is 
relativism. Relativism reduces all things to a ccrmon 
color. As a result, there is no longer a definition for 
treason, or for a crime. The criminal is protected by law 
because the law kncws no criminal, since so-called modern 
law denies that absoluteness of justice which defines good 
and evil. What cannot be defined cannot be limited or pro¬ 
tected. A definition is a fencing and a protection around 






















an object: It separates it from all things else and pro¬ 
tects its identity. An absolute law set forth by the 
absolute God separates good and evil and protects good. 
When that law is denied, and relativism sets in, there no 
longer exists any valid principle of differentiation and 
identification. What needs protecting from whom when all 
the world is equal and the same? Because the courts of law 
are increasingly unable to define anything due to their 
relativism, they are increasingly unable to protect the 
righteous, those who live the Law, in a world where crime 
cannot be prqperly defined. For Bnilie Durkheim, the crim¬ 
inal may be and often is an evolutionary pioneer, charting 
the next direction of society. In terms of Durkheim's rela¬ 
tivistic sociology, the criminal may be a mare valuable man 
than one living God's laws because the interests of the law- 
abiding citizen will be conservative or reactionary. [C] 

The relativistic society is indeed an "open society," 
open to all evil and to no good. Since the relativistic 
society is beyond good and evil by definition, it cannot 
offer its citizens any protection from evil. Instead, the 
trustees of this society, the self-appointed "protectors of 
the human race," will seek to protect the people from those 
who seek to restore a definition of good and evil in terms 
of Scripture. 

The law will always require inequality. Hie question is 
simply this; will it be an inequality in terms of fundament¬ 
al justice, i.e., the rewarding of good and the punishing of 
evil, or will it be the inequalities of injustice and evil 
triumphant? 

The cornnandment, "Thou shalt have no other gods before 
me," requires that we recognize no power as true and ul¬ 
timately legitimate if it be not grounded in God and His 
law-word. It requires that we see true law as righteous¬ 
ness, the righteousness of God, and as a ministry of just¬ 
ice, and it requires us to recognise that the inequalities 
of just law faithfully applied are the basic ingredients of 
a free and healthy society. The body p olitic, no less than 
the physical body, cannot equate sickness with neaTtn with¬ 
out perishing. ~ ~~ * ™~ " 

Hie commandment, "Thou shalt have no other gods before 
me," means also "Thou shalt have no other powers before me," 
independent of me or having priority over me. Hie command¬ 
ment can also read, "Thou shalt have no other law before 
me." The powers which today more than ever present them¬ 
selves as the other gods are the antichristian states. Hie 
anti-christian state makes itself god and therefore sees 
itself as the source of both law and power. Apart frcm a 
Biblical perspective, the state becomes another god, and, 
instead of law, legality prevails. 


- 235 - 





This devotion to legality has a long history in the 
modern world. Gohler, minister of justice in France during 
the years of the Reign of Terror, came to be known as "the 
causist of the guillotine" because of his dedication to 
legality. Later, as a member of the Directory, when faced 
with the threat of Napoleon's seizure of power, he declared, 
"At the worst, how can there be any revolution in St. Cloud? 
As President, I have here in my possession the seal of the 
Republic." Stalin operated his continuing terror under the 
umbrella of legality. [B] 

But legality is not law. A state can by strict legality 
embark on a course of radical lawlessness. Legality has 
reference to the rules of the game as established by a state 
and its courts. Law has reference to fundamental, God-given 
order. The modern state champions legality as a tool in 
opposing law. The result is a legal destruction of law and 
order. 


Power and the law are not synonymous. In 
truth they are frequently in opposition and 
irreconcilable. There is God's Law from which 
all equitable lavra of man emerge and by which 
men must live if they are not to die in oppres¬ 
sion, chaos and despair. Divorced from God's 
eternal and immutable Law, established before 
the founding of the suns, man's power is evil no 
matter the noble words with which it is employed 
or the motives urged when enforcing it. 

Men of good will, mindful therefore of the 
Law laid down by God, will oppose governments 
whose rule is by men, and, if they wish to sur¬ 
vive as a nation they will destroy that govern¬ 
ment which attempts to adjudicate by the whim or 
power of venal judges. 

-Cicero 

When Chief Justice Frederick Moore Vinson of the U.S. 
asserted after World war II, "Nothing is more certain in 
modern society than the principle that there are no abso¬ 
lutes," he made it clear that, before the law, the one 
clear-cut evil is to stand in terms of God's absolute law. 
"The principle that there are no absolutes," enthroned as 
law, means warfare against the Biblical absolutes. 

The modern courts act on this faith and the conclusion of 
such a course can only be the reign of terror magnified to 
encompass the world. Neither could the merchants become 
powers of the earth, nor could all nations be deceived under 
a system, and in a society, adhering to God's absolute law. 
The "relativity syndrome" is an essential element in the 


- 236 - 




Beast's aoguisition of power within his realm, the City/Ship 
of Babylon. 

With no absolutes it is easy to represent form as sub¬ 
stance. Symbols, the form, are used to hide reality and are 
part of a scheme for confusing and controlling the people in 
a relativistic society. Those who rely on symbols deprive 
themselves opportunity to acquire the knowledge necessary to 
be their own governors. One who relies on symbols is a 
prime candidate for manipulation and destruction for lack of 
knowledge. 


Pity the bull 
that cannot see 
which is the forest 
and which is the tree. 

Yet more pity the matador 
who survives by deception 
when his cape is transparent 
to the bull's perception. 

Seek the truth 
and you will survive 
for that is the essence 
of being alive. 

Poem by Verl K. Speer 


- 237 - 






CHAPTER IX 


LAND PATENTS AND ALLODIAL TITLES 


Part I: Introduction 


1 If the American people 

ever allow the banks to control 

issuance 

of their 


deflation. 

the banks 

and 

corporations that qrow up around 

IHSgimi] 

deprive 

the 

people of all property until their 

1 children 

will wake 

UE 

homeless on the continent their 


fathers occupied. rThcmas Jefferson] 


While it is generally believed in America today that the 
purpose of the American Revolution was to resist taxation 
without representation, the actual reason was to eliminate 
the cause of this and many other injustices, and that cause 
was the admiralty jurisdiction imposed within the bodies of 
the counties. A major effect of this cause was a contractual 
feudal/serf relationship between the colonial landholders 
and the Crown - legal title being held by Great Britain and 
an equitable title being held by the colonist/serf in 
possession of and working the land. 

This presumption of rightful legal title was challenged 
by the colonists, who insisted that the King of England did 
not own the land and, therefore, it was not his to grant to 
supportive colonists. After the Revolution, the land became 
the property of each State's people, with the authority of 
the people to parcel out the land to claimants in a fair and 
equitable manner. If sane land remained unoccupied, Jef¬ 
ferson said that anyone occupying it has, by possession, the 
right of ownership. Land was to be held by allodial title., 
[which simply means there is "No Superior or Overlord” to the 
land owner. He was Sovereign on his land. “ 

One of the earliest statutes for granting land patents 
was passed by an Act of Congress, April 24, 1820, which 
prohibited the use of credit for the purchase of government 
land. In the debates in Congress prior to the passage of 
this Act, Senator King of New York said: 

It (the Act) is calculated to plant in the 
new county a population of independent, unem- 
barrased freeholders ... it will put it in the 
power of every man to purchase a freehold, the 
price of which can be cleared in three years ... 
it will prevent the accumulation of an alarming 
debt, which experience proves never could or 
would be paid. 


- 238 - 


















In 1862, the Homestead Act, Section 4, provided that: 

No lands acquired under the provisions of 
this Act shall in any event become liable to the 
satisfaction of any debt or debts contracted 
prior to the issuing of the land patent. 


The issue of allodial vs. feudal land titles in America 
was addressed by the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsyl¬ 
vania in the case of Wallace v. Harmstad in 1863: 

I see no way of solving this question, except 
by determining whether our Pennsylvania titles 
are allodial or feudal .... 

I venture to suggest that much of the confus¬ 
ion of ideas that prevails on this subject has 
ccme from our retaining, since the American Rev¬ 
olution, the feudal nomenclature of estates and 
tenures, as fee, freehold, heirs, feoffment, and 
the like. 

Our question, then, narrows itself down to 
this: is fealty any part of our land tenures? 

What Pennsylvanian ever obtained his lands by 
openly and humbly kneeling before his lord, be¬ 
ing ungirt, uncovered, and holding up his hands 
both together between those of the Lord, who sat 
before him, and there professing that he did be¬ 
come his man from that day forth, for life and 
limb, and certainly honour, and then receiving a 
kiss from his lord? This was the oath of fealty 
which was, according to Sir Martin Wright, the 
essential feudal bond so necessary to the very 
notion of a feud. 

We are then to regard the Revolution and 
these Acts of Assembly as emancipating every 
acre of soil of Pennsylvania from the grand 
characteristics of the feudal system. Even as 
to the lands held by the proprietaries (city of 
Philadelphia) themselves,they held them as other 
citizens held, under the ccnmonwealth, and that 
by a title purely allodial. [Wallace v. Harms- 
tad, 44 Pa. 492,(1863)] 

So, the people had a right to allodial land titles as a 
direct result of the Declaration of independence and the war 
for Independence that followed. A holder of an allodial 
title (i.e. there being no Superior or Overlord) cannot be 
taxed on that property against his consent. There could be. 
a transfer or sales tax imposed by the State at the time of 
purchase, but no taxation on tEe proper ty , 'T tsST F''igainst the*. 


- 239 - 






















owner's consent. And yet, the taxation of property soon 




is coun 


Why and How? t 

When taxation of real property began, because of "the 
confusion of ideas that prevails on this subject," the 
people unknowingly, and voluntarily accepted the premise 
that government was the Superior and the legal title holder; 
and their interest in the land was merely an equitable one. 
This voluntary acceptance constituted tacit consent to a 


When the gigantic public trust was implemented in 1913 
via the Federal Reserve Act, no iirmediate changes with re¬ 
gard to this master/serf relationship between government and 
landholder were necessary. Life went on as usual with 
clues to the fact that all property had been hypothecated to 


e Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve: and as 


This was accomplished by 
owing the same taxing agencies to act as administrating 
agents for this newly formed trust. 

With the feudal tenent registered as a beneficiary of 
this trust via a Birth Certificate, and title to the land 
held in trust, further involvement and the consequent 
subjection to the controls of management was left to the 
individual. For example: The farmer/tenet was left to his 
own devices and discretion as to what to plant, when to 
plant, how much to plant, etc. - as long as he paid his 
tithes to the tax collector (now, in actualit 


emiums). However, when he 
applied for, and received, such "benefits" as farm subsidy, 
government supported grain storage, etc. , he became further 
bound to the trust and incurred certain additional obliga¬ 


tions and duties, he voluntarily subjected himself to the 


nEssScsIsDiKE51is * *** i<,|j 


even be ordered to destroy croi 




contract was 


voluntarily subiected himself to its coercive be 


If he had understood the facts and the applicable law, as 
it applies to those facts, he could have used the law to 
extricate himself from such an intolerable situation, in 
lieu of having the law used against him. 

The founding fathers knew free men could survive onl 


owned allodial title to propert 


was this type of ownership that accounted for broad 


reservation 































































gggm* EnE£i 


urv system, which they referred to as the 




manipulation of the money supply, via debt, would ultimate! 


eir substance 


tv into the hands of a few 


According to conservative estimates, possibly half a 
million U.S. fanners will be driven from the land in the 
next several years. Jim Hightower has put the goal of the 
present administration at 10,000 super farms. Mr. Hightower 
is the Texas Cctnnissioner of Agriculture. A total of 10,000 
farms for the nation has been the goal of public policy, i. 
e., the policy of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re¬ 
serve, our trustees, ever since its Committee for Economic 
Development wrote its Adaptive Program for Agriculture. 

Mortgage foreclosures of equitable title interests are on 
the increase, and are the means of implementing this public 
policy. 

The best title one can acquire frcxn a title company today 
is a "Fee Simple Absolute;" defined as: 


A fee simple absolute is an estate limited 
absolutely to a man and his heirs and assigns 
forever without limitation car condition. 

At first blush it would appear that this is the same 
title as "allodial;" defined as: 

Free, not holden to any lord or superior; 
[Black's Law Dictionary 

In order to discover the legal distinction between the 
terms "allodial" and "fee simple absolute," we must define 
the word "estate" as used in the definition of "fee simple 
absolute." 

ESTATE: The degree, quantity, nature, and 
extent of interest which a person has in real 
property is usually referred to as an estate, 
and it varies from absolute ownership down to 
naked possession. [Black's Law Dictionary] 

Thus, "fee simple absolute" is an overbroad, catch-all, 
phrase that enccmpases all interests in land from allodial 
down to naked possession. It in no way describes or defines 
your vested interest in the land. Clearly, if the land i 

title being hel3 fr/ the trustees o: 


do not possess allodial title 


























contracts you have consuirmated, placing additional burdens 
and restrictions upon your use of that land, 
i Mavbe we are beqinnincr to understand the leaal basis for 

1 planning commissions, land use permits, buildina oermits. 






What we are going to examine now is how one, as a free 
sovereign, can claim allodial title to property hypothecated 


to a trust governed by the Monetary power. 

The formula of the Monetary Power for a world program to 
deprive landowners of their lands has been stated thusly: 

We shall soon begin to establish huge monop¬ 
olies, colossal reservoirs of wealth, upon which 
even the big ... properties will be dependent to 
such an extent that they will all fall together 
with the government credit on the day following 
the political catastrophe. The economists here 
present must carefully weigh the significance of 
this combination. We must develop by every means 
the importance of CUR SUPERGOVEMSMENT, REPRE¬ 
SENTING IT AS THE PROTECTOR AND BENEFACTOR OF 
ALL WHO VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO US. (Join the 
Trust Wherein "US" are the trustees) 

The aristocracy ... as a political force has 
passed away. We need not take theirs into con¬ 
sideration. But, as owners of land, they are 
harmful to us in that they are independent in 
their sources of livelihood. THEREFORE, AT ALL 
COSTS, WE MUST DEPRIVE THEM OF THEIR LAND. 

THE BEST MEANS TO ATTAIN THIS IS TO INCREASE 
THE TAXES AND MORTGAGE INDEBTEDNESS. These mea¬ 
sures will keep land ownership in a state of un¬ 
conditional subordination ... 

At the same time IT IS NECESSARY TO ENROURAGE 
... ESPECIALLY SPEOJALTTON ... Without specu¬ 
lation, industry will cause private capital to 
increase and tend to improve the condition of 
Agriculture by freeing the land from indebted¬ 
ness for loans by the land banks. It is nec¬ 
essary for industry to deplete the land both of 
and, through speculations, transfer all the 
money of the world into cur hands.... 

To destroy ... industry, we shall, as an 
incentive to this speculation, encourage - a 
strong demand for luxuries, all enticing lux¬ 
uries. 

We will force up wages, which however will be 
of no benefit to workers, for we will at the 


- 242 - 


















same time cause a rise in the prices of prime 
necessities, pretending that this is due to the 
decline of agriculture and cattle raising.... 

THAT THE TRUE SITUATION SHALL NOT BE NOTICED 
... PREMATURELY, (before recognition of the 
Anti-Christ), WE WILL MASK IT BE A PRETENDED 
EFFORT TO SERVE THE WCRKIN3 CLASS AND PROMOTE 
GREAT ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, FOR WHICH AN ACTIVE 
PROPAGANDA WILL BE CARRIED ON THROUGH OUR 
ECONOMIC THEORIES. [A] 


Part II: Color of Title [B] 

Today, the American based system establishing land own¬ 
ership consists of three key requirements. These three are 
the warranty deed or seme other type of deed purporting to 
convey ownership of land, title abstracts to chronologically 
follow the development of these different types of deeds to 
a piece of property, and title insurance to protect the 
ownership of that land. These three ingredients must work 
together to ensure a systematic and orderly conveyance of a 
piece of property. None of these three by itself can act bo 
completely convey possession of the land from one person to 
another. At least two of the three are always deemed 
necessary to adequately satisfy the legal system and real 
estate agents that the title to the property has been placed 
in the hands of the purchaser. Often times, all three are 
necessary to properly pass the ownership of the land to the 
purchaser. Yet does the absolute title and the ownership of 
the land really pass from the seller to purchaser with the 
use of any one of these three instruments or in any 
combination thereof? None of the three by itself passes the 
absolute or allodial title to the land, the system of lancU 
ownership America originally operated under, and even, 
combined all three can not convey this absolute type of" 
ownership. what then is the function o? these three 
instruments that are used in land convey- ances; and what 
type of title is conveyed by the three? Since the abstract 
only traces the title and the title insurance only insures 
the title, the most important and therefore first group to 
examine are the deeds that pur- portedly convey the fee from 
seller to purchaser. 

These deeds include the ones as follows: warranty deed, 
quitclaim deed, sheriff's deed, trustee's deed, judicial 
deed, tax deed, will, or any other instrument that purport¬ 
edly conveys the title. Each of these dociments state that 
it conveys the ownership to the land. Each of these^ how¬ 
ever, is actually a color of title. [G. Thompson, Title to 


- 243 - 













s Real Property, Preparation and Examination of Abstracts, Ch. 
r 3, Section 73, p. 93 (1919).] 


A color of title is that which in appearance is title but 


whicn 

in 

mssva 

is 

not 

title; [B](l) and, in fact. 

any 

instrument 

may constitute color of title when it purports 

to 

convey 

title to 

the 

land 

as well as the land itself. . 


although it is void as a muniment of title. [B](2). The 


Supreme Court of Missouri has stated: 

[w]hen we say a person has a color of title, 
whatever may be the meaning of the phrase, we 
express the idea, at least, that seme act has 
been previously done ... by which seme title, 
good or bad, to a parcel of land of definite 
extent has been conveyed to him. [St. Louis v. 
Gorman, 29 Mo. 593 (I860)] 

in other words, a color of title is an appearance of 
apparent title, an "image" of the true title, hence the 
qualification "color of" which, when coupled with posses¬ 
sion, purports to convey the ownership of the land to the 
purchaser. However, this does not say the color of title is 
the actual or true title itself, nor does it say the color 
of title itself actually conveys ownership. In fact the 
claimant or holder of a color of title is not even required 
to trace the title through the chain down to his instrument. 
[B](3). Rather it may be said a color of title is prima 
facia evidence of ownership of land, and rights to posses¬ 
sion of the land until such time as that presumption o£ 
ownership is disproved by a better title or the actual title 
itself. If such cannot be proven to the contrary, then 
ownership of the land is assumed to have passed to the 
occupier of the land. To further strengthen a color of 
title holder's position, courts have held that the good 
faith of the holder of a color of title is presumed in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary. [B](4). 

With such knowledge of what a color of title is it is 
interesting to discover what constitutes colors of title: 

1. warraanty deed - A warranty deed is like any other 
deed or conveyance, [B](5) and a warranty deed or conveyance 
is a color of title. [B](6). 

2. Deeds generally - Deeds constitute colors of title 
[B](7) and a deed that purports to convey interest in land 
is a cola: of title. [B] (8) A deed which, on its face, 
purports to convey a title constitutes a claim and color of 
title. [B] (9). 

3. Quitclaim deeds - A quitclaim deed is a color of 
title [B](10) and can pass the title as effectively as a 
warranty with full covenants. [B](11). 


- 244 - 














4. Sheriff's deeds. Judicial deeds, and tax deeds - 
Sheriff's deeds are also colors of title [B](12), as are 4 
Judicial deeds [B](13). The Illinois Supreme Court went 
into detail in its determination that a tax deed is only a 
color of title: 

There the cctiplainant seems to have relied 
upon the tax deed as conveying to him the fee, 
and to sustain such a bill, it was incumbent of 
him to show that all the requirements of the law 
had been complied with. [Huls v. Buntin, 47 
Ill. 396 (1865)] 

A simple tax deed by itself is only a color of title and 
does not meet all the requirements of the law for a fee 
simple, allodial, title. Thus any tax deed which purports, 
on its face, to convey title is a good color of title. 

[B](14). 

5. Wills - A will passes only a color of title and can 
pass only so much as the testator owns, though it may 
attempt to pass more. [B](15). 

6. Trustee's deed, mortgage and foreclosure - A 
trustee's deed, a mortgage and strict foreclosure [B](16) or 
any document defining the extent of a disseisor's claim or 
purported claim [B](17) have all been held to be colors of 
title: 

[t]here is nothing here requiring a deed, to 
establish a color of title, and under the former 
decisions of this court, color of title may ex¬ 
ist without a deed. [Baldwin v. Ratcliff, 125 
Ill. 376, 383 (1888)] 

Thus, a color of title does not mean the actual title, 
nor does the question of notice of outstanding title effect 
a color of title. [B](18). 

None of these cases have been overruled and are still 
valid, well established, law. All of the documents des¬ 
cribed in these cases are the main avenues of claimed land 
ownership in America today; yet, none actually conveys the, 
true and allodial title. They in fact convey something^ 
quite different. 

When it is stated that a color of title conveys only an 
appearance of title, such a statement is correct but, per¬ 
haps, too vague to be properly understood in its correct 
legal context. Of better use are the more pragmatic state¬ 
ments concerning title. A title, or color of title, in 
order to be effective in transferring the ownership, or 
purported ownership, of the land must be a marketable or 
merchantable title. 


- 245 - 



A marketable or merchantable title is one that is rea- 
¥ sonably free from doubt. [b](19). This title must be 
reasonably free from doubts as necessary to not affect the 
marketability or saleability of the property, and must be a 
title a reasonably prudent person would be willing to ac¬ 
cept. [B](20). Such a title is often described as one 
which would ensure to the purchaser a peaceful enjoyment of 
the property [b]( 21); and it is stated that such a title 
must be obvious, evident, apparent, certain, sure or indub¬ 
itable. [B](22). 

Marketable Title Acts adopted in several states generally 
do not lend themselves to an interpretation that they might 
operate to provide a new foundation of title based upon a 
stray, accidental, or interloping conveyance. Their object 
is to provide for the reacarded fee simple ownership an 
exemption from the burdens of old conditions, which at each 
transfer of the property interfers with its marketability. 
[B](23). What each of these legal statements in the various 
factual situations says is that the color of title is never 
described as the absolute car actual title,' rather each says 
that is one of the types of titles necessary to convey 
ownership or ap- parent ownership. In order for a title to 
be effective it must be marketable - it must be a title 
which is good of recent record even if it may not be the 
actual title in fact. [B](24). 

Authorities hold that to render a title 
marketable it is not only necessary that it 
shall be free from reasonable doubt; in other 
words, that a purchaser is not entitled to de¬ 
mand a title absolutely free from every possible 
suspicion. [Cummings v. Dolon, 52 Wash. 496, 

100 P. 989 (1909)] 

The record referred to is the title of abstract and all 
documentary evidence pertaining to it: 

It is an axiom of hornbook law that a pur¬ 
chaser has notice only of recorded instruments 
that are within his chain of title. [1 R. 

Patton & C. Patton, Patton on Land Titles. 
Section 69, at 230-233. (2nd ed. 1957); Sabo v. 
Horvath, 559 P. 2d 1038, 1043 (Ak. 1976)] 

t Title Insurance then guarantees that a title is market¬ 
able , but not absolutely free from doubt, and under the color! 
_of title system used most often in this country today, no 
individual operating under this type of title system has the 
absolute or allodial title.. All that is really necessary to 
have a valid title is to have a relative clean abstract with 


- 246 - 



i 


a recognizable color of title as the operative marketable 
title within the chain of title. It therefore becomes 
necessarily difficult, if not impossible after a number of 
years, considering the inevitable contingencies that must 
arise and the title disputes that will occur, to ever 
properly guarantee an absolute title, ibis is not neces¬ 
sarily the fault of the seller, but it is the fault of the 
legal and real estate systems for allowing such a diluted 
form of title to be controlling in an area where it is 
imperative to have the absolute title. In order to correct 
this problem, it is important to return to those documents 
the early leaders of the nation created to properly ensure 
that property remained one of the inalienable rights the 
newly established sovereign freeholders could rely on to 
always exist. This correction must be in the form of 
restricting or perhaps eliminating the widespread use of a 
marketable title and returning to the absolute title. 


Part III: Land Patents - Why They were Created 

The Americans had a choice as to how they wanted their 
new government and country to be formed. Having broken away 
from the English sovereignty and establishing themselves as 
their own sovereigns, they had their choice of types of tax¬ 
ation, freedom of religion, and most importantly ownership 
of land. The Founding Fathers chose allodial ownership of 
land for the system of ownership in this country: 

After the American Revolution, lands in this 
state (Maryland) became allodial, subject to no 
tenure nor to any services incident thereto. 

[In re Waltz et al., Burlaw v. Security Trust 
and Savings Bank, 240 P. 19 (1925), quoting 

Matthews v. ward, 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 443 

(1839)]. 

The tenure referred to in this case was the feudal tenure 
and the services or taxes required to be paid to retain 
possession of the land under the feudal system. This new 
type of ownership was acquired in all thirteen states. 
[B](25). ~ 

The basis of English land law is the ownership of the 
realty by the sovereign and from the crown all titles flow. 
[B](26). It was stated this way in the case of McConnell v. 
Wilcox: 


From what source does the title to the land 
derived from a government spring? In arbitrary 
governments, from the supreme head - be he the 


- 247 - 





emperor, king or potentate; or by whatever name 
he is known. In a republic, from the law making 
or authorizing to be made the grant or sale. In 
the first case, the party looks alone to his 
letters patent; in the second, to the law and 
the evidence of the acts necessary to be done 
under the law, to a perfection of his grant, 
donation or purchase ... The law alone must be 
the fountain from whence the authority is drawn; 
and there can be no other source. [1 Scam. ill. 

344, 367 (1837)] 

The American people as newly established sovereigns after 
the Revolutionary war, became complete owners in their land 
beholden to no lord or superior, sovereign freeholders in 
the land themselves. These freeholders in the original 
thirteen states now held allodially the land they possessed 
before the war only feudally. This new and more powerful 
title protected the sovereigns from unwararanted intrusions 
or attempted takings of their land. More importantly, it 
secured in them a right to own land absolutely in 
perpetuity. By definition, the word perpetuity means: 

Continuing forever. Legally, pertaining to 
real property, any condition extending the in¬ 
alienability ... [Black's Law Dictionary, p. 

1027 (5th ed. 1980).] 

In terms of an allodial title, it is to have the property 
of inalienability forever. Nothing more need be done to 
establish the ownership of the sovereigns to their land, 
although confirmations were usually required to avoid 
possible future title confrontations. 

The Constitution in its original form was ratified by a 
convention of the states on September 17, 1787. The Con¬ 
stitution and the government formed under it were declared 
in effect on the first Wednesday of March, 1789. Prior to 
this time, during the Constitutional Convention, there was 
serious debate on the disposal of what the convention called 
the "Western territories," new the states of Ohio, Indiana, 
Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and part of Minnesota, more 
carmonly known as the Northwest Territory. This tract of 
land was ceded to the new American republic in the treaty 
signed with Britain in 1783. 

Part of the method by which the new United States decided 
to dispose of its territories, was stipulated in Article IV, 
Section III, Clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution: 

The Congress shall have the power to dispose 
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 



respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States. i 

Thus, Congress was given the power to create a vehicle to 
divest the National government of all its right and interest 
in the land. This vehicle, known as the land patent, was to 
forever divest the government of its land and was to place 
such total ownership in the hands of the sovereign free¬ 
holders who collectively created the government. The land 
patents issued prior to the initial date of recognition of 
the United States Constitution were ratified by the members 
of Constitutional Congress. Those patents created by 
statute after March, 1789, had the Congressional intent 
behind such statutes as a reference and basis for the 
determination of their powers and operational effect. 

There have been dozens of statutes enacted pursuant to 
Art. IV, Sec. Ill, Cl. II. [B](27). Some of these statutes 
had very specific intents of aiding soldiers of wars or 
dividing lands in a very snail region of one state, but all 
had the main goal of creating in the sovereigns - free¬ 
holders on their lands - a status in which they were be¬ 
holden to no lord or superior. One of these acts however, 
was the main patent statute in reference to the intent 
Congress had when creating the patents. That Statute is 3 
Stat. 566. 

In order to understand the validity of a patent in to¬ 
day's property law, it is necessary to turn to other sources 
than the acts themselves. These sources include the Con¬ 
gressional debates and case law citing such debates. The 
best source is the Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, 
Monday, March 6,1820. This abridgment and the actual de¬ 
bates found in it concern 3 Stat. 566, one of the most 
important of the land patent statutes. 

In this important debate, the reason for such a partic¬ 
ular act in general and the protections afforded by the 
patent in particular were discussed. As Senator Edwards 
stated: 


But, he said, it is not my purpose to dis¬ 
cuss, at large, the merits of the proposed 
change. I will, at present, content myself with 
an effort, merely, to shield the present set¬ 
tlers upon public lands from merciless specu¬ 
lators, whose cupidity and avarice would un¬ 
questionably be tempted by the improvements 
which those settlers have made with the sweat of 
their brows, and to which they have been en¬ 
couraged by the conduct of the government 
itself; for though they might be considered as 
embraced by the letter of the law which provides 


- 249 - 




against intrusion on public lands, yet, that 
their case has not been considered by the 
Government as within the mischiefs intended to 
be prevented is manifest, not only from the 
forbearance to enforce the law, but from the 
positive rewards which others, in their 
situation, have received, by the several laws 
which have heretofore been granted to them by 
the same right of preemption which I now wish 
extended to the present settlers. [Id. at 456.) 

Further, Senator King from New York stated: 

He considered the change as highly favorable 
to the poor man; and he argued at seme length, 
that it was calculated to plant in the new 
country a population of independent, unembar¬ 
rassed freeholders ... that it would cut up 
speculation and monopoly; that the money paid 
for the lands would be carried from the state or 
country from which the purchaser should remove; 
that it would prevent the accumulation of an 
alarming debt, which experience proved never 
would and never could be paid. [Id. at 456-57.) 

In other statutes, the Supreme Court recognized much of 
these same ideas. 

The object of the Legislation is manifest. 

It was intended to prevent speculation by 
dealings for rights of preference before the 
public lands were in the market. The speculator 
acquired power over choice spots, by procuring 
occupants to seat themselves on than and who 
abandoned them as soon as the land was entered 
under their preemption rights, and the specu¬ 
lation accomplished. Nothing could be more 
easily done than this, if contracts of this 
description could be enforced. The Act of 1830, 
however, proved to be of little avail; and then 
came the Act of 1838 (5 Stat. 251) which com¬ 
pelled the preemptor to swear that he had not 
made an arrangement by which the title might 
inure to the benefit of anyone except himself, 
or that he would transfer it to another at any 
subsequent time. This was preliminary to the 
allowing of his entry, and discloses the policy 
of Congress. [united States v. Reynes, 9 How. 

U.S. 127 (1850)) 


- 250 - 




Congress has the sole power to declare the dignity and 
effect of titles emanating from the United States and the 
whole legislation of the government mast be examined in the 
determination of such titles. [B](28). It was clearly the 
policy of Congress, in passing the preemption and patent 
laws, to confer the benefits of those laws to actual set¬ 
tlers upon the land. [B] (29 ). The intent of Congress is 
manifest in the determinations of meaning, force, and power 
vested in the patent. These cases illustrate the power and 
dignity given to the patent. It was created to divest the 
government of its lands, and to act as a means of conveying 
such lands to the generations of people that would occupy 
those lands. This formula, "or his legal representatives," 
embraces representatives of the original grantee in the 
land, by contract, such as assignees or grantees, as well as 
by operation of law, and leaves the question open to inquiry 
in a court of justice as to the party to whom the patent, or 
confirmation, should enure. [B](30). Hie Patent was and is 
the document and law that protects the settler from the 
merciless speculators, from the people that use avarice to 
unjustly benefit themselves against an unsuspecting nation. 
The patent was created with these high and grand intentions, 
and vras created with such intentions for a sound reason. 


Part IV: The Power And Authority Of A Patent 

Legal titles to lands cannot be conveyed except in the 
form provided by law. [B](31). Legal title to property is 
contingent upon the patent issuing from the government. 
[B](32). 


That the patent caries the fee and is the 
best title known to a court of law is the set¬ 
tled doctrine of this court. [Marshall v. Ladd, 
7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 106 (1869).] 

A patent issued by the government of the 
United States is legal and conclusive evidence 
of title to the land described therein. No 
equitable interest, however strong, to land 
described in such a patent, can prevail at law, 
against the patent. [Land Patents, Opinions of 
the United States Attorney General 1 s Office. 
(Sept. 1869.] 

A patent is the highest evidence of title, 
and is conclusive against the government and all 
claiming under junior patents or titles, until 
it is set aside or annulled by seme judicial 
tribunal, [stone v. United States, 2 wall. (67 
U.S.) 765 (1865).] 


- 251 - 



The patent is the instrument which, under the laws of 
Congress, passes title from the United States and the patent 
when regular on its face, is conclusive evidence of title in 
the patentee. When there is a confrontation between two 
parties as to the superior legal title, the patent is con¬ 
clusive evidence as to ownership. [B](33). Congress having 
the sole power to declare the dignity and effect of its 
titles has declared the patent to be the superior and 
conclusive evidence of the legal title. [B](34). 

Issuance of a government patent granting 
title to land is 'the most accredited type of 
conveyance known to our law'. [united States 
v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 111 (1935); see 
also United States v. Cherokee Nation, 474 F. 2d 
628, 634 (1973).] 

The patent is the only evidence of the legal fee simple 
title. [B](35). These various cases and quotes illustrate 
one fact that should be thorougly understood, thf PATENT IS 
THE HIGHEST EVIDENCE OF TITLE AND IS CONCLUSIVE OF THE 
OWNERSHIP OF LAND IN COURTS OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION. 


Part V: Treaties - The Substance Of Federal Land Patents 

The question of supremacy of confirmed federal patent 
proceedings, pursuant to an 1851 Act that had been enacted 
to implement the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, versus 
a claimed public trust easement by the City of Los Angeles, 
and State of California, was decided by the united States 
Supreme Court in April, 1984 (Summa Corporation v. State of 
California, 104 U.S. 1751) In this case petitioner (Summa 
Corporation) owned the fee title to the Bailona Lagoon, a 
narrow body of water connected to a man-made harbor located 
in the City of Los Angeles on the Pacific Ocean. The lagoon 
became part of the United States following the war with 
Mexico, which was formally ended by the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo in 1848. Petitioner's predecessors-in- interest had 
their interest in the lagoon confirmed in federal patent 
proceedings pursuant to an 1851 Act to implement the treaty, 
which provided that the validity of claims to California 
lands would be decided according to Mexican law. California 
made no claim to any interest in the lagoon at the time of 
the patent proceedings, and no mention was made of any such 
interest in the patent that was issued. 

Los Angeles brought suit against petitioner in a Cali¬ 
fornia state court, alleging that the city held an easement 
in the Bailona lagoon for ccmnerce, navigation, fishing. 


- 252 - 



passage of fresh water to canals, and water recreation; such 
an easement having been acquired at the time California 
became a State. California was joined as a defendant as 
required by state law and filed a cross- complaint alleging 
that it had acquired such an easement upon its admission to 
the Union and had granted this interest to the city. 

The trial court ruled in favor of the city and state, 
finding the lagoon was subject to the claimed public 
easement. The California Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting 
petitioner's arguments that the lagoon had never been 
tideland. Even if it had been, Mexican law imposed no 
servitude on the fee interest by reason of that fact, and 
such a servitude was forefeited by the State's failure to it 
in the federal patent proceedings. The Supreme Court ruled 
as follows: 

The question we face is whether a property 
interest so substantially in derogation of the 
fee interest patented to petitioner's predeces¬ 
sors can survive the patent proceedings con¬ 
ducted pursuant to the statute implementing the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ... 

CALIFORNIA ARGUES THAT SINCE ITS PUBLIC TRUST 
SERVITUDE IS A SOVEREIGN RIGHT, THE INTEREST DID 
NOT HAVE TO BE RESERVED EXPRESSLY ON THE FEDERAL 
PATENT TO SURVIVE THE CONFIRMATION PROCEEDINGS 
• • « 

The necessary result of the Coronado Beach 
decision (U.S. v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 

472 (1921), is that even "sovereign" claims such 
as those raised by the State of California in 
the present case nust, like other claims, be 
asserted in the patent proceedings or be barred 
• • • 

Those decisions control the outcome of this 
case. VJE HOID THAT CALIFORNIA CANNOT AT THIS 
LATE DATE ASSERT ITS PUBLIC TRUST EASEMENT OVER 
PETITIONER'S PROPERTY, WHEN PEITIONEER'S PRE¬ 
DECESSORS- IN- INTEREST HAD THEIR INTEREST CON¬ 
FIRMED WITHOUT ANY MENTION OF SUCH AN EASEMENT 
in proceedings taken pursuant to the Act of 
1851. The interest claimed by California is one 
of such substantial magnitude that ... (it) must 
have been presented in the patent proceedings or 
be barred. 


Part VI: The Land Acquisition Treaties [C] 
Northwest Ordinance: 


- 253 - 



A resolution of Congress that merely stated its intent 
that the territory shall be divided into three to five 
states to be created upon the existence of a certain nunfcer 
of inhabitants required to become states of the Union. The 
Ordinance was not a treaty, its subject matter was part of 
all territory gained from Great Britain under the Treaty of 
Peace with Great Britain, 1783, 8 Stat.80. 

Treaty Of Peace, 8 Stat. 80 (1783): 

The boundaries of the territory are given in Article II 
of the treaty, i.e., the western boundaries of those states 
today known as Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Illinois 
and Minnesota - all the states from the Mississippi River 
and eastward to include the original 13 colonies. 
Therefore, every federal land patent in every state thereof 
flows from that treaty. 

Treaty Of Cession, 8 Stat. 200 (April 20, 1803): 

This was the famous "Louisana Purchase” from which was 
gained the following states: Louisana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, 
Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Wisconsin, North and south Dakota, 
Montana, Wyoming, and the Northeast two-thirds of Colorado. 

Treaty Of Ghent: 8 Stat. 218 (October 20, 1818): 

Merely established the northern boundary of the Louisana 
Purchase as the 49th parallel to the Rocky Mountains. 

The Oregon Treaty, 9 Stat. 869 (June 15, 1846): 

An agreement with Great Britain that gave the united 
States undisputed claim to the pacific Northwest south of 
the 49th parallel. The states created from this acquisition 
are Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and the southwest corner of 
Wyoming. 

Treaty Of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922 (1848): 

Following the war with Mexico, under this treaty, the 
United States paid Mexico $15 million dollars in gold coin 
for reparations, and the territory now known as the states 
of California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and the western 
portions of Colorado and New Mexico. 

It is noteworthy that all lands under this treaty, 
purchased by private individuals from the United States, 
were paid for in gold and silver coin; after which a federal 


- 254 - 



land patent was confirmed and issued to the private 
claimant. 

Because of the confusion of land claims by the Gold Rush 
settlers on Mexican land grants. Congress enacted the Act of 
Congress, March 3, 1851, to ascertain and settle the private 
land claims in the State of California. For the first time, 
a Land Caimissioner was established to confirm the claims 
and the Court of Private Land Claims was established to 
settle disputes before final confirmation by what is now 
known as the U.S. Bureau of Land Management under the 
present Department of the Interior of the United States. 
The Act of 1851 established a two year limit to contest 
claims, after which the confirmed land claims were closed 
forever by the issuance of a federal land patent that 
generally included the phrase: 

given this day _ to _ his 

heirs and assigns forever. 

No claims could be made after the issuance date of the 
patent. This is what Surrina (supra) was all about. The two 
year limitation on contests of federal land patents issued 
to private land claimants was extended by the Act of March 
3, 1891, and is still in force today. 

Gadsden Purchase, 10 Stat. 1031 (Dec. 30, 1853): 

This was a treaty between Mexico and the United States in 
which the U.S. paid $10 million dollars in gold coin to 
Mexico for that southernmost strip of New Mexico. The 
treaty is significant because it refers back to the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo and conferred all the same rights and 
privileges to citizens of that territory as in the 1848 
treaty. Hence, that southernmost portion is, in actual 
fact included in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. All 
feudal land patents in this area also flow from treaty law. 

Cession Of Tesas: 

Texas was annexed to the United States by the independent 
vote of the inhabitants. While the Cession of Texas is a 
treaty, it was annexed as a House Joint Resolution (HJR) and 
it should be reasonably certain that its inhabitants had the 
same protections as those given under treaty law. 


Part VII: The Supremacy Clause [C] 

The lead case which said treaty law cannot be interfered 
with by a state legislature is ware v. Hylton (1796), 3 


- 255 - 



Dali. (3 U.S. 199). In this case, the Supreme Court held 
that a treaty is the supreme law of the land, pursuant to 
Article VI, Section 2, of the United States Constitution: 

... and the judges in every state shall be bound 
thereby, anything in the Constitution or the 
laws of any state to the contrary 
notwithstanding... 

any act of the legislature cannot stand in 
its way because a treaty is the declared will of 
the people of all the United States and shall be 
superior to the constitution and laws of any 
individual state. 

In other words, federal land patents put into evidence by 
a land owner cannot be challenged by a state court because 
it flows from a United States treaty and, therefore, no 
court has jurisdiction over title or ownership to land 
traced to this paramount source of title. Only private 
citizens were given federal land patents, hence the term 
"private land claim," or "FLC," used by the Bureau of Land 
Management as the date of the original patent. 

Because all federal land patents flow from treaties that 
fall under the supremacy clause, no state, private banking 
corporation or other federal agency can question the 
superiority of title to land owners who have "perfected" 
their land by federal land patent. Jurisdiction by any 
state court is invalid. Since federal land patents cannot 
be collaterally attacked as to their validity or authen¬ 
ticity as highest evidence of title, no mortgage institution 
can claim title to land by its "lien." Certified federal 
land patents were given free and clear allodial title with 
no encumbrances, then and nowl ~ 

43 USC 59 establishes duly certified copies of federal 
land patents shall be evidence in all cases where originals 
would be evidence. Section 57 covers the states of Oregon 
and California. Section 58 covers Louisiana. 

43 USC 83 covers the evidentiary effect of certified 
federal land patents for all states. All the courts in the 
United States must take judicial notice of these federal 
patents and their evidentiary effect under these federal 
statutes. If the patents are not certified when entered 
into evidence, any court may ignore the patent and overrule 
it as evidence of superior or paramount title versus the 
mortgage lien, the county tax assessment, etc.. 

The Act of Congress, March 3, 1851, since updated by the 
Act of Congress, 1891, stated anyone who was establishing a 
claim had to have it confirmed by the United States Land 
Commission. If no one protested that claim within a two 
year period, it could no longer be attacked under any cir- 


- 256 - 



cumstances it was fineil. This is what the Sunma case ad¬ 
dressed. When the United States Supreme Court interprets a 
federal statute, the courts of every state are bound by that 
interpretation. 

The key to finding case law in every state upholding 
federal treaty and its laws can be found in its law 
libraries in the Key Digest under "public Lands." Am. Jur. 
2d is the best starting point to find the case law on 
treaties as they pertain to decisions in the states. 


Part VIII: In Summary 

The federal land patent is the paramount or cannon source 
of titles from the United States government. It is the 
mechanism and procedure for an individual to lay claim to 
his right to allodial title of land, as was established by 
the Declaration of Independence (our first Organic Law) and 
the war for Independence that followed. 

A free sovereign individual who has a perfected federal 
land patent in his possession is in a very enviable position 
at law. No one can take that land from him without first 
proving they have a superior vested right in the land, and 
that is not possible. 

For example, a title company insures "good title" and a 
bank has given a farmer a loan on those grounds. Basically 
the title insurance company is at fault; they did not search 
that title back far enough to its original source to see who 
owned the land. If the bank subsequently attempts to 
foreclose, the farmer who has done his homework properly 
should win. Any remaining controversy is between the bank 
and the title insurance company. In this example, it 
appears that it does not natter whether the farmer is an 
heir or assign, the bank has to prove it has superior title 
in that land in order to take it over. 

Anyone who has purchased foreclosed lands has done so 
without guaranty of clear title, including IRS and state 
taxing agency foreclosures. By perfecting a federal land 
patent, a free sovereign should new be in a position to go 
on the offense. 


Part IX: Cannon Law Liens [D] 

It has been stated a cannon law lien is of no value in 
the legal and business community today. In part, this is 
because of the current misconception and confusion which 
surrounds a cannon law lien; and also, because of confusion 
over the extent to which it can be used in protecting an 
interest a person has in the property of another. First it 


- 257 - 



is important to understand how cannon law principles fit 
into the scheme of the American legal system. Only then can 
one understand how a cannon law lien works. 

Principles, usages, and rules of the cannon law system 
are distinguished from law created by the enactment of the 
legislature. The cannon law SYSTEM, as recognized by our 
courts, comprises the body of those principles and rules of 
action relating to government and security of persons and 
property, which derive their authority solely frcm usages 
and customs of immemorial antiquity (particularly the 
ancient and unwritten law of England), or from the judgments 
and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, and 
enforcing such usages and customs. [D](l). As such, cannon 
law principles, usages and rules are the law of the land 
pursuant to the united States Constitution. In Article ill. 
Section II, it is stated: 

The judicial power shall extend to all cases, 
in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution. 

As discussed in Chapter III, Part V, the Eleventh Amend¬ 
ment denied judicial power in suits in law and equity 
brought by "citizens" against federal and state governments. 
The Constitution was founded on the basic principles of the 
cannon law known bo the forefathers at the time of the 
Constitutional Convention, and upon the principles of the 
Law of Nature and Nations as incorporated in the Declaration 
of Independence. Unless a state or federal statute specif¬ 
ically overrules or alters how a segment of the common law 
is applied, the cannon law principles in any area to be 
analyzed will still apply through their continued appli¬ 
cation by the courts. As stated in the Illinois case of 
Robben v. Obering [279 F. 2d 381 (I960)]: 

The common law is in full force and effect in 
Illinois unless repealed by statute. General 
Assemblies have the power to broaden or restrict 
common law concepts, but until such actions cure 
taken, the common law is as much a part of the 
state, where it has not been expressly abrogated 
by statute, as the statutes themselves. Also 
see [D] (2). 

In other words, the common law system of England is the 
basis of the common law system in the states, and as such is 
the law of those states unless altered by constitution or 
statute. [D] (3) . As we have seen, however, these alterations 
must not violate the Law of Nature and Nations for, if the/ 
do, they have no force and effect except that acquired by 


- 258 - 



tacit consent. The question then is whether a particular 
area of the cannon law system, specifically that of liens, 
has been altered by the passage of statutes by any state 
legislatures, since the federal legislature has not yet 
passed a law which abolishes ccmmon law liens in America. 

In most states, cannon law liens have yet to be 
determined antiquated and then eliminated by statute. In 
seme, the cannon law lien has been recognized by statute 
although the principles for such a lien are defined by its 
parameters in the cannon law. [D](4). Thus, in determining 
whether the cannon law lien still exists in a particular 
state, the judiciary and the legal professions need only 
look to see if the legislature of that state has 
legislatively abolished the lien. If such a statute has 
been passed, then that state's courts need only declare a 
cannon law lien null and void and any such lien which was 
filed can be immediately removed through equitable 
proceedings in the court. If no such statute has ever been 
passed, then the ccmmon law lien must be given full force 
and effect assuming the necessary criteria has been met in 
creating the lien. Therefore, the next question is what are 
the proper circumstances under which a common law lien can 
be filed and what are the rights under such a lien? 

Liens can be created through only a few specific actions, 
those being: by contract, by statute, or by operation of 
law. Liens created by contract include mortgages which are 
also created in part by statute. Liens created by operation 
of law however are extremely limited in quantity, especially 
the different types of common law liens. These types of 
liens simply reinforce the idea that liens can only arise by 
some agreement, statute, or seme fixed rule of law. [D](5). 
Trade and commerce may act to create a common law lien, 
however liens cannot be created by the courts, not even from 
a sense of justice and equity. [D](6). 

American jurisprudence describes a common law lien as the 
right of one person to retain in his possession that which 
belongs to another until certain demands of the person are 
satisfied. The basis of a common law lien for materials and 
services arises when the claimant is entitled to be reim¬ 
bursed for labor and materials which have enhanced the value 
of the property on which the lien is claimed; And a con¬ 
tractual relation, even if only by implication, must exist 
between the owner of the property and the person claiming 
the lien. [D](7). In the absence of a specific agreement, 
if a party has bestowed labor and skill on a chattel bailed 
to him for such purpose, and thereby improved it, he has by 
general law a lien on it for the reasonable value of his 
labor - or he has the right to retain it until paid for such 
skill and labor. 


- 259 - 



A mechanic of any kind has a lien upon all personal pro¬ 
perty, which is not a mechanic's lien, for manufacture or 
repairs while it remains in his possession. Thus, the 
Drumnond Court said: 

If property is delivered to a person, to be 
by his skill and labor, or by adding thereto 
property of his, enhanced in value, and he 
performs the labor or adds his own property to 
that delivered, he may retain possession of it 
until he is paid for his labor and services. 

This is the doctrine of cannon law, and the 
right is usually denominated as a 'common law' 
lien and it exists under a state of facts as we 
have just detailed. [Drumnond Carriage Co. v. 

Mills, 74 N.W. 966, 967 (Neb. 1898)] 

It has been determined: (1) where statutory and written 
contractual agreements are not controlling, a person law¬ 
fully in possession and making a repair by labor or skill 
for the protection or improvement of a thing has a lien upon 
such property. [D](8). (2) Such a lien is a charge where¬ 
upon the property itself and not the people interested in 
the property. [D](9). (3) As a general rule, cannon law 
liens attach to the property without any reference to 
ownership, and override all other rights in the property, 
whereas liens created by contract or statute are subordinate 
to all existing rights therein. [D](10). Such a lien is a 
qualified right, a proprietary interest in the property of 
another. [D](ll). And, the law gives the right to hold such 
property only until the satisfaction of a debt to a par¬ 
ticular thing. [D](12). Thus, the first general principle 
of cannon law liens has been defined. 

The next principle is the requirement of possession. The 
right of a cannon law lien is based directly on the idea of 
possession, and it is indispensable that the one claiming it 
have an independent and exclusive possession of the pro¬ 
perty: [D](10). 

At cannon law there can be no lien without 
possession. It is there defined, a right in one 
man to retain that is in possession belonging to 
another, till certain demands of him, the person 
in possession, are satisfied. [Peck v. Jenness, 

7 How. (U.S.) 612, 620 (1849)] 

Possession for cannon law liens can be either actual or 
constructive. [D](13). And: 


- 260 - 



Where possession is actually, or in the eyes 
of the law, retained and the property preserved 
or irtproved by the performance of labor and the 
furnishing of materials a lien of the corrmon law 
exists and endures without the necessity of 
filing a lien statement if an action is com¬ 
menced within limitations upon the principal 
obligation as well as within the time specified 
by statute for preservation of the lien. [Peck 
(supra). See also Robinson v. Exchange National 
Bank of Tulsa, 31 F. Supp. 350 (1940)] 

The great difference between the equitable or statutory 
liens and the cannon law lien is that the former is not 
conditional upon the possession of the thing sought to be 
charged, while possession for the latter is absolutely 
essential: 

A cannon law lien is lost by the lienholder 
voluntarily and unconditionally parting with 
possession or control of the property to which 
it attaches, and such a lien cannot be restored 
thereafter by resunption of possession. How¬ 
ever, the possessory lien is not necessarily 
waived or destroyed as between the parties where 
there is an intention to preserve the lien, the 
lienholder only conditionally parting with the 
property, as where by special agreement he 
allows the owner to take the property into his 
possession without prejudice to the lien. But 
such a surrender of possession under such an 
agreement will destroy the lien as to third 
persons ... Priority of a possessory lien over 
that of a chattel mortgage is not lost where the 
property is taken from the actual possession of 
the lien claimant without his consent by force 
and fraud, where the pro- perty is taken from 
him involuntarily ... [Yellow Manufacturing 
Acceptance Corp. v. Bristol, 236 P. 2d 947 
(1951)] 

Thus, one in possession of property under such a lien is 
the owner of the property as against the world and even 
against the actual owner, until his claim is satisfied, and 
no one, not even the actual owner, has any right to disturb 
his possession without previous payment of claim. [D](14). 
Possession is essential and must not be given up freely in 
order to have an effective cannon law lien. 

The third principle of the ccrtmon law lien is its pri¬ 
ority to other liens. It may be said that a lien which 


- 261 - 



arises by force of the cannon law my be, under certain 
circumstances, superior to prior existing contractual or 
statutory liens on the same property; and my have 
precedence over an existing mortgage. In Drummond Carriage 
Co. v. Mills, the court said: 

I put down my decision on the ground that the 
mortgage, having allowed the mortgagor to con¬ 
tinue in the apparent ownership of the vessel, 
making it a source of profit by means of earning 
wherewithal to pay off the mortgage debt the 
relation so created by implication entitles the 
mortgagor to do all that maybe necessary to keep 
her in an efficient state for that purpose ... 

Under these circumstances, the mortgagor did 
that which was obviously for the advantage of 
all parties interested. He put her into the 
hands of the defendant to be repaired, and ac¬ 
cording to all ordinary usage the defendant 
ought to have a right of lien ... so that those 
who are interested ... and who will be benefited 
by the repairs, should not be allowed to take 
her out of his hands without paying for them ... 

It is to be observed that the money expended in 
repairs adds to the value ... and looking to the 
rights and interests of the parties generally, 
it cannot be doubted that the mortgagor should 
be held to have power to confer a right of lien 
for repairs necessary. 

As it is obvious that every ship will, from 
time to time, require repairs, it seems but 
reasonable under circumstances like these, to 
infer that the mortgagor had authority from the 
mortgagee to cause such repairs as should become 
necessary to be done, upon the usual and ordin-- 
ary terms. Now what are the usual and necessary 
terms? Why, that the person by whom the repairs 
are ordered should alone be liable personally, 
but that the shipwright should have a lien upon 
the ship for the work and labor he has expended 
on her; nor are the mortgages at all prejudic¬ 
ially affected thereby. They have the prqperty 
augmented in value by the amount of repairs. 
[Drurrmond Carriage Co. v. Mills, 74 N.W. 966, 

969 (N6b. 1898)] 

in cases where the mortgagor can be said to have expres¬ 
sed or implied authority from the mortgagee to procure re¬ 
pairs to be made on the mortgaged property, the cannon law 
lien will be superior and override the prior existing 


- 262 - 



mortgage lien. [D](15). In sane cases the improvements need 
not even actually be made known to the mortgagee and yet the 
cannon law lien still has priority. This then allows the 
mortgagor who makes improvements or repairs to the mortgaged 
property, benefitting all interested parties, to collect the 
just compensation for such improvements or repairs so long 
as possession is maintained. 

■Hie final area for purposes of this case law analysis is 
the allowable level of damages. This is succinctly stated 
as follows: 

[J Judgments on cannon law liens are based on 
charged fees that are fair, reasonable and 
unpaid through the rendition of services, 
materials, and performed labor. [Willimason v. 
Winningham, 186 P. 2d 644, 648 (Okla. 1947).] 

Once valid liens are established and given legal ex¬ 
istence, the lienholder has recourse against anyone who, 
knowing of the lien, disposes of or destroys the property 
subject to such a lien. [51 Am. Jur. Sect. 21.] Assuming 
that the criteria in this necessary though perhaps redundant 
analysis has been met or is assumed to have met, it is up to 
the courts to analogize between cases to make rules that are 
definitive in nature. In one particular area, the farming 
ccranunity, such analogization will help to prevent possible 
unjust enrichments in favor of the lending institutions. 

Farmers, by trade practices today, routinely borrow money 
thereby creating mortgages on both real and personal pro¬ 
perty. Cannon law liens, as the above analysis has shown, 
do not apply to real property, but they do apply to personal 
additions to the real property which would enhance or main¬ 
tain the upkeep of the farm. When a farmer improves the 
farm, he is benefiting all interested and secured parties, 
not just himself. This benefit to all is accomplished 
mainly through the relationship of the mortgagor and 
mortgagee to the property. Even if a mortgagor holds title, 
he is still doing everything for and making payments to the 
mortgagee as much as for himself. This is true even though 
a mortgage or deed of trust is technically no more than a 
lien and notes on personal property are no more than se¬ 
curity interests. In any of these situations, nonpayment 
leads to default and forfeiture of the property to the 
mortgagee. Therefore, all actions by the possessor are 
designed to satisfy the debt held by the mortgagee. 

Another prevalent criteria in all of these notes, whether 
on personal or real property, is the doctrine that waste 
must net be allowed to affect the value of that property. 
If such waste is allowed to occur, then even if the mort¬ 
gagor is not delinquent, the note can be assumed to be in 


- 263 - 


default and again the property confiscated by the mortgagee. 
This usually will not occur if the property is being pro¬ 
perly maintained and improved, but such actions show the 
authority wielded by the mortgagee in the commercial fanning 
industry today. In these types of situations, farmers who 
may have farmed anywhere from one to fifty or more years are 
vulnerable to loss of all that which they have labored over, 
improved and maintained, often without ever being compen¬ 
sated for their labor and improvements. This then is what 
the cannon law forbade. During the history of the cannon 
law system, a lien vas developed through case law which 
served to protect man from the loss of the fair value of 
services in the form of labor and management and materials 
expended in the good faith performance on the farm. 

Improvements are needed repairs to personal property to 
make such personal property operational or to make it ef¬ 
fectively new. A cannon law lien is one way to compensate 
the mortgagor-farmer when such equipment is lost to the 
mortgagee while the added value yet remains in the property. 
The other way lies in the materials, labor and management 
which are expended by the farmer to improve the value of the 
real property for the eventual benefit of the mortgagee. A 
farmer may lose the farm he has attempted to purchase, but 
such should not necessarily result in the loss of the value 
of the added work that went into developing that farm and 
creating a more viable operation. Either by tillage of the 
soil, or added fertilization, or improved conservation of 
the soil, or by means of new buildings, ditches, fences or 
other added fixtures, a farmer exerts effort and adds 
personal property to the real property, thereby enhancing 
its fair market value and making it more easily disposable, 
and he thus benefits all parties involved. This is exactly 
the situation the cannon law lien was designed to protect. 
A fanner who can properly prove actual expenses should be 
compensated for those expenses over and above the amount 
attributed to any assistance by the mortgagee. Equity 
requires that justice be done. Basic rules of law dictated 
the development of the cannon law lien but equitable prin¬ 
ciples now dictate, in part, that a fanner be protected frcm 
suffering the unnecessary loss that will occur if the fanner 
is divested of the improved property before he is compen¬ 
sated for those improvements and maintenance. As such, 
cannon law liens are very much alive and have a place in the 
modern law of property in this age of ever increasing farm 
foreclosures. 


- 264 - 



CHAPTER X 


SOLUTIONS 


Introduction 

It is time we came to the realization that we are engaged 
in a spiritual war against powers and principalities, con¬ 
tracting parties in high places who have entangled us irt 
their web of deceit via a multitude of non-disclosed ad¬ 
hesion contracteT "" 

It is time to pay particular heed to the advice of Ben 
Franklin, given to his colleagues at the Constitutional 
Convention, June 28, 1787: 

The snail progress we have made after 4 or 5 
weeks is me thinks a-melancholy proof of the im¬ 
perfection of Human understanding. We indeed 
seem to feel cur own want of political wisdom, 
since we have been running about in search of 
it. ... How has it happened that we have not 
hitherto once thought of humbly applying to the 
Father of lights to illuminate our understand¬ 
ings? 

In the beginning of the contest with G. Bri¬ 
tain, when we were sensible of danger, we had 
daily prayer in this room for the divine pro¬ 
tection. Our prayers were heard, and they were 
graciously answered. All of us who were engaged 
in the struggle must have observed frequent in¬ 
stances of a superintending providence in our 
favor. To that kind of providence we owe this 
happy opportunity of consulting in peace on the 
means of establishing our future national feli¬ 
city. And have we new forgotten that powerful 
friend? Or do we imagine that we no longer need 
his assistance? 

I have lived a long time, and the longer I 
live, the more convincing proofs I see of this 
truth - that God governs the affairs of men. 

And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground with¬ 
out his notice, is it probable that an empire 
can rise without his aid? We have been assured 
in the sacred writings, that "except the Lord 
build the House they labour in vain that build 
it." 

I firmly believe that; and I ail so believe 
that without his concurring aid we shall succeed 
in this political building no better than the 


- 265 - 



Builders of Babel: We shall be divided by our 
little, partial, local, interests; our projects 
will be confounded, and we ourselves shall be¬ 
come a reproach and bye word down to the future 
ages. And what is worse, mankind may hereafter 
from this unfortunate instance, despair of es¬ 
tablishing Government by Human wisdom and leave 
it to chance, war and conquest. 

I therefore beg leave to move - that hence¬ 
forth prayers imploring the assistance of Heaven 
and its blessings on our deliberations, be held 
in this Assembly every morning before we proceed 
to business.... [House Document 398, p. 295] 

Although not flawless, the framers of the Constitution 
did indeed, give us "A Republic, if you can keep it," as Peg 
Franklin said later. By wav ot something the framers had no 
control over, ignorance and apathy of their posterity - we 
failed to keep the best government ever devised]by man. 

The solution is tobe found within ourselves. In our 
consciences attuned and responsive to the laws and ccrrmand- 
ments of God. In other words, we must look to Divine Provi¬ 
dence, The Law of Nature and Nations, and our own con¬ 
sciences, just as our forefathers did over 200 years ago: 

It is time to awaken from the American dream, face re¬ 
ality, acquire the knowledge necessary to prevent cur de¬ 
struction, and effectively apply that knowledge to that end. 

In order to be successful in this battle I believe we 
will have to approach the problem from an overall systems 
viewpoint and strategy. We must define the essential, 
fundamental issues and marshall our facts and law in support 
thereof. We must analyze and understand the true nature of 
the adversary, and plan our strategy accordingly. To do 
otherwise will predictably result in failure. 

For example, although it may be conclusively proven that 
the sixteenth and seventeenth amendments to the U.S. Consti¬ 
tution were never lawfully ratified, I would predict prob¬ 
able failure for anyone who makes this the sole issue and 
basis at law for his endeavours. Based on some experience 
in this regard and same understanding of the nature and 
power of the adversary, I would expect his strategy and 
arguments to be cunning, devious and specious; And I would 
expect them to include the following, whether so stated or 
not: 

First - Ignore the issue. Stall as long as possible 
while developing alternative strategies and/or implementing 
those already developed for the purpose of remaining on 
course towards the world-wide superstate. 

Second - When, and if, the issue must be addressed, em¬ 
ploy circular arguments and reasoning in justification of 


- 266 - 




















past, present, and future actions: such as (1) Custom and 
usage of over seventy years moots the issue of law and is 


resent 






tricks at his di 


ezrnm 


: ra i rn M.T j y gra iCT Bis^ g H E55i 


sal - all under the banner of 


within the theme of the 


cod of the whole. 


This can, and must, be refuted with absolute proof of 
exactly the opposite: (1) A system whose provable roots and 
entire operation is founded on lies, deceit and intolerable 
fraud cannot be functioning in the public interest for the 
good of the whole; (2) Institutionalized wager policies are 
destructive to the very fabric of society. Any system 
proven to be founded on a wager policy is, by definition, 
against public interest and in direct violation of the Nec¬ 
essary Law of Nature and Nations, and is VOID from its in¬ 
ception; (3) A system which carpels, or attempts to carpel, 
a reasonable person to go against his conscience and contin¬ 
ue participating in what he now knows to be evil is contrary 
to God's laws and commandments. Such a system cannot be 
functioning in the public interest for the good of the 
whole; (4) Pursuant to God's caimandments and the Law of 
Nature and Nations, one has the right and duty to recede 
from such a system upon discovery of its true nature. 

These in my opinion, are the issues. We now have the 
facts and law marshalled to support these issues in the eyes 
of Man, and in the eyes of God. 

No one man can change history, but he can choose not to 
be a part of something evil. He can choose to act on TRUTH 
AS IDENTIFIED TO HIM BY HIS CONSCIENCE; and he can stand on 
the strength of his convictions. A FIRE INSIDE BURNS HOTTER 
THAN A FIRE OUTSIDE! 


Part II: A Satisfactory Judgment 




early, as long as we are within the realm and iuris- 


of the beast - we have no rights - and our status at 


We cam remain on board 







































diction by a multitude of adhesion contracts. Fortunately, 
law Is available for us to absolve ourselves from these 
obligations and recede from the power and jurisdiction of 
the Beast. It's principles, and our lawful authority to 
invoke it, are summarized as follows: 

n* 

Many Authors do farther rank under the Title 
of the Law of Nations, several Customs mutually 
observ'd by tacit consent, amongst most people 
pretending to Civility; ... 

However, these Reasons not being general, 
cannot constitute any Law of an universal Ob¬ 
ligation. Especially since to any Restraints 
which depend on tacit Agreement, it seams rea¬ 
sonable that either Party should have the Liber¬ 
ty of absolving themselves from than; BY MAKING 
EXPRESS DECLARATION THAT THEY WILL BE HODDEN TO 
THEM NO LONGER, AND THAT THEY DO NOT EXPECT OR 
REQUIRE THE OBSERVANCE OF THEM FROM OTHERS. 
[Puffendorf, "The Law of Nature and Nations"] 

When it has been said that each man is bound 
as soon as he accedes, and that the consent may 
be either express or tacit, it has been asked, 

"What is a tacit consent or compact?" Does it 
not appear plain that those who refuse their 
assent can not be bound? If one is at liberty 
to accede or not, is he not also at liberty to 
recede on the discovery of seme intolerable 
fraud and abuse that has been palm'd upon him by 
the rest of the high contracting parties? ... 

Those who want a full answer to them may consult 
Mr. Locke's discourses on government, M. de Vat- 
tel's Law of Nature and Nations, and their own 
consciences ... [James Otis, "The Rights of the 
British Colonies," Boston - 1764.] 

The applicable principle being: 

The universal Society of the human race being 
an institution of nature of nan, all men, in 
whatsoever station they are placed, are obliged 
to cultivate and discharge its duties, [vattel, 

"The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of 
Nature.] 


This principle is embodied in our First Organic Law. the 


Declaration of Independence. The Constitution was estab- 


lished to create a government bound to the 


ture and Nations and. pursuant to that law. we 








the riqht to recede from an’ 


founded on tacit consent; upon our discov 


fraud and abuse foisted upon us 


For those 




em to 


of her lest 


and receive her plaques 


ake of her sins 


Rev. 18:4 


Lindbc qh 


Conqressman Charles 


ese laws and their 


understood the true nature of the Federal Reserve Act 


on earth. ... THE PEOPLE MOST MAKE A DECLARATI 


OF INDEPENDENCE TO RELIEVE THEMSELVES FROM THE 


'ARY POWER. 


The solution and your authority for its implementation is 
the same as it has always been. It is beautiful in its sim¬ 
plicity! 


Part III: Defending Your Judgment 

Althouqh the solution mav be beautiful in its simplici 


lementation of this solution can be filled with 


stacles. traps, and snares for the unknowledqable. 


e to pro- 


vable fact. 

Second, after a proper Declaration has been executed the 
other parties to the various contracts being rescinded, and 
powers revoked, must be duly notified. 

Third, ycu must sincerely implement steps which most 
likely will require drastic changes in your previous life¬ 
style._A first and for emost step is to extr icate voursel 

f 




- 269 - 











































Alternatives available are dealing in substance for sub¬ 
stance, and/or privately operated barter associations. 

Fourth, upon proper execution of the above, you are, at 
that moment - a freeborn sovereign at law, just as our fore¬ 
fathers were in 1776. Recall, however, that King George 
refused to abide by the law and initiated force in an at¬ 
tempt to reestablish the authority and jurisdiction he had 
lost; and thereby tested the convictions of the colonists to 
the limit. You can be sure your convictio ns will be tested 
in various wavs; and that vou will 


s to cunni 


e citv/ship - threats 


confiscation, and numerous offers o: 


ir jM.MsraBaa ' w g 


agreement that not only places you square 


Independence 


Babylon are 


aware of this fact and will use all of the deceit, and 




rcion at their disposal to cause you to invalidate that 

.n whc ~~ 


as agents. 

Therefore, in order to defend your judgment it is abso¬ 
lutely essential that you possess a knowledge of the law as 
it pertains to your situation, the rules and strategy of the 
game, and an understanding of the battlefield upon which you 
will be called in defense of your judgment. This sounds 
like a big order, and it is; however, there are excellent 
educational programs and assistance available for those who 
are walling to help themselves. It is axiomatic that: only 
you can declare your independence, and only you can assert 
your God given rights as a free sovereign - others can only 
assist you in their defense. 

Knowledge is indeed, power; And from knowledge comes 
assurance and self-confidence. Knowledge opens up many 
exciting and rewarding avenues for a free sovereign to 
defend his judgment. For example: 


As A Defendant: 


1. A defendant is entitled to know the nature of the charges 
brought aginst him, and he is entitled to discovery (Bill 
of Particulars, Interrogatories, Depositions, etc.) in 
order to expose their true nature and present a proper 
and adequate defense. 

Knowing the true nature beforehand, a free sovereign can 
be justly rewarded. If the prosecution truthfully 
discloses , which is highly unlikely, his defense becomes 
easy. In any case: 


- 270 - 



































a. A defendant charged with a law cognizable on¬ 
ly under the jurisdiction of the beast, and 
who has properly executed a Declaration of 
Independence from his realm, can prove lack 
of lawful jurisdiction over his person by 
introducing these documents as evidence - by 
way of an "offer of proof." It now becomes 
the burden of proof of the prosecutor to show 
that (1) either his Declaration is invalid, 
or (2) produce a contract (or evidence there¬ 
of) whereby the defendant had voluntarily re¬ 
joined the city/ship subsequent to the Dec¬ 
laration. 

b. By way of an "offer of proof," a defendant 
can prove lack of lawful subject matter jur¬ 
isdiction for reasons that a VOID contract, 
consitituting a WAGER POLICY, is the sole 
basis ofthe charges. The contract being 
VOID pursuant to the Necessary and Positive 
Law of the Law of Nations. 

During the winter and spring of 1984 the 
author and his colleague. Dr. George Hill, 
developed a tape/slide program, with support¬ 
ing text and exhibits, entitled "You, the Law 
and the Great Deception." This program was 
created for educational purposes on general 
law and proof of the Federal Reserve wager 
Policy in violation of the Necessary and pos¬ 
itive Law of the Law of Nations; it was an 
abbreviated version of the materials present¬ 
ed in this work relating to these subjects, 
and was primarily based on source materials 
from the Universal Life University Carman Law 
program and the researach efforts of Lee 
Brobst and Associates on the Tontine and AcT" 
miraltv/Maritime connection. We were subse¬ 
quently delighted to learn that these mater¬ 
ials are now being used by many people as 
teaching aids. 

Since development of this program the author 
and Dr. Hill have been subpoened into severed, 
federal and state courts to make the presen¬ 
tation in support of offers of proof. For 
the most part the presentation has been well 
received by the courts and the issues are ad¬ 
mittedly valid and meritorious, however, as 
of yet, these issues are unresolved. One of 
the purposes of this book is the research and 
documentation of more detailed and complete 
evidence in support of these issues. 


- 271 - 



c. By way of an "offer of proof", a defendant 

can prove lack of lawful jurisdiction for 
reasons that: No act of congress has been 
lawful since April 8, 1913 (seventeehth 

amendment); "Specialized Federal Cannon Law" 
is the ruling law of the case - and this 
"law" was created by federal judges never 
lawfully appointed. These judges were never 
vested in the judicial power of the United 
States and, therefore, the ruling law of the 
case, allegedly binding on all courts because 
of the subject matter and nature of the 
cause, is null and void. 

d. In other words, having marshalled his facts, 
a defendant is in a position to prove num¬ 
erous instances of intolerable fraud in sup¬ 
port of his right to recede from an unlawful¬ 
ly imposed jurisdiction - pursuant to the 
laws of God, Nature and Nations and con¬ 
science. 

2. A defendant who truly believes, and lives accordingly, 
can offer proof that his spiritual training and belief in 
his Supreme Being absolutely forbids his voluntary par¬ 
ticipation in Babylon; for he is commanded by his Supreme 
Being to get out of Babylon and, therefore, has no choice 
in the matter; that his spiritual training and belief 
forbids his voluntary participation in Wager Policies 
which, by definition, are violative of God's law - being 
hurtful and destructive bo Society in general, the de¬ 
fendant, and defendant's neighbors who he is ccmmanded to 
"love as thyself," with all his heart and soul. 

For reasons aforesaid, defendant stands ready with an 
"offer of proof" that: (1) he has totally and lawfully re¬ 
ceded from the jurisdiction of Babylon; (2) it is his firm 
conviction and belief that imposition of this jurisdiction 
of Babylon is precisely what is being attempted by the pro¬ 
secution in the instant case; (3) And by virtue of the 
above, defendant is being persecuted for his spiritual 
beliefs. 

Offense - The Best Defense: 

Going on the offense can be truly exciting and rewarding 
for the free sovereign. However, the reader should be aware 
that a more thorough knowledge of the law is required frcm 
an offensive posture than from a defensive posture. This is 
true because the burden of proof always rests with the 
plaintiff; and, being the plaintiff, you had better be ready 


-272 



to prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt, each and every alle¬ 
gation. This requires, not only well documented facts and 
law, but a mastery of courtrocm strategy and procedure in 
order to prosecute your case to victory. Fortunately, there 
are excellent educational programs, and assistance available 
for those who are willing to help themselves. 

Keeping in mind that a properly executed Declaration of 
Independence reinstates the National Constitution and direct 
access to the Cannon Law - for that particular ex serf and 
now, free sovereign - the possibilities of offensive action 
against agents of Babylon, who refuse to comply with the law 
are limited only by the number of the agents' transgressions 
subsequent to being duly noticed of the individual's newly 
acquired status at Law. By this Declaration, the phantoms 
and ghosts of the past (cannon law principles as embodied in 
case decisions prior to 1913 and, most noticably, prior to 
1933), are relevant and applicable to this new free sov¬ 
ereign. In this regard, the biggest problem will be find¬ 
ing, or creating, a court of competent jurisdiction to hear 
common law issues and complaints (recall that admiralty, 
courts have no jurisdiction to hear camion law issues) . 

It is imperative that each natural born individual estab¬ 
lish his status at law on any issue to be brought before a 
court of competent jurisdiction prior to filing an action. 
This principle was addressed by the Supreme court as applied 
to constitutional challenges to congressional acts thusly: 

Plaintiff, alleging that he is the owner of a 
treasury bill, an obligation of the United 
States that is bought and sold on the open mar¬ 
ket, seeks a judgment (1) declaring the powers 
of the Federal Open Market Committee an unwar¬ 
ranted delegation of powers of the Federal Open 
Market Committee an unwarranted delegation of 
power by Congress: and (2) restraining its 
members from purchasing and selling obligations 
of the United States on the open market. The 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the com¬ 
plaint, or in the alternative, for stannary 
judgment on the grounds that: (1) PLAINTIFF 
LACKS STANDIN3 TO MAINTAIN THE ACTION; (2) the 
court lacks jurisdiction over the subject mat¬ 
ter; (3) the action is an unconsented suit 
against the united States; (4) the complaint 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted; (5) the venue is improper; and (6) the 
court lacks jurisdiction over the persons of the 
defendants. The motion is supported by an affi¬ 
davit of the assistant secretary of the Federal 
Open Market Committee. Briefs were filed by the 


- 273 - 



respective parties, and a hearing was held on 
defendants' motion. ... 

It is defendants' first contention that 
plaintiff has no standing to challenge the con¬ 
stitutionality of the powers of the Federal Open 
Market Ccrmittee, in that he has no legally cog¬ 
nizable right to a given monetary policy to be 
followed by the federal government nor to any 
policy of buying and selling securities. 

In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 1923, 262 U.S. 
447, 488, 43 S.Ct. 597, 601, 67 L.Ed. 1078, the 
Court recognized that it had no power per se to 
review and annul acts of congress on the ground 
that they are unconstitutional; that the ques¬ 
tion of constitutionality may be considered only 
"when the justification for some direct injury 
suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable 
issue, is made to rest upon such an act". To 
invoke the judicial power to challenge acts and 
powers on the ground that a statute is unconsti¬ 
tutional the "party who invokes the power must 
be able to show, not only that the statute is 
invalid, but that he has sustained or is immed¬ 
iately in danger of sustaining seme direct in¬ 
jury as the result of its enforcement, and not 
merely that he suffers in sane indefinite way in 
ccmnon with people generally". In that case it 
was held that a taxpayer had NO STANDING to 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute 
which would result in increased taxes, the Court 
saying in part: 

"If one taxpayer may champion and litigate 
such a cause, then every other taxpayer may do 
the same, not only in respect of the statute 
here under review, but also in respect of every 
other appropriation act and statute whose 
administration requires the outlay of public 
money, and whose validity may be questioned. 
The bare suggestion of such a result, with its 
attendant inconveniences, goes far to sustain 
the conclusion which we have reached, that a 
suit of this character cannot be maintained." 

In Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T.V.A., 
1939, 306 U.S. 118, 59 S.Ct. 366, 83 L.Ed. 543, 
the Court held that private power ccnpaines had 
NO STANDING TO CHALLENGE the constitutionality 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority, saying in 
part: 

"The appellants invoke the doctrine that one 
threatened with direct and special injury by the 


- 274 - 




act of an agent of the government which, but for 
statutory authority for its performance, would 
be a violation of his legal rights, my chal¬ 
lenge the validity of the statute in a suit 
against the agent. The principle is without 
application unless the right invaded is a legal 
right, - one of property, one arising out of 
contract, one protected against tortious in¬ 
vasion, or one founded on a statute which con¬ 
fers a privilege." (306 U.S. at 137-138m 59 
S.Ct. at 369.) ... 

Pauling v. McElroy, 1960, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 
372, 278 F.2d 252, holding that the appellants, 
39 individuals, who sought to enjoin the dona¬ 
tion of nuclear weapons which might produce ra¬ 
diation and alleging that the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 was unconstitutional, had NO STANDING TO 
SUE since they did not "allege a specific 
threatened injury to themselves, apart from 
others * * *" 

The rule followed in the foregoing cases is 
applicable here. Plaintiff has alleged no dir¬ 
ect injury and claims no specific damages. 
There is no contention that his treasury bill 
will not be paid at maturity. He claims only 
that its interim speculative value is affected 
and that he is unable to speculate in government 
obligations because the criteria for purchase 
and sale are secret and unknown to him. He has 
not alleged any injury to himself apart from 
that suffered by all other owners of government 
obligations. Paraphrasing Massachusetts v. 
Mellon, supra, if plaintiff could champion and 
litigate such a case, every other owner of gov¬ 
ernment obligations affected by the operations 
of the Open Market Committee could do the same. 

Plaintiff’s brief is devoted largely bo quo¬ 
tations from hearings before a Congressional 
Committee relative to the functions and oper¬ 
ations of the Federal Open Market Committee. 
Plaintiff's complaint and views on the monetary 
policy of the united States may properly be pre¬ 
sented to Congress. It is not the function of 
the judiciary to hear and determine claims of 
this nature. In other words, PLAINTIFF HAS NOT 
PRESENTED A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY. 

In Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank, supra, 
the court pointed out that defendant had "made a 
persuasive argument that upon the facts alleged 


- 275 - 



THE QUESTIONS RAISED ARE POLITICAL, AND NOT 
JUSTICIABLE", but stated that it had not dis¬ 
cussed this argument "because without it the 
defendant's position seems to be unassailable". 

(34 F.2d at 916). The same is true here. 

HAVING CONCLUDED THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NO 
STANDING TO SUE, IT IS UNNECESSARY TO DISCUSS 
AND RULE UPON THE OTHER QUESTIONS presented by 
defendants' motion to dismiss, many of which 
appear to be well taken. [Bryan v. Federal Open 
Market Committee, 235 F. Supp. 877 (1964)] 

Thus, in the situations presented in the foregoing cases 
the courts consistently ruled in favor of public policy for 
the good of the whole. The individuals involved had no le¬ 
gally cognizable right to challenge public policy as declar¬ 
ed in congressional acts because of lack of standing or 
status under constitutional law. 

This sovereign, however, is now in a position to go into 
the admiralty courts themselves and force the issue of the 
lack of in personam and subject matter jurisdiction; demand 
exoneration from limited liability for payment of debt, via 
the private, public National credit system; prove the exis- 
tance of wager policies and void the contract(s); and sue 
for refunds of cill premiums and interest paid - pursuant to 
the General Maritime Law of Nations. 

A free sovereign also has the status at law to file land 
patents granting allodial title to his land and make it 
stick in court. 

Never forget, in all these exciting possibilities we are 
dealing in the law of contracts (or proof of the lack there¬ 
of). Accordingly, certain steps must be taken in advance of 
filing an offensive action in Court to properly set the 
stage for victory. The details of these requisite steps 
vary on an individual basis and are beyond the scope and 
space of this work, as are the details of law, procedure, 
and strategy requisite to the prosecution of a winning case. 


Part IV: Where To Go For Help 

1. The universal Life University Common Law Program: 

The universal Life University (ULU) Common Law Program is 
a systems approac h (the first and only, to my knowledge) 
to the various aspects and fields of law, and their in¬ 
terrelationships. (See Exhibit 9 "Program Outline") It 
takes the student from history and philosophy of these 
fields through their development to present day procedure 
and practice, formulating the strategy necessary to ef¬ 
fectively use this knowledge. It is a correspondence 


- 276 - 




program consisting of twenty-four courses which, upon 
satisfactory completion, leads to a Doctor of Cannon Law 
degree and permanent membership in the Universal Bar 
Association. The Universal Bar Association is a cannon 
law association for continuing education of its members, 
and mutual assistance and fellowship of members. 

Students and graduates of this program are continually 
proving that they know who they are, where they cane from, 
and they knew where they are going. They, in other words, 
have acquired the power of knowledge that gives the 
self-confidence necessary to be a winner. 

Information on this program can be obtained by writing for a 
free brochure: 

Staff, Universal Life University 

School of Law 

P.0. Box 1796 

Modesto, CA 95393-1796 

2. There are many individuals and organizations specializing 
in research and implementation of various aspects and 
subject matter presented herein. Research is continuing 
at an ever accelerating pace and situations have a tend¬ 
ency to change rapidly as new knowledge and expertise 
become available to more effectively combat the Beast. 
For that reason, the author has elected to forego listing 
specific references that too soon may become obsolete. 
Rather, the author suggests that anyone desiring further 
assistance or information on any particular subject 
presented herein should write to the staff, universal 
Life University, School of Law. The Staff will either 
provide direct assistance or recommend specialists to 
contact for assistance. 


- 277 - 



REFLECTIONS OF THE AUTHOR 


I entered this battle little realizing the true nature of 
the adversary, thinking that I could prevail by reason 
alone. Slowly I began to realize this to be a spiritual 
battle with powers and principalities, the Beast and City of 
Babylon whose merchandise includes the bodies and souls of 
Men. 

I now see reason as something not always big enough for 
my encounters and will never again try fighting this battle 
with reason alone; Reason serves as the vehicle, my God- 
given power, for preparing myself for truth and virtue; 
Truth will not flow into one who refuses to prepare for 
truth; And virtue is never found in a place where evil 
lurks. 

The purpose of virtue and truth is for spiritual growth; 
And as my reasoning and spiritual powers grow and coalesce, 
the whole shall become greater than the sum of the parts. I 
can then hope to achieve new dimensions of consciousness and 
knowledge, preparing myself to truly LIVE THE LAW as in¬ 
tended by my Supreme Being. 

I believe this to be the path for all people who want to 
be their own governors and be at peace with themselves. 
Peace means Loyalty to self. Any peace, whether between two 
persons or between two nations, simply reflects loyalty to 
one's self. Loyalty to one's self means Living Honestly - 
never a gap between thought, speech and act. 

How can there be loyalty to self if the individual tries 
to make peace with someone whom his conscience tells him is 
an enemy? By going against conscience he creates internal 
conflict, declares war on himself, and will never knew 
peace. Peace exists only within the soul of each individ¬ 
ual. And so the individual, ever loyal to self, accepts the 
demands of an expanding spirit. He learns to recognize his 
conscience which identifies truth but never carpels him to 
act on truth. He then makes the choice, spiritual growth 
and peace with self, or stifled spirit and internal con¬ 
flict. He exercises a power that belongs to Man alone, a 
selective-power for good or a power for self-destruction. A 
power of reason and choice given to him for the purpose of 
spiritual growth. 

The nature of the adversary requires him to do all in his 
power to misdirect this reasoning power of the individual 
away from the spirit - to pipe the individual into spiritual 
bankruptcy, on-board the City/Ship Babylon. The adversary 
works very hard at suspending the reasoning of the individ¬ 
ual. WHOEVER PROMOTES A SUSPENSION OF MAN'S REASONING LOOKS 
FOR WAYS OF STIFLING MAN'S SPIRIT! 


Verl K. Speer 


-278- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 


PROLOGUE: 

[A] "Tile Cannon Law," Coarse 101, p. 7; universal Life 
University School of Law, 601 3rd St., Modesto, CA 
95351. 

[B] "The Main Street Journal," Volume IV, No. 1, 2, 3; 

Spencer Judd, Publishers, P.O. Box 143, Sewanee, Tenn. 
37375. 


CHAPTER II: 

[A] "The Cannon Law," (supra. Prologue) Course 101, pp. 

12-18. 

[B] Ibid, Course 102, pp. 23-29. 

[C] Ibid, Course 104, pp. 7-12. 

[D] Ibid, Course 204, pp.26-32. 

(1) On seditions libel see J. Stephens, "A History of The 

Criminal Law of England (1st. ed. 1883); Shientag, 
"Fran Seditious Libel To Freedom of The Press," 11 
Brooklyn L. Rev. 131 (1941); Kelly, "Criminal Libel 

And Free speech," 6 Kansas L. Rev. 295 (1958); L. 

Levy, "Freedom of Speech And Press In Early American 
History: Legacy Of Suppression" (1963). 

(2) Penn and Meads' Case, 6 Howell's 951 (1670). 

(3) Bushell's Case, 6 Howell's 999 (1670). 

(4) "The Hiree Trials Of William Hone," Tegg ed. (1876). 

(5) C. Andrews, "The Colonial period Of American History" 

(1934): H. Miller, "The Case For Liberty," 163-202 

(1965). 

(6) See Note, "Powers And Rights Of Juries," in Quincy, 

"Reports of Cases Argued And Adjudged in The 

Massachusetts Superior Court Of Judicature," 
1761-1772. 

(7) See note, "The Changing Role Of The Jury In The 
Nineteenth Century," 74 Yale L. J. 170 (1964). 

(8) See B. Bailyn, "The Ideological Origins Of The 
American Revolution," 109 n. 13 (1967). 

(9) 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 

(10) Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924 (No. 5127) (C.C.D. Pa. 

1800). 


-279- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 


(11) See generally Lillich, "The Chase Inpeachment, " 4 

Amer. J. Of Legal Hist. 49 (1960). 

(12) See Sigma, "Reminiscenses Of Samuel Dexter " (1857). 

(13) For more detail, see J. Story, "Corrmentaries On The 
Constitution," Sect. 1064 N. (a), 5th ed. (1891). 

(14) See I. Friedman, "The Wise Minority," 28-50 (1971). 

(15) Sax, "Conscience And Anarchy: The prosecution Of War 
Resistors," 57 Yale Review 481 (June 1968). 

(16) See Howe, "Juries As Judges Of Criminal Law," 52 Harv. 
L. Rev. 582 (1939); Everett v. United States, 336 F. 
2d. 979, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion by 
Judge Wright). 

(17) Note, "The Changing Role Of The Jury In The Nineteenth 
Century," 74 Yale, L. J. 170, 192 (1964). 

(18) United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (No. 14, 
545), C.C.D. Mass. (1835); Commonwealth v. Porter in 
1845 (Mass. Supreme Court decision); United States v. 
Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (No. 15, 815), C.C.D. Mass. 
(1851); Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 
(1895). 

(19) McGautha v. California, 401 U.S. 183, 199 (1971). 


CHAPTER III: 

[A] "The Cannon Law," (supra. Prologue) Course 107, pp. 
7-9. 

[B] Ibid, Course 102, pp. 9-12. 

[C] "Alert," January 1985, Barristers' Inn, School of 
Cannon Law, P.O. Box 9411, Boise, Idaho 83707. 

(1) The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 Harv. L. 
Rev. 198, 222 (1919). 

(2) See Kessler, Contracats of Adhesion, 43 Columbia Law 

Review, p. 640 (1943) Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts 

in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1072 
(1953). 

(3) G.T. Fogle & Co. v. U.S., 135 F. 2d 117, 120. 

(4) In re Altmann's Will, 266 N.Y.S. 773, 779, 149 Misc. 

115. 

(5) Ferrous Products Co. v. Gulf States Trading Co., 323 
S.W. 2d 292. 

(6) Kraft Foods Co. of Wise. v. Caimodity Credit Corp., 
266 F. 2d 254; Hill v. waxberg, 237 F. 2d 936. 

(7) Indep. School Dist. of White Bear Lake v. City of 
White Bear Lake, 292 N.W. 777. 


-280- 




BIBLIOGRAPHY 


(8) Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F. 2d 936; Stipp v. Doran, 18 

F.2d 83, 84; Donovan v. Kansas City, 175 S.W. 2d 874; 

In re united Burton Co., 140 F. 495, 501. 

(9) Keener, Quasi-Contracts, 4-5. 

(10) Moll v. Wayne County, 50 N.W. 2d 881. 

(11) dwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173, P. 2d 652; Chandler 
v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority, 137 P. 2d 97. 

(12) Hale v. Hinkel, 201 U.S. 43. 

[D] "The Cannon Law," (supra. Prologue) Course 107, pp. 
12-15. 

[E] "The Law of Bills, Notes and Cheques, pp. 1-7, by 
Melville M. Bigalow, Ph.D. Harvard, Second Edition; 
Boston, Little, Brown, and Canpany, 1900. 

[F] Kempe v. Kennedy, 5 Cr. 178, 185 (1809; Ex parte Cuddy, 
131 U.S. 280, 284 (1889). 

[G] "The Constitution Of The United States" (Annotated), 
Annotations of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of 
the united States to January 1, 1938. 

(1) Cohens v. Virginia. 6 Wheat. 264, 406 [1821], 

(2) Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dali. 419 [1793]; Heins v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 [1890]; See also Monaco v. 
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 [1934]. 

(3) Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 [1887]. 

(4) Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 [1921]; Ex parte 
Madrazzo, 7 Pet. 627 [1833]. 

(5) Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 [1933], 

(6) Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dali. 378, 382 [1798]; 

Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 731 
[1838]; Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 290, 318 
[1907]; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 406 [1821]; 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 [1890]; North Carolina 

v. Temple 134 U.S. 22 [1890]; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 

U.S. 516, 524 [1899]; Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 
311 [1920]; Bank of Washington v. Arkansas, 20 How. 

530 [1858]. 

(7) united States v. Peters, 5 Cr. 115, 137 [1809]. 

(8) Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 411-412 [1821]. 

(9) Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 487 [1887], 

distinguishing Pointexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 
[1885], from Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 
738 [1824]. 

(10) Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 301 U.S. 292 

[1937], citing Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 

[1883]; Hagood v. Southern 117 U.S. 52 [1886]; In re 


-281- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 [1887]; North Carolinia v. Temple, 
134 U.S. 22, 30 [1890]; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 
[1900]; Lankford v. Platte Iron Works, 235 U.S. 461 
[1915]; Ex parte State of New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 
490, 500 [1921]; Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 28 

[1933]; Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 
U.S. 446 [1883]; wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 [1918]. 

(11) Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110 [1828]. 

Confirmed in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 98 
[1861]. 

(12) Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 [1883]. Applied in 

Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 [1886], to a suit to 
compel performance of an act authorizing receipt of 
scrip for taxes; and in Christian v. Atlantic & N.C.R. 
Co., 133 U.S. 233 [1890], to a proceeding to declare a 
lien on railroad stock held by the States, and further 
to enforce that lien by sale, etc.. See also North 
Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 [1890], 

(13) New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 [1883]; North 

Dakota v* Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 [1923]; South Dakota 
v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 [1904], 

(14) Cunningham v. Macon & B.R. Co., 109 446 [1883]. 

(15) Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 [1887], 

(16) Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151 [1909]. 

See also Carolina Glass Co. v. south Carolina, 240 
U.S. 305 [1916]. 

(17) Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U.S. 461 

[1915]. Followed in American Water Softener Co. v. 
Lankford, 235 U.S. 496 [1915]; Farish v. State Banking 
Board, 235 U.S. 498 [1915]. Distinguished in Johnson 
v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 [1918], and Martin v. 

Lankford, 245 U.S. 547 [1918], where the action sought 
relief against the Commissioner and his surety 
personally, and not against the Guaranty Fund as such. 

(18) Re Tyler» 149 U.S. 164, 190 [1893]. Followed in Scott 
v. Donald 165 U.S. 58, 67; 165 U.S. 107 [1897], 

(19) Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 u.S. 292 

[1937], citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 [1908]; 
Scully v. Bird, 209 u.S. 481 [1908]; Old Colony Trust 
Co. v. Seattle, 271 U.S. 426 [1926]; Louisiana v. 

jumel 107 U.S. 711 [1883]; Hagood v. Southern, 117 
U.S. 52 [1886]; In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 [1887]; 

Lankford v. Platte Iron Works, 235 U.S. 461 [1915]. 

(20) Hopkins v. Clemson Agriculture College, 221 u.S. 636, 

643 [1911], holding a State agricultural college 

liable to suit for damages caused by its corporate act 
in constructing a dyke which caused overflow of 


-282- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 


plaintiff's property. See also Belknap v. Schild, 161 
O.S. 10, 18 [1896]. 

(21) Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 320 U.S. 292 
[1937]. 

(22) Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 [1883]; Ashton v. 
Cameron County Water Impr. Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 
531 [1936]. 

(23) Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 172 
[1909], citing Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 [1900]; 
Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590 [1904], See also Graves 
v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393, 403-404 [1936], 


CHAPTER IV: 

[A] "The Main Street Journal," (supra. Prologue). 


CHAPTER V 

[A] "A Plea for the Constitution of the United States, 
Wounded in the House of it's Guardians," by George 
Bancroft: Spencer Judd, Publishers, P.O. Box 143, 

Sewanee, Tennessee 37375. 

(1) General Court Records, VI. 170, MS. 

(2) Council Records, VI. 181, MS. 

(3) Province Laws, I. 36. 

(4) ibid, I. 306. 

(5) Council Records, VII. 109 in Province Laws I. 455. 

(6) Province Laws, I. 503. 

(7) Statutes at Large of south Carolina, II. 211, 665. 

(8) MS. Ccrrmunications from the Secretary of State of New 
Hampshire. 

(9) journal of the Legislative Council of the Colony of 
New York, 204. 

(10) Records of the Colony of Rhode island, IV. 96. 

(11) Ibid, IV. 128. 

(12) Province Laws, I. 700, 701. 

(13) Ibid, I. 750, 751. 

(14) Ibid, II. 61-64. 

(15) Ibid, II. 189, 194. 

(16) Ibid, II. 470. 

(17) Ibid, II. 242, 243. 

(18) Belknap's New Hampshire, Fanner's edition, 185-6. 

(19) Bronson's Connecticut Currency, 39, 40. 

(20) Ibid, 44, 45, 57-59. 

(21) MS, furnished from the archives of Penn, by H.D. Tate. 

(22) Statutes at Large of South Carolina, III. 34, 38. 


-283- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 


(23) Felt’s Massachusetts Currency, 94. 

(24) Ibid, 116. 

(25) Province Laws, Ill. 430-441. 

(26) 24 Geo. II. 1750-1 Chap. 53; reprinted in New 
Hampshire Laws, Edition of 1771, at pages 251 - 254. 

(27) Smith's Wealth of Nations, Book II. Chap. II. 

(28) Hening's Statutes at Large of Virginia, VI, 81 - 85 

and 467. 

(29) Records of the Colony of Rhode Island, VI. 358; VII. 
317 - 329. 

(30) Fanner's Edition of Belknap's New Hampshire, I. 344. 

(31) Bronson's Connecticut Currency, 84. 

(32) Van Schaack's Laws of New York, I. 534 - 581. 

(33) Laws of North Carolina, 397, 398. 

(34) Ibid, 409. 

(35) Hening, X. 398, 399. 

(36) Ibid, 456. 

(37) Statutes of South Carolina, IV. 508, 509. 

(38) Potter's Rhode Island paper Money, 116. 

(39) Washington to Theodoric Bland, August 15, 1786. 

(40) Hamilton's Works, II. 271. 

(41) Laws of North Carolina, Chap. I. of 1783, 443-6. 

(42) Ibid, Chap. V. of 1783, 550-553. 

(43) Statutes at Large of South Carolina, IV. 712 - 716. 

(44) Laws of New York, 283 - 303. 

(45) Fran Paterson's manuscript, in his own handwriting. 

(46) Sparks' Washington, IX. 120, Note. 

(47) Washington to R.H. Lee, Mount Vernon, August 22, 1785, 

in Sparks, IX. 120. 

(48) Letters to Washington, IV. 190. 

(49) Washington to Jefferson, August 1, 1786, in Sparks, 

IX. 186. 

(50) Writings of Madison, I. 255, 256. 

(51) Printed in papers annexed to Bancroft's History of the 
Constitution, II. 408. 

(52) Washington to stone, 16 February, 1787. Sparks, IX. 
232. 

(53) Gilpin, 712; Elliot, V. 120. 

(54) Works of Madison, I. 321. 

(55) Madison to Randolph, New York, 8 April, 1787, Elliot, 
V. 108. 

(56) Elliot V. 126; Gilpin, 729. 

(57) Madison's Note, Gilpin, 1346; Elliot, V. 435. 

[B] "A Caveat Against Injustice, or an Inquiry into the 
Evil Consequences of a Fluctuating Medium of Exchange," 
pp. 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, by Roger Sherman: Spencer Judd, 
Publishers, P.O. Box 143, Sewanee, Tennessee 37375. 


284- 




BIBLIOGRAPHY 


[C] Miracle on Main Street, by F. Tapper Saussy: Spencer 
Judd Publishers, P.O. Box 143, Sewanee, Tenn. 37375. 

(1) Davis R. Dewey: Financial History of the United 
States, John Wilson & Son, Cantoridge. Mass. 12th 
Edition, 1934, PP. 36 et. seq. 

(2) Ibid. 

(3) Ibid. 

(4) ibid. 

(5) Harry Atwood: The Constitution Explained, Destiny 
Publishers, Merrimac, Massachusetts, 1927, 1962. 

(6) Ibid. 

(7) Ibid. 

(8) Ibid. 

(9) Ibid. 

[D] "Documents Illustrative of the Formation of The Union 
of The American States," 69th Congress, 1st Session - 
House Document No. 398: Available through Spencer 
Judd, Publishers, P.O. Box 143, Sewanee, Tenn. 37375. 


CHAPTER VI: 

[A] "The Main Street Journal," (supra. Prologue). 

[B] "The Tontine Government," by Kenneth Phillip Sade, 
Kenneth Phillip Sade Publisher, 1983. Available 
through Lee Brobst - Lecturer, 116 Chestnut Avenue, 
Altoona, PA 16601. 

(1) "Report of the Special Caimittee Appointed to 
Investigate Tontine Insurance"; To the Legislature of 
the State of New York. 

(2) "The Liberalization of the Life Insurance Contract," 
by George L. Armhein, C.L.U., Ph.D., published by the 
author at the press of The John C. Winston Company, 
Philadelphia. 

(3) "Tontine Insurance," from the Annual Report issued by 
Hon. John K. Tarbox, The Commissioner of Insurance for 
the state of Massachusetts; The Case, Lockwood and 
Brainard Co. Print, Hartford, Conn.. 

[C] The Constitution of the United States (Annotated), 

Annotations of cases decided by the Supreme Court of 
the United States to January 1, 1938, United States 

Government Printing Office, Washington: 1938. 

(1) 157 U.S. 429 [1895]; 158 U.S. 601 [1895]. 


-2RS- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 


(2) Brushaber v. Union P.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 [1916]; 

Stanton v. Baltic Min. Co., 240 U.S. 103 [1916]; lyee 
Realty Co. v. Anderson, 240 U.S. 115 [1916]; Peck (V*n. 
E.) & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 [1918]; Evans v. Gore, 
253 U.S. 245 [1920]; Edwards v. Cuba R. Co., 268 U.S. 
628 [1925]; Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Bnpire Co., 271 U.S. 

170 [1926]. 

[D] "Justice Times," February 1985, P.O. Box 562, Clinton, 
Arkansas 72031. 

[E] "The National Educator," January 1985. 

(1) "The Process of Constitutional Amendment." Senate 
Document No. 314, 76th Congress, 3d Sess., Serial 
10467. 

(2) Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet. 632, 655 (1835); The 

"Moses Taylor" v. Hamnons, 4 Wall. 411, 430 (1867). 

(3) Kempe v. Kennedy, 5 Cr. 173, 185 (1809); Ex parte 

Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280, 284 (1889); Grignon v. Astor, 2 
How. 319, 341 (1884); Re Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 205 

(1830); Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 
278, 283 (1883). 

(4) Osborn v. Bank of united States, 9 Wheat, 738, 819 

(1824); Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 173 (1889). 

[F] "Honest Money," by Charles S. Norburn, M.D.; New 
Puritan Library, Route 1, Lytle Road, Fletcher, NC 
28732. 

(1) Congressman Wright Patman, "A Primer on Money," U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. (1964). 

(2) Ibid, page 54. 

(3) H.S. Keenan,"The Federal Reserve Banks, Noontide 
Press, Los Angeles, CA, 1968 edition. 

[G] "The Cannon Law," (supra. Prologue) Course 107, pp. 
26-37. 

(1) Ibid, Course 107, p. 25. 

[H] "An Essay on Maritime Loans from the French of M. 

Balthazard Marie Bmerigon"; Baltimore: published by 

Philip H. Nicklin Co., 1811. 

[I] "The Federal Reserve System - its purposes and 
Functions," a reprint with caiments by S.W. Adams, OMNI 
Publications, P.O. Box 216, Hawthorne, California. 

[J] "Kent's Caimentaries," 12 Ed., 1889. 


-286- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 


[K] "American Law and Procedure," Volume VI; Trusts and 
Trustees by Walter wheeler Cook, Professor of Law, 
University of Chicago. 

(1) Digby, History of Real property, Chapter VI. 

(2) Popham, 72. 

(3) Attorney General v. Landerfield, 9 Mo. 286; Chamber v. 
St. Louis, 29 Mo. 548. 

[L] "Hanta Yo," by Ruth Beebe Hill; Warner Books, Inc., 666 
Fifth Avenue, N.Y. 10103. 

[M] "Federal Practice and Procedure," Jurisdiction and 
Related Matters, Chapter 14 - The Law Applied in the 
Federal Courts - The Erie Doctrine and Federal Common 
Law. 

(1) Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 58 S.Ct. 817; 304 u.S. 64; 
82 L. ed. 1188. 

(2) Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 1; 10 L. Ed. 865. 

(3) Friendly in Praise of Erie, and of The New Federal 
Cannon Law, 1964; 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383, 405. 

(4) Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial 
Precedent; II 1962, 40 Texas L. Rev. 619, 625. 

(5) Ely, The irrepressible Myth of Erie, 1974, 87 Harv. L. 
Rev. 693. 

(6) Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York, 655 S. Ct. 

1464, 326 U.S. 99, 89 L. Ed. 1079 (1945); Byrd v. Blue 

Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 78 s. Ct. 893, 
356 U.S. 525, 2 L. Ed. 953 (1958); Hanna v. Plummer, 

85 S. Ct. 1136, 380 U.S. 460, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1965). 

(7) See e.g., Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, C.A. 5th, 1960; 
281 F. 2d. 401, 407, 408. 

(8) Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America, Inc., 76 
S. Cat. 273; 350 U.S. 198; 100 L. ed. 199. 

(9) Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood and Conklin 

Manufacturing Company, (1967), 87 S. Ct. 1801; 388 
U.S. 395; 18 L. Ed. 2d 1270. 

(10) City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (1981), 101 S. Ct. 1784, 
1790-1791; 68 L. Ed. 2d 114. 

(11) Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino (1964), 84 S. Ct. 
923, 939; 376 U.S. 398, 436; 11 L. Ed. 2d 804. 

(12) Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co. (1942), 63 S. 
Ct. 172, 173-174; 317 U.S. 173, 176; 87 L. Ed. 165. 

(13) U.S. v. Reliable Transfer Co. (1975), 95 S. Ct. 1708, 

421 U.S. 397, 44 L. Ed. 2d 251; Cooper Stevedoring Co. 
v. Fritz Kopke, Inc. (1974), 94 S. Ct. 2174, 417 U.S. 

106, 40 L. Ed. 2d 694; Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co. 

(1963), 83 S. Ct. 1646, 374 u.S. 16, 10 L. Ed. 2d 720. 


-287- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 


(14) southern Pacific Company v. Jensen (1917), 37 S. Ct. 

524; 244 u.S. 205; 61 L. Ed. 1086. 

(15) Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn (1953), 74 S. Ct. 202, 
206; 346 U.S. 406, 411; 98 L. Ed. 143. 

(16) Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc. (1970), 90 S. Ct. 
1772; 398 U.S. 375; 26 L. Ed. 2d 339. 

(17) Clearfield Trust Company v. United States (1943), 63 

S. Ct. 573; 318 U.S. 363; 87 L. Ed. 838. 

[N] "American Opinion," February 1985; 395 Concord Avenue, 
Belmont, Mass. 02178. 

[O] Many cases dealing with the character and distribution 
of judicial power and citing both sections 1 and 2 of 
Article III are noted under Section 1, "judicial 
Power." "As modified by the 11th Amendment this clause 
prescribes the Limits of the Judicial power of the 
court." [U.S. v. Louisana, 123 U.S. 32, 35 (1887)]. 

[P] "The Law That Never Was," Vol. I, by Bill Benson and 
M.J. "Red" Beckman, published by constitutional 
Research Assoc., Box 550, South Holland, IL. 60473. 


CHAPTER VIII: 

[A] "The Protocols Of Zion." A copy of the protocols was 

deposited in the British Museum and bears on it the 
stamp of that institution, "August 10, 1906." Author 

is unknown, but similar writings have been found by 
diplomatic officers in manuscripts in all parts of the 
world. A selection of Articles of the Protocols were 
published by Mr. Henry Ford's paper, "The Dearborn 
Independent," 1920-22. 

[B] "The Institutes of Biblical Law," by Rousas John 
Rushdoony, The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing 
Company, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 
72-79485. 

[C] Emilie Durkheim, "On the Normality of Crime," in his 
"The Rules of Sociological Method," in Talcott Parsons, 
Edward ShiIs, Kaspar D. Nargele, Jesse R. Pitts, eds., 
"Theories of Society"; New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 
1961, II, 872-875. 


CHAPTER IX: 


-288- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 


[A] "The Protocols of Zion," (supra. Chapter VIII) 

[B] "Memorandum of Law - History, Force, and Effect of the 
Land Patent". 

(1) Wight v Mattison. 18 How. (U.S.) 50 (1855). 

(2) Joplin Brewing Co. v. Payne, 197 Mo. 422, 94 S. W. 896 
(1906). 

(3) Rawson v. Fox, 65 Ill. 200 (1872). 

(4) Davis v. Hull, 92 Ill. 85 (1879). 

(5) Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees of 
Lawrence County, et. al., 93 Ill. App. 3d 366 (1981). 

(6) Dempsey v. Burns, 281 Ill. 44, 650 (1917). 

(7) Dryden v. Newman, 110 Ill. 186 (1886). 

(8) Hinckley v. Green, 52 Ill. 223 (1869). 

(9) Busch v. Huston, 75 Ill. 343 (1874); Chickering v. 

Failes, 26 Ill. 508 (1861). 

(10) Sufford v. Stubbs, 117 Ill. 389 (1886). 

(11) Grant v. Bennett, 96 Ill, 513, 525 (1880). 

(12) Kendrick v. Latham, 25 Fla. 819 (1889). 

(13) Huls v. Buntin. 47 Ill. 396 (1865). 

(14) Walker v. Converse, 148 Ill. 622, 629 (1894); see also 

Peadro v. Carriker, 168 Ill. 570 (1897); Chicago v. 
Middlebrooke, 143 Ill. 265 (1892); Piatt County v. 

Goodell, 97 Ill. 84 (1880); Stubblefield v. Borders, 
92 Ill. 284 (1879); Coleman v. Billings, 89 Ill. 183 
(1878); Whitney v. Stevens, 89 Ill. 53 (1878); Thcmas 
v. Eckard, 88 Ill. 593 (1878); Holloway v. Clarke, 27 
Ill. 483 (1861). 

(15) Baldwin v. Ratcliff, 125 Ill. 376 (1888); Bradley v. 

Rees, 113 Ill. 327 (1885). 

(16) Chickering v. Failes, 26 Ill. 508, 519 (1861). 

(17) Cook v. Norton, 43 Ill. 391 (1867). 

(18) Burgett v. Taliaferro, 118 Ill. 503 (1886); see also 

Connor v. Goodman, 104 Ill. 365 (1882); County of 

Piatt v. Goodell, 97 Ill. 84 (1880); Smith v. 
Ferguson, 91 Ill. 304 (1878); Hassett v. Ridgely, 49 
Ill. 197 (1868); Brooks v. Bruyn, 35 Ill. 391 (1864); 

McCagg v. Heacock, 34 Ill. 476 (1864); Bride v. watt, 
23 Ill. 507 (1860); and Woolward v. Blanchard. 16 Ill. 
424 (1855).] 

(19) Austin v. Barnum, 52 Minn. 136 (1892). 

(20) Roberts v. McFadden, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 47; 74 S.W. 105 
(1903). 

(21) Barnard v. Brown, 112 Mich. 452; 70 N.W. 1038 (1897) 

(22) Ormsby v. Graham. 123 la. 202; 98 N.W. 724 (1904). 

(23) Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W. 2d 800, 806 (1957). 


-289- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 


(24) 

Close v. Stuyvesant, 
(1890). 

132 

Ill. 

607; 

24 

N. E. 868 

(25) 

Wallace v. Harmstead, 

44 Pa. 492 

(1863) 

• 


(26) 

People v. Richardson, 
(1944) 

269 

Ill. 

275; 

109 

N.E., 1033 

(27) 

12 stat. 392, 37th Cong., 

Sess. 

II, 

Ch. 

75, (1862) 


(the Homestead Act); 9 Stat. 520, 31st Cong., Sess. I, 
Ch. 85, (1850) (Military Bounty Service Act); 8 Stat. 
123, 29th Cong., Sess. II, Ch. 8, (1847) (Act to raise 
additional military force and for other purposes); 5 
Stat. 444, 21st Cong., Sess. II, Ch. 30 (1831); 5 
Stat. 51, 18th Cong., Sess. I, Ch. 174, (1824); 5 

Stat. 52, 18th Cong., Sess. I, Ch. 173, (1824); 5 
Stat. 56, 18th Cong., Sess. I, Ch. 172, (1824); 3 

Stat. 566, 16th Cong., Sess. I, Ch. 51, (1820) (the 

major land patent statute enacted to dispose of 

lands); 2 Stat. 748, 12th Cong., Sess. I, Ch. 99, 
(1812); 2 Stat. 728, 12th Cong., Sess. I, Ch. 77, 

(1812); 2 Stat. 716, 12th Cong., Sess. I, Ch. 68, 

(1812) (the Act establishing the General Land-Office 
in the Department of the Treasury); 2 Stat. 590, 11th 

Cong., Sess. II, Ch. 35, (1810); 2 Stat. 437, 9th 

Cong., Sess. II, Ch. 34, (1807); and 2 stat. 437, 9th 
Cong., Sess. II, Ch. 31, (1807). 

(28) Bagnell v. Broderick. 38 U.S. 436 (1839). 

(29) Close v. Stuyvesant, 132 Ill. 607, 617 (1890). 

(30) Hogan v. Page, 69 U.S. 605 (1864). 

(31) McGarrahan v. Mining Co., 96 U.S. 316 (1877). 

(32) Sabo v. Horvath, 559 P. 2d 1038, 1040 (Aka. 1976). 

(33) Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92 (1871). 

(34) Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. 438 (1839). 

(35) McConnell v. Wilcox, I Scam. (Ill.) 381, 396 (1837). 

[C] "Acres U.S.A., A Voice for Eco-Agriculture," November 

1984, Volume 14, No. 11; 10008 East 60th Terrace, 

Kansas City, Mo. 64113: (An interview with Carol 

Landi) 

[D] "Cannon Law Liens," from "Memorandum of Law - History, 
Force, and Effect of the Land Patent," (supra). 

(1) 1 Kent Ccrrmentaries , 471; western Union Telegraph 

Company v. Call Publishing Company, 181 U.S. 765, 770 
(1901). 

(2) Karlson v. Murphy, 56 N.E. 2d 839, 387 Ill. 436 
(1944); People ex rel. Board of Trustees of university 
of Illinois v. Barret, 46 N.E. 2d 951, 382 Ill. 321 
(1943). 


-290- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 


(3) Mudge v. Mitchell Hutchins and Co., 54 N.E. 2d 708, 
322 Ill. App. 409 (1944); Heineman v. Hermann, 52 N.E. 
2d 263, 385 Ill. 191 (1943). 

(4) Williamson v. Winningham, 186 P. 2d 644, 650 (Okla. 

1947); see also 42 Okla. S. 1941 Sec. 9. 

(5) Williamson (supra) at 650; (Okla. 1947); Cincinatti 

Tobacco warehouse Co. v. Lefevre, 146 N.W. 653, 654 

(1914); Sullivan v. Sudiak, 333 N.E. 2d 60, 30 Ill. 

App. 3d 899 (Ill. App. 1975); Unger v. Checker Taxi 
Co., 174 N.E. 2d 219, 30 Ill. App. 2d 238 (Ill. App. 
1947); 

(6) Sullivan (supra) at 899; Deitchman v. Corach, 71 N.E., 
Id 367, 330 Ill. App. 365 (Ill. App. 1947); 

(7) 51 Am. Jur. Sect. 20. 

(8) Williamson (supra) at 650; Boston and Kansas City 

Cattle Loan Co. v. Dickson, 11 okla. 680, 69 P. 889 
(1902). 

(9) Williamson (supra) at 650; Boston and Kansas City 

Cattle Loan Co. v. Dickson, 11 Okla. 680, 69 p. 889 
(1902). 

(10) 51 Am. Jur., Sect. 21. 

(11) 33 Am. Ju. 419, Sect. 2; City of Sanford v. McCleland, 

121 Fla. 253, 163 So. 513 (1935); Small v. Robinson, 

69 Me. 425 (1879). 

(12) Peck v. jenness, 7 How. (U.S.) 612 (1849). 

(13) Williamson (supra); See also Robert v. Jacks, 31 Ark. 
597 (1876); Marston v. Miller, 35 Me. 153 (1852); 
Stewart v. Flowers, 44 Miss. 513 (1870). 

(14) Gordon v. Sullivan, 188 F. 2d 980, 982 (1951); See 

also Brown v. Petersen, 25 App. D.C. 359, 363 (1905); 
51 Am. Jur. Sect. 21. 

(15) Drunmond Carriage Co. v. Mills, 74 N.W. 970; 51 Am. 

Jur. Sect. 21; Shaw v. Webb, 131 Tenn. 173, 177 
(1914). 


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GLOSSARY 


ABSTRACT OF TITLE - a condensed history of the title to 
land, consisting of a synopsis or summary of the material 
or operative portion of all conveyances, of whatever kind 
or nature, which in any manner affect said land, together 
with a statement of all liens, charges, or liabilities to 
which it is in any way naterial for purchaser to be ap¬ 
prised. 

ADMIRALTY - A court which has a very extensive jurisdiction 
of maritime causes, civil and criminal. In American law, 
a tribunal exercising jurisdiction over all maritime 
contracts, torts, injuries, or offenses. Admiralty 
courts also have jurisdiction over cases of prize, i.e., 
war and the spoils of war. 

AFFIRMATION - In practice. A solemn religious asserveration 
in the nature of an oath. Nature meaning "the essence or 
essential quality of a thing", an affirmation is, in 
truth and fact, an oath. 

ALLODIAL - Free, not holden of any lord or superior; owned 
without obligation of vassalage or fealty; the opposite 
of feudal. 

ALLODIUM - An estate held by absolute ownership, without 
recognizing any superior to whom any duty is due on 
account thereof. In the U.S. the title to land is es¬ 
sentially allodial, and every tenant in fee simple has an 
absolute and unqualified dominion over it; yet in tech¬ 
nical language his estate is said to be in fee, a word 
which implies a feudal relationship, although such re¬ 
lation has ceased to exist in any form, while in several 
states the lands have been declared to be allodial. in 
England there was no allodial tenure, for all land is 
held mediately or immediately of the king; but the words 
"tenancy in fee simple" are there properly used to ex¬ 
press the most absolute dominion which a man can have 
over his property. 

ASSETS - The word has cane to signify everything which can 
be made available for the payment of debts. The word is 
always used when speaking of the means which a party has, 
as canpared with his liabilities or debts. 

All the stock in trade, cash, and all available property 
belonging to a merchant or caipany. 


-292- 



The property in the hands of an heir, executor, admini¬ 
strator, or trustee, which is legally or equitable 
chargeable with the obligations which heir, executor, 
administrator, or other trustee is, as such, required to 
discharge. 

ASSET CURRENCY - A currency that is backed by all who cure 
legally or equitable chargeable with its obligations; and 
with everything which can be made available for the pay¬ 
ment of debt. 

ASSUMPSIT - To assume, to undertake. In contracts. An 
undertaking, either express or implied, to perform a 
parol agreement. 

ATTACHMENT - Taking into custody of the law the person or 
property of one already before the court or of one whom 
it is sought to bring before it. 

A writ for the accomplishment of this purpose. This is a 
more caimon sense of the word. 

BENEFICIAL INTEREST - Profit, benefit, or advantage result¬ 
ing from a contract, or the ownership of an estate as 
distinct from the legal ownership or control. A cestui 
que trust has the beneficial interest in a trust estate 
while the trustee has the legal estate. 

BENEFICIARY - A term suggested by Judge Story as a substi¬ 
tute for cestui que trust and adopted to seme extent. 

BOTTOMRY - In Maritime Law. A contract in the nature of a 
mortgage, by which the owner of a ship, or the master, as 
his agent, borrows money for the use of the ship, and for 
a specified voyage, or for a definite period, pledges the 
ship (or the keel or bottom of the ship) as a security 
for its repayment, with maritime or extraordinary inter¬ 
est on account of the marine risks to be borne by the 
lender; it being stipulated that if the ship be lost in 
the course of the specified voyage, or during the limited 
time, by any of the perils enumerated in the contract, 
the lender shall also lose his money. 

CASE - Case, or more fully, action upon the case, or tres¬ 
pass on the case, includes in its widest sense assumpsit 
and trover, and distinguishes a class of actions in which 
the writ is framed according to the special circumstances 
of the case. 

A form of action which lies to recover damages for injur¬ 
ies for which the more ancient forms of action will not 
lie. 


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CERTIORARI - In Practice. A writ issued by a superior court 
to an inferior court of record, requiring the latter to 
send in to the former sane proceeding therein pending, or 
the records and proceedings in seme cause already termin¬ 
ated in cases where the procedure is not according to the 
course of the ccntnon law. 

CESTUI QUE TRUST - He for whose benefit another person is 
seised (has the right of inmediate possession according 
to the nature of the estate) of lands or tenements, or is 
possessed of personal property. 

He who has a right to a beneficial interest in and out of 
an estate the legal title to which is vested in another. 

He may be said to be the equitable owner but has no legal 
title to the estate, as he is merely a tenant at will if 
he occupies the estate; and, therefore, may be removed 
from possession in an action of ejectment by his own 
trustee. 

CESTUI QUE USE - He for whose benefit is held by another 
person. He who has a right to take the profits of lands 
of which another has the legal title and possession, to¬ 
gether with the duty of defending the same and to direct 
the making estates thereof. 

CHANCELLOR - An officer appointed to preside over a court of 
chancery. 

CHATTEL - Every species of property, moveable or immovable, 
which is less than freehold. 

CHOSE IN ACTION - A right to receive or recover a debt, or 
money, or damages for breach of contract, or for a tort 
connected with contract, but which cannot be enforced 
without action. 

CIVIL ACTION - In Practice. In The Civil Law. A personal 
action which is instituted to carpel payment, or the 
doing of same other thing which is purely civil. 

At Common Law. An action which has for its object the 
recovery of private or civil rights or compensation for 
their infraction. 

CIVIL LAW - This term is generally used to designate the 
Roman jurisprudence, or Reman Civil Law. In its most 
extensive sense, the term Roman law ccnprises all those 
legal rules are! principles which were in force among the 
Remans, without reference to the time when they were 
adopted. But in a more restricted sense we understand it 


-294- 



by the law compiled under the auspices of the Emperor 
Justinian. 

This system of law is the antithesis of the Cannon law in 
that its fundamental premise is that sovereignty resides 
in a ruler, or ruling body; whereas the fundamental pre¬ 
mise of the Common law is that sovereignty resides in the 
individual, and in the people as a whole. 

The influence upon (and, indeed, the usurpation of) prin¬ 
ciples, practices and usuages of the Common Law System in 
the united States by Raman civil law jurisprudence cannot 
be denied by the impartial inquirer. 

COLLATERAL - That which is by the side, and not the direct 
line; That which is additional to or beyond a thing. 

COLOR OF TITLE - The appearance, semblance, or "simulacrum" 
of title. Also termed "apparent title." Any fact ex¬ 
traneous to the act or mere will of the claimant, which 
has the appearance on its face, of supporting his claim 
to a present title to land, but which, for sane defect, 
in reality falls short of it. Any instrument having a 
grantor and a grantee, and containing a description of 
the lands intended to be conveyed, and apt words for 
their conveyance, gives color of title to the lands 
described. 

Such an instrument purports to be a conveyance of title, 
and because it does not, for sane reason, have that ef¬ 
fect, it passes only color or the semblance of title. 

COMMON LAW - The Law of Conscience as applied to governing 
the affairs and actions of the individual, and the af¬ 
fairs between individuals. Its essence is the golden 
rule. Its science is the science of living honestly with 
one's self and with other individuals. It is the coa¬ 
lescing of the two great powers bestowed upon Man by his 
Creator - the power to reason and the power of the 
spirit, working together in harmony with the laws of God 
and Nature, it is loyalty-to-self, loyalty-to-truth, as 
revealed to each individual through his conscience. 

Being the Law of Conscience, it cannot be written - it 
can only be written about. All that can be written about 
the Cannon Law is how it manifests itself through the in¬ 
dividual who is loyal to self - loyal to his conscience. 

It is frequently said that Common Law is custom and usage 
from immemorial antiquity, that Cannon Law is the judg¬ 
ments and decrees of courts recognizing these usages and 
customs, that Cannon Law is the statutory and case law 
background of England and the American Colonies before 
the American Revolution - and now, our courts tell us 
that there is such a thing as "specialized federal cannon 


-295- 



law," or just "federal common law." None of these are 
Common Law in its true sense and meaning. At best, they 
are manifestations of individual decisions and actions in 
particular situations, pursuant to conscience. At worst, 
they are manifestations of decisions and actions in 
situations wherein reason, spirit, and conscience of the 
individuals involved were stifled or suspended. To say 
otherwise is to lose or change the important thing - the 
true meaning of Common Law. 

COWON LAW SYSTEM - A system devised by man for the sole 
purposes of creating a forum in which the Common Law, the 
Law of Conscience, can flourish and function in the reso¬ 
lution of controversies, and in the determination and 
application of justice. The heart of this Common Law 
System is a Common Law jury of twelve randomly selected 
from the community in order to maximize the probability 
that, by each individual juror being loyal to his own 
conscience, the jury will represent the conscience of the 
ccrrmunity as a whole. Any system, or any aspect of a 
system, that suspends or interferes with the reasoning 
power and conscience of a juror is not a cannon law 
system, or any part thereof. 

CONSTRUCTIVE - That which amounts in view of the law to an 
act, although the act itself is not really performed. 

CONTACT OF ADHESION - A contract in which one predominate 
unilateral will dictates its law to an undetermined mul¬ 
titude rather than to an individual - as in all employ¬ 
ment contracts of big industry, transportation contracts 
of big railroad carpaines, and all those contracts which, 
as the Romans said, resemble a law much more than a meet¬ 
ing of the minds. 

CORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS - Substantial, permanent objects 
which may be inherited. The term land will include all 
such. 

CORPOREAL PROPERTY - In the cannon law, the term to signify 
property in possession. It differs from incorporeal pro¬ 
perty, which consists of choses in action and easements, 
as a right of way, and the like. 

COURT OF CHANCERY - In American Law. A court of general 
equity jurisdiction. The terms equity and chancery, 
court of equity and court of chancery, are constantly 
used as synoncmous in the United States. 


-296- 



CREDIT - The ability to borrow, on the opinion conceived by 
the lender that he will be repaid. A debt due in conse¬ 
quence of a contract of hire or borrowing of money. 

CREDITOR - He who has a right to require the fulfillment of 
an obligation or contract. 

DE FACTO - Actually, in fact, in deed. A term used to de¬ 
note a thing actually done. 

DE JURE - Rightfully, of right, lawfully, by legal title. 
Contrasted with de facto. Of right: distinguished from 
de gratia (by favor). By law: distinguished from de 
equitable (by equity). 

DEBT - In Contracts. A sum of money due by certain and 
express agreement. All that is due a man under any form 
of obligation or premise. 

DEED - A sealed instrument containing a contract or cov¬ 
enant, delivered by the party to be bound thereby, and 
accepted by the party to whcxn the covenant or contract 
runs. A writing under seal by which lands, tenements, or 
hereditaments are conveyed for an estate not less than 
freehold. 

DELICT - In Civil Law. The act by Which one person, by 
fraud or malignity, causes sane damage or tort to sane 
other. In its most enlarged sense, this term includes 
all kinds of crimes and misdemeanors, and even the injury 
which has been caused by another, either voluntarily or 
accidently, without evil intention. But more commonly by 
delicts are understood those small offenses which are 
punished by a small fine or imprisonment. 

Private delicts are those which are directly injurious to 
a private individual. 

Public delicts are those which affect the whole community 
in their hurtful consequences. 

Quasi-delicts are the acts of a person who, without ma¬ 
lignity, but by an inexcusable inprudence, causes an 
injury to another. 

DETINUE - In Practice. A form of action which lies for the 
recovery, in specie, of personal chattels from one who 
acquired possession of them lawfully but retains it 
without right, together with damages for the detention. 

DUTY - A hunan action which is exactly ccmformable to the 
laws which require us to obey them. 


-297- 



It differs from legal obligation, because a duty cannot 
always be enforced by the law; it is our duty, for ex¬ 
ample, to be temperate in eating, but we are under no 
legal obligation to do so; we ought to love our neigh¬ 
bors, but no law obliges us to love than. 

DOTIES - In its most enlarged sense, this word is nearly 
equivalent to taxes, embracing all inpositions or charges 
levied on persons or things; in its more restrained 
sense, it is often used as equivalent to customs, or 
imposts. 

EQUITY - In the broad sense in which this term is sometimes 
used, it signifies natural justice. 

In a more limited application, it denotes equal justice 
between contending parties. This is its moral signifi¬ 
cation, in reference bo the rights of parties having 
conflicting claims; but applied to courts and their 
jurisdiction and proceedings, it has a more restrained 
and limited signification. 

One division of courts is into courts of law and courts 
of equity And equity, in this relation and application, 
is a branch of remedial justice by and through which 
relief is afforded to suitors in the courts and juris¬ 
diction of equity. 

The avowed principle upon which the jurisdiction was 
first exercised vras the administration of justice ac¬ 
cording to honesty, equity, and conscience. This jur¬ 
isdiction is exercised by a chancellor in accordance with 
principles, rules and usages of the civil law - and the 
"conscience" referred to is the conscience of the king, 
ruler, or ruling body. 

This jurisdiction is extensive and has many diverse 
component parts. In the context of this work it is 
worthy of note that it exists where, from a relation of 
trust and confidence, the parties do not stand on equal 
ground in their dealings with each other: as, the re¬ 
lations of attorney and client, principal and agent, ex¬ 
ecutor and administrator, trustee and cestui que trust. 

ESOTERIC - Meant for or understood by only a chosen few. 

ESTATE - The degree, quantity, nature and extent of interest 
which a person has in real property, and it varies frcm 
absolute ownership down to naked possession. 

EX CQNTOACIU - Fran contract. A division of actions is made 
in the ccnroon and civil law into those arising ex con¬ 
tractu (from contract) and ex delicto (from wrong or 
tort). 


-298- 




EXCISE - An inland inposition, paid sometimes upon the con¬ 
sumption of the oonmodity, and frequently upon the retail 
sale. 

FEE SIMPLE - An estate of inheritance. 

FEE SIMPLE ABSOLUTE - An estate limited absolutely to a man 
and his heirs and assigns forever without limitation or 
condition. 

Although allodial in nature, a fee simple absolute title 
may include lands subject to feudal duties or burdens. 

FEUDUM - A feud, fief, or fee. A right of using and en¬ 
joying forever the lands of another, which the lord 
grants on condition that the tenent shall render fealty, 
military duty, and other services. The early English 
writers generally prefer the form feodum; but the meaning 
is the same. 

FIAT - A decree, order. A sanction. 

FIDUCIARY - Fiduciary may be defined in trust, in confi¬ 
dence. 

FRANCHISE - A special privilege conferred by government on 
individuals, and which does not belong to citizens of the 
country generally by cannon right. 

FRAUD - The unlawful appropriation of another's property, 
with knowledge, by design, and with criminal intent. 
Fraud is scmetimes used as a term synonymous with covin, 
collusion, and deceit, but improperly so. Covin is a 
secret contrivance between two or more persons to defraud 
and prejudice another of his rights. Collusion is an 
agreement between two or more persons to defraud another 
under the forms of law, or to accomplish an illegal pur¬ 
pose. Deceit is a fraudulant contrivance by words or 
acts to deceive a third person, who, relying thereupon, 
without carelessness or neglect of his own, sustains 
damage thereby. 

FREEHOLD - An estate for life or in fee. A freehold estate 
is a right of title to land. An estate to be a freehold 
must possess these two qualities: (1) Inmobility, that 
is, the property must be either land or some interest 
issuing out of or annexed to land; and (2) Indeterminate 
duration, for if the utmost period of time to which an 
estate can endure be fixed and determined, it cannot be a 
freehold. 


- 299 - 



GOODS - In Contracts. The term applies to inaminate objects 
and does not include animals or chattels real, as a lease 
for years of house or land, which chattels does include. 
In a more limited sense, goods is used for articles of 
merchandise. 

GOODS AND CHATTELS - In Contracts. a term which includes 
not only personal property in possession, but choses in 
action and chattels real, as a lease for years of house 
or land, or emblements (the profits of the land sown). 

HYPOTHECATION - A right which a creditor has over a thing 
belonging to another, and which consists in a power to 
cause it to be sold, in order to be paid his claim out of 
the proceeds. Hypothecation, properly so called, is that 
which is contracted without delivery of the thing hypoth¬ 
ecated. 

Conventional hypothecations are those which arise by 
agreement of the parties. 

General hypothecations are those by which the debtor 
hypothecates to his creditor all his estate which he has 
or may have. 

Legal hypothecations are those which arise without any 
contract therefor between the parties, express or 
implied. 

Tacit hypothecations are such as the law gives in certain 
cases, without the consent of the parties, to secure the 
creditor. They are a species of legal hypothecation. 
Thus, the public treasury has a lien over the property of 
public debtors. Code 8.15.1. The landlord has a lien on 
the goods in the house leased, for the payment of his 
rent, etc.. 

IMPOSTS - Taxes, duties or inpositions. A duty or imported 
goods or merchandise. 

The Constitution of the United States gives congress 
power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, excises, and 
imposts", and prohibits the states from laying "any 
imposts or duties on exports or imposts" without the 
consent of congress. u.S. Const. Art. I, Sect. 8, n.l; 
Art. I, Sect. 10, n.2. 

IN PERSONAM - A remedy where the proceedings are against the 
person, in contradistinction to those which are against 
specific things, or in rem. 

IN REM - A technical term used to designate proceedings or 
actions instituted against the thing, in contradistinc- 


- 300 - 



tion to personal actions, which are said to be in per¬ 
sonam. 

INDEMNITY - That which is given to a person to prevent his 
suffering damages. 

INSURABLE INTEREST - Such an interest in a subject of in¬ 
surance as will entitle the person possessing it to 
obtain insurance. It is essential to the contract of 
insurance, as distinguished from a wager policy, that the 
assured should have a legally recognizable interest in 
the insured subject, the pecuniary value of which may be 
appreciated and computed or valued. It is also essential 
to the contract that the insurer incur a risk in the un¬ 
derwriting venture. 

INSURANCE - A contract whereby, for an agreed premium, one 
party undertakes to indannify the other against loss on a 
specified subject by specified perils. 

INTEREST - In Contracts. The right of property which a man 
has in a thing. (See Insurable Interest). 

On Debts. The compensation which is paid by the borrower 
of money to the lender for its use, and generally, by a 
debtor to his creditor in recompense for his detention of 
the debt. 

JURISDICTION - The authority by which judicial officers take 
cognizance of and decide causes. Power to hear and de¬ 
termine a cause. It includes power to enforce the ex¬ 
ecution of what is decreed. 

JURISPRUDENCE - The science of the law. By science is un¬ 
derstood that connection of truths which is founded on 
principles either evident in themselves or capable of 
demonstration - a collection of truths of the same kind, 
arranged in methodical order. 

In another sense it is the habit of judging the same 
questions in the same manner, and by this course of 
judgments forming precedents. 

LAND - The word "land", in its legal signification, includes 
all soil or earth generally. But in our law it includes 
everything attached to it or constructed upon it, as 
houses, bridges, buildings of every description; and a 
grant of a parcel of land carries with it not only the 
things upon the surface of the land, but also everything 
above and below the surface, from the center of the earth 
to the highest heavens, the maxim being "the landowner 
owns the sky". So that a pond of water passes with the 


- 301 - 



land as land covered by water, and the mines and minerals 
below the surface pass with a grant of land. Land is 
classified as corporeal (visible/tangible), immovable, 
tenements (things held), hereditaments (things capable of 
being inherited), real property, real estate. 

LAND GRANT - A donation of public lands to a subordinate 
government, a corporation, or an individual; as from the 
United States to a state, or to a railroad company to aid 
in the construction of its roads. 

IAND PATENT - An instrument conveying a grant of public 
land; also the land so conveyed. A patent of the United 
States is the conveyance by which the Nation passes its 
title to the public domain and is the highest evidence of 
derivative title known to law; it is conclusive as 
against the government, and all persons claiming under 
junior patents or titles, until set aside or annulled by 
seme competent tribunal. When delivered to and accepted 
by the grantee, it passes the full legal title to the 
land, and carries with it the presumption that all the 
prerequisites of law have been complied with. To conform 
strictly to the letter of the law, the patent must be 
signed in the name of the President, either by himself or 
his duly appointed secretary, sealed with the seal of the 
General Land Office, and countersigned by the Recorder. 
Until all of these have been done, the United States has 
not executed a patent for a grant of lands. Each and 
every one of the integral parts of the execution is 
essential to the perfection of the patent. They are of 
equal importance under the law, and one cannot be dis¬ 
pensed with more than another. Neither is directory, but 
all mandatory, and neither the signing nor the sealing, 
nor the countersigning can be emitted any more than the 
signing or the sealing, or the acknowledgment by a grant¬ 
or or the attestation by witnesses, when by statute such 
forms are prescribed for the due execution of deeds by 
private parties for the conveyance of lands. Where, 
however, the patent is regular upon its face, then a 
presumption arises that it is valid and that it passes 
title. 

LIABILITY - Responsibility, the state of one who is bound in 
law and justice to do something which may be enforced by 
action. This liability may arise from contracts either 
express or implied, or in consequence of torts carmitted. 

MARITIME CAUSE - A cause from a maritime contract, whether 
made at sea or on land. 


- 302 - 



MARITIME CONIRACT - One which relates to the business of 
navigation upon the sea, or to business appertaining to 
cannerce or navigation to which courts of admiralty have 
jurisdiction concurrent with courts of cannon law. 

MARITIME LOAN - A contract or agreement by which one, who is 
the lender, lends to another, who is the borrower, a cer¬ 
tain sum of money, upon condition that if the thing upon 
which the loan has been made should be lost by any peril 
of the sea, or inevitable accident, the lender shall not 
be repaid unless what remains shall be equal to the sum 
borrowed; and if the thing arrive in safety, or in case 
it shall not have been injured but by its own defects or 
the fault of the master or mariners, the borrower shall 
be bound to return the sum borrowed, together with a cer¬ 
tain sum agreed upon as the price of the hazard incurred. 
It is essential to this contract that the lender have a 
risk, otherwise the contract is void by reason of being a 
wager. 

MUNIMENTS - The instruments of writing and written evidences 
which the owner of lands, possessions, or inheritances 
has, by which he is enabled to defend the title of his 
estate. 

NATURE - Fran the Latin nasci, be born. The essential 
quality of a thing, essence. 

OATH - An outward pledge given by the person taking it that 
his attestation or premise is made under an immediate 
sense of his responsibility to God. 

OBLIGATION - A duty. A tie which binds us to pay or do 
something agreeably to the lavra and customs of the 
country in which the obligation is made. Express or con¬ 
ventional obligations are those which the obligor binds 
himself in express terms to perform the obligation is one 
which arises by operation of law. 

OLERON, LAWS CF - A maritime code promulgated by Eleanor, 
duchess of Guienne, Mother of Richard I, at the isle of 
Oleron, - whence their name. They vrare modified and 
enacted in England under Richard I, and again promulgated 
under Henry ill and Edward III, and are constantly quoted 
in proceedings before the admiralty courts, as are also 
the Rhodian lawra. 

PAROL - A term used to distinguish contracts which are made 
verbally, or in writing not under seal, which are called 


- 303 - 



parol contracts, from those which are under seal, which 
bear the name of deeds or specialties. 

PARTITION - The division which is made between several per¬ 
sons of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or of goods 
and chattels, which belong bo them as co-heirs or co-pro- 
priators. 

PENDENTE LITE - Pending the continuance of an action while 
litagation continues. 

An administrator is appointed pendente lite, when a will 
is contested. 

PERJURY - In Criminal Law. A wilful false oath by one who, 
being lawfully required to depose the truth in any jud¬ 
icial proceeding, swears absolutely in a matter material 
to the point in question, whether he be believed or not. 
The wilful giving, under oath in a judicial proceeding or 
course of justice, of false testimony material to the 
issue or point of inquiry. 

The oath must be taken and the falsehood asserted with 
deliberation and a consciousness of the nature of the 
statement made. 

The party must be lawfully sworn and the oath must be 
false. 

PETITORY ACTION - That which demands or petitions: that 
which has the quality of a prayer or petition; a right to 
demand. A petitory suit or action is understood to be 
one in which the mere title to property is to be enforced 
by means of a demand, petition, or other legal proceed¬ 
ing, as distinguished from a suit where only the right of 
possession and not the mere right of property is in 
controversy. 

PILOTAGE - A compensation given to a pilot for conducting a 
vessel in or cut of port. Pilotage is a lien on the 
ship, when the contract has been made by the master or 
quasi-master of the ship or seme other person lawfully 
authorized to make it. 

PLENARY - Full, complete. In the courts of admiralty, and 
in the English ecclesiastical courts, causes or suits in 
respect of the different course of proceedings in each 
are termed plenary or summary. Plenary, of full and 
formal, suits are those in which the proceedings must be 
full and formal; The term summary is applied to those 
causes where the proceedings are more succinct and less 
formal. 


- 304 - 




POSSESSORY ACTION - A possessory action is a real action in 
which the plaintiff, called the demandant, seeks to re¬ 
cover the possession of land, tenements and heredita¬ 
ments. 

ERIMA FACIA - At first view or appearance of the business; 
as, the holder of a bill of exchange, endorsed in blank, 
is prima facia its owner. 

Prima facia evidence of fact is in law sufficient to es¬ 
tablish the fact, unless rebutted. 

PROPERTY - That which is peculiar or proper to any person; 
that which belongs exclusively to one. In the strict 
sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and 
protected by the government. The term is said to extend 
to every species of valuable right and interest. More 
specifically, ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive 
right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in 
every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude 
everyone else form interfering with it. The highest 
right a man can have to anything; being used to refer to 
that right which one has to lands or tenements, goods or 
chattels, which no way depends on another mans courtesy. 

QUASI-CONTRACT - In Civil Law. The lawful and purely volun¬ 
tary acts of a man, from Which there results any obliga¬ 
tion whatever to a third person, and sometimes a recipro¬ 
cal obligation between the parties. 

In contracts, it is the consent of the contracting par¬ 
ties which produces the obligation; in quasi-contracts no 
consent is required, and the obligation arises from the 
law or natural equity, or the facts of the case. These 
acts are called quasi-contracts because, without being 
contracts, they bind the parties as contracts do. 

QUASI-DELICT - In Civil Law. The act by which a person, 
without malice, but by fault, negligence or imprudence 
lot legally excusable, causes injury to another. 

A quasi-delict may be public or private: the neglect of 
the affairs of a ccmnunity, when it is our duty to attend 
to them, may be a crime. 

REAL EROPERTY - Something which may be held by tenure, or 
will pass to the heir of the possessor at his death, 
instead of his executor, including lands, tenements and 
hereditaments, whether the latter be corporeal or incorp¬ 
oreal. 

In respect to property, real and personal correspond very 
nearly with immovables and movables of the civil law. 


- 305 - 



REPLEVEN - In Practice. A form of action which lies to re¬ 
gain the possession of personal chattels which have been 
taken from the plaintiff unlawfully. In most of the 
states of the united States the action extends to all 
cases of illegal taking, and in sore of the states it may 
be brought wherever a person wishes to recover specific 
goods to which he alleges title. 

The object of the action is to recover possession; and it 
will not lie where the property has been restored. 

RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS - The abrogation or annulling of 
contracts. The equity of rescission and cancellation of 
agreements, securities, deeds, and other instruments 
arises when a transaction is vitiated by illegality or 
fraud, or by reason of its having been carried on in 
ignorance or mistake of facts material to its operation. 

RESPONDENTIA - In Maritime Law. A loan of money, on mari¬ 
time interest, on goods laden on board of a ship, upon 
the condition that if the goods be wholly lost in the 
course of the voyage, by any of the perils enumerated in 
the contract, the lender shall lose his money; if not, 
that the borrower shall pay him the sum borrowed, with 
the interest agreed. It differs from bottomry in that 
bottomry is a loan on the ship; respondentia is a loan 
upon the goods. 

REVOCATION - The recall of a power or authority conferred, 
or the vacating of an instrument previously made. 

THE REVOCATION OF POWERS CONFERRED UPON AGENTS. Naked 
powers, not coupled with an interest, may always be re¬ 
voked by the express act of the constituent, whenever he 
so elects, he being bound by all the acts of the agent 
until notice of the revocation. Until notice of revo¬ 
cation, the agent is entitled to compensation and indem¬ 
nity for all acts done and all liabilities incurred. The 
act of revocation is merely provisional and contingent 
until notice is ccrnnunicated to the agent. 

RHODIAN LAWS - A code of maritime laws adopted by the people 
of Rhodes, who had by their commerce and naval victories 
obtained the sovereignty of the sea, about nine hundred 
years before the Christian era. There is reason to sup¬ 
pose this code has not been transmitted to posterity, at 
least not in perfect state. A collection of marine con¬ 
stitutions, under the denomination of Rhodian Laws may be 
seen in Vinnius; but they bear evident marks of a spur¬ 
ious origin. 


- 306 - 




RIGHT - A well-founded claim. The ideas of claim and that 
the claim must be well-founded always constitute the idea 
of right. If these claims inhere in the very nature of 
man himself, they are called inherent, inalienable 
rights. 

Right and obligation are correlative ideas. 

The idea of a well-founded claim becomes in law a claim 
founded in or established by the law; so that it is said 
that a right in law is an acknowledged claim. 

Thus, at law, no right is brought into existense until a 
well- founded claim is made in a proper and timely 
manner. 

SEISEN - The completion of the feudal investiture by which 
the tenent was admitted into the feud and performed the 
rites of homage and fealty. 

SERVICE - In Contracts. The being employed to serve another. 
In Feudal Law. That duty which the tenant owed to his 
lord by reason of his fee or estate. In Civil Law - a 
servitude. 

SERVITUDE - in Civil Law. The subjection of one person to 
another person, or of a person to a thing, or of a thing 
to a person, or of a thing to a thing. A personal servi¬ 
tude is the subjection of one person to another: If it 
consists in the right of property which a person exer¬ 
cises over another, it is slavery. When the subjection 
of one person to another is not slavery, it consists 
simply in the right of requiring of another what he is 
bound to do or not to do: this right arises from all 
kinds of contracts or quasi-contracts. 

SOVEREIGN - The chief ruler with supreme power. A king or 
other ruler with limited power. 

Strictly speaking, in our republican forms of government 
the absolute sovereignty of the nation is in the people 
of the nation; and the residuary sovereignty of each 
state, not granted to any of its public functionaries 
(trustees), is in the people of the state. 

SUIT - In its most extended sense, the word suit includes 
not only a civil action, but also a criminal prosecution 
as, indictment, information, and a conviction by a mag¬ 
istrate. Hanmond, Nisi p. 270. Suit is applied to pro¬ 
ceedings in chancery as well as law, 1 Smith, Chanc. Dec. 
26, 27, and is, therefore, more general than action, 

which is almost exclusively applied to matters of law. 


- 307 - 



TENURE - The mode by which a man holds an estate in lands. 
Such a holding as is coupled with seme service, which the 
holder is bound to perform as long as he continues to 
hold. 

The thing held is called a tenement; the occupant, a 
tenant; and the manner of his holding constitutes the 
tenure. 

An estate held by allodial title necessarily excludes the 
idea of any tenure, since the occupant holding allodial 
title owes no services or allegiance to any superior as 
the condition of his occupation. 

TITLE - The means whereby the owner of lands ccmes into 
legal possession of his property. The union of all the 
elements which constitute ownership. The right to or 
ownership in lands; also the evidence of such ownership. 
A PERFECT TITLE requires the union of possession and the 
right to the thing possessed. 

TONTINE - In French Law. The name of a partnership composed 
of creditors or recipients of perpetual or life rents or 
annuities, formed on the condition that the rents of 
those who may die shall accrue to the survivors, either 
in whole or in part. 

This kind of partnership took its name from Tonti, an 
Italian, who first conceived the idea and put it in 
practice. 

TORRENS TITLE SYSTEM - A system for registration of land 
under which, upon the landowner's application, the court 
may, after appropriate proceedings, direct issuance of a 
certificate of title. With exceptions, this certificate 
is conclusive as to the applicant's estate in land. 
System of registration of land title as distinguished 
from registration or recording of "evidence" of such 
title. 

TORT - A private or civil wrong or injury. A wrong 
independent of contract. 

The corrmission or amission of an act by one without right 
whereby another received sane injury, directly or indi¬ 
rectly, in person, property, or reputation. 

TRESPASS - Any misfeasance or act of one man whereby another 
is injuriously treated or damnified. 

Any unlawful act committed with violence, actual or im¬ 
plied, to the person, property, or rights of another. 

Any unauthorized entry upon the realty of another to the 
damage thereof. 


- 308 - 




TOOVER - In Practice. A form of action which lies to re¬ 
cover damages against one who has, without right, con¬ 
verted to his cwn use goods or personal chattels in which 
the plaintiff has a general or special property. It dif¬ 
fers from detinue and replevin in this, that it is 
brought for damages and not for the specific articles; 
and from trespass in this, that the injury is not nec¬ 
essarily a forcible one. 

TRUST - A right of property, real or personal, held by one 
party for the benefit of another. 

The party holding is called the trustee, and the party 
for whose benefit the right is held is called the cestui 
que trust, or, using a better term, the beneficiary. 
Sometimes the equitable title of the beneficiary, 

sometimes the obligation of the trustee, and, again, the 
right held, is called the trust. 

But the right of the beneficiary is in the trust; the 
obligation of the trustee results from the trust; and THE 
RIGHT HEED IS THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE TRUST. Neither 
of them is the trust itself. All together they consti¬ 
tute the trust. 

VESTED INTEREST - An estate is vested in interest when there 
is a present fixed right of future enjoyment. 

WAGER - A bet, a contract by which two parties or more agree 
that a certain sum of money, or other thing, shall be 
paid or delivered to one of them on the happening or not 
happening of an uncertain event. 

In general, it seems that a wager is legal and may be 
enforced in a court of law, if it be not contrary to 
public policy, or inmoral, or if it does not in seme 
other respect tend to the detriment of the public, or if 
it do not affect the interest, feelings, or character of 
a third person. 

In the case even of a legal wager, the authority of a 
stakeholder, like that of an arbitrator, may be rescinded 
by either party before the event happens. And if, after 
his authority has been countermanded and the stake has 
been demanded, he refuses to deliver it, trover or as¬ 
sumpsit for money had and received is maintainable. 

And where the wager is in its nature illegal, the stake 
may be recovered, even after the event, on demand made 
before it has been paid over. 

WAGER POLICY - One made when the insured has no insurable 
interest; or the insurer has nothing at risk, i.e., 
nothing bo lose in the event of the occurance insured 
against. A wager policy has nothing in cannon with in- 


- 309 - 



contracts 


being 


surance but the name and form. Such 
against the policy of the law, are void. 


- 310 - 






Following is an interview with Dr. George Hill and the 
editor of Duck Club News Digest, Box 99148, Stockton, Cal¬ 
ifornia. This article was subsequently copied and dis¬ 
tributed in large quantities by the Populist Party and, 
thereby, initiated a correspondence series between Con¬ 
gressman Ron paul/joe Cobb, Assistant to the Congressman for 
Banking Legislation, and George Hill/Verl Speer. This cor¬ 
respondence is presented herein as Exhibits 2 th;rough 8: 

REVIEW OF SITUATION 

Interview with George Hill of 
Universal Life university School of Law 

DCND: Mr. Hill, please explain for cur readers what can 
happen after the statute of limitations is reached on Oct. 
29th, 1984. 

HILL: The opportunity will be wide open for the Federal 
Reserve System to issue the new currency they have had ready 
for sane time, and by changing the wording on the new FRN's 
to: "This note is legal tender for all Public Debts," they 
can declare the Federal debt uncollectible and foreclose on 
the property of all US citizens. 

DCND: How could that be possible? 

HILL: Well, of course they must get Congress to amend 
Section 26 of the Monetary Control Act of 1977, but since 
the US government cannot pay "our" debt of approximately 1 
1/2 trillion dollars to the FED and since the majority of 
the members of Congress are already bought and paid for by 
the "present real government of the US - the FED" it can be 
expected that they will do the bidding of their master. 

DCND: I don't understand just what they can gain by fore¬ 
closing on the people's property. can they send US mar¬ 
shalls to our homes and kick us out? 

HILL: Yes, of course. But they are not likely to do 
that. They will let us continue to live on the properties 
until they have a special need for them - such as a time 
when they bring in foreigners whom they want to set up in 
various businesses or in to the better homes. And of course 
since the FED new owns our properties outright they can 
start charging us rent, even thouth the properties were paid 
for when or since purchased. 

DCND: You state that we have until Oct. 29 to prevent 
such a foreclosure from happening, just what CAN we do? 

HILL: Well the FED itself was voted into law in 1913 by 
cur Congress, but that act was actually void because it was 
illegal, unconstitutional and a violation of the law of 
Nations upon which this Nation was founded, as per the ward¬ 
ing of the Declaration of Independence. What we as citizens 
must do is to bring to the attention of Congress the fact 


-311- 


EXHIBIT 1, Page 1 



that the FED is nothing but a "wagering organization" which 
is unlawful according to every test that can be given to it 
and that we the people DEMAND it to be repealed and the so 
called public debt to the FED was illegally passed and 
therefore must be cancelled. 

DCND: How can we force a Congress that is already bought 
and paid for to take this action? 

HILL: First, as many Patriots as can handle it should sue 
the FED in the Federal District Courts, we must deluge 
these Courts with such cases to call attention to Congress 
that we mean business. These cases must be filed as soon as 
possible by Patriots all over the u.S. Then further, we 
must present a Constructive Notice to all members of 
Congress that the Federal Reserve System is operating a 
wagering policy with the citizens of the U.S. as silent (and 
unwilling) third parties in a contract between the Congress 
and a private organization, to wit - the Fed. and that the 
FED operates unlawfully against the Law of Nations and thus 
must be voted out of existence by the Congress. 

DCND: How are the Patriots to know what to do? Can we 
supply them with the information needed to file proper 
suits, and can we get written explanation to send to the 
Congress? 

HILL: we are presently involved in court cases working 
towards this and plan to have ready a complete packet of 
information, case materials, briefs, etc., so these will be 
inmediately ready to be used by people all over the country. 
You can print in your paper that these can be ordered now 
and will be ready for mailing by August 15, 1984. 

DCND: Can the average pro se patriot use this material in 
Court, or must he/she be a lawyer or attorney? 

HILL: Well, a pro se with some previous court experience 
can do it provided he studies the Maritime and Admiralty 
laws thoroughly. The person who is going to volunteer to 
help us get this done must of course obtain a complete set 
of Maritime and Admiralty materials as soon as possible 
because this is the only jurisdiction involved. These 
materials have been prepared by the Universal Life 
University School of Law (ULUSofL). They are available at 
seminars the staff of ULUSofL are presently putting on 
around the Nation, or are available from your newspaper, 
DCND. ... 

DCND: Will the staff of ULUSofL be available to assist 
the Patriots in this? 

HILL: Yes. If they need more information they should 
write ULUSofL, attention George Hill, or Verl Speer, Box 
1796, Modesto, CA 95353, ... 

DCND: Can't Patriots contact attorneys in their own area 
to assist them in their suits? 


-312- 


EXHIBIT 1, Page 2 




HILL: In cur contacts around the country so far we have 
found that neither attorneys nor judges understand much 
about Admiralty and Maritime laws. If you don't mind 
looking for a needle in a haystack you might find one, but 
we are right now on the last lap of our life as a free 
nation, and we have no time to fiddle around, if we don't 
succeed in moving Congress to act before the 7 year statute 
of limitations on the Monetary Control Bill of 1977 expires 
on Oct. 29, 1984 we can all kiss goodbye to our property 
that we still call our own but will lose otherwise. 

DCND: I can't believe that all this can be true. 
Further, I don't believe one out of 100 reading this will 
believe it. We have been told many times that we are just 
spreading gloom and doom, and we believe-are- readers will 
say we are still doing it. OlXV 

HILL: If they want to sit on their hands and refuse to 
help us wto are working cur south ends off trying to save 
our country, they will wake up after it's too late to do 
anything. We ask all Patriots to get the Maritime and 
Admiralty materials made availabale to them at low cost and 

study up on it NOW. 

DCND: Thank you Mr. Hill. 


EXHIBIT 1 


-313- 


9 


Page 3 



RON PAUL 

22mo distinct texas 


COMMITTEE ON BANKING. 
FINANCE. AMO OMAN AFFAiW 


NANKING REPUBLICAN 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUME* AFFAIRS AND 
COINAGE 


BOOM 1234 

LONGWOBTM HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 
(2011 22B-BSB1 


Congress of the United States 

Jurasf of 'Rtprtstntatfots 
Washington, ©.<£. 2 ojij 


DOTNCT 0 W 2 CE,: 


4,4, IIUOMT SUITE 230 
•RUMS, TEXAS 77401 
fT 1 „«M- 0 M 2 


12, OTETEA CAiEK CHIVE 
U4K4 JAC420H. TEXAS 22,4, 

'402i 297-2441 

WEEKLY MCOROED MESSAGE: 

HOUSTON: (7121 444-0440 
LAKE JACKSON (SOW 242-0102 


August 30, 1984 


George Hill or 
Verl Speer 
Postal Box 1796 
Modesto, CA 95353 

Gentlemen: 


Enclosed is a copy of Public Law 95-147 and a copy of 
Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act. A lady from Texas has sent us 
a copy of a handbill distributed by the Populist Party in which you 
are cited as making several frightening and untrue claims about P.L. 
95-147 and Sec. 16 of the Federal Reserve Act. 

Why are you spreading this disinformation — urging patriots 
to waste their time and money on lawsuits in response to this phoney 
issue when there are so many real battles to fight? 

By using up the time, money and energies of patriots on 
false issues the Federal Reserve then doesn’t have to fight on our 
real issues — and risk losing! Which side are you on? 


Sincerely, 




Joe Cobb 

Assistant to the Congressman 
for Banking Legislation 


CC: Populist Party 


-314- 


EXHIBIT 2 



September 21, 1984 


Honorable Ron Paul 
Congress of the United States 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
ATTN: Joe Cobb, Assistant to the 

Congressman for Banking Legislation 

RE: Your letter of August 30, 1984, to George Hill or Verl Speer. 

Gentlemen; 

In response to your letter referenced above, it appears that we either 
have a fundamental disagreement on the "real issues" or (hopefully) a misunder¬ 
standing due to lack of communication. 

Admittedly, because of the esoteric nature of the subject matter involved 
with the Federal Resej^/e Act, and acts amendatory thereto, the ramifications 
of all acts of Congress relating to the private Federal Reserve Bank Corp¬ 
oration are an enigma. For this very reason, speculation and guesswork was, 
of necessity, involved in the handbill article distributed by the Populist 
Party; however, the article did accomplish its purpose of alerting readers to 
a most serious problem by speculation and discussion of one tip of a many 
faceted iceberg. 

We have devoted years of research and study into cause and effect relation¬ 
ships of the Federal Reserve Act, and acts amendatory thereto (the cause), and 
the erosion and destruction of basic, substantive, rights of American citizens 
(the effects) in every courtroom in this land. We have researched and documented 
fact and law which leads to certain broad and inescapable conclusions. These are*. 

1. The, private, Federal Reserve Bank Corporation acquired an HYPOTHECATION 
in the Public Pledge of Revenue Assurance on the Public Debt, by way of the 
Federal Reserve Act in 1913* in consideration of a pretended assurance of the 
Public Debt underwritten. 

Said assurance is non-existent for the simple, and proveable, fact that 
the Federal Reserve Bank Corporation has nothing at risk in the Public Debt 
underwritten — making the contract, by definition, a WAGER POLICY. 

2. a. Subsequent to the passage of House Joint Resolution 192, June 5t 
1933» The Federal Reserve Bank Corporation monetized the Public Debt, thereby 
converting our currency to nearly 100 % BANK CREDIT created by the Federal 
Reserve and its subsidiary commercial banks. 

b. These joint actions by Congress and the Federal Reserve made it 
impossible for an American citizen to pay a debt at law, via the currency of 
the United States; and imposed perpetual TRANSFER of debt obligations in BANK 
CREDIT in lieu of PAYMENT (3ee Stanek v. White, 172 Minn. 390, 215 N.W. 784 for 
the legal distinction between "transfer" and "payment" of debt). 

c. These joint actions of Congress and the Federal Reserve, from a 
jurisprudence viewpoint, brought Admiralty/Maritime jurisdiction inland (from 
its ancient and proper boundaries of the ebb and flow of the tide), within the 
body of the counties of the several states (see The Bank of Columbia v. Qkely , 

4 Fed. 559 Tor insight into proper jurisdiction over matters involving bank 
credit). 

d. The above-referenced actions of Congress and the Federal Reserve 
also converted all land titles in this country from ALLODIAL, as established 
by the Declaration of Independence,and the War for Independence itself, to 
FEUDAL fee simple titles. 

e. The above-referenced actions of Congress and the Federal reserve 
effectuated a total HYPOTHECATION of property, people and resources to the creator 


- 1 - 


-315- 


exhibit 3 


PAGE 1 



of our Public Credit (Bank Credit), The Federal Reserve Bank Corporation. 

It has been stated many times by officials in the Department of the 
Treasury and Federal Reserve "Our money" (i.e,, Bank Credit created by the 
Federal Reserve) "is backed by the goods, services and productivity of the 
American people." If this be so, are we not then, in fact, hypothecated to 
the private Federal Reserve Bank Corporation???? 

3. a. In 1938, the Supreme Court ruled that: "There is no federal general 
common law," ( Erie R.R, v. Tompkins , 304 U.3. 64, 1938) thereby overturning 
the Swift v. Tyson decision of 1842 (16 Peters 1, 1842) on this subject. 

Regarding the Erie decision, Henry J. Friendly, Judge, United States 
Court of Appeals, subsequently wrote" 

Since most cases relating to federal matters were in the federal courts 
and involved 'general law', the familiar rule of Swift v. Tyson usually gave 
federal judges all the freedom they required in pre-Erie days and made it 
unnecessary for them to consider a more Esoteric source of power . . . By 
focusing attention on the nature of the right being enforced, Erie caused the 
principle of a specialized federal common law, binding in all courts because of 
its source , to develop within a quarter century into a powerful unifying force. 

’The federal giant*,' ... professor Gilmore has written, is just beginning 
to stir with his long-delayed entrance we are, it may be, at last catching 
sight of the principle character." ( Friendly in Praise of Erie - and the New 
Federal Common Law , 1964, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383)- 

b. In our opinion, the questions to be placed in the public eye from 
this series of facts are these: 

1. What is the Esoteric source of power being exercised by federal 
(and state) judges since the Erie decision in 1938? 

2. What caused the Erie court to overturn the Swift v. Tyson decision 
and rule that there was no longer a general federal common law? 

3* What is the nature of the right being enforced that is binding 
in all courts because of its source (including state courts)? 

4. What is the principle character of the federal giant referred to 
by Judge Friendly? 

c. Our research has disclosed the following: 

1. Proper jurisdiction of any action or claim, particularly as to 
contracts, is determined by the subject matter and nature of the cause. 

2. That BANK CREDIT, notes issued by the United States, evidences 
of debt borrowed into circulation by the United States, limited liability 
actions, HYPOTHECATIONS, and maritime contracts are exclusively within Admiralty/ 
Maritime jurisdiction — WHETHER SO IDENTIFIED OR NOT! 

3 . That Admiralty/Maritime courts have no jurisdiction to hear 
common law issues. 

4. There are no RIGHTS in Admiralty/Karitime, only PRIVILEGES. 

5 . That, today, we have no access to substantive common law rights 
and issues in any court in this land, and extensive research indicates that 
there has been no access to this law since 1938. 

d. From these and other facts, fully supported by documentation, our 
inescapable conclusions are: 

1. Because of the subject matter and nature of the cause (i.e., Rank 
Credit as our currency, perpetual limited liability for payment of debtj and 
hypothecation of all our goods, cervices and productivity to the Federal Reserve 
Bank Corporation) every administrative proceeding and every court proceeding 
in this land is, by definition, exercising Admiralty/Maritime jurisdiction, 
and its Roman Civil Law procedures, upon all citizens of this Republic — thereby 
barring access to their Common Law BIRTHRIGHT. 


- 2 - 


EXHIBIT 3, PAGE 2 


-316- 




2. It is general public knowledge that said perpetual debt/credit 
system is the creation of a private corporation known as the Federal Reserve 
Bank Corporation. We have in our possession documented testimony of Federal 
Reserve Representatives, publications of Federal Reserve Banks, and publications 
of The Federal Reserve Board that the private corporation of the Federal Reserve 
has NO RISK in this venture for profit by way of a maritime contract with the 
United States government. 

3* Pursuant to the general maritime law of nations (The Necessary and 
Positive Law of the Law of Nations), a maritime contract in which the lender, 
or insurance underwriter, has no risk is, by definition, a WAGERING POLICY'. 

4. Pursuant to the general maritime law of nations, a wagering policy 
is ABSOLUTELY FORBIDDEN, and a contract by way of gaming or wagering is VOID 
FROM ITS INCEPTION. 

4. PUBLIC LAW 95-147 : Our specific research and analysis of this Public 
Law, in connection with acts related thereto, compels us to make the following 
allegations in the NAfcE OF GOD AND COUNTRY, AMEN: 

FIRST , The Federal Reserve Bank Corporation is a private, domestic, 
corporation, engaged in the business of Banking, created and organized under 
and pursuant to the Act of the Congress of the United States of 38 Stat. 251, 
ch.6, passed December 23, 1913* and entitled "Federal Reserve Act," and Acts 
amendatory thereof; whose certificate of incorporation, filed on or about 
December 23, 1913, declares its name to be "The Federal Reserve Bank Corporation," 
its place of business at Constitutional Avenue and 21st Street, Washington, D.C., 
20551, and its object is to perform as the Central Bank of the United States. 

SECOND , In violation of law and in abuse of its powers, and in exercise 
of Privileges and Franchises not conferred upon it, The Federal Reserve Bank 
Corporation on or about October 28, 19??, together with other subscribers 
thereto, entered into and became a party to and carried out the following 
agreement, namely: 

a. Public Law 95-147, Stat. 122?, passed October 28, 1977, and entitled 
"To Authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to invest Public moneys, and for 
other purposes," and the Acts amendatory thereof; and incorporates 

b. Public Law 1?1, ch. 339, 59 Stat. 512, passed July 31, 1945, and 
entitled "To provide for the participation of the United States in the Inter¬ 
national Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop¬ 
ment," and the Acts amendatory thereof; and 

c. Public Law 87, ch.6, 48 Stat. 337, passed January 30, 1934, and 
entitled "To protect the currency system of the United States, to provide for 
the better use of the monetary gold stock of the United States, and for other 
purposes," and the Acts amendatory thereof. 

FOURTH . Pursuant to the agreement, the capital stock of the Federal Reserve 
Bank Corporation was transferred to " International Monetary Fund" and in lieu 
thereof Special Drawing Rights certificates were issued by the Board of Governors. 

FIFTH . Pursuant to such agreement such of the parties thereto as were not 
then depositories of Public money became depositories of Public money and fiscal 
agents of the United States in the collection of taxes and other Obligations 
owed the United States, and transferring said Obligations to the Secretary of 
the United States Treasury at Accelerated Premiums in consideration of floating 
money-market interest rates. The greater part in number and value of said rates 
is regulated by said Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund. 

SIXTH . By means of the agreement, and the powers thereby conferred upon 
the Board of Governors of aforesaid International Monetary Fund, the said Board 
monopolizes the Faculty for Exchange of Debt Obligations in the United States, 
and is enabled to control at will the Exchange for Moneys, that ebbs and flows 
in the United States. 


-3- 


-317- 


exhibit 3. PAGE 3 



SEVENTH , In exercise of the powers conferred, by the agreement, the 
Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund controls the action 
of the Federal Reserve Bank Corporation and the other said depositories of 
Public money, parties to the agreement, in the conduct of their business, 
and controls and regulates the Exchange for Moneys and Considerations of 
Debt Obligations in the United States. 

EIGHTH , In the excercise of said powers, the Board of Governors of the 
International Monetary Fund has NARROWED the Commerce and Accelerated the 
Premiums in Consideration of Debt Obligations in the United States. 

NINTH , The agreement constitutes a combination to do an Act injurious 
to trade and commerce, to which The Federal Reserve Bank Corporation is a 
party. 

TENTH, The agreement constitutes a WAGER POLICY in favor of The Federal 
Reserve Bank Corporation and International Monetary Fund. 

ELEVENTH , High contracting parties, instead of protecting Rights, have 
imposed UNNECESSARY restrictions for their own purposes, and for the purposes 
of those wielding the authority of The Federal Reserve Bank Corporation; and 
have interfered capriciously to subvert and deprive all American citizens of 
Rights which are nominally assured to the people; for it is : 

"We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect 
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common 
defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty 
to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution 
for the United States of America." ( Preamble of U.S. Constitution ). 

Mr. Paul, our motives, objectives and energies have been, and still are, 
directed to one purpose; i.e., separating cause from effect and addressing the 
cause. It has long been our opinion that we all have been fighting the effects 
too long, while the disease rages on and on, ad infinitum . 

We renounce not only the despotic form, but the despotic principle as 
well, of being governed, as to our persons and property, by private, mercantile 
interests under the law and jurisdiction of Admiralty/Maritime. Our primary 
objectives are identical to those of our forefathers: 

1. Eliminate Admiralty/faaritime jurisdiction from within the body 
of the counties and restrict said jurisdiction to the ebb and flow of the 
tide (Its proper and ancient boundaries). 

2. Restore the right to allodial land titles to each and every American 

citizen. 

3. Restore access to our Common Law Birthright in the courts. 

Our question resolves itself to this: Will victory on the "real issues" 
that you espouse accomplish items 1 through 3 above? 

Please explain in sufficient detail such that we can determine which side 
you are on, without ambiguity. 

We would be most happy to share the details and results of our education 
and research program on this subject — please advise if you are interested in 
pursuing this matter, and, also, if you are Interested in our assistance in 
so doing. 



Sincerely 



EXHIBIT 3, PAGE 4 


-318- 




RON PAUL 


Congress of the United States 

tumst of TUprtsaitattoes 
Washington, ©.£. 20515 


MUAMC. TEXAS 7T401 


und owner. texas 


coMMrrrts on samum. 

flMAMCt. AHO UMAM AFFAMS 


BOOM 1234 

LONOWONTH HOUSE OFF1C1 UALDM8 
(303} 22B-4M1 


(?I3| SM-0M3 


1» OVSTCT CNfK OWVE 
IAKS JACKSON. TEXAS 77 GM 
|40St 2B7-3M1 


WEEKLY RECORDED MESSAGE: 
HOUSTON; (713) MS-0S40 
LAKE JACKSON; (40*2*7-0202 


October 17, 1984 


Mssrs. George E. Hill 
Verl K. Speer 
Postal Box 1796 
Modesto, CA 95353 

Dear Sirs: 

We would have responded earlier to your letter of September 
21, but you did not put your return address on the letter. It Is 
Impossible to help you when you fall to follow simple, commonsense 
practices like putting your address at the top of your 
correspondence. 

Your 4-page, single-space letter displays an obvious and 
serious concern with the legal Institutions of our Nation, but we 
are not impressed by your attempt to use big words as a substitute 
for legal reasoning. First, in the United States there is no leg al 
distinction-between 'allodial' and 'fee simple* land titles. Of 
course the definition of allodial is more pleasing to one who loves 
liberty — since allodial is the opposite of feudal; but "fee simple 
absolute," which is how U.S. property titles are registered, is the 
same thing as "allodial." You are attempting to make a distinction 
without a difference. Look up the words in Black's Law Dictionary . 

As for the heart of your argument, let me just quote it back 
to you to demonstrate how silly it is: 

e. The above-referenced actions of congress and 
the Federal Reserve effectuated a total HYPOTHECATION of 
property, people and resources to the creator of our 
Public Credit (Bank Credit), The Federal Reserve Bank 
Corporation. 

It has been stated many times by officials in the 
Department of the Treasury and Federal Reserve "Our money" 
(i.e., Bank Credit created by the Federal Reserve) "is 
backed by the goods, services and productivity of the 
American people." If this be so, are we not then, in 
fact, hypothecated to the private Federal Reserve Bank 
Corporation???? 


-319- 


exhibit 4, PAGE 1 


Mssrs. Hill and Speer 
October 17, 1984 


You ask: "If this be so?" The answer, simply, is: No, this 
be not so l You have invented a hypothetical hypothecation that is 
false. You have been fooled by some anonymous Treasury or Federal 
Reserve official, whom you decline to identify. 

No one should fail to notice that your source for the bogus 
quotation is anonymous. If you want to make a legal argument, you 
need to cite either an Act of Congress or a Supreme Court Decision 
that has not been subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court. Your 
logic falls on its face because you rely on, as your major premise, 
a silly generalization — in the form of an anonymous bogus 
quotation — about the "backing" of money, and it is simply a false 
premise. 


Federal Reserve notes are not "backed" by anything — they 
are simply bills-of-credit issued by the U.S. Treasury under the 

authority of JulUiarfl. V ._ Greenman . 110 D.S. 421 (1884). The 

Treasury does not s pend them into circulation, however, as President 
Lincoln did; it lends them under authority of statute (12 D.S.C. 

414) exclusively to the 12 privately owned Federal Reserve District 
Banks — there are 12 separate private corporations, not just one as 
you seem to believe. The F.R. banks then pay interest to the 
Treasury on the bills of credit they have borrowed into circulation, 
but at a "below-market" rate, due to the special monopoly 
privileges, and exemption from all taxes, enacted in 1913. 

It seems to me that one of the "real issues" that should 
concern all of us is the existence of this privileged monopoly over 
currency and banking in the United States. But instead of telling 
people about that real issue, you have invented some theory about 
P.L. 95-147 (October 28, 1977). This is the law that re-legalized 
gold clauses in private contracts, and you claim this law somehow 
gives the Federal Reserve the power to seize an individual's 
property — but you never say how. 

How ? what is the connection between giving private citizens 
back the right to use gold clauses in their private contracts and 
your spectre of John Doe losing his home to a gang of thugs from the 
regional Federal Reserve Bank? Even if you believe "Our money is 
backed ... by the American people,’ how do you conclude that John 
Doe will be the one who will pay, due to some foreclosure? 

Your continual references to Admiralty/Maritime law are a 
useless spinning of wheels. Based on the obvious illogic of your 
arguments so far, I doubt that you even know what Admiralty/Maritime 
law is. You obviously don't like "wagering" (did you have a bad 
time in Las Vegas recently?), but there is nothing in P.L. 95-147 
that has anything to do with Admiralty/Maritime law — nor anything 
with a seven-year statute of limitation. Federal law prohibits any 
financial institution from participating in lotteries (12 D.S.C. 

339), so where do you get this phoney issue from? 


2 - 


EXHIBIT 4, PAGE 2 


320- 




Mssrs. Bill and Speer 
October 17, 1984 


The "real issues" that I referred to in my earlier letter 
are (1) the absence in this country of a legal-tender gold or silver 
coinage; we must persuade Congress to enact legislation to 
re-establish such a coinage, as in B.R. 4226 or B.R. 4332. (2) The 
monopoly privilege of the Federal Reserve over the paper currency 
must be eliminated, and ideally the Treasury should stop printing 
paper currency, since the Constitution prohibits "bills of credit," 
i.e. debt-money, paper "obligations of the United States" such as 
Lincoln greenbacks and Federal Reserve notes. 

If you want to do some genuine legal research, instead of 
the wheel spinning you have done up to now, there are two excellent 
books you should read: 

- Henry Mark Holzer, Government Is Money Monopoly: its source and 
scope and how to fight it (New York: Books in Focus, 1982), 
S19.95; and 

- Edwin Vieira, Jr., Pieces of Eight: the monetary powers and 
disabilities of the united States Constitution, a study in 
Constitutional law (Greenwich: Devin-Adair, 1983), $19.95; 

Both of these authors would like to abolish the Federal 
Reserve instantly, and both are experts in the law — not amateurs. 
Both books can be obtained from 

Laissez Faire Books 
206 Mercer Street 
New York, NY 10012 
212/460-8222 

The Bolzer book is on sale for only $12.95; add $2.25 for shipping 
within the O.S. 



\J Joe Cobb 

Banking Committee 


P.S. Will you reprint this letter 
in your little newspaper, or will 
you be too embarrassed? 


3 - 


-321 - 


EXHIBIT 4, PAGE 3 



George E. Hill & Verl K. Speer 

P.0. Box 1769 

Modesto, GA 95353-1769 

November 5. 198** 


Honorable Ron Paul 

Congress of the United States 

House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

ATTN: Joe Cobb, Assistant to the 

Congressman for Banking Legislation 

RE: Your letter of October 17. 198**, to George E. Hill/Veri K. Speer 

We will attempt to confine our response to issues and concerns without intro¬ 
ducing new "big words." We will also restrain ourselves from emotional outbursts 
and/or the casting of sticks and stones - we are not politicians. 

1. You say: "First, in the United States there is no legal distinction 
between 'allodial' and 'fee simple' land titles. . . but 'fee simple absolute,' 
which is how U.S. property titles are registered, is the same thing as 'allodial.' 

You are attempting to make a distinction without a difference. Look up the words 
in Blacks Law Dictionary ." 

Even though there are better sources to draw from, let's do that: 

ALLODIAL : "Free, not holden of any lord or superior ; owned without obligation 
or vassalage or fealty." 

ALLODIUM 1 "Land held absolutely in ones own right, and not of any lord or superior : 

land not subject to feudal duties or burdens. An estate held by absolute 
ownership, without recognizing any superior to whom any duty is due on 
account thereof." 

FEE SIMPLE ABSOLUTE : "A fee simple absolute is an estate limited absolutely to a 
man and his heirs and assigns forever without limitation or condition." 

At first blush it would appear that you may have a point well taken, but 
before we concede, let's look a little farther and see if there are any legal 
distinctions between "an estate held in absolute ownership without recognizing 
any superior" and "an estate limited absolutely . . . without limitation or con¬ 
dition." 

ESTATE : "The degree, quantity, nature, and extent of interest which a person 

has in real property is usually referred to as an estate , and it varies 
from absolute ownership down to naked possession." 

Thus, pursuant to Black's Law Dictionary , a title of "fee simple absolute" 
can include any interest which one has in lands "from absolute ownership down to 
naked possession" (including an interest beholden to a lord or superior), while 
a purely "allodial" title is specifically limited to absolute ownership having no 
duty to a superior on account thereof. An allodial title is a fee simple absolute 
title, but a fee simple absolute title is not necessarily an allodial title. The 
distinction is more than academic in light of the fact that the Declaration of 
Independence and Revolutionary War that followed absolutely guaranteed citizens of 
these Union of States the right to allodial land titles. 

Thus, our questions and issues relative to this subject remain unanswered, i.e., 
just what are the conditions and circumstances in which land "owners" stand with 


- 1 - 


EXHIBIT 5 


PAGE 1 


-322- 



regard to their property in this country? If you have any doubt we suggest that 
you exercise the' right of an allodial title holder by refusing to pay property 
taxes. We guarantee that evidence of an overlord will quickly manifest itself. 

This fact raises the question of whether the county taxing agency is the overlord 
or are they merely acting as agents for the overlord? Who, or what, is in fact 
the overlord? 

2. You say that* "Federal Reserve notes . . . are simply bills-of-credit issued 
by the U.S. Treasury under the authority of Juilliard v. Greenman . 110 U.S. 421 
(1884)," and subsequently state that* "ideally the Treasury should stop printing 
paper currency, since the Constitution prohibits 'bills of credit." 

We agree that the Constitution prohibits bills of credit, but categorically 
deny the thesis suggested that the Supreme Court has the authority and jurisdiction 
to grant the U.S. Treasury "authority" to print bills of credit in the face of 
this constitutional prohibition. Either the*U.S. Treasury is violating the law 
on a regular basis or there is more to the problem than you have suggested. 

3. You sayi Federal Reserve notes are not 'backed' by anything," but admit they 
are "debt-money, paper ' obligations ' of the United States." 

Our question still remains relative to this subject matter, i.e., what are 
the nature of these obligations of the United States - and to whom are they owed? 

If they are not backed by anything, how can an obligation attach and what is its 
nature? 

4. You says "The Treasury does not spend them (FRN's) into circulation, however, 
as President Lincoln did; it lends them under authority of statute (12 U.S.C. 4l4) 
exclusively to the 12 privately owned Federal Reserve District Banks. . . The 
F.R, banks then pay interest to the Treasury on the bills of credit they have 
borrowed into circulation . . ." 

Please explain the fundamental differences between this scenario and the one 
depicted by the following experts and authorities on this subject matter: 

" Federal Reserve Bank Credit resembles bank credit in general, but 
under the law it has limited and special use - as a source of member 
bank reserve funds. It is Itself a form of money authorized for spe¬ 
cial purposes, convertible into other forms of money, convertible 
therefrom, and readily controllable as to amount. 

Federal Reserve Bank Credit, therefore, as already stated, does not 
consist of funds that the reserve authorities 'get' somewhere in order 
to lend, but constitutes funds they are empowered to create ." 

The Federal Reserve System - its Purposes and Functions , 
published by the Federal Reserve Bosrd in 1939. 

Rep, Louis T. McFidden rose to become president of the First National Bank, 
Canton, Pa. Later he served as Chairman of the Committee on Baijking and Currency 
and fought for fiscal integrity and a return to constitutional government. On 
June 10, 1932, in the midst of the Great Depression, he addressed the House of 
Representatives. His historic speech was included in his testimony later before 
the Rules Committee, in connection with his Herculean efforts to obtain a sweep¬ 
ing investigation of the entire Federal Reserve System, and has been widely 
reprinted since then. The complete text of his prophetic message appears on 
pages 12596-12603 of the Congressional Record . Following are selected excerpts 
from his address: 

"Some people think that the Federal Reserve Banks are United States Government 


- 2 - 


- 325 - 


EXHIBIT 5, PAGE 2 


Institutions. They are not government institutions. They are private credit 
monopolies which prey upon the people of the United States for the ben¬ 
efit of themselves and their foreign customers? 

’’They should not have foisted that kind of currency, namely an asset curr ¬ 
ency, on the United States Government. They should not have made the gov¬ 
ernment liable on the private debts of individuals and corporations and, 
least of all on the private debts of foreigners. 

"The Federal Reserve Notes , therefore, in form have some of the qualities 
of government paper money but, in substance are almost purely asset curr ¬ 
ency possessing a government guaranty against which contingency the govern¬ 
ment has made no provision whatsoever. 

"Every effort has been made by the Federal Reserve Board to conceal its 
power but the truth is the Federal Reserve Board has usurped the Government 
of the United States. 

"Mr, Chairman, when the Federal Reserve Act was passed the people of the 
United States did not perceive that a world system was being set up here 
that the United States was to be lowered to the position of a coolie coun¬ 
try ... and was to supply financial power to an international superstate — 
a superstate controlled by international bankers and international indus¬ 
trialists acting together to enslave the world for their own pleasure." 

So Federal Reserve Notes are almost purely asset currency possessing a 
government guranty (or this was the case in 1932). Once again referring to Black 1 s 
Law Dictionary ; 

ASSETS; The word, . . . has come to signify everything which can be made avail¬ 
able for the payment of debts . . . . and we always use this word when we 
speak of the means which a party has, as compared with his liabilities 
or debts," (Was Mcfhdden sayiny that everything was hypothecated to the F.R.' 1 ) 

The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 contained 27 pages. It was an unclear collect¬ 
ion of rules on credit. A flexible currency was to be obtained by discounting 
sound and elgibile commercial bank paper. 

Amended and amended and the amendments amended — in total or in part — 
reaffirmed and changed again,, the 1966 edition of the Act, mixed with laws on 
banking, contained 6^1 pages of fine print. Many provisions used code numbers 
to refer to amendments or laws, not otherwise identified or explained, and not 
available to us. We sincerely doubt that any congressman can know what it means 
or know whether a new amendment, asked for, is necessary. The entire maze seems 
irrational unless it was created for the purpose of obscurity, secrecy and deception . 

A new edition came out in 1971• The Federal Reserve had become the depository 
and manager of many government agencies. Laws governing the handling of these 
agencies have been placed in appendage. The Federal Reserve Act had been reduced 
to 60 pages by omitting most amendments and replacing them with their numbers. 

On page 30« section 12,3i there are only a few words to the provision" 

"PURCHASE AND SALE OF OBLIGATIONS OF UNITED ST*TES, COUNTIES, ETC." Its amendments 
were given by numbers only. There were twenty=three of these. If the 1966 edition 
was an enigma, this one is a vacuum. Most of the book dealt with organizations, 
duties, penalties and the like — of both the Federal Reserve banks and their 
member banks. Here and there are sentences giving the Board of Governors wide 
latitude, such as the use of their own discretion in forming policies. 

Much of the Act was obsolete for it dealt with the discounting of commercial 
bank paper, (in 1964 Mr. Wright Patman said that the discounting of bark japer 
hadn’t been done in years, that U.S. bonds were used.) The Federal Reserve , 
published by the American Banking Association, Columbia Press, 1974, says that the 
U.S, government debt is sufficient to serve as the basis of our monetary system! 

(And yet, the stated purpose of the original Act was to rediscount commercial 


-3- 


EXHIBIT 5, PAGE 3 


- 324 - 




paper. Nothing was said about government debts and bonds. Just how and why were 
these brought in?) 

Evidently government bonds are used in these manipulations — but how? One 
may read and reread the Act and still not have the slightest idea. It simply does 
not tell. Fortunately there was in Congress a very dedicated man who for some 
45 years pled the people's cause against the bankers. He was the Honorable Wright 
Patman, former Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency. Mr. 
Patman's notes, written over that long period of time, are published asj A Primer 
on Money , August 5» 19&4> and its supplement, Money Facts . September 21, 1964. 

Both are from the Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 
of and printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 

Yet, even from these fine notes, it is difficult for the uninitiated to 
get a compact, definite picture of the Federal Reserve System and its operation. 
The notes are, however, invaluable in a further study. They serve as a veritable 
Rosetta Stone in deciphering, not only the Federal Reserve Act, but the Federal 
Reserve System. The Act, The Federal Reservfe of the bankers and all associated 
literature now begin to take on a meaning, and furnish the missing links. The 
gist and conclusions of the writer's study are as follows* 

"The Federal Reserve is a complete money making machine." It may create, or, 
if it chooses, extinguish billions of dollars in a few seconds. It controls the 
amount of bank credit and money we use. It has gained control and management of 
government financing. Through its manipulations, " The government has been reduced 
to the position of a perpetual borrower at interest from a private monopoly ." 

When, in long-term government borrowing, there is call for "new money," 
the Treasury prepares interest bearing bonds (promises to pay) and sends them to 
the open market. From there they are sent to the Federal Reserve Bank. The Federal 
Reserve has no money to purchase these bonds and needs none. The Federal Reserve 
Bank puts the bonds in its vault and credits the government's account with the 
amount of the bonds. This is done by simply writing a notation of the transaction 
in its ledger and entering the credit upon its computer. The very act of entering 
the credit creates the moneyl 

Such statements have been verified many times. When Mariner Eccles, the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, was testifying before the House Banking 
and Currency Committee, September 30, 1941, Congressman Patman asked* 

"Mr. Eccles, how did you get the money to buy these two billions of govern¬ 
ment bonds? 

Mr. Eccles* "We created it." 

Mr. Patman* "Out of what?" 

Mr. Eccles* "Out of the right to create credit money." 

In the Primer , on page 38» Mr. Patman tells that upon learning that the 
Federal Reserve Banks hold a large amount of cash, he went to two of its regional 
banks. He asked to see their bonds. He was led into vaults and shown great piles 
of government bonds upon which the people are taxed for interest. Mr. Patmen 
then asked to see their cash. The bank officials seemed confused. When Mr. Patmen 
repeated the request, they showed him some ledgers and blank checks. Mr. Patman 
warns us to remember that* 

"The cash, in truth, does not exist and never has existed. What we call 
'cash reserves' are simply bookkeeping credits entered upon the ledgers of the 
Federal Reserve Banks and then passed along through the banking system." 


If, as you say, the U.S. Treasury lends the privately owned Federal Reserve 
District Banks Federal Reserve Notes, which are simply bills-of-credit — and if 
this accurately summarizes the Federal Reserve operation* 

a. Why did the Federal Reserve Board, in 1939* publish the statement 


-4- 


-325- 


exhibit 5, PAGE 4 



that its tank credit constitutes funds they get from no one in order to lend, 
tut constitutes funds they are empowered to create? 

b. How did the Federal Reserve Board usurp the government of the United 
States within 19 years after enactment of the Federal Reserve Act — as testified 
to by Congressman McFadden? 

a. How did the Federal Reserve become a "complete money making machine" and 
how was the government "reduced to the position of a perpetual borrower at 
Interest from a private monopoly," as testified to by Congressman Patman? 

d. What is the true nature of these mutually acknowledged obligations of 
the United States, and to whom are they owed? 

e. What steps has.Congress taken to resolve the plight of the American 
people, as described by Congressmen McFadden and Patman? Please give cites. 

We remind you of the fact that there was no absence in this country of 
legal-tender gold and silver coinage from 3513 to 1932 — the period in which, 
according to Congressman McFadden, the Federal Reserve usurped the government 
of the United States. We also remind you of the fact that there was no absence 
of legal-tender gold coin in Babylon. 

The evil, in our opinion, is the usuary and its compelled acceptance by 
legal-tender acts that has destroyed societies throughout recorded history. 

There is no point in discussing the evil effects of legalized wager policies 
on a national scale (quite distinct from lotteries and/or gambling at Las Vegas), 
or whether Admiralty/frarltime law has, in fact, been imposed on the counties of 
this country (as it was over 200 years ago) until the nature of these mutually 
acknowledged obligations of the United States is properly and adequately ident¬ 
ified. 

This is true because it is well settled that the subject matter and nature 
of the right being enforced is the sole determining factor of proper jurisdiction 
and governing law. 

Our offer to share the details and results of our education and research 
program on this subject still stands. 


P.S. Yes, we will reprint your letter, 
and this response, in our "little 
newspaper." Would you use your 
influence to get them reprinted in 
the major newspapers? 

(verbatim, or course) 


Sincerely 



Geori^E. Hill ~ 


-5- 


EXHIBIT 5, PAGE 5 


- 326 




RON PAUL 

22NO DttTMCT. TIXAS 
COMMITS ON iANWNQ. 

FINANCt AND UHOAN AFFAIRS 

kUMHG HfUU CAN 

SUKOMMTm ON COMUMCH AfFAMC AND 
COMAO* 

DOOM 12)4 

LONGWOKTX HOUSE OfWCt DUILDMG 
(202) 229-4M1 


November 21, 1984 


Mssrs. George E. Bill 

Verl K. Speer 
Postal Box 1796 
Modesto, CA 95353 

Dear Sirs: 

In referece to your letter of November 5, 1984, I am pleased to 
see that you have dropped the irrelevant ranting and raving about 
maritime and admiralty law, as well as all of the hysterics about 
Public Law 95-147 (October 28, 1977), which repealed the unjust 
deprivation of rights of U.S. citizens enacted in 1933 in respect to 
the use of gold-clauses in private contracts. (Your readers may 
notice that your "doomsday" — seven years after P.L. 95-147 — has 
passed without anything happening as a result; the Federal Reserve 
still does not have the power to seize anyone's property.) 

Let me answer the five questions you pose at the end of your 
letter: 

a. The Federal Reserve creates itB own bank credit the same 
way that anybody else creates credit on behalf of another: if 
your neighbor wanted to obtain a bag of chicken feed from the 
local feed & seed store, but bad no cash, you might step 
forward and guarantee his good character to the storekeeper. 

In the process of his obtaining the chicken feed, you have 
created credit in the amount of the value of the chicken feed. 

* If the storekeeper agreed to receive his payment from you, 
and delivered the feed to him explicitly on those terms, 
then you would pay the storekeeper and your friend would 
owe to you the value of the chicken feed. 

* You would be the creditor and he would be the debtor. You 
simply have created the credit out of thin air — just 
like the Federal Reserve monopoly does. The word "credit" 
is the Latin verb "he trusts," and that is all it is: the 
creditor trusts the debtor ("debit" is the Latin verb "he 
owes") . 


- 1 - 


Congress of the Hratd States 

ftonst of ‘Rtp ro a itat to o i 
Washington, ©.£. 20515 


4*4* — DO NNI . sum 220 
MLLMHE. T1XA* 77401 
<71* «— 0*0) 

monmcmDm 
LAM JACKSON, TIXAS T7M4 
(40*| 2S7-MS1 

WEEKLY RECORDED MESSAGE: 
HOUSTON: (713) MS-0S40 
LAM JACKSON NON 2*7-0202 


-327- 


exhibit 6, PAGE 1 



Mssrs. Hill and Speer 
November 21, 1984 


* You should not make the simple mistake that so many 
"economists* make of confusing "money" with "bank 
credit." When they talk about "the M-l money supply," 
that is what they are doing — making a sum of all the 
Federal Reserve Notes (money) and all the bank credit in 
checking accounts, which are not money but are debts owed 
to each depositor who is trusting the bank to make any 
payment he may direct ("pay to the order of" it says on 
your checks). The fact that some people identify this 
bank credit as "checkbook money" no more makes it money 
than calling oil "black gold" makes it a metal. 

b. The Federal Reserve was able to usurp the monetary powers 
of Congress within 19 years by playing upon the theory of 
central banking, which had become an economic dogma in the 
years following the Bank Charter Act of 1844 in England. The 
story is told in two books. The Rationale of Central Banking by 
Vera C. Smith (1936) and Free Banking in Britain by Lawrence H. 
White (1984) . 

* The Federal Reserve consolidated its power in 1933, after 
it first caused the stock market and banking collapse of 
1929-32. It was hailed as the savior because it relaxed 
its torture, just as prisoners of war who are subject to 
brainwashing will come to praise their torturers. 

* The House Joint Resolution 192 of June 5, 1933 (partially 
repealed by your nemesis, P.L. 95-147) made Federal 
Reserve Notes legal tender for the first time, as well as 
prohibiting any payments in gold or the measurement of 
values in weights of gold [48 Stat. 112] . 

c. If you want to understand the evolution of the Federal 
Reserve in the years since its creation, the book to read is 
America's Money Machine by Elgin Groseclose (1980). It was the 
Banking Act of 1935 that made the most sweeping grant of power 
to the Federal Reserve and its new administrators appointed by 
F.D.R. 


d. The "true nature" of obligations of the United States is 
that the government must pay whatever it owes r perrv v. United 
States . 294 U.S. 330 (1935)], but it can choose how to pay. 
Federal Reserve Notes are bills-of-credit that earn interest 
for the U.S. Treasury but do not ever "mature* the way Treasury 
Bills, Notes, and Bonds do, which earn interest for the 
holders, paid by the Treasury. 

* All Federal Reserve Notes are obligations owed to the 

"holder in due course" by the U.S. Treasury. Exactly what 
the government promises to pay, now that there are no more 
Constitutional dollars of 371.25 grains fine silver in 
circulation, is a good question. 


2 - 


EXHIBIT 6, PAGE 2 


-328 




Mssrs. Hill and Speer 
November 21, 1984 


* Because bills-of-credit pay no interest to the holders, 
they are a classic form of rip-off. This is one reason 
the Pounding Fathers tried to prohibit them by striking 
the words "to emit bills of credit" out of the Powers of 
Congress as given in the Articles of Confederation when 
they drafted Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution 
(which is just a revision of the Articles of 
Confederation). 

* In the case of Juilliard v. Greenman . 110 U.S. 421 
(1884) , the Supreme Court simply ignored the arguments 
against bills-of-credit and dredged up an old English 
case. The Case of Mired Monies [Sir John Davies Rep. 18, 

80 Eng. Rep. 507, (Eng. tr. 1762) 48, 2 State Tr. 113 
(1605)], to rationalize this unconstitutional actionl 

e. Congress has done nothing in the past 70 years to resolve 
the plight of the American people, as described by Congressmen 
McFadden, Patman, and Ron Paul. 

* The Supreme Court has done even less, most recently by 
refusing to hear the case of Solyom v. Maryland , docket 
number 82-2016, dismissed October 3, 1982. The arguments 
by Solyom prove that the Federal Reserve is 
unconstitutional, that the money of account of the United 
States is a silver dollar of 371.25 grains fine, and that 
paper money is prohibited. 

* You should read the legal arguments in this court case, 
which have been published in the book by Edwin Vieira, 

Jr., Pieces of Eight: the monetary powers and disabilities 
of. the United State s . Consti-tullon. a study in 
Constitutional law (Greenwich: Devin-Adair, 1983), $19.95, 
which I mentioned in my previous letter. 

Thank you for your kind offer to sell me your book, or papers, 
about the monetary laws, but since you seem not to have studied the 
work by Vieira, I will have to pass. Anyone who is seriously 
interested in the law of the United States as it affects money or 
contracts calling for the payment of money needs to read this study 
by Vieira — or else I doubt they know what they are talking about. 


Sincerely, 



v/ Joe Cobb 

Banking Committee 


JMC/hs 


- 3 - 


-329- 


exhibit 6, PAGE 3 



P.O. Bo* 1796 


Verl K. Speer 
George E. Hill 
Modesto, CA 95353 

January 12, 1985 

Honorable Ron Paul 

Congress of the United States 

House of Representatives 

Room 1234, Longworth House Office Bldg. 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

RE: Your letter of November 21, 1984, to George E. Hill and Verl K. 
Speer. 

Mssrs. Ron Paul 
Joe Cobb 

Dear Sirs: 

This series of correspondence began with the mutually a3ked 
question, "Which side are you on?" We believe it is time to review 
the record to see if we can make a determination in that regard or, if 
not, to at least determine where you appear to be coming from. 

We will attempt to do this while addressing specific statements 
and comments in your letter of November 21, 1984. 

1. You say you were pleased to see that we have dropped the 

"irrevelant ranting and raving" about maritime and admiralty law, as 
well as the "hysterics" about Public Law 95-147. 

First, let us assure you that we have not dropped our 

research and analysis of these subjects. If you had read our 
letter of November 5, 1984, and applied a modicum of 

understanding of the English language—you most likely would have 
percieved the truth of the matter regarding our reason for not 
pursuing these subjects in more detail, at that particular time. 
To put it bluntly, it was because we detected a touch of 

cognitive dissonance and/or paranoia in your prior response 
relating to these subjects. Such being the case, we felt that we 
should fall back to simple basics and see if there is common 
ground for communication. 

As far as "ranting", "raving", "hysterics" and just plain 
being "silly"; these terms are highly charged with emotionalism, 
the use of which is very non-professional and unbecoming of the 
House Banking Committee or its representatives—particularly in 
view of the seriousness of the subject matter involved. 

We leave it to our readers to determine, from the record, 
which correspondents have ranted and raved, bordering on 
hysterics at times. 

2. In paragraph (a), your simple analogy of credit creation and the 
contractual relationships it may create between various parties is 
well taken—as far as it goes. Some additional observations: 


- 1 - 


EXHIBIT 7, PAGE 1 


-330 - 




a. If I step forward and 'guarantee his (sty neighbor's) 
good characater*, I become an insurance underwriter against the 
possibility of default on the part of sty neighbor. 

In the real world of business and banking, I could 
demand security (i.e., a pledge of assets commensurate to the 
value of my risk) and premiums from my neighbor in consideration 
of the guarantee (standard business custom and practice). 

b. If the storekeeper agreed to receive his payment from 
me, I become the creditor to my friend, the debtor, and could 
demand security and interest from my friend in consideration of 
the credit advanced and received (standard business custom and 
practice). 

It is comnon knowledge that standard banking policy is to 
require assets to be pledged as security for credit advanced to 
its debtors. Is it your position that the Federal Reserve, a 
private banking corporation, does not follow standard banking 
policy and practice in this regard? If so, you are in 
disagreement with Congressmen McFadden and Patman, both 
recognized as authorities on the Federal Reserve. 

Also worth noting is the fact that a voluntary recipient of 
private bank credit places himself in the position of an 
hypothecator of goods and a stipulator in Admiralty (Bank of 
Columbia V. Okley, 4 Fad S59), thereby waiving his rights to due 
process of law and subjecting himself to the coercion of the 
contract; and that, as to contracts, the jurisdiction and 
governing law is determined by the subject matter and nature of 
the cause (DeI<ovio V. Bolt, 2 Gall. 398). 

3. We agree that the Federal Reserve usurped the monetary powers of 
Congress (and, thereby, the Government of the U.S., as McFadden 
stated) by playing upon the theory of central banking to gain its 
monopoly. 


Our questions are: What are the rules for playing? What 
are its claims against the United States, and how were they 
acquired? Clearly, the practice of the theory was implemented in 
accordance with some system of law—and under some recoginzed 
jurisdiction at law—In what system of law is this theory 
practiced? In what jurisdiction are the claims settled and the 
contracts enforced? Bow do private individuals become subject to 
this jurisdiction? 

A complete understanding of the evolution of the Federal 
Reserve and its modus operandi is not required to answer the 
above questions, and attempts to divert those interested in 
finding the answers to such irrelevant trivia as the mechanics of 
its operation makes one wonder just where you are coming from. 

It is noted that you have consistently felt compelled to 
remind us Federal Reserve Notes earn interest for the u.S. 
Government (as if that answers our questions concerning the 
nature of the obligations involved, and their effects on our 
system of jurisprudence—specifically going to the jurisdictional 
questions). In your interview—with "The Spotlight", December 3, 
1984, you make the statement "After they (Federal Reserve Notes) 


- 2 - 


- 331- 


exhibit 7, PAGE 2 



are printed, the government lends them to the Federal Reserve. 
Federal Reserve Notes actually earn interest for the U.S. 
Government. The Federal Reserve paid the Treasury about $15 
billion in interest in 1983 on the Federal Reserve Notes it 
borrowed into circulation.* 

If this were true. Hr. Cobb, it doesn't pass the *so what* 
test. Clearly, loans by the U.S. government are not 
"obligations” of the U.S. government (the creditor). However 
this statement is not true, as pointed out by Dr. Martin A. 
Larsen, (a recognized authority and expert on the Federal 
Reserve) in his response to your Spotlight interview. He concur 
with Dr. Larsen's statement on this subject: *When he (Mr. Cobb) 
says that the Federal Reserve notes 'actually earn interest for 
the U.S.Government,' he simply does not know what he is talking 
about. The $15 billion he mentions pertains to the interest 
collected by the Fed from the U.S. Government as interest on 
securities which it holds. These totaled about $152 billion as 
of December 31, 1983. The Open Market Committee has the power to 
buy unlimited quantities of bonds, bills, and notes in the open 
market. It pays for them either by checks drawn against the 
treasury or by printing Federal Reserve notes.... In fiscal 
1983, the Fed collected $15,150,174,988 as interest on these 
securities from the federal government; and then, after paying 
all its expenses, mostly from this source of income, it returned 
to the treasury its surplus of $14,420,631,234. It is time Mr. 
Cobb learned a few of the elementary facts concerning the 
operation of the Fed.* Mr. Cobb, why have you gone to such 
lengths to spread these falsehoods—which can only serve to lead 
away from the "real issues"? 

4. He would add to Dr. Larsen's suggestion that it is also time our 
legislators, and their assistants, learned a few of the elementary 
facts concerning the operation and effects of laws and resolutions 
enacted by Congress. 

The fact, as you say, that "the government must pay whatever 
it owes" neither establishes, nor defines, the "true nature” of 
obligations of the United States. This statement reminds us of 
your in depth analysis of the distinction (or claimed lack 
thereof) between "allodial title" and "Fee simple absolute 
title". 

By the way, now that we have assisted you in the proper use 
of Black's Law Dictionary to distinguish between these two 
elementary, and fundamental terms of law; Hould it be asking too 
much for an intelligent and knowledgable answer to our question 
relating to allodial titles and the "real issues” you espoused? 
Ignorance is no longer a viable excuse for non-response, wouldn't 
you agree. 

Hhy is it so difficult to understand elementary facts and 
principles? 

You go on to acknowledge that Treasury Bills, notes, and 
bonds earn interest for the holders, paid by the treasury; but 
state that Federal Reserve notes are "bills-of-credit" which pay 
no interest to the holders and, because of this, "they are a 
classic form of rip off". 

-3- 


EXHIBIT 7, PAGE 3 


-332- 



Why do you fail to point out that the Fed buys bonds, bills, 
and notes in the open market from its right to create credit, 
granted in the Federal Reserve Act, and does so in unlimited 
quantities at no risk to the Federal Reserve? Why do you fail to 
point out that the Federal Reserve banks have huge vaults filled 
with these bonds, bills and notes—as our mutually acknowledged 
expert, Congressman Wright Patman, described? Why do you fail to 
point out that the paper in those Fed vaults constitute 
obligations of the Dnited States upon which interest is paid to 
the Federal Reserve by the U.S. 'Taxpayers*? 

Why is a request to discuss the nature of these obligations, 
(and others) as it applies to, and is determinate of, the 
jurisdiction at law within which individuals are compelled to 
perform on the contracts—'silly* and "irrevelant*? Why does the 
mention of documentated fact and law proving the relevancy to 
admiralty law constitute 'ranting' and "raving"? why do you 
refuse to acknowledge the fact (or even the possibility) that the 
obligations under discussuion here are maritime in 
nature—flowing from maritime contracts and consummated by 
alleged benefits received? 

5. You say 'The arguments of Salyom prove that the Federal Reserve is 
unconstitutional*, and castigate the Supreme Court for refusing to 
hear the case. 

We suggest the possibility that in refusing to hear the 
case, the Supreme Court displayed a knowledge and understanding 
of the governing law involved that Solyom, and you, have failed 
to comprehend. That, in point of law, the Federal Reserve is not 
unconstitutional (as much as we would like to believe otherwise) 
for the simple reason that the Federal Reserve is operating on 
private contract law within the framework of the "federal" 
constitution—as contradistinguished to the 'National' 
constitution. 

You are aware, of course, that the authors of the 
Constitution established two systems of government within that 
document—very specifically identifying them as "federal" and 
'national*, and distinguishing their natures and purposes? 
Without an understanding of these elementary facts, we venture to 
say that no one is knowledgable enough of the Constitution to 
intelligently determine what is constitutional, and what is not. 

By the way, for your information, the word "federal" has its 
roots in, and is synonymous with, the word “feudal' —meaning, of 
course, an overlord/serf relationship between the parties 
involved in the contract(s). 

We would be happy to send you copies of the 'rantings and 
ravings" of the authors of the Constitution regarding this 
subject upon request. 

6. Once again, your problem with reading comprehension becomes 
apparent in your "Thank you for your kind offer to sell me your book, 
or papers, ...." 


- 4 - 


-333" 


EXHIBIT 7, PAGE 4 



Me will leave it to our readers to see if they can discover 
any suggestion of an offer to sell you anything in the 
correspondence record. The kind offer "to share", however, still 
stands. 

7. In response to your rather gleeful reference to the fact that our 
“ "doomsday" — seven years after P.L. 95-147 — has passed without 
anything happening as a results the Federal Reserve still does not 
have the power to seize anyone's property." 

a. The fact that nothing has happened proves nothing about 
whether the Fed has the power to seize anyone's property. If 
they do have this power, it would be illogical to expect them to 
exercise it as long as there are other avenues more effective, 
and advantagous, to accomplishing the objectives of establishing 
a world-wide, mercantile, superstate—governed by international 
bankers and industrialists, as Congressman McFadden described. 

b. you ignore, for reasons unknown to us, the fact that, in 
our response to your letter of August 30, 1984, that speculation 
and guesswork was inovlved on our part—due to the esoteric 
nature of the subject matter. 

c. While continually attempting to make an issue out of 
admitted speculation and guesswork on one possible aspect of P.L. 
95-147, you have totally ignored our in depth analysis of this 
Public Law—which was neither speculation nor guesswork. This 
analysis systematically showed, from other Public Laws brought 
into play by P.L. 95-147, that, among other things: 

i) The capital stock of the Federal Reserve Bank 
Corporation was transferred to the’International Monetary 
Fund". 

ii) Powers were conferred upon the Board of Governors 
of the IMF which allows the said Board to monopolize the 
Faculty for Exchange of Debt Obligations in the U.S., and to 
control at will the exchange of moneys that ebbs and flows 
in the U.S. 

iii) The agreements implemented by P.L. 95-147 
Constitute a combination to do an Act injurious to trade and 
conmierce, to which the Federal Reserve is a party. 

iv) The agreement constitutes a Hager Policy in 
favor of the Federal Reserve Bank Corporation and the 
International Monetary Fund. 

The conclusions from this analysis are in keeping with the 
objectives of the international merchants—as McFadden described. 

Mr. Cobb, why did you fail to comment on this analysis and 
our conclusions therefrom, but, instead persist in "kicking a 
dead horse", so to speak? In point of law, your silence can be 
construed as assent; and, unless, and until, we hear to the 
contrary that assent is presumed. 

With a world-wide monetary power now in control via the IMF, 
some questions come to mind about the "real issues" you espouse: 

1) Who needs the Federal Reserve any longer? Certainly not 
the international bankers and industrialists. It has served 



EXHIBIT 7 , PAGE 5 


- 334- 




its purpose in the implementation of the worldwide, 
mercantile, superstate—its functions now being consolidated 
in the IMF. 

2) Who needs legal tender laws any longer? Certainly not 
the international bankers and industrialists who are in 
control of all money and currency. 

3) who needs to maintain the monopoly of the Federal 
Reserve any longer? Certainly not the international bankers 
and industrialists who are in control of the IMF monopoly. 

Mr. Cobb, our forefathers rebelled against an "unwarrantable 
jurisdiction" being imposed within the bodies of their 
counties—its effects being a subversion of their individual 
rights. They specifically identified this jurisdiction as the 
"Jurisdiction of Admiralty*. 

Would you say that their documentaries of this admiralty 
jurisdiction constituted "hysterical rantings and ravings”? 

In summary, we have provided documentation as space allowed to 
support our statements of fact and law 4nd our conclusions thereforn. 
You have made many statements, such as “No, this be not so!" with no 
support whatsoever. You have refused to address any issue of key 
significance raised by us, and have resorted to emotionalism and 
attempts at ridicule in the alternative. You have made false and 
misleading statements, even on the subjects you purportedly specialize 
in. 

You have recommended several books for us to read, however, if 
they are the source of your misinformation—we will have to pass. 

Whether wittingly, unwittingly, or half-wittedly, you have 
demonstrated a lack of interest in searching out the truth, and a 
propensity for subverting the truth by erecting barriers to its 
access. 

As long as you persist along such lines you are most definitely, 
not on our side! We are still undecided about Ron Paul. Clearly, he 
is responsible for statements made on his letterhead stationary and 
signed by his assistant. 

Sincerely, 


c.c. Dr. Martin Larson 

Spotlight Publication 

Populist Party 

Justice Times 

Enclosure!s) 2 

Post Script 

- 6 - 



-335- 


EXHIBIT 7, PAGE 6 



P.S. The lateness of this letter was necessitated by our 
desire to furnish you the name and correspondence of at 
least one Treasury Official who may have fooled us. It is 
obvious that this individual has no understanding of what he 
is talking about when he makes such ludicrous statements as 
because they (federal reserve notes) are legal tender 
"federal reserve notes are 'backed 1 by all the goods and 
services in the economy." (See enclosure number 2, page 2, 
paragraph 1). 


Perhaps, Mr. Cobb, you owe a Christian duty to this 
poor deluded individual, to inform him of the "real issues” 
and to caution him against spreading this dangerous and 
untrue dogma lest he be branded as an uninformed, dangerous 
miscreant. We are in the process of obtaining other 
documentation on this issue which we will from time to time 
copy and sen*? to you. 

'a 


We are not deliberately trying to embarass you by 
exposing you to the truth, in re: wagering policies. 

Tontine insurance; law of nations and nature and natures 
GOD; admiralty/maritime jurisdiction; etc.. 


It is very unlikely that the Federal Reserve System of 
the IMF would or could foreclose on all of the land of all 
of the people simultaneously. The class "A" stock holders 
are not lacking in common sense, even though a legal if not 
lawful right exists for doing so. 


It is important in a powerful nation of slaves, to make 
the slaves or semi-slave citizens believe that they are the 
freest of all the people on the face of the whole earth. 


-7- 


EXHIBIT 7, PAGE 7 


-336- 




Dept, of the Treasury 
Office of the General Counsel 
Washington, D.C. 20220 


David C. Chovanak 
2120 Carrigan 
Turlock, Calif. 95380 

March 10, 1984 

Dear Sirs/Madam, 

I am interested in the history of cur U.S. money system. 
I understand there is a law that authorizes the treasury to 
print U.S. Notes up to a limit of 3 - 400 Million dollars. 

My question is (1) What is the law, (2) When there is an 
issue are these notes ordered by the president of that term 
and (3) is the note correctly known by the president's name? 
i.e. - I understand there were notes issued in 1963, so 
would these be called "Kennedy Notes." (4) If notes were 
issued in 1963 could you please tell me what denominated 
amounts were issued (ones, fives tens?) and the total value 
of the issue if any. (5) As our money is usually termed Fed¬ 
eral Reserve Note, what Law visually puts forth an issue of 

» 

United States Notes? Is this a decision of the President or 
a regulation decision within [the] Secretary of the treasury 
discretion. Thank you for answering. 

Sincerely Yours, 

David C. Chovanak 

EXHIBIT 7, 

_337_ ENCLOSURE 1 



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL. 
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220 



MAR 2 S1984 


Dear Mr. Chovanak: 

This is in response to your letter of March 10 in which you 
raised several questions about the money of the United States. 

Federal Reserve notes are legal tender currency (31 U.S.C. 
5102). They are issued by the twelve Federal Reserve Banks 
pursuant to Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (12 
D.S.C. 411). A commercial bank which belongs to the Federal 
Reserve System can obtain Federal Reserve notes from the 
Federal Reserve Bank in its district whenever it wishes, but it 
must pay for them in full, dollar for dollar, by drawing down 
its account with its district Federal Reserve Bank.. 

The Federal Reserve Bank in turn obtains the notes from the 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing in the United States Treasury 
Department. It pays to the Bureau the cost of producing the 
notes. The Federal Reserve notes then become liabilities of 
the twelve Federal Reserve Banks. Because the notes are 
Federal Reserve liabilities, the issuing Bank records both a 
liability and an asset when it receives the notes from the 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing, and therefore does not show 
any earnings as a result of the transaction. 

In addition to being liabilities of the Federal Reserve 
Banks, Federal Reserve notes are obligations of the United 
States Government (12 U.S.C. 411). Congress has specified that 
a Federal Reserve Bank must hold collateral (chiefly gold 
certificates and United States securities) equal in value to 
the Federal Reserve notes which that Bank receives (12 U.S.C. 
412). The purpose of this section, initially enacted in 1913, 
was to provide backing for the note issue. The idea was that 
if the Federal Reserve System were ever dissolved, the United 
States would take over the notes (liabilities) thus meeting the 
requirements of Section 411, but would also take over the 
assets, which would be of equal value. The notes are a first 
lien on all the assets of the Federal Reserve Banks, as well as 
on the collateral specifically held against them (12 U.S.C. 

412). 

Federal Reserve notes are not redeemable in gold or silver 
or in any other commodity. They have not been redeemable since 
1933. Thus, after 1933, a Federal Reserve note did not 
represent a promise to pay gold or anything else, even though 
the term "note" was retained as part of the name of the 
currency. In the sense that they are not redeemable. Federal 
Reserve notes have not been backed by anything since 1933. 


EXHIBIT 7, PAGE 1 OF ENCLOSURE 2 


-338- 




- 2 - 


They are valued not for themselves, but for what they will buy. 
In another sense, because they are a legal tender. Federal 
Reserve notes are ’backed* by all the goods and services in the 
economy. 

There i3 no seigniorage on Federal Reserve notes. The 
commercial banks which receive them from the Federal Reserve 
Banks pay for the notes, dollar for dollar, by drawing down 
their reserve accounts with the Federal Reserve Bank in 
their region. 

The Federal Reserve Banks pay the Bureau of Engraving 
and Printing for the cost of printing the notes. When the 
Federal Reserve Banks receive the notes from the Bureau, 
they record both an asset and a liability, because the notes 
are liabilities of the Federal Reserve System (12 U.S.C. 

412). The Federal Reserve Banks do not derive any profit 
from the transaction. 

Although the notes are recorded as an asset, the Federal 
Reserve Banks do not have the power to spend them. The 
Federal Reserve Banks can use the notes only by providing 
them to commercial banks which are members of the Federal 
Reserve System in exchange for a reduction of the member 
banks' accounts with the System. Cn the other hand, the 
liability must be provided for. As noted above, the Federal 
Reserve Banks are required to hold collateral equal in value 
to the Federal Reserve notes which the Banks receive (12 
U.S.C. 412). 

It cost the Bureau of Engraving and Printing a little 
more than 2 cents to make a Federal Reserve note, whether 
the note is for $1, $5 or $10. 

Both United States notes and Federal Reserve notes are part 
of our national currency and are legal tender; they circulate 
as money in the same way. However, the authority under which 
they are issued derives from different statutes. United States 
notes were authorized by the Legal Tender Act of 1862, while 
Federal Reserve Notes were authorized by the Federal Reserve 
Act of 1913. United States notes are issued directly by the 
United States Treasury and are obligations of the United 
States. Federal Reserve notes are issued by the Federal 
Reserve System and are obligations of both the Federal Reserve 
System and the United States Government. 

United States notes were originally issued during the Civil 
War. The total amount which may be issued is limited to three 
hundred million dollars (31 U.S.C. 5115(b)). While this was a 
significant figure in Civil War days, it is now a very small 
fraction of total currency in circulation in the United States. 
As of March 31, 1982, total U.S. currency in circulation was 
$128,853 -million, of which $305 million were United States 
notes. The United States note is issued only in the $100 

H r 0*1 


EXHIBIT 7, PAGE 2 OF ENCLOSURE 2 


-339" 



-3- 


denomination, although it was issued in smaller denominations 
in the past. 

There has been no increase in the amount of United States 
notes outstanding for many years. Worn out United States notes 
are simply replaced by new ones. There can be no seignorage as 
a result of such a transaction. 

When the United States notes were first issued in the 
1860's, no seignorage was recorded. The notes were recorded 
both as assets and as liabilities, because they were obliga¬ 
tions of the United States government. As a practical matter, 
however, the asset could be spent and the liability was not 
collectible. (The notes did become redeemable in gold in 1879 
and cease being redeemable in gold in 1933, but in any case 
they were not retired during those years or subsequently.) In 
short, as an accountng matter there was no seignorage on United 
States notes, but as a practical matter there was a gain by the 
United States Government. This gain was used to finance the 
Civil War. 

I know of no currency of the United States that is 
designated by the name of the President of the United States in 
office at the time that particular currency is issued. 

I hope that this information is useful to you. 

Sincerely, 

Russell L. Hunk 
Assistant General Counsel 
(International Affairs) 


Mr. David C. Chovanak 
2120 Carrigan 
Turlock, CA 95380 


EXHIBIT 7, PAGE 3 OF ENCLOSURE 2 


-340- 




Post Oftice Box 1776. Lake Jackson, Texas 77566 


February 12, 1985 


Verl K. Speer/ George £. Hill 
P.0. Box 1796 

Modesto, California 95353 
Dear Mr. Speer and Mr. Hill: 

I got your letter of January 12th after it was forwarded 
to me here in Lake Jackson. As you know I am now out of the 
U.S. Congress and do not have the staff to answer in detail 
your very well thought out letter. 

I happen to believe that the disagreements that seem 
to be present certainly are minor compared to the differences 
between individuals like ourselves and those who are promoting 
the Federal Reserve System and Keynesian Economics. 

Thanks for your interest in my activities. 

Sincerely yours, 

Ron Paul, M.D. 

Former Member, 

U.S. House of Representatives 


RP: p 


Publisher of Ron Paul's Freedom Report 


-341- 


EXHIBIT 8 



PROGRAM OUTLINE, “THE COMMON LAW,’’ 
UNIVERSAL LIFE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 

PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 


Law 101 History of the Common Law 

A recent history of the Common Law; its rediscovery 
by the Anglo-Saxon culture; the development of equity. 
Law 102 Fundamental Concepts 
Types of governments; historical development of the 
rise and fall of centralized governments; the revolu¬ 
tion of reason. 

Law 103 Law and Modern Society 

An analysis of political realities and the law, relying 
heavily on French economist Frederick Bastiat and his 
ideas on how the law is perverted to become an instru¬ 
ment of plunder. 

Law 104 The Common-Law Jury System 


An examination of the Common Law jury system. 
Law 105 Rights, Persons and Property 
The nature of property and possession; the jural 
postulate that an individual must control what he has 
acquired under the existing economic order. 

Law 106 Sources and Form of Law 
A review of the sources of law; moral precepts. Com¬ 
mon Law, Bill of Rights, local custom and constitu¬ 
tions. 

Law 107 The Road Back to Justice 

The role of equity, civil law and law merchant in cir¬ 
cumventing Common Law as it is documented in the 
Bill of Rights. 


PRACTICE AND APPLICATION OF COMMON LAW 


Law 201 The Common Law in America 

How to distinguish between public and private law, 
civil and criminal law, administrative and constitu¬ 
tional law; what is law and what is not. 

Law 202 Court Organization 
The dangers of “blended” and chancery courts; court 
requirements for filing actions at Common Law and 
avoiding dismissals. 

Law 203 Jurisdictional Issues 
Jurisdictional dollar requirements in State and Federal 
courts; types of damages; functions and duties of 
judges; detecting unlawful judicial actions and what to 
do about them. 

Law 204 Due Process of Law 

Due process in procedural and substantive rights; trial 


by jury, when and how to demand it; how to avoid be¬ 
ing charged with contempt. 

Law 205 Actions, Moving Papers and Evidence at 
Common Law 

How to enter evidence at Common Law. 

Law 206 Court Rules Mid procedures 

Various types of Common Law actions; class action 
suits; habeas corpus; ex rel suits and quo warranto 
writs. 

Law 207 Proceedings in Criminal and Civil Actions 

Sequence of Events in a court proceeding: Summons, 
arraignment and trial, statute of limitations, jury trial, 
procedural safeguards. In Common Law actions, the 
Filing of the complaint, service, trial date and court 
procedures. 


FORMS, PLEADINGS AND RESEARCH 


Law 301 Legal Research 

How to locate a new library; how to use Black’s Law 
Dictionary : how to find a case citation: how to identify 
Head Notes and Key Notes; using dissent opinions. 
Law 302 Parties to an Action 
Forms, pleadings, and legal research; how to file a 
professional-looking legal document. The reason for 
the action, who may be the parties, when to sue, where 
to file. 

Law 303 Legal Papers and Service 

How to do legal documents: headings, captions and 
styles; the proper designation of exhibits; pleading and 
answering. 


Law 304 Summons and Complaint 

The summons and the complaint: how to file with the 
Court Clerk; service of the summons. 

Law 305 Answer and Pleading Practice 
The pleading and the answer at Common Law; the 
disclaimer and special appearance; Common Law 
writs; special judicial notices. 

Law 306 Court Procedure I 

Adjective law in constitutional courts, pretrial and 

during trial. 

Law 307 Court Procedure II 

Adjective law in constitutional courts, post trial. 


TRIAL PREPARATION AND CONDUCT 


Law 401 Courtroom Strategy I 

The capacity of organized thinking, verbal skills and 
logic. 

Law 402 Courtroom Strategy II 

Non verbal communication, strategy as a conscious 


discipline, Admiralty Law in America, Law Merchant. 
Law 403 Courtroom Strategy III 
Thinking as a conscious skill, the nature of sovereignty. 
Jurisdiction, Admiralty and Law of Nations, the sov¬ 
ereign Common Law, the Declaration of Sovereignty. 


342- 


EXHIBIT 9 








Verl K. Speer was raised on a Kansas 
m and had first hand experience with the 
beginning of the destruction of the true inde¬ 
pendence of the JEFFERSONIAN farmer: 
the beginning of the myth that farm subsidies would free the farmer from con¬ 
trols and manipulations of mercantile interests in the cities and result in long 
term.economic stability; the beginning of an everlasting tune with “benefits” as 
its theme that has, in fact, piped all recipients of these so-called “benefits” 
directly on board the City/Ship Babylon and placed these beneficiaries under 
the absolute control and jurisdiction of the Merchants of the earth - the Beast of 
Babylon. 


About The 
Author 


In 1961, he received his Bachelor’s degree in physics from the University of 
Wichita and in 1968 received his Master’s degree in Systems Management, the 
science that put men on the moon, from the University of Southern California. 
From 1968 through 1979 he was employed by TRW on contract with the United 
States Air Force as a Systems Engineer and Technical Director in the test and 
development of various Minuteman III missile subsystems. 

This education and training in the analysis and understanding of interacting 
components and subsystems caused him to use this approach in probing into a 
system of legality and its various subsystems, which affect every aspect of our 
lives. Much of this “legal” system, he has discovered, is not based on law but is, 
in fact, operating in direct violation of law. The author has deeply involved him¬ 
self in research and writing on various topics of law for the past eight years and 
has co-authored a correspondence program for the Universal Life University 
School of Law entitled “THE COMMON LAW,” He received his Doctor of 
Common Law degree from the University in 1984. 

“Pied Pipers of Babylon” .is a systems approach to an understanding of the 
present day plight of the Natural Born Individual and his recourse at Law to 
regain and maintain the Birthright to be his own governor. 

Keeping in mind the maxim that THE IMPORTANCE IS THE MESSAGE 
AND NOT THE MESSENGER - It is the deep and sincere hope of the author 
that the message will serve as a catalyst for “spiritual” revival of knowledge, 
understanding and practice for the Law. He means by SPIRITUAL that we 
start with the spirit of man and work through the laws of God and Nature - the 
first systems approach to harmonizing our lives, thoughts and actions with an 
orderly Universe.