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nited Nations

Review

GROSVENOR

DEC 13 1960

December 1960 Volume 7

The News in Review
DISARMAMENT: THE MAJOR PROBLEM
PREPARING FOR PLEBISCITES IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN CAMEROONS
UNITED NATIONS SOCIAL WoRK
ASSEMBLY ADOPTS PLAN FOR DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD SURPLUSES
COMMITTEE ACTS ON OBLIGATION OF
NATIONS TO REPORT ON DEPENDENCIES
SECOND PROGRESS REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FROM
HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THE CONGO
SUMMARY CHRONOLOGY OF
UNITED NATIONS ACTION RELATING TO THE CONGO
CALL FOR CONTINUED HUMANITARIAN AID FOR REFUGEES
ELEVENTH GENERAL CONFERENCE OF UNESCO OPENS IN PARIS
AUSTRIA AND ITALY URGED TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON
BOLZANO (Bozen) MINORITY
SUMMARY OF THE GENERAL DEBATE — Part II
Australia, 55; Bolivia, 54; Burma, 67; Byelorussian SSR, 57; Cameroun,
75; Ceylon, 73; Chile, 71; China, 63; Congo (Brazzaville), 61; Costa
Rica, 78; Cyprus, 79; El Salvador, 78; Federation of Malaya, 66;
Ghana’s reply, 62; Guinea, 64; Haiti, 71; India (second statement),
79; Indonesia’s reply, 53; Iraq, 58, and reply (77); Ireland, 59; Israel,
68, and replies (70); Jordan’s reply, 70; Laos, 74; Lebanon’s reply,
70; Liberia’s reply, 77; Mali, 72; Morocco, 51; Netherlands, 52, and
reply (53); New Zealand, 49; Norway, 60, and reply (77); Philip-
pines, 56; Portugal, 62; Saudi Arabia’s reply, 69; Spain, 49; Sudan,
54; Sweden, 73, and reply (77); Tunisia, 66; Union of South Africa,

76; United Arab Republic’s reply, 69; Yemen, 64.
PROPOSAL FOR EXPERT GRouP TO StuDY EFFECTS OF DISARMAMENT
United Nations Digest
International Meetings

aa ~

nited Nations

Number 6

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13
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PUBLISHED BY UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

Review

Above: The International Court of Justice
in session at The Hague. Elections to fill six
vacancies on the Court were held in the
Security Council and General Assembly last
month. (See page 3.)

Front cover: Distribution of milk to school
children, as part of general aid in food
supply, is carried out under the United
Nations Civilian Operations in the Congo.
(See page 2.)

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The News in Revieuo

Assembly Agenda

The number of items on the agenda
of the current General Assembly ses-
sidn was raised from 88 to 90 when,
on October 31, the Assembly approved
without objection the recommendation
of the General Committee that two
additional items be included. These
were the question of Oman, submit-
ted by 10 Arab member states (Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, ‘Morocco,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United
Arab Republic and Yemen); and the
item submitted by Cuba _ entitled
“Complaint by the Revolutionary Gov-
ernment of Cuba regarding the various
plans of aggression and acts of inter-
vention being executed by the Gov-
ernment of the United States of Amer-
ica against the Republic of Cuba,
constituting a manifest violation of its
territorial integrity, sovereignty and
independence, and a clear threat to in-
ternational peace and security.”

The item relating to Oman was
referred to the Special Political Com-
mittee. After discussion, the Assem-
bly, on November 1, by a roll-call vote
of 53 to 11, with 27 abstentions, ap-
proved the recommendation of the
General Committee that the Cuban
item be referred to the First (Political)
Committee. A Cuban amendment to
have the item considered in plenary
meeting was rejected by a roll-call
vote of 29 to 45, with 18 abstentions.

Congo Report

The second progress report to the
Secretary-General by his Special Rep-
resentative in the Congo, Ambassador
Rajeshwar Dayal, of India, was issued
at United Nations Headquarters on
November 2 (see page 24 for text).
The report covers what it described
as “significant developments” during
the period September 21—the date of
the Special Representative’s first report
—to the end of October.

The report, especially in regard to
its references to Belgium, was sharply
criticized by Pierre Wigny, Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Speaking
at a press conference which he held
at United Nations Headquarters on
November 14, Mr. Wigny said that
in his opinion it was not “a report”

UNR—December 1960

but an “indictment.” Referring to the
report’s account of current United Na-
tions activities in the Congo, he said:
“If it is a report, then it is a report
of a failure.”

With regard to references to Belgian

technicians and specialists in the
Congo, Mr. Wigny said these now
totalled some 2,100. They had been
called back by the Congolese authori-
ties and were there in their capacity
as private citizens, not as government
servants, he said.

The Belgian Foreign Minister held
that the foundations of the Congo
were “solid” and that they had not
been taken away “by the recent
shocks.” He added: “For our part, we
had no desire to take part in the inter-
nal political life of the Congo because
we know it would be useless after inde-
pendence, and it would do no good.
We are always prepared to give the
Congo the assistance it needs.”

Mr. Wigny said he did not favor
“liquidation of the United Nations
action in the Congo.” Belgium agreed
on the need for “collaboration” of
some sort with the United Nations on
the matter, but he said “the present
terms are absolutely unacceptable.”

Conciliation Commission

Composition of the Conciliation Com-
mission for the Congo, appointed by
the Advisory Committee for the
Congo, was announced on November
17, as follows:

Ato Andom Mellesse (Ethiopia),
Mohamed Sopiee (Federation of Ma-
laya), Nana Kobina Ketsia (Ghana),
Keita Fodeba (Guinea), Shri Ramesh-
war Roa (India), Major-General Ab-
dul Kadir (Indonesia), George Sher-
man (Liberia), Demba Diallo (Mali),
Ahmed Snoussi (Morocco), Jaja A.
Wachuku (Nigeria), Agha Shahi (Pak-
istan), Alioune Cisse (Senegal), Fadl
Obeid (Sudan), Taieb Sahbani (Tu-
nisia), and Dr. Mohamed Hassan El
Zayet (United Arab Republic.)

The Advisory Committee for the
Congo, which was appointed by the
Secretary-General, consists of the 15
countries represented in the Concilia-
tion Commission plus Canada, Ireland
and Sweden.

The Conciliation Commission held
its first meeting on November 17 and
unanimously elected Jaja A. Wachuku,
Minister of Economic Development of
the Federation of Nigeria, as Chair-
man. Mohamed Sopiee was elected
Vice-Chairman, and Ato Andom Mel-
lesse Rapporteur. The Commission
had decided to assemble in Leopold-
ville on Saturday, November 26, but
its departure was deferred.

Congo Delegation Seated

After a debate which continued through
eight plenary meetings, the General
Assembly on November 22 adopted a
recommendation by its Credentials
Committee that the credentials of the
representatives of the Republic of the
Congo (Leopoldville) issued by the
Head of State and communicated by
him to the President of the General
Assembly in a letter dated November
8, 1960, be accepted. The decision was
arrived at by a roll-call vote of 53 to
24, with 19 abstentions. The Head of
State referred to in the resolution is
President Joseph Kasavubu.

The question of seating the delega-
tion had been before the Assembly
since September .20. On that date the
Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville)
was admitted to membership of the
United Nations, but, in view of the
unclear constitutional and political sit-
uation in the Republic, the Assem-
bly was faced with difficulty in imple-
menting that decision and, on the pro-
posal of the President, referred the
question to the Credentials Committee.

The Committee debated the problem
through three meetings, on November
9 and 10, and finally recommended
that the Assembly take the action
which it in fact took on November 22.
The proposal for such a decision was
made in the Credentials Committee by
the United States, and after the repre-
sentatives of Morocco and the United
Arab Republic had stated that they
could not participate in the vote, the
United States draft resolution was
adopted by a vote of six to one, with
no abstentions. The Credentials Com-
mittee is composed of the following
members: Costa Rica, Haiti, Morocco,
New Zealand, the Philippines, Spain,

the USSR, the United Arab Republic
and the United States.

Congo Civilian Operations

A progress report on United Nations
Civilian Operations in the Congo from
their inception in mid-July to the end
of October, issued by the United Na-
tions mission in Leopoldville, reviews
the background of economic problems
before the Republic of the Congo
(Leopoldville) became independent;
describes needs that arose in the early
days of independence; and summarizes
Operations carried out through the
United Nations Civilian Operations,
headed by Dr. Sture C. Linner, of
Sweden.

An introduction comments that, in
a quarter of a year, “an integrated ad-
visory and expert team, now number-
ing 170 members, was brought in
from six continents and placed within
a framework of 11 major fields of
United Nations assistance.” The oper-
ations, it states, “developed with a
speed and scope unprecedented in
United Nations history.”

The report describes aid in agri-
culture and food supply; communica-
tions; education; finance and eco-
nomics; foreign trade; health; judica-
ture; labor; military instruction; nat-
ural resources; public administration;
and social affairs. It cites “tangible
progress” in activities such as the ini-
tiation of the first public works proj-
ects, the administration of United
Nations-prepared foreign exchange
and import-export regulations, the
maintenance of stopgap hospital serv-
ices by Red Cross teams, maintenance
of telecommunications, air traffic con-
trol and meteorological services, oper-
ation of basic rail and water transport
facilities, and the organization of train-
ing courses. A full summary of the
report will be published in the next
issue of UNITED NATIONS REVIEW.

Ambush

A patrol of 11 Irish soldiers serving
with the United Nations Force in the
Congo was ambushed on November 8
in the Niemba area of North Katanga.
The bodies of five of the patrol were
found, and an intensive search later
succeeded in locating two survivors
and the bodies of three others. The
eleventh soldier was still missing and
presumed dead.

Ambassador Frederick H. Boland of
Ireland, President of the General As-
sembly, cabled his profound condo-
lences to Major-General Sean Mac-
Eoin, Chief of Staff of the Irish De-
fence Forces, Dublin. The memory of
the men lost in the ambush, he cabled,
“will be honored everywhere as men

who gave their lives in a noble and
unselfish cause.”

Service for Colonel McCarthy

A funeral service for Colonel Justin
McCarthy, of Ireland, Deputy Chief
of Staff of the United Nations Force
in the Congo, who was killed in an
automobile accident in Leopoldville
on October 28, was held at the Church
of Ste. Marie, in the African quarter
of the city two days later.

Among those who attended the
solemn requiem mass was Ambassador
Rajeshwar Dayal, the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General. The
coffin, drapped with United Nations
and Irish flags, was met at Leopold-
ville station by an honor guard of
the Congolese National Army when
the casket was entrained for Matadi,
en route to Ireland for interment.

Treatment of Radiation

Thirty of the world’s leading spe-
cialists in the diagnosis and treatment
of radiation injury reached general
agreement on basic therapy for such
injuries at a week-long meeting re-
cently held in Geneva under the joint
auspices of the World Health Or-
ganization and the _ International
Atomic Energy Agency. The spe-
cialists at the meeting came from
France, the United Kingdom, India,
the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, the
United States and Yugoslavia. They
agreed that although future radiation
accidents would differ from those ex-
perienced so far, certain essential fea-
tures in diagnosis and treatment of
acute radiation would remain un-
altered.

IDA Ready for Business

A new affiliate of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, known as the International De-
velopment Association (IDA), which
has been organized to finance eco-
nomic growth in the less developed
countries, is now ready for business.
Ipa officially began business on No-
vember 8, when the inaugural meeting
of its Executive Directors was held.

The Directors sanctioned an adminis-
trative budget, approved the agency’s
by-laws and seal and authorized Iba
to engage in financial transactions
necessary to its operations. Under the
new agency’s articles, Eugene R.
Black, as President of the World
Bank, is ex-officio President of Iba
and Chairman of Ipa Executive Direc-
tors. Officers and staff of the World
Bank have been appointed to serve
concurrently as officers and staff of Iba
without additional compensation.

Membership of Ipa is open to any
member of the World Bank. To date,
22 countries have accepted member-
ship, and others in Africa, Asia, Europe
and Latin America have completed
various stages of membership pro-
cedure.

Locust Control

The first training course under a
United Nations Special Fund project
for prevention and control of the
desert locust in Africa and southwest
Asia opened in Rabat, Morocco, on
November 12 and will run for eight
weeks with 36 students participating.
The course was organized by the
Food and Agriculture Organization,
executing agency for the $3.8 million
project which, over a period of six
years, will seek to formulate plans
and adopt techniques for the pre-
vention and control of the desert
locust which, from north Africa
through the Middle East to Pakistan
and India, threatens the crops of coun-
tries and territories containing ap-
proximately one eighth of the world’s
population. Twenty-one countries are
participating in the project, to which
they will contribute the equivalent of
$1,378,850, with the Special Fund
contributing $2,492,700.

United Nations Finances

The serious and “crucial question of
the financial status of the United Na-
tions” was emphasized by Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjold in a state-
ment he made to the General Assem-
bly’s Fifth Committee on November
21. He summed up the present finan-
cial outlook as being “that the Organi-
zation will commence the financial
year 1961 with a virtually empty treas-
ury; with arrears of assessed contribu-
tions totalling approximately $31 mil-
lion ($8.5 million regular budget and
$22.5 million on the UNEF budget);
and, at the same time, the necessity
of financing normal budgetary dis-
bursements amounting to some $5 mil-
lion a month, UNEF expenditures of
about $1.5 million a month and sub-
stantially larger monthly requirements
for the United Nations Force in the
Congo (perhaps of the order of $10

UNR—December 1960

million monthly for such period as
the Force and its supporting services
must be maintained at their present
strength) .”

On the financing of the Congo op-
eration, which Mr. Hammarskjold re-
called had been considered vitally nec-
essary both by the Security Council
and the General Assembly, he pointed
out that unanimity had prevailed re-
garding the political decisions giving
rise to these expenditures, but there
had been “considerable hesitation”
when it came to the question of volun-
tary contributions and of assessments
of the budget.

“The Organization cannot have it
both ways,” commented Mr. Hammar-
skjold. “It must either pursue its
policy, as represented by the presence
of the Force in the Congo, and make
appropriate and speedy arrangements
for covering the cost, or it must take
the initial steps for a liquidation of the
military operation and the reversal of
the policy which this would mean.
This choice must be squarely faced,
and faced at such time as to avoid
that financial considerations cast a
shadow of uncertainty over the politi-
cal steps.”

Estimates quoted in the Assembly,
said Mr. Hammarskjold, had put the
current cost of armaments at $320
million a day, and he added: “It may
be felt by members that the cost of
peace is high, but indeed what is it
in comparison to the cost for the
preparation of war—not to speak of
war itself?”

What he had said about the United
Nations Force in the Congo applied
equally to United Nations civilian ac-
tivities in the Congo, he continued.
These were now limited to the most
urgent emergency operations, but the
needs were vastly more extensive.
“Every vacuum needs to be filled. If
no steps are taken by the United Na-
tions to fill, under its flag, the vacuum
that exists today in the Congo, it will
inexorably be filled in other ways as
pressures become irresistible,” he
stated.

Election of Judges

In separate but simultaneous ballotting,
the Security Council and the General
Assembly elected five new judges of
the International Court of Justice to
fill vacancies which will occur in the
Court on February 5, 1961, and one
judge to fill a vacancy caused by the
death of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, of
the United Kingdom. The elections
were held on November 16 and 17.

The five elected to fill rotation va-
cancies were Philip C. Jessup (United
States), Viadimir M. Koretsky (USSR),
Kotaro Tanaka (Japan), José Luis
Bustamante y Rivero (Peru) and

UNR—December 1960

Gaetano Morelli (Italy). These judges
will replace the following, who have
completed their nine-year term of
office: Helge Klaestad (Norway), Sir
Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan),
Green H. Hackworth (United States),
Enrique C. Armand-Ugon (Uruguay)
and Feodor I. Kojevnikov (USSR).

Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (United
Kingdom) was elected to fill the
vacancy caused by the death of Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht, whose term runs
until February 5, 1964.

Sea Pollution

The Maritime Safety Committee of the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consul-
tative Organization (tMco) has de-
cided that a revision of the Interna-
tional Convention for the Prevention
of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil is
necessary and that a conference for
this purpose should be held in 1962.

UN Building in Chile

The United Nations has announced
the winners in a contest to select plans
for the building in Santiago, Chile, to
house the Economic Commission for
Latin America and other United Na-
tions bodies. From 40 entries in the
contest, the plans submitted jointly
by Emilio Duhart, Roberto Goyco-
chea, Christian de Groote and Oscar
Santelices were judged the best. Con-
struction of the new building on a site
donated by the Government of Chile
is expected to begin in May 1961.

Addis Ababa Seminar

The first human rights seminar to be
organized by the United Nations on
the continent of Africa will open in
Addis Ababa on December 12. It is
one of a series being held in different
regions of the world under the pro-
gram of advisory services in human
rights established by the General As-
sembly in 1955. The subject of the
Addis Ababa seminar will be the par-

ticipation of women in public life,
and it will be attended by women lead-
ers from countries and territories in
Africa. The Government of Ethiopia
is acting as host to the meeting, which
will be held in the Haile Selassie I
Theatre in Addis Ababa.

These seminars bring together key
people for an exchange of ideas and
experience in solving, or attempting to
solve, human rights problems. The
first was held in Bangkok in June
1957, and the second at Bogota in
May 1959.

In addition to participants, alter-
nates and observers nominated by gov-
ernments, the seminar will be attend-
ed by observers from a number of
specialized agencies and from non-
governmental organizations in con-
sultative status with the Economic and
Social Council whose purposes and
programs are closely concerned with
the status of women.

South West Africa

The Union of South Africa on No-
vember 14 announced that it would
not participate in the debate on the
mandated territory of South West
Africa in the Assembly’s Fourth
(Trusteeship) Committee. Eric H.
Louw, South Africa’s Foreign Minister,
told the Committee that “it would not
be proper” for the Committee to con-
sider the South West Africa question
while the issue was before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. Mr. Louw
noted that Liberia and Ethiopia on
November 4 had filed with the Inter-
national Court an application for an
interpretation on certain matters con-
nected with South West Africa. In
view of that development, he urged
that the Committee should not discuss
the item which, he said, “deals with
matters pending before the Interna-
tional Court and which are thus sub
judice”; but his motion for adjourn-
ment was rejected by 67 votes to 1
(South Africa), with 11 abstentions.
After the vote, Mr. Louw informed

This picture, taken during the visit of the Swedish princesses to the United

Nations, shows (l. to r.): Osten Unden, Foreign Minister of Sweden, Princess
Birgitta, Mrs. Agda Rossel, Sweden’s permanent representative to the UN,
Princess Desirée, and the Secretary-General.

the Committee that his delegation
could not be a party to discussion of
the question while it was before the
Court.

The Committee, which on Novem-
ber 11 completed action on various
issues concerning non-self-governing
territories (see page 19), then began
consideration of the report of the
Committee on South West Africa. It
also heard statements by a number of
petitioners concerning conditions in
the territory.

Elections in Ruanda-Urundi

United Nations observers have been
invited by Belgium to witness prepar-
ations for the legislative elections due
to be held in Ruanda-Urundi about
mid-January 1961. An announcement
to this effect was made in the General
Assembly’s Fourth (Trusteeship) Com-
mittee on November 17 by the Chair-
man, Adnan Pachachi, of Iraq. The
elections, under United Nations super-
vision, are for the purpose of con-
stituting national assemblies for Ru-
anda and Urundi, the two states which
comprise the East African trust ter-
ritory under Belgium’s administration.
At its session last June the Trusteeship
Council welcomed Belgium’s statement
that after the elections it intended to
hold a meeting with representatives
of both Ruanda and Urundi to discuss
further constitutional plans leading to
ultimate independence for the ter-
ritory.

Economic Study of Libya

Ways in which Libya can promote eco-
nomic advancement through develop-
ment of agriculture, livestock raising
and tourism, as well as through the ex-
ploitation of its recently discovered
oil resources, are recommended in the
report of a mission to that country by
the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development.

The report points out that while
the discovery of oil holds out long-term
prospects of establishing a prosperous
economy, the petroleum industry is
unlikely to provide employment and
wages for more than a small fraction
of the Libyan people. Libya’s princi-
pal natural resources are agricultural
and production from the land can be
greatly increased—with better educa-
tion and training, good administration
and an adequate supply of capital.

Libya’s attractions for tourists in-
clude a sunny climate, a long Mediter-
ranean coastline with numerous sandy
beaches and monuments ranging from
Greek and Roman antiquities through
Islamic architecture to the battlefields
of the Second World War.

Other recommendations in the re-
port refer to the development of an
industrial structure “consisting mainly

of small units,” handicrafts expansion
and promotion, fisheries, electric
power, transport and communications
and health and community services.

Highways in Mexico

A loan by the Bank equivalent to $25
million will assist in the development
of Mexico’s highway network by fi-
nancing the foreign exchange cost of
building or improving 13 roads with
a total length of approximately 2,000
miles in central and southern Mexico.
The roads are among the most impor-
tant in a five-year program being
undertaken by the Government of
Mexico to develop the Federal High-
way System.

Surinam Mineral Survey

An agreement providing for a $1.5
million detailed geophysical survey of
the mineral resources of Surinam has
been signed by representatives of the
International Bank and the Govern-
ment of Surinam. Surinam, on the
northeastern coast of South America,
is one of the constituent parts of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands. The
project is one approved earlier by the
United Nations Special Fund, which
has allocated $770,000 to the cost of
the survey to be carried out over the
next two to three years. The remainder
of the cost will be borne by the Gov-
ernment of Surinam.

UNEF Troop Rotation

Rotation of Indian troops serving with
the United Nations Emergency Force
in the Gaza Strip began on November
9 with the arrival at Suez of a con-
tingent of the fourth battalion of the
Rajput Regiment to replace the fourth
battalion of the Kumaon Regiment,
which left the Strip on November 13
after a year’s service there.

The eighth Yugoslav contingent,
which has served with UNEF in the
Gaza Strip for six months, has also
been replaced by Yugoslavia’s ninth
contingent.

New UNESCO Official

Dr. Vittorino Veronese, Director-
General of the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organi-
zation, has announced that on Jan-
uary 1 next year Pavel Ivanovitch
Erchov, of the USSR, will take up his
appointment as Assistant Director-
General of UNEsco. Mr. Erchov, who
was born in 1914 and completed his
studies at the Pedagogical Institute of
Leningrad in 1939, was named
Minister Plenipotentiary to Israel in
1948. He served in that capacity until
1953, when he became Assistant Chief
of the European Section of the Sovict
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From

1955 to 1957 he was Soviet Ambas-
sador to Switzerland.

IMCO Membership Increase

The Ivory Coast, Senegal, Iceland and
New Zealand have become members
of the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization. Their ad-
mission at the beginning of November
brought membership of this specialized
agency to a total of 43. Imco formal-
ly came into existence in 1959, with
headquarters in London.

African States Join WHO

Eight African states have been ad-
mitted to membership of the World
Health Organization, bringing the
membership of this specialized agency
to 99. The eight new members are the
Central African Republic and the Re-
publics of Dahomey, the Upper Volta,
the Niger, Mali, the Congo (Brazza-
ville), the Ivory Coast and Chad.
With the exception of Dahomey, all
were formerly associate members of
the agency. Cyprus, Gabon and
Nigeria, also associate members, will
become full members upon deposit of
their instruments of ratification. The
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land and Sierra Leone are also asso-
ciate members of WHO.

Loan To India

If India’s targets for employment and
production under the government’s
third five-year plan are to be achieved
during the 1961-1966 period, a rapid
rate of expansion of private industry
must be maintained during the current
five-year plan. To facilitate this, the
International Bank has granted a loan
of $20 million to the Industrial Credit
and Investment Corporation of India,
Limited. Ictct is a privately owned and
managed development bank, and the
corporation has previously received
two earlier loans, each of $10 mil-
lion. These and the present loan will
be used to meet foreign exchange re-
quirements of projects which the corp-
oration is financing. The current loan
by the International Bank is for a term
of ten years.

Atomic Energy

The sixth” mission to be sent out to
member nations by the International
Atomic Energy Agency to study on a
preliminary basis the possibility of
atomic energy developments has
visited Latin America. Following ten
days of consultation in Mexico City
at the end of October, the mission
visited El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru
and Paraguay. The experts studied pos-
sibilities of starting programs on the
peaceful uses of atomic energy and
gathered information to assist govern-
ments in assessing requirements in

UNR—December 1960

formulating requests for Agency as-
sistance. It also advised on atomic
plans and programs, with special refer-
ence to the use of radioisotopes in
agriculture and medicine, the training
of specialists, nuclear research and
power and mining nuclear raw ma-
terials.

Friends Donate

Members of the Society of Friends in
many parts of the United States have
taxed themselves voluntarily and have
given the proceeds to the United Na-
tions. In mid-November a group of
40 Quakers presented checks totalling
$16,000 to further United Nations
technical assistance programs in Afri-
ca. Colin Bell, a member of the
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, Meeting of
Friends, who made the presentation,
said that the present contributions rep-
resented merely a first installment of
anonymous Quaker donations given as
a “manifestation of their positive role
in favor of peace.” William McCaw,
United Nations Deputy Controller,
told the group that during the previous
two months the United Nations had
received additional donations amount-
ing to about $15,000 from meetings
and individual members of the Society
of Friends in many parts of the United
States.

Food Surpluses

The General Assembly resolution on
the distribution of food surpluses (see
page 14) was hailed as a “challenge
and opportunity” by B. R. Sen, Di-
rector-General of the Food and Agri-
culture Organization. “There can be
no doubt,” he said, “that the resolu-
tion reflects the great change in out-
look that international developments
have brought about. There seems to be
much clearer appreciation today than
ever before of the contribution that the
United Nations system can make in
strengthening cooperation by govern-
ments to assist in economic develop-
ment of underdeveloped countries. I
feel happy that the resolution estab-
lishes such an explicit link with the
Objectives of the Freedom-from-
Hunger Campaign.”

Funds to Fight Malaria

The World Health Organization’s
Malaria Eradication Special Account
has fallen short by about $5 million
for 1961. The wHo Executive Board
decided to recommend to the next
World Health Assembly that some
part of the cost of the malaria eradica-
tion program be financed by the or-
ganization’s regular budget, which is
based on assessments of all wHO mem-
ber states. It was emphasized that
there was no intention of abandoning

UNR—December 1960

the Malaria Eradication Special Ac-
count, which was established by the
World Health Assembly as an interna-
tional repository of funds for anti-
malaria work. WHO has appealed to
governments, industry and private
sources for voluntary donations to this
fund. The most recent contribution,
$4,257.50, came from the Govern-
ment of the Federation of Malaya.

New UNRWA Training Centre

A new vocational training centre for
Palestine refugees, built by the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency at
Wadi Seer, near Amman, Jordan, was
formally opened by King Hussein of
Jordan on United Nations Day, Octo-
ber 24.

The centre, which has 232 youths
in residence, is part of UNRWA’s pro-
posed expanded vocational training
program, designed to increase the
number of graduates from this and
similar centres.

In inaugurating the Wadi Seer cen-
tre, King Hussein paid tribute to
UNRWA for alleviating “the human
misery and pain suffered by the refu-
gees” and commended the Director’s
proposals to the General Assembly
for expanding the training program.

PRIME MINISTER OF MALAYA

Among the distinguished visitors to the
United Nations last month was the
Prime Minister of the Federation of
Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Dur-
ing his visit, the Prime Minister met
with the members of the Asian-African
group and is shown above being greet-
ed by Ambassador Nong Kimny of
Cambodia, Chairman of that group for
November.

Secretariat Organization

Three past Presidents of the General
Assembly were invited by the Secre-
tary-General to consultations with him
on questions related to the organiza-
tion of the work of the Secretariat at
the Under-Secretary level. Convening
at United Nations Headquarters on
November 25 for a three-day session
of consultation were: Lester B. Pear-
son, of Canada, President of the sev-
enth Assembly session; Prince Wan

Waithayakon, of Thailand, President
of the eleventh session; and Dr. Victor
Andrés Belatiinde, of Peru, President
of the fourteenth session.

In asking the three past Presidents
for their advice, the Secretary-General
called attention to the introduction to
his annual report of August 31, 1960,
in which he stated that there is, gen-
erally speaking, within the Secretariat
not enough of a diplomatic tradition
or staff with training in political and
diplomatic field activities to meet the
needs which have developed over the
years.

He indicated also that the group
might like to give thought to various
ideas which have been expressed by
various delegates in the general de-
bate, with special emphasis on the
question as to how those ideas could
be developed in a way that would cor-
respond to the explicit terms of the
Charter by increasing the efficiency of
the Organization, and also reflecting
the changes in the geographical basis
of the membership of the United Na-
tions. The conclusions reached on the
basis of these consultations will be
embodied in a report which the
Secretary-General will submit to the
Committee established by the Gen-
eral Assembly to study the organiza-
tion and activities of the Secretariat.

Technical Assistance

When the proposed expanded program
of technical assistance for 1961-62
came before the Technical Assistance
Committee of the Economic and So-
cial Council on November 23, David
Owen, Executive Chairman of the
Technical Assistance Board, reported
that indications were that about half
the governments participating would
increase their voluntary contributions
in 1961. Mr. Owen was speaking be-
fore the opening meeting of the Com-
mittee, which was to review the larg-
est program of technical aid to under-
developed nations ever proposed under
the expanded program. During . the
two-year period the recommendation
was for aid to 119 less-developed
countries amounting to $84.5 million
compared with an overall program of
$34.3 in 1960 and $35.8 million in
1959. Voluntary contributions in sup-
port of the 1961 program were esti-
mated in the TAB report at $41.8 mil-
lion, or about $7.8 million more than
1960 contributions. The most signifi-
cant development in the proposed pro-
gram, said Mr. Owen, related to the
program for Africa, where the per-
centage share had risen from 8.9 in
1956 to 15.9 in 1960 and to about 29
per cent in 1961-62. But, he stressed,
while the African region would get
more, no other region would get less
because of the African program.

The Major Problem:

DISARMAMENT

Twelve Draft Resolutions Before Furst Committee

T its fourteenth regular session, the

General Assembly declared in a
resolution unanimously adopted that
“the question of general and complete
disarmament is the most important
one facing the world today.” And, at
the opening of the current fifteenth
session, speaker after speaker in the
general debate emphasized the added
urgency and importance of disarma-
ment as the major problem confront-
ing the United Nations.

This general consensus was reflected
in the decision of the Assembly’s First
(Political) Committee to give priority
in its work to consideration of the four
agenda items relating to disarmament
which had been referred to it.

These four items were: the main
item on disarmament and the situation
with regard to the fulfilment of the
Assembly’s 1959 resolution on the
problem, the report of the Disarma-
ment Commission, and the items relat-
ing to the suspension of nuclear and
thermonuclear tests and the prevention
of the wider dissemination of nuclear
weapons.

Committee consideration of these
items began on October 19 and, in the
course of 25 meetings held between
that date and November 17, 65 de-
legations — some of them on more
than one occasion — spoke in the gen-
eral debate or in connection with the
various draft proposals submitted. As
this issue of the Review went to press,
the debate had not been concluded,
and no decision had been reached on
any of the draft resolutions before the
Committee.

As of November 23, there were 12
separate proposals under considera-
tion. Two of these—among several
which had been circulated even before
the Committee began its work—re-
presented the positions of the Soviet

Union and the Western powers on the
main question, that of general and
complete disarmament. One was sub-
mitted by the USSR; the other jointly
by Italy, the United Kingdom and the
United States.

There was a short break in the dis-
cussions between November 8 and 14,
during which, it was indicated, efforts
were continued outside the Committee
to draft a compromise draft resolution,
more or less on agreed lines, which
would lead to the resumption of the
disarmament negotiations. This was
sponsored jointly by 12 members—
Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana,
India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco,
Nepal, the United Arab Republic,
Venezuela and Yugoslavia, described
by one of them as “small uncom-
mitted states which have no axe to
grind”—and was introduced by the
representative of India on November
15. The sponsors indicated that they
recognized that no attempt should be
made to press to the vote any draft
resolution that was not acceptable to
the big powers concerned and that the
United Nations could take action on
major issues only if the United States
and the Soviet Union were in agree-
ment.

Below will be found a summary of
the 12 draft proposals that were before
the First Committee by November 23,
with a brief indication of their purpose
as outlined by the delegations which
sponsored them.

Soviet Draft Resolution

The USSR draft resolution set forth
six principles on the basis of which
the Assembly would recommend that
a treaty on general and complete dis-
armament be drawn up and concluded
as quickly as possible.

The first five of these principles

were:

general and complete disarmament
must include the disbanding of all
armed forces, the destruction of all
armaments, the cessation of war pro-
duction, the liquidation of all foreign
bases in the territory of other states,
the prohibition of nuclear, chemical,
bacteriological and rocket weapons,
the cessation of the manufacture of
such weapons, the destruction of stock-
piles of such weapons and of all means
of delivering them, the abolition of
agencies and institutions intended for
the organization of military affairs in
states, the prohibition of military train-
ing and the discontinuance of the ex-
penditure of funds for military pur-
poses;

such disarmament must be carried
out in an agreed sequence, by stages
and within a specified period;

the disarmament measures relating
to nuclear weapons and conventional
armaments are to be so balanced that
no one state or group of states can
obtain a military advantage, with se-
curity ensured for all in equal meas-
ure;

the measures provided for in the
program of general and complete dis-
armament are to be carried out from
beginning to end under international
control, the scope of which is to cor-
respond to the scope and nature of
the disarmament measures imple-
mented at each stage; an international
control organization to carry out con-
trol over and inspection of disarma-
ment is to be established under the
United Nations, with all states partici-
pating;

under conditions of general and
complete disarmament, necessaty
measures are to be adopted, in ac-
cordance with the Charter, for main-
taining international peace and se-
curity, including an undertaking by

UNR—December 1960

[— ~_— FF. ewe

states to make available to the Security
Council, where necessary,-units—from
their_contingents of police (militia)
retained for maintaining internal order
and ensuring the personal security of
citizens.
_ As the sixth principle the Soviet
{draft resolution included a provision
regarding a change in the structure of
the Secretariat and of the Security
Council. Under it, the Assembly would
recognize that, in order to create con-
fidence in the correct use of interna-
\tional armed forces of police (militia)
and to preclude the possibility of their
use in the interests of a particular state
or group of states, “it is necessary to
change the structure of the United
Nations Secretariat and of the Security
Council so that all three groups of
\states—the socialist countries, the
countries members of the Western
powers’ blocs, and the neutralist coun-
tries—may be represented in those
organs on a basis of equality.”

The Assembly would also transmit
to the Disarmament Committee for
examination the proposals of the So-
viet Government concerning “Basic
Provisions of a Treaty on General and
Complete Disarmament,” submitted by
Chairman Khrushchev to the Assem-
bly on September 23, and other pro-
posals on the question with a view
to drafting such a treaty, including a
system of international control and in-
spection which must ensure strict com-
pliance with the treaty.

In the preamble of the Soviet pro-
posal, the Assembly would state that,
“in conditions in which modern weap-
ons are of infinite destructive power
and range, the continuing arms race
is fraught with tremendous danger for
the peoples of all countries”; and that,
“in the face of the danger of nuclear-
rocket war, the problem of general
and complete disarmament is the most
important question of our time and
requires immediate solution.”

The Assembly would also reaffirm
its 1959 resolution on general and
complete disarmament and would note
with regret that that resolution had
not been carried out and that appro-
priate measures to put it into effect
had not yet been taken.

The Assembly then would again call
on governments to make every effort
to achieve a constructive solution of
the problem and recommend that a
treaty should be drawn up and con-
cluded as quickly as possible on the

basis of the principles set forth.
Valerian Zorin, of the USSR, re-
ferred to the proposals submitted to
the Assembly during the general de-
bate by Chairman Khrushchev as
“Basic Provisions of a Treaty on Gen-
eral and Complete Disarmament” and
said that those proposals were drawn

UNR—December 1960

up with due account taken of the
views expressed by various states and
of world public opinion in the year
since the fourteenth session of the
Assembly.

Thus all states should carry out
gradually, in three consecutive stages
during an agreed period of time, the
complete and final elimination of all
their armed forces and armaments,
under strict and effective international
control, Mr. Zorin said.

The program had not been sub-
mitted on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, to
be adopted or rejected in toto, but to
be thoroughly discussed while making
use of everything helpful that might
be proposed during the discussion.

If, as a result of the work of the
First Committee, members could agree
on the basic provisions of a treaty,
that would be a great step forward in
the solution of the most important
question of the time, Mr. Zorin re-
marked. If, as a minimum, they could
agree on specific instructions for the
subsequent work of the Disarmament
Committee, that alone would be a job
well done. A draft of such instructions
was provided by the Soviet draft res-
olution, which Chairman Khrushchev
had also submitted.

As soon as all the basic principles
had been approved by the Assembly,
negotiations to work out the draft
treaty could be continued in the Dis-
armament Committee which, under
another draft resolution (see page 84),
the Soviet Union was proposing should
be broadened to include five members
in addition to the members of the
existing Ten-Nation Committee on
Disarmament.

“At an appropriate stage of the
negotiations,” Mr. Zorin added, “it
will be necessary to work out a de-
tailed program of measures on dis-
armament for each stage of general
and complete disarmament, together
with the corresponding measures of
control; and for this purpose appro-
priate specialists should be invited.
However, there is a time for every-
thing.”

He reiterated Chairman Khru-
shchev’s warning of October 13 that if
the Western powers again deflected
matters from the working out of a
treaty on general and complete dis-
armament and if they again used the
negotiations to deceive the peoples,
the Soviet delegation would not par-
ticipate in the discussion either in the
First Committee or in a more re-
stricted negotiating body.

Three-Power Proposal

The draft resolution sponsored by
Italy, the United Kingdom and the
United States set forth six achieve-
ments which the Assembly would con-

clude must be the final goal of a pro-
gram of general and complete dis-
armament under effective international
control, as well as six principles which
it would recommend should guide any
disarmament negotiations.

The following were listed as what
must be achieved:

reduction of all national armed
forces and armaments to levels re-
quired for internal security and for
the provision of agreed contingents’ to
an international peace force within the
United Nations;

elimination of delivery systems of
all weapons of mass destruction;

elimination of all weapons of mass
destruction — nuclear, chemical and
bacteriological;

the use of outer space for peaceful
purposes only;

the establishment of effective means
for verification of the observance of
disarmament obligations and for the
maintenance of peace;

the achievement of a secure, free
and open world, in which all peoples
are protected from the dangers of
surprise attack or the outbreak of war
by miscalculation.

The six principles which, under the
draft resolution, the Assembly would
recommend as guidance for disarma-
ment negotiations were:

disarmament should be carried out
progressively, with measures to be
completed as rapidly as possible with-
in specified periods of time;

transition from one stage to the next
is to be initiated when the measures
in the preceding stage have been satis-
factorily implemented, provided that
effective verification is continuing and
that any additional verification ar-
rangements required for measures in
the next stage have been agreed to
and are ready to operate effectively;

nuclear and conventional measures
of disarmament must be so balanced
that no country or group of countries
will obtain, at any stage, a significant
military advantage and that equal se-
curity for all will be maintained and
thus international confidence progres-
sively increased;

compliance with all disarmament
obligations must be effectively verified
throughout by an international dis-
armament organization within the
framework of the United Nations to
ensure that compliance with those ob-
ligations is verified from their entry
into force; such verification should in-
clude the capability to ascertain not
only that reductions of armed forces
and armaments in agreed amounts
take place, but also that retained
armed forces and armaments do not
exceed agreed levels at any stage;

provisions in respect of international
control and verification are to form an

integral part of any agreement on dis-
armament;

general and complete disarmament
must begin with those measures which
are capable of early implementation
under effective international control
and are compatible with the third
principle requiring a balance in the
nuclear and conventional measures of
disarmament.

Finally, under the three-power pro-
posal, the Assembly would urge that
negotiations be resumed as soon as
possible on the basis outlined.

As in the Soviet draft resolution,
the Assembly would, in the preamble,
reaffirm its resolution of the four-
teenth session on general and com-
plete disarmament. It would note with
regret that negotiations on disarma-
ment had not yielded the expected
positive results, and would recognize
that general and complete disarma-
ment requires the maintenance of in-
ternational law and order in a dis-
armed world by strengthened interna-
tional peace-keeping machinery with-
in the United Nations. It would re-
affirm its hope that measures leading
toward the goal of general and com-
plete disarmament under effective in-
ternational control will be worked out
in detail and agreed upon in the short-
est possible time.

James J. Wadsworth, of the United
States, expressed his delegation’s hope
that the debate in the First Committee
would lead to an early resumption of
disarmament negotiations among the
powers principally concerned and
would help to give the negotiators the
necessary guidance. The only effective
approach to balanced and verified dis-
armament was through patient and
probably prolonged negotiation, he
emphasized. The joint draft resolu-
tion sponsored by Italy, the United
Kingdom and the United States was
designed to lead to general and com-
plete disarmament under international
control.

Mr. Wadsworth commented that the
First Committee was an important
deliberative forum which commanded
great respect, and he added, “We will
not walk out of this Committee under
any circumstances, and we will not be
intimidated by any threats on the part
of any other delegation to do so.”

He then set forth the basic prin-
ciples of disarmament to which the
United States adhered and to which,
he said, the joint draft resolution
sought to give expression.

That proposal and the USSR draft
resolution shared many similarities, he
stated, but differed in many important
respects. The essential question was
which was more likely to bring about
the goal of full and balanced disarma-

ment.

The Soviet proposal, he asserted,
was intended to forestall rather than
promote real disarmament. Aside from
other deficiencies, it put two funda-
mental obstacles in the way of real
disarmament negotiations. First, it in-
sisted on a reorganization of the Sec-
retariat and of the Security Council,
intended solely to break down the
administrative machinery of the
United Nations and further to cripple
its primary organ for preserving peace
and security. Such steps would critical-
ly impair the ability of the United
Nations to prevent or deter an aggres-
sion in an armed world, a partially
disarmed world or a completely dis-
armed world.

Second, it insisted that progress to-
ward disarmament had to be made
only through a single treaty in which
all disarmament measures were to be
laid out for all time. Negotiation of
such a treaty, Mr. Wadsworth ob-
served, would be a process so long and
arduous as to delay for many months,
and perhaps years, the immediate and
concrete steps that should be taken
right away. The realistic approach
would be to isolate and identify those
areas, whether broad or limited, in
which agreement and action now could
clearly serve the interests of both sides
and lead toward the goal on which all
had agreed. He mentioned in this re-
gard nuclear disarmament, outer
space, surprise attack and reductions
in conventional armaments and armed
forces, and in delivery systems for
weapons of mass destruction, prog-
ress in any one of which would not
have to await agreement on a full
treaty for complete and general dis-
armament.

David Ormsby-Gore, of the United
Kingdom, commented that many
points in the Soviet draft resolution
paralleled those in the three-power
proposal and that perhaps it might be
possible to reconcile the existing
points of difference. Examining what
he regarded as the main differences,
he said that the phrase “shall cor-
respond to the scope and nature of
the disarmament measures” in the So-
viet draft resolution was obscure and
appeared to indicate reluctance to ac-
cept complete and effective verifica-
tion and control; the proposed Soviet
measures for maintaining peace in a
disarmed world seemed subject to
paralysis and hence wholly inadequate;
the Soviet Union had unfortunately
introduced into its draft resolution
proposals for the reorganization of the
United Nations Secretariat which were
unacceptable to a large majority of
the member states; and the Soviet
draft made no mention of four im-
portant points dealt with in the three-
power draft, that is, the use of outer

space for peaceful purposes only, the
need to promote greater confidence
between states by proceeding with
measures which could be implemented
at an early date, procedures govera-
ing the transition from one stage of
disarmament to the next, and the prin-
ciple that provisions on control should
form an integral part of any disarma-
ment agreement.

12-Power Draft Resolution

The third draft resolution on gen-
eral and complete disarmament was
sponsored jointly by Burma, Cam-
bodia, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indo-

nesia, Iraq, Morocco, Nepal, the
United Arab Republic, Venezuela and
Yugoslavia.

In the preamble, the Assembly
would recall its 1959 resolution on
the same subject, the Disarmament
Commission’s resolution of August 18
and its own appeal of October 17 in
the interests of peace and progress—
all unanimously adopted—and would
then state:

the definitive purpose of general and
complete disarmament is that war
should no longer be possible or be an
instrument for settling international
disputes;

implementation of any or all phases
and steps of disarmament requires the
simultaneous establishment and opera-
tion of effective machinery for their
inspection and control, and no state
should obtain a military advantage
over other states at any phase or step
of disarmament;

negotiations have not yielded agree-
ments which would bring general and
complete disarmament within measur-
able distance but stand deadlocked;

delays and deadlocks constitute a
serious threat to prospects of real dis-
armament and of a world without
war;

retention of the present levels of
armaments and, even more, the con-
tinuing increase of them and the adop-
tion of newer and more weapons make
the achievement of general and com-
plete disarmament not only impera-
tive but urgent;

the United Nations has a continu-
ing responsibility for bringing about
general and complete disarmament.

In the operative part of the draft
resolution, the Assembly then would
set forth five directives which it would
declare should form the basis for an
agreement on general and complete
disarmament. The directive on what
such disarmament should consist of
was in seven parts. The first three di-
rectives were:

& general and complete disarmament
‘should result in a world in which the
method of war for the solution of in-

UNR—December 1960

5 eS OT RD SS OSS

ternational problems and the con-
tinued existence of all the instruments
and machinery of war should stand
eliminated;
—~ no phase or step adopted should
“enable any state or group of states to
acquire military superiority over an-
other;
. in respect of each phase and step
“there must be established, by agree-
ment, effective machinery of inspec-
tion and control for its operation and
maintenance;
» The fourth directive was that gen-
Yeral and complete disarmament should
consist of:

1. the elimination of armed forces
and armaments and of armament pro-
duction,

2. the total prohibitio the man-
ufacture, maintenance and use of nu-
clear and thermonuclear weapons and
of bacteriological and chemical weap-
ons of war,

3. the elimination of all existing es-
tablishments and training institutions
for military_purposes,

4. the elimination of all equipment
and facilities for the delivery, the
placement and the operation of all
weapons of mass destruction within
national territories and of all foreign
military bases and launching sites of
all categories,

_S. the maintenance by each_mem-
ber state of necessary security units
and training establishments, arms and

) their production as are agreed fo be
necessary exclusively for the purposes
of internal security and of acing at
the disposal of the United Nations for

( thé maintenance of international peace
and security, in accordance with the
Charter,

\. dergo such agreed changes for the im-

plementation of the proposed resolu-
tion and for the maintenance of peace
in a disarmed world which would ex-
clude the possibility of the interna-
tional police force being used for any
purpose inconsistent with the Charter
including such use in the interests of
one state or group of states against
another state or group of states,

7. the exclusive use of outer space
and all developmental efforts in re-
gard to it for peaceful purposes.

Z The fifth directive was:

a treaty on general and complete
disarmament embodying the terms and
provisions set out in the first four
directives is to include the time-limits
and schedules for the implementation
of each successive step and phase of
general and complete disarmament,
and the completion of each stage is to
be followed by the implementation of
the next stage.

Further, under the 12-power draft
resolution, the Assembly would urge

UNR—December 1960

that negotiations should be resumed
for the purpose of the earliest con-
clusion of an agreement on general
and complete disarmament under ef-
fective international control and tak-
ing into account the provisions of the
draft resolution itself.

It would add that the possibility of
putting into effect either agreed or
unilateral measures which would create
more favorable conditions for general
and complete disarmament and which
would help the fulfilment of the di-
rectives would not be precluded.

The Assembly would also urge that,
pending the establishment of agreed
machinery for their prevention, all
countries should refrain from all forms
of surprise attacks and preparations
for the same.

It would remind all countries of the
October 17 resolution in the interests
of peace and progress and request
them to refrain from actions likely to
aggravate international tensions, and
would appeal to them to give their full
cooperation for the fulfilment of the
purposes of the 12-power proposal.

This 12-power draft was not sub-
mitted until late in the First Com-
mittee’s discussion—on November 15.
It was the result of patient talking to
everyone concerned, explained V. K.
Krishna Menon, of India.

The sponsors had hoped that they
might have been able to ask for
priority for their proposal and to see
it adopted at least without a dissent-
ing voice, if not unanimously. But
regrettably that was not the case, Mr.
Krishna Menon said. The suspicion
that existed on both sides, the con-
text in which the Assembly session
had taken place, and other circum-
stances had contributed, and the spon-
sors had had a great deal of searching
of mind and heart as to whether it was
the right course to follow.

But there was the basic fact that
the United States, on the one hand,
and the Soviet Union, on the other,
were both anxious to bring about dis-
armament and to establish peace in the
world. There was also their recog-
nition that no longer could that be
done in the old way of trying to bal-
ance reductions, which would no long-
er provide security, but that they must
proceed all together for the total eli-
mination of war, and that whatever
phases had to come into it were part
of the general unfolding of total dis-
armament. Thus the members should
look to a world where war would be-
come impossible, not for sentimental
or pacifist reasons, but purely for prac-
tical reasons.

In submitting their draft resolution,
Mr. Krishna Menon said, the spon-
sors were grateful to the representa-
tives on both sides who had given

them a patient hearing, had examined
various details and difficulties, had
made suggestions and had tried so far
as possible to widen the areas of
agreement. In fact, he said, such areas
of agreement were far wider than any
that had been reached before.

The draft resolution also tried to
place the onus on the General Assem-
bly to take the responsibility of telling
the people concerned what they were
to do—of giving them directives. This
was necessary in view of the deadlock
and the inescapable fact that the world
had to abandon war and resolve its
disputes, if any continued, by other
methods.

Mr. Krishna Menon declared that
the purpose of the draft resolution was
to create a basis where the principles
would be so wide as to accommodate
different points of view and to contain
nothing which would preclude any
reasonable, legitimate or desirable at-
tempt that could be made. It would
preclude the idea that something small
could be pleaded as an obstacle to the
main objective. The sponsors hoped
that the Assembly would throw its
weight behind the world attitude that
one side or the other could not expect
its own viewpoint to prevail and,
equally, that it would be recognized
that the Assembly was bending over
backwards so that decisions might be
agreed upon between the two sides.

The Indian delegation had repeated-
ly stated in the First Committee that
attempts to pass resolutions by mobil-
izing votes would not achieve disarm-
ament. The fact that India was an
uncommitted nation, suffering as much
as others from the effects of the arms
race, and the reception which a num-
ber of representatives had given to the
broad outlines of the proposed text,
had encouraged the Indian delegation
to co-sponsor it. The Indian delega-
tion was confident that, once the dire
alternatives to disarmament were real-
ized, the Assembly would be able to
bring about a further improvement in
the situation in a comparatively short
time. The sponsors were not seeking a
majority decision, which would merely
add further confusion to the problem;
they hoped unanimous support would
be possible. No resolution or decision
of the Assembly on disarmament
would ultimately have any effect un-
less it was adopted with the consent of
those primarily concerned.

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons:
10-Power Draft
A draft resolution on the prohibi-
tion of the use of nuclear and thermo-
nuclear weapons was sponsored by
Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria,
(Continued on page 82)

Future of West African Trust Territory

Preparing for Plebiscites

in Northern and Southern Cameroons

R. DJALAL ABDOH, United Nations
Commissioner for supervising
plebiscites to be held in the British
Cameroons on the future of that West
Afri¢an trust territory, arrived in
Buea, capital of Southern Cameroons,
in mid-October to take up the task of
supervising for the United Nations the
organization and conduct of the plebis-
cites scheduled for February 11, 1961,
in the northern and southern sections
of the United Nations trust territory
administered by the United Kingdom.
The holding of the plebiscites was
recommended by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1959 in order to
determine the freely expressed wishes
of the population of the two sections
of the territory as to their political
future. The United Kingdom, as ad-
ministering authority of the trust terri-
tory, is responsible for the actual
carrying out of the plebiscites.
Ambassador Abdoh, a former for-
eign minister of Iran, for many years
was Iran’s permanent representative to
the United Nations, and one time was

Chairman of the Assembly’s Political
Committee. He was elected by the
Assembly in March 1959 to serve as
United Nations Commissioner for su-
pervising the plebiscites and to report
to the United Nations on the conduct
and results of the operation.

Two Questions To Be Asked

The General Assembly recommend-
ed that, in the plebiscites, the two
questions to be put to the people of
both the northern and southern sec-
tions of British Cameroons should be:

1. Do you wish to achieve inde-
pendence by joining the independent
Federation of Nigeria?

2. Do you wish to achieve in-
dependence by joining the independent
Republic of Cameroun? [That repub-
lic was formerly the United Nations
trust territory of the Cameroons ad-
ministered by France.]

The Federation of Nigeria became
independent on October 1 and the

Wrapping banana stems at Tiko in the Southern Cameroons. Bananas, one of
the main exports, are shipped to the United Kingdom from Tiko and Victoria.

Republic of Cameroun became inde-
pendent on January 1 this year. British
Cameroons lies between these two
newly independent states.

Ambassador Abdoh is assisted by
35 international staff members, rep-
resenting 21 nationalities appointed by
United Nations Secretary-General Dag
Hammarskjold in consultation with
Dr. Abdoh. His official headquarters
for the plebiscites are located at Buea,
and he will also have an office in
Mubi, seat of the Northern Came-
roons administration.

A former German colony, the British
Cameroons has been administered by
the United Kingdom since World War
I, first as a League of Nations man-
date and later as a United Nations
trust territory. The territory has an
area of 34,081 square miles and a
population of about 1,600,000, divided
fairly evenly between north and south.

Registration of Voters

Registration of voters for the plebis-
cites, the first phase of the operation,
was scheduled to begin in Northern
Cameroons on October 17 and in
Southern Cameroons on October 26.
After publication of a preliminary
voters’ list, there followed a period
allowed for submission of claims be-
fore publication of the final lists. Poll-
ing day, for both Northern and
Southern Cameroons, is February 11.

The arrangements for the plebis-
cites, as directed by the General As-
sembly,”are being carried out during
the period from October 1960 to
March 1961, the dry season.

Nineteen United Nations observers,
whose task is to assist the Commis-
sioner in supervising the various stages
of the plebiscite operation, were in
their assigned stations when registra-
tion began.

Events Leading to Plebiscites

The background of events leading
to the decision to hold the plebiscites

UNR—December 1960

Djalal Abdoh of Iran, Plebiscite Com-
missioner for the British Cameroons.

in the northern and southern sections
of British Cameroons is briefly as
follows.

From 1922 until October 1, 1960,

the United Kingdom administered the
' trust territory—both the northern and
' southern sections—as integral parts of
, Nigeria, formerly a British colony and
' protectorate.
4 Until October 1, Northern Came-
roons was administered as part of the
Northern Region of the Federation of
Nigeria, sharing in the system of
government of that region. Southern
Cameroons was a region within the
Federation of Nigeria, with its own
legislature. Since October 1, the two
parts of the trust territory have been
administered directly by the United
Kingdom.

In 1958, the United Kingdom, in
the expectation that Nigeria soon
would become independent, raised in
the United Nations the question of
the future of the trust territory. It
stated that the inhabitants of British
Cameroons would not be obliged to
remain part of an independent Nigeria
if that was contrary to their wishes,
and that before Nigeria became in-
dependent the people of Northern and
Southern Cameroons would have to
say freely what their wishes were as
to their own future.

— _—_ wr me we TET

ee en

, = oe

g Visiting Mission’s Report
0 That same year, the United Nations
Trusteeship Council, which supervises
s, the administration of trust territories
$- under the authority of the General
~] Assembly, sent a visiting mission to
nD the Cameroons to study the question.
4 The mission reported in brief that
the future of British Cameroons had
become a question of urgency in view
of the fact that both its neighbors—
Nigeria and the former French Came-
roons—were soon to attain independ-
ence.

UNR—December 1960

It pointed out that each of these
neighbors had indicated its desire to
have British Cameroons join it, if that
should be the wish of the population
of the trust territory.

The mission emphasized that for all
practical purposes the two sections of
British Cameroons—north and south
—should be regarded as having sepa-
rate and different existence.

From the Trusteeship Council, the
matter went before the General As-
sembly which, at a special resumed
thirteenth session, recommended in
March 1959 that separate plebiscites
be held in the northern and southern
sections of British Cameroons to as-
certain the wishes of the population
regarding their future.

The plebiscite in Northern Came-
roons was scheduled to take place in
November of that year, and the one

in Southern Cameroons between De-
cember 1959 and April 1960.

Southern Cameroons

In respect to Southern Cameroons,
however, the Assembly was not able
to reach a decision at that time on the
questions to be asked in the proposed
plebiscite and on the qualifications of
the voters. The reason was that leaders
of the territory who were attending
the Assembly session expressed differ-
ing Opinions on these two issues. At
the Assembly’s fourteenth session, in
October 1959, agreement was reached
on the two pending issues.

Thus, the plebiscite in Southern
Cameroons, originally planned for
1959-60, did not take place.

The Assembly has recommended
that only persons born in the Southern
Cameroons, or one of whose parents

|
10°
12°

ADMINISTRATION

r— 10°

NIGERIA

TRUST TERRITORY OF
THE CAMEROONS
UNDER UNITED KINGDOM

r— ge —
ADAMAWA WY
TRUST TERRITORY. SOUTH
\ CAMEROUN
4
H- 6° vs BAMENDA \ \ oe
q MAMFE AS e a?
~' Oo
Pa Oo : 4 1¢0 150
al . MILES
KUMBA cy . . mm
rs ot KILOMETRES
% 2 7 e indaries shown on ti ma lo not im ° la
Lstiaill YU = nom " S p os by Ae United Nan o
a oe ° °
Oce hl v y rg

12°

MAP NO. 1203 REV.I
OCTOBER 1960

UNITED NATIONS

Villagers in the Southern Cameroons discuss land-leasing proposals.

was born in the Southern Cameroons,
should vote in the plebiscite.

Northern Cameroons

The plebiscite originally recom-
mended for the Northern Cameroons
was held on November 7, 1959. The
two questions asked in that plebiscite
were:

1. Do you wish the Northern
Cameroons to be part of the Northern
Region of Nigeria when the Federa-
tion of Nigeria becomes independent?

2. Are you in favor of deciding
the future of the Northern Cameroons
at a later date?

That plebiscite was supervised by
Ambassador Abdoh as United Nations
Commissioner with a United Nations
staff working under his direction. It
was carried out, as provided in the
Assembly resolution, on the basis of
the register for the elections in North-
ern Cameroons to the Nigerian Fed-
eral House of Representatives.

Ambassador Abdoh’s report on the
plebiscite stated that nearly 88 per
cent of the registered voters had par-
ticipated, and that almost 62 per cent
of the total votes cast favored deciding
the future of Northern Cameroons at
a later date (the second alternative
offered in 1959).

The matter was first discussed by
the Trusteeship Council and later by
the General Assembly. The Assembly,
in December 1959, recommended that
a further plebiscite be held in North-
ern Cameroons. It asked that this
second plebiscite take place at the
same time as the one recommended
for the Southern Cameroons.

The questions to be put in this
second plebiscite in Northern Came-
roons will be different from those in
the first plebiscite there. Under the

Assembly’s recommendation, the two
questions before the voters in the 1960
plebiscite will be the same for both
Northern and Southern Cameroons.

As for voters’ qualifications, the
Assembly recommended that the sec-
ond plebiscite in Northern Cameroons
should be conducted on the basis of
universal adult suffrage, with all those
over 21 and ordinarily resident in
Northern Cameroons qualified to vote.
This means that women there will be
voting for the first time in the terri-
tory’s history.

As the forthcoming plebiscites in
both Northern and Southern Came-
roons will now be held after Nigeria’s
independence, the Assembly recom-
mended that the United Kingdom take
steps to separate the administration of

i>. ere

Homecraft classes are held at a number of domestic science centres in the Came-

the two parts of the trust territory
from that of Nigeria.

Regarding Northern Cameroons,
the Assembly further recommended
that the necessary measures be taken
without delay for the further decen-
tralization of governmental functions
and the effective democratization of
the system of local government in the
area.

In response to these requests, the
United Kingdom in May 1960 sub-
mitted two reports to the Trusteeship
Council concerning the measures it
was taking to separate the administra-
tion of British Cameroons from
Nigeria.

The United Kingdom stated that
the formal separation would take place
on October 1, 1960, the date of
Nigeria’s independence.

In a resolution adopted on May 31,
1960, on this matter, the Trusteeship
Council requested the administering
authority to take into account the
observations and suggestions made at
the Trusteeship Council’s session in
completing the separation of the ad-
ministration of the two parts of the
territory from that of Nigeria not
later than October 1, 1960. In par-
ticular, it requested the United King-
dom to ensure the existence, until the
completion of the plebiscites, of police
forces wholly responsible to the au-
thorities in the territory.

Another provision of the Council’s
resolution requested the United King-
dom to take appropriate steps, in con-
sultation with the authorities con-
cerned, to ensure that the people of
the territory were fully informed, be-
fore the plebiscites, of the constitu-
tional arrangements that would have
to be made, at the appropriate time,

roons. A land of rugged mountains and dense forests, the territory extends for

about 700 miles from Lake Chad in the north to the Gulf of Guinea in the south.

UNR—December 1960

for the implementation of the deci-
sions at the plebiscites.

Registration Period

By the end of November it was ex-
pected that the registration phase of
the plebiscites in both sections of the
trust territory would be completed.
Registration for the plebiscite in the
Northern Cameroons got under way
during the last two weeks of October.
Reports from United Nations observers
stationed at various points in the re-
gion revealed that women outnum-
bered men during the first few days
of registration.

Dr. Abdoh, the Plebiscite Commis-
sioner, witnessed the process of regis-
tration at several centres in the North-
ern Cameroons and saw both Moslem
and “pagan” women waiting their
turn to register.

In the Southern Cameroons, where
registration began a little later and was
due to end about November 22, wo-
menfolk have participated in previous
elections and are more familiar with
the registration process.

During his tour of the Northern
Cameroons, Dr. Abdoh visited Mubi,
administrative seat of the region,
where he was welcomed by Sir Percy
Wyn-Harris, the United Kingdom’s
Plebiscite Administrator, and by vari-
ous local leaders. Dr. Abdoh held
talks with representatives of the politi-
cal parties of the North who, in his
presence, agreed on the choice of bal-

lot box colors to symbolize the two
alternatives facing the voters.

The parties agreed that the color
black will symbolize the alternative of
the Northern Cameroons’ achieving
independence by joining the Federa-
tion of Nigeria, while light purple will
symbolize the other alternative—the
achievement of independence by join-
ing the Republic of Cameroun.

Enlightenment Program

Dr. Abdoh has also held consulta-
tions with Hubert Childs, the United
Kingdom’s Plebiscite Administrator in
the Southern Cameroons, and with
leaders of political parties in that re-
gion. As in the North, the registration
phase of the plebiscite in the Southern
Cameroons began with a public en-
lightenment program. United Kingdom
plebiscite officers trekked throughout
the region and, with the aid of leaflets
and posters, told the people that a
plebiscite under United Nations super-
vision would soon be held to decide
the territory’s future.

The officials explained the two al-
ternatives facing the electorate in the
plebiscite and also the procedure for
registration. They also stressed that
people must first register in order to
be able to vote in the plebiscite.

Major problems in conducting and
supervising a plebiscite in a territory
like the British Cameroons, with its
rugged terrain and almost complete

lack of roads, are transportation and
communications. Long treks through
the districts often lead through thick
jungles and crocodile-infested rivers.
The traveller usually takes with him
such necessities in his camp equip-
ment as mosquito net, filter for drink-
ing water, tinned foods, a small first-
aid kit, kerosene storm lamps, torches,
a canvas bath, and a folding chair and
table. The packages are carried by
“bearers” who, on a long trek, may
number as many as ten.

To make regular contacts between
the Northern and the Southern Cam-
eroons, a chartered “Piper Apache”
plane is available, which normally
makes a weekly flight between the
centres of Buea and Mubi. The flights
are used to send instructions from
the United Nations Commissioner to
observers in the North and to bring
back their reports. The plane is also
used by the Commissioner for making
periodic inspection trips to the North-
ern Cameroons. To speed communica-
tions for the plebiscite in the territory,
special army signal units are also being
established by the United Kingdom
authorities.

The most isolated of the United
Nations observers is stationed in
Gembu on the Mambilla Plateau. Be-
cause of washed-out bridges and tracks,
it took one observer several days to
reach his lonely station, which is about
four days’ trek from the nearest road-
head.

United Nations Social Work

EPORTS on the social work being

done by the United Nations, espe-
cially for children, were made when
the General Assembly’s Third Com-
mittee considered sections of the re-
port of the Economic and Social
Council.

Mr. F. Schnyder, of Switzerland,
Chairman of the Executive Board of
the United Nations Children’s Fund,
informed the Committee that UNICEF
was receiving more and more requests
for assistance. About 55 million chil-
dren in developing countries were re-
ceiving aid, but these were but a small
fraction of 600 million or so who
needed protection from misery, hun-
ger and disease. UNICEF, therefore had
decided to organize its assistance in

UNR—December 1960

such a way as to strengthen efforts by
governments to help themselves. By
supporting only those programs to
which beneficiary countries made at
least an equal contribution, national
programs involving $100 million a
year became possible, even though
UNICEF’s budget was only about a
quarter of that. Special attention was
being paid to Africa, and it was in-
tended to appoint a special represen-
tative for UNICEF activities south of
the Sahara.

A series of resolutions emerged from
the Committee’s discussion on these
questions. These proposals, among oth-
er points, would have the General
Assembly commend UNICEF; invite the
Economic and Social Council and the

Commission on the Status of Women
to take appropriate measures that
would lead to special assistance by
the United Nations and the special-
ized agencies for the advancement of
women in developing countries; con-
demn all manifestations of racial and
national hatred and call upon govern-
ments to take measures to prevent
such manifestations; urge all con-
cerned to continue their efforts to
promote in primary and secondary
schools the teaching of the purposes,
principles, structure and activities of
the United Nations; and request the
Economic and Social Council to in-
vestigate the possibilities for domestic
and international financing of low-
cost housing programs in less devel-
oped countries.

To Help Fight Hunger in Underdeveloped Lands

Assembly Adopts Plan

for Distribution of Food Surpluses

—- of the impelling need
to solve the problems of hunger
and malnutrition confronting many
peoples, the United Nations General
Assembly has taken new steps to use
United Nations machinery to help
solve this critical problem.

On October 27, 1960, it unani-
mously adopted a resolution aimed at
providing food surpluses to food-de-
ficient peoples through the United
Nations system. It invited the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
to work on procedures without delay
for making available the largest prac-
ticable quantities of surplus food to
help fight hunger in less developed
countries, on mutually agreeable terms.
(For details of resolution, see page 18.)

These procedures are to be com-
patible with desirable agricultural de-
velopment as a contribution to eco-
nomic development, without prejudice
to bilateral arrangements for this pur-
pose. They are to be compatible, too,
with FAO’s principles for the disposal
of surpluses.

Fao was also invited to study the
feasibility and practicability of addi-
tional arrangements, including multi-
lateral arrangements under FAO aus-
pices, with a view to mobilizing avail-
able surplus foodstuffs and distributing
them in areas of greatest need, particu-
larly in the economically less devel-
oped countries.

The Assembly, in addition, stressed
the need for adequate safeguards and
appropriate measures against: (i)
dumping agricultural surpluses on in-
ternational markets; and (ii) adverse

aa
~

effects upon the economic and finan-
cial position of countries primarily de-
pendent on food exports for their for-
eign exchange earnings. The avoidance
of damage to normal trading in food-
stuffs, it was recognized, would best
be assured by multilateral trading
practices.

The Assembly’s resolution was
transmitted for consideration by the
FAO Council meeting in Rome.

The ultimate solution to the hunger
problem, the Assembly’s resolution
recognized, lies in an effective speed-
ing-up of economic development, al-
lowing underdeveloped countries to in-
crease their food output and enabling
them to purchase more food through
normal international trade channels. It
believed, too, that international aid in
establishing national food reserves was
one effective transitional measure of
helping accelerate economic develop-
ment in the less developed countries.

In adopting the resolution on the
use of food surpluses, the Assembly
also endorsed, and called on members
of the United Nations and of the
specialized agencies to support, FAO’s
*‘Freedom-from-Hunger Campaign”
launched in July 1960 as a concerted
attack on the problem of providing
adequate food for food-deficient peo-
ples.

Fao will report on the action taken
on the food surplus question to the
United Nations Economic and Social
Council in mid-1961. The Secretary-
General of the United Nations will
also report to the Council’s mid-1961
session—on the role which the United

Nations and the appropriate special-
ized agencies can play in facilitating
the best possible uses of food surpluses
for the economic development of the
less developed countries.

The Assembly’s resolution was based
on a proposal originally introduced,
in its Second (Economic and Finan-
cial) Committee, by Canada, Haiti,
Liberia, Pakistan, the United States
and Venezuela. After several revisions,
it was adopted by the Second Com-
mittee in an amended form by a
unanimous vote on October 26, 1960.

The six-power proposal, as origi-
nally introduced in the Second Com-
mittee on October 18 by Frederick
Payne, of the United States, urged
all members of the United Nations
and of the specialized agencies to
support FAO’s Freedom-from-Hunger
Campaign and to take suitable meas-
ures to relieve the suffering of needy
people in other nations and assist
them in their efforts toward a better
life. Among other things, it called at-
tention to the contribution which the
appropriate use of food surpluses
could make in the economic develop-
ment of the less developed countries
and affirmed the value of establishing
food reserves in food-deficient coun-
tries. It also invited FAO, after consult-
ing member governments, the Secre-
tary-General and the specialized agen-
cies, to establish without delay pro-
cedures by which, with the assistance
of the United Nations system, the
largest practicable quantities of surplus
food could be made available on spe-
cial conditions.

Fao, Mr. Payne explained, would
offer information and advice to the
food-surplus and food-deficient coun-
tries, on the basis of which the coun-
tries concerned could negotiate agree-
ments for the transfer of food on
special terms.

The original draft also invited FAo
to study the feasibility of additional
arrangements having as their objective
the mobilization of available surplus
foodstuffs and their distribution in
areas of greatest need.

Finally, the Secretary-General was
requested by the six-power text to
report to the Economic and Social
Council on the role which the United
Nations and the specialized agencies
could play to facilitate the best possi-
ble use of food surpluses for the eco-
nomic development of the less de-
veloped countries.

The following criteria, added Mr.
Payne, should be taken into account
in deciding on the final shape of the
program: There should be no harmful
interference with normal patterns of
international and domestic trade. There
should be no adverse effect on indige-
nous production; and the transfers
must help the recipient countries to
increase their productivity. The long-
term goal must be a world in which
all people had enough to eat. Special
terms must be transitional.

Héctor Bernardo, of Argentina,
found difficulty in seeing why the
General Assembly should assume re-
sponsibility for a problem already
being dealt with by Fao, which pos-
sessed the technical facilities for re-
solving it. Moreover, the draft resolu-
tion might have quite the opposite
consequences from what was intended,
he said, for the release of surpluses
might have disastrous effects on the
trade of producing countries and re-
duce the foreign currency earnings
they needed to speed up their rate of
development. In adopting the pro-
posal, the General Assembly would
also run the risk of sanctioning the
protectionist agricultural policies fol-
lowed by certain industrial countries,
against which many countries and in-
ternational bodies had objected. Gifts
of free food would not be enough to
solve the problem of hunger in certain
underdeveloped countries. The process
of development in those countries
must be accelerated to enable them
to earn enough to buy food for them-
selves, or to develop techniques for
producing food cheaply at home.

Mr. Bernardo also saw no adequate
reason for hasty action.

P. M. Chernyshev, of the USSR,
agreed with the Argentine representa-
tive that the United States proposal
was neither new nor urgent. If the
United States so desired, it could dis-
tribute its surpluses either direct or

UNR—December 1960

through Fao, he said. In his view, the
American monopolies were wanting to
use the United Nations as a means
of enriching themselves and the pro-
posal was part of the United States
election campaign.

Mohammad Sarwar Omar, of Af-
ghanistan, stressing the need for in-
creased capital investment in agricul-
ture to produce more food, and for a
worldwide surplus program to raise
nutritional levels and provide a source
of financing for development projects,
welcomed the six-power proposal and
FAO’s Freedom-from-Hunger drive.

Arguing in favor of the proposal,
W. Arthur Irwin, of Canada, said it
was one of the great anomalies of
modern times that there were wide-
spread areas in desperate need of food
while there were other areas where
foodstuffs were in abundant surplus.

Canada, he added, earnestly hoped
that in studying the feasibility and
acceptability of additional arrange-
ments for mobilizing and distributing
available surplus foodstuffs in areas
of greatest need, FAO would find it
possible to recommend the establish-
ment of a United Nations food bank,
which would be supported by all mem-
ber countries on an equitable financial
basis. He agreed with those who held
that any international arrangements
for the disposal of surplus agricultural
commodities must not prejudice nor-
mal trade. Canada had no intention
of supporting action with that effect.

Also speaking in favor of the six-
power proposal, Max Dorsinville, of
Haiti, said that peoples freed from
the scourge of hunger would be better
equipped to continue the task of per-
sonal and national rehabilitation. Fur-
ther, the proposal ensured that surplus
disposal would no longer be regarded
solely as a question of charity but
would provide a basis for broad inter-
national cooperation. He did not think
there was any basis for fear that the
proposal would prejudice normal trade.

B. K. Nehru, of India, also sup-
ported the six-power draft resolution.
Its adoption would enable international
institutions to have a voice in pro-
grams which were at the moment com-
pletely bilateral, he said.

Pointing out that India had bene-
fited considerably from the surplus dis-
posal programs of the United States
and, more recently, of Canada, he
added that foodstuffs made available
under such programs were of im-
mense value in assisting recipient
countries to maintain social and politi-
cal stability while engaged in the
task of economic development. There
was no truth in the contention that the
programs interfered with the normal
course of trade and that, if food sur-
pluses were not made available, the

countries receiving them would buy
more from those willing to sell com-
mercially. If India, for example, did
not receive such surpluses, it would
not buy more food grains from abroad,
for the simple reason that it did not
possess the necessary foreign exchange.

Food surplus programs were not,
however, tantamount to giving the re-
cipient countries direct economic as-
sistance for capital development, Mr.
Nehru stated. What the provision -of
food in fact did was to enable people
who would otherwise have died to con-
tinue to live. It did not enable them to
earn their own living and was there-
fore no substitute for capital assistance
for the provision of tools, plant and
equipment.

The six-power draft resolution,
maintained Hassan Mohamed Hassan,
of the Sudan, was an effort to give
the United Nations a greater role in
connection with food disposal pro-
grams, without harming the normal
economic development of the recipient
countries. He therefore supported it.
Some countries, he pointed out, had
food surpluses which they could dis-
pose of only by depressing world mar-
ket prices or by physical destruction
of the foodstuffs. At the same time
other parts of the world suffered from
serious food shortages. Concerned
over the lack of United Nations ma-
chinery for dealing with such emer-
gencies, his delegation felt that the
United Nations should be one of the
principal channels through which as-
sistance in eradicating human misery
should be extended.

Mr. Hassan also wanted full assur-
ance that the action contemplated un-
der the draft resolution would not
endanger the commercial interests of
trading countries or the development
of agriculture in the underdeveloped
countries.

Speaking for New Zealand, W. A.
E. Green said his Government fully
supported the use of food surpluses
to combat hunger, provided that the
principles and guiding lines laid down
by FAO for the disposal of surpluses
were fully observed. At the same time,
he cautioned that the production of
surpluses had important side effects
on national economies, and that the
policies which gave rise to surpluses
must be modified if international trade
was to develop healthily. The draft
resolution, he suggested, would be im-
proved if it stressed that any action
taken or contemplated under the reso-
lution should proceed in accordance
with FAo’s principles for the disposal
of surplus commodities, and it should
be recognized that avoidance of dam-
age to normal trading in foodstuffs
would best be assured by multilateral
trading practices.

Further, the disposal of surplus
foodstuffs should not be undertaken
in a manner which would prejudice
the trade of normal exporters of food-
stuffs. For that reason, the United
Nations should undertake no action,
such as the establishment of a world
food bank, which would tend to insti-
tutionalize the existence of surpluses.
This would involve real difficulties.

Scheme’s Many Benefits

Pointing out that more than 1,000
million human beings suffered from
malnutrition, Mario Franzi, of Italy,
did not share the fear that the action
proposed in the draft resolution would
result in a fundamental alteration of
traditional trade patterns and a de-
cline in the world market prices of
foodstuffs. Distribution of surplus
foodstuffs on special terms would
raise the nutritional level of millions
of human beings and help to increase
their productivity so that in the near
future they would be able to buy at
world market prices what they were
now to be given on special terms. The
system proposed would not only have
the advantage of channelling surplus
disposal programs through the United
Nations but would also guarantee the
foodstuff-producing countries greater
protection of their interests. It was
thus in the long-term interests of the
foodstuff-producing countries. As to
short-term problems, he said, arrange-
ments could be made which would
make it possible to satisfy potential
demand with the least possible dis-
turbance of the world market.

Abdel-Hamid Abdel-Ghani, of the
United Arab Republic, warned against
overestimating the significance of the
six-power proposal. It was not de-
signed to solve the problem of hunger
and malnutrition, or that of surplus
foodstuffs. It did not even radically
change the present praiseworthy ar-
rangements to channel surplus foods
to needy countries, principally on a
bilateral basis, but also through inter-
national and philanthropic institutions.
The draft resolution in effect sought
to associate the United Nations and
its affiliated organizations more closely
with that practice. It was also less
far-reaching than other Assembly reso-
lutions such as that approved at the
Assembly’s ninth session, which en-
visaged creating a world food reserve.

Mr. Abdel-Ghani suggested amend-
ing the text so as to encourage action
to tackle the problems of national and
world food reserves and studies of the
effect of the distribution of surplus
foodstuffs on the agricultural develop-
ment of underdeveloped countries.

U Hla Maung, of Burnia, suggested
that the six-power text be amended

to stress the need for safeguards
against adverse effects of disposing of
food surpluses on the economies of
food-producing countries.

W. M. Q. Halm, of Ghana, thought
that some time limit should be speci-
fied for the distribution of surplus
foodstuffs, since underdeveloped coun-
tries were not likely to remain in per-
petual need of them, particularly if
the necessary action was taken to
speed up their agricultural develop-
ment and expand their production.
The more advanced countries could
promote that development more effec-
tively by providing scholarship facili-
ties for students from underdeveloped
countries than by making their surplus
foodstuffs available to the latter coun-
tries at low prices.

Mr. Chernyshev contended that the
United States had been prompted pri-
marily by domestic considerations to
submit the proposal. Agriculture in
the United States had for many years
been in a state of crisis, a feature of
which was gross relative overproduc-
tion of agricultural produce. United
States monopolies hoped to secure
large profits in the world market
through the agency of the United Na-
tions to the detriment of other food-
producing countries, he said. Adop-
tion of the proposal would undoubted-
ly disrupt the world agricultural mar-
ket. Offers of foodstuffs, however
large or attractive they. might seem,
could not solve the problem of food
shortages in the underdeveloped coun-
tries or their economic development
problems. Such deliveries could at
best only constitute a temporary
emergency measure. Food shortages
could only be overcome by the de-
velopment of national agriculture,
thus avoiding continued dependence
on countries possessing so-called sur-
pluses. To achieve that, the under-
developed countries needed agricul-
tural machinery and implements, seed,
fertilizer, agricultural experts, and ad-
vice on crop cultivation and land
reform. Such assistance could properly
be given under the Expanded Pro-
gram of Technical Assistance and the
operation of the United Nations Spe-
cial Fund. The Soviet Union was
ready to provide such aid as part of
its 1961 contribution to these pro-
grams. The USSR was also prepared
to extend agricultural assistance to
countries on a bilateral basis.

If the United States and other high-
ly developed capitalist countries sin-
cerely wished to help the underde-
veloped countries overcome their food
shortages and achieve economic prog-
ress, Mr. Chernyshev added, they
should consider how to promote the
industrial and agricultural develop-

ment of these countries and improve
their terms of trade.

The USSR’s attitude to the draft
resolution would depend on _ ihe
amendments to the text, which should
include a recommendation that FAo
draw up measures to guard against
the dumping of agricultural surpluses.

Mr. Bernardo, deploring the politi-
cal turn in the discussion, called for
adequate safeguards to ensure stability
of commodity prices on world mar-
kets. The resolution, he said, should
be amended to have the Assembly
recognize that the true solution to the
problem of hunger lay in effective
acceleration of the economic develop-
ment of underdeveloped countries as
a means of increasing their purchas-
ing power. Also, a study should be
made of the question of the produc-
tion of and demand for primary com-
modities in relation to the problem
of hunger.

Supporting Argentina’s proposed
amendment, D. W. Rajapatirana, of
Ceylon, said that his country’s experi-
ence showed that, while the bilateral
disposal of surpluses resulted in some
savings in foreign exchange, the local
cost was often in excess of that of
supplies from normal sources. Never-
theless, it was true that if the under-
developed countries could import
cheaper food, they had a better chance
of expanding their economies. The
provision of surplus foodstuffs, he also
stressed, was not a _ substitute for
development capital.

Three Principles

W. C. Wentworth, of Australia, said
that three principles had to be taken
into account: (1) Commercial stocks
produced under normal competitive
conditions must be distinguished from
surpluses arising as a result of agricul-
tural protectionism. (2) The markets
of the primary-producing countries
must be safeguarded. (3) Domestic
production in the recipient countries
must be protected and encouraged.

The draft resolution, he observed,
explicitly noted that any procedures
which might be developed should con-
form to the generally recognized prin-
ciples laid down by Fao for surplus
disposal. It’should also be remembered
that many of the less developed coun-
tries were handicapped in their strug-
gle for better nutrition by the low
purchasing power of their peoples as
well as by their shortage of foreign
exchange. The problem was to find
enough foreign exchange to finance
imports of both foodstuffs and manu-
factured goods.

No one, Mr. Wentworth added,
would disagree that ultimately the
only satisfactory solution was to raise
the effective demand in the countries

UNR—December 1960

in greatest need and to facilitate the
development of their agriculture. These
required soundly-based programs of
economic development. There was,
nevertheless, an interim period in
which increased commodity aid could
prove beneficial. He hoped that the
proposal to reappraise the procedures
for surplus disposal would enable suffi-
cient foodstuffs to be made available
without delay to meet the essential
nutritional needs of impoverished peo-
ples. Accordingly, Australia supported
the six-power draft resolution.

Bilateral Assistance

‘Mr. Omar, of Afghanistan, pointed
out that his country and others re-
ceived wheat on a bilateral basis from
both the United States. and the Soviet
Union, and there were doubtless other
less developed countries in a similar
position. Such countries earnestly
hoped that the draft resolution would
not prejudice bilateral assistance.

Afghanistan, together with the Unit-
ed Arab Republic, proposed amending
the text accordingly.

Anand Panyarachun, of Thailand,
while fully endorsing the humanitarian
aims of the six-power draft resolution,
said he could not support it as long
as it did not protect the economic and
financial position of the food-export-
ing countries against being adversely
affected by the proposals embodied in
the draft. There was no point, he com-
mented, in feeding the hungry peoples
of the world if, at the same time, the
measures recommended involved starv-
ing others.

Ladislav Smid, of Czechoslovakia,
stressing the need for wide interna-
tional cooperation to raise food pro-
duction in needy countries by techni-
cal aid and equipment, by industrial-
ization and by land reforms, said that
the proposal on the provision of sur-
plus foodstuffs was obviously of benefit
to the producers of the surpluses,
which had become a fixed feature of
the capitalist system. It would make
no radical changes in the present situ-
ation. It would not even solve the
problem of hunger. On the other hand,
there was a positive danger that sur-
plus foodstuffs from the United States
and Canada would be channelled into
the markets normally supplied by
food-exporting countries which were
dependent on their export earnings for
the financing of their economic devel-
Opment. The draft resolution as it
stood did not contain adequate safe-
guards against this. He accordingly
proposed that the text be amended
to ask FAO to elaborate further ap-
propriate measures against the dump-
ing of agricultural surpluses in the
international market. While the pro-
posal would continue to deal only with

UNR—December 1960

a temporary expedient, many of its
drawbacks would thus be eliminated.

Janvid Flere, of Yugoslavia, said
FAO should devote special attention to
the favorable effects which surpluses
might have on the economic develop-
ment of underdeveloped countries. It
should take into full account the legiti-
mate need for agricultural develop-
ment in the less developed countries.

He also stressed the need to
strengthen the role of the United Na-
tions in the field of surplus disposal,
and thus to expand and improve the
distribution of surpluses to less devel-
oped countries.

Agreeing with those who held that
the distribution of surplus food stocks
was only a temporary expedient, Denis
A. Holmes, of Ireland, considered it
necessary that the six-power text be
altered to help allay the fear that one
effect of the action proposed might be
to encourage and perpetuate excess
stocks of agricultural products.

Mr. Green, approving the idea in
the Czechoslovak amendment that FAO
should elaborate further appropriate
measures against dumping of agricul-
tural surpluses on the international
markets, said New Zealand had itself
felt the effects of the dumping of food-
stuffs by certain countries of the So-
viet bloc. However, since the Czecho-
slovak amendment seemed to be in
conformity with one of the FAo prin-
ciples of surplus disposal, it was fair
to ask whether Czechoslovakia and
the other countries of the Soviet bloc
also subscribed to the others.

To Stop Dumping

Mr. Smid stated that the sole object
of his amendment was to stop the
dumping of agricultural surpluses on
international markets, since such
dumping would have serious conse-
quences. It was therefore advisable to
draw up specific recommendations on
that point and to request FAO to give
the problem its attention.

Replying to Mr. Green, the repre-
sentative of the Byelorussian SSR, A.
E. Gurinovich, said the socialist coun-
tries had never dumped agricultural or
other commodities on the markets of
other countries, and certainly not on
the New Zealand market. The coun-
tries which exported agricultural com-
modities certainly suffered losses be-
cause of price fluctuations in the world
market and because of the deteriora-
tion of their terms of trade, but the
socialist countries were not involved;
these losses were due to the workings
of the capitalist system.

S. Korteweg, of the Netherlands,
said that a real solution of the surplus
problem could not be sought in the
disposal of those surpluses through a

series of ad hoc arrangements, even if
carried out under United Nations or
FAO auspices. The real solution lay in
an increase in effective demand and in
a better international distribution of
production. Action to be taken under
the proposal should be in accordance
with FAO’s principles for surplus dis-
posal and should also cover transport
arrangements.

Camara Sikhé, of Guinea, thought
that the six-power proposal could
jeopardize the economic development
of the underdeveloped countries if it
led their peoples to believe that they
need make no further effort to speed
up their economic development and
raise their level of living, and that all
they had to do was to wait for the
food surpluses which the more de-
veloped countries would kindly offer
them. The text also contained certain
terms not consonant with the dignity
of the peoples who might benefit from
the food surpluses. He suggested
amendments to correct this.

Second Revised Draft

Introducing a second revision of
the six-power text on October 26, Mr.
Payne, of the United States, pointed
out that it included most of the
amendments suggested during the de-
bate. It took into account, for in-
stance, the views of representatives of
food-exporting nations. Further, al-
though the FAo principles and actions
were designed specifically to prevent
disruptive and harmful actions such
as dumping, the sponsors believed
that, as some members of the United
Nations were not members of FAO, it
would be useful for the General As-
sembly to be on record against dump-
ing. Their revised text therefore in-
cluded a reference to “adequate safe-
guards against dumping.”

Mr. Smid regretted that the spon-
sors had not accepted his delegation’s
amendment. The reference to dump-
ing in the new text did not satisfy him.
It was necessary to stress the need for
elaborating further positive measures
against the dumping to which the reso-
lution might give rise.

Mr. Gurinovich supported Mr.
Smid’s stand. The fact that Fao had
already elaborated measures against
dumping, he said, was not a sufficient
reason for rejecting the Czechoslovak
amendment, which requested FAO to
elaborate further appropriate meas-
ures. In fact, dumping had continued,
in spite of the measures taken by FAO.

The spokesman for the United Arab
Republic suggested a compromise pro-
posal which, he said, might be accep-
table to the sponsors and to Czecho-
slovakia by having the six-power text
call not only for “adequate safe-
guards” but also for “appropriate

measures” against dumping of agri-
cultural surpluses. To this the spon-
sors agreed, whereupon Czechoslovak-
ia withdrew its amendment.

Mr. Gurinovich also stated that his
delegation had always supported the
principle of universality in the in-
terests of the underdeveloped coun-
tries themselves. It would be wholly
illogical not to respect that principle
in making an appeal for support for
a world campaign against hunger. He
therefore proposed amending the re-
vised six-power text so that it would
appeal to “all states” rather than “to
members of the United Nations and
specialized agencies.” Countries which
were not members of the United Na-
tions or of the specialized agencies
should not be denied the right to fight
hunger and help the hungry. This
point was also made by Chedli Ayari,
of Tunisia, and by Hassan Hajoui, of
Morocco.

In addition, Mr. Gurinovich pro-
posed other amendments to ensure
that trading practices should not be
prejudicial to the interests of the
underdeveloped countries.

Mrs. Nonny Wright, of Denmark,
stressed three principles embodied in
the revised text. First, the use of agri-
cultural surpluses for the benefit of
the hungry was only a short-term
measure. If the problem was to be
finally resolved, it was necessary to
promote the economic development of
countries whose agricultural produc-
tion was inadequate, so that they
could import the necessary foodstuffs
on normal terms. Secondly, the dis-
posal of surplus commodities should
not hamper the economic develop-
ment of the underdeveloped countries
or do injury to normal trade or the
interests of other member countries.
Thirdly, surplus foodstuffs would be
transported under normal conditions.
She said she would vote for the draft
resolution, on the understanding that
no specific arrangement made under
its provisions would affect normal
competition in agricultural commodi-
ties and international transport.

The resolution, she said, could not
then be used to favor the agricultural
or shipping interests of any country.
A similar point was also made by

Birger Breivik, of Norway, and A. A.
Dudley, of the United Kingdom.

After some further amendments,
the six-power text was unanimously
adopted following a series of votes on
individual paragraphs. The approved
text also included an amendment by
Afghanistan and the United Arab
Republic. This action followed rejec-
tion of the Byelorussian amendments.

Explaining his vote, the USSR rep-:
resentative said he would have pre-
ferred to see the Committee adopt
the Czechoslovak amendment and the
Byelorussian amendments. Making
what he called “a point of principle
applicable to all resolutions,” he said
that the text just adopted gave wide
powers to the Secretary-General. The
Soviet delegation could not concur in
that arrangement, for it no longer
had complete confidence in the Secre-
tary-General for reasons which Mr.
Khrushchev had outlined in the As-
sembly.

The resolution was later submitted
to a plenary meeting of the Assembly,
where it was unanimously adopted on
October 27.

Excerpts from General Assembly’s Resolution

The General Assembly... .

Recognizing further that the ultimate
solution to the problem of hunger lies in
an effective acceleration of economic
development allowing the underdeveloped
countries to increase their food produc-
tion and enabling them to purchase more
food through normal channels of inter-
national trade. . . .

Further convinced that assistance to
food-deficient peoples will help raise pro-
ductivity and thus contribute to the im-
provement of their standard of living,

1. Endorses the Freedom-from-Hung-
er Campaign launched by the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations and urges all states members of
the United Nations and members of the
specialized agencies to support this cam-
paign in every appropriate way;

2. Appeals to states members of the
United Nations and members of the
specialized agencies to take suitable mea-
sures to relieve the suffering of food-
deficient people in other nations and
assist them in their economic develop-
ment and in their efforts toward a better
life;

3. Expresses the belief that interna-
tional assistance in the establishment of
national food reserves in food-deficient
countries is one effective transitional
means of assisting accelerated economic
development in the less developed coun-
tries;

4. Invites the Food and Agriculture
Organization, after consulting govern-

ments of member states, the Secretary-
General and

appropriate specialized

agencies, to establish without delay pro-
cedures—in particular, for consultation
and the dissemination of information—
by which, with the assistance of the
United Nations system, the largest prac-
ticable quantities of surplus food may
be made available on mutually agreeable
terms as a transitional measure against
hunger, such procedures to be compatible
with desirable agricultural development
as a contribution to economic develop-
ment in the less developed countries and
without prejudice to bilateral arrange-
ments for this purpose and compatible
with the principles of the Food and
Agriculture Organization;

5. Further invites the Food and Agri-
culture Organization, in consultation
with governments of member states, the
Secretary-General, appropriate special-
ized agencies and other international
bodies [such as the International Wheat
Council, the Wheat Utilization Commit-
tee, etc.], to undertake a study of the
feasibility and acceptability of additional
arrangements, including multilateral ar-
rangements under the auspices of the
Food and Agriculture Organization, hav-
ing as their objective the mobiilzation
of available surplus foodstuffs and their
distribution in areas of greatest need,
particularly in the economically less
developed countries;

6. Requests the Director-General of
the Food and Agriculture Organization
to report on action taken to the Eco-
nomic and Social Council at its thirty-
second session;

7. Requests the Secretary-General, in
consultation with the Director-General
of the Food and Agriculture Organiza-

tion and after such other consultations
as he may deem necessary, to report to
the Economic and Social Council at its
thirty-second session on the role which
the United Nations and the appropriate
specialized agencies could play in order
to facilitate the best possible use of food
surpluses for the economic development
of the less developed countries;

8. Recommends that the Secretary-
General, in preparing, in consultation
with the Director-General of the Food
and Agriculture Organization, the pro-
visional program for the joint session of
the Commission on International Com-
modity Trade and the Committee on
Commodity Problems of the Food and
Agriculture Organization which will ex-
amine a report on the prospects of the
production of, and demand for, primary
commodities, include the question of the
production of, and demand for, food in
relation to the problem of hunger;

9. Stresses that any action taken or
contemplated under the present resolu-
tion proceed in accordance with the
Principles of Surplus Disposal and Guid-
ing Lines of the Food and Agriculture
Organization, and, specifically, with ade-
quate safeguards and appropriate mea-
sures against the dumping of agricultural
surpluses on the international markets
and against adverse effects upon the eco-
nomic and financial position of those
countries which depend for their foreign
exchange earnings primarily on the ex-
port of food commodities, and in the
recognition that the avoidance of dam-
age to normal trading in foodstuffs will
best be assured by multilateral trading
practices.

UNR—December 1960

Committee Acts on Obligation of Nations

to Report on Dependencies

Portugal Asked to Transmit Information on Territornes

B bag obligation of member nations
to supply information to the
United Nations on conditions in de-
pendent territories under their admin-
istration, in accordance with the Char-
ter, was the subject of recommenda-
tions made by the General Assembly’s
Fourth Committee on November 10.
The Committee called on the As-
sembly to adopt a set of 12 principles
as guidance for members to be applied
“in the light of the facts and the cir-
cumstances of each case to determine
whether or not an obligation exists to
transmit information under Article 73e
of the Charter.”

One of the most important of the
principles, which were drawn up by a
special committee established by the
Assembly in 1959 (see below), states
that “there is an obligation to transmit
information in respect of a territory
which is geographically separate and
is distinct ethnically and/or culturally
from the country administering it.”

The draft resolution endorsing the
principles was adopted by the Fourth
Committee by 62 votes to 3 (Portugal,
Spain and the Union of South Africa),
with 19 abstentions. Previously, on
the proposal of Togo and Tunisia, the
Committee incorporated a clause in
Principle IX (concerning integration)
to the effect that the United Nations
could, when necessary, supervise pro-
cesses of integration.

Portugal's Territories

A second draft resolution on the
subject, recommended by the Fourth
Committee on November 11, would
have the Assembly request the Govern-
ment of Portugal to transmit informa-

UNR—December 1960

tion to the United Nations on terri-
tories under its administration, in ac-
cordance with Chapter XI of the
Charter—the “Declaration on Non-
Self-Governing Territories.”

The Fourth Committee’s proposal
then goes on to declare that “an obli-
gation exists on the part of the Gov-
ernment of Portugal” to supply such
information and that this obligation
“should be discharged without further
delay.” As originally presented in
the Committee by nine African and
Asian states, it had also included a
specific request to Spain to transmit
data to the United Nations on its
overseas territories. That was deleted,
however, after the representative of
Spain announced that his Government
would transmit such information.

As recommended by the Committee,
the draft resolution includes an expres-
sion of satisfaction over Spain’s agree-
ment to do so.

The third preambular paragraph of
the proposal recognizes that “the de-
sire for independence is the rightful
aspiration of peoples under colonial
subjugation and that the denial of
their right to self-determination con-
stitutes a threat to the well-being of
humanity and a threat to international
peace.”

The draft resolution lists nine Portu-
guese-administered territories as falling
within the meaning of Chapter XI: the
Cape Verde Archipelago; Guinea
(called Portuguese Guinea) ; Sao Tomé
and Principe and their dependencies;
Sao Joao Baptista de Ajuda; Angola
(including the enclave of Cabinda);
Mozambique; Goa and dependencies
(called “State of India”); Macao and

dependencies; and Timor and depend-
encies.

By far the largest of those territories
are Angola and Mozambique, situated
on the western and on the eastern coast
of Africa, respectively. Angola has an
area of 481,000 square miles and a
population of about 4.5 million. Mo-
zambique covers an area of 297,654
square miles and has a population
of about 4.55 million.

The Committee’s action followed an
eleven-day debate in which differences
arose concerning the status of certain
territories administered by Spain and
Portugal and the obligations of the two
countries to submit data to the United
Nations on those territories in accord-
ance with the provisions of Article
73 of the Charter.

Committee of Six

With a view to resolving such differ-
ences regarding non-self-governing ter-
ritories, the General Assembly in 1959
set up a Special Committee of Six
charged with studying the principles
which should guide members in deter-
mining whether or not an obligation
exists to transmit the information
called for in Article 73e. The Assem-
bly, in its resolution 1467(XIV), of
December 12, 1959, considered it
“would be desirable” to enumerate
such principles.

The Committee of Six was com-
posed of an equal number of admin-
istering and non-administering mem-
bers. After meetings in September it
submitted its report containing the
12 principles.

In general considerations prefacing
the list of principles, the Committee
of Six stated: “The right of depend-
ent peoples to choose their own destiny

is more universally accepted today
than at any time since the signing of
the Charter in San Francisco.
There now exists general recognition
that independence is among the right-
ful aspirations of every nation, the
fulfilment of which is an important
factor in the preservation of interna-
tional peace and security. . The
Charter is a living document, and the
obligations under Chapter XI must
be viewed in the light of the changing
spirit of the times.”

In presenting the report to the
Assembly’s Fourth Committee, J. S.
Jha, of India, Chairman of the Special
Committee of Six, explained that his
group had confined itself to the enu-
meration of universal principles with-
out reference to any particular non-
self-governing territories, although in-
dividual territories had occasionally
been cited in order to illustrate certain
points.

Mr. Jha said the entire discussion
of the Special Committee had been held
in the context of the present-day situ-
ation and of the problems of the non-
self-governing territories as they had
been studied in recent years in the
Fourth Committee and the General
Assembly.

Mr. Jha added that not only had the
Committee’s work been carried out
against the background of the no
longer controversial ideal of a world
in which no people could dominate
another, but that the Committee had
also taken account of such practical
aspects as the different sizes and geo-
graphical situations of the non-self-
governing territories, the development
and experiences of the last few years
and the various studies that had al-
ready been made on the subject.

Dr. F. Cuevas Cancino, of Mexico,
a member of the Committee of Six,
also stressed the constructive conclu-
sions reached by that body. He thought
the principles drawn up set out clearly
the conditions in which the obligations
imposed under Article 73e were ap-
plicable.

“Overseas Provinces” Claim

The Fourth Committee’s debate, in
which more than 50 representatives
participated, centred mainly on the
question of the obligations of Spain
and Portugal to submit information to
the United Nations on current condi-
tions in their territories in Africa,
Asia and the Atlantic islands.

It may be recalled that since attain-
ing membership in the United Nations
in 1955, Portugal and Spain have con-
sistently maintained that the territories
involved are “overseas provinces” of
the homeland and as such do not
come within the scope of the Charter’s
provisions regarding non-self-govern-

ing territories. The representative of
Portugal, Alberto Franco Nogueira,
again adduced a number of legal argu-
ments on the issue and maintained
that the principles enumerated by the
Committee of Six did not apply to
the “overseas provinces” of Portugal.

Mr. Nogueira reiterated his Govern-
ment’s stand regarding the proceed-
ings which led to the establishment of
the Committee of Six. He said his
delegation had always kept an open
mind on the matter and had studied
the Committee’s report without any
preconceived views. It had also ex-
amined the replies received from gov-
ernments (in regard to the invitation
contained in the Assembly’s resolution
of December 12, 1959). In that re-
spect he pointed out that only 25
governments had taken the trouble to
reply, a fact which seemed to suggest
that the subject had failed to arouse
the interest of the large majority of
member governments.

Differing Interpretations

Mr. Nogueira thought the question
before the Fourth Committee was
again that of the interpretation of Ar-
ticle 73 of the Charter. Precisely be-
cause various divergent interpretations
had been placed on Article 73, the
Committee of Six had tried to estab-
lish a set of principles which sought
to implement that provision without
interpreting it.

Portugal, however, considered that
no provision of the Charter, or of any
other legal document, could be prop-
erly implemented without prior defini-
tion of its meaning and scope and
that there could be no agreement on
the implementation if there was no
agreement on the substance. The ques-
tion of interpretation, therefore, was
again of paramount importance.

Many interpretations had been sug-
gested for Article 73. Every delegation
was entitled to its opinion. Portugal
requested for its views the same re-
spect that it readily accorded to others.
Nevertheless, he felt the fact remained
that Article 73 was a written provision
of the Charter and that no interpreta-
tion was valid unless it was based on
it.

Noting that Chapter XI of the Char-
ter was entitled “Declaration Regard-
ing Non-Self-Governing Territories,”
Mr. Nogueira said that some might
suggest that the word “declaration”
should not be understood literally but
rather in the sense of an obligation.
Such an interpretation might, in prin-
ciple, be valid, but its validity must
be tested and, to that end, Chapter XI
must be placed in its proper context.
If that were done, he thought the
word “declaration” meant nothing
else than a declaration, or an act left

entirely to the initiative and discretion
of member governments.

Mr. Nogueira argued that the ques-
tion was therefore: in what context
should Article 73 and Chapter XI be
read? The obvious answer was that
they should be read in the context of
the Charter. The Charter established
three different systems for the promo-
tion of the welfare of peoples and for
cooperation among nations in the so-
cial, economic, educational and politi-
cal fields. The first system was that
provided by Chapters IX and X of the
Charter, entitled “International Eco-
nomic and Social Cooperation” and
“The Economic and Social Council”;
the second was that outlined in Chap-
ter XI, entitled “Declaration Regard-
ing Non-Self-Governing Territories”;
the third was laid down in Chapter
XII, entitled “International Trustee-
ship System.”

Those systems were clearly de-
limited, and the Charter had empha-
sized the differences by creating differ-
ent forms of application for each of
them. The first and third systems
were “international” systems. In other
words, the authors of the Charter, by
placing them under that heading, had
intended that the international commu-
nity, through the appropriate machin-
ery of the United Nations, should
have a say in their implementation. As
for the second system, the word
“international” had been omitted,
which was an indication that the prob-
lem was considered to be national
rather than international in character.

Mr. Nogueira pointed out, more-
over, that the Charter emphasized the
differences among the various systems
by providing machinery for “interna-
tional economic and social coopera-
tion” in the form of the Economic and
Social Council and for the “interna-
tional trusteeship system” in the form
of the Trusteeship Council, while it
did not provide any machinery fo
the supervision of the implementation
of Chapter XI. He considered there
was no doubt, therefore, that the
Charter did not ascribe to Chapter XI
the same scope and the same obliga-
tions that it had embodied in Chapters
IX and X on the one hand, and in
Chapter XII on the other.

Two Important Points

The representative of Portugal also
pointed out that Article 73e of the
Charter referred to two important
points: transmission of information
and limitations arising from security
and constitutional _ considerations.
There was no question that Article 73
did not, either in letter or spirit, pre-
scribe any specific obligation: it merely
made a declaration, the terms and

UNR—December 1960

scope of which were left entirely to
the discretion of member states. It
followed that the only obligations as-
sumed by member states were those
arising from that declaration; were it
not so, the precepts laid down in Arti-
cles 73 and 74, addressed solely to
member states, would not be compre-
hensible.

If member states, by their free dec-
larations, assumed obligations under
Article 73, Mr. Nogueira affirmed that
they alone had the power to determine,
in accordance with their own consti-
tutions, the limitations which might
exist. The interpretation of a national
constitution was a matter within the
exclusive competence of a member
state and was not one for discussion
by any international body; a dangerous
precedent would be set by acting
otherwise. Constitutional limitation op-
erated in two ways: it could limit the
nature or amount of the information
provided, in cases where a govern-
ment was allowed to transmit informa-
tion, and it could prohibit a member
state from supplying information on
territories and populations whose politi-
cal status that state alone could define.

Question of National Laws

The representative of Portugal noted
that some delegations, when defining a
non-self-governing territory, sought to
discard entirely the concept of na-
tional law and were apparently guided
exclusively by political considerations;
for them, legal arguments and the ex-
istence of national law were merely
obstacles to progress and to the devel-
opment of societies and peoples. If
they discarded the national laws of
Others, the time might come when
their own might be brushed aside.
Such a course of political expediency
involved seeking shelter behind a ma-
jority gathered at random and
prompted by motives which, however
much they might at one time coin-
cide, might become opposed; the state
concerned would then be in a minor-
ity, at a time when their own national
law was no longer respected. The ques-
tion arose, he said, whether the ma-
jority of the General Assembly had
the power to impose its decisions on
a country in matters pertaining to
that country’s internal juridical order.
Portugal’s reply to that question was
firmly in the negative; the United Na-
tions was not a world parliament or
a world government.

In conclusion, Mr. Nogueira pointed
to a “most serious omission” in the
report. The questions concerning non-
self-governing territories had been
“tied up with what was usually called
colonialism and imperialism,” he said.
The Fourth Committee for years had
concerned itself with a particular and

UNR—December 1960

“narrow type” of colonialism and im-
perialism. This year the field to be
covered should embrace all kinds of
colonialism and imperialism, including
those of a political and ideological
nature. The report had been drawn
up without taking such things into
account. Mr. Nogueira thought that
those “new types of colonialism”
should be taken into account.

Africa's ‘Wind of Change”

Portugal’s arguments were rebutted
by many speakers during the Commit-
tee’s debate. A majority of representa-
tives were critical of the attitude
adopted by both Portugal and Spain,
which was described as being “com-
pletely out of step with the times.”
Several speakers pointed to the “wind
of change” and the movement for
freedom sweeping across Africa.

Such a movement, said Joseph A.
Braimah, of Ghana, could not be
stopped by “legal and juridical for-
mulas.” The so-called “overseas prov-
inces” of Portugal could not be indefi-
nitely isolated from the changes taking
place in the rest of Africa. Mr. Brai-
mah warned that the recent events in
the Congo and in Nyasaland had in-
fluenced those who were fighting for
freedom in Angola and Mozambique.
The flight to Ghana of increasing
numbers of political refugees from
Angola indicated that the nationalist
movement there was being intensified,
he said. Portugal’s continued suppres-
sion of such movements would lead
to explosions and perhaps even con-
flicts which might endanger interna-
tional peace and security.

Similar views were expressed by
representatives of other African coun-
tries, including some of those which
recently emerged from dependency.
Speaking for Nigeria, Nuhu Bamalli
said that Angola and Mozambique
were both geographically and ethni-
cally separated from Portugal. - Their
people did not enjoy the same rights
as the Portuguese people, and fewer
than 0.1 per cent of the indigenous
inhabitants of the two territories were
Portuguese citizens.

The Nigerian representative joined
others in commending the report of
the Committee of Six. That body, he
said, had accomplished a long-standing
task, one which, if done earlier, might
have prevented certain member na-
tions from violating the spirit and let-
ter of the Charter and evading the
obligations they had accepted at the
time of their admission into the United
Nations.

Miss Angie Brooks, of Liberia,
thought the Assembly had no choice
but to request Portugal to implement
the obligations it undertook in joining

the United Nations. The Assembly
should recommend that Portugal ad-
vance with the tide of history and see
that the territories under its admin-
istration and the peoples under its
rule in Africa and Asia were delivered
from Portuguese administration and
that they join the community of free
nations.

In welcoming the great change in
the spirit now prevailing in the Fourth
Committee and in the Committee on
Information from Non-Self-Governing
Territories from that of a few years
earlier, Miss Brooks appreciated the
wisdom of those administering mem-
bers which in fact and in practice had
accepted international responsibility
for the administration of dependent
territories and had adjusted their poli-
cies to the facts. She hoped that a
similar but more rapid change would
take place on the part of the Portu-
guese Government.

Legal Arguments Dated

A number of speakers felt the time
had long since passed for legal argu-
menis and a discussion of general
principles on the issue. Thus, M. I.
Kuchava, of the USSR, maintained
that the Fourth Committee should
not waste time but should immediately
take note of the fact that since 1955
Portugal and Spain had been under an
unconditional obligation to transmit
information about their colonies, in
accordance with Article 73 of the
Charter. The General Assembly should
then deal with the vital question of
the grant of independence to all de-
pendent territories, including those of
Portugal and Spain, where so many
millions were deprived of their rights
and were the victims of cruel oppres-
sion. Mr. Kuchava said the Fourth
Committee had already wasted much
time in studying procedural and for-
mal questions.

V. K. Krishna Menon, of India,
noted that in different ways Portugal
and Spain were maintaining that none
of their territories came within the
scope of the provisions of Chapter XI
and therefore they were not obliged
to transmit information under Article
73e. At the same time Spain had
adopted “a more conciliatory attitude,”
in the sense that, although making
legal reservations, it had transmitted
material to the Secretary-General for
information purposes. He regarded
that as a gratifying step forward and
hoped to be able to note further prog-
ress when the Assembly had “clearly
expressed its opinion.”

Portugal, on the other hand, he
said, felt itself under no obligation to
transmit information, as if its rights
and duties were different from those

of other states signatories of the Char-
ter.

The representative of India, in a
lengthy analysis of the question, also
observed that Portugal claimed exemp-
tion from the obligations imposed by
Articles 73 and 74 by using as an
argument the meaning of the word
“territory.” That word signified only
an area of land or a region of the
world; since it was not capitalized,
he held, there was no need to give
it a special definition or interpretation.
Therefore Portugal could not claim
that its colonies were not “territories,”
since that word had no special mean-
ing. The only way of knowing whether
the regions were within the scope of
Articles 73 and 74 was to determine
whether their “peoples had not yet
attained a full measure of self-govern-
ment.” That was the case with the
Portuguese possessions.

In accepting the “sacred trust” de-
fined in Article 73, states signatories
to the Charter acknowledged their ac-
countability to the United Nations, he
continued. While those Articles did
not, like the ones dealing with the
international trusteeship system, give
the United Nations the right to ex-
ercise supervision, they placed the
General Assembly under a duty to
require information from the admin-
istering members in order to see that
they discharged their trust. No ad-
ministering member before Portugal
had made the slightest difficulty; Por-
tugal alone had raised the question of
interpretation.

Portugal’s only title was the right
of conquest. First in search of spices
and then to spread Christianity, Por-
tuguese explorers had set out to dis-
cover the world. The only ground
invoked by Portugal for keeping its
possessions was that they were very
old. No conquest of that kind would
be accepted today. Be that as it might,
Portugal was the only country which
wanted to make the inhabitants of its
colonies Portuguese. The United King-
dom had never claimed the Indians to
be English!

Educational Situation Deplored

Referring to conditions in the ter-
ritories under Portuguese administra-
tion, Mr. Krishna Menon stressed “the
deplorable educational situation.” He
said that in Angola, with a population
of four million, only 58,000 children
had been attending school in 1954.
Most schools reserved the few vacant
places for the Portuguese. Generally
speaking, it appeared that only five
per cent of the children of school age
were able to attend school.

Mr. Krishna Menon also referred to
Goa, the territory on India’s west

coast. There, he said, public meetings
were banned, and permission was re-
quired even for prayer meetings. In
1955 Portuguese troops had fired on
the inhabitants taking part in demon-
strations of passive resistance. Many
persons had been killed and others
sentenced to imprisonment terms of
up to 28 years. Still others had been
deported to Africa and to Portugal.
Between 1954 and 1959 several hun-
dred Goans had been arrested, tor-
tured and imprisoned for taking part
in the freedom movement.

Despite all that, Mr. Krishna Menon
pointed out, India had not stationed
any troops on the Goan frontier—but
its silence must not be interpreted as
approval. It was because India was
aware of its international responsibili-
ties that it did not want to have any
difficulties with Portugal or the inter-
national community. Nevertheless, In-
dia reserved the right to call for the
liberation of Goa, which was as much
an integral part of Indian territory as
were the former French establishments.

The Indian representative empha-
sized that the realities of the world
could not be ignored. It had become
impossible to speak of colonies from
a purely legislative point of view. The
Charter prescribed respect for human
rights and the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. It im-
posed on the Portuguese Government
the obligation at least.to transmit in-
formation on the economic, social and
educational conditions in the territories
it administered. In that connection the
General Assembly had the right to
apply the provisions of Article 10 of
the Charter (on functions and pow-
ers). Because it was convinced of the
truth of that assertion, India had
sponsored, with 11 other delegations,
the draft resolution on transmission of
information from _ non-self-governing
territories, specifically asking Portugal
to submit information on its territories.

Other Views

Many other speakers during the
long debate emphatically endorsed the
12 principles enumerated in the report
of the Committee of Six, which they
hoped would be approved by the Gen-
eral Assembly. Expressing such a
hope, Wayne Morse, of the United
States, noted that his Government had
already applied the principles estab-
lished by the Committee of Six in
the territories under its administration.
The United States, he said, had regu-
larly transmitted detailed information.
In the cases of Puerto Rico, Alaska
and Hawaii, it had only ceased to do
so when the people of those territories
had themselves determined their new

status.

Mr. Morse considered that the As-
sembly should face up to the obvious
reality that the overseas territories of
Portugal and Spain were certainly
causing tension “among thousands and
thousands of people indigenous to
those areas.” The Assembly should
seek, as a united body, to resolve
those tensions in a friendly way.

Position of Spain

Presenting Spain’s position on the
question, Manuel Aznar regretted that
“political passions” entering the dis-
cussion had prevented the Committee
from making a thorough study of the
legal problem as stated by the repre-
sentative of Portugal. The latter had
analyzed in detail the scope and sig-
nificance of Article 73e of the Char-
ter, and it would be difficult to equal
his arguments, Mr. Aznar said.

He considered that the intransigent
position of those who refused to con-
sider the substance of the problem,
because they could see only its super-
ficial aspects, might entail serious con-
sequences for the coexistence, within
the United Nations, of delegations of
differing opinions, and might, indeed,
extend the “cold war” to the Fourth
Committee itself.

Referring to the report of the Com-
mittee of Six and the 12 principles it
contained, Mr. Aznar thought these
had been praised in very general
terms, as if “out of mere courtesy.”
For its part, Spain wished to congratu-
late that Committee, several of whose
members had had to renounce certain
ideas and abandon certain profound
personal convictions. The Committee
of Six had stated that the “Charter is
a living document and the obligations
under Chapter XI must be viewed
in the light of the changing spirit of
the times.” To whom was that dis-
covery directed? Was the inescapable
corollary that the Fourth Committee
might modify the Charter, simply to
keep it in step with the “changing
spirit”?

When it was realized to what extent
a country’s constitution was protected
against any violations and how pro-
vision was made for amendments only
through a carefully controlled process,
one had to ask what would happen
if a majority group could without
hindrance interpret a national constitu-
tion along lines favorable to its inter-
ests. Who, moreover, was going to
define “the changing spirit of the
times”?

Desire to Cooperate

Mr. Aznar felt that many delega-
tions had forgotten the position pre-
viously taken by Spain on the inter-
pretation of Chapter XI of the Char-

UNR—December 1960

ter. He therefore reiterated his state-
ment made at the 1959 session to
the effect that Spain neither knew
what a non-self-governing territory was
nor accepted the obligation to send
information on territories which it
administered. In view of Spain’s desire
to cooperate with the United Nations,
however, it was prepared in due course
to transmit information on its over-
seas provinces, in the selection of
which information he had himself col-
laborated.

Although some had questioned that
attitude, the allegation could hardly
be made that the Spanish Government
replied only with refusals. Spain con-
demned colonialism and all exploita-
tions of peoples as being an “anachron-
ism,” Mr. Aznar declared. Spain had
nothing to hide. No territory under
its jurisdiction presented problems
which could not be resolved within
the framework of bilateral discussion
with countries which had the same
rights toward it. The Spanish Govern-
ment based its attitude “on honor and
justice and only asked the same in
return.”

Subsequently, the representative of
Spain reiterated his Government’s in-
tention of transmitting information.

12-Nation Proposal

Further debate in the Fourth Com-
mittee turned on the draft resolution
sponsored by 12 member states con-
cerning the transmission of information
under Article 73e and containing a spe-
cific request to Portugal and Spain
regarding information on their terri-
tories. The sponsors were Afghanistan,
Burma, Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, India,
Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Nigeria
and Senegal. After Spain’s statement
regarding the submission of data on
its territories, the sponsors deleted a
request appearing in the original draft
calling on Spain to transmit informa-
tion. At the same time the proposal, in
its operative part, asked the Secretary-
General to take “the necessary steps
in pursuance of the declaration of the
Government of Spain that they are
ready to act in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter.”

In the course of further considera-
tion of the proposal, Ivan G. Neklessa,
of the Ukrainian SSR, submitted a
series of amendments, the general effect
of which was to reinstate references to
Spain and its obligations to transmit in-
formation on its territories. Another
Ukrainian amendment called for an
additional clause in the draft urging
the Governments of Spain and Por-
tugal “to grant to the indigenous popu-
lations of the non-self-governing ter-
Titories under their administration the
enjoyment of full freedom for demo-
cratic political activities which would

UNR—December 1960

ensure their attainment of independ-
ence.”

Speaking in support of the Ukrain-
ian amendments, Mieczyslaw Blusztajn,
of Poland, considered that the declara-
tion made by the representative of
Spain left “too many doubts” on the
question of submission of data. He
found nothing in that declaration
which could be interpreted as express-
ing the willingness of the Spanish
Government to abide by the provisions
of Article 73 of the Charter.

Ali Yavar Jung, of India, while
appreciating the spirit which inspired
the Ukrainian amendments, said he
could not agree with most of the
suggestions contained in them. He
felt that the Assembly should express
satisfaction over any positive step for-
ward in the matter, however small.
He noted that the enumeration of
Spain’s territories—contained in the
original draft resolution — had been
deleted from the proposal to comply
with the wishes expressed by a num-
ber of delegations.

Resolution Adopted

After further discussion, the Com-
mittee, late on November 11, voted
on the various proposals submitted.
The Ukrainian amendments were all
rejected by varying votes (see page
91). After a paragraph-by-paragraph
vote, the draft resolution as a whole
was then adopted by 45 votes to 6,
with 24 abstentions (23 delegations
were absent).

Member states voting against the
draft resolution were: Belgium, Brazil,
France, Portugal, Spain and the Union
of South Africa. Abstentions were
cast by: Albania, Australia, Austria,
Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Czechoslo-
vakia, Dominican Republic, Hungary,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Ro-
mania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United
Kingdom and United States.

After the voting, the representative
of Portugal told the Committee that
he “categorically” reserved the position
of his Government on the recommen-
dation.

Explanations of Vote

A number of delegations which had
opposed or abstained on the Com-
mittee’s recommendation subsequently
explained their positions. Pedro de
Souza-Braga, of Brazil, said his dele-
gation had voted against the proposal
because it considered that the enu-
meration of territories in the draft
went beyond the principles which had
been approved by the Committee and
“created a dangerous precedent.” He
hoped Brazil’s stand would not be

misinterpreted either by the young
nations of Africa or by Portugal, with
which Brazil had close ties.

France, said Jacques Koscziusko-
Morizet, had opposed the draft resolu-
tion because its werding ran counter
to the principles enshrined in the
Charter, which France had always de-
fended. Article 73 referred to an ac-
ceptance, not to an obligation. The
Charter, he said, had not given the
United Nations the right of supervision
over non-self-governing territories; it
did not enumerate the territories to
which Article 73 might apply, nor
empower the Assembly to draw up
such a list. Nor were the administering
members called upon to supply a list
of such territories.

As the Charter stood, the Assembly
was not entitled to decide whether a
territory was or was not self-governing,
said Mr. Koscziusko-Morizet. Accord-
ingly, the Assembly had refrained
from drawing up any lists and had
merely taken into account the informa-
tion voluntarily supplied by the ad-
ministering members. France, which
had applied with the letter of the law,
felt that respect for a rule that was
common to all, however imperfect it
might be, was the best guarantee that
the United Nations aims would be
attained.

Reasons of a legal character were
advanced by Belgium for its negative
vote on the draft resolution. In ex-
plaining these, E. Vanderborght held
that in the light of Article 73 the
recommendation was an infringement
of the prerogatives of member states.
It was for them alone to decide
whether or not to transmit to the Sec-
retary-General the statistical and other
information referred to in Article 73e.

Mr. Vanderborght said Belgium
considered there were a number of ter-
ritories concerning which information
had never been transmitted but which
should have been regarded as coming
within the terms of Chapter XI. If,
however, the Assembly had assumed
the right to enumerate those territories,
it would have overstepped its func-
tions and “undermined the contractual
foundations on which the provisions
of the Charter were based.” Belgium’s
position could be summed up in one
phrase—“the whole Charter and noth-
ing but the Charter.”

Doubts on Wording

A number of delegations which ab-
stained on the proposal expressed
doubts over its implications, and some
questioned the wording of its third
preambular paragraph. Thus Sir An-
drew Cohen, of the United Kingdom,
thought that the meaning of the latter

(Continued on page 42)

Second Progress Report

to the Secretary-General

from his Special Representative

in the Congo

Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal

1. Introduction

HE first progress report of the
Special Representative of the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations
in the Congo was submitted on Sep-
tember 21, 1960. This second report
covers significant developments during
the period from September 21 to the
end of October 1960, without trespas-
sing on ground already covered by the
first report, except in referring to
earlier events in so far as they have
conditioned subsequent developments.
The Special Representative would,
however, point to the general conclu-
sion in his first report, indicating the
magnitude and intricacy of the diffi-
culties facing ONUC. The urgent prob-
lems both in the field of law and
order and in the field of civilian opera-
tions continue seriously to obstruct
progress toward national unity and the
establishment of a coherent govern-
ment and administration which could
assume responsibility, with the assist-
ance of the United Nations, for the
conduct of the affairs of the country.
The basic conditions prerequisite to
such progress—namely, some measure
of stability in the Central Government,
an integrated policy and the assurance
throughout the country of a sense of
security and freedom from disorder—
are still tragically lacking, and in many
respects the situation both in Leopold-
ville and throughout the provinces
markedly deteriorated during the
period under report.
At the heart of the present confu-
sion and disintegration in the Congo

November 2, 1960

is the complete lack of progress in the
way of a political settlement, clearly a
matter for the Congolese people them-
selves, which could provide a stable
and recognized government and allow
the assistance provided by ONUC to be
increasingly and more effectively ap-
plied. The various contenders for
political power are still at a complete
stalemate, and no effective, constitu-
tional central government exists to
give direction to the solution of the
nation’s urgent problems. All that can
be said is that the most vocal con-
tenders for power have gradually
tempered their extravagant claims to
sole authority, or at least their threats
of force or other forms of intimidation
to assume full power, and that steady
pressure applied by ONUC against
arbitrary acts and violence has pre-
vented worse disorder. An analysis, in
the light of recent developments, of
the various conflicting claims and the
lack of effective progress toward a
political settlement is given in chapter
II of this report.

Not only is an effective central
government non-existent, but the po-
litical chaos has spread in a large
measure to the provincial govern-
ments, often beset by inner strife and
lack of continuing and purposeful sup-
port and collaboration from a central
government. Repeated arrests and

changes of provincial leaders, arbi-
trary assumption of political authority
with the backing of units of the ANC
[Congolese National Army], absence
of effective machinery and qualified
staff in the provincial ministries, vir-

tual bankruptcy and lack of prospec-
tive revenues—all these reflect the
political disorganization in the pro-
vincial capitals.

The single most disturbing, even
alarming, development since Septem-
ber 21, 1960, has been a steady and
often rapid breakdown of law and
order. The greatest contributing factor
to this breakdown has been the further
indiscipline of the aNc forces, which
have increasingly been guilty of illegal
and arbitrary acts of all sorts. This
indiscipline constitutes at the present
time one of the greatest menaces to
the objectives of the United Nations
operations in the Congo. The illegal
and violent acts of the ANC in the past
few weeks have occurred both in
Leopoldville and in the various prov-
inces. A more detailed analysis of
these sombre developments appears in
chapter V below.

The financial and economic situa-
tion of the Congo has also grown
steadily worse. The depletion of for-
eign reserves, the virtual absence of
orderly tax collection, the inability to
pay salaries of public servants, have
reached a stage where only quick and
drastic remedial measures can prevent
total collapse.

In the last few weeks there has
been increasing evidence of the return
of Belgian nationals into many phases
of public life in the Congo. While the
reactivation of economic enterprises
and the participation in bona fide
humanitarian pursuits is of benefit to
the country, unfortunately there has
been a substantial incursion of those
elements which appear to seek a
dominating influence in the councils
of administration and to exclude or
obstruct the application of United Na-
tions technical assistance and _ influ-
ence. Some Belgian nationals are be-
lieved to have been actively arming
separatist Congolese forces, and, in
some cases, Belgian officers have di-
rected and led such forces, which, in
certain areas, have been responsible
for brutal and oppressive acts of vio-
lence. Advisers of Belgian nationality
have been returning to governmental
ministries both in Leopoldville and in
the provinces, partially through what
seems to be an organized recruiting
campaign in Belgium. The motives and
activities of a significant portion of
these returning officials appear to be
clearly at variance with the principles
of the General Assembly resolution
and with oNuc’s basic objectives.
These developments are analyzed in
greater detail in chapter IV below.

Attention must be drawn to the fact
that the appeal addressed in the Gen-
eral Assembly resolution of September
20, 1960 [the resolution adopted by
the General Assembly at its emergency
special session], “to all Congolese with-

UNR—December 1960

in the Republic of the Congo to seek
a speedy solution by peaceful means
of all their internal conflicts for the
unity and integrity of the Congo,”
unfortunately remains largely un-
heeded.

The people of the Congo are vigor-
ous and fully conscious of their re-
cently won independence. They would
like to see their country advance on
the road to stability and progress and
to utilize to the full its enormous na-
tural resources and the talent and
labor of the people. The difficulties
encountered by the United Nations
operations in the Congo are often the
result of past experiences and the
conditioning of the people during the
years of colonial administration. One
may express the hope that the spirit
of independence will induce a change
in attitudes and increase the national
consciousness in regard to the grave
responsibilities facing the new nation.
With the single-minded devotion of
the leaders and with such assistance as
the United Nations can render, the
sovereign independent Republic of the
Congo should be able to raise itself in
a measurable period of time to a
position of economic independence
and political and social well-being.

ll. The Constitutional Crisis

The first progress report outlined
the basic problem facing ONUC in the
political field. In its section II on
“Political Instability and the Problems
of Non-Intervention,” it gave a chron-
ological account of the development of
the constitutional crisis within the
Central Government up to September
20, 1960. In so doing, it drew atten-
tion to the essential predicament of
ONUC, i.e. that it is bound by the
principles of the Charter and the ex-
press terms of its mandate from the
Security Council not to “be a party to
or in any way intervene in or be used
to influence the outcome of any in-
ternal conflict, constitutional or other-
wise.”

Onuc has therefore had the delicate
task of maintaining, in the midst of a
deepening political crisis, an attitude
of strict neutrality while at the same
time complying with the requirements
of General Assembly resolution A/
RES/1474/Rev.1. (ES-IV) that it “con-
tinue to take vigorous action,” in
accordance with Security Council reso-
lutions, “to assist the central govern-
ment of the Congo in the restoration
and maintenance of law and order
throughout the territory of the Repub-
lic of the Congo.” The onuc dilemma
has accordingly centred upon the fact
that it is confronted with rival group-
ings claiming to constitute the Central
Government of the Congo. This is
further complicated by the rivalry be-

UNR—December 1960

tween central and separatist “govern-
ments.”

In such a situation each contestant
for power has continually attempted
to enlist United Nations support to
enforce his own particular or factional
political solution. The inevitable result
has been that almost every significant
measure taken by ONUC, in the im-
partial fulfilment of its mandate, has
been interpreted by one faction or
another as being directed against itself
by the United Nations, or by some of
its member states. Indeed, even a
decision by oNnuc to refrain from a
particular measure, in order to pre-
serve its neutrality, has often been
interpreted as an act of political collu-
sion on its part. In the heat of political
passion the same party which has con-
demned onuc for “interference in
domestic affairs” not infrequently calls
upon it to “intervene” against the
actions of a rival.

These tendencies, previously noted,
have increased with the prolongation
of the crisis in the period under re-
view to the point where at times ONUC
has had to face waves of manufactured
propaganda in an orchestrated local
press, periodic bouts of official non-
cooperation, and even public threats
of countrywide military or individual
personal assault.

The following paragraphs will trace
the development of the political crisis
in relation to the ONUC mandate and
the principle of non-intervention.

At the end of the period covered by
the first progress report, the Chief of
Staff of the Congolese National Army
proclaimed that the army had decided
to solve the problems of the country,
“tint it would take power, in view of
the struggle going on between two
opposing governments, until December
31, 1960,” and that a Collége des
universitaires would be charged with
the management of the ministerial de-
partments, acting neither as ministers
nor as substitutes for popularly elected
representatives, but only as_ tech-
nicians. It was announced that, in
addition to keeping the administrative
machinery of government in operation,
it would be the task of these tech-
nicians to prepare a reunion of all
Congolese political leaders with a view
to a broad national entente.

These technicians were installed in
office by a military occupation of the
administrative buildings of govern-
ment under orders of the Chief of
Staff. They were ultimaiely designated
as a college, or council, of commis-
sioners-general, and appointed by a
presidential ordinance which, under
date of September 20, 1960, named
14. commissioners-general and an
equal number of commissioners. Citing
the article of the Fundamental Law
which confers on the Chief of State

executive authority—as regulated by
that law—under countersignature of
the responsible minister, this ordi-
nance was signed by the President and
countersigned by the Minister of Fi-
nance (who held that office in the
Lumumba government and also in the
cabinet designated by Mr. Ileo). No
rescission of the presidential ordinance
of September 12 naming the Ileo
government was announced.

On September 20 and 21, Mr.
Patrice Lumumba formally requested
the immediate armed “intervention” of
ONUC to counter this action and repel
the Congolese troops—an act which
would have violated the terms of its
mandate. On September 27 a delega-
tion of parliamentarians, styling them-
selves a majority group, presented to
the United Nations a memorandum
which, after accusing ONUC both of
inaction and of interference in internal
affairs, laid down an ultimatum that
its troops liberate the Parliament, evict
Congolese troops from the airport and
national radio station, and restrict
these latter to the sole use of the
Lumumba government. This was ac-
companied by a threat that if the
United Nations failed to comply with
the demands, steps would be taken to
“requisition” the Afro-Asian troops
serving under the United Nations com-
mand for the exclusive use of that
government. Such appeals for inter-
vention have occurred intermittently
during the period under review.

On September 27 and 28, the Presi-
dent and Mr. Ileo announced that
within a few days a round-table con-
ference would bring together the prin-
cipal political leaders of the six prov-
inces with a view to resolving the
political crisis and settling the defini-
tive structures of the state. The Col-
lege of Commissioners-General was to
be responsible for the arrangements.
Twenty-six officers of the Congolese
National Army began an infructuous
tour of the provinces to select dele-
gates. They were ultimately discharged
from the army by the Chief of Staff
on the ground that they had, in the
course of their mission, been “in-
doctrinated.” On September 29 the
Chief of State conducted a ceremory
in which he swore in the commission-
ers, praised and ratified the decision
of the Chief of Staff to install the
college, and again announced his in-
tention to pursue the project of calling
a round-table conference. The Chief
of Staff let it be known that he ob-
jected to the ceremony, on the ground
that he had “neutralized political per-
sonalities” whose homes were guarded
by onuc in order that they not emerge
therefrom or make tendentious declar-
ations.

Discussions about a round-table
conference continued through October

but without any agreement either as to
its venue, functions or composition.
Mr. Lumumba made it known that he
favored the use of Parliament instead.
Mr. Kalonji objected to this on the
ground that Mr. Lumumba controlled
the deputies. Mr. Tshombe preferred
a conference in another country.
Others would not participate in any
conference entailing a reconciliation
with Mr. Lumumba. By the end of
October it was generally conceded that
for the present the project had failed.

Centrifugal political tendencies con-
tinued during this period. Different
separatist moves within Leopoldville
Province and the contiguous lake dis-
trict and in the Maniema district of
Kivu Province were threatened. A
group of 29 members of the MNC,
Lumumba’s party, including a number
of members of Parliament and Mr.
Lumumba’s Minister of Communica-
tions, Mr. Songolo, on October 3 pub-
lished a communiqué in which they
announced their decision to break with
Mr. Lumumba.

Meanwhile, several lists of reshuffled
cabinets were compiled. On October 6,
the leaders of the Chambers of Parlia-
ment circulated a proposed list revis-
ing the Lumumba Cabinet and con-
taining 11 new additions, including
some prominent opponents of Mr.
Lumumba who, however, denied any
previous consultation or, indeed, any
connection with the scheme. Previous
Cabinet members who had since op-
posed him were dropped from the list.
At the same time another list appeared
with the apparent backing of the Chief
of Staff, with all parties of conse-
quence represented, but including a
variety of mutually hostile personali-
ties.

On October 10, representatives of
the ANC appeared at ONUC headquar-
ters and showed a warrant against
“Patrice Lumumba, Deputy.” It cited
an article of the criminal code (con-
tinued in force from the colonial
régime), punishing speech exciting the
population against the established au-
thorities. They demanded that the
ONuUC guard (which had long been
stationed at the residence of Mr.
Lumumba, as at those of President
Kasavubu, of the Chief of Staff,
Colonel Mobutu, and others) be in-
structed to facilitate the arrest. ONUC
took the position that it would not,
consistently with its neutrality, alter
the standing orders of any guard in
order to facilitate the execution of a
warrant which was not prima facie
valid. In this instance the action was
patently wanting in due process, as
there had been no attempt at com-
pliance with the provisions of the
Fundamental Law requiring certain
parliamentary procedures to authorize
the arrest of a deputy, provisions de-

signed to protect the state and not
individuals. Although ONUC had not
the competence to interpret domestic
law, neither could it withdraw from
its functions in order to facilitate an
arbitrary military arrest which amount-
ed to an act of political violence. At
the same time ONuc felt obliged to
communicate to the Chief of Staff that
such an action against a leading figure
was difficult to reconcile with the
declared purpose of his régime, that
of bringing together all political fac-
tions to negotiate a national settlement.

This decision evoked a violent re-
action, with public accusations of bad
faith, from both the Chief of Staff and
the president of the College of Com-
missioners-General, who published an
“ultimatum” against ONUC. It was
threatened that from all the garrisons
of the Congo the troops of the ANC
would attack onuc if it did not hand
over Mr. Lumumba by a specified
hour. Extensive pourparlers were en-
tered into by onuc, the guard was
reinforced, and the hour passed with-
out incident. The Chief of Staff ulti-
mately advised the press that the Chief
of State, being neutralized, had acted
without authority in approving the
warrant.

On the other hand, numerous com-
missioners for some while thereafter
conspicuously withheld their coopera-
tion. The Commissioner-General of
Information announced that ONUC
would henceforth be denied the use of
the national radio for its programs for
the troops, but ONUC succeeded in
obtaining a reversal of this arbitrary
decision at a higher level. As noted in
another section of this report, the
uniform campaign of slander and
vilification in the local press against
ONUC, its troops and its professional
personnel mounted in intensity as
rapidly as it sank in decency, not stop-
ping at the headlining of scurrilities
directed by name at the leading per-
sonalities of the mission.

On October 11, the Chief of State
signed a “constitutional decree-law”
creating the Council [or College] of
Commissioners-General, conferring on
himself the authority to name and
revoke the commissioners-general and
their deputies, adjourning Parliament,
transferring to that Council the legisla-
tive power granted to Parliament by
the Fundamental Law (this new au-
thority to be exercised by decree-law)
and devolving the executive authority
of the Prime Minister upon the Presi-
dent of the Council and that of

ministers upon the respective commis-
sioners-general.

It will already have been noted that
the commissioners were originally ap-
pointed by a presidential ordinance
said to derive its authority from article
17 of the Fundamental Law confer-

ring executive authority on the Chief
of State under countersignature of the
responsible minister “as regulated by
the present law.” The constitutional
decree-law of October 11 did not pur-
port to be based on any article of the
Fundamental Law. Article 21 of that
law states: “The Chief of State has no
other powers than those which the
present law formally attributes to
him.” By article 15, his legislative au-
thority is exercised “collectively” with
the Chambers of the Parliament, and
“within the limits determined by the
present law.” By article 27, he issues
ordinances “necessary for the execu-
tion of the laws, without power ever
either to suspend the laws themselves
or to dispense with their execution.”
Only article 37 permits him to adopt
measures by ordonnance-loi, but it
confines this to matters, normally in
the domain of the law, as to which
the Government has obtained from
the Chambers a narrowly restricted
authorization.

As concerns the provision of the
decree-law of October 11 adjourning
Parliament indefinitely, it will be re-
called from the first progress report
that the Chief of State had on Septem-
ber 14 suspended Parliament. In
accordance with article 70 of the
Fundamental Law, any adjournment
pronounced by him could not exceed
the term of one month, nor be re-
newed in the same session without the
assent of the Chambers.

From the foregoing paragraphs, the
entry of a new element in the political
dilemma of oNuc will be apparent.
Committed to the principle of neutral-
ity, it could not have chosen between
rival governments, nor could it re-
spond to the continuing appeals that
it install one or another government
or “reinstate the legal government.”
Equally committed to the principle of
legality, it was now unable to give
recognition to a régime founded in
fact only on military force. On the
other hand, its mission could not be
accomplished without many routine
day-to-day contacts with ministries,
for urgent arrangements in specific
fields of work must be undertaken if
the grave situation of the country is
not to deteriorate further.

Onuc accordingly, while taking no
position on the legality of the con-
stitutional decree-law of October 11,
1960, creating the Council of Com-
missioners-General, has continued to
follow its policy of dealing, in routine
matters, with whatever authority it
finds in the ministerial chairs. It has
thus maintained useful contacts of an
informal character on all matters of
practical value in the fields of adminis-
tration and technical assistance, with-
out admitting any element of political
recognition. Thus, it has not been

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possible to conclude formal agree-
ments, for want of an effective central
government as well as for legal and
political reasons. It has nevertheless
been possible—in specific fields of an
urgent nature such as teacher recruit-
ment and unemployment relief — to
draw up, with the individual commis-
sioners concerned, memoranda setting
out the details of practical action.
Such memoranda specify that their
terms are subject to review and altera-
tion by any constitutional government
succeeding the present régime.

The President of the Council of
Commissioners-General, Mr. Bombo-
ko, has formally acknowledged that
this policy governing relations “limited
solely to the technical plane” is not to
be treated as amounting to a recogni-
tion of the Council as a government.
He has observed that it exactly cor-
responds to the mission assumed by
the Council, that of an interim service
in a technical capacity.

Meanwhile, official contacts have
continued between the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General and
President Kasavubu as Chief of State,
as well as between the Supreme Com-
mander and Colonel Mobutu as Chief
of Staff.

On United Nations Day, October
24, 1960, the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General addressed a
solemn “appeal to the Congolese lead-
ers to take stock of the situation, to
put an end to the factional and party
strife and to embark on the path of
national unity. That path, which has
been taken by other newly independ-
ent countries in Africa and Asia,
would lead to stability, integrity and
progress. The path of division would
lead only to fratricidal strife, disinte-
gration and chaos, dangerous not only
to the Congolese people but to the
continent of Africa and indeed to the
world.”

il. The Question of Katanga

The initial events relating to the
entry of the United Nations Force into
the Province of Katanga have pre-
viously been reported to the Security
Council by the Secretary-General (S/
4417 and Addenda), and the subse-
quent developments in his succeeding
reports to the Security Council and to
the fourth emergency special session
of the General Assembly.

The period under review has been
characterized by the following impor-
tant developments:

(a) The withdrawal, at the insist-
ence of the Secretary-General, of regu-
lar Belgian troops from Katanga in
accordance with resolution $/4426 of
August 9, 1960;

(b) The recrudescence of hostili-

UNR—December 1960

ties throughout the province between
the Balubakat and Conakat political
groups and the resulting disturbances
in North Katanga, which are described
in chapter V of this report; and

(c) The violent reaction of the
Katangese authorities to the letter of
the Secretary-General of October 10
to Mr. Tshombe inviting him to solve
in a spirit of conciliation and national
unity the constitutional problem cre-
ated by the secessionist claims of the
Katangese authorities, and transmitting
the contents of the Secretary-General’s
communication of October 8 to the
Belgian Government requesting the
withdrawal from the territory of the
Republic of the Congo (including
Katanga) of all military, para-military
and civilian personnel engaged in an
advisory or executive capacity by the
Congolese authorities.

The withdrawal of Belgian troops
from Katanga, with the sole exception
of technical personnel temporarily re-
quired at Kamina base, has been com-
pleted. As of October 31 there re-
mained, however, 231 Belgian na-
tionals (114 officers and 117 of other
ranks) in the Katangese gendarmerie
and 58 Belgian officers in the police.

The grave incidents in North Ka-
tanga and the United Nations attempt
at pacification of the area through
open consultations with all the parties
involved, and not by the use of force
on behalf of one of them, have had
an untoward effect on the general atti-
tude of the Katangese authorities to-
ward the solution of their internal
problems and toward their relations
with the United Nations. Despite their
obvious failure to restore normality
through acts of violent repression, the
Katangese authorities persist in believ-
ing that argument of force is the only
argument that the opposition groups
are able to understand. Thus, the in-
terruption of hostilities that has been
brought about by the United Nations
approach not only has not been ap-
preciated but has provoked a series of
unfounded charges and recriminations.
The United Nations Force has been
accused by Mr. Tshombe of “abetting”
the cause of the rebels, and a number
of gross and baseless allegations have
been publicly made against the Force’s
comportment and professional integ-
rity. Finally, in a letter to the Secre-
tary-General, Mr. Tshombe asked for
the recall of the oNuc representative
in Elisabethville and of part of the
general staff of the United Nations
Force in Katanga.

The letter of the Secretary-General
mentioned above has intensified the
factious attitude of the Katangese au-
thorities. The proposals of the Secre-
tary-General to Mr. Tshombe and to
the Belgian Government have been
officially denounced as “a flagrant in-

terference in the internal affairs” of
two sovereign states. The denunciation
has been accompanied by a persistent
and methodical press campaign against
the United Nations. The official an-
swer of Mr. Tshombe to the letter of
the Secretary-General has been unco-
operative and intransigent.

The negative position of the Ka-
tangese authorities has extended to
virtually all aspects of their relations
with the United Nations, including
their boycott of the celebration of
United Nations Day. This attitude may
be ascribed in part to the influence of
Belgian advisers in Katanga. It may
also be due in part to the frustration
of the Katangese authorities in their
efforts to obtain international recogni-
tion and to a concern at the decline of
their influence in some regions of the
Katanga Province. It is hoped, how-
ever, that the Katangese authorities
will be persuaded to take a realistic
view of the situation and of the prob-
lems facing them, in the larger frame-
work of the unity and independence
of the Congo, so that progress toward
a solution may be achieved by means
of peaceful negotiations and concilia-
tion.

IV. The Question of New
Belgian Return

There is clear evidence of the steady
return in recent weeks of Belgians
to the Congo and, within this frame-
work, of increasing Belgian participa-
tion in political and administrative
activities, whether as advisers, coun-
sellors or executive officials. Belgian
military and para-military personnel
as well as civilian personnel continue
to be available to authorities in the
Congo, notably in Katanga and South
Kasai.

This steady return, following the
precipitate mass departure of last July,
may be attributed in part to spontane-
ous, individual reactions to an im-
provement in the security factor fol-
lowing the arrival of the United Na-
tions forces in the Congo, but the
magnitude and nature of subsequent
developments are difficult to explain
in such terms.

Symptomatic of the changing pic-
ture is the rise of the Belgian popula-
tion in Leopoldville from a low of
4,500 in July to at least 6,000. While
a proportion have come back from
Brazzaville, the regular Sabena service
brings back full loads of passengers.
An overwhelming majority of the re-
turnees remain in Leopoldville.

Soon after a measure of security
had been re-established in the Congo,
a recruiting agency for the Congo was
set up in Brussels and supported by
Leopoldville. Congolese contacts with

the agency were made through stu-
dents in Brussels and visiting emis-
saries from the central and provincial
authorities. Members of the College of
Commissioners, for their part, have
made statements to the effect that the
Belgians, better than anyone else,
could bring prosperity back to the
country.

The object of the agency seems to
be to assist in re-establishing a civil
service of Belgian nationality prin-
cipally at the policy level. Specifically,
the posts occupied by or envisaged
for Belgians are in the first instance
those of chefs de cabinet in the exec-
utive offices and technical advisers to
the Congolese directors-general in the
bureaus.

One striking illustration has been
the recent joint application of 122
candidates from Belgium for posts in
the Congolese judiciary. In this and
other cases, there is an implication of
considerably more than that individu-
als are seeking employment solely
and directly with the Congolese au-
thorities.

As a result of the concerted ac-
tivities of the recruiting agency, the
task of onuc has been made more
difficult. For example, in the Ministry
of Economic Coordination and Plan-
ning, which played a part in setting
up the agency, the Chef de Cabinet
Adjoint has been responsible for de-
laying the submission of applications
for United Nations technical aid. The
Ministry of Public Health has also
been strongly manned by Belgians.
Half a dozen Belgian advisers arrived
with the newly appointed Commis-
sioner-General for Health on Septem-
ber 20, and one of them publicly ex-
pressed the opinion that there was
therefore no longer any need for the
United Nations advisory team. Simi-
larly in other ministries, cooperation
with ONUC, vital to its smooth func-
tioning, has been hampered in various
ways by high-ranking Belgians. United
Nations documents and reports have
frequently been withheld from the
Congolese officials in the ministries,
and propaganda has been engineered
regarding the supposed dangers of the
emergence of United Nations trustee-
ship as a result of ONUC’s mission.

In the field of telecommunications
and civil aviation, while the Congo-
lese officials have generally welcomed
and eagerly cooperated with Icao [the
International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation] personnel, Belgian nationals
have sought to discredit the Icao mis-
sion as a whole and many of its ex-
perts individually. A Belgian national
at Ndjili Airport has sought to in-
terfere with United Nations work
by withholding appropriate facilities
from 1cao officials. At Luluabourg and
Stanleyville transition from Belgian to

Congolese operation of radio facilities
has not proceeded according to plan;
in explaining his difficulties, the
Congolese radio official at Luluabourg
has complained that Belgian nationals
failed to hand over to him the rele-
vant archives, and that they committed
acts of physical sabotage of radio-
electrical equipment; an 1cao official
has investigated and confirmed these

charges.

In the Information Ministry, the
Commissioner-General, Mr. Albert
Bolela, having brought back from
Brussels four Belgian advisers, issued
instructions on October 22 that in-
ternational news on the Congolese
radio was no longer to be given in the
four main indigenous languages of the
Congo. This is a return to an earlier
practice.

Belgian influence is also seen in the
military field. A Belgian colonel, who
recently arrived from Brazzaville, acts
as an adviser to the Leopoldville
Ministry of National Defence, while a
former Belgian warrant officer serves
as aide-de-camp to Colonel Mobutu,
with the rank of captain. Thirty-six
Congolese, recently promoted to sec-
ond lieutenants, have been sent by
Colonel Mobutu to Brussels for mili-
tary training. In the outlying area of
Thysville, where ANC armored cars
are stationed, the number of Belgian
military officers has increased from
one to five, and they are presumably
training ANC personnel! in the use of
their equipment.

Katanga

In Katanga, Belgian influence is
omnipresent. Virtually all key civilian
and security posts are either held di-
rectly by officials of Belgian nation-
ality or controlled by advisers to re-
cently appointed and often inexperi-
enced Congolese officials. Significantly,
within the security forces there are,
according to the latest available data,
114 Belgian officers and 117 Belgians
of other ranks in the gendarmerie, and
58 Belgian officers in the police. These
figures do not reflect any significant
recent increase, although several offi-
cials have been brought from Belgium
recently to fill specific key posts.
What is abundantly clear is that the
Belgian encadrement remains strong.

In the last week of October 1960,
Mr. Yav of the Katangese Provincial
Government arrived in Belgium with
47 Katangese cadets of the so-called
Katangese Army to begin an extended
course of military training.

On October 13, it was announced
that the Belgian technical mission to
Katanga was being withdrawn and
that all but one of its political mem-
bers were leaving. The chief of the

mission, Ambassador Robert Rots-
child, departed from Elisabethville on
October 16. It may be noted that
Belgians now direct the reorganiza-
tion policy in some Katangese minis-
tries, which is in the direction of
“africanization.”

South Kasai

In the so-called “Autonomous State
of South Kasai” there is also a con-
siderable Belgian presence. The current
emphasis there is on warlike prepara-
tions directed by a Colonel Crevecoeur,
serving in Belgian uniform, and as-
sisted by another Belgian, Colonel
Levaux. There is no apparent short-
age of rifles. Moreover, arms from
Katanga are brought in through the
Mwene-Ditu territory of the Kabinda
district, reportedly with the help of a
Belgian businessman. As _ described
elsewhere, a Captain Roberts and three
other non-Congolese officers have re-
cently been taken into United Nations
protective custody (see chapter V).

Equateur

There is reliable information that
at Coquilhatville anti-United Nations
rumors and propaganda are originat-
ing from a Belgian national there,
who, in effect, manages the airport,
notwithstanding the presence of a
Congolese director. In the provincial
ministries most of the seven Belgian
conseillers généraux have been in of-
fice since independence, but there are
two newcomers.

Conclusion

From the above data and the gen-
eral consensus of well-informed oNUC
officers and from other sources, it
may be concluded that a gradual
but purposeful return is being staged
by Belgian nationals, which has as-
sumed serious significance in view of
the key areas which they have pene-
trated in the public life of the country
and the possible effect of their ac-
tivities on all aspects of ONuUC’s re-
sponsibilities. All too often these de-
velopments have coincided with anti-
United Nations policies or feelings at
the various points of impact.

Belgian activities in recent weeks
have increased the intransigence of
the anc Command as well as of the
Katangese authorities, inhibited peace-
ful political activity and therefore the
possibility of an eventual return to
constitutional government and the re-
establishment of the unity and integrity
of the country. These activities have
also had their repercussions, direct or
indirect, on the technical assistance
program, as has been indicated in this
and other chapters.

UNR—December 1960

V. The Question of the
Maintenance of Law and Order

The maintenance of law and order is
the primary responsibility of the na-
tional government, acting through its
appropriate security organs. The Re-
public of the Congo is no exception to
this rule. But because of the particular
circumstances obtaining in the Congo
at the time of its independence, the
United Nations assumed the obliga-
tion to maintain law and order as part
of its general mandate in the Congo
to render assistance to the Congolese
authorities in the discharge of this
basic responsibility.

A brief analysis of the concept of
the responsibility for the maintenance
of law and order is here necessary in
order to clarify the role of the United
Nations troops. In all organized so-
cieties this basic function of govern-
ment is primarily entrusted to the in-
ternal security organs of the state,
namely, the police, gendarmerie if any,
and the magistracy. It is only when the
civil authority is powerless to handle
a particular situation that may have
arisen, that the military power is
called upon in aid of the civil power.

In the Congo, the situation has been
that the internal security organs have
ceased to function effectively; the
police force has practically disin-
tegrated; the gendarmerie is ineffec-
tive, while the magistracy exists only
in name. The situation prevailing in
Leopoldville is illustrative of the state
of affairs. While there are 17 police
stations and some 1,500 police per-
sonnel on the rolls, the stations are
lightly manned and they do not func-
tion during the night, which is the
very time when increased vigilance is
necessary. Of the police force, the
majority has melted away and hardly
a couple of hundred can be regarded
as at all reliable. The Police Commis-
sioner himself is entirely new to his
responsibilities and lacks the experi-
ence to reconstitute his force. There
is no patrolling done by the Congolese
police, and traffic control is practically
non-existent. In the absence of a
magistracy, arrested persons are either
let off or languish indefinitely in the
jails and lockups, and the case lists
are choked with cases awaiting refer-
ence to a magistrate.

In such a situation the aNc has been
called upon by the authorities to as-
sume the responsibility for the mainte-
nance of the basic elements of law and
order in Leopoldville and elsewhere.
This force is some 25,000 strong and,
because of the prominent role which it
has played in the turbulent events of
the past weeks, some background in-
formation about it would be relevant.
Under Belgian rule, the anc, then

UNR—December 1960

called the Force Publique, officered by
Belgians and equipped with modern
weapons, was mostly employed in re-
lation to tribal and other internal con-
flicts, and it used methods of its own
to achieve its objectives. Soon after
the withdrawal of Belgian authority,
the Force mutinied against its Belgian
officers and so was left without any
control or leadership. Only Congolese
non-commissioned officers were avail-
able to fill the gaps in all officer
ranks. The mutiny and the concomitant
public disturbance resulted in the in-
tervention of Belgian paratroopers and
other Belgian military personnel. It
was a principal responsibility of the
United Nations operations in the
Congo to facilitate the withdrawal of
the Belgian forces.

The ANC, disorganized by the de-
parture of its Belgian cadres and of-
ficered by persons unused to their new
responsibilities, suddenly assumed the
responsibility for the maintenance of
law and order. This responsibility was
in fact further extended by the usurpa-
tion of political powers by the Chief of
Staff. A description of the consequen-
ces of these developments in relation
to the activities of the ANc and their
impact on the United Nations troops
and the general law and order situa-
tion in the country follows in the
succeeding paragraphs.

During the past few weeks, the at-
tention of the anc Command has re-
peatedly been drawn by the ONUC au-
thorities to the high-handed and il-
legal activities of ANC personnel not
only in Leopoldville but throughout
the country. Indeed, the situation de-
teriorated to such an extent that these
lawless activities constituted a grow-
ing danger to the lives and security of
the law-abiding citizens, obstructing
peaceful association, freedom of the
press and of speech, and inhibiting
peaceful political activity. Sanctity of
private property or respect for the hu-
man person have frequently been
gravely violated. Arbitrary acts of
lawlessness, such as unauthorized ar-
rests, detentions, deportations and as-
sault, have grown in number. Often
such acts have been committed by
groups of armed ANc personnel, travel-
ing about in military vehicles. There
have been frequent cases of large
bodies of troops locking up their of-
ficers and threatening them with vio-
lence; equally, threats have been held
out against members of provincial gov-
ernments and civil servants, and these
threats have sometimes actually been
carried out. Large bodies of undis-
ciplined troops in some centres have
broken out of their camps and
threatened the population with vio-
lence. It is only the timely presence
of United Nations troops that has

prevented these outbreaks from threa-
tening the complete disruption of the
life of the community.

In a situation where the supposed
guardians of the honor, integrity and
security of the country are themselves
constantly menacing and frequently
violating law and order, the dangers to
the lives, property and honor of the
peaceful inhabitants are gravely in-
creased. If, in addition, the police and
the gendarmerie, who are likewise in-
effective, join in these lawless acts, the
danger is further heightened.

It is a regrettable fact that the anc,
scattered over various parts of the
country, lacks cohesion or discipline.
In few centres does the force have any
actual leadership. There is no evidence
that the ANC troops are properly em-
ployed or subject to the ordinary
routine, such as physical training,
drilling or other exercises which are
the normal practice in all armies. The
ANC troops, disgruntled and dissatis-
fied, merely sit around in their camps,
a prey to every type of rumor and
suspicion. Since the assumption of
power by their Chief of Staff on Sep-
tember 14, these undisciplined troops,
lacking any coherent control, have
been drawn into the vortex of the
political strife. Their lawless actions
have had varying and sometimes con-
tradictory political motivations. Gen-
erally, however, it is hunger, idleness
and the consciousness of their extreme
nuisance value which have driven
them either singly or in bands or,
more dangerously still, in large groups
to threaten the honor and safety not
only of their own officers but also of
the peaceful civilians and govern-
mental functionaries. As these troops
are armed, often heavily, the danger
is greatly magnified.

The seriousness of the situation lies
in the fact that although their Chief
of Staff claims to have neutralized
political activity, he has in a sense
assumed governmental responsibility
which he attempts to exercise through
a College of Commissioners nominated
by him. Although his army has not it-
self formally assumed the prerogatives
of the judiciary or the functions of the
police, members of the aNc have fre-
quently usurped those functions. They
have set themselves up as judges of
what type of activity they will allow
or disallow, regardless of the laws of
the land. It is they who have taken
upon themselves to decide who is to
be imprisoned or detained, for how
long and under what conditions. It
is they who have issued orders for the
deportation of persons or prevention
of movement, generally without writ-
ten authority of any kind. For the law
of the land, the arbitrary will of the
soldiery has been substituted.

The disregard for the norms of
justice and legality at the ANc head-
quarters naturally finds its reflection
in a yet more indiscriminate form at
other centres where large numbers of
troops are congregated, threatening a
paralysis of the life of the country.
The fear of arbitrary arrest, assault,
deportation, detention, looting or
worse hangs over the populace and,
principally, over political figures who
at the moment may be out of favor
with the military group in the ascend-
ant in a given area.

The ANC command in Leopoldville
denies authorization for many of the
acts of lawlessness committed by ANC
personnel. The very fact of the denial
is conclusive evidence of the complete
absence of control. Even in Leopold-
ville itself, the ANC troops are not un-
der any single effective command, and
the Chief of Staff himself has sought
and long enjoyed the protection of
United Nations troops. The former
Commander-in-Chief, General Lundu-
la, had similarly sought United Na-
tions protection. As the high com-
mand of the ANC seems unable to ac-
cept responsibility for the 25,000
ANC troops scattered throughout the
country, and indeed is incapable of
exercising it, the United Nations op-
erations in the Congo are faced
with an extremely difficult problem,
which goes to the heart of its re-
sponsibility in regard to the preserva-
tion of law and order.

For the present ONUC has sought to
combat this situation by reinforcing
its existing procedures and developing
new measures consonant with its
mandate and the means at its disposal.
In Leopoldville strong representation
made to the Chief of Staff of the anc
in the last weeks of October obtained
a general withdrawal of his troops
from the streets of Leopoldville to
their barracks. Patrolling, both by
United Nations troops and by United
Nations police, was intensified. Route
marches were organized to show the
United Nations flag and to emphasize
the presence of the ONUC troops, with
a view to restoring confidence and im-
proving public morale. Experiments
were begun with the establishment in
several critical sectors of the city of
joint foot patrols by United Nations
and Congolese police, although the
latter have proven scarcely prepared
for such a measure. A rising clamor
from political figures for personal pro-
tection was met by an increase in
mobile patrols.

Where provincial capitals have been
put in a state of alarm by anc riot-
ing, acts of indiscipline, or political
arrests, much has been accomplished
by determined action on the part of
the Force, by security surveillance to

protect provincial officials against il-
legal harassment, by a concentrated
show of strength at key points, and
by firm persuasion to rectify illegal
measures through good offices. In-
creasing deployment of troops has
brought new confidence to some re-
gions which had been harried, as in
areas of Equateur Province, where
many of the plantations have begun
work again, with a consequent im-
provement in the economy. When the
passage of unpaid ANC troops with-
drawing from Katanga to Orientale
Province brought looting and pillage
along the route followed, ONUC trans-
port planes were used to airlift them
to their destinations in order to elim-
inate these incidents.

A principal effort for dealing with
the problems of inactivity and indis-
cipline has been the preparation of a
program of reorganization and train-
ing of the anc. Unfortunately, prog-
ress in training measures actually
launched has been disappointing, as
a result of non-cooperation and disin-
terest on the part of the anc, both
officers and men. To some extent this
is undoubtedly due to the current
tendency to place politics before pro-
fession. Nevertheless, ONUC efforts to
advise on the necessary reorganiza-
tion and encourage the professional
spirit prerequisite to any real pro-
gram of instruction have been intensi-
fied, while ONUC military headquar-
ters continues with its preparation of
the details of the project.

As a result of the negotiations
undertaken by the United Nations for
the enactment of a cease-fire order in
the area of South Kasai, President
Kasavubu issued an order on Sep-
tember 23 instructing the troops of
the ANc stationed in or passing through
the southern region of the Kasai
Province to return immediately to
Leopoldville. Subsequently, on Sep-
tember 24, President Kasavubu re-
quested the assistance of the United
Nations in the establishment of a no-
man’s land roughly covering the ter-
ritories of Luiza, Kazumba, Lulua-
bourg, Dibaya, Mwene-Ditu§ and
Bakwanga.

In accordance with this order, the
bulk of the ANC was withdrawn from
the Province of Kasai, and only a
small contingent was left in the city
of Luluabourg to protect it against
the possibility of an armed attack by
the Katangese gendarmerie or by Bal-
uba forces from south Kasai. Coin-
ciding with the aNc withdrawal, and
in Opposition to the cease-fire order,
the troops of Mr. Kalonji, which until
then had been concentrated in the
area of Gandajika near the Katanga
border, extended their zone of oc-
cupation to a region delimited by the

Katanga Province on the south, the
rivers Bushimaie and Lubi to the west
and the territories of Bakwanga and
Gandajika on the north and southeast.
In the absence of ANc troops, the area
was occupied without resistance. An
attempt to enter the territory of Ka-
binda was, however, frustrated by a
group of armed members of the
Basonge tribe, supported by the Ka-
binda gendarmerie.

Negotiations with Colonel Gillet
and Colonel Crevecoeur and other
European commanding officers of the
Kalonji troops were immediately
started by United Nations representa-
tives for the enforcement of the cease-
fire in the area occupied by their
troops, and the conversion of these
troops into a police force exclusively
devoted to the maintenance of law
and order was tentatively agreed to by
both parties. However, the feelings
of apprehension created among the
surrounding Basonge and Kanioka
tribes by the frequent sallies and re-
pressive actions of the Kalonji troops
resulted in the adoption by these tribes
of a series of defensive measures,
which were in turn interpreted by the
Kalonji officers as indicative of the
existence of a concerted plan of at-
tack against the area occupied by their
troops. The tense state of alert created
by such mutual fears and suspicions
made it impossible for the United Na-
tions representatives to achieve the en-
visaged neutralization of the Kalonji
forces.

On October 25 an armed clash took
place between the Kanioka and the
Baluba in the regions of Mwene-Ditu
and Kabinda, resulting in a large but
still undetermined number of casual-
ties. The clash was temporarily halted
by the United Nations Force but was
later resumed with greater violence,
despite United Nations efforts at paci-
fication. A force estimated at 5,000
men and led by Captain Roberts, an
English-speaking European, and by
non-Congolese residents of Mvwene-
Ditu began to advance toward Luiza
on October 28 against the opposition
of armed Kanioka. The Belgian-led
Kalonji forces burnt the village of
Malunda and killed its inhabitants.

The United Nations forces have
been instructed to utilize all means at
their disposal to prevent the Kalonji
troops from pursuing their advance
and are attempting to form a neutral
zone between the Baluba and the
Kanioka tribes in the area separating
the Mwene-Ditu territory from the
territories of Bakwanga and Ganda-
jika, and between the Bakwanga and
Kabinda territories. Captain Roberts
and three of his assistants were taken
into custody on October 29 while at-
tempting to lead their units across

UNR—December 1960

United Nations lines in defiance of the
cease-fire orders.

The presence in central and north
Katanga of heavily armed gendarmerie
units under the command of Belgian
officers had been for some time a
source of irritation to the Baluba
tribes opposed to the present Katan-
gese authorities. The prevailing state
of tension increased to the point
where, on September 13 and 14,
groups of armed Baluba engaged the
gendarmerie forces at Manano and
kept them in check in spite of the
gendarmerie’s considerable numbers
and superior armament. Arson and
looting occurred in the town before
the United Nations forces could inter-
vene to stop the conflict.

On the following day the United
Nations forces averted a clash between
the Balubakat and the pro-Tshombe
Conakat workers of the nearby coal
mine of Luena but were unable to
persuade the demonstrators to dis-
perse. On the afternoon of that day,
however, and when the situation ap-
peared to be relatively stable, a train
with two seemingly empty carriages
arrived at the station of Luena; there
emerged a force of 95 Katangese
gendarmes, including 30 special re-
cruits, who immediately took up posi-
tions. On the other side of a wire
barrier there was a large crowd of
Baluba, many of them armed with
primitive weapons or bicycle chains.
After a short interval, the gendarmerie
opened fire on the crowd and, after
dispersing it, despatched patrols in
various directions which hunted down
and shot numerous Baluba, some of
whom had offered no resistance to the
patrols’ advance.

On September 16, further patrols
were sent by the gendarmerie to
neighboring villages, which were sub-
sequently found by United Nations
troops to be deserted, with several
dwellings burnt. Two truckloads of
prisoners were taken out of Luena by
the gendarmerie. The trucks were later
found abandoned by the roadside and
the United Nations troops counted 68
dead, all of them Baluba. There were
no casualties on the side of the gen-
darmerie.

As was to be expected, this brutal
repressive operation, and raids which
were carried out by the Katangese
gendarmerie in the towns of Niemba,
Kabalo and Mitwaba, aroused the
feelings of the local population to a
degree bordering on desperation. In
some cases, as in Luena, the civilian
population sought the protection of
the United Nations forces, but in
general their desire was to take re-
venge, whatever the risks involved.

In view of the explosive character
of the situation, it was proposed to
the Katangese authorities at Elisabeth-

UNR—December 1960

ville that the regions comprising the
territories of Nyunzu, Kabalo and
Manono, and the north of the terri-
tories of Malemba-Nkulu and Kabon-
go, and the area of Luena and Bu-
kama, be placed under the protection
of the United Nations Force. The
Katangese authorities accepted the
proposal and it was agreed that the
Katangese gendarmerie would abstain
from actively intervening in these re-
gions and that the United Nations
troops would defend the sectors
against incursions by armed groups
and would assume primary responsi-
bility for their security. On October
19, before the arrangement had come
into force, the town of Kabalo was
surrounded by some 1,000 to 3,000
tribesmen armed with primitive weap-
ons, but after protracted negotiations
a major clash was successfully avert-
ed. Similarly, peaceful negotiations
with all the parties involved have also
contributed to prevent the outbreak
of hostilities in other parts of the pro-
tected sector.

As part of the United Nations ar-
rangements for the pacification of
north and central Katanga and in ac-
cordance with established United Na-
tions principles and procedures, the
United Nations has arranged a visit to
Bukama, Manono and Kabalo of rec-
ognized leaders of the Baluba popula-
tions in those areas.

Vi. Military Operations

The United Nations Force in the
Congo continues to serve, during this
period of emergency, as a security
force at the request of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of the Congo,
to assist the Government in the resto-
ration and maintenance of law and
order.

There has been an increase in the
total strength since the previous re-
port. The United Nations Force in
the Congo now consists of 18,451
officers and men provided by 29 na-
tions. The main contingents, however,
continue tc be supplied by 15 coun-
tries, the remainder furnishing the
administrative and ancillary units, in-
cluding the air force personnel and
the headquarters staff. The major ad-
ditions have been a battalion from
Indonesia, which is now serving in
southern Equateur Province, and a
battalion from Malaya, just arrived,
and designated for service in Kasai
Province. In addition, a battalion from
Nigeria is expected early in Novem-
ber 1960 and will be deployed in Kivu
Province. With the change in the
political structure of the Mali Federa-
tion, the Mali battalion is shortly to
leave the Congo. After the above
changes, the Force will have the

equivalent of 22 battalions in addi-
tion to a complement of signals, an
ordnance depot, a field hospital, sup-
ply and transport units and an air
transport unit.

During the period under review, as
already indicated, law and order in
the Congo deteriorated. Apart from
heavy calls on the troops in the areas
in which they were deployed, there
were numerous occasions when re-
deployment had to be made in con-
sequence of serious situations that
arose from time to time. In some of
these instances, reinforcements had to
be airlifted from other provinces, im-
posing a heavy strain on the already
fully-committed resources of the air
force. In spite of an increase in the
total strength of the United Nations
Force in the Congo, it can by no
means be considered as adequate to
deal with the complex situations that
arise in the various parts of the coun-
try from time to time, especially bear-
ing in mind the enormous distances
involved. Moreover, political and other
disturbances occur so rapidly that it
is often very difficult to predict mili-
tary requirements in any given area.

The United Nations troops often
find themselves faced with situations
beyond normal military experience and
yet they have acted with the utmost
tact and moderation in carrying out
their duties as a peace force. By de-
votion, restraint and good discipline,
they have been able to inspire admira-
tion and respect. The troops have dis-
played great patience in the face of
serious provocations to which they
are continually subjected. Throughout
the political turmoil, the United Na-
tions soldier has remained impartial,
unbiased and devoted to his task of
helping to maintain law and order.

Air Operations

Since the first progress report, the
number of hours flown by United Na-
tions aircraft has increased, while the
incidence of charter work has de-
creased. Despite this, the total United
Nations airlift has not been as great
as during the previous period. More
surface transport is now being utilized
than previously, and during the period
under review there were no major,
apart from operational, troop move-
ments by air.

Operations by C-119 aircraft have
been curtailed because of an increase
in unserviceability resulting from a
lack of spare parts. The serviceability
of DC-3 aircraft is improving, and
many have now had their first main-
tenance inspection by United Nations
personnel at the air transport unit,
Kamina. The serviceability of light
aircraft and helicopters is not yet sat-
isfactory but should improve with the

arrival of additional personnel and
spare parts.

Costly training of air crew and
technicians has shown a marked de-
crease during the period. This was to
be expected, as sufficient personnel
have gained experience in the type of
flying required in the Congo. To date,
fortunately, there have been no flying
accidents, and an active flight safety
program has been introduced.

The important air operations during
this period included:

(a) The movement of the Indo-
nesian advance party from Leopold-
ville to Coquilhatville and the Moroc-
can parachute company from Coquil-
hatville to Leopoldville;

(b) The movement of the Indo-
nesian troops and of their equipment
from Leopoldville to Boende;

(d) The movement of the Ghanaian
troops and their equipment from
Leopoldville to Tshikapa and of Tuni-
sian troops from Tshikapa to Leopold-
ville. All aircraft with available space
were moved through Luluabourg en
route to Leopoldville so that the Tuni-
sian Brigade could use all the space
and therefore reduce the total amount
which would have to go by surface
route.

The United Nations scheduled flight
service connecting all major terminals
throughout the Congo commenced on
November 1. This should reduce sig-
nificantly the number of requests for
special flights and at the same time
improve mail deliveries, individual
personnel movements, urgently re-
quired medical and logistics items and
generally result in an overall economy
in the utilization of air transport.

During the period an air mainte-
nance unit was established at Kamina.
The centralization of this facility has
resulted in a significant saving in man-
power and has avoided a duplication
of equipment such as would be re-
quired if separate maintenance bases
were established. An effective organi-
zation and system of maintenance
adapted to the peculiar requirements
of the Congo have been evolved. This
system is such that maximum utiliza-
tion of the aircraft will be realized
while retaining the highest possible
standards of maintenance.

The United Nations Air Transport
Force is still hampered by a shortage
of adequate personnel. The manning
position of the air staff at oNUC head-
quarters is now satisfactory, but there
are still serious deficiencies in the
field.

Force Logistics

The problem of logistics for a Force
of nearly 19,000 troops, widely de-

ployed, often at vary short notice,
throughout a large country, with in-
adequate transportation facilities and
shortages of essential supplies, con-
tinues to be one of the most difficult
facing the oNuUC Force. Sufficient ex-
perienced personnel have not been
prompily available, and only the most
strenuous efforts of those assigned to
the task, with full support of the civil-
ian procurement services, have pre-
vented serious breakdowns. At the
start of operations, the magnitude of
the logistics task had not been fully
realized, with the result that the ad hoc
organization to meet it was found to
be inadequate. With the experience
gained, the entire organization, par-
ticularly its movement control element,
has been revised, and it is hoped to
put these revisions into effect in the
near future. The scope and complexity
of the logistics problem are indicated
by a few illustrative items taken from
a detailed report covering the period
under review: air passengers, 1,676;
air freight, approximately 500 tons;
sea passengers, 1,840; 20 ships with
cargo of approximately 1,100 tons of
stores and 403 vehicles; river passen-
gers, 2,127; river freight, approximate-
ly 1,550 tons plus 300 vehicles; ord-
nance equipment for the entire Force,
including clothing and personal issue,
beds, cots and mattresses, vehicles,
technical equipment; supplies in wide
variety, and mail; accommodations
provided in Leopoldville for a further
1,000 troops.

Health

While the health of the troops in
general has been satisfactory during
the period under review, there has
been some increase in _ sickness
amongst certain units, due to seasonal
symptoms and also the stress and
strain of service in the Congo. There
has been an overall deterioration in
the civilian health services and pre-
ventive measures for the civilian popu-
lation; as a result, there is a real
danger to the health of troops de-
ployed in rural areas. Thus there is a
need for more military hygienists with
experience of tropical diseases, who
would be located at each territorial
command headquarters to advise units
on environmental sanitary methods.

The Indian field hospital has set up
a large base hospital in Leopoldville
and is in the process of setting up
two 50-bed units each in Luluabourg
and Coquilhatville. An Italian hospital
is being set up in Elisabethville with
a forward detachment at Albertville.
Plans call for an Austrian hospital to
be established in Stanleyville with a
detachment at Bukavu; reconnaissance
for this purpose has been carried out.
Arrangements have been made to pro-

vide dental services at each main
hospital.

A medical store has been set up for
ONUC troops in Leopoldville, and ef-
forts are being made to stock it with

six months’ supplies for 20,000 troops.

Communications

Radio teletype facilities have been
made available from Leopoldville to
each of the provincial capitals and
Matadi. In addition, hand speed Morse
circuits operate to Kamina, Goma and
Albertville. The Indian signals com-
pany has arrived and communications
in Katanga Province have been taken
over by them. A major problem for
tactical communications results from
the vast distances involved.

Conclusion

The political and economic situa-
tion has deteriorated to such an extent
as to impose a considerable strain on
the resources of the ONUC Force. The
activities of the ANC and the gendar-
merie, throughout the provinces, have
in no small way contributed to the
present chaotic conditions. This dan-
ger will remain until this force is
properly handled, officered and dis-
ciplined. The oNuc Force has suc-
ceeded to a considerable extent in
restoring law and order in areas which
had been the scene of intense inter-
tribal conflict. Though the strength of
the Force is less than adequate for the
task confronting it, much has been
achieved during the period under re-
view. The presence and sustained ac-
tivity of the United Nations troops
have been a major contribution to
peace and security throughout the
country.

On the organizational plane, multi-
farious problems, especially those of
logistics involved in the movement
and deployment of troops, have been
overcome through intensive effort.
However, more means of transporta-
tion are needed, by river and air, along
with the necessary staff to handle
them. The air transport force in par-
ticular is seriously deficient in aircraft
and personnel to carry out its mission
effectively.

Vil. Former Belgian Military
Bases

As reported by the Secretary-Gen-
eral to the Security Council in his
third report on the implementation of
the Security Council resolutions, the
United Nations took over, on the
withdrawal of Belgian combat troops,
full responsibility for the administra-
tion of the military bases of Kamina
and Kitona (including Banana). The
report also stated that the Secretary-
General had called upon the Belgian

UNR—December 1960

Government to put the necessary num-
ber of Belgians, in a civilian capacity,
at the disposal of the United Nations
for technical assistance for the tem-
porary administration of the bases,
until such time as the necessary United
Nations staff could be assembled and
organized for that purpose.

On October 15, while a number of
Belgian technicians were still necessary
for the performance of essential tasks,
a point had been reached where ONUC,
having deployed the necessary mini-
mum personnel, could take over the
actual managerial functions of the
bases. Where appropriate, ONUC also
assumed contractual obligations relat-
ing to their operation, which concerned
essentially the employment of Congo-
lese workers on the bases and the
supply and procurement contracts
necessary to their maintenance.

Meanwhile, a study group appointed
by the Secretary-General to inquire
into the future use of the bases of
Kamina and Kitona, under the chair-
manship of Mr. Galo Plaza (Ecuador),
had visited the Congo from August 29
to September 15. Proposals resulting
from the report of this study group
will be discussed with the Congolese
authorities and their views and agree-
ment sought on the future use of the
bases. In accordance with the terms
of Article 40 of the United Nations
Charter, these discussions will reserve
the question of the settlement of issues
of title to, and payment for, the prop-
erty. The circumstances of the politi-
cal situation, however, have not yet
permitted fruitful consultations with
the Congolese authorities in this re-
gard.

Kamina

Whereas the Belgian military base
of Kamina had a normal establish-
ment of 1,105 non-combat personnel,
the actual number was 759 early in
September. On November 1, 392 of
this personnel were still at Kamina,
but the great majority of them were
by then completing the briefing of the
United Nations personnel which had
arrived to replace them. It is planned
that the number of Belgian technical
personnel working at Kamina base as
of November 15 will be 95—of whom
28 will be employed at the hospital,
to be shortly replaced by ONUC per-
sonnel; 11 for the supervision of con-
struction works; 22 in the air main-
tenance unit; 10 (including four wom-
en social workers) in the administra-
tion and welfare of Congolese labor;
and the others in various essential
engineering and technical tasks. The
departure of this personnel will de-
pend only upon the speed with which
minimum essential replacements, in
addition to the oNUC personnel al-

UNR—December 1960

ready assigned to the base, can be
provided.

The problem of the continued op-
eration, as an immediate measure, of
the various services of Kamina base
has a special importance because the
base provides at present a source of
employment for nearly 4,000 Congo-
lese, who live on the base with their
families — some 10,000 in all — and
have the benefit of important social
services. This immediate problem has
been solved by the fact that some of
the facilities of the base have been
put to use for the support of the
United Nations Force in the Congo.
An air transport and maintenance unit
has been established, and some troops
of the Force stationed on the base;
supporting engineering, medical, ord-
nance, signals and supply services are
being maintained.

Some of the construction contracts
which had been cancelled by the Bel-
gian military authorities during the
month of August were revived and
taken over by ONuc, thus ensuring
renewed work for several hundreds
of Congolese who would have other-
wise been unemployed. Only those
contracts were revived, however, which
related to work beneficial to the Con-
golese population of the base or which
were important in relation to its future
use. Appropriate measures were also
taken, within the framework of the
exercise by the United Nations of its
exclusive authority over the base, for
the regulation of the municipal life of
the approximately 15,000 Congolese
population living there.

Kitona

In the first days of September there
were 650 Belgian military personnel
at the base of Kitona (including
Banana). On November 1, this num-
ber had been reduced to 77 technical,
non-combatant personnel. The com-
plete withdrawal of all Belgian per-
sonnel from Kitona will be possible
in a short time (not exceeding one
month), once a decision has been
taken as to the immediate future of
the base.

Contrary to the situation at Kamina,
the United Nations has not found the
base of Kitona necessary or useful
for the support of the United Nations
Force. Moreover, the problem of the
Congolese population living on the
base is less acute than in Kamina,
since a much smaller number of per-
sons is involved. The total number of
Congolese employed at Kitona base
is approximately 1,000, and the total
population only slightly over 2,000,
as many women and children have
left following the events of the past
months.

The study group referred to above,
in its report, has suggested that, as an
interim measure, the buildings and
other facilities at Kitona could be put
into immediate and effective use for
the training of the Congolese Army.
This suggestion is presently under
discussion with the Command of the
Congolese Army. Should this solution
not be adopted, the only practical
solution would consist in closing down
the base and in preserving it, pending
final disposition, on a care and main-
tenance basis.

Meanwhile, a number of Congolese
who had been left without work fol-
lowing the cancellation by the Belgian
military authorities of construction
contracts were re-employed during the
month of October by onuc for the
completion of some construction work
on the base.

Vill.

The period under review was one
of acute difficulty for technical assist-
ance operations, owing to the pro-
longed state of political instability and
the absence of security. In fact, new
obstacles arose to the continuance of
existing programs, while the launching
of new programs was rendered diffi-
cult if not impossible by the absence
of any governmental authority with
which formal contracts and agreements
could be concluded. The economy of
the country verged on collapse, and
the treasury was so depleted that the
country stood on the brink of bank-
ruptcy. Nevertheless, in spite of the
manifold difficulties, the problems
were confronted with persistence and
determination, with the result that not
only were the existing programs con-
tinued but in some cases even ex-
tended, where fresh authorizations
were not necessary, and, in the case
of unemployment relief, were under-
taken as a humanitarian measure in
consultation with the local authorities.
The financial situation was temporarily
salvaged by the timely application of
ONUC assistance. In result therefore,
as the following paragraphs will show,
advances of some significance have
been made in several fields of techni-
cal assistance.

Civilian Operations

Special Points of Progress

In the last report, the accomplish-
ments listed were mostly of an emer-
gency and operational nature. This
type of activity continues on an effec-
tive scale and has beca supplemented
in the past month by the start of an
emergency public works program for
the relief of unemployment. One of
the first of the public works projects
was started toward the end of October
in Leopoldville, where 1,000 of an

expected force of 2,200 laborers are
now at work draining the first 1,200
hectares of swampland. The drainage
of the swamp will eliminate the re-
maining breeding spot for the malaria
mosquito in the area of the capital
and will also provide a stretch of land
with rich agricultural possibilities.

The United Nations work, however,
has gone well beyond the purely op-
erative phase in the past month, to the
point where it is having a wider and,
if conditions permit, a long-term effect
on the economic and social conditions
of the country:

(a) Two experts have been provid-
ed for a monetary council providing,
on a transitional basis, for Congo
management of monetary and credit
policies.

(b) The release by the United Na-
tions of a grant of $5 million not only
gives the country access to desperately
needed foreign exchange for essential
imports, but also makes it possible for
the Central Bank to credit the full
countervalue in Congolese francs, to
add to the depleted treasury.

(c) The adoption of a series of
import-export and foreign exchange
controls, with advice from United Na-
tions experts, safeguards the country
against further drains on its foreign
earnings and allows essential imports
to begin again on a modest scale.

(d) The completion of background
studies on the economic status of the
country, on the status of unemploy-
ment, on budgetary principles, on the
mining industries, etc., has given Con-
golese authorities a documentary basis
on which to build future policy.

The plans of ONUC to provide train-
ing facilities for Congolese so as to
enable as many as possible to take
over positions of responsibility has
reached the stage of definite action.
Thus, 60 fellows are en route to a full
medical education in different coun-
tries of Europe. Seven fellows have
left for meteorological training in
France. The accelerated agriculture
courses which have been established by
ONUC at Lovanium University, as well
as the more informal in-service courses
being given by the meteorological and
financial experts to their Congolese
counterparts, are likewise part of a
larger scheme to prepare the people
for immediate participation in the
development of their country.

As regards the provision of foreign
staff, WHO [the World Health Organi-
zation] and UNESCO [the United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization] have recently
agreed with responsible authorities to
start immediate recruitment in their
respective fields. WHo will send 130
doctors and medical aides to support
preventive health services, and UNESCO
will provide 500 teachers to replace

those who have left. This arrangement,
however, represents a setback in the
plan originally conceived. Whereas
one month ago it was hoped that
these people would be recruited on
behalf of the Government and be paid
wholly or at least partially by the
Government, they will now have to
begin under ONUC auspices, with ONUC
paying their salaries for an_ initial
period. Doctors and teachers being of
the first priority, it was felt that re-
cruitment simply could not be held
up while waiting for the proper con-
ditions of service. ONUC may en-
counter the same prospect in the judi-
ciary field, where an equally pressing
need exists.

Special Points of Difficulty

The difficulties hampering civilian
operations are many. Most of them
are carry-overs from the first months,
but serious new ones have been added:

(a) The virtual lack of a central
government, with which a technical
assistance mission would ordinarily be
able to cooperate;

(b) The inexperience, and in many
cases the political preoccupations, of
ministerial officials and even heads of
technical departments, which prevent
them from devoting themselves with
sufficient competence and attention to
the organization of their respective
services;

(c) The continuing transport prob-
lem, particularly as it affects move-
ment of goods from a rail or plane
depot to the consuming area. This
has been particularly acute in the
Bakwanga area of Kasai Province,
where the ONUC programs of food re-
lief for refugees are constantly dis-
rupted by the lack of transport;

(d) The danger of a loss of con-
fidence in ONUC aid. One of the more
ominous difficulties which has pre-
sented itself recently is the feeling in
different parts of the country that
ONUC civilian operations have not re-
sponded to the situation as quickly
as the Congolese had expected. The
fact that many requests were not well-
founded, or that a good portion of
the “delays” were attributable to lack
of action by the Congolese themselves,
does not in any way lessen the threat
inherent in the spread of this attitude.
Part of the problem can be attributed
to the situation regarding public
works, where the first attempt by
ONUC to draw up a sizable list of proj-
ects gave rise to the belief that the
unemployment problem would be
speedily remedied. When these proj-
ects did not all materialize at once,
the feeling of “being let down” by
ONUC began to gain momentum. If
civilian operations have been able to
rise above the political stagnation, it

is only because some Congolese offi-
cials understood the economic aims of
ONUC on their behalf and welcomed
technical assistance. It would be most
unfortunate if this reservoir of good
will were to be lost through a mis-
guided impression that ONUC is not
fulfilling its promises.

(e) A psychological climate domi-
nated by fear or misunderstanding. In
some cases, the operation has been
handicapped, not by an attitude of
disappointment, but by groundless
fears and misapprehensions, often the
result of hostile propaganda. A re-
grettable example was the treatment
of five diesel mechanics who had been
provided by ONUC to cope with the
accumulation of diesel breakdowns.
Fearing another disruption of rail
services, this time for lack of work-
able engines, ONUC had recruited this
team as an emergency measure. The
five experts arrived in the Congo at
the end of October and were assigned
to the Thysville railway workshop,
only to be driven out by the local
workers. Although they have been re-
assigned to equally important work in
other fields, i.e. the maintenance of
steamship equipment at Boma and the
maintenance of facilities at the Kamina
base, the fact remains that it was not
possible to use their services for the
crucial purpose originally intended.

(f) Activities of Belgians returning
to advisory and administrative posts
of government. Chapter IV deals with
this subject, but a listing of the diffi-
culties facing civilian operations would
be incomplete without a pointed refer-
ence to the problems posed by a con-
certed influx of Belgians. Administra-
tive advisers of Belgian nationality
have in several instances tried to
create a barrier between Congolese
officials and ONUC representatives.
Onuc programs for the training of
Congolese have sometimes been ob-
structed by Belgians. Reports and in-
formation intended for the Congolese
have been blocked. Non-Congolese
advisers and experts could surely be
of great value at this critical juncture.
But their assistance should be given in
close coordination with the United
Nations and in a spirit adapted to the
independent Congo’s desire to take a
new course in the shaping of its own
economic and social affairs.

The Status of Civilian Operations
in the Provinces

The period covered by this report
is notable for the liaison which has
been established between the Chief of
Civilian Operations in Leopoldville
and the onuc civilian officers in the
provinces. The reports of these offi-
cers, and of other members of the
civilian operations mission who have

UNR—December 1960

begun to travel more _ frequently
through the country, have given the
United Nations a much more adequate
picture than it had a month ago of
the economic and social situation out-
side Leopoldville.

The existence of one or even two
ONUC Officers in each province cannot
make up for the breakdown in the
transmission of essential economic in-
formation and statistics, which has, in
fact, isolated Leopoldville from other
parts of the country, nor can it make
up entirely for the disruption in liaison
between central and provincial minis-
tries. Nevertheless, the information
which has thus far been received
makes it possible to estimate the na-
ture and scope of technical assistance
needed in different areas and to sug-
gest a system of priorities. Unfortu-
nately, this information has also tend-
ed to confirm earlier impressions of
the state of administrative, economic
and social disruption. The general diffi-
culties which have been listed in the
previous section can be said to apply
to the provinces as well as the capital,
but the following considerations must
be added:

(a) The oONuc civilian officer—in
terms of his responsibility for techni-
cal assistance—finds himseif deluged
with miscellaneous information from
all sources. The latter include not
only government officials, but com-
mercial interests and private citizens
as well. The demand on his time has,
in fact, negated part of the job which
it was visualized he would do—name-
ly, to travel widely within the province
to which he is assigned. As most of
the officers have already reported,
their impressions are confined to the
area of the capital city because the
demands on their time tend to keep
them there.

(b) With the possible exception of
one province, provincial governments
are very weak, and the uncertainty as
to whether a president or minister will
be in power the next day makes it
almost impossible to begin work on
any serious economic or social plan.
The situation which apparently obtains
throughout the country was summed
up recently by one of the civilian offi-
cers in the following words: “It is
necessary to realize that they [the
ministers] are particularly inclined to
ask my assistance whenever they are
faced with an urgent problem, but
that they hardly ever take advantage
of the opportunity to consult me on
longer-term problems.”

(c) Although the scope of civilian
operations in the various provinces
has increased over the past month, it
must be realized that oNUC technical
assistance outside of Leopoldville is
still modest. In most of the provinces,
civilian operations are represented by

UNR—December 1960

the Red Cross and telecommunica-
tions teams, who are continuing their
excellent practical work. On the ad-
visory level, and in addition to the
ONUC civilian officers, there are WHO
specialists attached to the ministers of
health of five provinces. The success
which the wHo experts have had and
the need which has been expressed by
the other ministers themselves make
it seem wise to attach advisers to key
ministries in each province. Belgian
consultants are now present in most
provincial ministries.

(d) Reports from the provinces
make it clear that the injection of
financial aid is essential if the eco-
nomic structure is to be kept intact.
Although, as was mentioned in the
last report, the momentum of the past
has carried most of the industrial,
agricultural and mining enterprises
through the first few months, many
may yet be abandoned if money for
salaries and equipment is not forth-
coming. Indeed, the civilian officer in
Bukavu has warned that small in-
dustries and agricultural concerns
“threaten to flow away unless a means
is found of continuing their financing.”
He has also warned that the mines
now operating in Kivu Province might
very well be crippled if all the per-
sonnel who have already handed in
their notices follow through on their
plans to leave.

Conclusion

The conclusion to the section on
civilian operations in the last progress
report expressed the hope that ONUC
could contribute toward the solution
of the multiple economic problems of
the Congo in a measurable period of
time, provided the basic conditions
were assured. That hope has unfortu-
nately not advanced materially be-
cause of the manifold considerations
described in this and other chapters.
Nevertheless, as stated at the outset
of this chapter, the economy and the
essential public services have been
prevented from collapsing, thanks
largely to the efforts of the ONUC
technicians. The technical assistance
consultants are always available, when
the proper conditions are created, to
advance the country rapidly toward
economic stability, assisted by fur-
ther teams of experts who would be
required when they can be usefully
and purposefully employed in different
parts of the country.

IX. Conclusion

The period under report has been
one of great uncertainty and much
turbulence. Various rival “govern-
ments” were announced and their

composition revised, but they existed
on paper only. The coup of the ANC
Chief of Staff had introduced a new
factor adding to the complexity of the
situation. The aim of this incursion
was ostensibly to neutralize the two
principal political figures and the
Parliament, with a view to political
solutions being found in the resultant
state of suspended animation. The
day-to-day business of the administra-
tion was to be conducted by a College
of Commissioners recruited predomi- -
nantly from students. In fact, however,
as indicated earlier in this report, the
eruption of the army into the political
scene constituted a new menace to
peace and security and actually in-
hibited peaceful political activity. Far
from the ANC’s providing any measure
of security or stability, it became the
principal fomenter of lawlessness. This
force, scattered in different centres
throughout the country, lacking any
coherent leadership or control, undis-
ciplined and unpaid and fully armed,
began to take the law into its own
hands. The carrying out of arbitrary
arrests and imprisonments without
any shadow of legal justification be-
came the order of the day. In Leo-
poldville, the hub of the life of the
country and the principal centre of
political activity, it introduced a state
of terror threatening a paralysis of the
life of the community.

Such a situation had to be coun-
tered with firmness, as the continuance
of a state of anarchy and lawlessness
became increasingly dangerous. After
persistent effort, the Chief of Staff of
the ANC was persuaded to withdraw
his troops from the city, where they
had been roaming the streets at
will. Concurrently, the United Nations
troops took on added responsibilities
in regard to the maintenance of law
and order. This has had an immediate
calming effect on the city which has
found some reflection in the provincial
capitals. But the serious problem posed
by the ANC continues. Its proper solu-
tion is the responsibility of the Congo-
lese leaders themselves if the country
is not to be repeatedly menaced by
chaos and anarchy.

Another complicating factor has
been the violent advent of bands of
lawless youths, ostensibly subscribing
to one political persuasion or another,
and having sometimes no more than
tribal affiliations. These bands, some-
times armed, taking advantage of the
prevailing disorder, have become in-
creasingly bold and active. From
carrying out violent physical assaults,
generally inspired by dubious political
motives, they have been implicated in
acts of assassination and abduction, a
few cases of the kind having occurred
in Leopoldville itself. This is a form
of activity which is extremely danger-

ous to the future of the country and
must be controlled by the leaders in
whose name these youths claim to
operate.

The College of Commissioners,
drawn from inexperienced young stu-
dents and whose declared purpose was
to keep the elements of the administra-
tion running, created problems of its
own in relation to the United Nations
effort. The young men were invariably
accompanied by numerous Belgian
advisers, occasionally drawn from
among their own teachers. The in-
evitable consequence was that the
commissioners were more inclined to
listen to their own mentors than to
act in cooperation with the United
Nations consultants, who in many
ministries found a wall of opposition
building up against them. Indeed, in-
stead of cooperating with the United
Nations technical aid mission, as was
their proclaimed purpose, the commis-
sioners actually set themselves up in
opposition to it. Their inexperience,
their lack of method and order, their
susceptibility to outside influences,
combined with a propensity to issue
conflicting statements, introduced new
elements of delay, confusion and dis-
organization. As a result of these
combined factors, the chaotic admin-
istrative and economic situation
reached the verge of collapse.

As a result of the initiatives of
oNuc and offers of cooperation from

the head of the College of Commis-
sioners, efforts are being made to re-
move some of the obstructions and
impediments which bedevilled work-
ing relations between the commis-
sioners and the United Nations con-
sultants.

In dealing with the College on a
purely technical plane, for the purpose
of continuing the existing technical
aid programs, there has been no ques-
tion whatsoever of recognizing the
College as a legitimate government,
for its existence does not derive any
sanction from the Loi fondamentzele.
The College was nominated by the
ANC Chief of Staff and later formally
installed by the Chief of State, an
action which the Chief of Staff im-
mediately criticized as unauthorized,
since he had “neutralized” the Chief
of State. The authority of the com-
missioners is at best only derivative;
as a body nominated by the Chief of
Staff, its ultimate sanction is his will
and such authority over his troops
as he may be in a position to exercise
from time to time. There have been
frequent conflicts between the College
or some of its members and the Chief
of Staff, the will of the latter generally
prevailing.

Nevertheless, despite the absence of
a single effective government, or even
a coherent administration, technical
assistance programs have continued,
and much devoted work has been done

in manning the hospitals, preventing
the spread of disease, keeping the
arteries of the country open, feeding
the hungriest, starting relief programs
for the growing number of unem-
ployed and preventing complete finan-
cial bankruptcy. It can therefore safely
be said that by dint of the incessant
labors of the United Nations team of
consultants, who, despite the difficul-
ties and obstructions, have continued
in the face of seemingly insuperable
odds to carry out their task, the situa-
tion has, for the moment, been sal-
vaged from the disaster that threatened
it.

In the sphere of law and order,
United Nations troops have been un-
der tremendous pressure everywhere,
working around the clock without rest
or relaxation to provide the minimum
of security to the peaceful inhabitants.
The situation in north Katanga, which
has been earlier described, has im-
posed an added burden on the Force,
which has taken up the responsibility
for the pacification of the area. In
Kasai, where ruthless tribal and po-
litical warfare has been in progress,
the Force has interposed itself and
thus avoided much bloodshed; the
situation there is still troubled. In
other areas, the Force has prevented
the situation from deteriorating into
complete anarchy and lawlessness. In
Leopoldville itself, what measure of
order and security reigns is due large-
(Continued on page 81)

Summary Chronology of United Nations

Action Relating to the Congo

SEPTEMBER 1:

Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Under-Secretary
for Special Political Affairs, returned to
New York from service in the Congo
as Personal Representative there of the
Secretary-General. At a news conference
later in the day, he said that “despite all
the difficulties and misunderstandings, the
United Nations Organization in the
Congo is definitely off the ground.” There
were now some 16,000 United Nations
troops deployed throughout the vast
country, he reported. The civilian tech-
nical assistance program was burgeoning,
with a large number of experts already
at work.

He expressed the belief that “there
has never been in the history of interna-
tional organization the spirit of coopera-
tion amongst all the organizations—the

PART Ill: September 1-30, 1960

United Nations, the specialized agencies
and indeed private institutions as well—
that has been evidenced out there in
these last two months,” and never before
had there been “so generous a response
on the part of the nations of the world,
large and small” to an appeal for aid.

The overall health situation in the
Congo remained generally satisfactory,
the World Health Organization’s Regional
Office for Africa, in Brazzaville, reported.
WHo’s senior representative in the Congo
stated in his latest report that develop-
ments in the fourth week of health as-
sistance proved that “wHo enjoys the full
trust and confidence of the Congolese
health authorities.” He added that the
Congo’s Central Minister of Health had
recognized WHO as his advisory body and
as the sole coordinating agency in all

matters related to health services in the
Congo. WHO activities are carried out
as part of the overall United Nations
civilian operation there. WuHo public
health engineers were keeping a close
watch on water supplies. Arrangements
were being made to send medical supplies
urgently needed by hospitals and dis-
pensaries in the refugee areas in Kasai
Province.

SEPTEMBER 2:

The Secretary-General met with his
Advisory Committee on the Congo, con-
sisting of representatives of states so far
contributing units to the United Nations
Force in the Congo—Canada, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Liberia, the Mali Federation, Morocco,
Pakistan, the Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia
and the United Arab Republic.

UNR—December 1960

SEPTEMBER 3:

Texts of resolutions and special state-
ments adopted by the Conference of
Independent African States, in Leopold-
ville, August 25-30, were issued in a
press release circulated at United Nations
Headquarters on September 3.

The resolutions, among other things,
stressed the need to maintain the unity
and territorial integrity of the Republic
of the Congo; condemned any “seces-
sion and all colonialist maneuvers aimed
at dividing” the territory of the Congo;
extended full support and backing to
the Central Government of the Republic
of the Congo; expressed hope that Afri-
can assistance to the Congo would be
given “rapidly and on an ever-increasing
scale”; and paid tribute to the United
Nations for its work for peace in the
Congo. In a special message to Dr.
Bunche, the Conference congratulated
him for his work for peace and under-
standing in the Congo.

SEPTEMBER 4:

Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal, of In-
dia, left New York to serve as the Sec-
retary-General’s Special Representative
in the Congo and arrived there on Sep-
tember 5.

SEPTEMBER 6:

The United States transmitted to the
Secretary-General a check for $5 million
for use in the United Nations program
of international assistance to the Republic
of the Congo. The money was earmarked
for financing imports into the Congo as
stipulated in an agreement signed on
August 23 by representatives of the
United Nations and the Republic of the
Congo.

SEPTEMBER 7:

A second addendum to the third report
of the Secretary-General on implementa-
tion of Security Council resolutions of
July 14 and 22 and August 9, was is-
sued (S/4475/Add.2). This contained ex-
changes of communications between the
Secretary-General and the Belgian For-
eign Minister and the permanent repre-
sentative of Belgium to the United Na-
tions regarding delays in the withdrawal
of Belgian troops from the Congo. These
included: the letter of September 4 from
Ambassador Loridan to the Secretary-
General, the cable of the same date from
the Secretary-General to the Belgian For-
eign Minister and the latter’s reply of
September 5 and the Secretary-General’s
letter of September 5 to Ambassador
Loridan.

The fourth report of the Secretary-
General on implementation of the Secu-
rity Council resolutions of July 14 and
22 and August 9 was issued (S/4482).
In it, the Secretary-General set before
the Security Council estimates of urgently
needed international financial aid to the
Republic of the Congo.

The Secretary-General requested the
Council to appeal to member states for
contributions to a total of $100 million
in convertible currencies for a United
Nations Fund for the Congo; to urge
the parties within the Congo to bring
their conflicts to an end and to seek by

UNR—December 1960

peaceful means a solution to their in-
ternal problems; and to reaffirm its ear-
lier resolutions,

In making this last request, Mr. Ham-
marskjold declared: “The internal con-
flicts which have become increasingly
grave in the last few weeks and even
days, have taken on a particularly seri-
ous aspect due to the fact that parties
have relied on and obtained certain as-
sistance from the outside, contrary to
the spirit of the Security Council resolu-
tions, and tending to reintroduce elements
of the very kind which the Security
Council wished to eliminate when it re-
quested the immediate withdrawal of
Belgian troops.”

The Secretary-General also asked the
Council to “clarify, in appropriate terms,
the mandate of the United Nations
Force.” He envisaged the possible need
for temporarily disarming Congolese mili-
tary units.

The Secretary-General stated that in
deciding to send the United Nations
Force to the Congo in fulfilment of its
primary duty to maintain peace and
security, the Council had made only the
first move to stabilize the country and
protect peace in Africa. He warned that
the very major efforts of a great num-
ber of member countries, assisted by the
Organization, would be of no avail unless
parallel and consecutive steps were taken
to rebuild national life.

Stressing the need for a speedy end
to internal conflicts, the Secretary-Gen-
eral stated that no United Nations aid
to the Congo could serve its purpose if
the Organization “cannot count on full
cooperation from all responsible quarters
within the Republic of the Congo itself.”

He noted that the country had been
“torn by internal strife” centering around
constitutional problems but reaching
deeper and being linked to tribal differ-
ences and claims. He said that conflicts,
“which so far have completely stymied
all efforts to re-establish normal life, must
speedily be brought to an end if disinte-
gration is not to continue in spite of all
efforts made from the outside to achieve
a stabilization. And they must be brought
to an end by peaceful means.” He added
that it should be kept in mind that
solutions to internal problems “should
aim at the conservation and consolida-
tion of the unity and integrity of the
country.”

The Secretary-General emphasized that
the program of financial assistance he
urged for the Congo was not intended to
initiate “a permanent régime of external
subsidy, but is rather a relatively short-
term effort designed to set the Congo
on the road to becoming a source of
economic strength once more.”

The Secretary-General requested the
President of the Security Council to con-
vene a meeting of the Security Council
to consider his fourth report on the
Congo.

SEPTEMBER 8:

In an addendum to his fourth report
(S/4482/Add.1) the Secretary-General
gave the text of a note verbale dated
September 8 and addressed to the per-

manent representative of Belgium con-
cerning reports he had received of a
cargo marked “Belgian weapons” un-
loaded at Elisabethville airport from a
Sabena plane on September 7.

The Government of Yugoslavia con-
veyed through its delegation to the
United Nations a request for the urgent
convening of the Security Council to
consider the situation in the Congo in
order to take measures which would
finally ensure full implementation of the
decisions of the Security Council on the
question. The Yugoslav letter stated, inter
alia, that “in the last few days particu-
larly, new and very serious difficulties
have arisen,” and charged that “outside
interferences” had given support to
“secessionist ringleaders” such as Moise
Tshombe in Katanga Province and AIl-
bert Kalonji in Kasai Province. “These
actions,” the letter added, “have, un-
fortunately, been facilitated by the prac-
tices adhered to by the Command of the
United Nations Force under the ap-
pearance of non-intervention in the in-
ternal affairs of the Republic of the
Congo.”

A cable from Prime Minister Patrice
Lumumba addressed to the Secretary-
General urged the Security Council to
hold its next meeting in Leopoldville to
give Council members “the opportunity
to see for themselves the situation exist-
ing in the Republic of the Congo as a
result of the United Nations authorities’
interference in the Congo’s domestic
problems . . .” (S/4486).

SEPTEMBER 9:

In a further letter to the President of
the Security Council, the Secretary-Gen-
eral urged that the Council meeting he
had requested in his letter of September
7 be held “tonight”—September 9.

Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assist-
ant to the Secretary-General, returned
to New York after a two-week mission
to the Republic of the Congo. Mr.
Cordier had left for Leopoldville August
26 to review for the Secretary-General
the administrative organization in the
civilian and military United Nations op-
eration in the Congo.

The Secretary-General received a cable
from J. Kasongo, President of the Cham-
ber of Representatives, Republic of the
Congo. The cable said that the Chamber
had congratulated the United Nations
on the stand taken with the Belgian
Government against the slowness in im-
plementing the Security Council’s resolu-
tion on Katanga; requested the Secretary-
General to free immediately the Congo-
lese National Broadcasting Station; to
leave to the Congolese National Army
control of the Republic’s airfields; to
negotiate exclusively with the “only cen-
tral government of the Republic”; to
withdraw from the Congo all United
Nations troops belonging to NATO coun-
tries and to replace them by troops from
African countries; to send a commission
to the Congo to supervise on the spot
the implementation of the Security Coun-
cil’s resolutions; not to reconvene the
Security Council on the question of the
Congo before the full implementation

of the resolutions previously adopted by
that body.

Mr. Kasongo added that the Chamber
of Representatives protested against in-
terference of United Nations troops in
the internal conflict of the Republic of
the Congo and any attempt to place
“our independent and sovereign state
under the trusteeship of any organ what-
soever.”

The Security Council met in urgent
session to consider the Secretary-Gen-
eral’s fourth report on the Congo situ-
ation. Yugoslavia and Indonesia — not
members of the Council—were invited to
participate, at their request, in its delib-
erations.

The Secretary-General introduced his
report on implementation of the Coun-
cil’s resolutions on the Congo.

At the beginning of the meeting, Vasily
Kuznetsov, of the Soviet Union, drew
attention to a cable dated September 8
from Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister
of the Republic of the Congo, asking
the Council to hold a meeting in Leopold-
ville. The Council rejected a Soviet draft
resolution under which it would have
decided, in accordance with Article 28 of
the Charter, to hold immediately a spe-
cial meeting in Leopoldville. The vote
was 3 in favor (Ceylon, Poland and the
USSR) to 6 against (Argentina, China,
France, Italy, the United Kingdom and
the United States), with 2 abstentions
(Ecuador and Tunisia).

In the course of a lengthy statement
in introducing his fourth report to the
Council, the Secretary-General declared
that the Security Council had now come
to a point where it must take a clear
line as regards all assistance to the
Congo. He believed the Council would
achieve its aims only if it requested that
such assistance be channeled through the
United Nations, and only through the
United Nations. That would solve the
problem of military assistance to Ka-
tanga and of abuse of technical assist-
ance in other parts of the Congo, thus
serving the vital interest in a localization
of the conflict and in a peaceful solution
of the Congo’s domestic problems “with-
out any interference from outside influ-
encing the outcome.” The Secretary-
General declared, “Thus, and only thus,
could it justify its appeal to member
nations for the funds now so desperately
needed by the Congo.”

SEPTEMBER 10:

A letter from the permanent repre-
sentative of Belgium to the Secretary-
General regarding Belgian troops at the
Kitona base, issued as addendum 3 to
the third report of the Secretary-General
(S/4475/Add. 3), stated that “there are
no operational troops left in the Congo.”

Also issued on September 10, as ad-
dendum 2 to the Secretary-General’s
fourth report (S/4482/Add.2), was a
Belgian note verbale replying to the Sec-
retary-General’s communication of Sep-
tember 8 regarding a cargo of weapons
said to have been unloaded at Elisabeth-
ville. The reply stated that some light
weapons of Belgian origin had reached

Katanga. They had been ordered before
June 30 but the execution of the order
was due to the incompetence of an ill-
informed official. Measures had been
taken to make certain no action of this
kind would recur.

In a letter to the President of the
Security Council the Secretary-General
reported he had received from his Special
Representative in the Congo the informa-
tion that the Central Government of the
Republic of the Congo requested post-
ponement of the Security Council meet-
ing until a Congo delegation arrived.
If postponement were granted, the dele-
gation would leave on September 11.

As addendum 3 to the Secretary-Gen-
eral’s fourth report (S/4482/Add.3) was
issued: a note verbale dated September
4 from the Secretary-General to the per-
manent representative of Belgium re-
garding officers of Belgian nationality at-
tached to Katanga forces and other
groups in armed conflict with the Congo
Central Government; and the Belgian
note verbale of September 9 in reply,
which stated, inter alia, that the Katanga
forces were not an army but a gendar-
merie and that a small number of Bel-
gian experts had been supplied to this
gendarmerie as technical assistance. It
was hard to see in this technical assist-
ance a measure contrary to the Security
Council's resolution of July 22, especially
as the only mission of the forces to which
the experts were assigned was the main-
tenance of order.

At the request of the First Deputy
Foreign Minister of the USSR, a state-
ment of the Soviet Government on the
situation in the Congo was circulated
as a Security Council document (S/4497).
The statement declared that developments
in the Congo “indicate that the con-
spiracy of the colonialists against the
independence and integrity of this Afri-
can state, against its people and lawful
government, is assuming an increasingly
dangerous nature.” Belgium, its NATO
allies, particularly the United States, and
the Command of the troops sent to the
Congo under the Security Council resolu-
tion were acting in concert in an attempt
to snuff out the freedom of the Congolese
people. The Secretary-General had failed
to display the minimum of impartiality
required of him in the situation, added
the statement.

The text of a “solemn appeal” ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General by the
Prime Minister of the Republic of the
Congo was issued as document S/4498.
The communication requested (1) that
the Secretary-General and his fellow
workers in the Congo “cease to interfere
either directly or indirectly in the internal
affairs of the Republic”; (2) that the
United Nations adopt no further resolu-
tion on the Congo, since the resolutions
already adopted were clear and specific
but were not being fully implemented
due to the bad faith of the Belgian
Government and its allies.

A cable from the President of the
Republic of the Congo (Mr. Kasavubu)
announced that the composition of a
new Congo Government was imminent.

Meanwhile, he asked that the United
Nations not deal with the former Prime
Minister and other ministers whose man-
dates had been revoked. This was fol-
lowed by another cable under the same
date naming Joseph Ileo as Prime Min-
ister, Justin Bomboko as Foreign Min-
ister, and other appointments.

The Security Council met in the after-
noon to continue its consideration, begun
the previous day, of the Secretary-Gen-
eral’s fourth report on the situation in
the Congo. The representative of Ghana
was invited to participate in the discus-
sion.

During the meeting, Vasily Kuznet-
sov, of the Soviet Union, moved that the
Council accede to the Congo request
for a postponement of the meeting, but
later withdrew the motion because, he
said, the discussion on the point had
assumed a substantive character.

After statements had been made by
the representatives of the USSR, the
United Kingdom, Ecuador, the United
States, Poland, Argentina, Ceylon and
by the Secretary-General, the representa-
tive of Tunisia called attention to the
fact that since the discussion had begun,
the Council had constantly received new
information and new documents. The
Council needed to study these and, after
consulting delegations from the African
countries particularly concerned with this
question, he considered it his duty to
propose an adjournment of the meeting
until September 12. The motion was
agreed upon without objection.

The President, Egidio Ortona of Italy,
made an appeal that no action be taken
by any party which would aggravate an
already dangerous situation in the Congo.
He said he was certain he was expressing
the consensus in the Council if he
stressed the importance of such a course
in conformity with the letter and spirit
of the United Nations Charter. He re-
minded members that the Council had
already, in its previous resolutions of
July 22 and August 9, very clearly called
upon all member states to refrain from
any acts which could aggravate the situa-
tion in the Congo, and he stressed that
those resolutions were of the utmost
relevance at this juncture.

SEPTEMBER 11:
A number of communications were
circulated to the Security Council.
Document S/4503 contained the text
of a note verbale dated September 5 from
the Secretary-General to the delegation
of the USSR regarding Soviet protests
about the sending of United States troop
units to the Congo and insisting on their
immediate withdrawal, and also regard-
ing the provision by the Soviet Govern-
ment of the temporary use of five Soviet
aircraft for the transport of Ghanaian
troops and material to Leopoldville. The
Secretary-General referred also to infor-
mation that a certain number of planes
had been put at the disposal of the
Congo Government by the USSR and
that ten of these planes, coming from
Stanleyville, arrived at Luluabourg carry-
ing Congolese troops to reinforce the
Congolese force in the Sakwanga area.

UNR—December 1960

The reply of the Soviet delegation
dated September 10 and contained in
the same document said that the Security
Council resolution of July 14, providing
for military assistance to the Republic of
the Congo to ensure the withdrawal of
Belgian troops, did not restrict, “nor
indeed can it restrict,” the right of the
Government of the sovereign Republic
of the Congo to request assistance from
the governments of other countries, apart
from the United Nations, and to receive
such assistance. Nor did it give United
Nations officials any right to control the
assistance rendered to the Congo by any
state at the request of the Congolese
Government. Further, the Security Coun-
cil resolution of July 22 requested all
states to refrain from any action which
might tend to impede the restoration of
law and order and the exercise by the
Congolese Government of its authority,
and also to refrain from any action which
might undermine the territorial integrity
and the political independence of the
Republic of the Congo.

Soviet assistance to the Congolese Gov-
ernment in the form of civil aircraft and
motor vehicles was in no way at variance
with the above-mentioned resolutions of
the Security Council. “It is surprising,
therefore, to read the Secretary-General’s
note dated September 5, 1960, which
seeks to control the relations between the
Republic of the Congo and other states,
specifically the Soviet Union, although
the Security Council has not given the
Secretary-General any such mandate and
the Charter does not give any United
Nations administrative officer . . . the
right to intervene in the relations between
sovereign states unless they request his
intervention.”

Other documents circulated were:

A cable signed by Patrice Lumumba,
Prime Minister of the Republic of the
Congo, announcing that a delegation
headed by Thomas Kanza, Ambassador
to the United Nations, was leaving Leo-
poldville and expected to arrive in New
York on September 12 (S/4504).

A cable from Joseph Kasavubu, Presi-
dent of the Republic of the Congo, an-
nouncing that an “official delegation,”
headed by Justin Bomboko, Foreign Min-
ister, had been appointed to represent
the Republic of the Congo in the Security
Council and informing the Council that
any other delegation did not represent
the legal Government of the Republic
and should not be received by the Secu-
rity Council (S/4504).

A cable to the Secretary-General from
President Kasavubu accrediting Foreign
Minister Justin Bomboko as _representa-
tive to the Security Council, accom-
panied by two other delegates. That cable
said that the delegation had left Brazza-
ville for New York September 11 and
requested the Council to delay its meet-
ing pending the delegation’s arrival (S/
4504/Add.1).

A communication to the Secretary-
General from his Special Representative
in the Congo, Ambassador Dayal, stating
that Mr. Lumumba, accompanied by a
personal civilian guard and about eight
to ten ANC (Armée nationale congolaise)

UNR—December 1960

personnel, under General Lundula, had
arrived at the Leopoldville radio station
at 3:20 p.m. local time. Mr. Lumumba
had forced his way in despite the warn-
ings of the Ghana guard on duty. On
entering the studio, a member of Mr.
Lumumba’s personal bodyguard drew a
pistol at the Ghana Nco in charge of
the guard. The Nco, “with commend-
able presence of mind” and with the
help of the guard, immediately disarmed
the bodyguard and the aNc personnel
and ousted the entire party from the
studio. After protesting, Mr. Lumumba
left the studio with his entourage (S/4505).

A cable from President Kasavubu re-
questing the United Nations (1) to re-
organize and train the National Army of
the Congo; (2) to provide for the speedy
formation of army and police units; (3)
to help the Congo reactivate the courts;
(4) to provide “for the transport and pro-
tection of Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Kalonji,
whom I am inviting to a national con-
ference to be held at Leopoldviile” (S/
4500/Add.1).

SEPTEMBER 12:

A report from the office of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General
in Leopoldville announced the reopening
of Radio Leopoldville that day. An ap-
peal had been broadcast “to all patriotic
sons of the Congo to refrain from using
this national means of communication in
a manner that may cause incitement to
violence or result in the shedding of
innocent blood.”

Two different Congolese delegations
arrived at United Nations Headquarters
—one headed by Foreign Minister Justin
Bomboko, the other by Ambassador Des-
ignate to the United Nations, Thomas
Kanza.

The Security Council met briefly, ad-
journing after 11 minutes on a motion
proposed by the United States, whose
representative said that, as the latest in-
formation showed that the situation in
the Congo was still confused, the Council
should adjourn and meet again at the
call of the President.

The motion was carried by 9 votes in
favor to 2 against (USSR and Poland).

Valerian Zorin, of the USSR, later
moved that the Council be reconvened
that night. The President, however, ruled
that, as adjournment had been agreed,
no other motion could be considered.

In a statement issued in the evening
of September 12, the Soviet delegation
protested the cancellation of the Council
meeting that had been scheduled for
3:00 p.m. that day and charged that “the
colonialists, with the active assistance of
the United States . . . are using more
and more openly the United Nations in
order to bring the new independent
African state to the position of a trust
territory.”

SEPTEMBER 13:

The Soviet Union called for a meeting
of the Security Council on September 13
for urgent consideration of the imple-
mentation of the resolutions of July 14
and 22 and August 9 on the situation in
the Republic of the Congo (S/4506).

The statement charged that there was
more than enough justification for assert-
ing that the new situation in the Congo
was an out-and-out conspiracy against
the country’s independence and integrity.
A coalition of Belgium, its NaTo allies
—particularly the United States—and
the Command of the forces sent to the
Congo under the Security Council resolu-
tion were trying to replace one set of
colonialists by another under cover of
the United Nations flag, it said. There
were still Belgian troops on Congolese
territory. The Belgian Government was
actively encouraging criminal elements
in the Republic of the Congo, was fo-
menting civil war and plotting against
the Government. Katanga, the country’s
most important province, had been trans-
formed by Belgium, with the direct sup-
port of its NATO allies and the United
Nations Command, “into a camp of
forces hostile to the lawful Government
of the Republic.” The note charged the
United Nations Command and the Secre-
tary-General with open violation of the
Security Council’s resolutions.

A cable signed by the Prime Minister
and transmitted to the Secretary-General
by his Special Representative urged, “in
view of the aggression committed against
Prime Minister Lumumba” and in order
to prevent other attacks being prepared
behind the scenes, that the United Na-
tions furnish the Government of the
Republic of the Congo with 20 aircraft
with crews, a large quantity of ammuni-
tion and a powerful radio transmitter.
If refused this assistance, the message
added, “the Government will be obliged
to seek such assistance elsewhere” (S/
4507).

The permanent representative of Yugo-
slavia to the United Nations, Dobrivoje
Vidic, requested the President of the
Security Council to consider a prompt
reconvening of the Security Council that
day. In view of the arrival of the official
delegation of the Republic of the Congo,
headed by Ambassador Kanza, the Yugo-
slav delegation saw no justifiable reason
for further delay in the work of the
Security Council (S/4511).

The Secretary-General’s Special Rep-
resentative in the Congo reported an at-
tempt by Prime Minister Lumumba’s
military aide to arrest Mr. Bolikango at
the Leopoldville radio station on Sep-
tember 13. The arrest was prevented by
the Ghana Liaison Officer, who informed
the aide that no arrest could be made
without a warrant (S/4505/Add.2).

SEPTEMBER 14:

The Secretary-General received two
messages transmitted by Thomas Kanza,
Congolese Minister-Delegate to the Unit-
ed Nations, describing the arrest and
detention of Prime Minister Patrice Lu-
mumba for a few hours at his residence
by a small group of soldiers sent by Mr.
Kasavubu and Mr. Bolikango.

One of the messages, a cable from
Prime Minister Lumumba addressed to
all heads of African states, Ambassador
Thomas Kanza and the Chairman of the
Afro-Asian group at the United Nations,
included a complaint that, after his re-

lease, United Nations guards had pre-
vented him from broadcasting a message
to the people but had permitted Mr.
Bolikango to speak over the Leopoldville
station.

The second message, addressed to the
Secretary-General and to Mr. Kanza and
signed by Joseph Kasongo, President of
the Chamber of Representatives, and
Joseph Okita, President of the Senate,
protested “vehemently” against Prime
Minister Lumumba’s arrest.

The Ileo government, the message
stated, had not yet had a parliamentary
vote of confidence and consequently
could not replace the legal government.
Charging the Ileo government with crim-
inal acts against democratic freedoms
and the sovereignty of the constitution-
ally recognized Congolese Parliament,
the signers insisted that the matter be
taken before the Security Council that
evening. The message closed with an
appeal to the free world and to Security
Council members for protection “against
such degrading dangerous machinations,
provocation, civil war and fratricide”
(S/4515).

The Security Council held three meet-
ings on this date on the question of the
Congo. The first meeting, which opened
at noon, adjourned at 3:00 p.m. without
any decision on the question of the
representation of the Republic of the
Congo.

At its afternoon meeting, the Council
rejected a Polish proposal to invite
Thomas Kanza, representative of the
Central Government of the Congo, to
participate in the debate by 3 votes in
favor (Ceylon, USSR and Poland), none
against, with 8 abstentions.

A request of the representative of
Guinea, Caba Sory, to speak on the
seating of the Congo representative was
rejected by a vote of 4 in favor (Ceylon,
Poland, Tunisia, Soviet Union), 5
against (China, France, Italy, United
Kingdom, United States), with 2 ab-
stentions (Argentina, Ecuador).

At the evening meeting, the Security
Council heard statements by the repre-
sentatives of the USSR and Tunisia and
by the Secretary-General.

Mr. Zorin, of the Soviet Union,
charged that the United Nations Com-
mand in the Congo and the Secretary-
General had consciously violated the
Security Council resolutions on the Con-
go and had played into the hands of the
colonial powers. He demanded that the
United Nations Command be replaced
and that the Security Council take im-
mediate measures to stop all interference
in the internal affairs of the Congo.

The Secretary-General replied in de-
tail to a number of allegations made by
the Soviet representative, concluding:
“No misunderstandings, no misinforma-
tion, no misinterpretations of the actions
of the United Nations Organization
should be permitted to hamper an opera-
tion the importance of which, I know, is
fully appreciated by all those African
countries which, with great efforts of
their own, support the work of the
United Nations in the Congo.”

Mongi Slim, of Tunisia, charged that
Belgium had shown bad faith in respect
of the withdrawal of its troops from the
Congo. He suggested that the Council
take the initiative in offering its good
offices to the various political leaders in
the Congo. Such a good-offices mission,
he added, could be composed of a cer-
tain number of African states which were
now members of the Secretary-General’s
Advisory Committee on the Congo. He
also paid tribute to the untiring efforts
of the Secretary-General in the Congo.

A letter from Mr. Kanza to the
Secretary-General reported that the two
Legislative Chambers of the Republic of
the Congo, convened in extraordinary
meeting on September 13, voted full
powers to the Government of Patrice
Lumumba by 88 votes to 25, with 3 ab-
stentions. The same meeting declared
outlawed and illegal any other central
government which might claim to exist
in the Republic of the Congo. Mr. Kanza
added that he had been instructed not
to participate in the proceedings of the
Security Council if it should permit rep-
resentatives of an outlawed and illegal
government to take places at the Council
table (S/4514).

Another letter from Mr. Kanza, ad-
dressed to the President of the Security
Council, transmitted messages received
from Prime Minister Lumumba and the
Presidents of the Congolese Chamber of
Representatives and Senate protesting
the “arbitrary, illegal and shameful ar-
rest for a few hours” of Mr. Lumumba
on September 12 in Leopoldville by sol-
diers sent by Mr. Kasavubu.

SEPTEMBER 15:

On this date a letter was issued, dated
September 14, from Mr. J. M. Lumbala,
Special Delegate of the Republic of the
Congo, to the President of the Security
Council (S/4517). After reviewing at
length the situation in the Congo and
the constitutional position, Mr. Lumbala
concluded by appealing to the Council
to recommend (1) that the Secretary-
General place at the disposal of the Cen-
tral Government aircraft, arms and am-
munition which would enable it to make
“a triumphal entry into Katanga escorted
by the National Army”; (2) that the
Secretary-General and representatives of
the United Nations deal direct with Mr.
Lumumba, the only head of the Govern-
ment of the Republic.

The Security Council held two further
meetings on the Congo.

At the morning meeting, the repre-
sentative of Belgium was invited to the
Council table. Statements were made by
the representatives of Argentina and the
United States. The latter introduced a
draft resolution which would have urged
the Secretary-General “to continue to
give vigorous effect to the resolutions
of the Council.” It called on member
governments to make voluntary financial
contributions to a United Nations Fund
for the Congo, to be used under United
Nations control “as determined by the
Secretary-General,” for financing the nec-
essary governmental expenditures not
covered by governmental revenue, owing
to the present disruption of administra-

tion and civilian life. It also urged all
parties to the internal conflict in the
Congo, in the interest of its unity and
integrity, to seek a speedy settlement by
peaceful means, with such assistance
from the Secretary-General as might be
required. The draft reaffirmed the Coun-
cil’s request to all member nations to
“refrain from sending personnel, supplies
or equipment to be used for military pur-
poses into the Congo other than through
the United Nations.” Finally, the pro-
posal reiterated that the United Nations
Force should continue to act to restore
and maintain law and order as necessary
for the maintenance of international
peace and security (S/4516).

At the afternoon meeting, the Council
heard statements by the USSR, Ecuador,
France and the United Kingdom. A
Soviet draft resolution was introduced by
Mr. Zorin (S/4519) which would have the
Council request the Secretary-General
and the United Nations Command in
the Congo “immediately to put an end
to all forms of interference in the inter-
nal affairs of the Republic of the Congo”
and to evacuate all airfields and radio
stations presently occupied by United
Nations troops. It would also instruct the
Secretary-General to remove the present
United Nations Command because “its
actions constitute gross violations of the
decisions of the Security Council on the
Congo question.” The draft resolution
would appeal to all member states to
provide the Congo urgent financial and
other economic aid, which “should be
placed at the direct disposal” of the
Central Government.

SEPTEMBER 16:

A telegram to the Secretary-General,
dated September 15, was issued (S/4520)
from the President of the Republic of
the Congo, who lodged a “vigorous” pro-
test against “United Nations interference
in the Congo’s internal and, above all,
judicial affairs.” He informed the Secre-
tary-General that “Ex-Prime Minister
Lumumba had just been arrested by the
Congolese Army” on a legally issued
warrant, but that Ghanaian troops of
the United Nations Force were prevent-
ing his being taken before an examining
magistrate.

SEPTEMBER 16-17:

The Security Council held three further
meetings on September 16. In the early
hours of September 17, the Council
voted to convene an emergency special
session of the General Assembly on the
Congo question.

At its morning meeting, the Council
heard statements by the representatives
of Ceylon, Poland and China and a
reply by the Secretary-General to the
Polish representative, who had charged
that the Security Council’s objectives in
the Congo were not being fulfilled.

Continuing its debate in the afternoon,
the Council heard statements by the rep-
resentatives of Italy and five non-mem-
bers—Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea, Belgium
and the United Arab Republic.

Meeting again at 8:30 p.m., the Coun-
cil received a joint draft resolution from

UNR—December 1960

Ceylon and Tunisia in the course of a
five-hour meeting (S/4523).

Under the resolution, the Council
would urge the Secretary-General to give
“vigorous” implementation to previous
Council resolutions on the situation in
the Congo. The draft proposal called
upon all Congolese to seek a speedy solu-
tion by peaceful means of all their inter-
nal conflicts for the unity and integrity
of the Congo and reaffirmed that the
United Nations Force should continue
to act to restore and maintain law and
order “as necessary for the maintenance
of international peace and security” and
appealed to all member governments
for urgent voluntary contributions to a
United Naiions Fund for the Congo to
be used under United Nations control and
in consultation with the Central Govern-
ment of the Congo for the purpose of
rendering the fullest assistance to achieve
the aforementioned objectives.

Finally, the resolution reaffirmed spe-
cifically the request to all states to re-
frain from any action which might tend
to impede the restoration of law and
order and the exercise by the Govern-
ment of the Congo of its authority and
also to refrain from any action which
might undermine the territorial integrity
and political independence of the Repub-
lic of the Congo and decided that no
assistance for military purposes be sent
to the Congo except as part of the United
Nations action, as well as its call to all
member states, in accordance with Arti-
cles 25 and 49 of the Charter, to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Secu-
rity Council and to afford mutual assist-
ance in carrying out measures decided
upon by the Security Council.

In the early hours of September 17
the Council voted on the proposals be-
fore it. The USSR draft resolution was
rejected by 2 votes in favor (Poland and
the USSR), to 7 against, with 2 absten-
tions (Ceylon and Tunisia). The Council
then voted on a series of USSR amend-
ments (S/4524) to the joint draft resolu-
tion of Ceylon and Tunisia, all of which
were rejected by varying votes.

Finally, the Council voted on the joint
Ceylonese-Tunisian proposal, which re-
ceived 8 votes in favor and 2 against
(USSR and Poland), with France abstain-
ing. As one of the two negative votes was
that of a permanent member of the
Council, the resolution was not adopted.

Following the voting, Mr. Zorin an-
nounced that his Government had re-
quested the inclusion on the agenda of
the regular session of the General Assem-
bly the question of “the threat to the
political independence and the territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Congo”
(S/4495).

The representative of the United States
told the Council he would not press for
a vote on the United States draft, as he
did not wish to prolong the proceedings.

He then introduced a draft resolution
under which the Council, having con-
sidered the agenda item on the Congo
and taking into account that the lack
of unanimity among the permanent mem-
bers had prevented it from exercising its
primary responsibility for the mainte-
nance of peace and security, would de-

UNR—December 1960

cide to call an emergency special session
of the General Assembly on the issue in
accordance with the provisions of the
Assembly’s “Uniting for Peace” resolu-
tion of November 3, 1950 (S/4525).

The motion for convening an emer-
gency special session of the Assembly
was adopted by 8 votes to 2 (USSR and
Poland), with 1 abstention (France) (S/
4496).

SEPTEMBER 17:

The fourth emergency special session
of the General Assembly, convened by
the Security Council, opened at 8 p.m.

At its first meeting the Assembly heard
statements by the representatives of the
United States, the USSR and Italy and
a brief reply by the Secretary-General
to the Soviet statement.

The first part of the meeting was de-
voted to the question of the admission
of new members to the United Nations.
The United States moved that the admis-
sion of new members already recom-
mended by the Security Council should
be placed on the agenda of the emer-
gency session and dealt with as the first
item,

The General Assembly eventually
adopted, by 43 votes to none, with 26
abstentions, a motion by Caba Sory, of
Guinea, to adjourn consideration of the
admission of new members until a later
stage.

The need to reactivate preventive
health services in the Republic of the
Congo, particularly at the district and
village level, was stressed in a WHO re-
port on health activities of the United
Nations operations in the Congo.

Action should be taken as quickly as
possible to ensure against loss of the
progress of recent years, especially in
the control of insect-borne diseases, the
report said.

Hospital services were being used to
a greater degree, the report stated, and
bed occupancy at main hospitals had
increased. National Red Cross and Red
Crescent teams continued to give valuable
service in provincial and district hospitals,
although some were working under great
difficulties. Intensive training courses for
Congolese staff operating water-purifica-
tion plants had been started by WHO
and bilateral assistance personnel. Ex-
perienced water plant operators were
being recruited from Switzerland to con-
tinue the courses in a systematic manner.
Attempts were being made to improve
the distribution of medical supplies from
Leopoldville to provincial district centres.

Who had placed its worldwide recruit-
ment service at the disposal of the Congo-
lese Government for outside medical
staff. Plans for training Congolese medi-
cal students were well advanced and
programs were being made for training
Congolese medical assistants overseas.

The 15-member wHo advisory team
attached to the Central Ministry of
Health was also assisting in drawing up a
budget for modified health services for
the remainder of 1960 and budget esti-
mates for 1961.

Thirty-three medical teams from 22
countries, with a total of 157 doctors,

x fechnicians, were at work in
the. «yO under the United Nations
civilian operation, the report indicated.
It listed 23 teams sent by Red Cross
and Red Crescent societies in 18 countries
(Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, East Germany, Federal Republic
of Germany, Finland, Greece, India, Ire-
land, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Paki-
stan, Poland, Sweden, United Arab Re-
public and Yugoslavia). In addition, ten
teams were sent by governments (Ghana,
Israel, Switzerland and the USSR).

SEPTEMBER 18:

At the second meeting of the emer-
gency special session, held in the after-
noon of September 18, the General As-
sembly heard statements by the repre-
sentatives of Brazil, Libya, Argentina,
Poland, Yugoslavia, Saudi Arabia, Bul-
garia, Romania, and comments by the
Secretary-General on points made by
several speakers. The Secretary-General
and the representative of Israel exercised
the right of reply.

Reconvening at 8:30 that evening, the
Assembly received a draft resolution co-
sponsored by 17 Afro-Asian nations—
Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indo-
nesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia,
Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Repub-
lic and Yemen. It was introduced by
Ghana.

In its operative part, the resolution
fully supported the resolutions of July
14 and 22 and of August 9 of the Se-
curity Council; requested the Secretary-
General to “continue to take vigorous
action” in accordance with those earlier
resolutions and to assist the Central
Government of the Congo in the restora-
tion and maintenance of law and order
throughout the territory of the Republic
of the Congo and to safeguard its unity,
territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence in the interests of international
peace and security”; appealed to all
Congolese within the Republic of the
Congo “to seek a speedy solution by
peaceful means of all their internal con-
flicts for the unity and integrity of the
Congo”; appealed to all member govern-
ments for urgent voluntary contributions
to a United Nations Fund for the Congo
to be used under United Nations control
and in consultation with the Central
Government.

The resolution also requested “all
states to refrain from any action which
might tend to impede the restoration of
law and order and the exercise by the
Government of the Republic of the Con-
go of its authority and also to refrain
from any action which might undermine
the unity, territorial integrity and the
political independence of the Republic
of the Congo: It called upon all member
states “to accept and carry out the de-
cisions of the Security Council” and
“without prejudice to the sovereign rights
of the Republic of the Congo, to refrain
from the direct and indirect provision of
arms or other materials of war and mili-
tary personnel and other assistance for
military purposes in the Congo during
the temporary period of military assist-
ance through the United Nations, except

upon the request of the United Nations
through the Secretary-General .. .”

In the course of the discussion, state-
ments were made by Jordan, Pakistan,
the Ukrainian SSR, Nepal, Tunisia, Hun-
gary, Ghana, Czechoslovakia, the United
Arab Republic and Norway.

SEPTEMBER 19:
At a morning meeting, the Soviet
Union introduced a draft resolution

which would have the Assembly, recog-
nizing the necessity of ensuring the po-
litical independence and territorial in-
tegrity of the Congo “and her protec-
tion from imperialist aggression”: (1)
condemn “the armed aggression of Bel-
gium” against the Congo “committed
with the support of her NaTo allies,” and
strongly urge Belgium and her military
allies to withdraw completely without
delay their troops and military personnel
from the Congo “under whatever dis-
guise or pretext they may be stationed
there”; (2) note with satisfaction earlier
Security Council resolutions “aimed at
putting an end to the aggression of Bel-
gium against the Republic of the Congo
and ensuring the territorial integrity and
political independence of the Republic
of the Congo”; (3) note that “the failure
of the Secretary-General and of the
United Nations military command to ful-
fill a number of major provisions” of
the resolution, “in particular the pro-
visions concerning the non-interference
in the internal affairs of the Congo and
the ensuring of the territorial integrity
and political independence of the Re-
public of the Congo, has led to the dis-
organization of the economy, the aggra-
vation of the political situation in the
country and the removal of the legitimate
government and parliament”; and (4)
appeal to all states to refrain from any
action which might prejudice the terri-
torial integrity and political indepen-
dence of the Congo.

Statements were made by the repre-
sentatives of Australia, Albania, New
Zealand, China, Mexico, the Sudan, the
Union of South Africa, Iraq, Ireland,
Liberia, Belgium, Burma and the Neth-
erlands.

At a night meeting that began at 8
o’clock and adjourned in the early hours
of the following day, discussion con-
tinued with statements by the Byelo-
russian SSR, Canada, Greece, Sweden,
Lebanon, Israel, Laos, Ethiopia, the
USSR, the Federation of Malaya, Cey-
lon, Indonesia, Ecuador, Haiti, India,
the United States and Ghana.

The Soviet represeniative introduced
amendments to the 17-power draft, but
on the appeal of Ghana, made on be-
half of the Afro-Asian members, he
announced he would not press for a vote
on the amendments, nor on the USSR
draft resolution.

The President then put to the vote
the 17-power draft resolution (A/L.292/
Rev.1). A vote was first taken on the
text as a whole minus paragraph 6. The
result was 71 in favor, none against,
with 9 abstentions.

Paragraph 6, calling upon all states to
refrain from direct or indirect provi-
sions of arms and military personnel to
the Congo except upon the request of

the United Nations through the Secre-
tary-General, was adopted by a roll-call
vote of 80 in favor, none against, with
one abstention (Union of South Africa).

The resolution as a whole was then
adopted by a roll-call vote of 70 in favor,
none against, with 11 abstentions (AI-
bania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR,
Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Po-
land, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, Union
of South Africa, USSR).

SEPTEMBER 21:

The first progress report to the Secre-
tary-General from his Special Represen-
tative in the Congo, Ambassador Rajesh-
war Dayal, was issued (S/4531). [The
full text of this report was published in
the November 1960 issue of UNITED Na-
TIONS REVIEW. ]

A message dated September 18 from
the Secretary-General to Moise Tshombe,
President of the Provincial Government
of Katanga, was issued (S/4529). Re-
ferring to actions undertaken against
Balubas by gendarmerie, the message
stated that, according to confirmed re-
ports, the gendarmerie had carried out
“brutal repressive operations” in the
neighborhood of Luena. Actions of this
type, it said, “must be condemned by
the United Nations as inadmissible in-
fringements upon human rights and the
humanitarian principles for which the
Organization stands.” Any repetition of
repressive measures of this kind, added
the Secretary-General, would be resisted
by the United Nations Force and im-
mediately reported. “The authorities in
Katanga must assume full responsibility
for the consequences of actions by their
gendarmerie and I have to express the
firm expectation that they will give in-
structions avoiding any further repres-
sive measures.”

SEPTEMBER 23:

The Secretary of State of the United
States presented a check for $5 million
in accordance with the General Assem-
bly’s appeal of September 20 to member
governments for urgent voluntary con-
tributions to a United Nations Fund for
the Congo.

In his letter of transmittal, Secretary
of State Christian Herter said that addi-
tional contributions would be made as
specific plans and requirements were
developed by the United Nations. He
added that no decision had been made
concerning the total amount which the
United States was prepared to contribute
to the Fund because of legislative condi-
tions providing that United States con-
tributions shall not exceed 40 per cent
of the total made available to the United
Nations for this purpose.

SEPTEMBER 25:

A 141l-man advance party of a trans-
port company of the Pakistan Army left
Karachi to serve with the United Na-
tions Force in the Congo as one of its
administrative units. The remainder of
the company, 157 officers and men, was
scheduled to leave Karachi September 26.

The advance party, under the com-
mand of Lt. Colonel Hamid Hajibhoy,
was airlifted by planes of the United
States Military Air Transport Service.

Fourth Committee

(Continued from page 23)

part of that paragraph was not clea.
He said that the expression “a threat
to the well-being of humanity and a
threat to international peace” should
be used with extreme care and with
great precision. The United Kingdom
representative questioned whether the
use of those words was justified and
regretted that they had been used.

A. H. Loomes, of Australia, had
reservations concerning the Assembly’s
competence to specify territories, and
he did not think the United Nations
could reasonably be expected to reach
an accurate decision on which Portu-
guese territories should and which
should not be enumerated, as there
were a number of complex factors
that could combine to make a decision
unwise and even arbitrary.

R. Austin Acly, of the United States,
did not think the Assembly was en-
titled to single out particular countries
to remind them of their obligations
under Article 73, or that it was the
function of the United Nations to
determine which territories fell within
the scope of Article 73. He noted a
conflict between the spirit of the Gen-
eral Assembly’s resolution 1467(XIV)
and any attempt on the part of
the Assembly to determine for it-
self whether an obligation to trans-
mit information existed in a spe-
cific case. The decision in that respect
should, he said, be made by the ad-
ministering members in the light of
their constitutional arrangements.

The United States representative also
considered it was for the administering
members to decide on the application
of the principles. If the Assembly
called on one particular country to
supply information on_ territories
whose status was questioned, it was
difficult to see why it should not call
on other countries to do the same.
Such considerations had not, of course,
prevented the United States from giv-
ing the broadest possible interpretation
to Article 73e. It had reported, for
example, on territories which had been
incorporated in the United States and
on two which had recently, of their
own choice, become states of the
Union.

Similar views were expressed by the
representatives of other members ab-
staining on the draft resolution, which
was to be submitted to the Assembly
for its endorsement in plenary meeting.

After completing its action on ques-
tions relating to the transmission of
information on non-self-governing ter-
ritories, the Fourth Committee on No-
vember 14 began consideration of
the question of South West Africa.

UNR—December 1960

Dr. Auguste R. Lindt,
UN High Commis-
sioner, reported prog-
ress in protection and
resettlement action.

Call for Continued Humanitarian

Aid to Refugees

An Algerian refugee
in Tunisia examines
his identity card. It
entitles him to rations
and other assistance.

Success of the World Refugee Year Is Noted

Bee humanitarian aspect of assist-
ance to refugees was stressed by
the General Assembly’s Third Com-
mittee October 27 when it noted the
“remarkable success” of World Refu-
gee Year and expressed the belief that
the enthusiasm and interest which it
had aroused could, if maintained, con-
tribute vitally to an ultimate solution
of the problems of refugees every-
where.

In a draft resolution on World Ref-
ugee Year, the Committee thanked all
those who helped in that success and
requested members of the United Na-
tions and of the specialized agencies
and international non-governmental
organizations to continue their efforts
to assist refugees “on a purely hu-
manitarian basis.”

The draft resolution, together with
three other draft resolutions on assist-
ance to refugees, was recommended to
the Assembly by the Third Committee,
which debated the issues after hearing
detailed reports by the Secretary-Gen-
eral, the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees and the Direc-
tor of the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East.

In those resolutions, continued ac-
tion on behalf of refugees from Algeria
in Morocco and Tunisia was recom-
mended; continued attention to other
refugee problems still awaiting solu-
tion was invited; and thanks and good
wishes to High Commissioner Auguste
Lindt, soon to leave office, were ex-
pressed.

In his report on World Refugee Year,
Secretary-General Hammarskjold an-
nounced that 97 countries and terri-

UNR—December 1960

tories had participated and that pre-
liminary figures showed that more
than $80 million had been contrib-
uted by governments, organizations
and the general public. That figure
would probably be increased, since
money was still coming in, and some
countries had decided to continue their
efforts.

Mr. Hammarskjold also pointed out
that an important result of the wry
campaign had been aroused public in-
terest and greater international support
for the United Nations.

“While the success achieved by
World Refugee Year was obviously
due to the participating countries,”
Mr. Hammarskjold said in his report,
“its appeal was strengthened by the
guarantee of high purpose and by the
sense of international solidarity which
United Nations sponsorship provided.
That sponsorship has been for many
people the first intimation of the con-
structive work which the United Na-
tions carries on in the humanitarian
field. It has been reported that this
fact led to an increase in active mem-
bership of the United Nations Associa-
tions in a number of countries.

“It was the General Assembly’s res-
olution [of December 5, 1958] which
enabled World Refugee Year to be-
come a reality on a multinational scale,
and it was also the United Nations
which served as an indispensable co-
ordinating element throughout the
campaign. The methods and _ tech-
niques used in this multinational cam-
paign may not be without their les-
sons for future initiatives which the
United Nations may be called upon to
sponsor. Those methods have enabled

more than 20 countries or territories
not members of the United Nations or
of its specialized agencies to participate
in the spirit of the resolution.”

Mr. Hammarskjold recalled that, in
the language of the Assembly 1958
resolution, the aims of World Refugee
Year were “to focus interest on the
refugee problem, to encourage addi-
tional financial contributions from
governments, voluntary agencies and
the general public, and to encourage
additional opportunities for permanent
refugee solutions through voluntary
repatriation, resettlement or integra-
tion.” His report showed the extent of
the multinational action taken and its
results, but he emphasized that those
results were not final, since certain
countries had decided to continue
their campaigns.

In all, 97 countries and territories
participated; 39 national committees
were established to promote the objec-
tives of World Refugee Year, often
under the patronage of the head of
state; 74 among the most powerful
international non-governmental organ-
izations set up an International Com-
mittee for World Refugee Year to
help promotion in the participating
countries, and—a unique fact — all
great faiths gave their support to the
humanitarian endeavor. Publicity given
to the effort in all participating coun-
tries was unprecedented in the refugee
field.

Reports available on September 30,
1960, indicated that supplementary
funds paid, or pledged subject to par-
liamentary approval, over and above
normal contributions by governments
and voluntary agencies amounted to

more than $80 million, approximately
11 per cent of it in kind. Of that total,
$23 million was from governments
and about $57 million from the public.
Since the end of September, efforts
in Austria, Belgium, Canada, France
and Switzerland indicated that an
additional $3 million would be forth-
coming. In addition, a stamp plan
sponsored jointly by UNHCR and UNRWA
was expected to produce about $1
million, while several countries, in-
cluding Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Colombia, France, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Italy,
Sweden, the Union of South Africa
and the United States, had not closed
their campaigns, and some had not
announced their preliminary results.

Mr. Hammarskjold added that re-
sults announced by some countries
that had ended their campaigns would
be changed, since contributions con-
tinued to arrive at the national com-
mittees.

As of October 20 last, Mr. Ham-
marskjold reported, $22,673,646 had
been contributed, pledged or raised
on behalf of refugees within the man-
date of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees, not counting
refugees from Algeria in Tunisia and
Morocco. Of that sum, more than $8
million was directly contributed to the
High Commissioner to finance sup-
plementary wry efforts on behalf of
refugees within his mandate.

An Important Result

An important result of the wry
effort, the Secretary-General pointed
out, was that the High Commissioner’s
camp-clearance program in Europe
could now be completely financed
from available funds. That would
mean that all the 32,000 refugees with-
in his mandate living in European
camps when wry opened would either
be integrated in their countries of
first asylum or resettled elsewhere.

Also included in the total of $22,-
673,646 was a sum of $1,210,724
exclusively for refugee transportation,
mainly by the Inter-Governmental
Committee for European Migration,
and $13,404,047 for other programs
also benefiting refugees within the
High Commissioner’s mandate, but
in most cases not administered by
him.

Particularly encouraging results were
obtained, the Secretary-General point-
ed out, in the case of handicapped
and _ difficult-to-settle refugees. The
Office of the High Commissioner esti-
mated that, thanks to the liberaliza-
tion of immigration criteria by various
countries during wry, some 4,000
handicapped refugees would be reset-
tled outside their countries of first

asylum, making with their dependents
some 7,000 persons in all. That com-
pared with 4,665 handicapped refugees
and their families who were resettled
in the seven years from 1952 to 1958.

Various appeals for the refugees of
Algeria in Tunisia and Morocco, said
Mr. Hammarskjold, produced $5,360,-
122, and $4,514,694 was contributed
or pledged up to October 20 on behalf
of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong.
By the same date $7,875,967 had been
contributed or pledged for the Arab
refugees from Palestine within the
mandate of UNRWA. Other refugees
would benefit to the extent of $17,-
914,112.

Of the total of $83 million, almost
$20 million remained unallocated.

Latest available figures, said Mr.
Hammarskjold, showed that more than
3,000 refugees within the mandate of
the High Commissioner for Refugees
had been repatriated at their own re-
quest during wry. Also, during wry,
six countries had deposited their in-
struments of ratification of the inter-
national convention relating to the
legal status of refugees or had ap-
proved ratification of the convention.

Thus, said the Secretary-General,
the appeal of the General Assembly
was heeded. Some refugee problems
would be completely solved, and
many refugees had seen or would see
an amelioration of their pitiful condi-
tion; thanks to the good will of gov-
ernments and the understanding of
national committees, World Refugee
Year had succeeded in remaining faith-
ful to the purely humanitarian aims
expressed in the resolution voted by
the Assembly. Some organizations
created for wry, he added, had de-
cided to continue to work on behalf
of refugees on a permanent basis.
Thus, he said, although it was officially
concluded, World Refugee Year could
be regarded, not as the end of an
effort, but as a beginning.

The Secretary-General reported that
in terms of total additional cash raised
during wry by the end of September
last, the major contributors were the
United Kingdom, with $21,660,150,
and the United States, with $18,125,-
996. The latter figure was not final,
since the United States campaign was
continuing.

John H. Davis, Director of the
United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East, also addressed the Com-
mittee concerning the continuing needs
of the Palestine refugees.

He expressed UNRWa’s profound ap-
preciation to governments, national
committees, voluntary agencies, private
individuals and the Secretary-General
and his special representative and staff
for their work on UNRWaA’s behalf.

At the beginning of 1960, he said,
UNRWA had set a target of some $4
million in additional contributions as
as result of World Refugee Year.
Since then it had drawn up for the re-
maining three years of its mandate,
ending in 1963, a program that would
be considered by the Special Political
Committee at the current session. He
expressed the hope that the General
Assembly would approve the program,
which would make it possible to main-
tain UNRWaA’s relief program at the
current per capita level, increase the
number of vocational training gradu-
ates from 300 to 2,500 per year, in-
crease the number of university schol-
arships available to first-year students
from 90 to 180 a year, continue the
small-loan and grants program and en-
sure a limited expansion in elementary
and secondary education to meet the
exploding demand in the Middle East
and provide an appropriate base for
the expanded vocational training ac-
tivities.

Annual Expenditure

It was estimated that the annual
expenditure for the period 1960-1963
would be about $35 million, while im-
plementation of five recommendations
he had outlined would involve addi-
tional expenditures of slightly more
than $16 million dollars for the three-
year period. Part of the cost of the last
four recommendations ($12 million)
would be covered by funds collected
for UNRWA during World Refugee
Year.

Mr. Davis listed three points to
emphasize the complexity of UNRWA’s
mission:

Disregarding all political considera-
tions, the fact was that jobs for un-
skilled workers and farmers which the
refugees could do did not exist in
sufficient numbers in the Middle East
or elsewhere. Refugees, therefore, had
to be trained.

The problem would be solved in
time, not by UNRWa, but by the
broader forces which were shaping the
future of the Middle East.

Every effort should be made to en-
sure that the solution was a peaceful
and orderly one, and by its action the
Agency not only alleviated the suffer-
ing of the refugees but contributed to
the stability of that entire part of the
world. It seemed, therefore, that the
Agency’s work was worthy of the
interest and support of every country.

The report of the Secretary-General
was considered at three meetings of
the Third Committee, under the chair-
manship of Eduard Mezincescu, of
Romania, during which the representa-
tives of 22 countries spoke. Each men-
tioned briefly what steps had been

UNR—December 1960

taken in his own country to implement
the spirit of the Assembly resolution
and expressed satisfaction at the re-
sults.

The draft resolution on wry, spon-
sored by Afghanistan, Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Canada, France, Iran, Italy,
Norway, Pakistan, the United King-
dom and the United States, was
adopted by the Committee by a vote
of 64 to none, with 12 abstentions.

High Commissioner's Report

When the Third Committee con-
sidered the report of Auguste Lindt,
United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, the Chairman congratu-
lated the Commissioner on the prog-
ress made by his Office during the
year with regard to the international
protection of refugees and the pro-
gram for a permanent solution. He

A handicapped refugee arrives in
Malmo, Sweden, to begin a new life.
Many such “difficult” cases have been
helped by the generous worldwide re-
sponse to World Refugee Year appeals.

UNR—December 1960

also welcomed the assistance extended
by the High Commissioner’s Office to
the refugees from Algeria in Morocco
and Tunisia. The High Commissioner,
he said, would be missed when he
left the Office at the end of the year.

Mr. Lindt made a verbal report. His
Office, he said, had two important
tasks: the international protection of
refugees and the provision of assist-
ance where necessary. Every refugee
must be able to enjoy certain mini-
mum rights, and his Office had been
successful in stimulating the introduc-
tion of provisions favorable to refugees
in international treaties and national
laws and regulations.

Very important to the protective
work done by his Office, he said, was
the indemnification of refugees under
the High Commissioner’s mandate who
had suffered Nazi persecution, and he
was glad to announce that on October
5, 1960, an agreement had been signed
with the Federal Republic of Germany
in favor of such refugees. The agree-
ment provided that those refugees who
had suffered permanent injury to body
or health would be entitled to com-
pensation on the same scale as refugees
who had been persecuted for racial
or political reasons, and that the Fed-
eral Government would place approxi-
mately $10.7 million at the disposal of
his Office for the establishment of a
fund for additional assistance to those
refugees and their surviving depend-
ents, on a basis of need rather than of
a legal claim to indemnification.

To ensure effective legal protection
would require a sustained effort. In
Europe alone 870,000 refugees still re-
quired protection in 1960.

Although the great majority of refu-
gees under his protection were eco-
nomically self-sufficient, and only the
non-settled refugees needed interna-
tional material assistance, the enormity
of the refugee problem was still such
that priorities had to be established,
said Mr. Lindt, and, without any
doubt, the first priority belonged to
individuals or groups of refugees in
danger of starvation.

Speaking of various aspects of the
refugee problem, Mr. Lindt pointed
out that if a great refugee wave broke
in a country of asylum, it would be
both impossible and unjust to leave
that country to shoulder the responsi-
bility alone for the refugees’ care and
maintenance. His Office had had that
problem during the Hungarian refugee
movement in 1956-7. Today that prob-
lem was practically, if not completely,
solved.

In North Africa, on the other hand,
the problem continued. More than
200,000 refugees from Algeria in Mo-
rocco and Tunisia were living in
countries that were making efforts to

develop their own economies, and the
presence of the refugees added a very
great burden. In 1959 the joint opera-
tion of the League of Red Cross So-
cieties and his Office improved con-
siderably the living conditions of those
refugees. Distribution of monthly ra-
tions had become regular, and clothing
and blankets were now being dis-
tributed. With great generosity the
Governments of Tunisia and Morocco
had allowed refugees to benefit from
their health and educational services.
In order to improve the feeding of
children, who comprised one half of
the refugee group, provision had been
made for distribution of reconstituted
milk from 41 milk centres in Morocco
and 71 in Tunisia, and it was hoped
that the number of centres would be
increased considerably by the end of
the year. Mobile and stationary clinics
and multi-purpose centres, which had
begun as an experimental project in
Tunisia, provided health care, milk,
hot meals and education.

Both Tunisia and Morocco had a
considerable degree of unemployment,
so that, although refugees were al-
lowed to work, it was difficult for
them to earn a living.

The League of Red Cross Societies,
added Mr. Lindt, should be con-
gratulated on its efficiency and re-
sourcefulness, but, unfortunately, its
executive committee had adopted a
resolution by which its participation
in the joint operation would cease at
the end of June 1961.

Solution in Sight

The High Commissioner also in-
formed the Committee that, while in
1955 there had been 252,000 non-
settled refugees in Europe, both in-
side and outside camps, there would
be no more than 75,000 by the end
of 1960, even though 238,000 new
refugees had arrived during the five-
year period. Also by the end of 1960
the camp population would fall to
13,800 persons; of those remaining,
10,500 persons (from Germany, Aus-
tria and Italy) qualified for the camp-
clearance program. By the beginning
of 1961 there would be no refugees
in camps in Greece, and there should
be none in Austria and Italy by the
end of 1961. There were still 3,300
refugees living in camps who did not
come under the camp-clearance pro-
gram. However, the problem of non-
settled refugees living outside camps
had assumed manageable proportions,
their number having dropped from
167,000 in 1955 to 61,000 currently.
Providing there was no new influx of
refugees, the solution of the problem
of refugees under the Office’s mandate
in Europe was in sight.

Mr. Lindt also informed the Com-
mittee that the emigration of handi-
capped refugees had been greatly in-
creased as a result of revolutionary
developments in medicine and other
fields.

The Office’s program for refugees
of European origin living in the Far
East had also benefited from new
developments and was being con-
ducted, as in the past, in close co-
operation with the Inter-Governmental
Committee for European Migration.
There was a general shift of the refu-
gee problem away from Europe. Also,
he said, he had been authorized to use
his good offices to assist other refu-
gees not within his mandate, such as
the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong
and, more generally, refugees not
within the competence of the United
Nations.

Committee Action

After debate, the Third Committee
approved by a roll-call vote of 76 to
none, with France abstaining, a re-
vised draft resolution presented by
Afghanistan, Libya, Morocco and Tu-
nisia concerning the refugees from
Algeria in Morocco and Tunisia.

Under it, the Assembly recommend-
ed that the High Commissioner
should continue his efforts and that
he should use his influence to ensure
the continuation of the operation car-
ried out jointly by his Office and the
League of Red Cross Societies, or,
should that prove impossible, draw
up and execute a program for the
assumption by his Office of responsi-
bility for those refugees from July 1,
1961.

Also adopted in Committee—by 65
votes to none, with 12 abstentions—
was an eleven-power draft resolution
sponsored by Brazil, Ceylon, Colom-
bia, Denmark, the Federation of Ma-
laya, Ghana, Greece, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, New Zealand and Togo. This
invited member states and members
of the specialized agencies to continue
to devote attention to refugee problems
still awaiting solution (a) by continuing
to improve the legal status of refugees
living in their territory, in consulta-
tion, where necessary, with the High
Commissioner; (b) by further increas-
ing facilities for the voluntary repa-
triation, resettlement and integration
of refugees; (c) by enabling the High
Commissioner to reach his financial
targets for 1961 and other programs
entrusted to his Office; and (d) by
continuing to consult with the High
Commissioner in respect of measures
of assistance to groups of refugees
who do not come within the compe-
tence of the United Nations.

A resolution expressing thanks and
good wishes to the High Commissioner

Eleventh General Conference

of UNESCO Opens in Paris

To eleventh General Conference
of the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organi-
zation opened in Paris on November
14. Akale-Work Apte-Wold, Ethiopian
Ambassador to Paris, was elected
President of the Conference. New
member states admitted to UNESCO
since the previous General Conference
in 1958 were welcomed by Jean Ber-
thoin of France, President of the tenth
General Conference, who presided at
the opening meeting of the current
session. The new members are: Ca-
meroun, Central African Republic,
Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Guin-
ea, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali,
Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Upper Volta
and Nigeria. In the first week of the
Conference, Kuwait, Gabon and Togo
were also admitted bringing UNESCO’s
member states to 97.

The proposed program and budget
for UNESCO for the two-year period
1961-1962 were presented by Dr. Vit-
torino Veronese, Director-General. He
proposed a budget of $30,929,128, an
increase of 19.9 per cent over the
budget for 1959-1960. On November
21, the General Conference adopted
a resolution recommending that the
provisional spending level of the Or-
ganization for 1961-1962 should be
fixed at $31,597,628—a sum higher
than that proposed by the Director-
General. The final spending level will
be definitely fixed by the Conference
at the end of the session around De-
cember 10.

Dr. Veronese emphasized as “pri-
ority tasks” for UNESCO, activities re-
lating to education and assistance to
underdeveloped countries. The draft
program stresses the need to provide
schools for the 114 million children of
Africa, Asia and the Arab states now
lacking adequate educational facili-
ties, and long-range education plan-
ning in these areas and in Latin
America.

Other projects in the proposed pro-
gram for 1961-1962 referred to by
Dr. Veronese are measures to advance
adult education, marine science, arid
zone and seismic research, the devel-
opment of mass media facilities in un-
derdeveloped regions and the UNESCO-
sponsored campaign to save the Nu-
bian monuments in the Sudan and the

on his leaving the Office shortly was
sponsored in Committee by Argen-
tina, Australia, Canada, Denmark,
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Tunisia, Turkey,
the United Kingdom and the United
States. It was adopted by acclamation.

United Arab Republic threatened from
the flooding which will follow from
the building of the Aswan High Dam.

The necessity of educational plan-
ning in the Asian and African regions
and the Arab states was brought out
during three surveys conducted by
UNESCO in 1960. A meeting called by
UNESCO at Karachi, with participants
from 15 Asian nations, showed that
87 million school-age children cur-
rently lack educational facilities. In
view of the population growth in that
continent, the governments of Asia
need to plan on a primary school sys-
tem capable of absorbing 220 million
children by 1980, if all children are to
be assured at least a sixth-grade edu-
cation, UNESCO stated in announcing
plans for the Conference.

In the Arab states, 10 million chil-
dren still lack primary education, and
the development of secondary and
vocational schools is essential if these
states are to complete a transition to
an industrial society, the UNESCO an-
nouncement stated.

In tropical Africa, 17 million chil-
dren lack schools and an estimated
345,000 teachers will have to be re-
cruited to fill the gap in the primary
schools. African education officials
have also asked UNESCO for immediate
help in developing secondary, techni-
cal and vocational schools, and train-
ing leaders. Contributions amounting
to three million dollars have been pro-
posed, both from UNESCO’s own bud-
get and from the United Nations
Technical Assistance program and the
Special Fund, to start helping member
states in these areas to plan long-
range educational development, train-
ing of education planners, administra-
tors and supervisers, as well as teach-
ers and social scientists. Because of
the important role played by the press,
radio, television and other audio-visual
media in developing a literate popula-
tion, the development of the mass
media will also be given special atten-
tion.

For the past four years, UNESCO has
concentrated, its educational resources
to extend primary education in Latin
America, an activity regarded as a
major project of the organization.
Under this program, education special-
ists and school teachers have been
trained, seminars organized, and help
granted to education ministries. This
program will be intensified in 1961-
1962, as its success has been notable;
the primary school enrollment among
the participants has increased by an
average of 18.5 per cent since the pro-
gram got under way in 1956.

UNR—December 1960

Austria and Italy Urged to Resume

Negotiations on Bolzano (Bozen) Minority

HE GENERAL ASSEMBLY on Octo-

ber 31 urged Austria and Italy to
resume negotiations toward solving all
differences relating to the implementa-
tion of an agreement on the status of
the German-speaking element in the
Province of Bolzano (Bozen) in north-
ern Italy, signed by the two countries
in September 1946.

A resolution which the Assembly
adopted by acclamation in plenary
meeting had previously received unani-
mous endorsement in the Special Po-
litical Committee and was welcomed
by the delegations of both Austria and
Italy.

The Assembly went on to recom-
mend that, should the resumed nego-
tiations not lead to satisfactory results
within a reasonable period of time,
both parties should give favorable con-
sideration to the possibility of seeking
a solution of their differences by any
of the means provided in the Charter
of the United Nations, including re-
course to the International Court of
Justice or any other peaceful means of
their own choice. It also recommended
that the two countries refrain from
any action which might impair their
friendly relations.

The area in question, in South Ty-
rol, was part of Austria until the peace
treaty after the First World War under
which Bolzano was awarded to Italy,
which now refers to it as Alto Adige.
Despite extended bilateral diplomatic
conversations between Austria and
Italy, their dispute concerning the sta-
tus of the German-speaking minority
in the province remained unresolved.

The matter came before the Assem-
bly as a result of a request made by
Austria last June, when its Foreign
Minister, Bruno Kreisky, requested
that an item described as “The prob-
lem of the Austrian minority in Italy”
be included in the agenda of the fif-
teenth session of the Assembly. When
the Assembly included the item in its
agenda, however, the title was changed

UNR—December 1960

Assembly Resolution Adopted by Acclamation

to read: “The status of the German-
speaking element in the Province of
Bolzano (Bozen). Implementation of
the Paris Agreement of 5 September
1946.” The item was referred to the
Special Political Committee for con-
sideration.

Austria originally submitted a draft
resolution on this question which asked
the General Assembly to “recognize
the justified demand of the South Ty-
roleans for a substantial and effective
regional autonomy” and to recom-
mend that “the two parties concerned
resume without delay negotiations aim-
ing at the establishment of the Prov-
ince of Bozen/Bolzano as an autono-
mous region with legislative and exec-
utive power.” The draft resolution,
which was subsequently amended to
eliminate the rider, also originally sug-
gested that the two parties to the dis-
pute be invited to submit a report on
the result of their negotiations to the
General Assembly’s sixteenth session
next year.

Two Foreign Ministers

Consideration of the question in the
Special Political Committee continued
through ten meetings, during which
the representatives of 32 countries
spoke, in addition to Mr. Kreisky,
who outlined the case for Austria, and
Antonio Segni, Foreign Minister of
Italy, who responded for his Govern-
ment.

Austria complained that the 1946
Paris Agreement, which provided for
legislative and executive autonomy of
the South Tyrolean population in order
to protect the ethnic and cultural
character of the Austrian population,
had been interpreted by Italy in such
a way that application of the agree-
ment contradicted its purpose in es-
sential respects.

Italy responded that it had imple-
mented the terms of the agreement in
every particular; that Austria was en-

deavoring to supersede the agreement;
that Austria was asking the Assembly
to interfere in the internal affairs of
Italy; that, although Austria had re-
fused to take the matter to the Inter-
national Court of Justice, Italy was
still willing to do so and to abide by
the Court’s decision; and that the
Italian Government was still willing to
discuss matters with Vienna so long as
discussions were within the terms of
the agreement.

In explaining the case for Austria,
Mr. Kreisky recalled for the Com-
mittee that the Tyrol had been a dis-
tinct political entity since 1254 and
had been an integral part of Austria
since 1363. The gorge of Salurn (Sa-
lorno) was a clear and natural divid-
ing line between the Italian- and
German-speaking populations. How-
ever, in April 1915, Great Britain,
France and Russia concluded the Lon-
don Agreement, under the terms of
which Italy was promised that if it
declared war on its former ally, Aus-
tria, it would receive all that part of
the Tyrol south of the Brenner. Con-
sequently, at the Peace Conference it
was decided to grant Italy the so-
called strategic Brenner frontier.

From then on, said Mr. Kreisky,
matters had gone from bad to worse
in the South Tyrol. A few examples
would suffice to demonstrate the op-
pressive character of the régime insti-
tuted there: German place names and
family names had been replaced by
invented Italian names; Italian had
been made the only official language;
the use of German as a medium of
instruction in public and private
schools had been forbidden, as it had
for religious instruction, and even the
inscriptions on tombstones had been
replaced by Italian ones.

A climax to the sufferings of the
South Tyrolean people came with the
establishment of the Hitler-Mussolini
axis, since an agreement between the
two dictators provided for a resettle-
ment, in the German Reich or else-

where, of the entire South Tyrolean
population. Seventy thousand South
Tyroleans had thus been forced from
their native soil.

Subsequently, the South Tyrolean
people clearly expressed their desire
to be reunited with Austria, but the
second Peace Conference of 1947 de-
cided otherwise.

However, on September 5, 1946,
Austria and Italy concluded the Paris
Agreement. A generous and equita-
ble implementation of that agreement
might have created conditions in which
the South Tyroleans could have ad-
ministered their own. affairs and have
settled down to a reasonably secure
existence within the Italian state. Italy,
however, had not implemented either
the spirit or the letter of the Paris
Agreement, he charged.

Speaking of the present conditions
in South Tyrol, ‘Mr. Kreisky said that
Italian arguments were used to show
that the Province of Bozen (Bolzano)
was thriving. But Austria was not ask-
ing for economic assistance for the
province; its aim was to enlist support
for the political demands of the in-
habitants, who were rightly claiming
regional administrative and legislative
powers. Hardly anything had been
done to redress the injustices inflicted
by the fascist regime, which had de-
nied the South Tyrol people any
chance of employment in the public
service, compelled them to devote
themselves to agriculture and had
forced 70,000 of them to emigrate,
only about 20,000 having been able
to return. Less than seven per cent of
state-subsidized housing was inhabited
by South Tyroleans, although South
Tyroleans made up about two thirds
of the population. In the administra-
tion of justice only 13 per cent of all
positions were held by South Tyro-
leans; of 52 judges, all but four were
Italian. In 1958 all nine medical di-
rectors of clinics in the largest hos-
pital in South Tyrol were Italians, as
were the 57 nurses, only one of whom
spoke German. Of 7,800 persons em-
ployed in the public services, 7,100
were Italians. Thousands of South Ty-
roleans were forced to emigrate each
year because they could not find work
in their native land. South Tyroleans
were also at a great disadvantage when
they had to deal with judges, police-
men or other administrative officials
whose language they seldom under-
stood. The people, therefore, were de-
nied their democratic rights.

Speaking for Italy, Mr. Segni said
that his Government had long ago
indicated that it was prepared to grant
the German-speaking inhabitants of
the province a liberal statute and to
review some of the 1939 options. That
was how the De _ Gasperi-Gruber

Agreement of September 5, 1946, sub-

sequently annexed to the 1947 Peace
Treaty, had come into being. That
agreement was the only legal title
under which Austria could discuss the
status of the German-speaking people
of that part of Italy.

He maintained that Italy had
scrupulously observed the provisions
of the Paris Agreement dealing with
the recognition of certain university
degrees and diplomas, and it had hon-
ored, to Austria’s entire satisfaction,
its obligations with regard to frontier
facilities, local trade and the free
transit of persons and goods between
Northern and Eastern Tyrol. The
other provisions of the agreement had
also been fully impiemented. The Ger-
man-speaking people of Bolzano Prov-
ince enjoyed full civil and political
liberties; they were provided with a
great number of German-language
schools, entirely at the cost of the
Italian state; their culture, traditions
and folklore were flourishing; and they
enjoyed economic prosperity which
gave them a higher standard of living
than the average for the whole of Italy
and one of the lowest unemployment
indices in the country. Above all, they
had a most active autonomous admin-
istrative unit—the Autonomous Prov-
ince of Bolzano—with wide legisla-
tive and executive powers of the same
nature as those granted to other re-
gions of Italy which enjoyed special
status. He emphasized the climate of
freedom and democracy’ in which Italy
allowed that autonomy to develop and
he pointed out that the Italian Govern-
ment had put no obstacle in the way of
the German-speaking Italian citizens
who had come to New York to pre-
sent their views to the United Nations.

Interference Alleged

The Austrian delegation, added Mr.
Segni, persisted in referring to “the
Austrian minority in Italy” after hav-
ing Officially agreed to the formula
“the German-speaking element in the
Province of Bolzano (Bozen).” Thus
Austria was not claiming the applica-
tion of the Paris Agreement but was
seeking to supersede it. The Austrian
draft resolution, he said, did not reflect
genuine concern for the protection of
a minority but rather the desire to
transform that minority into a domi-
nant racial group. Moreover, the pre-
amble called for a new and quite dis-
tinct autonomy status for the Province
of Bolzano. The draft resolution, he
added, gave the impression that the
bilateral negotiations between Rome
and Vienna had been intended to raise
the Province of Bolzano to the status
of an autonomous region, whereas in
fact those conversations related only
to the implementation of the Paris
Agreement. What the resolution was

asking the General Assembly to do
was to interfere in the internal affairs
of Italy.

Italy still hoped that Austria would
act in due conformity with the Paris
Agreement, which the Italian Govern-
ment would continue to apply in its
entirety. His Government was also
ready to resume conversations with
Austria within the framework of the
agreement and, should there be an
insurmountable difference of opinion,
to submit the issue to the International
Court of Justice; and, whatever the
outcome, Italy would submit to the
Court’s decision.

The conclusion of discussion in
Committee was that a 17-power draft
resolution, sponsored by Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Cy-
prus, Denmark, Ecuador, Ghana, In-
dia, Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Mexico,
Norway, Paraguay and Uruguay, was
submitted. After statements by a num-
ber of representatives, including those
of Austria and Italy, that they would
support that draft resolution, the
Chairman, Carlet Auguste, of Haiti,
stated that if there were no request
for a vote, he would consider the draft
adopted by acclamation.

The report of the Committee, rec-
ommending Assembly approval of that
proposal, came before the plenary
meeting of October 31.

Commenting on the draft resolu-
tion, Mr. Kreisky observed that it
urged the two parties to try to find a
solution to “all” differences relating to
implementation of the Paris Agree-
ment. He also stressed that the lan-
guage of the agreement, which was
most expressive of its spirit, had been
included in the preamble. He hoped
unanimous adoption would help create
an atmosphere that would permit the
problem to be solved in a manner
satisfactory to all.

Gaetano Martino, of Italy, said the
draft resolution was entirely satisfac-
tory to his delegation. He noted that
it referred unequivocally to the imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreement and
that, in urging resumption of Italian-
Austrian negotiations, it met a wish
expressed time and again by his Gov-
ernment. His delegation also approved
the recommendation that, should bi-
lateral negotiations fail, there should
be recourse to the International Court
of Justice or other peaceful means for
reaching agreement.

Gratification that the Special Politi-
cal Committee had been able to reach
unanimity and that a cooperative spirit
had been shown by the sponsors and
by the two countries concerned was
expressed by the representatives of
Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay.

The resolution was then declared
adopted by acclamation by the Presi-
dent of the Assembly.

UNR—December 1960

Summary of the General Debate—Part II

For reasons of space, the summary of the General Assembly’s general debate is
being presented in two parts. Statements made in the early part of the debate
were summarized in the November 1960 issue of the Review. As in Part I,
Part II follows the order in which delegations spoke, except that the order of
statements made under the right of reply has sometimes been changed for pur-
poses of clarity. While reasons of space preclude the use of their texts in full,
effort has been made to present the main points of all speakers’ statements.

SPAIN

José Félix de Lequerica
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

The present Assembly session, with the
presence of so many chiefs of state, had
a certain flavor of a Vienna Congress,
said Mr. de Lequerica. The music was
different and the contents varied, but it
was a wider congress with “less har-
mony.” To this wider gathering they
welcomed the new nationalities. The
monopoly of Europe at the Vienna Con-
gress had occupied a long period of
history. Today the world, as a policy-
making body, not as a culture, had be-
come non-European and fulfilled its role
fully.

The duty of those countries with the
highest degree of development was to
banish wretchedness, and it was only fair
to say that these countries were fulfilling
this duty to a considerable extent. The
largest amount of aid given for the de-
velopment of underdeveloped countries
had so far come from the United States.
It had done so in order to rebuild the
lives of countries after periods of crisis.
This was a fine example of “contempor-
ary conscientiousness.”

Spain was in the middle road of eco-
nomic development among the industrial
countries and among those who were
comparatively backward. It had had occa-
sion to obtain economic assistance. Spain
could not forget the $62 million voted
ten years ago by the United States Con-
gress to help it with its economic prob-
lems. Today Spain presented a picture
which was visibly satisfactory.

Nothing could contribute as much to
the lessening of the danger of war as
could the strengthening of relations and
bonds between those who were animated
by a desire for peace and whose resist-
ance had so far prevented violence and
who, with a super-loyalty, Spain trusted
would be able to make war impossible
for the future. In stating this, Spain was
thinking of the Western group, which
covered various continents and which
was armed with all the necessary ele-
ments of war in order to make their
peace-loving purposes prevail. “We must
not hesitate between one group and the

UNR—December 1960

other in order to show any doubt that
we support the peace-loving group.”

The opposite group—the Soviet group
—trepresented the only threat to the peace
of the world today, he continued, In the
Congo, this group had unleashed a cam-
paign to make the Secretary-General and
the United Nations lose prestige. The
United Nations had reacted well by rea-
son of their decisions, particularly in
respect of the Afro-Asians. This was a
lesson of “sense and responsibility” which
fully confirmed his optimism “in wel-
coming them here in a friendly way.”

The danger of Soviet imperialism was
not limited to Europe. It began in
Europe itself. There was the occupation
of Eastern Germany, the threats to Ber-
lin, the fate of the Baltic countries, and
there was Hungary. Europeans may have
erred in their colonial pasts and were
paying for it with Soviet colonization.

On the disarmament question, Mr. de
Lequerica said that to think of any
disarmament measures without control
was to avoid the problem and give free
rein to those who prepared for violence
and wished to prevent the universal
observation of their movements and con-
trol over what they did. He believed that
after many disappointments and with the
“confused encouragement” caused by the
universal feeling of discontent, the im-
pulses of the Soviet Union would end
by renouncing their aggressive urges,
“cultivating assiduously their own gar-
dens, bettering the lot of their own peo-
ples and not thinking always of vio-
lence.”

Spain firmly believed in the United
Nations. It was entrusted by its members
with high missions, within a framework
of scrupulous respect for their sover-
eignty; it was not an instrument for get-
ting entangled in minor matters unworthy
of its stature. They must not be dis-
couraged, in talking of disarmament, by
the weakness of their position—particu-
larly those who had no armaments and
could contribute little directly to the
task. Enthusiasm, resolve and the spirit
of sacrifice were also important elements
in the fight for disarmament.

President Eisenhower in the Assembly
had spoken for peace, for the abandon-
ment of weapons and nuclear destruction

and for the utilization of outer space
only for peaceful purposes. All of this
was on the basis of solid, unquestionable
international guarantees, for the imple-
mentation of which the United Nations
would play a significant role. President
Eisenhower had offered also to begin the
financing of the “new Africa” and to
give assistance to United Nations forces
in maintaining liberty for the African
peoples. The President’s words had met
with full approval. Everyone should now
do what was necessary and make the
sacrifices which were called for.

Spain underlined the extraordinary im-
portance of technical assistance at the
present time. Economic aid would be of
no great value if they did not, at the
same time, take into account the need
for properly trained administrators, man-
agers and executives who were prepared
to promote economic and social progress.
Although it did not have an excess of
material resources, Spain had an “old
and glorious tradition” of educators
which it gladly offered to all peoples,
particularly “to our brothers in Latin
America and to our Arab brothers with
whom we have close bonds.” Spain was
anxious to cooperate fully in the tech-
nical assistance programs of the United
Nations.

Members should cooperate in every
way in this assistance. Spain, for its part,
would not forget the help it had received
from the Monetary Fund and the Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation Organization
in stabilizing its economy.

NEW ZEALAND

Walter Nash
Prime Minister and
Minister of External Affairs

New Zealand looked upon the United
Nations as the principal source of peace
in the world, said Mr. Nash. They re-
garded it as “the mainstay of the free-
dom and independence of all its smaller
and less powerful members.”

New Zealand refused to contemplate
the failure of the united efforts of tke
majority of members of the United Na-
tions to reverse the present disturbing

trend in international relations. New
Zealand pledged itself to work toward
this reversal. The events of recent
months left no room to doubt the gravity
of the situation with which this General
Assembly must grapple. The tensions
which for so long frustrated efforts to
build a secure and lasting peace had
revived; and, most unhappily, they had
spread to blight the vigorous growth of
independence in Africa.

Mr. Nash believed that 1960 would
be best remembered as the year of Afri-
can independence, with 15 African
states admitted at this session and the
prospect of additions to that number.
This was a striking testimony to Africa’s
political awakening.

Contrasting the circumstances of 1945
with those of 1960, he recalled that at
San Francisco the nations had built an
organization which had proved, “through
all the stresses of the intervening years,
strong enough to maintain, and progress
toward, its objectives.” Yet, at the very
time the newly independent nations were
taking their seats, they were exposed to
suggestions and proposals that the United
Nations should “trim its sails” and com-
promise with the renewed pressure of
power politics.

The cold war had now been intro-
duced into Africa; the United Nations
authority had been challenged; and the
integrity of the Secretary-General, “who
has done so much to advance the peace-
ful evolution of all peoples,” had been
attacked in a torrent of cold war propa-
ganda. This was not only distressing but
“highly dangerous” for the small nations.
He would not ask the newly independent
states to align themselves with any
power bloc. There was much that was
hopeful in the concept of neutralism ex-
pressed by African leaders like Dr.
Nkrumah and Asian leaders like Mr.
Nehru. The world community should
aid the new states and see that they were
free to develop their own personality.
This was what the United Nations was
trying to do in the Congo.

It was necessary to learn from the
“tragic events” there and resolve to keep
other areas about to become independent,
or recently become independent, free
from a major international conflict.

In Asia, the Middle East and Africa,
the majority of United Nations members
had supported prompt and vigorous ac-
tion. Recently, the Security Council
seemed to take on new life, and its
unanimous agreement to send a United
Nations Force to the Congo provided
“an impressive illustration” of how the
Council could continue to work “if it
received the full backing of all mem-
bers.”

Turning to the role of the Secretary-
General, Mr. Nash said that in bringing
to bear the full weight and authority
which the Charter accorded to his Office,
Mr. Hammarskjold had made “a signal
contribution” to the work of the United
Nations. Even more disquieting than the
attack on the Secretary-General, in whom
the vast majority placed “fullest trust
and confidence,” was the proposal to
replace unity by crippling division, de-
cision by indecision, trust by suspicion

and uncertainty. Acceptance of such a
proposal could foreshadow the Organiza-
tion’s failure as defender of peace and
security.

Though dissension among the great
powers had hindered the United Nations,
this dissension had not been allowed to
invade the Secretariat. On the contrary,
the Charter and the practice of the
United Nations had placed great em-
phasis on the exclusive duty owed to
the Organization by all members of its
staff. If some of the proposals and sug-
gestions were adopted, that could no
longer be the case. The Secretary-Gen-
eral and Secretariat, instead of taking in-
structions from United Nations organs
such as the Security Council, would
instead “reflect the factions represented
in its directorate,” which would, in effect,
become a powerful committee to supplant
the established organs of the United
Nations except the General Assembly it-
self. This would stultify the Organiza-
tion, and the smaller countries would be
the greatest losers.

Any possible difficulty, it seemed to
Mr. Nash, arose from the lack of precise,
well-thought-out directions from the Se-
curity Council itself. That was the proper
body to control the Secretary-General’s
actions, not “a political directorate” in-
side the Secretariat, and certainly not a
committee instead of a Secretary-Gen-
eral, involving as it would a revision of
the Charter.

Small Countries Concerned

The failure of members to accept their
obligations and responsibilities, rather
than imperfections of the Charter, ex-
plained the Organization’s deficiencies,
continued Mr. Nash. The recent tragic
events in the newly born Congo showed
what was bound to happen if members
ignored the Organization in pursuit of
their national interests. It was a matter
of profound concern for small countries
such as New Zealand that “any great
and powerful state should seek to wrest
a narrow political advantage from the
turmoil in that unhappy country.”

In expressing his Government’s sup-
port for the United Nations action in the
Congo, Mr. Nash said New Zealand
would make an immediate contribution
of £100,000 to the United Nations Fund
for the Congo, established by the Assem-
bly in its resolution of September 20.

The countries of the Commonwealth
had also launched their own program to
assist the development of African coun-
tries within the Commonwealth, and
New Zealand would play its part in this
special assistance plan by providing help
to the emerging African Commonwealth
countries up to a maximum of £100,000
annually.

In the Pacific Trust Territory of
Western Samoa, for whose administra-
tion New Zealand was responsible, the
stage was set for the Samoans to assume
full sovereignty within the international
community. Less than a year ago the
territory had embarked on the final stage
of its political development. With the
introduction of cabinet government, by
arrangement with New Zealand, Western

Samoa became fully self-governing. At
the end of 1961, if the General Assembly
decided that the territory was ready to
assume this status, Western Samoa would
become the first completely independent
Polynesian state.

In order to enable Western Samoa to
effect “an orderly transition” from self-
government to full sovereign independ-
ence, New Zealand proposed that the
Assembly provide for a plebiscite to be
held in Western Samoa, in accordance
with the recommendation of the 1959
visiting mission, to ascertain whether the
Samoans wished their country to take
this decisive step.

Economic and social progress in the
world was the urgent and continuing
concern of the United Nations, especially
the raising of the productive capacity of
underdeveloped countries, Mr. Nash con-
tinued. The improvement of living stand-
ards was, in fact, the foundation of all
United Nations action to establish an
enduring peace.

If the resources of the United Nations
were, however, strained to the limit in
meeting a single emergency situation,
they were “absolutely inadequate” when
applied to the problems of underdevel-
oped countries. Only when progress was
made toward disarmament would ade-
quate resources become available to
grapple effectively with these problems.

Disarmament remained the key to
peace and security. It was not merely
the mounting threat of nuclear destruc-
tion that appalled people. It was also
the monstrous waste of capital and
technical effort which could be put to
use for the social and economic better-
ment of mankind.

A year ago, the Assembly had looked
forward to substantial progress in dis-
armament and to the early conclusion of
an agreement to end nuclear tests. Nei-
ther hope had been fulfilled. Despite
the collapse of disarmament negotiations,
the Geneva Conference on the Discon-
tinuation of Nuclear Weapons Tests had
remained in session and, in the mean-
time, the three negotiating powers had
prolonged their voluntary suspension of
tests. New Zealand earnestly hoped that
“this voluntary action” would in the near
future be confirmed in an international
agreement to which all states would
accede.

Referring to the two proposals on
disarmament submitted by the United
Kingdom and the USSR, Mr. Nash
said that although there were many im-
portant differences in them, there were
also important areas of agreement; these
might be enlarged during the course of
negotiations. It was doubtful, however,
if general and complete disarmament
could be achieved within the short span
of four years, as suggested by the USSR.
The important thing was to progress
as far as possible within those four years.

Mr. Nash urged the early resumption
of “meaningful” negotiations among the
great powers. He also felt that the Dis-
armament Commission should play 4a
more active role.

New Zealand endorsed a proposal by
Canada in the Disarmament Commis-
sion to the effect that those areas of

UNR—December 1960

disarmament—for example, the levels of
conventional forces—on which progress
had already been made in the course of
negotiations should be singled out for
special study. There was also much hope
in the suggestions of the Foreign Min-
ister of Denmark and of the Prime Min-
ister of the United Kingdom.

Touching on “some minor notes,” Mr.
Nash said that wisdom required more
thought. The Assembly had too many
long speeches. “The more time we give
to thinking,” he said, “the less time
there is for talking. And if we could
only stop the rain—you can spell it any
way you want — of invectives and
vindictive speeches, then the sun will
shine again. We want more open hands,
less closed fists; more ‘how do you do’
instead of defamations all the time; more
handshaking and less nose-punching.”

Disarmament called for reason, cour-
age and imagination in equal measure.
First, by applying reason and science to
studies on control, the great powers
could, and must, seek to reduce to a
very minimum the magnitude of the risk
involved. Second, by refraining from
intemperate political attacks and by pro-
moting international cooperation, the
great powers could, and must, reduce
“the demands on our courage” in facing
the remaining risks which cannot be
avoided. Third, to take the initial hurdle
they must be assisted by some faith and
imagination, remembering always ; that
the only choice was a relative choice and
that, in the end, inactivity would be
the most dangerous course of all.

The United Nations was the major
agency defending the smaller powers in
the world today. The Organization, in
spite of its limitations, was still the most
powerful agency for peace and for the
disarmament that “we are talking about,
and longing for.”

MOROCCO

Crown Prince Moulay Hassan
Vice-President of the Council

The attainment by many underdevel-
oped countries of independence had un-
fortunately led great nations to compete
not only for their friendship but also
for support in conflicts which did not
concern them. They did, however, think
it important that these conflicts be
solved. The great powers did not realize
the importance attached by the newly
independent countries to the absence of
any interference into their internal affairs
in connection with their being given
financial or technical aid. These unfor-
tunate interventions had “a neo-colonial
character” and created a serious risk of
local or general conflicts. The smaller
nations considered that the United Na-
tions offered the best chance to attain
peace. It should not be reduced to a sad
echo of the divisions afflicting the world.
It should endeavor to bring about posi-
tive solutions to problems that directly
concerned the maintenance of peace.
Assistance to the underdeveloped coun-
tries, which could provide a basis for
cooperation, had now become a field

UNR—December 1960

for additional rivalries, Prince Hassan
added.

In the efforts for a relaxation of ten-
sions, the only practical and positive
contribution the new countries could
make was to refuse in advance any par-
ticipation in the quarrels opposing the
West to the socialist camp. The un-
committed countries should make every
possible effort to help solve the disarma-
ment problem.

Three positive contributions to its
solution had been made at the current
session—by President Eisenhower, by
Premier Khrushchev and by Prime Min-
ister Macmillan. Nothing fruitful and
nothing positive, however, could be done
as long as the committed powers faced
one another alone in disarmament com-
mittees. “One cannot be at one and the
same time the judge and party to a dis-
agreement.”

It was necessary to have the neutral
states take part in the search for disarma-
ment. First, a sub-committee, composed
solely of the representatives of five
neutral countries, should, with the as-
sistance of experts, determine the points
of agreement and disagreement between
the two proposed plans. Secondly, the
committee on disarmament, composed of
the ten countries already participating in
this work, plus five neutral states, should
work on the basis of documents prepared
by the neutral sub-committee, whose task
of good offices and arbitration would
make the discussion more efficient. The
chairmanship of the new committee
should go, by rotation, to a representa-
tive of one of the five uncommitted
countries.

Then, liberated from the nightmare of
the armaments race, the nations of the
world could make aid to the underdevel-
oped countries their main concern. The
aim should be to have all available re-
sources placed in a single fund, managed
on an equitable basis under United Na-
tions auspices. This would avoid bilateral
aid with its inevitable consequences of
compromises and more or less concealed
pressure. It would also permit the active,
not merely symbolic, participation of the
countries receiving aid in the manage-
ment of the fund. Assistance to under-
developed countries would thus become
the instrument of continued progress
rather than a means of political pressure
and a source of ever recurring dissen-
sions.

The “collective personality” of the
new countries should be based on a
declaration inspired by the principles of
the Bandung Conference. It should rest
upon three essential points: tolerance,
mutual support and universality. Toler-
ance involved admitting that there were
many ways of leading the people to their
fulfillment, and that no nation could
claim to have a miraculous formula for
real power and progress, and favoring
peaceful solutions by negotiation or arbi-
tration in all cases of conflict.

Mutual help was the key to the future
for the poor countries, which had above
all to rely on themselves. In Africa, for
instance, first regional and then conti-
nental collaboration were required. Uni-
versality involved seeking world solutions

for the only problem which really coun-
ted—the improvement of the well-being
of every individual. Morocco would
therefore never cease to encourage the
development of international organiza-
tions and institutions.

Welcoming the new member states,
Prince Hassan regretted the absence of
Algeria which, he was sure, would obtain
independence before long. He found it
inconsistent that France could sponsor
the admission of eleven countries to the
United Nations which were still under
its tutelage when the Algerian conflict
began, while conducting a war of repres-
sion in Algeria, a war which endangered
world peace and security. Even in the
French Government itself there were
those who believed that independence for
Algeria was inevitable. The General A: -
sembly, he added, “cannot, unless it is
to fail criminally, allow this war to con-
tinue.” The provisional Government of
the Algerian Republic was the only repre-
sentative organization of the Algerian
nation. The Algerians had asked the
General Assembly for arbitration, so
that a referendum on the right to self-
determination could take place in Algeria
under the auspices of the United Nations.
If the situation in Algeria were allowed
to continue for a long time, the cold
war could be brought into Africa.

As to the “great drama of the Congo,”
Morocco, which had been among the
first to provide the assistance asked for
by the United Nations within the frame-
work of the Charter, regretted that the
United Nations Force did not go into
Katanga on the day decided upon by
the Security Council.

The United Nations should recognize
the legitimacy of the Congolese Govern-
ment and the integrity of its territory
and also reconsider its attitude toward
the problem of the People’s Republic of
China, whose participation “in our work
would have much greater weight than
its opposition to the General Assembly
of the United Nations,” Prince Hassan
said.

He was also critical of France for
ignoring the Assembly’s resolution of
1959 that it refrain from nuclear bomb
tests in the Sahara. Morocco also felt
the United Nations could not remain
indifferent to the fate of the million
Palestinian refugees. Morocco, further,
hoped for support for its stand in respect
of Mauritania, which was still under
foreign domination.

Discussing the political, economic and
social development problems of the Afri-
can continent, Prince Hassan referred to
movements for union and asked for a
flexible policy “to respect the political
sincerity of each one of us, to allow for
a speedier and less costly development
through economy of means.” The need
for work on the national level did not
preclude regional economic cooperation
agreements. The African countries wanted
the developed countries to adopt a line
of action that would enable them to re-
ceive economic or financial aid where-
ever it came from, without discrimina-
tion.

As for the difficult problem of African
political regroupings, “leave time to pass

before sovereignties are to be aban-
doned.” What was premature on the
political level, however, was not only
possible but also indispensable on the
economic level.

For tackling Africa’s economic diffi-
culties, Prince Hassan advocated, in addi-
tion to economic development efforts by
individual African countries, the forma-
tion of regional associations to be
grouped within a continental organiza-
tion, endowed with a permanent secre-
tariat.

Morocco, he said, was willing, with
the cooperation of its African sister na-
tions, to prepare a draft plan for discus-
sion at a continental conference. It
would welcome this conference being
held in Tangiers in the spring of 1961,
to decide on the forms of regional and
continental association, the limits of com-
petence to be ascribed to it, the possibili-
ties for specialization in planning and in
common investments, and the organiza-
tion of intra- and extra-African relations.

He suggested the creation of a speciti-
cally African fund within this framework
of regional and continental association,
with an initial capital of $10 million, to
be subscribed and managed by the inde-
pendent countries of Africa. The funds
thus collected would be use to finance
the constitution of a “first guarantee
fund.” The real resources of the fund
would come from obligatory loans,
placed abroad, long-term national, multi-
lateral or international loans with inter-
national guarantees.

In addition, industrialized countries
could cooperate in the stabilization and
improvement of the financial resources
of underdeveloped countries. The fact
that they were often the suppliers of raw
materials was sufficient cause for the
buyers of these products to help in set-
ting up of a more rational system of
markets.

With regard to the structure of the
United Nations, he considered they
should refrain from making any changes
at present which ran the risk of produc-
ing conditions of partiality or immobility,
which recent events in the Congo had
plainly proved would be a major reason
for conflicts.

NETHERLANDS

J. M. A. H. Luns
Minister for Foreign Affairs

The problem of disarmament should
be at the central point of the Assembly’s
thinking and acting, said Mr. Luns. If
the foundations of peace had not yet
been laid, it was that fear and suspicion
still held the world in too firm a grip.

The Netherlands Government was in
full accord with the statement on this
made by the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom, and also with his ar-
guments to expose the insidious fallacies
of some speakers about Germany and
the policies of the Western countries in
respect of that country. The German
Federal Republic was a valuable partner
in the joint efforts for peaceful coopera-
tion among nations.

The Netherlands would lend strong
support to any proposals designed to
contribute really and effectively to the
promotion of peace, to the banishment
of suspicion and fear, and to the abate-
ment of the atomic threat.

The only way to lessen the peril of
an outbreak of war was through inter-
national cooperation on a _ worldwide
scale. That meant that strengthening the
United Nations was an essential condi-
tion for the success of any such efforts.
Whoever acted, or threatened to act, in
a manner contrary to the principles of
the United Nations undermined its au-
thority and jeopardized peace.

One such threat was uttered in the
address to the Assembly by the President
of Indonesia, said Mr. Luns. Indonesia
wished to annex part of New Guinea to
its own territory without allowing the
population of the island to exercise its
right of self-determination. Acceptance
of this claim would mean that the Pa-
puan people, in the eastern half of the
island, which was under Australian
guidance, would be enabled to determine
its own future, while those in the west-
ern half would be forever deprived of
this right.

Four times, in the period from 1953
to 1957, the General Assembly had re-
fused to recognize Indonesia’s claim, tak-
ing into account that the claim was
based on the interpretation of a treaty
—which Indonesia had unilaterally re-
pudiated—and that the Netherlands had
offered to abide by the decision on that
interpretation by the International Court
of Justice.

In his address to the current Assembly
session, the President of Indonesia had
announced that Indonesia was now de-
termined “to reach a solution by its
own methods,” which he described as
“a determined surgical effort.”

Such an approach to the settlement of
an international dispute was a direct at-
tack both on the principles of the Char-
ter and on the means of settlement of
disputes it sanctions and prescribes. It
was also contrary to the solemn pledge
given by all members of the United Na-
tions. Intentions so contrary to the
obligations imposed by the Charter had
not often been so openly announced
from the Assembly.

That the Netherlands could possibly
harbor any idea of aggressive intentions
toward Indonesia was so fantastic a no-
tion that no sensible person would give
it credence. It was to be sincerely hoped
that the threat of armed aggression im-
plicit in the Indonesian statement was
not really intended as such.

The Netherlands Government adhered
to its policy of full support for the
United Nations. The United Nations was
the infrastructure of growing interna-
tional cooperation, aimed not only at
security but more particularly at the
raising of the level of existence in the
underdeveloped countries.

To disturb this intricate structure was
a hazardous undertaking, because each
of its branches was organically connect-
ed with the others.

The question of transference of the
seat of the United Nations from New
York had been raised as if it were a

simple matter. “Let us beware of such
lighthearted suggestions.”

He could not but mention with ad-
miration the name of Secretary-Genera!
Dag Hammarskjold, said Mr. Luns. Per-
haps in the past there had been mo-
ments when the Netherlands Govern-
ment, as well as some of its friends,
would have preferred him to follow a
different line from that on which he had
decided within the purview of his com-
petence. This did not mean that the
Secretary-General was carrying out his
duties injudiciously. Rather, it was an
indication that he took them seriously
and tried to act impartially. The Nether-
lands could not agree with the proposal
made by the Soviet Union to amend the
Charter of the United Nations so as to
abolish the post of Secretary-General and
replace it by a body of three persons.
Acceptance of such a proposal would
lead to paralyzing the executive arm of
the United Nations.

This proposal did, however, contain
one welcome element, for by proposing
an amendment of the Charter, Mr.
Khrushchev indicated that the Soviet
Union had definitely abandoned its poli-
cy of opposing any Charter amendment.
For years it had been against the much-
needed increase in the membership of
the main organs of the United Nations
on the grounds that the Charter could
not be amended as long as the represen-
tatives of the People’s Republic of
China did not occupy the seat of China
in the Organization. Now that the Soviet
Union had abandoned this stand—for
otherwise Mr. Khrushchev could not
himself propose a Charter amendment—
a large majority of the Assembly would
be eager to take advantage of this op-
portunity to enlarge the Economic and
Social Council from 18 to 24 members.

Under the circumstances that unhap-
pily prevailed, the most important con-
tribution to be made to peace was to
increase economic assistance to under-
developed countries and to buttress the
work of the United Nations in that do-
main. The schemes of international eco-
nomic assistance had shown a spectacular
and still continuing upsurge. Interna-
tional economic assistance was not an
act of charity; it was a necessity for all
nations, rich and poor alike.

Tribute should be paid to the pro-
posal presented by President Eisenhower
for a special educational assistance pro-
gram for Africa. Existing machinery,
such as the Special Fund, already active
in the field of education, might be the
best to administer this additional activity.

Fortunately, the United Nations had
an impressive array of institutions capa-
ble of dealing with the teeming programs
for international assistance, including the
United Nations Special Fund and the
Expanded Program of Technical Assist-
ance. It would not be unsound if the
General Assembly were to consider in-
creasing the financial target for the ex-
panded program and Special Fund from
$100 million to $125 million. Even such
an amount, however, would not be
quite adequate for carrying out the most
urgent programs and projects.

In contributing to the United Na-
tions activities, the Netherlands had

UNR—December 1960

made a great effort—an effort greater
both absolutely and percentually than
that made by many other member states.
For the Special Fund, it intended to
pledge again for 1961, subject to parlia-
mentary approval, the sum of $2.4 mil-
lion. Contributing that amount made the
Netherlands the second largest contribu-
tor to the Special Fund in 1959, and the
third largest in 1960. Its contribution to
the expanded program for 1961 would
be increased by 7 per cent. It was to be
hoped that all countries would contribute
their proportionate share, so that the
target of $100 million would be reached.

The Netherlands welcomed the new
United Nations members from Africa
and would help them with their prob-
lems primarily through the United Na-
tions.

One of the gravest of these problems
was that of the Congo. In connection
with this, two things should be stated.
First, it was undeniable that it was
Belgium which took the initiative to
grant independence to the Congo. For
this initiative it deserved praise and
gratitude. Second, the only thing that
mattered now was that the United Na-
tions undertaking in the Congo should
be continued and carried through for the
benefit of the Congolese people.

On the assumption that other govern-
ments would act likewise, the Nether-
lands Government was willing to con-
tribute about $1 million to the United
Nations Fund for the Congo, a share
corresponding to its percentage assess-
ment in the regular budget of the United
Nations.

In Netherlands New Guinea, said Mr.
Luns, the only aim of the Netherlands
administration was to prepare the popu-
lation of the territory, within the shortest
possible time, for the exercise of its right
of self-determination. That was to say
that the population should freely deter-
mine what its own future was to be,
that it should decide for itself whether
it wished to be an independent country,
or to join up with the eastern part of the
island, or to become part of Indonesia,
or to opt for any other form of political
existence. The Netherlands was prepared
to subject its policy to the continuous
scrutiny and judgment of the United
Nations.

INDONESIA’S REPLY to the Netherlands

In replying to the Netherlands Foreign
Minister’s challenge to Indonesia to clar-
ify its position and statement, Mr. Soeb-
andrio said that Indonesia did not retreat
from the position taken earlier by Pres-
ident Sukarno.

The conflict between Indonesia and the
Netherlands originated in the fact that
the Netherlands still refused to recognize
the complete transfer of sovereignty from
the Netherlands East Indies to the in-
dependent Republic of Indonesia. It had
been explicitly agreed that this transfer
was to cover the whole territory of the
Netherlands East Indies. A decade later,
the Netherlands had still not lived up to
this agreement.

Indonesia declared the right of the
Indonesian people to be sovereign and

UNR—December 1960

independent within all the territory
formerly covered by the Indonesian
Archipelago which had formed part of
the Netherlands East Indies. Indonesia
explicitly did not make any claim at all
to territory, such as that in Borneo or
Timor, which lay within the Indonesian
Archipelago but which had not been
part of the Netherlands East Indies. In-
donesia was sustaining, not a territorial
claim, but a national claim, which was
“the right of our nation to be united and
independent.”

The Netherlands had not yet whole-
heartedly completed the formal transfer
of sovereignty to Indonesia. Indeed, in
every part of Indonesia the Netherlands
had left behind the seeds of unrest and
disturbance. There had been military dis-
turbances, separatist movements and po-
litical, economic and military subversion
instigated and encouraged by Dutch in-
terests. But Indonesia had survived these
things.

Indonesia had never acted or threat-
ened to act contrary to the principles of
the United Nations. The same could not
be said about the Netherlands, which had
committed an act of aggression against
Indonesia, in open defiance of the Se-
curity Council. It was therefore hardly
for the Netherlands, which had once de-
fied the United Nations, which continued
to refuse to be guided by the United
Nations process of negotiation, to accuse
any country, including Indonesia, of act-
ing contrary to the principles of the
United Nations.

Since 1950, Indonesia had tried bi-
lateral negotiations and negotiations
within the United Nations, even when
Netherlands subversion within Indonesia
was rampant in the economic, military
and political fields. Attempts had been
made to persuade the Netherlands into a
lasting friendship and cooperation with
Indonesia. But it could come about only
if the Netherlands recognized the com-
plete territorial independence of In-
donesia. Unfortunately, Indonesia’s ef-
forts had foundered on the rock of Dutch
colonial intransigence.

“Now we are meeting political under-
mining with political force. We are meet-
ing economic undermining with economic
force, and we will meet physical force
with physical force, too. This is a na-
tional right which cannot be denied.”

To say that Indonesia was determined
to meet force with force on any field
was not a threat; this was a reality
which the Netherlands and the world
must accept. In meeting force with force,
Indonesia was within its rights and act-
ing within the spirit of the Charter of the
United Nations. This was not to say
that Indonesia was not filled with re-
gret and sorrow that this situation should
have arisen, for “it is tragic that so much
of our effort and so much of our money
must be used in this way.”

The Netherlands Foreign Minister had
said that the Netherlands administration
in West Irian was aimed only at pre-
paring the population of the territory,
within the shortest possible time, for the
exercise of its right of self-determination,
and that it should decide for itself
whether it wishes to be an independent

country, or to join up with the eastern
part of the island, or to become part of
Indonesia, or to opt for any other form
of political existence.

The Netherlands, however, did not
contemplate a genuine right of self-de-
termination. Statements about this were
misused for continuing colonialism. The
Netherlands Foreign Minister had said
that the people of West Irian might de-
cide to become part of Indonesia. The
fact was that they had decided to do
this, and did it, 15 years ago.

NETHERLANDS REPLY to Indonesia’s Reply

The Foreign Minister of Indonesia,
said C. W. A. Schurmann, was incorrect
in arguing that the Netherlands had
agreed to transfer to Indonesia, when
it became independent, the whole of
the territory that had formerly consti-
tuted Netherlands East Indies. Article 2
of the Charter of Transfer of Sover-
eignty excepted the territory of Nether-
lands New Guinea from the transfer to
Indonesia with the stipulation that the
future of that territory would be decided
later—to be precise, within one year.

Further, the Netherlands did not agree
with Indonesia’s assumption that Nether-
lands New Guinea was a part of Indo-
nesia and that the population of Nether-
lands New Guinea wished to be a part
of Indonesia. What Indonesia meant by
saying that the people of Netherlands
New Guinea had already exercised the
right to self-determination was that when
President Sukarno had declared Indo-
nesia’s independence on August 17, 1945,
he had done so on behalf also of the
population of Netherlands New Guinea.
But there was at that time no communi-
cation whatsoever between Netherlands
New Guinea and Indonesia. Netherlands
New Guinea had been occupied in the
war by the Japanese and at that time
was still occupied. It was therefore not
possible for anybody at that time to
ascertain what the wishes of its people
were.

If the people of Netherlands New
Guinea really did wish to be part of
Indonesia, that would certainly appear
at the time when the plebiscite—or other
form of consultation with the people—
took place, said Mr. Schurmann. What
objection could Indonesia therefore pos-
sibly raise to the Netherlands’ preparing
the population in the shortest possible
time for the exercise of that right?

Despite the contention by the Foreign
Minister of Indonesia to the contrary, the
Netherlands did take the right of self-
determination seriously, he continued.
That was shown by the fact that, a few
years ago, the General Assembly ac-
cepted the new regulation of the King-
dom of the Netherlands whereby Surinam
and the Netherlands Antilles were given
complete self-government and a status
entirely and exactly equal to that of the
Kingdom in Europe. The decision to
that effect was taken, and the new con-
stitution introduced, after due consulta-
tion in a really democratic form by the
population concerned.

The Foreign Minister of Indonesia
had also said that Indonesia would use

force only if the Netherlands used force.
No one, however, could seriously believe
that the Netherlands, which maintained
but a few thousand troops in New
Guinea—a territory larger than France—
could have any evil intentions toward
Indonesia. There was no question of the
Netherlands’ wishing any harm to Indo-
nesia or ever having the idea of possi-
bly attacking Indonesia. If Indonesia
was sincere in what it said, then the
Netherlands could assure the General
Assembly that there was no danger, be-
cause it certainly would never use force.

SUDAN

Ahmed Kheir
Minister for Foreign Affairs

This session would always remain a
landmark, for the admission of the states
newly independent as a result of the
wave of liberation in Africa and the
close of a chapter of imperialism was
indeed an historic occasion, declared
Foreign Minister Kheir. Africa was no
longer “a dark continent.” The new mem-
bers would be “a dynamic force” in the
United Nations.

Despite nearly 15 years of continued
negotiations, disarmament remained the
most difficult and most threatening prob-
lem facing the world. The Sudan sincere-
ly hoped that efforts would be continued
for the earliest possible resumption of
negotiations to achieve a constructive
solution.

The Sudan believed that the cause of
peace could not be served effectively
through the United Nations with one
fourth of the world’s population unrep-
resented. The representation of China
not only would be a recognition of the
legitimate rights of the Chinese people
and Government but would surely en-
hance the effectiveness of the Organiza-
tion, Mr. Kheir said.

As an African country, the Sudan was
greatly concerned with the grave events
taking place in Africa as well as with the
problems facing its peoples. Thus, one of
the tragedies of human dignity and self-
respect was the apartheid policy of the
Union of South Africa, which had been
condemned by world public opinion.
Apartheid must be defeated, not on
South Africa’s account only but “on
account of us all.” The Sudan, acting on
the resolutions passed by the Conference
of Independent African States, had boy-
cotted South Africa—its goods and its
economy—and had made a “small dona-
tion” to the victims of that action. It was
prepared to take further measures to
defeat the immoral policies of apartheid.

South Africa’s contempt for Africans
went beyond its own boundaries. South
West Africa was a ward of the inter-
national community, but that did not
save it from the unnatural, unwarranted
policies of South Africa. “We shall be
failing in our responsibilities if we do
not make it known to the world that a
country which has caused so much misery
to its own nationals is hardly fit to help
others,” Mr Kheir said. The United
Nations must take over for a specified

period and prepare South West Africa
for independence.

In another area of Africa, the Sudan
wished to safeguard the national inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Congo and to banish any
form of external interference in its
domestic affairs. The structure of the
Government and the personnel of that
Government were questions for the
Congolese themselves to decide, accord-
ing to their own free will. The Sudan
supported the work started, maintained
and still being done by the United Na-
tions under the supervision of the Secre-
tary-General, in whom it had full con-
fidence.

Turning to the question of Algeria,
Mr. Kheir recalled that when he ad-
dressed the Assembly in 1959 there had
been “a ray of hope” radiating from
General de Gaulle’s solemn recognition
of the right of the Algerian people to
self-determination. But the past year had
been a cruel one for Algeria. The war
there raged more furiously than before.
Loss of life—whether French or Algerian
—mounted daily. More than one fourth
of the population was held in prisons
and internment camps, subjected to the
most cruel and humiliating treatment.
That aspect of “this inhuman war” was
shockingly revealed in a report of the
International Committee of the Red
Cross and had been the subject of a
strong protest to the Secretary-General
by 20 Afro-Asian member states last
February.

The Provisional Government of Al-
geria, in a statement on September 28,
1959, responding to General de Gaulle’s
declaration, had agreed with France’s
position that the right of self-determina-
tion should be the basis for a solution of
the Algerian problem. They also agreed
with the French Government that re-
course to universal suffrage as a means
of determining the political future of
Algeria could not take place without the
return of peace.

France seemed to insist that any dis-
cussions regarding the cease-fire, the con-
ditions and the modalities of any meeting
between France and representatives of
the Provisional Government of Algeria
should be unilaterally decided by France
alone. There was ample proof of this
from what took place at Melun between
June 25 and 29 this year. Despite the
disappointment at Melun, the Algerians’
Foreign Minister, Mr. Belkacem, affirmed
on August 10: “We are ready to reopen
negotiations with the French Govern-
ment at any time.”

The French argument that the Al-
gerian issue was an internal matter, out-
side the competence of the United Na-
tions, was a cruel delusion, said Mr.
Kheir. The Provisional Government of
Algeria had asked the United Nations
that consultations of the Algerian people
should take place by means of a referen-
dum organized and controlled by the
United Nations. “It is our earnest hope
that the United Nations will not fail
them again,” he added.

The United Nations had an equally
great responsibility for finding a solution
for the Palestine problem and for the
Palestinian Arab refugees, because the

problem was of the United Nations’ own
creation, arising from the Assembly’s
1947 resolution calling for the partition
of Palestine against the will of its people.
At the time, the Arabs accounted for
two thirds of the population of Palestine,
so the decision contravened the Charter
principle of self-determination of peoples.

The Palestine refugee problem con-
cerned an entire nation uprooted from
its ancestral land and consigned to
torturous and undignified exile. There
would be no real peace in the Middle
East unless a just and satisfactory solu-
tion was found.

Other controversial issues included the
tense situation in some parts of the Arab
world, particularly Oman and Mauri-
tania. The Sudan delegation hoped that
the aspirations of the people of those
areas would be realized and that their
right to self-determination would be
respected.

As a great believer in free trade, the
Sudan was concerned over any develop-
ment of regional economic groupings
designed to use trade as a_ political
weapon or to be restrictive and dis-
criminatory. The Sudan hoped that such
groupings as the European Common
Market and the Free Trade Area would
not only concern themselves with the
expansion of trade and payments within
their groups, but would also implement
all policies that strengthened and broad-
ened international trade and economic
cooperation.

Recognizing the vital role of the Unit-
ed Nations in Africa, the Sudan re-
gretted that the Organization had en-
tered the continent much later than it
had entered other regions. Africa’s share
in the new and uncommitted funds of
the United Nations should be such as to
redress the balance in the allocation of
funds. Africans faced many complex
problems while suffering a serious short-
age of trained administrators, technicians
and professionals. They were struggling
for a better life in larger freedom and
were hopeful of receiving international
cooperation and understanding. But the
assistance should not spring “from a
sense of charity” or be motivated by the
self-interest of the donor. It should be
given in good time, before the African
states took decisions of policy, which
were expedient in the short term but
detrimental to their balanced economic
growth and development. The recent
events in the Congo and the speedy
action taken by the United Nations lent
great strength to arguments for such
assistance.

The Sudan believed that the program
known as OPEX (for operational and ex-
ecutive personnel) should be placed on a
permanent basis and given a larger bud-
get to expand its constructive activities.

BOLIVIA

Federico Alvarez Plata
Senator
Mr. Alvarez Plata expressed his coun-
try’s support of United Nations technical
and economic aid programs but joined
those who had spoken of the limited

UNR—December 1960

7. ee Oe SS CU Ora SO ——‘<C DP

funds and resources available to the
Organization and of the way in which
they were allocated. “Perhaps the time
has come,” he said, “to readjust the pol-
icy of international cooperation in order
to integrate it and make it more dynamic
and more in keeping with the situation
of the growing countries, whose need is
greater than the cooperation received.”

Until new plans helped to expand and
exploit the wealth of the underdeveloped
countries, there would be chronic eco-
nomic and political unrest, accompanied
by the anarchy which fomented sub-
version, and he believed the time had
come to put into practice a recommen-
dation contained in a resolution present-
ed by the Bolivian delegation to the
Seventh Consultative Meeting of Amer-
ican Foreign Ministers. That recommen-
dation would set up a system to protect
the Latin American economies against
the constant fluctuations in the world
market prices of raw materials and the in-
creased prices of manufactured goods
which the underdeveloped countries im-
ported.

The level of Latin American develop-
ment, Mr. Alvarez Plata said, is unlike
that of the rest of the world, for while
some countries have achieved a modicum
of progress, others have not even at-
tained the degree of development of
backward nations in other parts of the
world. That was why at the Bogota con-
ference it was decided to set up priorities
for countries in dire need as well as
countries which, like Bolivia, had no
outlet to the sea.

The Bolivian delegate called for joint
action by members of the Organization
of American States and the underdevel-
oped countries in general to defend prices
of raw materials exported to interna-
tional markets, even when a country was
not directly affected because it did not
produce the particular item involved.
Bolivia, like the other Latin American
nations, welcomed the decision of the
United States to establish a new period
of assistance to the other members of
the regional organization.

Describing recent developments in Bo-
livia, Mr. Alvarez Plata declared that
one of the outstanding aspects of the
revolution of 1952 was that the Indian
farmers now had the same rights and
duties as other citizens and, as a result
of the land reform law, two million of
them owned land. Land reform, he
stated, was so important that the General
Assembly had included it as an item in
this year’s agenda.

Mr. Alvarez Plata said that many
countries had given Bolivia proof of
their understanding of and respect for
its political and social movement; some,
like the United States, had given direct
assistance through technical and eco-
nomic cooperation, which had “in no
way carried with it political strings for
influencing the domestic or external life
of Bolivia.” Such a situation, he said,
“we could never countenance, nor could
a revolutionary government or people
accept, for we are and have been jealous
and careful of our sovereignty and inde-
pendence.”

Internationally, Bolivia was opposed
to all forms of imperialism which eco-

UNR—December 1960

nomically or politically controlled weak-
er nations and was sympathetic to all
processes of liberation and the efforts of
all nations to raise their peoples to higher
levels of justice and social welfare.

Speaking of trusteeship matters, Mr.
Alvarez Plata said that the process of
liberation had been very rapid, and in
some cases the administering powers had
not been able to provide a strong enough
cadre. Such had been the obvious situa-
tion in the colonies not under trusteeship,
and the colonial powers’ unfulfilled obli-
gations had become an international bur-
den. Bolivia believed that the administer-
ing powers had an obligation to continue
to give assistance—through the United
Nations, not unilaterally—even after
trusteeship had ended.

“People who say that the crisis in the
Congo is due to the fact that the new
Republic was given its independence pre-
maturely, that it was not sufficiently ma-
ture, and other insults, must receive our
protest and our affirmation that such
countries should be given their indepen-
dence as quickly as possible,” Mr. Al-
varez Plata said. “Often with freedom
there is an explosion like a flash of light
which blinds one for a while. That
transition period must not be used as a
pretext for foreign intervention.”

He declared that the Assembly must
use every means available to promote
an agreement on the cessation of nuclear
tests and the prohibition of the manufac-
ture of nuclear weapons. He expressed
the hope that the great powers would
re-examine the conflicts which embittered
countries in various parts of the world,
sterilizing their progress and diverting
their energies, not only for their own
sake but because all countries were be-
coming more interdependent every day.

The function of the Secretary-General,
he added, flowed from the Charter and
from the General Assembly, which in
practice reflected the will of the majority
of the member states: “that is how we
have interpreted the measures recently
taken by the Secretary-General.”

AUSTRALIA

Robert G. Menzies
Prime Minister

As a newcomer to the General As-
sembly, Mr. Menzies said he was shocked
at the evidence that there were some
present who had no peace in their hearts,
who appeared to believe that by threats
of aggression, violent propaganda, and
by actual conquest if necessary, they
would extend the substance of their ma-
terial wealth and the boundaries of their
economic influence.

He agreed with the “high line” taken
by President Eisenhower in his speech to
the Assembly, to the effect that “we are
not to look at our new colleagues as if
they were voters to be collected, or as
pawns in a vast international game, but
as independent, co-equal, and free.”

These new nations had not failed to
observe that there were those in the As-
sembly who sought to inflame their minds
with a spirit of resentment and to make
them believe that their best friends were

among those who produced with mo-
notonous but fierce regularity slogans
about. “colonialism” and “imperialism.”
It was sometimes forgotten that the great-
est enemy to present joy and high hope
was the cultivation of retrospective bit-
terness, The dead past should bury its
dead. It was the present and future that
mattered. Most of the representatives
knew that political independence could
be won more swiftly than economic in-
dependence. Yet both were essential to
true nationhood. Under these circum-
stances, nations which were older in self-
government should not be looking at the
new nations as people whose support
should be canvassed, but as people who
needed objective assistance with no
strings.

The gap between the advanced and the
relatively unadvanced countries tended,
unless something was done about it, to
grow wider every year. It was not a
state of affairs which civilized and hu-
mane thinking could indefinitely tolerate.

If in this Assembly they constantly re-
membered that “our trust is for human-
ity” and that, indeed, the United Nations
itself had no other reason for existence,
then, said Mr. Menzies, they would more
and more concentrate efforts on provid-
ing economic and technical help for new
nations to the very limit of their capa-
city; and this, he added, “not only because
we really and passionately believe in in-
dependence and freedom, but also be-
cause we believe that our fellow human
beings everywhere are entitled to decent
conditions of life, and have enough sense
to know that independence and freedom
are mere words unless the ordinary peo-
ple of free countries have a chance of a
better life tomorrow.”

It was an act of complete hypocrisy
for a communist leader to denounce co-
lonialism as if it were an evil character-
istic of the Western powers, when facts
showed that the greatest colonial power
now existing was the Soviet Union itself.

Mr. Khrushchev had made reference
to the Australian-administered territories
of Papua and New Guinea, calling on
Australia to give them immediate and
full independence and self-government.
This had exhibited a disturbing want of
knowledge of these territories and of the
present stage of their development. No-
body who knew anything about them and
their indigenous people could doubt for
a moment that for Australia to abandon
its responsibilities would be “an almost
criminal act.”

Here was a ccuntry (Papua-New
Guinea) that not very long ago was in
a state of savagery. During the last war
it passed through “the most gruesome
experiences” and emerged without organ-
ized administration and, in a sense, with-
out hope. Its people had no real struc-
ture of association. Its groups were iso-
lated among mountains and forests.
There were, it was estimated, over 200
different languages. The work to be done
in fostering an organism of community
was enormous. Since the war, some form
of civilized order had been established
over many thousands of square miles
previously unexplored.

Australia has built up an extensive ad-
ministration service from nothing to a

total of 3,623 Australian public servants,
334 indigenous members of the public
service, and 7,500 administration indi-
genous employees. It had created five
main ports with modern equipment; built
over 5,000 miles of road; constructed
over 100 airfields; established and im-
proved postal and telecommunications
services; and built four large and mod-
ern base hospitals. In a little more than
a few years, it had established 4,100
schools, attended by 200,000 pupils; large
stock stations had been established; and
a great forestry industry had been
founded.

Emphasizing that this achievement had
not been without cost, Mr. Menzies de-
clared: “We have put many more millions
into Papua and New Guinea than have
ever come out.” Australia had also set
up a Legislative Council on which there
was a growing number of indigenous
members.

Commenting on the fact that this ses-
sion of the General Assembly had at-
tracted what must be the greatest number
of heads of state and heads of govern-
ment in its history, Mr. Menzies said
the dominating fact was that world peace
was threatened and, as Mr. Nehru had
pointed out, peace was “the paramount
problem.” But they were not living in a
time of peace. The “cold war” was in-
tensifying. Most representatives had come
to the Assembly hoping that tensions
might be reduced. There was a wide-
spread feeling that the United Nations
represented the great hope; that it was
better to debate freely about grievances
than to make war about them.

But what had happened so far? A
highly organized group had developed
an attack in at least four directions, In
the first place it had engaged in a colossal
war of propaganda singularly uninhibited
by facts and marked by gross falsity of
argument. The old slogans had been used
ad nauseam.

In the second place, Mr. Khrushchev
had attacked the Secretary-General, the
distinguished choice of the United Na-
tions, a man with whose opinion anybody
had a right to disagree, but whose ability
and integrity were beyond challenge. Mr.
Hammarskjold had the complete con-
fidence of Australia. Mr. Khrushchev had
asked for his replacement by a triumvir-
ate of Secretaries-General, in which there
would be, in the modern jargon, a “built-
in” veto; a triumvirate whose work would
be clearly doomed to frustration and
fatuity, leading to the consequential col-
lapse of the United Nations executive
machinery.

Thirdly, Mr. Khrushchev had sought
to convert the United Nations into the
Dis-United Nations by dividing the na-
tions into three parts, which he con-
veniently described as the communist
world, the free democratic world and the
neutral world. Neutralism, of course,
was one of “those rather rotund words”
which did not readily admit of definition.
If, when they said a nation was neutral,
they meant that it would not under any
circumstances take arms in any conflict
which did not concern the protection of
its own immediate boundaries, it seemed
to be a notion hard to reconcile with
the Charter, which contemplated under

certain circumstances the use of com-
bined force in terms of the Charter itself.
It was impossible to make the United
Nations effective by converting it into
the “Dis-United Nations,” by converting
all members into pledged advocates of
groups of supposedly conflicting interests.
Unity must be the aim. Common action
for peace must be the procedure.

In the fourth place, Mr. Khrushchev
on this occasion, far from working
toward an easing of the “cold war,” had
set out to exacerbate it by fomenting
tension, by encouraging bitterness and by
seeking to paralyze or confuse the minds
of the free peoples.

Mr. Menzies spoke, he said, for a
small nation with a love of peace, with-
out nuclear weapons, with a burning
desire to develop itself and to raise its
standards of living, with no aggression in
its heart, utterly independent, though
with strong historic and present ties with
its sister nations of the Commonwealth.
Australia would welcome “peaceful co-
existence,” if the communists would only
practise it. Nobody denied the great
modern development of the resources of
the communist powers. The technological
achievements of the Soviet Union had
excited admiration. “All that we ask is
that we be left alone to enjoy our own
forms of government and our own type
of civilization,” said Mr. Menzies.

He was profoundly interested in what
Mr. Nehru had said about disarmament
and the need for establishing contem-
poraneously arrangements for disarma-
ment and inspection. There were two
aspects of the matter worth mentioning.
The first was that the problem of dis-
armament itself could not be divided into
parts. Disarmament and inspection were
inseparable. It was unthinkable to im-
agine that the risks of war would be
diminished if the nations disarmed in the
nuclear field but not in the field of what
was politely called “conventional arms.”
The fact was that it was only the exist-
ence of nuclear weapons, horrible as it
was to contemplate their further develop-
ment, which deprived the communist
powers of instant and overwhelming
military superiority in the relevant areas.
Nuclear, thermonuclear and conventional
arms must, therefore, all be dealt with
together.

He could not honestly accept the view
that armaments were the major cause of
world tension. Such a view was serious
oversimplification. If any power or com-
bination of powers had shown it was
aggressively-minded and sought to extend
its boundaries of control wider and
wider, by force if necessary, then the
possession by that power or group of
powers of vast armaments would be a
cause of tension. But if the non-aggres-
sive powers were then driven into main-
taining and developing great defensive
armaments, it was proper to say that
their armaments were the results of ten-
sion and “not its cause.”

In effect, what they now wanted in the
world just as much as the vastly im-
portant disarmament talks was a serious
attempt by negotiation to encourage free-
dom and understanding, to remove the
causes of friction and to persuade na-
tions that aggressive policies and pro-

selytizing political religions were the
enemies of peace.

In conclusion, Mr. Menzies said Au-
stralia subscribed to the sound principle
of foreign policy that no nations should
seek to interfere with the domestic affairs
of another. This, indeed, was the “good
neighbor” principle. “If it could be ac-
cepted seriously and generally, the world
would become a happy place,” he de-

clared.

PHILIPPINES

Francisco A. Delgado
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

The presence at this Assembly of the
world’s great leaders had given a new
dimension to the Assembly’s delibera-
tions, said Dr. Delgado. Despite some
discouraging evidence to the contrary,
one remained hopeful that they would
apply their personal prestige and broad
experience of statesmanship to bring
about a heightened sense of sobriety
and responsibility in this developing
parliament of man and federation of the
world.

While peace was supremely important
to all—the difference between survival
and annihilation—it was particularly in-
dispensable to developing countries like
the Philippines, where the economic and
social impulse remained to be fulfilled.
But while his country was profoundly
dedicated to peace, it categorically re-
jected a peace of submission imposed by
the powerful upon the weak.

In the foremost duty to find quickly a
practical way to prevent the perils of
thermonuclear war, the smaller nations
could perform a useful role through the
exercise of the power of persuasion.

Two main problems, he thought, over-
shadowed all others: the question of dis-
armament and raising living standards
in the less-developed areas of the world.

Dr. Delgado spoke in terms of disap-
pointment of the things that might have
been accomplished toward disarmament
at the ill-fated summit conference in
Paris. The dialogue between East and
West, so sharply broken in Paris, had
not been resumed and, as the world
marked time on the great issues of peace
and survival, some unsuspected action
arising from error or miscalculation could
plunge the whole world into sudden and
total destruction. For this reason his dele-
gation would vote in favor of the draft
resolution submitted by India, Indonesia,
Ghana, the United Arab Republic and
Yugoslavia.

His delegation also favored the re-
opening of disarmament discussions as
soon as possible in the Ten-Nation Com-
mittee, and if this were no longer prac-
tical, it might be wise to return the dis-
cussions under the direct auspices of the
United Nations. He did not think that
enlarging the Ten-Nation Committee
would be wise, since deliberations would
become cumbersome and protracted.

Dr. Delgado then turned his attention
to the question of military alliances and
the existence of foreign bases which, he
said, was a symptom, not the cause, of

UNR—December 1960

le
ld

prevailing fear and suspicion. The Philip-
pines, he emphasized, was party to one
of these alliances and housed American
bases solely out of overriding concern
for national security and the free exer-
cise of national sovereignty. His country
would be happy to be without the bases,
but they would not be secure without
them and accepted their existence as an
unavoidable necessity. He stressed that
Philippine membership in sEATO and the
establishment of United States bases in
his country were without any aggressive
intent and were solely for the purpose
of mutual defence.

“We recognize that we are a part of a
deterrent force against the aggressive in-
tentions of international communism,”
he said. “We are fully aware of the
penalties, nay, risks, which we incur,
and we are not unmindful of the ad-
vantages enjoyed by the uncommitted
countries whose representatives have
spoken to us here of the superior virtues
of neutralism. But we would ask them
honestly to consider this thought: that it
is precisely the existence of this deter-
rent capacity of the free world which
keeps communism in check and main-
tains a certain balance of power in the
world—and, therefore, a condition of
peace, no matter how precarious it may
be. For it is only in this condition of a
balance of power that the neutrals can
perform their useful role of mediation,
conciliation and compromise.”

When the communists stopped rattling
their atomic rockets and missiles and
there was no longer the menace of com-
munist subversion and attack, he added,
there would no longer be any need for
defensive military alliances and foreign
bases. “We cannot all be neutrals. Some
of us have to perform the unpleasant,
dangerous duty of helping to keep the
scales of power in equilibrium.”

Turning his attention to the urgent
need to raise the living standards in the
less developed countries, Dr. Delgado
pointed out that roughly two thirds of
the world’s population lived in the so-
called underdeveloped areas and they
shared among them just one sixth of the
world’s total income. The United Nations
had now the opportunity to develop the
natural resources of these countries, first
of all for the benefit of the native in-
habitants themselves and then for the rest
of the world. He welcomed the support
that President Eisenhower had given to
the principle of multilateral economic
assistance to these countries on a more
substantial scale than had been possible
through the United Nations.

Speaking of the Congo, Dr. Delgado
declared that in the bustling continent
of Africa the United Nations faced a
great challenge and a great opportunity.
The opportunity was one of proving that
Africa could be insulated against the
clash of embattled ideologies and the
cold war. He congratulated the United
Nations on what it had already done in
this direction and paid tribute to the
Secretary-General for his scrupulous im-
partiality.

He thought that all aid to the Congo
should be channeled through the United
Nations and he commented that while the

UNR—December 1960

last vestiges of colonialism should be
eradicated from the Congo, the infiltra-
tion of communist imperialism, open or
disguised, should not be permitted either.

Dr. Delgado expressed regret that the
hopeful French initiative toward an
“Algerian Algeria” had so far produced
no hopeful results, and said that the
United Nations must continue to press
for a peaceful solution of the problem.

He warned that countries newly freed
from the colonial yoke must always be
on the alert against the reintroduction of
colonial influence through economic de-
vices, but he added that though subject
peoples were familiar with the ways of
their former masters, they were com-
parative strangers to the “more insidious
methods by which international com-
munism seeks to subvert their liberties
and their institutions.”

The Philippines was entitled to speak
of these twin dangers, he said, for the
country had experienced both. He spoke
of his country’s 400 years as a colony
of Spain and of the years during which
the Philippines was under American
rule. After itemizing some of the good
things the United States had done for
his country, he commented:

“You can discuss, argue and talk back
to the Americans, as we have discussed,
argued and talked back to them during
all the years of our subjection, and since
then, without being slapped down or
getting shot at dawn. One wonders some-
times what would happen to a Latvian
or an Estonian or a Lithuanian who
talked back to Mr. Khrushchev. We
know, of course, what happened to the
Hungarians who did just that.”

Finally, Dr. Delgado said he would
like to address his concluding words to
the Secretary-General. He said they were
grateful for his pledge of unflinching
fidelity to the ideals of the United Na-
tions and for his assurance of unbending
loyalty to the Organization as a whole,
but more especially to the small coun-
tries. This pledge was returned with
equal earnestness and fervor. Assuring
the Secretary-General of implicit faith in
his good judgment and impartiality, Dr.
Delgado added: “For you there are many
trying days ahead, for your antagonists
are among the most powerful in the
world. But today, as never before, it is
mightily important that the power of
righteousness should not resign the battle
in the face of outrageous wrong. We
humbly beseech you, sir, to stand with us
till the end, so that, together, we shall
give the lie to the ancient dogma of the
despots and totalitarians that might is

right.”

BYELORUSSIAN SSR

K. T. Mazurov
Member of the Bureau of the
Council of Ministers
Many, but unfortunately not all, dele-
gations, Mr. Mazurov said, had come to
the General Assembly with a sincere
desire to help achieve constructive deci-
sions on the problems of disarmament
and other problems facing the United
Nations.

The socialist countries, whose policies
were based on the principle of peaceful
coexistence, were actively struggling for
the consolidation of peace and the pre-
vention of a new war. On the other hand,
he said, the Western powers, primarily
the United States, had trampled the
hopes of the peoples of the world for
peaceful relations between the states. The
violation of the Soviet Union’s air space
by American spy planes and the United
States government’s calculated disruption
of the Paris summit conference, the in-
trigues of the colonialists in the Republic
of the Congo and the threat of inter-
vention against Cuba, the sabotage of
the work of the Ten-Nation Disarma-
ment Committee, the plans to arm the
West German militarists with rocket and
atomic weapons—all these showed that
the ruling circles of the United States
and other Western powers had taken the
course of a new aggravation of inter-
national tension, said Mr. Mazurov.

The Assembly therefore had a great
responsibility to take decisions that would
pave the way for the realization of
radical measures in the interests of
universal peace.

Special attention must be paid to dis-
armament, “the most important and
burning issue of our time.” General and
complete disarmament was imperative.

Mr. Mazurov refuted the “slanders”
voiced by the Canadian Prime Minister
to the effect that the peoples of the
Soviet Union were not free. He also
criticized the Australian Prime Minister’s
“cold war” remarks in defence of im-
perialism and colonialism. As to assur-
ances by the Western countries of respect
for the interests of the neutrals, the
whole history of the United Nations had
shown that the interests of the neutral
countries had been disregarded by the
bloc of Western countries, which acted
at the behest of the United States.

Turning to the problem of a peaceful
settlement with Germany, Mr. Mazurov
said that the Western powers’ policy of
arming the Federal Republic of Germany
was particularly dangerous. “One would
be a naive simpleton or guided by crimi-
nal intentions to put atomic and rocket
weapons in the hands of former nazi
generals,” he asserted.

Mr. Mazurov thought it strange that
the Prime Minister of the United King-
dom had defended the policy of West
Germany’s rearmament, particularly when
officials of the Federal Republic had
openly proclaimed militarist German re-
vanchism, the revision of boundaries and
the seizure of foreign lands as_ their
goals. With the existence of military
alliances, and with the Federal Republic
of Germany a member of NATO, an
adventurist policy of that Government
might lead to a new world war.

The socialist countries’ position on the
German question was based not on feel-
ings of revenge or hatred toward the
German people but on concern for peace
in Europe and the world. The German
people wanted peace, and their interests
were appropriately championed by the
German Democratic Republic, as shown
by its proposals, which the Byelorussian
delegation fully supported, on general
and complete disarmament of the two
German states.

The Western countries should recog-
nize the fact that there were two German
states. A peace treaty with those two
states should be concluded, and the West
Berlin situation should be normalized in
accordance with the Soviet Union’s pro-
posals. Concluding a peace treaty would
halt revanchism and remilitarization in
West Germany, facilitate the solution of
the German reunification problem and
help liquidate the seed-bed of war emerg-
ing in Central Europe.

The flights of American U-2 and RB-
47 aircraft into Soviet air space were
only part of a long series of provocative
actions pursued by the United States,
Mr. Mazurov continued. One could well
imagine what would be left of the sov-
ereignty of the many small countries that
made up the majority of United Nations
members if checks were not placed on
the United States Government, which
proclaimed air espionage and the viola-
tion of the sovereignty of other states as
its official policy.

Stressing the need for an end to the
arms race and for general and complete
disarmament, as proposed by the Soviet
Union, which would open up boundless
prospects for improving living standards,
Mr. ‘Mazurov blamed the Western powers
for the collapse of negotiations in the
Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
They had followed their old line for
control over armaments, which was just
the reverse of disarmament.

The Soviet Union’s new proposals for
general and complete disarmament not
only provided for carrying out such dis-
armament in three stages but also pro-
vided a guarantee against any state’s
gaining, at any of those stages, military
advantages over other states. From the
very outset, by that proposal, all dis-
armament measures were to be carried
out under strict and effective interna-
tional control.

The “so-called new positions” of the
Western powers contained nothing to
show that they sought disarmament at
all, Mr. Mazurov charged. In addition,
the United States and the United King-
dom had, for nearly two years now, been
hampering the conclusion of an agree-
ment on discontinuing nuclear weapon
tests, under dubious technical or pseudo-
scientific pretexts.

The Soviet Union had proposed a clear
program to ban both tests and the pro-
duction of nuclear weapons, to destroy
the means of delivering them and then
to destroy the weapons themselves and
dismantle military bases. But the Western
powers were against those proposals.
They had sabotaged the disarmament
negotiations because militarization of the
economy and the arms race brought
fabulous profits to capitalist monopolies.

The General Assembly should recog-
nize the need for solving the problem of
general and complete disarmament and
the early conclusion of a disarmament
treaty; should recommend the early com-
pletion of a treaty on discontinuing nuc-
lear weapon tests; and should call on
those possessing nuclear weapons not to
carry out tests of such weapons until an
appropriate agreement had been con-
cluded. Further, the Ten-Nation Com-
mittee should be enlarged to include the

representatives of five neutral countries.

The Byelorussian delegation, continued
Mr. Mazurov, agreed completely with
Chairman Khrushchev’s proposals on re-
organizing the United Nations Secretariat
and on ending the unjust representation
on the Security Council. Despite the
changes in the world situation since the
adoption of the United Nations Charter,
the Security Council and the structure of
the Secretariat had remained unchanged.
The executive bodies and personnel of
the United Nations were staffed with
advocates of the Western capitalist bloc
and pursued a policy designed to please
the United States. Mr. Hammarskjold’s
conduct in the Congo clearly proved that
he was a servant of the Western powers.

There was a crisis in the United Na-
tions, not because of the Soviet Union’s
proposals, but because the United States
had usurped the power in its executive
bodies. The Soviet Union’s proposals
were aimed at overcoming the crisis and
at invigorating the United Nations. They
were prompted not by the wish to secure
an exceptional role in the United Nations
for the socialist countries, but merely by
the wish that the position of all coun-
tries, not just of one group, be taken into
account in the executive bodies of the
United Nations as well as in the Organi-
zation itself.

Taking up the question of colonialism,
Mr. Mazurov said that the powerful tide
of national liberation was brushing aside
the last strongholds of colonialism in
Africa, which had a special place in the
plans of the Western powers, for the
capitalist monopolies thought that that
fabulously rich continent should make
good what they had lost in Asia.

The United Nations should act deci-
sively to restore the normal situation in
the Republic of the Congo and create
conditions for the unhampered function-
ing of the Lumumba Government, the
only legitimate government. The primary
requirement was the immediate with-
drawal of the troops and military per-
sonnel of Belgium and its allies. Only
those troops approved by the Lumumba
Government should remain in the Congo.
The Congolese people, their parliament
and legitimate government could and un-
doubtedly would settle their national
problems unassisted if interference by
the United States and other Western
countries in the Congo’s internal affairs
were ended.

The Byelorussian delegation, further,
fully supported the Soviet Union’s pro-
posal for a declaration on grantirg inde-
pendence to colonial countries and peo-
ples. Those struggling for freedom and
independence against “shameful colonial
slavery” could count on moral and ma-
terial support from the socialist countries.

Economic liberation from imperialist
monopolies was no less important than
political liberation, as shown by the
Cuban people’s struggle.

President Eisenhower and Prime Minis-
ter Macmillan had tried, though in vain,
to prove how little aid was being pro-
vided by the USSR and other socialist
countries to underdeveloped countries.
Aid from the socialist countries, how-
ever, was not tied to political conditions,
but was guided strictly by the principle

of non-interference in the inter‘al affairs
of underdeveloped countries.

Aid to the peoples who had freed
themselves from the colonial yoke should
be expanded and given both through the
United Nations and on a bilateral basis,
he contended.

IRAQ

Hashim Jawad
Minister for Foreign Affairs

The attainment of political independ-
ence by subjugated peoples was an in-
evitable step in the progress of human
society toward higher social and po-
litical levels, said Mr. Jawad. The ex-
istence of non-independent nations and
efforts to perpetuate them by use of
force had been an important cause of
international conflict. It was therefore
important for the Assembly to act im-
mediately and collectively to remove
such a factor.

Mr. Jawad considered that Mr.
Khrushchev’s proposal for the termina-
tion of colonialism and the immediate
granting of independence to colonial
countries and peoples was of the highest
significance. At such a critical moment
in history, the liberation of colonial and
semi-colonial countries and peoples would
greatly contribute to the removal of cer-
tain causes of conflict.

Speaking of the increased world ten-
sion which the United Nations had to
meet in a divided world, Mr. Jawad held
that, despite criticism of the United Na-
tions and its weaknesses, its presence was
imperative and its support by all nations
a major historical necessity.

In the last 15 years, active movements
for political emancipation had spread to
all subjugated peoples. The whole world,
with the exception of certain vested in-
terests, had become more aware of the
need for recognizing that revolution and
the necessity of maintaining machinery
for coordinating the interests of nations
and peacefully settling their differences.

In a period of increasing danger of war
it was incumbent upon member states
to rally to the support of the United Na-
tions to prevent further deterioration of
the international situation. The 15 years
of the United Nations had witnessed a

reatci split between East and West and
the gathering of power into two con-
tending and hostile blocs, negotiating
from positions of strength. However, the
development of the two blocs had not
reached the point of collision. The time
had come for the non-committed nations,
and others which had recently attained
independence, to bridge the gap separat-
ing East and West.

Among the problems contributing to
increased tension, Mr. Jawad gave the
following: “The denial of membership to
the People’s Republic of China in the
United Nations; the continued occupation
of West Irian by the Netherlands; the
attempt at the separation of Mauritania
from Morocco by France; the war in
Algeria; the fighting in Oman; the
Palestine question; and the question of
the Congo.”

UNR—December 1960

Speaking of Algeria, Mr. Jawad de-
plored the fact that, despite the ac-
cepted principle of the Charter regarding
the right of the Algerian people to self-
determination, a right which had been
endorsed by the General Assembly and
recognized even by France, the war was
being continued by France with increas-
ing force and determination.

A year previously President de Gaulle
had spoken of self-determination for
Algeria, but subsequent events had
shown beyond doubt that he did not
mean what he had said—he wanted
nothing less than surrender.

It was time, declared Mr. Jawad, that
the General Assembly took a more posi-
tive stand on Algeria. Peace in Algeria
was an essential preliminary to the rela-
tions of the Arab states with France, and
to a large extent with the West. Unless
action were taken rapidly to end the
Algerian war to the satisfaction of the
Algerian people’s aspirations, the war
area might extend and the struggle be-
come more international.

Negotiations had failed because of
France’s determination to suppress by
force the right of Algerians to self-de-
termination. It now fell to the United
Nations to work out a plan for imple-
menting self-determination in Algeria.
The Algerian Government, he recalled,
had suggested a plebiscite under the
supervision and control of the United
Nations. That practical proposal was a
challenge both to the United Nations and
to all powers seeking to promote peace
and justice.

Mr. Jawad, turning to the question of
Palestine, said the aggressive and hostile
attitude of Israel and its policy of ex-
pansion by military means had kept the
Arab countries in a state of fear and
turned the whole Middle East into an
area of perpetual instability.

Israeli militarism, supported by certain
political circles and groups with eco-
nomic vested interests in Europe and
America, reflected the existence of close-
ly knit relationships between Israel and
certain Western powers, he said. Eco-
nomic and financial aid generously pro-
vided to Israel by certain Western coun-
tries, particularly the United States and
France, showed the determination of
those countries to make of Israel a
stronghold against the Arab states. The
special task assigned to Israel had been
divulged during the tripartite aggression
against Egypt in 1956.

The strategy and tactics of the im-
perialist powers in the Middle East had
centred around the presence of Israel,
he continued. “We who fought, and
are still fighting, the imperialist domina-
tion in our countries therefore view Is-
rael not only as a usurper of our land, but
also as an instrument of oppression to
our people and a continuous threat to our
national freedom and independence,” de-
clared Mr. Jawad.

In another part of the Middle East—in
Oman and Southern Arabia—the colonial
system continued the suppression by force
of the national liberation movements in
order to perpetuate its control and
supremacy established during the nine-
teenth century, he added. For the last

UNR—December 1960

five years the people of Oman had been
in a state of revolt and had been fighting
the British colonial occupation. For five
years the world had been prevented from
knowing the facts. Consideration of the
question by the United Nations in 1957
had been barred, and there had followed
a conspiracy of silence.

As to the situation in the Congo, Mr.
Jawad held that Belgium bore the major
responsibility for its deterioration. The
crisis in the Congo would never have
reached the critical stage if Belgium had
not tried through secessionists to violate
the unity, territorial integrity and in-
dependence of the Congo. When Presi-
dent Kasavubu and Premier Lumumba
addressed their joint appeal to the United
Nations for help, the main problems at
the time were the withdrawal of Belgian
troops and the maintenance of internal
peace and order. The crisis would have
ended with the withdrawal of Belgian
troops, which was effected under relent-
less pressure from the Secretary-General,
acting in accordance with the mandate
given to him by the Security Council.
Unfortunately, the Belgians had left be-
hind them a “time bomb” which ex-
ploded, threatening not only the inde-
pendence of the Congo and its terri-
torial integrity, but world peace and
security and the future of the United
Nations.

What had to be done now was to find
the appropriate means to bring about
harmony and peace in the Congo and
to safeguard its independence and terri-
torial integrity. To achieve that, the ex-
ecutive action was of primary impor-
tance, and Mr. Jawad quoted Mr.
Nehru’s statement to the effect that “the
executive should be given authority to
act within the terms of the directions
issued. At the same time the executive
has to keep in view all the time the
impact of various forces in the world,
for we must realize that unfortunately
we live in a world where there are many
pulls in different directions.”

Mr. Jawad associated himself with
“the wide expression of confidence in
the ability of the Secretary-General, his
impartiality and his devotion to the
cause of peace and freedom every-
where.”

He then dwelt on the necessity for
economic independence to go with po-
litical independence. “The attainment of
politics! independence by certain states,”
he deciared, “will serve little purpose if
the process of economic decolonization
is not attained in the light of the follow-
ing two criteria of economic indepen-
dence: the freedom to terminate the
colonial pillage of the economic re-
sources of the new states; and the free-
dom of the new states to choose their
own ways and methods of economic
development.”

The economic development of under-
developed countries was hampered by
lack of investment capital, technical
knowledge and qualified personnel. Iraq
had consistently advocated the channel-
ling of both capital and technical as-
sistance to the less-developed countries
through the United Nations. It had wel-
comed the establishment of the Special
Fund and hoped that the initial goal of

$100 million for the expanded program
and the Special Fund would soon be
realized. Those programs, however, were
still inadequate. There was growing ne-
cessity for the speedy establishment of
a United Nations capital development
fund.

There were disturbing signs that the
prices of hitherto stable commodities,
such as petroleum, were being cut, with
serious consequences for those countries
whose economies were largely dependent
on the export of such commodities, The
time had also come for a fresh and
major effort to be made, through the
United Nations, to assist in curbing ex-
cessive fluctuations and to bring order
into the international market of primary
commodities. Unless that were done, no
reasonable amount of outside aid to the
underdeveloped countries could be truly
effective.

Turning to disarmament, Mr. Jawad
referred to the wide support given to the
Soviet proposal of September 18, 1959,
for general and complete disarmament.
The future of civilization depended pri-
marily on finding a solution for the arms
race, he emphasized. Nuclear weapons
added greatly to the danger of “acci-
dental” war; and in an atmosphere of
fear the risk was all the greater. More-
over, peace through fear was an un-
stable peace and signified “brinkman-
ship,” wasteful military expenditure and
a permanent “cold war.”

The alternative was peace through dis-
armament. That was why Iraq supported
the Soviet proposal for general and com-
plete disarmament. The possibility of
peaceful coexistence of states with dif-
ferent social and political systems had
been confirmed in the inter-war period
and had become clearer since then.

Iraq, under the guidance of its leader,
Abdul-Karim Kassim, had been follow-
ing the road of positive neutrality in its
relations with the various groups of
powers in the world, continued Mr. Ja-
wad. Its foreign policy of neutrality was
in essence a policy of peaceful coexist-
ence. It had thus been able to help com-
bat the cold war and to set an example
for small states.

IRELAND

Frank Aiken
Minister for External Affairs

Seventeen new nations had entered the
Organization at a moment of crisis,
perhaps at a turning point in history,
said Mr. Aiken. Members should ask
themselves what would be their situation
if the United Nations were to break
down or become paralyzed. What form
would the cold war then take? The
prelude to the Spanish tragedy had been
a catastrophic decline in the prestige of
the League of Nations and the sequel
had been World War II.

The present crisis and the future of
the Organization were closely related to
the governing currents of the twentieth
century—the cold war and the “widening
of freedom,” by which he meant the
emergence into independent national life
of vast areas, mainly in Asia and Africa.

Competition between the great powers
for the favor of world opinion had
brought about the freedom of many new
member states and would help to bring
others toward independence. But at the
same time this competition carried with
it most appalling burdens and dangers.
If the tragedy of nuclear war were to
be avoided, two sets of conditions must be
fulfilled. First, there should be control
of the incidence of “flash points,” to stop
the development of situations in which
the nuclear powers might become so
deeply involved that they could not re-
treat without loss of prestige. Secondly,
the spread of nuclear weapons to fur-
ther countries should be prevented, and
Ireland would introduce a draft resolu-
tion suggesting methods for restricting
the spread of weapons of indiscriminate
destruction.

If these two things could be done
“before the present balance of terror can
be upset by the scientists,” a third meas-
ure might be adopted—to turn critical
areas of tension into peaceful areas of
law. By this he meant a region in which
neighboring states would agree to limit
their arms “below blitzkrieg level,” to
exclude foreign troops, and to accept
supervision by the United Nations of
fulfillment of these conditions. In this
way there could be built up throughout
the world an expanding network of
areas where Charter pledges would be
supported by tangible and effective guar-
antees—areas in which neighboring peo-
ples would be definitely committed to
seek change and to settle disputes by
peaceful means alone.

Speaking of what “the rank and file”
delegations were entitled to look for
from the big powers, Mr. Aiken thought
the best way for the great powers to win
their confidence and support was by
proving themselves loyal members of
the United Nations.

He did not claim that sole responsi-
bility for preserving peace, or the sole
guilt if it were not preserved, rested on
the shoulders of the big powers. In
recent times the smaller powers had
come to bear a greater responsibility and
the big powers had become more sensi-
tive to the attitudes of the smaller
countries.

The recently emerged nations carried
a tremendous collective responsibility;
either subservience or recklessness in the
present crisis could destroy the Organi-
zation and, with it, the smaller nations’
independence. In fact, if the United Na-
tions collapsed, many of the independent
nations might not survive.

“The United Nations,” he emphasized,
“is the best guarantee of freedom and
independence; for many it offers the
best hope of disinterested help in the
economic and technical development of
which they stand in such urgent need.”
As the only Western European nation
which had experienced a long epoch of
foreign rule, Ireland assured the smaller
and newly independent countries of Asia
and Africa that it did not hear with in-
difference the voices of their spokesmen.
Ireland had laid aside bitterness regard-
ing “the dark old days.” But Ireland
stood unequivocally for the swift and

orderly ending of colonial rule and other
forms of foreign domination. He warned
“other anti-colonialist countries present
here” against attempts to represent the
United Nations as a mask for imperialist
intervention. The United Nations was,
on the contrary, a body in which the
small nations had an influence such as
they had never before possessed in their
history, and it was both their duty and
in their own interest to rally to its de-
fence if the Organization were attacked.

“Some fervent anti-colonialists are in-
clined to take the United Nations and
their own say in it rather too much for
granted, and to ignore what an achieve-
ment it is from their roint of view—how
important and at the same time how
fragile it is,’ Mr. Aiken declared. Who
could seriously maintain that the Organi-
zation was or could be made a tool of
imperialism? The theory was a product
of the cold war working on national
liberation movements.

He was far from claiming that the
struggle against imperialism was over.
On the contrary, one of the most vital
tasks of the United Nations was to en-
sure swift and orderly transition toward
a new world of free nations—without
endangering peace. It was a task fraught
with great difficulties, of which the
Congo was a reminder. The crisis there
touched all countries, including Ireland,
which had sent a contingent to the
United Nations Force in the Congo.

It had been said that Central Africa
must not be “Balkanized,” but the fact
must be faced that it had already been
“Balkanized.” What was in their power
to do, however, was to prevent a repeti-
tion in Central Africa of the unfortunate
history of the Balkans and, indeed, the
history of Europe. For generations to
come the countries of Africa would need
all their resources to build up the stand-
ard of life of their people. Outsiders
could not do this. The carefully thought-
out plan outlined by Prince Moulay
Hassan, of Morocco, should be atten-
tively studied by all the African states.
Outsiders could help, however, as pointed
out by President Eisenhower, to develop
all the rich resources and should help
them to avoid repeating in Africa the
bitter conflicts that had characterized
the history of Europe and other parts
of the world.

Mr. Aiken opposed the suggestion that
the office of Secretary-General should
be turned into a triumvirate, which would
be tantamount to the disruption of the
Organization. “As regards the present
holder of the office of Secretary-Gen-
eral,” he added, “I can only say that we
are fortunate indeed to have as Secre-
tary-General a man who, by his wisdom,
impartiality, devotion to duty and loyalty
to the principles of the Charter has
earned the confidence of the overwhelm-
ing majority of the members of this
Organization—and has deserved the con-
fidence of all. . . . During Mr. Ham-
marskjold’s period of office the United
Nations has shown itself an unpre-
cedented instrument of action by the
world community in the defence of
peace. That instrument is the most

precious thing we possess in common.

Let us maintain it intact and learn to
use it with increasing skill and sureness.”

NORWAY

Halvard M. Lange
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the last few years the most im-
portant task of the United Nations, said
Mr. Lange, had been to prevent political
unrest of a local character from spreading
geographically and from developing into
conflicts of a wider scope. This task
was still of overriding significance. A
timely entry of the United Nations on
the scene tended to prevent a conflict
becoming an issue in the contest between
the major power groupings of the world
and adding new difficulties for the people
of the area.

In this context, Norway felt compelled
to reconsider what realistic assistance the
United Nations could render in the
tragic Algerian situation, with a view to
the peaceful implementation of the
agreed principle of self-determination.

The second major task of the Organi-
zation was to cooperate with member
states in their economic and social de-
velopment and in the educational and
administrative fields. The programs for
such aid had been expanded more rap-
idly than before. It was now generally
recognized that assistance in solving the
problems of the many countries in the
early stages of economic growth was a
task of first priority. A crucial problem
in this regard was that of increasing the
financial resources available. His Gov-
ernment was fully prepared to make
more funds available for these various
United Nations programs.

After warmly welcoming the new
countries admitted to the Organization,
Mr. Lange noted with regret that the
Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville)
was not yet represented in the Assembly
hall. Norway had been greatly impressed
by the effective and speedy action by
the United Nations for the Congo. It
considered that the direction of the op-
eration by the Secretary-General was
based on a correct interpretation of the
Security Council’s resolutions. He paid
“unreserved tribute” to the Secretary-
General’s initiative, firm leadership and,
above all, to his impartiality in handling
the Congo situation.

With regard to the machinery of the
United Nations, Mr. Lange associated
himself with the views of Mr. Nehru
that members’ efforts to improve and
strengthen the United Nations should be
a process of gradual improvement and
expansion; they should not “drastically
tear apart” the present structure and
embark on a major revision of the
Charter.

On the vital question of disarmament,
Mr. Lange noted that another year had
passed without agreement on any single
specific measure. The first and most im-
mediate contribution this Assembly could
make was to re-establish suitable ma-
chinery for the resumption of disarma-
ment negotiations. Norway’s attitude to-
ward the Ten-Nation Committee was de-
termined by the fact that the four major

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powers themselves had agreed on its
composition and desired to conduct the
negotiations in this forum.

It had been suggested that a neutral
and highly respected personality should
be selected as chairman. Norway thought
such a suggestion deserved consideration.
Norway realized the benefits which might
be gained from the inclusion in the com-
mittee of countries pursuing a policy of
neutrality or non-alignment. This must,
however, be carefully weighed against
the risk of making the machinery more
cumbersome and too diversified. Both
East and West had stated that the exist-
ing balance of power, or the present rela-
tive strength of armed forces, must not
be tilted in any direction at any point in
the process of gradual and phased dis-
armament. Was it not conceivable that
this principle could give a new sense of
direction to the negotiations they all so
ardently wished to see resumed? The
Assembly might well recognize and en-
dorse this principle, thereby giving it
universal recognition.

The vicious circle of disarmament meas-
ures on the one hand and of control and
inspection on the other must be broken
if any measure of disarmament was to
be achieved. For this reason, Norway
believed that singling out specific units
for disarmament, in such a manner that
their abolition did not interfere with
the existing power relationship, could
ease the way for technical and detailed
exploration of what would be the ade-
quate control machinery.

To make even “a modest start” with
an international control and verification
machinery seemed to be essential. For
this reason Norway at least hoped that
the nuclear test negotiations could be
brought to a successful conclusion and
that the control machinery agreed upon
for this purpose might serve as a pilot
project for control and disarmament.
Norway was willing to permit reciprocal
inspection of its territory under interna-
tional auspices.

In order to pave the way for disarma-
ment, all nations had an obligation to
show restraint and patience in any con-
flicts of interest in which they might be
involved. There was at present one such
conflict of interest of particular concern
in Europe— West Berlin and its people
living under continuous threats against
their status as a city. It was understand-
able that the peoples to which the fate of
West Berlin was of special concern might
have certain difficulties in embarking on
plans of large-scale disarmament as long
as this situation persisted.

Touching on the unsuccessful summit
meeting in Paris, Mr. Lange considered
that interchange and personal contact be-
tween heads of state were most important
and, in certain circumstances, could be
of decisive influence. Perhaps they should
reserve this ultimate form of contact,
however, for situations of real crisis. It
also had its place in situations where
the possibility of significant achievement
appeared to be within reach as a result
of careful preparations.

_ Perhaps peoples could then hope to
live in “a somewhat more temperate
climate.” Some would say that in adopt-

UNR—December 1960

ing this course they were running the
risk of foregoing the “real bright days.”
He tended to put greater emphasis on
avoiding so far as possible the sudden
changes for the worse, with threatening,
black clouds darkening the horizon.

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
(Capital: Brazzaville)

Stéphane Tchichelle
Vice-President of the Council of Ministers

The plan proposed by the President
of the United States for the development
of the African states, said Mr. Tchichelle,
could have fortunate effects for the whole
of Africa and for the peace of the world
if it were applied in sincerity and harmony
by all nations and if the countries repre-
sented in the Assembly were to respect
the right of the African people to choose
their own mode of life and to determine
for themselves the course to follow—and
if, of course, each of those countries
stood by its commitments and undertak-
ings.

Mr. Khrushchev’s proposal, for grant-
ing full independence to all colonial peo-
ples and the freedom to set up their own
national states in accordance with the
will freely expressed by their peoples, was
of equal scope, said Mr. Tchichelle. The
two great powers of the world were thus
agreed on giving an opportunity for as-
suming their place in the family of na-
tions to colonial peoples aspiring for
freedom.

Nationalism should not be “a false
mirror,” he said. The real faith animating
the peoples of Africa who were still de-
pendent and those who had just acquired
their independence should be devoid of
xenophobia or racism.

It was, however, a matter for concern
to Mr. Tchichelle that some of the lead-
ers who sought to keep the idea of Pan-
Africanism alive had neglected some of
the lessons of the past showing that the
great African kingdoms and empires
which existed before the colonial era
had foundered partly because of lack of
administrative structure and partly be-
cause of the enormous difficulties of im-
posing the authority of the central power
“upon clans in an equal way.”

That situation had not changed today.
“Before dreaming of expansion and domi-
nation . . . we must in wisdom re-
vert, rather, to the management of our
own affairs,” Mr. Tchichelle stated. He
warned, however, against the folly of
folding “back into one’s shell.” His Gov-
ernment would, moreover, like to see the
development of a large African economic
community which, basing itself on all of
the efforts of all African countries, would
develop and exploit natural resources to
the benefit of all Africans.

As to the situation in the former Bel-
gian colony of the Congo, Mr. Tchichelle
said that colonialism had had its day
and must now give way to the right of
peoples to self-determination. But the
old colonialism must not be replaced by
an ideological neo-colonialism with im-
ported foreign doctrines. The Congolese
who had struggled for their independence
did not want to see the Belgians replaced

by other colonialists who did not even
know the territory and did not speak
their language.

Under the terms of the resolution
adopted by the Security Council on July
22, 1960, there could be no foreign inter-
ference in the Congo (Leopoldville) with-
out the control of the United Nations.

The Assembly had entrusted a mission
to the United Nations. Why not let the
United Nations carry out that mission
with respect for the resolutions which
had been approved? United Nations ac-
tion was indispensable for the former
Belgian Congo, and everyone was in
agreement with the resolution of August
9 which stated that the United Nations
should not be used to influence the out-
come of internal conflicts in the country.
Why, then, should the United Nations
not put its trust in the present Chief of
State (Mr. Kasavubu), the only person
in the territory who was legally in office
under the basic law of May 19, 1960,
and whose constitutional authority had
never been contested? The “Congo solu-
tion” must be worked out by the Congo-
lese alone, by the only Congolese repre-
sentative legitimately empowered to act.

Mr. Tchichelle hoped that the round-
table conference called by Mr. Kasavubu
would find a solution to the problem.

He also suggested that, in order to
end “this climate of mistrust” which
weighed so heavily on the United Na-
tions forces stationed in Leopoldville,
those forces should be recalled and re-
placed by men who had never worked
in Leopoldville Province. That would
automatically halt partisan acts by one
party or another for its own benefit.

Discussing “the fate of my Congolese
brothers under Portuguese domination,”
Mr. Tchichelle said that the Government
of Lisbon had remained unmoved by the
legitimate independence claims of the
population of Angola as well as of the
populations of other Portuguese African
territories, Was that policy of indifference
reasonable? What could Portugal have
to fear from the reasonable emancipa-
tion of the populations which it main-
tained, sometimes with far too much
strictness, under its tutelage?

Mr. Tchichelle said the only thing
that his “brothers in Angola” wanted was
to be considered as human beings, given
the means of becoming citizens and elec-
tors, and permitted to choose their own
representatives who could discuss all
matters as equals with all those who had
worked in the country and who would
have rights not greater than but the same
as those of the natives.

Mr. Tchichelle also called for inde-
pendence for the people of Cabinda,
which formed an enclave between the
Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) and
his own country. That Portuguese colony,
he said, was unable to make its voice
heard and was subjected to an oppres-
sive régime of which President Salazar
himself was certainly unaware.

His country, said Mr. Tchichelle, as-
sociated itself with all the peaceful state-
ments made from the Assembly rostrum.
It hoped that agreement would be
reached on disarmament; that the Congo
problem would be solved; that the dele-

gation of the Government headed by Mr.
Kasavubu would be seated to enable it to
give the viewpoint of the free Congolese
people; and that the United Nations
would deal with the colonial problems of
Portugal.

In conclusion he expressed the faith
held by the people of his country in the
future of the United Nations and their
confidence in its Secretary-General.

PORTUGAL

Vasco Vieira Garin
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

Having spoken of the deterioration in
international relations during the past
year—relations that had become still
more inflamed recently—Dr. Garin said
he would not attempt to examine causes
or make accusations. In the spirit of
harmony and tolerance, his delegation
would not incite peoples to rebellion,
collaborate in schemes designed to un-
dermine the very foundations of the
United Nations or attack the structure
of other states. Portugal, a nation de-
voted to peace and without excessive
ambitions for high standards of living
which its resources would not permit,
would not find it difficult to follow its
creed of harmony. It was imperative that
nations revert to the simple principles
of tolerance and mutual respect before
it was too late.

Commenting that no government
could afford to ignore the reciprocity of
peace and disarmament, he believed that
it had become desperately urgent to re-
sume disarmament negotiations.

“The present arms race, based on
weapons which offer mankind the capaci-
ty to destroy itself,” he said, “places the
future of the world at the very edge of
a vast nothingness.”

It was also true, he pointed out, that
man’s fallibility persisted, and a human
miscalculation could easily lead to a
third world war. Logic might govern
men’s reason but not their actions, and
the fear of surprise attack lurked on the
horizon of their daily lives. The first
great service, as the arms race rapidly
approached a point of no return, would
be to insulate disarmament negotiations
from political propaganda.

That question also brought to the fore
the peaceful use of outer space. Here
should be an issue susceptible of uniting
every country of the world, but no prog-
ress whatever had been achieved to allay
fears arising from the possible military
uses of outer space. Therefore it became
equally urgent to reach international
agreement on the prohibition of military
uses of outer space and on the explora-
tion of technical means to use the new
discoveries for peaceful purposes.

Speaking of the Congo, Dr. Garin said
that the Portuguese people hoped the
new republic’s difficulties would be only
temporary. Portugal recognized the re-
public, one of its closest and oldest
neighbors, on the day of independence.
The United Nations had been called on
to play a very difficult role in helping
the Congo through its crisis: it had to be

safeguarded from becoming a battle-
ground of the cold war. The Secretary-
General and all those helping him had
proceeded with great wisdom and ability
and certainly commanded respect and
admiration. Dr. Garin also warmly wel-
comed all the other new African states.

He then turned to Portugal’s overseas
provinces, since some speakers, acting
rather emotionally, he said, had seen fit
to offer derogatory and unjust remarks.

The inspiration for the Portuguese
discoveries of centuries past, he said, was
to spread the ideals of Christianity and
to bring the many worthy factors of
Western civilization into contact with
other civilizations and cultures flourish-
ing beyond the seas. In the course of
that process “the integration of our over-
seas peoples in the unity of the Portu-
guese nation followed naturally.”

Dr. Garin developed the theme that
“for five long centuries the Portuguese
joined and blended with the peoples they
had contacted overseas, forming with
them the elements which would become
part of the same national entity.” Thus
a unique nation was formed and “grew
in the four corners of the earth.” The
naticnal territory, under the Portuguese
Constitution, was an indivisible unit,
with all parts on a plane of equality.
There was not the slightest question that
the Portuguese overseas provinces were
independent with the independence of
the nation.

Portugal, he said, was proud of the
unceasing toil that for nearly five cen-
turies of common history had been de-
voted to the overseas provinces—the
work of maintaining order, organizing
community life, promoting economic de-
velopment, providing education, invest-
ing capital and raising living standards.
Referring to “accusations against Portu-
gal contained in a paper recently circu-
lated by a delegation well known for its
special affinity to attempt to discredit
countries or peoples who refuse to gravi-
tate around their political system,” he
said that “such accusations leave us un-
impressed.”

In December 1959 Portugal, he re-
called, was the host at Luanda, Angola,
to the first session of the African Ad-
visory Committee of mo. More than
600 delegates, from government, em-
ployer and trade union circles, had the
opportunity to observe Portuguese life
in the overseas provinces. Some of them
had come to the meeting in doubt, but
they all recognized the absence of dis-
crimination or forced labor, as_ they
also saw the lack of foundation for so
many of the accusations made against
his country.

It was painful for him, he said, to hear
the Chief of the State of Ghana saying
that what he called—probably in a facet-
ious vein — “the Portuguese arrange-
ment” was repugnant to any concept of
African freedom. It appeared that the
Chief of State of Ghana shared a politi-
cal philosophy whereby African freedom
was incompatible and could not coexist
with multi-racial countries, free as they
might be, on account of some kind of
inevitable conflict of races and cultures.
The gravity of such a concept was un-

deniable. Throughout its history Portugai
had always rejected racialism and was
not prepared to accept it now, said Dr.
Garin.

Also, he recalled, the Foreign Minister
of the Republic of the Congo (Brazza-
ville) had made reference to the Portu-
guese territory of Cabinda and had read
a letter said to have been addressed to
the Secretary-General by a group of in-
dividuals who live in Brazzaville in which
certain accusations were made against
the Portuguese administration.

Cabinda, said Dr. Garin, was a small
territory with a population of about
40,000 persons and was part of the
Mayombe forest region, a dense forest
difficult to penetrate. Therefore Cabinda’s
communications problems were of prime
importance, and 66 million escudos had
been allocated to solving them under
Portugal’s development plan. Admitting
that Cabinda had not undergone develop-
ment as fast as other districts of the
province, he pointed out that, contrary
to allegations in the letter, it had three
hospitals, one maternity centre, 16 aux-
iliary health centres and laboratories, and
two ports (with a third being planned).
He also stated that the report of dis-
turbances in Cabinda, with loss of life,
was completely false.

Dr. Garin also mentioned that the
development plan provided for invest-
ments of 31,000 million escudos through-
out all the national territories, which was
one third of the total sum expected to
be invested during the five-year period.

Portugal regarded with support and
sympathy United Nations efforts to en-
courage and assist the underdeveloped
countries. Portugal was also following
with great interest the work of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa. Every
year his country was distributing many
scholarships for the specialization of
African graduate students and noted with
pleasure that students from Ghana, Ethi-
opia, Sudan and Somalia had applied.

GHANA'S REPLY to Portugal

Exercising the right of reply, K. B.
Asante, of Ghana, declared that Dr.
Garin’s speech contained a clear implica-
tion that the President of Ghana was
preaching racialism, which was not true.
What the President had said was that
Portugal, a member of the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization, had, by her
metropolitan law, claimed the territories
she had colonized in Africa as an in-
tegral part of Portugal. The President
had always emphasized that Africa was
not, and never could be, an extension
of Europe and had said that that Portu-
guese arrangement was repugnant to any
concept of African freedom. He was
referring to an arrangement by which,
by the stroke of a Portuguese pen in
Lisbon, an African territory was made
a part of Portugal.

“By this device, modern colonialists
hope to avoid discussion of their dark
deeds in this Assembly,” he added. The
President of Ghana had spoken against
the disingenuous attempt to enslave Afri-
cans, and not in support of racialism. It
was to be hoped that members of the

UNR—December 1960

Assembly would not be lulled to sleep
by Dr. Garin’s suggestion that all was
quiet in Angola and other Portuguese
territories. The situation was explosive.
Portugal was attempting to stem the
tide of history by a futile legalistic de-
vice, and was presenting a counterfeit
spectre of racial partnership in which a
handful of indigenous Africans joined
Portuguese settlers and expatriates to
oppress the vast majority of Africans,
whose lot was a mixture of forced
labor, ignorance and squalor. It was that
device which the President of Ghana had
deplored and not the existence of differ-
ent races in the same country.

CHINA

Tingfu F. Tsiang
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

China, said Dr. Tsiang, supported the
United Nations because the Organization
stood for the high ideals of law and jus-
tice, peace and security. The United
Nations, despite the Soviet Union’s mis-
use of the veto power in the Security
Council, had made significant contribu-
tions to the cause of peace. The greatest
landmark, he considered, had been the
collective action to counter communist
aggression in Korea. The work the
United Nations had undertaken in the
Congo to restore law and order would
also go down in history as one of its
most significant achievements, he said.

Peace and security could not be if
there were no respect for and observance
of human rights. For that and other
reasons, the millions of human beings
living in conditions of terror and slavery
in East Europe, Tibet, on mainland
China and in other parts of the world
under communist domination should not
be forgotten, said Dr. Tsiang. It was on
the basis of slavery and oppression that
totalitarian dictators were able to plan
and carry out war.

As a result of the courage with which
the Secretary-General had carried out
his mandate, a beginning had been made
to put the Republic of the Congo on a
stable basis. The Secretary-General had
the support of the overwhelming majority
of the General Assembly to go ahead
with his work of implementing the resolu-
tions of the Security Council and of the
Assembly’s emergency special session.

“We were shocked by the slanderous
and abusive charges which the Chief of
the Soviet Government deemed fit to
make against the Secretary-General from
this rostrum a few days ago,” added Dr.
Tsiang. To call that selfless and con-
scientious and courageous international
public servant an agent of colonialism
was to add insult to injury. All fair-
minded men and women the world over
would condemn the utterly unfounded
and irresponsible attack on Mr. Hammar-
skjold’s personal integrity.

In proposing that the Secretary-Gen-
eralship be replaced by a directorate of
three, each with the veto, the Soviet
Union showed that it was only interested
m making the United Nations a forum

UNR—December 1960

for propaganda and a tool of the Soviet
Union, Dr. Tsiang asserted.

The Chinese people, he continued,
knew from years of experience what was
meant by the Soviet Union’s propaganda
arguments that only the Soviet Union
could help the emergent peoples achieve
their national aspirations and lead them
to economic prosperity and social well-
being.

The Chinese Government and people
rejoiced in the emergence of Africa on
the international scene. The new African
states had won their freedom and inde-
pendence from the colonial powers on
the basis of mutual sympathy, respect
and understanding, and that redounded
to the credit of both. The maintenance
of close relations between the new
states and the former metropolitan pow-
ers, on a footing of freedom and equal-
ity, could be of immense benefit to all
concerned.

Western colonialism was on its way
out, Dr. Tsiang observed, but unfor-
tunately there had arisen a new colonial-
ism in the form of international com-
munism, which was more dangerous and
sinister than the Western because it op-
erated under the guise of aid to national-
ism. International communism, however,
was the most deadly enemy of national-
ism. It was interested only in exploiting
the national aspirations of the colonial
peoples for its own purposes. The com-
munists would not hesitate to overthrow
any of the legally constituted govern-
ments in the newly independent countries
if it was thought the opportune moment
had arrived.

The Chinese were nationalists, anti-
colonialists and anti-imperialists, and
knew by experience that the Soviet type
of imperialism was the worst of all, Dr.
Tsiang continued. The Soviet Union was
the greatest colonial power in the twen-
tieth century. Whereas European colonial
powers had given freedom and _ inde-
pendence to more than 600 million peo-
ple in 30 countries since the last war,
the Soviet Union had increased its colo-
nial holdings enormously since the sign-
ing of the infamous non-aggression pact
with Hitler on August 23, 1939. Mr.
Khrushchev should set an example for
the world by liquidating Soviet colo-
nialism.

The Chinese delegation believed in the
complete elimination of colonialism. Na-
tionalism, the most elemental force in
the world today, could not be stopped.
Undue delay in solving colonial questions
would make their final solution more
complicated, more intractable and more
costly. Therefore, it was to be hoped
that those African countries still under
colonial rule would soon emerge as
free and sovereign members of the world
community.

The less developed countries needed
substantial outside capital and technical
assistance for their economic develop-
ment. Naturally, they looked to the
United Nations for help. It was doubtful,
however, whether their needs could be
wholly met by the United Nations unless
extraordinary efforts were made.

Nowhere was need for economic and

technical assistance more urgent than in
newly emergent Africa. The Chinese dele-
gation applauded President Eisenhower's
program for aid to Africa and supported
the policy of channeling all assistance to
the African countries through the United
Nations. In the interest of world peace
and of the African countries themselves,
the United Nations should forestall any
move on the part of any power or any
bloc of powers to use economic and
technical assistance as a form of political
and economic penetration.

The United Nations should make good
use of the opportunity to assist the new
and emergent states in building social
and economic foundations for political
freedom.

Reviewing the progress made in recent
years in developing the economy of
Taiwan, Dr. Tsiang said his Govern-
ment was willing to make the experience
gained in the fight against poverty avail-
able to other countries, either through the
United Nations technical assistance pro-
gram or on a bilateral basis.

As to the complex question of disarma-
ment, the Chinese delegation believed
that disarmament was both urgent and
feasible. While there was no harm in en-
visaging total and complete disarmament
as the final goal, to wrangle over the im-
mediate abolition of all armaments was
to become bogged down in empty talk.
The more practicable procedure was to
appraise honestly the various specific pro-
posals that had been submitted. An
agreement, even one of a minor char-
acter, was better than no agreement at all.
A series of minor agreements could add
up to major gains. It was only through
the stage-by-stage reduction of armaments
that the final goal of complete disarma-
ment could be achieved.

Under the existing climate of mutual
mistrust, it was essential that disarmament
be inspected and controlled. Any agree-
ment on disarmament, without being ac-
companied by a system of controls, was
not worth the paper it was written on.

On the question of Tibet, Dr. Tsiang
said that the Chinese communists had
succeeded by ruthless suppression in
transforming Tibet out of all recognition.
The brutalities practiced in Tibet had
been practiced in other parts of China
also. The social and economic program
of the communists in Tibet was identical
with their program in China proper.

The drive of the Chinese communists
toward imperialist expansion showed an
aggressiveness sharply at variance with
their professions of loyalty to the “spirit
of Bandung.” The Chinese communists
had frankly proclaimed that war was
inevitable. They would not hesitate to
use war and violence to achieve their
final victory. No country sharing com-
mon frontiers with China was safe from
Chinese communist aggression on one
pretext or another. The Chinese com-
munist régime was the greatest menace
to international peace and security. At
home, it had spawned a gigantic system
of terror and torture, surveillance and
repression, the lik> of which the world
had never known: the whole country had
literally become an oversized slave camp.

The day would surely come when the
people of China would rise in revolt
against their oppressors. When that day
came—and there was not the slightest
doubt that it would—the Government of
the Republic of China now in Taiwan
was duty bound to come to their aid.
“We Chinese will yet see the day of
national liberation,” declared Dr. Tsiang
in conclusion.

YEMEN

Ahmad Ali Zabarah
Alternate Representative to the
United Nations

Welcoming the 16 new member states,
said Mr. Zabarah, was a source of par-
ticular joy for the Arab nations, which had
been bound to them by strong cultural
and religious ties since the twelfth cen-
tury. Yemen had high hopes that delega-
tions from Algeria, Palestine, Oman,
Kuwait and the African nations not yet
free would soon be received in the As-
sembly.

The fourteenth session, he recalled, had
been convened in an atmosphere of un-
derstanding and of hope emanating from
the Geneva conference, the Foreign Min-
isters’ Conference and a good start to-
ward disarmament through the Ten-Na-
tion Committee on Disarmament. There
had also been high hopes for solving the
question of Algeria, when France had
finally conceded to the Algerians the right
to self-determination and expressed will-
ingness to negotiate on that basis,

That atmosphere of hope, however,
had faded with the disintegration of the
Ten-Nation Committee, the collapse of
the Paris summit conference and the
increased complexity of the situation in
the Congo. In the Middle East, the
international situation was discouraging.
The Algerian war was in its sixth year,
with no hope of an agreement based on
self-determination; Palestine was still “un-
der the yoke of Zionist colonialism,”
and the refugees still destitute and dis-
persed; the question of the “usurped
southern part” of Yemen threatened the
peace of the area; war still raged in
Oman; and, above all, there was the
life-and-death race between the two
power blocs for thermonuclear arms and
the domination of outer space.

However, the Yemen delegation still
believed that the dark clouds could be
dispersed.

Speaking of disarmament, Mr. Zabarah
urged both parties to leave the door open
for negotiation. He stressed that in the
atomic age the choice was negotiation
or destruction. While complete disarma-
ment was desirable, the initial aim should
be partial disarmament under “a certain
degree” of control. “But before that can
be achieved, we must discard hate and
distrust,” he said. “That is a funda-
mental prerequisite for success.”

The United Nations had made a good
start in the Republic of the Congo, he
felt. In response to its call, many states
had sent military contingents, and others
had sent food, clothing and medical sup-
plies. That would have been an impossible
accomplishment without the energy and

experience of the Secretary-General and
his aides, through whom the withdrawal
of the Belgian troops—the first United
Nations objective in the Congo—had
been achieved. Only some civilian ex-
perts remained; they should be replaced
as soon as possible by experts from the
Congo itself or from other African
countries.

Unfortunately, serious impediments
had begun to hamper the United Nations
mission in the Congo. An internal dis-
pute had broken out, and, with outside
help, some provinces had seceded, hinder-
ing the independence and unity of the
Congo. There could be no hope of stabil-
ity so long as foreign hands continued
to spread seeds of discord in the dark.

Yemen appealed to the Congolese peo-
ple to close ranks and forget their
hatreds and to the African countries to
use their good offices in the Congo with
a view to achieving stable conditions and
to observe strict neutrality between the
parties to the dispute. “Last, but not least,
the forces and representatives of the
United Nations in the Congo should be
careful to pursue a course of absolute
neutrality between the various commu-
nities and parties,” he declared.

In the Middle East, continued Mr.
Zabarah, the sparks of a fire about to
blaze showed through the ashes. The
Palestine question, the main cause of
instability in the area, was still outstand-
ing. For 12 years Israel had refused to
implement United Nations resolutions on
the Palestine question. The problem of
the Palestine refugees was still unsolved,
and the people of Palestine still lived in
destitution and humiliation.

In the Middle East, continued Mr.
addition, a problem of great concern to
Yemen—the question of its southern re-
gions. Although part and parcel of
Yemen’s territory, those lands had been
called a federation. The situation had
led to continuous border aggressions
against Yemen, causing grave loss of life
and property. Yemen continued to hope
that the problem would be solved through
friendly negotiations.

War still raged in Oman. The country’s
leaders were subjected to severe restric-
tions, and its people faced imminent dan-
ger. The question of Oman had been
brought before the Security Council in
1957 to no avail, and, in view of the
great tension in the area, the members
of the League of Arab States had de-
cided to bring up the question again
during the current Assembly session. The
military operations in Oman were a
danger to the peace of the Middle East
and a flagrant violation of the Charter
and of the principles of international law.

A closely related issue was the prob-
lem of the Buraimi Oasis, not far from
Oman and part of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. The Secretary-General had done
well to send a representative to investi-
gate conditions there, but Yemen hoped
that he would also investigate conditions
in Oman and bring an amicable solution
to both problems.

Mr. Zabarah then spoke of the prob-
lem of Mauritania which, he said, France
wanted to make independent in order to
separate it from Moroccan territory, of

which it was an integral part. France
had recognized the fact that Mauritania
belonged to Morocco before it had estab-
lished its protectorate over Moroccan
territory in 1912.

One of Morocco’s chief concerns since
its independence had been to consolidate
its sovereignty over all its territory and
to recover Mauritania; an agreement
had been made with France under which
Morocco would reserve its right to nego-
tiate the question of its borders. More-
over, the inhabitants of the region in-
sisted on being returned to Morocco.
their homeland, he said.

Mr. Zabarah, after dwelling on the
loss of life and property on both sides
incurred in the six years of the Algerian
war, said that France’s willingness to
negotiate on the basis of self-determina-
tion had been a ray of hope. The AI-
gerian Government had accepted France’s
offer of negotiation and sent a delega-
tion to France for the purpose. How-
ever, it had developed that negotiations
would not be held in a free atmosphere.
Restrictions were imposed which the Al-
gerians had been unable to accept, since
negotiations held under such circum-
stances offered no hope of success.

The Algerians had, however, left the
door open for future negotiations. Later,
they had proposed a plebiscite in Algeria
under United Nations auspices to deter-
mine the country’s future.

At each of the three most recent As-
sembly sessions, said Mr. Zabarah,
France had brought out a “new trick.”
Once it was a law on an Algerian
plebiscite; another time, an offer of a
“Peace of the Brave”; and last year,
self-determination. Each time the United
Nations had formulated moderate resolu-
tions in response to the wishes of mem-
ber states that the door be left open
between the two parties. In 1959 the
“trick of self-determination” was so effec-
tive that the draft resolution on Algeria
failed to muster the necessary two-thirds
vote.

The United Nations should agree on
a resolution on Algeria that would place
matters in a proper perspective, without
ambiguity or suspicion. The time had
come for the United Nations to assume
its responsibility in this serious matter,
Mr. Zabarah urged.

The United Nations would be able to
face the serious problems of the arms
race, the Congo, the Algerian war,
Palestine and the rest if members, real-
izing the dangers which those outstanding
problems posed for the human race in
general, would set aside competition and
disagreement, debating with wisdom
rather than in a spirit of conflict and
indifference. That was the only way to
ensure peace for their children and
grandchildren, Mr. Zabarah concluded.

GUINEA

Sekou Touré
President
President Touré spoke of the change
in the international climate since the
fourteenth session of the Assembly and

UNR—December 1960

of the waning hopes of humanity. But,
he said, the fifteenth session could still
be an historical chance for humanity if
the debates could be raised “beyond our
egotistical interests and if we can show
mutual understanding and a wish to leave
aside all prejudice and suspicion.”

In Africa, he said, the struggles of
peoples for freedom had acquired an
accelerated rhythm, and he warned that
the continent was no longer a source of
booty and “a bone of contention.” Africa
was now becoming “simply itself.”

Until false ideas of discrimination on
a racial or chauvinistic basis were put
aside, it would not be possible to settle
the fundamental problems concerning
peace and the stability of the world. All
peoples wished directly and freely to
express their views in full sovereignty; to
try to stop that would only bring chaos.

Mr. Touré referred to the “ghastly
massacre” at Sharpville in March 1960
and declared that international opinion
had reacted to condemn the insane laws
of the racist government of Pretoria.
Portugal, also, he alleged, advocated
maintaining Africa in a state of submis-
sion. The situation created in the Congo
on the heels of Belgian aggression
threatened peace and security throughout
the world.

In Central and Eastern Africa, he said,
colonialism was “beginning a new home,”
and economic exploitation continued in
all sorts of disguises. By subtle maneuvers
and under the guise of economic agree-
ments, the imperialist powers were pool-
ing their resources and coordinating their
efforts for the building of military bases
which were indispensable for exploiting
the immense resources they saw.

However, he emphasized, it must be
recognized that national independence
presupposed not only political liberation
but total economic freedom. Despite all
the humanitarian speeches, no colonized
country had yet achieved a social level
comparable to that considered as the
lowest level in Europe.

Nevertheless, the idea of an African
common market was making headway,
and it was now conceded that an eco-
nomic entity must be created with a
purely African character in order to
safeguard the interests of the people.
The false colonial concept of the impos-
sibility of industrializing Africa must be
forgotten.

President Touré criticized the “negative
action” taken by the United Nations in
the Congo. If at the moment of Belgian
aggression the new young republic could
have defended itself, it would not have
called on the United Nations. He argued
that Premier Lumumba’s Government
was the legally elected government of
the Congo, and since an appeal for help
had been made to the United Nations,
it was surely the duty of the United
Nations to defend the position of the
legitimate government. How could the
United Nations declare that it would
not take any position in the internal
affairs of the Congo which were char-
acterized by foreign aggression, the very
justification for the Organization’s inter-
vention?

He felt it timely to make an appeal to

UNR—December 1960

all peoples and nations that their joint
efforts should give back to the United
Nations a role of justice to assist all
peoples, without taking into account the
degree of their material or military
power. Guinea considered the United
Nations the crucible of society and of the
universal conscience.

Speaking of representation of the
Congo in the United Nations, President
Touré said that Guinea “insisted” that
the representatives of the Central Gov-
ernment be accredited immediately. He
therefore submitted a draft resolution by
which the Assembly would decide to
seat representatives of the Central Gov-
ernment of the Republic of the Congo
(Leopoldville) immediately. What was
being threatened in the Congo, he added,
was the moral prestige of the United
Nations, and it was necessary to choose
between the greater interests of Africa
and the interests of the colonialist ex-
ploiters.

Importance in International Affairs

He spoke of the importance that the
African continent had assumed in inter-
national affairs and said that in the
light of that it became obvious that
African representation in the United
Nations now was far from corresponding
to reality. Today Africa was represented
by 27 members, more than a quarter of
the total membership of the Organiza-
tion. In view of the real contribution to
the maintenance of peace made by the
African nations and in order to take into
account an equitable geographical dis-
tribution, the Security Council, the Trus-
teeship Council—which should disappear
at the time that colonialism and trust
territories disappeared — the Economic
and Social Council, the Secretariat and
other subsidiary organs should have
larger African representation.

Speaking of the office of the Secretary-
General, President Touré said it was not
Guinea’s idea to have three Secretaries-
General, but only one. But he would
like to make a suggestion which seemed
to take very broadly into account the
concern of the Soviet Union: that three
deputy Secretaries-General be appointed
“according to the proposals of the three
political trends in the United Nations.”
Thus, implementation of resolutions of
the General Assembly would be more in
keeping with the political realities, since
each deputy would be a direct collabora-
tor of the Secretary-General and respon-
sible for both coordination and the geo-
graphic tones proposed.

He also declared that it was time that
a great injustice was rectified—the refusal
of the United Nations to give the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China its place within
the international community. There was
no more direct way of undermining the
United Nations than by converting it
into a house where much was spoken of
equality and peace but where a certain
exclusiveness was maintained and justice
to one part of the world refused.

Disarmament, he observed, was of pri-
mary concern to the African continent,
where the young states needed peace in
order to face the many problems con-
fronting them. They could not but de-

plore the overwhelming war and military
budgets and the existence of military
bases in foreign territories, all of which,
far from protecting anyone, unnecessarily
increased the dangers of war. Nuclear
tests recently repeated in the Sahara ob-
viously ran counter to any desire for
disarmament and clearly had not changed
power relations in the world.

On Algeria, Guinea thought that a just
solution must be found and that the
United Nations must, therefore, guarantee
the organization of free elections and the
setting up of a democratic government.

Regarding economic assistance, Presi-
dent Touré alleged that the new African
states were having economic agreements
proposed “which are nothing other
than revised colonialist pacts.” But
Africa was not going to be deceived.
“Our people,” he added, “have engaged
in a fight for national edification in
accordance with its aspirations.” Against
this, he alleged, the imperialists had set
up a huge plot, the purpose of which
was the recolonization of Guinea. Cer-
tain embassies at Conakry, he said, had
given their support to the internal organi-
zation of that plot. Fortunately all the
plotters were expelled within 48 hours.
Inquiries conducted by Senegal and the
Guinean police on the origin of the arms,
which had been placed clandestinely
along Guinea’s frontiers, had demon-
strated the responsibility of certain offi-
cers of the French army stationed at
Dakar, he said.

President Touré also said that “in the
so-called Portuguese Guinea” colonialists
were feverishly setting up military instal-
lations. “But,” he added, “our people
have other things to do.” And he went
on to explain in detail the administrative
and economic structures being set up in
his country, which, thanks to the assist-
ance of friendly countries, would be
able to invest, in three years, capital equal
to the investments of 60 years of the
colonial régime.

Finally President Touré spoke of the
necessity for this session to pronounce
itself clearly in favor of the immediate
and complete elimination of the colonial
régime in all its forms, and he presented
nine suggestions for the Assembly’s work:
general and complete disarmament was
essential for stability and peace, and
greater importance could not be given
to the question of control than to agree-
ment on a disarmament plan; there
should be a “solemn proclamation” for
immediate cessation of the colonial sys-
stem and the trusteeship system; the
Government of the Republic of the
Congo, headed by Patrice Lumumba,
should be authorized to take a seat in
the General Assembly immediately;
Cuinea supported President Nkrumah’s
proposal concerning the increase in the
responsibility of the Afro-Asian group,
within the framework of the United Na-
tions military and civilian action in the
Congo; the United Nations should “truly
and frankly” assist the legitimate Gov-
ernment of the Congo; there should be
a referendum in Algeria, followed by
democratic elections, under United Na-
tions control; People’s China should be
given its rightful seat in the United Na-

tions; the United Nations should recog-
nize the legitimate rights of the Arab
people of Palestine by seeing to it that
resolutions already adopted were strictly
implemented; and, finally, there should
be fair representation of the peoples of
Africa and Asia through a modification
of the structure of the international
Organization.

FEDERATION OF MALAYA

Dato’ Nik Ahmed Kamil
Permanent Representative to the
United Nations

This was no ordinary session, declared
Mr. Kamil, for rarely had the Assem-
bly faced so many problems of such
great magnitude. Events since the 1959
session had not justified the hopes then
felt. He recalled the failure of the sum-
mit meeting, the foundering of negotia-
tions on disarmament and the recent
events in the Congo and said that all
mankind was looking to the Assembly
now to weather out cold-war acrimony
and pave the way for the renewal of
negotiation leading toward a secure and
lasting peace.

Against the dark clouds, he continued,
there was the happy event of the ad-
mission of new countries, bringing United
Nations membership to 99 states. Un-
fortunately, the increase in membership
had not been matched by increases in
the membership of major organs, in par-
ticular, the Security Council and the
Economic and Social Council. That was
a problem requiring urgent consideration,
he said.

By its action in the Congo, the United
Nations had demonstrated its efficacy in
averting what might have become an
international crisis and national chaos
in the heart of Africa. The response of
the United Nations to the Congolese ap-
peal for assistance would go down in
the annals of the Organization as one
of the most important and praiseworthy
tasks ever undertaken. Although the situ-
ation in the Congo was still far from
stable, the United Nations had managed
to contain the crisis. As a contributor
to the United Nations Force in the
Congo, his country fully subscribed to
the philosophy of the operation, which
was to safeguard and defend the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of the
Congo. The young republic must not be
exposed to the “crossfire of big-power
politics and the furious storm of the cold
war.”

Mr. Kamil paid tribute to the Secre-
tary-General for his untiring and deter-
mined efforts in discharging the mandate
given to him by the United Nations.
The Maiayan Government deeply re-
gretted the unjustified accusations made
against the Secretary-General, for it felt
that, apart from their error and distor-
tion, they tended to hinder the United
Nations operation in the Congo and to
undermine the authority and prestige of
the Organization.

Referring to his country’s unwavering
faith in the United Nations, Mr. Kamil
said it viewed with grave concern any

attempt at discrimination among peoples
on the grounds of color, race or creed.
The apartheid policy of South Africa was
a case in point: apartheid had now be-
come an international issue, and its con-
tinuance would give rise to mounting
tension and could result in a threat to
international peace. It was profoundly
regrettable that the Union Government
had not heeded the world’s concern.
Malaya, in order to give more con-
crete expression of its own concern, had
prohibited the import of goods of South
African origin as from August 1, 1960,
and would maintain that stand until the
South African Government gave sufficient
indication of its intention to tackle the
problem in a manner consistent with the
humanitarian principles of the Charter.

Mr. Kamil then dealt with the “mali-
cious acts of suppression of Tibetans”
by the communists. It was disconcerting
to note, he said, that that suppression
had not abated, despite the Assembly’s
1959 resolution on the subject. Jointly
with Thailand, his country had requested
the inscription of the item on the agenda
of this session, as the members must
again address themselves to the question.

Mr. Kamil declared that, as one of the
small nations recently emerged from colo-
nial rule, Malaya was irrevocably and
resolutely opposed to all forms of colo-
nialism and imperialism. While many
new nations had freed themselves from
colonial bonds, millions of people were
still shackled by the “rusty chains of
dying colonialism,” and millions more
had fallen victims to a new and more
sinister form of dominion—that of world
communism. Dedicated to the cause of
national liberation anywhere in the world
and believing that any attempt to per-
petuate colonialism was inconsistent with
the trend of the times as well as with
the Charter, his delegation believed that
the situation in West Irian should be
rectified by an amicable solution among
all parties concerned.

As regards Algeria, the Malayan dele-
gation felt that the basic principle of
self-determination must be allowed to
operate. The situation in Algeria, where
a senseless war persisted with ruthless
brutality, was a cause of alarm and
concern. He hoped that the Assembly’s
discussion might reveal some way of
solving the problem, based on Algeria’s
rightful claim to self-determination.

Mr. Kamil then turned to the impor-
tant question of disarmament. His dele-
gation had been profoundly concerned
at the failure of the Geneva talks, but
it was more concerned with the subse-
quent exchange of bitter blames and
counter-blames. The Assembly forum
must be used, he said, for reasoned dis-
cussion. Though mainly the responsibil-
ity of the major powers, disarmament,
involving the question of survival or
total annihilation, was of paramount
concern to all mankind.

His delegation was convinced that a
workable program for the reduction of
armaments was possible if simultaneously
carried out and consistent with the
security of every nation. “It is our firm
conviction,” he observed, “that disarma-

ment should be the net result of an
effective system of international security,
cooperation and trust, not the basis.”

Another responsibility of the United
Nations was to assist the economic and
social development of member countries,
especially the less fortunate ones, where
the struggle for food, shelter and cloth-
ing was often a struggle for survival.
Conditions of peace and stability had to
prevail, however, if social and economic
progress was to be made.

Mr. Kamil also spoke of the impor-
tance for underdeveloped countries —
which, like Malaya, are dependent on
the earnings of primary commodities—
to have international agreements aimed at
stabilizing prices of such primary com-
modities. He recalled with satisfaction
the new tin agreement reached at the
recent conference sponsored by the
United Nations and designed to minimize
fluctuations in the price of tin. He
looked forward to similar stabilizing
measures with regard to rubber, follow-
ing the recent meeting of the Interna-
tional Rubber Study Group.

The task facing the underdeveloped
countries to close the gap between their
underdevelopment and their objective of
economic and social contentment was
even more difficult because of recent
staggering technological and _ scientific
achievements; but it had to be tackled,
both by the individual countries and by
international cooperation, he said. To
a large measure, the peace of the world
would depend on the success in closing
the gap. That was one of the reasons
why the smaller nations attached such
great importance to this session of the
Assembly, where grave issues of war or
peace, of total annihilation or survival,
of oppression or freedom, were at stake.

TUNISIA

Mongi Slim
Permanent Representative to the
United Nations

The admission of the new member
states to the United Nations had brought
the Organization closer to universality.
Their determination to obtain genuine
emancipation and social and economic
liberation would stress the paramount
need for decolonization.

The United Nations, Mr. Slim added,
was being subjected to disquieting pro-
posals for a reappraisal, not only with
regard to its geographical location, but
of its administrative structure and means
of action, which affected the very sig-
nificance of the Organization and the
guiding principles of the Charter govern-
ing its activities. The United Nations,
heretofore a supra-national body in which
conflicting interests between nations
could be attenuated if not resolved, rested
on the fundamental principles of the
equality of all nations, whether great or
small, weak or powerful. Recently, how-
ever, there had arisen a clear lack of
tolerance, a narrow, regionalist and paf-
tisan approach, which supplanted any
general approach, bearing in mind the
long-term, general interests of human s0-

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ciety. The United Nations was in a moral
crisis.

The small countries of Africa and
Asia were being pressed to embrace
various dogmas, to forsake their new-
found freedom and leave the determina-
tion of their own position on interna-
tional problems to others and to become
members of a third bloc, an African or
Afro-Asian bloc. Their faithful support
of democratic principles made them re-
luctant, however, to espouse the very
principle of a power bloc. They were
firmly attached to a policy of non-align-
ment. It seemed more realistic and more
in line with peaceful and free coexistence
among nations to stick to that position
of non-alignment and to judge each issue
on its merits and from the point of view
of law and justice.

To regard the division of the world
into blocs of nations as final would in-
volve the end of coexistence and amount
to a kind of collective suicide. Opposed
to the division of the United Nations
into three official or institutional blocs,
the Tunisian delegation was even less
prepared to agree to splitting the United
Nations executive by establishing a tri-
umvirate.

The veto right over decisions of the
Security Council was repugnant to
the majority of member states, for it
impaired the principle of the equality of
all states and conferred on a few the
power to frustrate the will of the many.
The majority of member sstates still
hoped that the veto could be replaced by
a more democratic system.

To seek to transform the Secretariat
into an organ which would also have a
type of veto over the decisions of the
Organization would without doubt ren-
der the actions of the United Nations
ineffectual. One could easily agree that it
was to some extent necessary to think in
terms of adapting the Organization to
the new situation created by the admis-
sion of a great number of new states
and the increased diversity of the prob-
lems before it; but it should be left
to the committee on the revision of the
Charter to make adjustments. In no
way, however, could the proposed radical
changes be justified, for they would
paralyze the normal operation of the
Organization.

Small states like Tunisia were inter-
ested in having an effective international
organization, particularly in view of the
need to meet the problems involved in
achieving independence for Algeria and
other territories in Africa and the world,
and in economic development.

Tunisia regarded the Algerian conflict,
which was about to enter its seventh
year, as most prejudicial to relations
between North Africa, France and the
rest of the world. It deeply regretted the
lack of progress in settling the question
since the last Assembly session, despite
the agreement in principle reached be-
tween the French and the Algerians on
the need to allow the Algerian people
freely to determine their own future by
means of a genuine consultation of the
people.

The French Government, however,
now again seemed to think that the
Algerian people should lay down their

UNR—December 1960

arms and accept the status which France
might be kind enough to confer on them
—an attitude which was a flagrant viola-
tion of the Charter, for it gave priority
to might over right and rejected negotia-
tions in favor of decisions reached by
force of arms.

The Tunisian Government had de-
cided to give their Algerian brothers un-
ambiguous and complete support, regard-
less of the political hue of the assistance
which might be given to them to bring
about an end to the war.

The United Nations must help both
parties find an honorable and fair solu-
tion through a sincere referendum, car-
ried out under the aegis of the United
Nations. No other solution was possible,
as the door to any bilateral talks seemed
to have been firmly closed.

In Palestine, too, said Mr. Slim, might
had supplanted right. A people had been
compelled to leave its fatherland. Hun-
dreds of thousands of human beings who
had been living in honor and dignity
had been reduced to the condition of
stateless masses, surviving only through
assistance from the United Nations. Tu-
nisia, which was not a racist country
and had never confused Judaism and
Zionism, condemned anti-semitism, which
had been invoked to justify the expul-
sion of the Arab people from its home-
land.

As to the crisis in the Congo, that
seemed to have been engendered pri-
marily by the rather exceptional diffi-
culties encountered when it ceased to be
a colony. Belgium must assume the
heavy responsibility for having all too
long been remiss in the training of
cadres in the Congo in preparation for
the young African republic to move on
to a future of stability, peace and con-
cord.

The role of Belgian agents and nation-
als in jeopardizing peace and stability in
the Congo could not be minimized. It
was particularly difficult to deny the
action undertaken by groups of interests
in the attempted secession of the Prov-
inces of Katanga and Kasai. It was
possible, however, that official Belgium
was practising a policy which was sab-
otaged by some of its executors in the
Congo, by high-ranking officials, officers
in civilian clothes and representatives of
economic interests who had remained
active in the Congo. But the direct and
indirect responsibility, official or con-
cealed, on the part of Belgium was “fla-
grant.”

What lent special value to the experi-
ence of the United Nations in the Con-
go was that it marked the first time that
a young state, faced with a dramatic
situation which might cost it the loss of
its independence, had appealed to the
moral conscience of the United Nations
and had received civil and military as-
sistance from it rapidly and efficiently.

Thanks to the United Nations, the
Congo had obtained the evacuation of
military occupation troops, something
which Tunisia could only in part achieve
after five years of independence. Today,
a substantial sector of the Tunisian port
system and facilities still remained in
French hands, despite the will of the
Tunisian Government, despite the Se-

curity Council, and despite the interven-
tion and good offices action by friendly
countries.

Total success with the Congolese ex-
perience could be a precedent for the
peaceful solution of the problems of
decolonization. The experiment would
have far-reaching significance if, thanks
to concerted action through the United
Nations, the economic improvement, if
not the economic liberation, of a for-
mer colony followed so closely its po-
litical emancipation.

Tunisia deeply regretted the attempts
to exploit the Congolese situation for
cold-war purposes. The action of the
United Nations in the Congo was in
conformity with the decisions of the
Security Council. Tribute should be paid
to the Secretary-General, charged with
the implementation of the Council’s de-
cisions, and to his representatives for
their untiring devotion in carrying out
that action of peace and international
solidarity in a purely impartial spirit.
The debates in the Security Council and
in the General Assembly had shown the
need for action in the Congo to be
truly neutral and disinterested.

Tunisia’s own experience showed that
political liberation might sometimes be
only a stage on the path of true eman-
cipation. The experience of the Congo
had also indicated the administrative,
political, military, economic and social
aspects of the problem of decoloniza-
tion.

On the question of international tech-
nical and economic aid to underdevel-
oped countries, Mr. Slim said such as-
sistance was a duty to the extent that it
was recognized that underdevelopment
was mainly the result of colonial expan-
sion. Supplementing the efforts of the
newly independent countries themselves,
such aid brought out the full significance
of the problem of decolonization by
opening the path to a rapid restoration
of their economic and social struc-
ture.

The need for peace was the primary
world need today. There was an urgent
need for finding the best possible formula
for bringing about general and complete
disarmament, including both nuclear and
conventional weapons and accompanied
by an efficient system of control of a
nature such as to bring about the re-
birth of mutual confidence. It was also
necessary to find a practical and agreed
solution for preventing surprise attacks
and for the cessation of nuclear tests for
military purposes.

BURMA
U Thant
Permanent Representative to the
United Nations

U Thant considered that the main
obstacle to world peace was the divi-
sion of the world into two hostile ideo-
logical camps, “each suspicious and fear-
ful of the other and both scrambling to
entice new recruits into their respective
ranks.” tae

Under such conditions, an alignment
with either power bloc would be a griev-

ous disservice to the cause of peace.
Peace, however, could not be achieved
through passive neutralism. Burma had
pursued a policy of strict but active
neutrality without aiming to group to-
gether neutral or unaligned states; for
that would mean splitting further an
already divided world.

Commenting on the small results
which disarmament negotiations had
yielded so far, and their disruption since
the collapse of the summit conference,
the Burmese representative said that the
Soviet Union and its allies blamed the
collapse entirely on the United States
U-2 flight over Soviet territory, while
the United States and its allies held that
the Soviet Union had no intention of
letting the summit conference succeed
and used the U-2 overflight as an
excuse. He quoted Prime Minister U Nu
as having told the Chamber of Deputies
of Burma last September 22 that, while
the U-2 flight was a violation of inter-
national law and the American justifica-
tion for the flight was “new and to us
unconvincing,” the U-2 flight, “in our
view, did not justify calling off the sum-
mit conference.” He added that Burma
associated itself with the resolution of
the United Nations Disarmament Com-
mission calling on all concerned to re-
sume negotiations on general and com-
plete disarmament.

Saying that agreement had _ been
reached on several aspects of nuclear
weapons test controls, U Thant held that
every effort should be made in and out-
side the United Nations to pursue the
progress achieved. Willingness to accept
the other side’s good faith was as great
a stride toward peace as a signed treaty.
He regarded a ban on testing an essen-
tial preliminary to a disarmament agree-
ment as it would halt the arms race.

Although at one time the problem
could be framed in terms of the nuclear
powers getting rid of their nuclear
weapons, he said, it was now becoming
a question of preventing potential nu-
clear powers from manufacturing nu-
clear weapons at all.

The People’s Republic of China was
now the most important such power
which, in the absence of political agree-
ments, was almost certain to have its
own bomb within two years even without
outside help. In the light of that fact, the
General Assembly’s refusal on October
8 even to include on its agenda an item
on the representation of China at the
United Nations was a demonstration of
inability to read the signs of the times
and of refusal to face realities.

Modern diplomacy, U Thant went on
to say, was in most cases a series of
conditioned reflexes, with the West cer-
tain to denounce whatever proposals
came from Moscow or Peking as propa-
ganda and often the other way around.
That was true of the abrupt Western
dismissal of Premier Chou En-lai’s pro-
posal of last July for a peace pact that
would clear Asia and the Pacific of
nuclear weapons. Pointing out that the
Latin Americans were anxious to main-
tain peace in their region, that the
Africans wanted to keep their region
free from big-power rivalries, and that
most Asians welcomed any move from

any quarter to keep Asia free from
military entanglements, he suggested that
Premier Chou En-lai’s statement de-
served close attention. The latter had
said that a peace zone free from atomic
weapons must be created in the Far East
and in the whole Pacific area.

Questioning China’s sincerity would
be poiniless, he said. The word sincerity
long having been dropped from the vo-
cabulary of diplomacy, a more reliable
criterion would be whether the proposal
would serve China’s long-range inter-
ests: the best way for the West to find
out whether Premier Chou En-lai was
indulging in mere propaganda was to
take his proposals at face value and to
open discussions.

Speaking of Algeria, U Thant com-
mented on the difference between the
treatment given Algeria and that given the
17 French territories which had recently
chosen to become part of the French
community. Stressing the great danger
that other nations might be sucked into
the Algerian war, he said that President
de Gaulle would either offer proper ne-
gotiations for self-determination or the
war would be intensified, with more and
more of Africa drawn into it. “No Afri-
can Government, however much it may
desire good relations with France, will
be able to maintain even official neu-
trality much longer,” he stated.

President de Gaulle wanted negotia-
tions only on the issue of a cease-fire
and envisaged self-determination as elec-
tions supervised by French armed forces,
U Thant declared. The Algerian nation-
alists, after six years of revolution against
the French, would never agree to vote
under the sole control of the French
army. The only way out of the deadlock
would seem to be to implement the prin-
ciple of self-determination through in-
ternational action. However, he ex-
pressed the hope that the two parties
would enter into pourparlers, as pro-
posed by the United Nations, before any
internationally supervised referendum
was envisaged.

In his discussion of events in the Con-
go, U Thant called United Nations opera-
tions there “a test case for the Organiza-
tion.” Should the United Nations fail to
make headway in its primary task of
restoring law and order to the young
republic, then it might become as im-
potent as the League of Nations. The
Congo operations must not be allowed
to break down, he asserted.

The terms given the Secretary-Gen-
eral by the Security Council had been
fulfilled, and Burma’s delegation had
every confidence that he had sincerely
and efficiently discharged the functions
assigned him. Pointing out that the
Secretary-General had referred disputes
over his mandate in the Congo back to
the Security Council, U Thant expressed
Burma’s satisfaction that all his author-
ity was based solely on the decisions of
the Council. In the circumstances, Bur-
ma saw no need to modify the Secre-
tary-General’s office or his functions or
to reorganize the Secretariat. Any such
course, he said, would not only retard
the efficiency of United Nations opera-
tions but would be certain to weaken
the Organization itself.

“The world has never so desperately
needed an organization whose existence
expresses not a Utopian fantasy but
the biggest international reality of all,”
he added. “It symbolizes humanity’s col-
lective need for peace for the sake of
survival, a need which overrides the
national or ideological interests of any
member state.”

The Congo question marked the start
of a new phase in the evolution of the
United Nations, U Thant said. “It is
our fervent hope that it will emerge as
the world’s indispensable agency to pour
oil on troubled waters.” He added that
while the world was entering a period of
acute crisis, perhaps the most hopeful sign
was that all significant campaigns in-
volved in the cold war were being
“fought out” in the United Nations.

ISRAEL

Mrs. Golda Meir
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Mrs. Meir regarded the admission of 16
new members into the United Nations
as a revolutionary event in human his-
tory. Those members represented millions
of people who, for the first time, were
experiencing sovereignty and freedom
in the modern world. Nothing was so
debasing as national dependence and
inequality—nothing so exhilarating as
national independence and equality. Even
the best foreign rule could not take the
place of self-rule, she said.

Mrs. Meir warned, however, of two
dangers facing the emerging countries—
lingering in the past and believing that
political independence would automati-
cally provide solutions for all problems.
It was natural that many new peoples
should have unhappy and, in some cases,
bitter memories and that many should
feel a sense of grievance against their
former rulers and should view their pres-
ent plight as a legacy of the past. But a
people could not live only by brooding
over the past; it must invest all its
energy and ability in the future.

Independence was not only a culmina-
tion of ardent dreams and aspirations; it
was also an overwhelming challenge, for
there were now innumerable problems
and dangers to be faced.

The new countries had gained their
independence in an era of man’s greatest
achievements. In parts of the world the
standard of living and development had
reached fantastic heights.

“We should not be told to go slow
in our development, or that the advances
of the déveloped countries have taken
generations and centuries to attain,” Mrs.
Meir declared. “We cannot wait. We
must develop quickly. Our freedom will
be complete only when we have learned
to bring forth from our own soil the
food that we need. The cry that goes
out from Africa today is: ‘Share with us
not only food, but also your knowledge
of how to produce it.’”

The United Nations and its allied
organs were devoting even more attention
to those crucial problems, she continued.
The urgent demands of the newly inde-
pendent nations, in particular, made it

UNR—December 1960

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imperative to increase the resources at
the disposal of the United Nations for
the purpose of assistance. While science
and technology could provide the keys
of knowledge, a major part of the capital
for development must still be provided
from outside sources.

What was required was an initial in-
jection of development capital on so mas-
sive a scale that it could put into motion
self-perpetuating local forces of eco-
nomic growth. It was ironic that the
most spectacular expansion and the most
rapid rise in the standards of life were
taking place not in the backward but
in the advanced countries: the gap was
widening daily instead of narrowing.

Turning to the situation in the Congo,
Mrs. Meir said Israel’s position was that
the Congo was for the Congolese. The
Congolese people alone had the right to
decide under what type of constitution
they wished to live. Nobody who was
sincerely a friend of the African peoples
wanted to gain any political or economic
advantage at their expense; only their
enemies could wish to bring the African
continent within the orbit of the “cold
war.” Only the United Nations should
be entrusted with the task of assisting
the Congolese people to solve their intri-
cate and tragic problems.

With regard to the “fateful debate on
disarmament,” Israel found one encourag-
ing aspect: the general admission that in
a world war nobody could now win.
That might be a basis for the hope that
no side would wilfully begin a war. But
a war caused by miscalculation in the
atomic age could destroy all mankind,
and it would matter little what the post-
mortem findings might be. Could not the
powers concerned agree to the assump-
tion that all wanted peace and disarma-
ment, and then accept Prime Minister
Macmillan’s practical suggestion for a
technical study? Israel respectfully made
one further suggestion: give the tech-
nicians a limited time—say, three or six
months—and during that time let the
powers agree to a complete moratorium
in the cold war, in words and deeds.
Give the technicians, or rather the world,
a fair chance, Mrs. Meir urged.

Israel was committed to a policy of
disarmament; not only was it so com-
mitted generally, but it had also adopted
a specific policy in that field. One of the
planks in the Government’s program, as
approved by Parliament, was complete
disarmament of Israel and the Arab states
under mutual inspection and control.

Mrs. Meir said her delegation had
listened attentively to the principles of
peace, negotiation and the preservation
of the United Nations Charter as pro-
fessed from the Assembly rostrum by
the President of the United Arab Repub-
lic. Israel accepted those praiseworthy
principles. She now asked the President
of the United Arab Republic: Was he
Prepared to do as he advised President
Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev to
do, namely, to meet and negotiate? Was
he prepared to meet Mr. Ben-Gurion, the
Prime Minister of Israel, for negotiation
of peace, or at least an agreement on
non-aggression? Israel put the same ques-
tion to all the other Arab leaders. Israel’s

UNR—December 1960

Prime Minister was prepared for such a
meeting without any preconditions, im-
mediately, “here or at any other place
proposed to him.”

Israel welcomed the plea by the Presi-
dent of Ghana for the recognition of the
political realities in the Middle East and
was willing to accept his suggestion for
finding means to make it “impossible
either for Israel to attack any of the
Arab states, or for the Arab states to
attack Israel.”

A number of Arab spokesmen had
attacked Israel during the debate and had
tried to rewrite the history of the events
which attended its birth, Mrs. Meir said.
The President of the United Arab Re-
public had spoken of an error in the
Middle East that should be corrected.
Referring to Israel in a speech before
the Executive of the National Union at
Damietta on May 8, 1960, President
Nasser had said: “We hereby proclaim
our determination to retrieve our rights
by the force of our arms.”

Mrs. Meir asked: “Is this according
to the United Nations Charter? Is this
in accordance with his call for peace? Is
economic boycott, as practiced by the
United Arab Republic against Israel, in
keeping with the Charter and with lofty
pronouncements of peace on earth?”

In 1947, when the United Nations took
its decision on the establishment of the
Jewish state, it was the Jews who had
called on the Arab population in the
country and on the Arab states to im-
plement that decision in peace with them.
Instead, on May 15, 1948, seven Arab
armies had marched across their borders,
to “correct the error” of the United Na-
tions, with the proclaimed purpose of
destroying the resolution by force of
arms and of wiping out the cities, villages
and population. “We had to meet the in-
vading armies virtually unarmed; the
flower of our youth fell upon the battle-
field defending their homes and families
and the honor of their people,” she said.

“We are the last people to be insensi-
tive to the question of refugees,” Mrs.
Meir continued. “We are the classic peo-
ple of refugees. Over the last 12 years
we have accepted over a million refugees
into Israel, of whom over 500,000 came
from Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Syria and
other Arab lands. Three hundred thou-
sand Jews came from camps in Germany,
Italy and elsewhere.” Those last were
the unwanted people of the world: they
had only Israel to receive them.

On the other hand, those Arabs who
had left the country did not go into
strange lands, but crossed the borders
into the same countries from which the
invading armies had come, Mrs. Meir
declared. They spoke the same language,
had the same religion and were of the
same culture. Why were they not ab-
sorbed, as Israel absorbed its refugees?

As to the solution of the Arab refugee
problem, objective observers had said
over and over again that there was only
one factor standing in the way, and that
was the political policy of the Arab lead-
ers. The Arab states had not merely re-
fused to implement the partition resolu-
tion of 1947, but by force of arms had
tried to annul it. The Arab aggression

against Israel and the United Nations
was the only reason for the existence of
the Arab refugee problem. Ever since
1948, Israel had called on its neighbors to
negotiate to settle all problems at issue
between them and to conclude a peace.
So far, they had refused and had in-
sisted on maintaining a state of war
against Israel, a fellow member of the
United Nations. Israel again called “most
solemnly” to the leaders of the Arab
states: “Let us sit down in a free, not pre-
conditioned conference, to discuss peace.
We are convinced that that is the only
realistic approach.” ‘

The life of the United Nations was
becoming more difficult, and it seemed
there was one way only to keep the
Organization alive and active. That was
to live up strictly to the United Nations
Charter. The United Nations had come
sufficiently near the brink for all to
behold the abyss, which was large enough
to swallow all countries, big and small.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC’S REPLY to Israel

On the question of a meeting between
Israel and the Arabs, Omar Loutfi said
the problem was not the same as a meet-
ing between the Soviet Union and the
United States for in that case there had
not been a war or any armed aggression
condemned by the Security Council and
the General Assembly. The United Arab
Republic’s relations with Israel were set-
tled by the armistice convention of
February 1949 which Israel did not even
recognize as existing. It was unnecessary
to recall the number of occasions on
which Israel was condemned by the
Security Council and the General Assem-
bly for its numerous acts of armed
aggression or violations of the Charter
and of the armistice convention, includ-
ing the massacres of Qibya, Gaza, Lake
Tiberias and others, crowned by the
aggression of 1956. That was certainly
not the conduct of a peaceful govern-
ment but rather of a bellicose, belligerent
and aggressive state, declared Mr. Loutfi.
The respect of the Charter to which
Israel had referred was “pure and simple
propaganda.”

The United Arab Republic, for its
part, was ready to put all those resolu-
tions into effect. He wondered if Israel
was ready to implement, in particular,
a resolution dealing with the refugees.

With regard to Israel’s charges that the
United Arab Republic prevented the
passage of Israeli ships and goods through
the Suez Canal, Mr. Loutfi said Israel
based itself on a resolution of the United
Nations of September 1, 1951. It ap-
peared that Israel wished to have a
single resolution of the United Nations
implemented while overlooking all the
others dealing with the Palestine ques-
tion. Moreover, the resolution of Septem-
ber 1, 1951, was based on the existence
of the armistice convention signed be-
tween Egypt and Israel in February
1949, which Israel maintained no longer
existed.

SAUDI ARABIA’S REPLY to Israel

Ahmad Shukairy, of Saudi Arabia,
said that Mrs. Meir had contended that

seven Arab armies had marched across
their boundaries with the proclaimed pur-
pose of destroying Israel, its villages, its
cities and its population.

It was true that there was a war in
Palestine and the refugees were its vic-
tims, but the war was waged by Israel,
he said. It was a war started with terror
by Israel in 1940 and ended in the crea-
tion of Israel in 1948.

Mrs. Meir had alleged that the Jewish
armies were virtually unarmed, but the
Anglo-American Commission sent to
Palestine to inquire reported “the organi-
zation of the Haganah, the Israeli mili-
tary force, the Jewish Army, over 60,000
strong, well armed, procuring its arms
since a number of years.”

That army, declared Mr. Shukairy,
had spread terror, destruction and fire
and had committed acts of lawlessness in
the Holy Land. No Arab town, no Arab
village was spared. 7

He quoted the British Commander-in-
Chief in the Middle East during the
Second World War as having said that
the Zionist forces in Palestine were di-
rectly impeding the war efforts of Great
Britain and assisting its enemies.

Mrs. Meir had contended that Zionist
military operations belonged to a history
long past, but the truth was that that war
of aggression culminated in the emer-
gence of Israel, usurpation of the Arab
homeland and the exodus of its people.
The intervention of the Arab armies, re-
ferred to by Mrs. Meir, was only for the
purpose of containing a war, a nazi war
already started by Israel.

When the British Minister of State,
Lord Moyne, was assassinated by the
Zionist forces in November 1948, said
Mr. Shukairy, Winston Churchill told the
British House of Commons that if the
dream of Zionism were to end in the
smoke of assassins’ pistols, “and our
labors for its future are to produce a
new set of gangsters worthy of nazi
Germany, many like myself will have to
reconsider the position which we have
maintained so consistently and so long
in the past.” ,

Mr. Shukairy also quoted the historian
Arnold Toynbee as saying: “The evil
deeds committed by Zionist Jews against
the Palestinian Arabs, that were com-
parable to crimes committed against the
Jews by the nazis, were the massacre of
men, women and children at Deir Yas-
sin on April 9, 1948, which precipitated
a flight of the Arab population in large
numbers from the district within range
of the Jewish armed forces. . . .” That
statement, he added, refuted the asser-
tion of Mrs. Meir that the refugees left
as a result of the call of Arab leaders.

The speaker also quoted Mr. Ben-
Gurion as having said in 1948, when the
United Nations was discussing the vari-
ous resolutions on Palestine, that force
of arms, not formal resolutions, would
determine the issue. Likewise, when the
United Nations at Lake Success was con-
sidering a United States plan of trustee-
ship for Palestine instead of partition,
Mr. Shukairy said, the Israeli Command
addressed to the United Nations a warn-
ing: “Our battles serve as additional
evidence for Lake Success diplomats who

are studying the American plan, that the
decisive step would be taken in Palestine.”

He could continue, but he thought that
was sufficient to convince the Assembly
that the charge against the Arabs was
nothing but an Israeli fiction.

Mrs. Meir had issued a call to the
Arabs “to discuss peace,” but, he said,
for the Arabs to do that would be to
surrender to the aggressor. President
Nasser and other Arab leaders would
never meet Mr. Ben-Gurion to discuss
peace. The comparison of such a meet-
ing with an Eisenhower-Khrushchev
meeting was blasphemous, he asserted.
Both great men had refused such a meet-
ing: Mr. Khrushchev had claimed an
apology, and Mr. Eisenhower had stressed
the release of two United States fliers.
But Israel’s evils could not be remedied
by an apology, and the rights of the
whole people of Palestine could not be
compared to the liberty of two fliers.
Furthermore, the disagreement between
Eisenhower and Khrushchev, with all its
gravity, did not involve the loss of a
homeland.

However, Mr. Shukairy did not wish
to leave the Assembly in an atmosphere
of despair and bitterness. Peace was the
Arabs’ goal—their dearest and most
sacred —for Palestine was the Arabs’
homeland, not the Israelis’. Peace in the
Holy Land could be realized. There were,
he said, thousands and thousands of
Jews clamoring to get away from Israel,
if they were only given an exit visa.
When the alien Jews were allowed to
quit the country, he said, the situation
wouid return to normal.

ISRAEL‘S REPLY to Saudi Arabia’s Reply

Speaking for Israel, Michael S. Comay
said he had no intention of replying to
the representative of Saudi Arabia. “We
have heard these harangues for years,”
he commented. He had asked for the
floor only to register Israel’s sense of
disgust that there should be on the
records of the Assembly a comparison
of any people, his or any other, with
the nazis.

LEBANON’S REPLY to Israel

Replying to statements by Mrs. Meir,
Fouad Ammoun, of Lebanon, said the
words of those “who do not respect what
they have written and signed could not
be trusted.” What had Israel done in re-
gard to the resolutions of the United
Nations or the Protocol of Lausanne,
which it had signed on the eve of its
admission to the United Nations and
denied the very next day? One could
negotiate only with persons whom one
could trust. “Let them begin by respect-
ing the Protocol of Lausanne and ap-
plying its clauses,’ Mr. Ammoun de-
clared.

The danger to peace in the Middle
East did not stem from armaments, espe-
cially the armaments of the Arab states,
which had been used on a single occasion
to repel the Israeli aggression against the
Suez Canal. While the Israeli armaments
were offensive armaments, the greatest

danger nevertheless lay in the million
unarmed Palestinians forced to flee from
their homes and deprived of all posses-
sions, whose misery was an insult to
justice and humanity and a threat to
order and peace.

JORDAN’S REPLY to Israel

Foreign Minister Musa Nasir of Jor-
dan, also in reply, declared that the
Palestine problem was born and con-
tinued to flourish behind a thick smoke-
screen of clever distortions and misrep-
resentations. The creation of a Jewish
state in the Middle East was nothing
but camouflaged imperialistic aggression,
he said. Invaders from all over the
globe had established a Jewish state in
Palestine on the frivolous pretext that
Jews had lived there for a very short
period more than 2,000 years before.
That was not only an error, but a grave
injustice.

No atrocities were ever perpetrated
on Jews by Arabs, he said, but the nazi-
like acts inflicted on Arabs by Jews were
part of the injustice of which he com-
plained.

For the benefit of members who had
newly joined the United Nations, Mr.
Nasir went into the history of the found-
ing of Israel and declared that the result
was that Jews occupied four fifths of the
country, and one million innocent Arabs
had been expelled from their homes and
their country and had become refugees.
So long as the rights and welfare of a
million human beings were sacrificed for
the political ends of others, no solution
could be found to the Palestine problem,
and no real peace could be established
in the Middle East.

Mr. Nasir implored the new states to
examine that serious problem carefully
before lending moral support to one side
or the other. He reiterated many of the
charges frequently voiced against Israel
and suggested that an impartial commis-
sion be set up to examine the conditions
under which Arabs remaining in Israel
lived.

ISRAEL’S REPLY to Jordan

Mrs. Meir declared in reply that,
realizing how untenable their position
was when they refused to answer a call
for peace and negotiations, for a non-
aggression agreement and for an armi-
stice, the Arab states had produced a
series of fantastic accusations against
Israel that distorted both the ancient and
modern history of Israel and the Israeli
people. Allegations by the Arab represen-
tatives about the condition of Israeli
Arabs, which had been refuted on many
occasions, became no truer by repetition,
she said. Israeli Arabs enjoyed exactly
the same political rights as Israeli Jews;
they participated fully and actively in
parliamentary elections and sat in the
Israeli Parliament. Since establishment
of the Israeli state, more had been done
to raise the economic, social and cultural
standards of the Arab community than
was accomplished in past centuries.

The only outstanding difficulty con-
cerned certain security restrictions in

UNR—December 1960

wwe Ft

are awe & FF F

sensitive border areas, rendered neces-
sary by the belligerent policies of neigh-
boring Arab states. Those restrictions had
been whittled down to a bare minimum
consistent with the safety and defence
of Israeli borders and would disappear
entirely as soon as peaceful relations with
Israel’s neighbors had been established.

The leaders of the African countries,
added Mrs. Meir, could be relied on to
judge their relations with other countries
by the behavior of those countries to-
ward them and not by propaganda
speeches. As long as the Arab states
asked the African countries to cooperate
with them only in hatred for Israel, no-
body was going to be impressed.

HAITI

Carlet Auguste
Permanent Representative to the
United Nations

The agenda of this session, said Mr.
Auguste, was not only the most volumin-
ous, but it involved the most important
and complex questions which had ever
had to be considered, and in a highly
charged atmosphere. The fact that a
number had been the subject of earlier
resolutions but had returned to the
United Nations reflected the tendency to
depart from the spirit of San Francisco.

Questions such as underdevelopment
and imperialism were of long standing,
but they had gripped man’s conscience in
the second half of the twentieth century
because this was not only the century of
the atom and planetary exploration, but
also the century of great social conquests
and ultimate rehabilitations.

The world had reached an important
turning point. The call from everywhere
was for change; for equity and social
justice; for human dignity to be inte-
grated into men’s social-political lives;
for illiteracy, disease and pauperism to
be eliminated.

Haiti, the first Negro state to call for
its rightful place in the world, had had to
wait 38 years for recognition as a free
and sovereign state, and even then for a
long time was faced in its international
life with “a conspiracy of silence and
isolation.” Nevertheless, it did not hold
this against anyone. What was important
was to fight against bad ideas which had
inherent in them selfishness and error.

He hoped that there were signs that
man not only had tried to reduce dis-
tances and to improve his material life,
but, under pressures that nothing could
stop, had awakened to his own social
conscience.

Mr. Auguste cited as a great contradic-
tion the fact that those who spoke most
of peace also threatened most with the
strength of their conventional or nuclear
weapons or their terrifying rockets. The
underdeveloped countries had voted for
disarmament not only because they be-
lieved in peace but also because dis-
armament had been presented to them as
something that would result in aid.

Unfortunately, a few months later,
deplorable events dispelled the optimism
that had been inspired. The Paris Con-
ference had lamentably failed, despite
the efforts of a great statesman, General

UNR—December 1960

de Gaulle, who had done his utmost to
cause Mr. Khrushchev to remain. Since
then, fear had taken hold of the world,
and the economically weak nations un-
derstood more than ever that they had to
have faith only in principles and that
they had to group themselves around the
United Nations, which was the only in-
ternational institution capable of engen-
dering respect for those principles.

“Without the presence of an organiza-
tion such as the United Nations, we, the
small nations, are exposed to those who
dream of limitless empires,” he added.

Life, he continued, was “a tissue of
contradictions.” Perhaps the members
had thought of that when listening to
speakers who, while talking against colo-
nialism, seemed to have taken the cause
of the oppressed and the weak but were
quite carefully maneuvering to dis-
organize the United Nations, “which, as
we all know, is the only moral force
capable of protecting all of us effectively
and, in particular, those who have just
acceded to independence.” The United
Nations had guided those nations to the
very point where they were able to as-
sume their seats, with dignity, among the
members of the international family.

However, Mr. Auguste said, it should
not be pretended that the United Nations
was absolutely perfect. The Secretary-
General was also too human to believe
that man was perfect, “even though he
may be the best example of us all.” Mr.
Auguste did not believe that the office of
Secretary-General should become a tri-
partite board representing three different
policies. That was a proposal to which
serious men would not subscribe. The
Charter had given the Secretary-General
not too much but sufficient power. He
was the agent of the great organs and of
the resolutions passed by those organs
and by the General Assembly. In the
unfortunate case of the Congo, Mr. Ham-
marskjold had always referred to the
resolutions of the Security Council, of
which he was only the instrument and
executor par excellence.

In welcoming the new African nations
to the United Nations with pride and
intimate satisfaction, he recalled that the
great ancestor of his race, Toussaint
L’Ouverture, as he was being deported,
had uttered the prophetic words: “In
overthrowing me, they have only cut
down the trunk of the tree of liberty of
the black man, but that tree will grow
again because its roots are deep and
strong.”

The new African nations, he added,
had taken their places in the great family
of nations at an extremely troubled time,
and they were welcomed with great
sympathy because they were the new
blood necessary to revitalize a world in
cruel moral distress.

CHILE

Daniel Schweitzer
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

Mr. Schweitzer first expressed the thanks
of his Government and the Chilean peo-
ple for the international assistance ren-
dered after the catastrophe of the earth-

quake and tidal wave which overswept
his country last year.

Welcoming the entry into the United
Nations of so many new states, he said
that in the progress toward the goal of
United Nations universality it would be
only fair to recognize the role played by
the great powers and the persevering effort
of the United Nations. In the memoranda
submitted to the General Assembly by
the Secretary-General, as well as in
many reports and in the indefatigable
activity displayed by the technical organs,
Mr. Schweitzer found “the stamp of a
firm and determined wish to put an end
to the colonial existence prevailing
throughout a great part of the immense
continent of Africa.”

Speaking of the new states, he observed
that attainment of political independence
did not put an end to the aspirations of
peoples, who also wished to attain eco-
nomic and social progress. Chile was con-
vinced that the new states would under-
stand how indispensable it was in every
way to have international cooperation
and how necessary it was to strengthen
and defend the structure of the United
Nations.

Referring to the crisis in the Congo,
Mr. Schweitzer said that the absence of
clear authority and the political interest
evidenced in introducing the cold war
there gave rise to violent incidents which
kept the Security Council alert, and al-
though doubt had been cast upon the
impartiality of the United Nations and
although the Secretary-General had even
been held directly responsible, such im-
putations had been rejected through the
support which the Security Council
brought to the Secretary-General. Chile
took pleasure, he said, in voicing the
support and the respect which Mr. Ham-
marskjold deserved because of his patient,
earnest, determined and constant work
as a faithful interpreter of the principles
and decisions of the Organization, all of
which had made it possible for the
United Nations to remain aloof from the
alternatives in the domestic struggle in
the Congo.

Speaking of world conditions, Mr.
Schweitzer said that international ten-
sion had once again increased after the
failure of the Paris conference; the work
of the Assembly session had begun under
that dark cloud. Chile therefore wished
to renew its unshakeable adherence to
the principles of the Charter and to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which, through means of active coopera-
tion, would bring about better days for
humanity.

Though disarmament depended above
all on the great powers, all countries had
an identical interest in preventing not
only disaster but also the prolongation
of the depressing armaments race. He
counselled the Assembly to be content
with modest achievements—less spectacu-
lar agreements which nevertheless were
advantageous and permitted progress.

Peaceful coexistence could not flourish
in the midst of invective and recrimina-
tions, and he warned against the reduc-
tion of problems to oversimplified formu-
las which were useful for propaganda
but inadequate for any effective solution.

He thought that coexistence should not
be restricted to talk but practiced with
deeds.

Material disarmament, Mr. Schweitzer
submitted, must be preceded by “a sort
of moral disarmament” which would re-
flect a sincere desire for peace. If the
United Nations were the highest forum
for negotiation, all the disagreements
which separated people should be con-
centrated in it, and thus they could be
certain that a satisfactory and fair solu-
tion would be found.

He took pleasure in pointing out that
Chile had concluded conventions with
Argentina under which border problems
would be referred to arbitration for
peaceful solutions. He also reconfirmed
Chile’s confidence in the effectiveness of
the regional systems for the maintenance
of international peace and security as
provided for in Article 52 of the Charter,
and he especially mentioned the Organ-
ization of American States and the part
it was playing in Latin America.

Mr. Schweitzer noted that the Assem-
bly was being called on to consider in-
creasing the number of members of the
Security Council and of the Economic
and Social Council; the increase in the
membership of the United Nations made
it impossible to postpone a decision on
those matters any longer.

Chile, he added, could not fail to ex-
press surprise at the proposal to change
the Secretary-Generalship into a presid-
ium. Chile aspired to have absolute
equality among all members of the
United Nations; the existence of the
veto power in the Security Council de-
stroyed that equality, and now if there
were to be several Secretaries-General,
the unity necessary in any executive
branch would be lost. In substance the
idea seemed to be an attempt to extend
the right of veto, and in Chile’s opinion
that was inadmissible.

Emphasizing the parallel between politi-
cal peace and economic and social prog-
ress, Mr. Schweitzer pointed out that
technical assistance problems were be-
coming more and more important. Such
assistance must be increased and given to
all countries without any strings attached,
he said. He hoped that the Permanent
Committee on Industrial Development,
newly established by the Economic and
Social Council, would help solve many
problems. Since the growth of under-
developed countries required cooperation
from the more developed countries, the
flow of capital must be encouraged, and
present efforts by the United Nations and
other international agencies must be sup-
plemented by the creation of a fund for
the development of capitalization. He
was especially pleased with the establish-
ment of the Inter-American Bank for
Development, and he paid tribute to the
action taken by the International Mone-
tary Fund, the International Bank and
other existing credit institutions.

Finally, Mr. Schweitzer referred to the
construction of the United Nations build-
ing in Santiago. In 1955, he recalled, the
Government of Chile offered to transfer
to the United Nations, free, a plot of
land near the capital. A recent decree
approved the agreement between Chile

and the United Nations which set forth
the financial obligations assumed by the
Government. He hoped the Assembly
would approve the documents by which
Chile would freely hand over the land
on which the building would be erected.

MALI

Ousman Ba

Ousman Ba first commented on what
he termed the uncalled-for irony in the
allusions to his country by the delegation
of France. While to some Western coun-
tries the political attitudes of the new
African states might appear raw and
vulgar, their concept of diplomacy was
based on law and good will.

“We are not here to strengthen auto-
matic majorities in favor of this or that
power,” he said. Mali’s conception of
neutralism was to search, as a non-com-
mitted country, for the most efficacious
ways and means of peaceful coexistence
between the two great economic and
political systems into which the world
was divided, and to try daily to strength-
en the possibilities of peace against the
onslaught of the warmongers.

Only in that sense was Mali uncom-
mitted, for it was and had been for 20
years in the anti-imperialist camp and
was committed against colonialism in all
its guises.

Mr. Ba paid tribute to President Sekou
Touré of Guinea, whose statement to the
Assembly, he said, was a blueprint for
African solidarity and could be con-
sidered the adaptation to present-day
situations of the position defined in
Bandung and other conferences of the
independent African states.

Mr. Ba said he was saddened when
the representative of Belgium tried to
make the Assembly believe that the per-
centage of school attendance in the
Congo was 45 to 50 per cent of the
population and that there were Congo-
lese university students—that was some-
thing that existed only in the fertile
imagination of the Belgian representative.

“They have spoken of the fact that
they have built schools, that they have
built clubs, that they have built networks
of roads, but they never speak to us of
the privileges they acquired and the
monstrous profits they have drawn from
the soil of the territories they have colo-
nized,” he said. “They have never spoken
of the cannon fodder they drew from
our countries to be placed at the disposal
of the imperialists.”

Mali, he emphasized, placed great
hopes in the United Nations and had
come to the Assembly with the ardent
hope of taking part in the forging of the
destiny of mankind. But, he added, cer-
tain surprising events had taken place
which had been a shock. He described
those events as “vile procedural maneu-
vers” used to avoid voting on the draft
resolution submitted by the Afro-Asian
group.

Another reason for his delegation’s
bitterness, he said, was the refusal to
discuss the admission of the People’s
Republic of China. Six hundred and fifty

million persons in China were not repre-
sented at the Assembly by those repre-
senting Chiang Kai-shek, he said. The
absence of the Chinese People’s Republic
from the United Nations would give
more ammunition to the ever-growing
number of countries which argued about
the divided quality of the Assembly.

Mr. Ba also declared that ill-inten-
tioned people would no doubt accuse
Mali of having “dared” to take a posi-
tion on many burning questions after
only a few days as a member of the
United Nations, but it was precisely be-
cause of those questions that his country
had to invoke national sovereignty and
equality between great and small nations
at all times.

The problem of the Congo was very
close to Mali, he said. Mali had sent the
best of its troops to the Congo because
it was a question of defending the inde-
pendence of a fledgling African state,
and because Mali knew full well of the
colonial stratagems of secession. He re-
ferred to “the Mobutus, the Tshombes,
the Kasavubus and the other puppets
that were agents of colonialism” and
declared that without delay the free na-
tions of the world must take the only
decision that could lead to a favorable
settlement of the Congolese question—to
re-establish the authority of the Central
Government which had been democratic-
ally elected by Parliament, assist that
Government to consolidate its adminis-
trative structure, place at its disposal the
necessary coordinated means and help to
build up the country’s economy by re-
establishing unity. Mali unreservedly sup-
ported the proposal by the President of
Guinea provisionally to admit to the
Assembly the legally accredited represen-
tatives of the Central Government.

He alleged that the former Federation
of Mali had been subjected by French
colonialists to an attempt similar to that
being made in the Congo, but because of
the maturity of the political leaders of
Mali, the colonialists did not succeed in
having a second Congo operation.

With regard to the Algerian problem,
Mr. Ba declared that all peoples who
were attached to peace and liberty must,
with no further delay, impose a cease-
fire and organize a referendum under
the control of the United Nations.

“This,” he said, “is the assembly of
nations, including France, and it cannot
any longer be defied by General de
Gaulle.”

In the opinion of Mali, the historic
opportunities of African solidarity were
at stake in the United Nations, and the
touchstone of that solidarity. was the
Algerian problem. !n an attempt to dis-
credit Mali for the stand it had taken in
favor of the Algerian people, the French
Ministry of Defense had “dreamed up”
the Conakry-Bamako-Sahara axis by
means of which Guinea and Mali were
supposed to be aiding the FLN; but the
French activists must be aware that
Guinea and Mali were underdeveloped
countries where colonialism had left al-
most nothing, and therefore they could
not meet the problems of transport and
material required to cross thousands of
kilometers of the Sahara.

UNR—December 1960

Mr. Ba also spoke of apartheid as the
twentieth-century’s deepest shame and
said his delegation would vote for any
draft resolution that set a deadline for
the end of colonialism.

If economic assistance was not to be
charity, he said, the underdeveloped coun-
tries should have placed at their disposal
by the highly industrialized countries
equipment that would increase industrial-
ization and enable living standards to be
raised.

On disarmament, Mali would support
any effort to induce the great powers to
carry out general and complete disarma-
ment.

Mali’s dearest hope was that the inde-
pendence, solidarity and unity of Africa
would be achieved on the basis of mutual
respect of all countries for all men, in
dignity. It was at that price that Africa
would contribute to civilization.

SWEDEN

Osten Unden
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Unden confined his remarks to
two topics—the situation in the Congo
and the problem of disarmament.

On the first he spoke in high praise of
the energy, ability and impartiality of the
Secretary-General in carrying out the
difficult tasks given him by the Security
Council and expressed the hope that it
would be possible to pursue United Na-
tions action successfully in the future.

Although it did not appear in the
beginning that the situation in the Congo
would give rise to special complications,
it had since become so controversial that
it had become focused in world atten-
tion. The action undertaken by the
United Nations was intended to be of a
local nature. At the same time, there
existed a widespread feeling that the
risk of complications would be greater if
the United Nations remained passive in
relation to events taking place in the
Congo. There appeared a possibility that
rival political leaders in the country
might appeal to foreign powers for as-
sistance. Such a development could re-
sult in foreign troops facing each other
on Congolese soil.

It was of particular importance, he said,
that there had been a large degree of
agreement among the African states on
the advantage to the Republic of the
Congo of receiving international assist-
ance through the United Nations. Mr.
Unden admitted that there might be
differences of opinion regarding taking or
omitting certain measures in the Congo,
but to comment on them would require
a thorough knowledge of conditions on
the spot. Nevertheless, there were some
controversial questions of a more gen-
eral character.

The separatist movement in Katanga,
for instance, was a source of unrest and
discontent. It had been forcefully con-
demned by the Central Government of
the Congo, a majority of governments
of other African states, the Security
Council and the Secretary-General. And
there had been some influence to the
contrary from Belgian circles with inter-

UNR—December 1960

ests in Katanga, but criticism levelled at
the Secretary-General for insufficient
energy in endeavoring to bring about
withdrawal of Belgian troops could not
be sustained in the face of facts and
documents. His actions had been correct.

“Are we witnessing a clash of inter-
ests between some of the big powers?”
Mr. Unden asked, “And is it necessary
that an action to assist the Congo,
undertaken by the United Nations, must
lead to a taking of sides in favor of any
one party in the cold war?”

Sometimes it seemed that in the na-
ture of things the Congo was to be the
object of a struggle between East and
West—and mention had been made of
a bloc of neutral states. Sweden, he
said, did not regard itself as belonging
to a neutral bloc; it did not expect to
derive profit or disadvantage from its
participation in helping the Congo. And
he sincerely hoped that the Congo would
escape the fate of becoming the scene
of competition between other powers to
secure influence over the country.

It had been said that the Secretary-
General necessarily would carry out his
duties in the interests of one group of
states to the detriment of other states.
That view, he thought, was an expres-
sion of a dogmatic, somewhat antiquated
concept of the communist doctrine on
the struggle between classes.

It had been said in some quarters
that the United Nations forces in the
Congo should have been put at the
disposal of the Government of the Congo
or that the Government should have been
permitted to use them for the settle-
ment of domestic political conflicts. The
Swedish Government could not agree
with that view, since intervention in the
political affairs of the Congo could,
from a political point of view, easily
lead to a spread of unrest and to conflicts
between member nations of the United
Nations.

Mr. Unden added that there should be
no doubt whatsoever as to the functions
of the United Nations forces, which were
those of a police force.

Stating Sweden’s viewpoint on the
problem of disarmament, Mr. Unden ex-
pressed satisfaction that the three-nation
committee in Geneva, carrying on its
deliberations regarding a ban on nuclear
weapons tests, had made considerable
progress—‘“the only bright spot in the
disarmament picture.” There seemed to
be real prospects that before long the
three powers at Geneva would be able
to agree on ending the tests and that
would prove a great incentive to the big
powers to reach agreement on nuclear
production and conventional forces.

Referring to the Ten-Nation Com-
mittee, which had come to a standstill,
Mr. Unden noted optimistically that,
while the differences between the big
powers were “quite considerable,” there
also existed certain points of agreement
between them which were not insignifi-
cant.

The Swedish Government, he said, was
of the opinion that an advance toward
common goals—general and complete
disarmament under effective controls —
might be facilitated by “de-politicizing”

essential preparatory studies. After so
many years of debating the problem, it
appeared unnecessary to devote much
further time to general discussion, at least
until a number of problems of an es-
sentially technical nature had been map-
ped and clarified by experts. Such studies,
he suggested, should be carried out to
provide an agreed basis for proceeding
with implementation in the appropriate
stage, and he thought that among the
early studies should be a technical ex-
amination of measures necessary to verify
control over and reduction and elimina-
tion of agreed categories of nuclear de-
livery systems, including missile, aircraft,
surface ships, submarines and artillery.

Thus he suggested that the Ten-Na-
tion Committee, “perhaps somewhat mod-
ified as regards its composition,” begin,
within the framework of the United Na-
tions, to try to organize its work in such
a way that prospects would be opened
for results as soon as possible. Among
the experts might be persons from none
of the countries represented in the Ten-
Nation Committee.

In conclusion, Mr. Unden said that
members of the United Nations, as a
working hypothesis, should start from
the assumption that the problem of dis-
armament, despite its tremendous diffi-
culties, was not unsolvable.

CEYLON

Sir Claude Corea
Permanent Representative to the
United Nations

Before commenting on any of the
problems confronting the Assembly, Sir
Claude recalled that in September 1959
Ceylon had lost a great leader in tragic
circumstances and that subsequently, in
July, as a result of parliamentary elec-
tions, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike had
become the first woman Prime Minister
in the world. She had hoped to attend
the Assembly, but urgent, pressing prob-
lems at home prevented her, but she
conveyed her greetings and good wishes
for the success of the session.

Speaking of the situation in the Congo,
Sir Claude pointed out that the Soviet
Union, which had supported the United
Nations position as stated in the resolu-
tions of the Security Council of July 14
and 22 and August 9, had conceded that
that action was right and proper. Ceylon
did not think that, except for some
errors of judgment, the Secretary-Gen-
eral had failed to carry out the decisions.
Ceylon was satisfied as to Mr. Ham-
marskjold’s bona fides; his views and his
work for the freedom and independence
of dependent peoples were well known,
as was his hard work and single-minded
devotion to duty. It could not be ignored
that, in implementing the Council’s reso-
lutions, he had to take actions on which
there could be honest difference of
opinion, but none of his actions was due
to a partisan attitude.

Ceylon could not accept the suggestion
that the office of the Secretary-General
be abolished and replaced by a triumvir-
ate. In any case, acceptance of the pro-
posal would require an amendment of
the Charter, and Ceylon knew well that

the Soviet Union was against any Char-
ter amendment.

“The Secretariat, if it is to be able to
maintain the impartiality of the United
Nations in the cold war and to further
the interests of peace,” said Sir Claude,
“should remain and act independently of
cold-war pressures and also serve as
a kind of buffer, as well as a bridge,
between cold-war groups. The body
envisaged in the Soviet proposal would
be too much of a creature of the cold
war to function with any independence,
even if it could function at all.”

Turning to Algeria, he said that the
situation there did not permit any
ambiguity or equivocation. In the view
of Ceylon, any further delay in the
settlement of that question was fraught
with danger to the peace of the world.
President de Gaulle himself had said that
no policy was worth while apart from
realities. The realities of the Algerian
situation were that it was a war that
could not end except with the triumph of
the Algerian people and that the will of
a people for freedom could not be des-
troyed by arms. France had to take
account of those realities of the mid-
twentieth century; if France were unwill-
tng or unable to do so, Ceylon sincerely
hoped that this session of the Assembly
would finally face its responsibilities and
act in such a way as to put an end to
the futile, tragic and meaningless loss of
life. Ceylon would support any measure
to that end.

Ceylon was wholly opposed to the
continuance of colonialism, an anachron-
ism which had to be ended, Sir Claude
continued. However good a _ colonial
government might be, good government
could not be a substitute for self-govern-
ment. Therefore his delegation fully sup-
ported the draft resolution calling for
abolition of colonialism.

Sir Claude spoke at length about the
urgent need for world disarmament.
Tracing the deterioration in East-West
relations since the U-2 incident, he said
there seemed to be two ways in which
efforts could be fruitfully continued.
There was a need to stop the arms race
and a need for increased assistance in the
economic development of underdeveloped
countries.

To be effective, he declared, economic
development must be tackled in a large
and comprehensive manner: attacked on
all fronts and conceived and prepared
with greater imagination and with larger
resources than were devoted to the Mar-
shall Plan for the recovery of Europe.
That could be done only if the arms race
were ended and a major part of what
was lavishly spent on weapons of destruc-
tion were devoted to the constructive,
humanitarian purpose of improving
standards of living of all people so they
might live in dignity and contentment.

The tragedy of the arms race—which
he described as man’s most colossal folly
and an absurd monstrosity—was that it
would either disrupt severely the economy
of countries which had entered it or lead
to a clash that would destroy the world.

He pointed to the danger that nuclear
war might start through an accident or
misconception, or that another Hitler
might arise, who, drunk with a lust for

power and believing in the invincibility
of his own arms, might decide to take
a gamble.

The two main parties, Sir Claude con-
tinued, had put forward their plans to
achieve general and complete disarma-
ment. There were many points of agree-
ment between them, particularly on the
important question of control, but there
were still points on which they were
diametrically opposed. One of the most
serious difficulties seemed to be the ques-
tion of the effectiveness of control. Dis-
armament, he said, could not be based
entirely on trust. There must be an ac-
ceptable control scheme. However, it
might be impossible to formulate a
scheme that would guarantee 100 per
cent effectiveness. Some risk had to be
taken; otherwise it would not be possible
to reach any control scheme acceptable
to all sides.

It was important to remember, he add-
ed, that at a time when the questions of
control and inspection were both accept-
ed points, the discovery of a plan accept-
able to both sides should not be difficult
if one people were prepared to drop the
demand for absolute certainty that the
plan of control and insvection be 100
per cent effective. Unless that were
agreed to, there would never be dis-
armament with adequate control.

Reaching a disarmament agreement
was not something that could be left to
the great powers, Sir Claude went on.
His delegation suggested that the Dis-
armament Commission should meet soon
after the General Assembly and continue
to study the problem until a solution was
found. At the same time the United
Nations should make every effort to get
the great powers to résume their dis-
armament talks in the Ten-Nation Com-
mittee or in any other form they might
wish to set up.

“There is a heavy responsibility to all
humanity, and theirs—the great powers’
—the primary responsibility,” he de-
clared. “It is our hope that they will
overcome their mutual suspicions, create
an area of understanding and good will
and genuinely seek an agreement which
will bring an end to armaments and lead
to peace on earth.”

LAOS

Khamking Souvanlasy
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

With the admission of the newly inde-
pendent African states and Cyprus, the
United Nations had moved toward the
achievement of universality of member-
ship.

Pointing out that peace was still threat-
ened in many parts of the world, Mr.
Souvanlasy stated that Laos had not
known peace for 20 years. Its hard-won
independence had not completely freed it
from new pressures and danger, arising
from a policy aimed at involving weak
and underdeveloped and under-armed
nations in ideological crusades which
could only destroy peace and provoke
inevitable tensions among states.

People had the right to choose the
social system which best suited them,

and nobody should interfere with that
choice. Laos would reject any commit-
ments that might tie it to any bloc. It
wished to remain neutral in accordance
with its traditional peaceful policy. It
also wished to express its profound grati-
tude to the United Nations for the aid
given during the grave events which
shook the Kingdom last year, which
were caused by foreign interference in
its domestic affairs. “This interference is
continuing and we should like it to be
stopped definitely once and for all so
that that part of Southeast Asia can
finally enjoy peace,” Mr. Souvanlasy de-
clared.

The present difficulties in Laos were
caused by opposing foreign political inter-
ests. The country’s geographical position
in the very heart of a crucial area,
where two opposing ideologies confronted
each other, had been “a terrible handi-
cap” in strengthening its independence
and safeguarding its territorial integrity.

Welcoming the proposal for the neu-
tralization of Cambodia and Laos made
in the General Assembly by Prince
Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, Mr.
Souvanlasy asked the United Nations and
the powers concerned in the maintenance
of stability and peace in the area to
ponder this proposal seriously.

The failure of the negotiations of the
Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament
in Geneva had sown the seeds of crises
caused by fear. While suspicion and
mistrust persisted, even the most earnest
desire to negotiate and to arrive at some
agreement on disarmament remained
problematic. Those who had the future
of humanity in their hands should devote
themselves to dissipating mistrust and re-
storing confidence among peoples and
governments. It was necessary to estab-
lish confidence to achieve disarmament
and to free humanity from the nightmare
of a catastrophic war.

Paying tribute to Mr. Hammarskjold
for his untiring action in the cause of
peace, Mr. Souvanlasy contended that to
attack the position of the Secretary-Gen-
eral was to undermine the very founda-
tion of the United Nations and deprive
the small nations of the last bastion of
their defence and protection. The offen-
sive conducted by certain powers against
the highest authority of the Organization
was puzzling. The delegation of Laos
welcomed Mr. Hammarskjold’s coura-
geous decision to remain at his post de-
spite “attacks that would surely have
broken a weaker man.”

The problems of the underdeveloped
countries required solutions which were
more human than political. Their peoples
must be given the hope of better days
in the near future. Laos was grateful
for the technical and economic aid it
had received from the United Nations.
Such assistance, linked to bilateral aid
from friendly nations, already showed
that an impulse of solidarity existed be-
tween the large nations and the small.
Mr. Souvanlasy hoped that such work
would be continued in Laos and else-
where, without any political commitments
and with an exclusively human aim.

In conclusion, he believed “the dis-
tressing spectacle of discord, of ideologi-

UNR—December 1960

~~ we Ss FF

cal struggle and of unrestrained propa-
ganda which the Assembly had witnessed
at its current session was not one to
inspire confidence, to dispel fears or to
diminish international tension. The cur-
rent Assembly session was a severe test
for the United Nations, which provided
a source of hope for the small nations.
Every effort must be made to safeguard
peace.

CAMEROUN

Charles Okala
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Cameroun, Mr. Okala recalled, became
independent on January 1, 1960, in ac-
cordance with a General Assembly res-
olution of March 12, 1959, and there
was thus a sacred duty to explain how
independence and democracy were prac-
tised in this former French-administered
trust territory.

The Assembly resolution had called,
first, for the organization of free elec-
tions by universal suffrage as early as
possible after the proclamation of in-
dependence and, secondly, for sincere
efforts for a national reconciliation. The
principal concern after the attainment of
independence was to endow the country
as rapidly as possible with democratic
institutions that might enable it to tackle
the task of decolonization with as many
assets as possible.

On February 21, 1960, a popular ref-
erendum had been held on a constitu-
tion establishing the state of Cameroun
as a Republic, proclaiming the sovereign-
ty of the people, and recognizing and
guaranteeing all liberties. It had been
adopted by a majority of more than
250,000 votes, despite a virulent and
violent campaign waged by the opposi-
tion.

After the referendum, the Union des
populations du Cameroun (upc), the
Jeunesse démocratique du Cameroun
(spc) and the Union démocratique des
femmes camerounaises (UDEFEC) had
been re-established, and political amnes-
ties had been granted on the sole condition
of the renunciation and condemnation of
violence. These measures had been taken
to enable those who kad voluntarily
taken\ refuge abroad to participate in the
elections in April 1960, which had been
democratically and freely conducted.

Those abroad, with the exception of
two persons who had both been elect-
ed, had decided, however, to boycott the
elections, in which 1,349,739 out of
1,940,438 registered voters had actually
voted. Out of 100 seats, 53 had gone
to the Union camerounaise, 18 to the
Parti de la reconciliation, 11 to the
Démocrates camerounais, eight to the
Group des progressistes and eight to the
Union des populations du Cameroun
(upc).

The forces represented by Mr. Mou-
mié, a upc leader, had been reluctant,
however, to adopt, let alone use, demo-
cratic methods in order to come to
power, said Mr. Okala. The only thing
left to them was to maintain a perpetual
state of tension in the Cameroun so as
to come to power by force.

UNR—December 1960

All who thought to serve democracy
by giving aid to Camerounian exiles
should know that their struggle was no
longer a national one, but a trial of
strength against a young state, which
therefore had to divert all its attention
to safeguarding internal order, instead
of concentrating on the fulfillment of
objectives to consolidate the indepen-
dence so dearly acquired. After the April
elections, the first President of Camer-
oun had proclaimed a total and uncon-
ditional general amnesty. This had com-
pleted the general reconciliation meas-
ures urged by the General Assembly.

Recalling Mr. Khrushchev’s remarks
in the General Assembly that while the
USSR had no liking for capitalism, it
did not want to foist its system upon
other countries, Mr. Okala observed that
an armed struggle was being maintained
in Cameroun, not against colonialism
but against the democratic institutions
that had emerged from universal, direct
and secret suffrage. It was a struggle to
impose an ideology “sustained and im-
ported from abroad,” so as to foist a
political régime upon the people of
Cameroun which they did not want.

After the amnesty, the President of
Cameroun and his Government had pre-
sented their resignations so as to yield
to a Government of National Union in
which all political parties, including the
UPC, were invited to cooperate in con-
tributing to the great work of national
unity. The upc, however, had rejected
the offer. It thus became evident that
the voluntary exiles wanted personal
power and cared little about elementary
democracy. Orders of death had been
launched from abroad to disturb the new
order and the economy of the fledgling
republic. Mr. Okala said he would like
to believe that the governments from
whose soil these orders had been launched
in order to nip the young Cameroun state
in the bud had not been informed about
all these deeds. But if these orders con-
tinued, “we cannot fail to accuse these
states of active and aggressive com-
plicity in deeds against our new state.”

There had been much talk of “African
solidarity,” but “to tolerate such pro-
ceedings on the part of those to whom
you offer sanctuary constitutes an act
of hostility,” he added. The Cameroun,
the vassal of no group, only wanted to
maintain the best of relations with all
states.

Turning to the Algerian question, Mr.
Okala declared: “It is a scandal for all
of us who know what France had done
for the liberation of peoples throughout
the world and throughout the centuries to
see today that, owing to this Algerian
drama .. . all those who have régimes
which are made in the likeness of the
French Government raise their heads
and pledge themselves in the position of
censors of France.” He appealed for a
solution of the Algerian problem which
would guarantee respect for an observ-
ance of the right of individuals and
ethnic minorities in response to the desire
of the Algerians for liberty.

Preferring not to “incite Africans to
hate the whites,” he said that colonizers
were the same everywhere. “When we

upbraid France with regard to the Al-
gerian question, we must not forget that
we also upbraid others for the atrocities,
the humiliations and the injustices prac-
ticed in Africa under other flags than
that of France.” It was time that the
whole African family celebrated its inde-
pendence. He wished that certain heads
of state, when speaking of the sufferings
of Africa, had also asked for the libera-
tion of Jomo Kenyatta; condemned the
repression of the Mau Mau; asked for
the restoration of the good lands taken
away from the Wameru (in Tanganyika)
and for the immediate independence of
all the territories still under foreign
domination.

As for the situation in the Congo
(Leopoldville), that country’s integrity
was “sacred and indivisible.” If nothing
had been done to curb or prevent the
secession of Katanga, that was because
certain great powers, instead of propos-
ing their mediation between the factions,
had thought it better to support certain
intransigent elements. Efforts should be
made for a rapprochement between both
sides, before there was talk of armed
aid to the Central Government of the
Congo. The United Nations prompt in-
tervention in the Congo had made for-
eign intervention in that country unjusti-
fiable. Many representatives, however,
blamed the Secretary-General for the
present complications and _ increasing
troubles in the Congo. But, Mr. Okala
stated, “if to err is human, let us accept
the responsibility of error in the applica-
tion of resolutions adopted in the Securi-
ty Council.” The Secretary-General had
proved his impartiality.

The United Nations went to the Congo
to assist the Congolese state through its
legitimate government. It was up to the
Congolese people to say which was the
legitimate government. In divesting Mr.
Lumumba of power, the Congolese Chief
of State had acted in keeping with the
loi fondamentale. It was therefore legally
impossible for the United Nations or its
Secretary-General to declare invalid, or
to modify, the constitutionally legal act
of deposing Mr. Lumumba. Refusal to
recognize the Secretary-General’s neu-
trality at the time the Chief of State
took this step stemmed from the desire
of some to substitute themselves for the
Congolese people and choose the man
to rule over them. The United Nations
could not declare “a domestic law. of a
people invalid.”

The role of the Secretary-General was
to assist the Central Government, but
the United Nations did not have the
right to decide who should be the head
of that Government. Until the Congolese
loi fondamentale was modified, the act
of divestiture was complete, so that Mr.
Lumumba’s case could definitely be de-
clared closed.

All that remained now was, as Nigeria
had suggested, for the United Nations
to permit the Congolese Parliament to
meet as soon as possible to express, or
refuse to express, confidence in Mr.
Lumumba’s successor. And if, through a
compromise, the Chief of State asked
Mr. Lumumba to succeed Mr. Lumumba,
that would not be irregular. Mr. Lu-

mumba could ask Parliament for a vote
of confidence. But in no way could the
Lumumba Government of June 30, 1960,
now be considered as in legal existence.

The United Nations and its Secretary-
General, stated Mr. Okala, had served
the Congo and peace well. Without them,
“there would have been another Korea
in the very heart of Africa.”

With regard to the “fevered avalanche
of proposals . . . to change the structure
of our Organization,” Mr. Okala said:
“Ignored at the time when the notion of
the balance within this Organization was
established, we claim our place in the
specific organs: the Security Council, and
so forth.” But he formally rejected the
proposal for a triumvirate. The United
Nations is “our supreme resource and
the guarantee of our frail sovereignty,”
and as Mr. Hammarskjold put it “so
magnificently,” it “belongs to the smaller
nations.” Mr. Okala affirmed: “We can-
not tolerate a situation in which the
supreme executive organ—from which
we expect prompt action to help us in
case of aggression—would be hamstrung
by paralyzing discussions. We are at-
tached to the United Nations, and its
survival is a guarantee of our own sur-
vival.” The disagreement on disarmament
between the United States and the Soviet
Union worried every nation. There was
cause for real anxiety, since they refused
even to accept the simple invitation to
speak together. “We have a right to
fear the worst. Never have there been so
many weapons, never have they been
so perfected.”

The great powers should stop their
dissensions and realize that the era of
the settlement of disputes by force of
weapons was finished. If they persisted
in their disagreements, they would be
doing a disservice to the cause of hu-
manity.

Assistance to underdeveloped countries
should be stripped of any philanthropic,
alms-giving or charity features. It should
have the character of international co-
operation between states in order to
consolidate national independence and to
eliminate all causes capable of giving rise
to discontent or disturbing international
peace. Economic assistance should be
such as to enable underdeveloped states
to accept it without forswearing their
sovereignty and without its being coupled
with political conditions.

Supporting the Nigerian Prime Min-
ister’s appeal in respect of the former
Belgian Congo, the Cameroun delega-
tion was prepared to submit urgent
measures to its Government to enable
educational establishments in Cameroun
to receive, in the near future, young
Congolese capable of following a clas-
sical education of the complete seconda-
ry curriculum. To make technical aid to
the Congolese state effective, his Govern-
ment believed that a meeting of re-
sponsible African officials should be held
soon in Africa to draw up a list of ur-
gent needs to be met.

Mr. Okala warned against the danger
of importing into Africa, “where we

want to avoid clashes between East and
West,” an ideology which would seem
to incline in favor of one or the other

of these two antagonistic blocs. He de-
nounced, in the newly independent states,
subversion aimed only at supplanting
with a Marxism-Leninism mode of life
whatever was reminiscent of the West.

Africa, he stressed, must be allowed to
build itself up outside of ideological
competition. “Negritude is at the same
time a philosophy and a civilization
which it pleases us to retain. It would
. . . be the worst kind of folly to destroy
Negritude only to supplant it by a Euro-
peanism which will turn us into rootless
men who had destroyed their past with-
out having a chance for the future of
glory.” Opposing “any sort of fetter
upon the self-determination of peoples,”
Mr. Okala stated that “ideological im-
perialism is as nefarious and sinister as
the imperialism of interests.”

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Eric H. Louw
Minister of External Affairs

The session would be remembered in
future years, said Mr. Louw, firstly be-
cause of the record attendance of Heads
of State and Prime Ministers and sec-
ondly because of the entry into the Or-
ganization of 16 states from the con-
tinent of Africa. A third and more im-
portant reason was that the cold war
against the Western nations had been
openly and aggressively waged by the
Soviet delegation, under the personal
leadership of Mr. Khrushchev. There
was a danger that the cold war could
lead to a global, shooting war, and most
of the delegations were aware that a
dangerous and delicate situation had
been created.

The danger might be averted tem-
porarily, he thought, but the state of
tension that had existed since the West
Berlin blockade of 1948 would continue
unless the leaders of the United States,
Great Britain, France and the Soviet
Union got together and settled outstand-
ing issues around a conference table.
Such talks in the past had not been fruit-
ful, but that was no reason why another
attempt should not be made. He was in
full agreement with Mr. Macmillan and
fully supported attempts made by Mr.
Menzies in the direction of removing
fear and suspicion.

Mr. Louw added that a factor in the
situation that could not be ignored was
the increase in one session of 16 new
member states from the continent of
Africa, for the relative position of the
different groups in the United Nations
was thereby materially altered.

“There seems to be little doubt—at
any rate, in my mind—that this was one
of the main reasons for Mr. Khrush-
chev’s unexpected decision personally to
lead his delegation at this session of the
Assembly,” he commented.

Mr. Khrushchev was very interested
in Africa and it was common knowledge
that for the last five or six years there
had been a steady infiltration into some
of the emergent states of Africa of com-
mercial, technical and political commu-
nist agents. That “courting” had met with
some success, as evidenced by the pro-

Soviet leanings shown by certain of the
African delegations. And, added Mr.
Louw, the record of Soviet interference
in the Congo was well known to all
delegations.

South Africa, he pointed out, had
always taken a strong stand against com-
munism. Of its own volition the Govern-
ment sent units of the South African Air
Force to participate in the West Berlin
airlift in 1948; and, at a considerable
cost of human lives and financial sacri-
fice, South Africa was one of only 16
out of 60 member countries to send an
air squadron to assist the United Na-
tions forces in Korea. South Africa had
no direct political or strategic interest in
the Far East; sending an air squadron
was the Union’s contribution to the fight
against communism.

He pointed out that the word “Afri-
can” was a purely geographical term
and had no ethnic connotation: there
was no African race as such, and as re-
gards racial origin, language and cus-
toms, the African states and territories
differed as much from each other as did
the different countries of Europe and of
Asia.

Mr. Louw dealt with the settling of
South Africa, which, 300 years ago, he
said, was uninhabited except for roam-
ing bands of Hottentots near the coast
and small bands of bushmen further
north. Thus the descendants of the Ban-
tus, who were immigrants from the east-
ern and northern territories, had no bet-
ter claim to South Africa than the de-
scendants of the original Dutch and
English settlers who came there 300
years ago. The original European settlers
in the two Americas opened up and
developed the countries of North, South
and Central America and made them
what they were today.

Unfortunately, the stirring up of un-
rest in South Africa had not been lim-
ited to communistic activities, for during
past years the United Nations Com-
mittee on South West Africa had been
willing to hear and accept evidence from
expatriates and other persons of no
standing whatsoever among their own
people who could not speak on behalf
of those people. He quoted statements
and findings of inquiries to show that
trouble had been deliberately stirred up
from outside, by both expatriates and
communist agents.

Attacks on South Africa, which had
been going on for 15 years, were, to a
very large extent, based on prejudice
and on one-sided and often false press
reports published in various newspapers,
he said.

Most of the 41 states that were this
year making the charges against the
Union of South Africa had not come to
the Assembly with clean hands. The
main charge, he said, was South Africa’s
alleged contravention of Article 55 of
the Charter and the Union’s alleged non-
observance of the principles of the
Declaration of Human Rights and of
fundamental freedoms, but those making
the charges should look to their own
records, he suggested. India had led the
attack, but he accused India—dquoting
various reports and documents—of com-

UNR—December 1960

he
fr.
ice
all

= eS we ee

mitting oppression and violence against
the people of Naga and of Kashmir and
against the Sikh minority. He also stated
that in southern India bondage for debt
was still the lot of millions of poor
Indians.

Mr. Louw also accused Norway and
Sweden of oppression and _ ill-treatment
of the Lapps and quoted national news-
papers of those countries to substantiate
his charges.

“I have dealt with an Asian country
and with two European countries,” ob-
served Mr. Louw. “Let us now turn to
Africa and the Middle East.”

Despite periodic discussion and con-
demnation, he said, slavery was still
being carried on in Arabia, certain coun-
tries of the Middle East and some West
African countries. The centre of the
slavery traffic was still the Arabian
Peninsula and in particular Saudi Arabia,
he reported Lord Shackleton as having
said in the British House of Lords.

Mr. Louw also reported Lord Maug-
ham as having said that there were two
main slave routes into Saudi Arabia,
one from West Africa and the other
from Iraq. And, speaking of Iraq, he
said that a survey by the Royal Institute
of International Affairs had given the
rate of infant mortality there as one of
the highest in the world, mainly through
malnutrition. Also, a United Nations
document had reported that it was im-
possible to apply compulsory education
in some of Iraq’s rural provinces because
of the poverty of parents who needed
the labor of their children on the land.
Furthermore, the World Bank had stated
that the land was largely in the hands
of the sheiks and urban proprietors and
that there appeared to be a law forbid-
ding a sharecropper from leaving a
property so long as he was indebted to
the owner—‘“a sort of debt-bondage.”
The report further had stated that only
175,000 out of 750,000 children attended
school, that only one half of the chil-
dren progressed beyond the primary
standard, and that there was a serious
lack of medical services, with only one
doctor per 8,000 persons.

One sympathized with the difficulties
of the Government of Iraq, Mr. Louw
commented; but, one of their problems
being the privileged position of wealthy
sheiks and urban landowners, people
living under such conditions should not
sponsor an item which accused South
Africa of a mass denial of human rights.

Turning to Liberia, Mr. Louw said
that there the ownership of land and
the right to vote were confined to per-
sons of Negro blood—which he de-
scribed as racial discrimination in re-
verse. Liberia was perfectly free to have
such a law if it wished, he said, but then
it should not accuse South Africa. Mr.
Louw also charged that a small group
of Americo-Liberians controlled the in-
digenous population, who had minimal
representation in the Legislature. Re-
gretfully, he said, he accused Ghana of
boasting of the boycott action recently
taken against South Africa and added
that anyone who followed events in
Ghana could not deny that democracy
there would soon exist in name only—

UNR—December 1960

yet Ghana, too, accused South Africa.
He also included among those who had
come to the Assembly with unclean
hand “certain Central American coun-
tries” and Malaya and Indonesia.

Regarding the Soviet Union, he said
that the unsavory history of oppression
and the denial of human rights and free-
doms in the Soviet Union and its col-
onies—and he wished to stress the word
“colonies”—and also in other commu-
nist countries was so well known to
members of the Assembly that further
comment from him would be superfluous.

In view of the conditions existing in
the countries he had named, he said,
none had the right to accuse South Africa
of denying to its non-white peoples the
fundamental freedoms set out in Article
55 of the Charter. Statistics showed that,
in standards of living, social services,
health and education services, far more
was being done in South Africa per
capita of the Bantu population than in
any other country of the African con-
tinent.

In conclusion he spoke “a word of
warning.” The basic principle of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of a
member state contained in Article 2 (7)
of the Charter was put there by the
founders of the United Nations par-
ticularly for the protection of the smaller
and weaker states. Those who were to-
day making a mockery of that Article
were engaged in removing one of the
foundation stones of the Organization.

LIBERIA’S REPLY to South Africa

Henry Ford Cooper of Liberia exer-
cised the right of reply. Mr. Louw, he
said, had levelled against Liberia the
crime of discrimination, especially as
regards ownership of property and the
right to vote.

“We do not deny these charges,” de-
clared Mr. Cooper. “We do not deny
that there are discriminatory laws in
Liberia. We admit it. But we have to
say this: that without such laws there
would have been no Liberia today, and
especially at that time when the con-
tinent of Africa was being parcelled out
among the great ruling powers of our
day.”

Liberia, he said, had been criticized,
ever since its existence as a state, of
wholesale exploitation and even forced
labor. The charges had been levelled
out of prejudice, for the sole purpose
of proving that the African, particularly
the black African, was incapable of self-
government and independence. However,
he said, when such charges had been
made against his country, they had im-
mediately been investigated and measures
were taken to remedy any evils.

On its own initiative, in 1932, Liberia
invited an international commission to
investigate charges of forced labor in
the country and had accepted its findings
and recommendations without reserva-
tion. Would the Government of South
Africa welcome an international body
to investigate the charges of racial dis-
crimination and wholesale shooting of
helpless civilians at Sharpeville for the
simple reason that they were black?

In Liberia, said Mr. Cooper, all Li-
berian citizens, whether they came to
Liberia or were born there, had the same
rights. Could the South African Govern-
ment cite one single example where a
native African had been allowed to hold
or occupy any position of importance in
South Africa?

Mr. Louw had based his Govern-
ment’s right to exploit, suppress and
even kill its fellow men on the United
Nations Charter, saying, “Why allow
interference in the domestic jurisdiction
of South Africa?” The South African
Government should take warning, said
Mr. Cooper, that the people of Africa
would not continue to permit their fel-
low Africans to be the victims of such
pernicious practices without taking force-
ful measures for the protection of the
rights of their fellow Africans.

SWEDEN’‘S REPLY to South Africa

Exercising the right of reply, Mrs.
Agda Réssel, of Sweden, said that Mr.
Louw had seen fit to quote the Swedish
press in regard to what he called Lapps,
who, in fact, preferred to be called
“Same.” They were a group of about
10,000 nomads living in the northern
part of the country. She thought that
the South African Foreign Minister must
be very short on arguments in defence
of the Union Government’s policy of
racial discrimination to refer to Lapps
in order to try to justify that policy.
She would set the record straight in the
Special Political Committee when the
item on apartheid was dealt with.

NORWAY’S REPLY to South Africa

Sivert A. Nielsen, of Norway, also re-
plied briefly to Mr. Louw’s allegations
about Norwegian Lapps, saying that he,
too, would reserve the right of reply
until the question of racial conflict in
South Africa came before the Special
Political Committee.

IRAQ’S REPLY to South Africa

Also speaking under the right of reply,
Hashim Jawad, of Iraq, said that Mr.
Louw’s charges against Iraq seemed to
have the central thesis that poverty,
illiteracy and disease in the less-developed
countries deprived them of the right and
duty of drawing attention to the pitiless
and inhumane policies of his own Gov-
ernment.

It was important, he said, to state
that the sources which Mr. Louw had
quoted to support his charges were
hopelessly out of date. His reference to
debt bondage in present-day Iraq was
simply ridiculous.

As regards the other charges, he said
that one week after the revolution in
Iraq, in July 1958, an agrarian reform
law was enacted. Mr. Louw had told the
Assembly that only 175,000 children out
of 750,000 were at school. In fact, during
the last academic year, 673,426 pupils
were enrolled in primary schools—80 per
cent of all children of primary school
age. Total enrollment in schools and

colleges was 825,350. During the last
two years the budget for education was
more than doubled. During the same
period the number of schools increased
by 40 per cent, and students by 57 per
cent. Instead of one doctor per 8,000
persons, as mentioned by Mr. Louw, the
latest available figures showed one per
3,000 persons.

Mr. Louw’s remarks, said Mr. Jawad,
were completely removed from the truth,
completely irrelevant in the context of
the universally condemned racial policy
of the South African Government—a
policy which shamefully contradicted all
accepted human values of modern society
and which undermined the United Na-
tions endeavors to promote the basis for
progress and justice in a large sector of
Africa.

EL SALVADOR

M,. Rafael Urquia
Permanent Representative to the
United Nations

After welcoming the new countries
admitted to the Organization, Dr. Urquia
said it was obvious that the colonial
system was “on its way out” and that
not too many years would pass before
it had completely disappeared. El Salva-
dor did not believe, however, that sud-
denly the machinery built up by the
United Nations for the gradual and
progressive evolution of the colonial peo-
ples toward self-government and _ inde-
pendence should be abandoned. For that
would leave many of those peoples in a
situation of abandonment which could
lead them to chaos and expose them to
the danger of a neo-colonialism much
less desirable than the colonialism under
which they had previously labored.

Dr. Urquia said it could not be denied
that the international situation had
worsened greatly since the fourteenth
Assembly session, as demonstrated by
such events as the failure of the sum-
mit conference, the breaking-off of nego-
tiations in the Ten-Nation Disarmament
Committee, the constant activity of the
Security Council and, in the regional
field, the holding of two meetings for
consultation of the Foreign Ministers of
the American states, in San José, Costa
Rica.

If members truly wished to find ways
and means of assuring peaceful coex-
istence in this “agitated and tormented
world of today,” they must work with
pragmatic ideas and seek viable solutions
to the great problems, rather than in-
tensify the cold war and try to hide
purposes that could not be frankly ad-
mitted behind “more or less fantastic
proposals.” Unfortunately, what had been
witnessed at this session of the Assembly
and at the recent Security Council meet-
ings, as well as at the Assembly’s emer-
gency session on the Congo question, was
but an overt offensive of the cold war
designed to achieve certain ends through
the use of threats and intimidation. In
corroboration of this, it was sufficient to
recall the unjust campaign waged against
the Secretary-General, the intemperate

language used during the debate on the
representation of China and the reiterated
warnings concerning Berlin.

El Salvador believed that the Secre-
tary-General’s conduct in dealing with
the Congo situation was not only correct
and in keeping with the spirit and letter
of the Security Council’s resolutions, but
in all respects had been “noble and
praiseworthy in its nature.” The most
serious problem the United Nations had
had to deal with was that of the Congo.
In cooperation with the Security Council
and the emergency session of the General
Assembly, the Secretary-General, as
spokesman for both those bodies and
working within the limitations and in-
evitable imperfections that existed in
such cases, had been able to meet the
needs and requirements of the moment
in that young African republic.

Regardless of the Secretary-General’s
impartiality, intelligence and behavior,
El Salvador on principle opposed the
Soviet idea of substituting the Secretary-
General’s position by a triumvirate com-
prising one person from the Western
world, another from the communist world
and a third from the neutralist sector,
“to use this neologism that has become
so fashionable.” Such a tripartite body
would only be able to act on the basis
of unanimity.

Thus the executive organ of the United
Nations in charge of implementing the
decisions of the Council or the General
Assembly would be imbued with the
disease that made the Council itself in-
operative—the veto.

An amendment to the Charter was
urgently required, said Dr. Urquia, but
only to increase the: composition and
membership of the Security Council and
the Economic and Social Council, in
keeping with the increase in the member-
ship of the United Nations, as well as
for other equally useful and necessary
ends. If, when amending the Charter,
thought was given to the veto, it should
be to suppress it and not extend it to
other bodies.

El Salvador commended the accom-
plishments of the United Nations through
its expanded program of technical as-
sistance, its Special Fund, the United
Nations Children’s Fund and each and
every one of the specialized agencies.
El Salvador also welcomed the setting
up of the Inter-American Development
Bank, the first meeting of whose gov-
ernors took place in its capital.

In affirming his people’s faith in nego-
tiation and other peaceful means for
overcoming difficulties among some Latin
American republics, Dr. Urquia declared
that “Operation Pan-America is on the
go.” The countries of Central America
were making efforts toward improvement.
In February 1960 the Governments of
El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala
subscribed to a treaty of economic asso-
ciation, drawn up to guarantee the free-
dom of movement of persons, capital and
possessions among the three countries.
The object of that association was to
give an impetus to the economic develop-
ment of the countries and so improve
the conditions of life of their inhabitants
and consolidate and increase economic

cooperation between them, thereby con-
tributing to the economic integration of
Central America and the setting up of a
common market to stimulate joint pro-
duction and investment.

Remarking on the “constant nightmare
of nuclear war,” Dr. Urquia said the
fate of mankind was in the hands of a
few men—those who directed the policies
and behavior of the great powers, par-
ticularly the two “that are best prepared
to begin the final suicidal conflagration.”

There should be an immediate renewal!
of negotiations between the great powers
under the auspices of the United Nations,
whether that was done through the heads
of states or of governments—namely, at
the highest level—or whether by some
other means which would ensure gradual
success for those negotiations. Recent
events showed that the procedures of the
“summit conference” were not always
correct or the best means of achieving
the goal.

Every effort and every sacrifice would
be worth while if, at long last, the world
was able to shake off its fear and men
would be able to enjoy the benefits of
life in peace and calm. The right attitude
would be to consider the possibility of
changing the structure of the Disarma-
ment Commission, to have it composed
of a small group of states and, if possible,
give it certain concrete directives for the
fulfillment of its functions. Thus it would
replace the Ten-Nation Committee which,
because of its origin, was “foreign to
the United Nations.” There should be
an official commission, reasonably con-
stituted, that would, with the probability
of success, be able to undertake consider-
ation of the main disarmament problems.

COSTA RICA

Gonzalo Ortiz Martin
Permanent Representative to the
United Nations

Extending a welcome to all the newly
independent countries which had joined
the United Nations, Dr. Ortiz Martin
stressed the importance of the Organiza-
tion as “a created institution.” In addi-
tion to its objective of preserving peace,
it was established to help, protect and
advise all countries that aspired to inde-
pendence. The small, underdeveloped na-
tions had nothing to do with disputes
among the great. They had only one thing
to do—to see that they did not serve as
a pretext “so that there is born between
us discord which will give rise to cold
wars,” thereby creating tensions, which
would ultimately destroy the. world. They
must stand steadfast by the United Na-
tions, for as human beings they under-
stood the value of its worldwide protec-
tion.

Dr. Ortiz Martin also put to the new
members the fact that Costa Rica had
found that keeping a standing army had
given no positive result because “our
well-known love of peace made it impos-
sible to believe that we might need an
army to war against our neighbors.”

Barracks were useful only for setting
up a military caste that kept the govern-

UNR—December 1960

ments in power against the people’s will
or served as an electoral instrument,
frightening the voter with its power or
potential and allowing governments to
retain power illegally. But Costa Rica
believed in its regional institution, the
Organization of American States, and in
the United Nations as sufficient guar-
antees for the maintenance of peace and
justice in the remote possibility that it
might be attacked.

In its budget, Costa Rica did not
earmark a single cent for arms, In its
struggles or differences it used reason, not
force. Its decisions were taken by votes,
not bullets. It recommended such an at-
titude to all newly independent states,
for they would find the guarantee of
stability of their institutions not in their
armies but in those institutions them-
selves. He assured the new members
that it was more useful to spend money
on schools than to use it for arms.

That might be taken as Costa Rica’s
definition of its conduct in “the terrify-
ing subject of disarmament.” It was
also its general viewpoint regarding the
painful situation which had developed
in the Congo. With United Nations help,
the Congolese themselves must settle
their own conflicts “with their eyes fixed
on the future of their beloved country.”

Turning to economic questions, Dr.
Ortiz Martin recalled that Costa Rica
had, in the Economic and Social Council,
always vigorously contended that prices
for raw materials should be fixed in the
same way as those for industrial products
by the governments of the highly indus-
trialized nations.

“We no longer have patience,” he
said, “to accept the fact that while the
salaries of our working masses are sub-
ject to the fluctuations of international
markets, the salaries of the workers in
the highly industrialized countries con-
stantly increase, establishing an ominous
difference which causes a_ constant
malaise.”

Referring to the recent economic con-
ference in Bogot4, Dr. Ortiz Martin said
that Operation Pan-America was begin-
ning to function and that it would spur
economic development.

Underdeveloped countries, he added,
must be morally and socially prepared
to make adequate use of the economic
aid provided by the United Nations and
other sources and not to waste efforts in
sterile political discussions or fratricidal
quarrels. Efforts should be concentrated
on building true political stability and on
developing health, education and dignity
in freedom. That did not mean, however,
that they should wash their hands of the
great international problems which ob-
viously touched them closely.

Paying tribute to the work of the
Organization of American States, Dr.
Ortiz Martin said it had been an idea
born of the mind of Simon Bolivar. Latin
America had faced many difficulties in
its international life but had always
maintained the principle of Bolivar. Costa
Rica, when host to the Foreign Ministers
of the Americas last August, had been
able to show them an atmosphere of
true freedom in which the word “dis-
crimination” was not even known.

UNR—December 1960

CYPRUS

Zenon Rossides
Permanent Representative to the
United Nations

Mr. Rossides told the Assembly that,
as a recently admitted member, Cyprus
approached the general debate with diffi-
dence, but with a sense of perspective
and objectivity. He expressed gratitude
to the nations that supported Cypriot
independence and he recalled “with
warmth of feeling” the encouragement
received from many delegations.

He said that Cyprus was in no way
committed and would not align itself
with any power bloc or camp. His nation
would follow an independent line. Its
commitment—a strong commitment—was
to the United Nations and its Charter.
Mr. Rossides said that while Cyprus was
just emerging from a liberation struggle,
his people bore no vestige of bitterness
toward anyone.

His nation had listened with particular
interest and deep satisfaction to the
speeches in support of freedom and
against colonialism. The collective voice
of nations had spoken out; the age of
domination and force was a thing of the
past. “There can be no stability and
peace where the will of the people is in
rebellion,” he said. Therefore, he wanted
to see a solution of the Algerian problem
by mutual understanding between the
French nation and the Algerian people,
whose cause of self-determination had the
full support of his own nation.

Regarding Africa, Mr. Rossides looked
forward to the day when all African
peoples would be free, living under their
own sovereign governments. As to the
question of the Congo, Cyprus’s stand
was consistent with the resolution of the
General Assembly adopted at its emer-
gency special session. There should be
no outside interference in the Congo. Its
government and people, with the assist-
ance of the United Nations, would be
able to find their way to peace and unity.
The work of the Secretary-General in
the Congo was performed with impar-
tiality, efficiency and speed under con-
ditions of great difficulty and strain. Mr.
Rossides therefore wished to associate
himself with the wide expression of con-
fidence in Mr. Hammarskjold. It was
most essential, he said, that the office of
the Secretary-General should in no way
be weakened.

Mr. Rossides called for increased eco-
nomic and technical assistance by the
United Nations and suggested a reap-
praisal of the whole subject of such
assistance. On the item of Bozen, or
Bolzano, he offered Cyprus’s help toward
a compromise agreement.

Regarding disarmament, Mr. Rossides
said a study of documents and speeches
indicated to him a deep desire for peace
and disarmament. Why, then, could there
be no agreement? It would seem that the
main obstacle was suspicion and distrust.
It was feared that in the process of dis-
armament the balance of power might be
tipped. Speaking of the Ten-Nation Com-
mittee, he considered that the attitude of
the two sides regarding disarmament and
control should not be irreconcilable. Par-

allel plans on disarmament and control
could, he said, be simultaneously agreed
to as part of one treaty carried out by
stages while the balance of power was
retained. If disarmament was not to
continue to be an ever-elusive phantom,
the world must achieve a climate of
confidence. Moral progress was an im-
perative. Such a moral impact, said Mr.
Rossides, had already begun to make
itself felt in the general atmosphere of
the Assembly.

INDIA (second statement)

Vv. K. Krishna Menon
Minister of Defence

Mr. Krishna Menon reminded the As-
sembly that the Prime Minister of India
had drawn attention earlier to the great
urgency of current problems and to In-
dia’s approach to them. Three weeks of
intensive discussions had occurred since
the Prime Minister’s speech, and althorgh
they had sometimes been acrimonious,
in the long run they had been fruitful.

In regard to the problem of the Con-
go, Mr. Krishna Menon said his Govern-
ment did not seek to apportion blame or
responsibility, but it did feel that the
problem must be attacked with a greater
sense of urgency for a solution seemed to
be no nearer. Every member had been
engaged with the problem—some, like
India, more than others because of the
presence of their personnel.

Outlining the Indian Government's
views, Mr. Krishna Menon said that no
management of a people by another na-
tion or by the United Nations was a
substitute for management by themselves,
so the Parliament of the Congo had to
be convened without further delay. That
was one of the urgent and imperative
responsibilities of the United Nations.
All non-Congolese personnel in the Con-
go not there for United Nations or hu-
manitarian purposes should leave the
country.

The United Nations had to establish
beyond doubt that it was not there as an
arbitrator between rival claimants, be-
cause the Charter did not authorize that.
For the first time, forces of the United
Nations had been used not as between
nations, but within a nation. Greater at-
tention had to be directed toward en-
suring that the administration, policing
and necessary personnel were to come
from the Congo itself, and some disen-
gagement of the United Nations should
take place.

Furthermore, while no one could or
should prevent assistance going into the
Congo from any part of the world, in
the existing circumstances it would not
be in the interests of the world “for
very powerful people to fish in these
troubled waters.” Whatever aid was to
be given should be with the cognizance
of the United Nations—not necessarily
channeled through it—so that everything
would be above board.

Mr. Krishna Menon then turned to
what he regarded as the urgent problem
arising from the situation in Laos. He
recalled the Geneva agreements of 1954

which brought about a settlement with
regard to Laos and Indo-China and un-
der which India had great responsibili-
ties. As a result of those agreements, on
August 11, 1954, guns were silenced in
the world for the first time in 25 years;
and, despite their limitations, the agree-
ments had kept peace in that part of the
world.

However much they might agree or
disagree with the position of Viet-Nam,
a country divided into two, or however
much they might sympathize or other-
wise have opinions about the complaints
of Cambodia regarding incursions on its
territories, Mr. Krishna Menon said he
was sure his Cambodian friends would
agree that the presence of the Commis-
sion for Supervision and Control had
kept that part of the world free from
actual war. The Geneva agreements had
been brought about by four of the West-
ern powers and China—with the United
States associated in the final declaration
—and had been based on the idea of
non-interference in the affairs of those
peoples.

“There is no hope for an Asian coun-
try, particularly a small country—there
is no hope of peace in Asia—unless the
parties to the cold war keep out of our
territories,” declared Mr. Krishna Menon.
That, he continued, was India’s main
objection to military pacts, for when
the machinery of conflict—cold war or
otherwise—was projected into those
areas, troubles arose.

The future of Laos lay in non-inter-
ference in its affairs by the great powers
or parties to the cold war, either in
open or disguised form. As for Laos it-
self, no matter what kind of a govern-
ment it had, so long as it did not in-
fringe the Geneva agreements and re-
mained in the areas of peace, it was to
be assisted.

It was very important, he added, that
that part of the world should be left
alone, without ideological conflicts. Both
East and West should realize that non-
committedness there was to the advan-
tage of both. Thus, in the “rather com-
bustible” area of Laos, there was a con-
stitutional government which should have
assistance but should draw it from its
own neighbors and not from anyone
else.

Next Mr. Krishna Menon dealt with
the problem of dependent territories. In
the previous two years, he noted, the
area of liberation had become larger and
larger. A few years before nearly 10 mil-
lion square miles were still under colon-
ial rule. Now there were about 4% mil-
lion square miles, with a population of
72 million, still in a state of dependence
or tutelage under the international trus-
teeship system. One must pay tribute, he
said, to those countries—particularly the
United Kingdom—which had found it
paid dividends to liberate peoples.

“Empires gain by terminating imperi-
alism,” he declared. “Today there is a
higher standard of life in the United
Kingdom; there is no unemployment;
there are better relations between the
former dependent countries and them-
selves, and, so far as our country is
concerned, there are more United King-
dom nationals in India today than there

were under imperial occupation. There-
fore friendship and cooperation pay. The
position today is, however, that under
the British system there are 37 units
occupying 1,346,000 square miles with
a population of 34 million out of which
the greater part of them will become
free in the next few months.”

As for France, if the problem of AIl-
geria were settled, the greater headaches
of France would be over, he said, for
there would be a vast ally occupying a
large part of Africa which would make
a great contribution to civilization.

However, added Mr. Krishna Menon,
independence had no meaning if it was
exclusively the removal of foreign rule.
Independence for a people meant more
food, more education, more sanitation,
more opportunity, more leisure. The
vast continent of Africa was in a state
of backwardness in all those aspects,
whether in the form of nutrition, educa-
tion, opportunity or political advance-
ment. Those were the things that had to
be implemented, and it should be the
concern of the United Nations and of
the populations themselves not to regard
the ending of empire as something that
was forced upon them, but as a con-
scious effort of modern policy.

Mr. Krishna Menon told the Assembly
that there was a fundamental difference
in the development of dependent terri-
tories and the development of Western
Europe. In Western Europe industry and
economic progress had come first, but
in all of Asia and in Africa full-fledged
political revolutions came first. And that
division created social problems which
it was necessary for the United Nations
to assist in overcoming, not merely in
the time-honored ways, but in other, new
ways. At the proper time India would
put forward proposals in that regard.

United Nations Levy Suggested

He then suggested that it should be
possible for the United Nations to make
a levy—a percentage of national income
of countries, related to their capacity to
pay—which would probably produce a
very large amount. The underdeveloped
nations themselves would also be par-
ticipants in the levy, but on a smaller
scale because of their lower standards.
International pools of technicians and
experts would be established. It would
not be all a one-way flow of traffic. Each
country, Mr. Krishna Menon empha-
sized, would not be exclusively a giver
or a taker.

The time had come to make a request
on a very large and ambitious scale, he
asserted, particularly to ask the more
advanced countries, the United States
and the Soviet Union, to submit them-
selves to a United Nations levy, collected
by the United Nations and administered
by special organizations established for
that particular purpose, so that a new
system would develop whereby some of
the problems that had been talked about,
involving the incapacity of the Organiza-
tion to respond to newer situations, would
also disappear.

Mr. Krishna Menon then turned to the
make-up of the United Nations. It was

founded, he pointed out, some fifteen
years ago. The political and social di-
mensions of the world had become
larger, and the economic, security, peace
and other functions of the United Na-
tions had vastly expanded.

Membership in the United Nations
from some areas had increased more
than six times; almost every region had
shown some increase. In regard to the
Security Council, India still believed it
necessary for the United Nations to be
based on unanimity of the great powers,
but he questioned the formula for select-
ing the other member states represented
in the Council; for, in the existing state
of membership, India, as a member of
the British Commonwealth, would be in
the Security Council once in 24 years
and, from the end of 1961, once in 48
years. An African country under that
system—unless the Asians and Africans
came to some arrangement among them-
selves—would not be there at all; and
even if some arrangement were reached,
an African country would be there only
once in 70 or 80 years, with a two-year
term to be distributed among all of
them. While not every country might
want membership, it would still take a
very long time—some 10 to 30 years—
before a given country could be in the
Council.

Therefore the necessity became appar-
ent, he said, for finding ways and means
of dealing with this problem calling for
an amendment of the Charter. His own
country, he asserted, consistently op-
posed amending the Charter without get-
ting agreement among the great powers,
but he was certain that the great powers
would recognize that the Security Coun-
cil—like the other organs of the United
Nations—lived in a political vacuum
unconnected with the realities of the
modern world.

Mr. Krishna Menon told the Assembly
that India was not a “neutral country”
—an appellation that could apply only
in war—but was an unaligned and un-
committed nation in relation to the cold
war.

“The greater the increase of the area
of peace in the world,” he said, “the
greater the non-committedness, the great-
er amount that the so-called committed
nations have to canvass for the moral
support of others, the greater are the
chances of peace.”

That did not mean that his country
would simply sit on the fence and not
take sides. Nor was it, he asserted, an
attempt to escape international responsi-
bilities. In Korea, in Indo-China, in the
Lebanon; in the Gaza Strip, his country
had been committed and was even then
committed in the Congo far beyond its
capacity, because it thought that was in
the interests of peace. No troops or arms
belonging to India were anywhere outside
its own frontiers except at the behest of
the United Nations or international
agreements. His country did not want to
be involved in the war blocs.

On that subject, Mr. Krishna Menon
said India was against the formation of
isolated blocs in the United Nations, for
that would mean the Assembly had no
capacity to decide in freedom. Unless

UNR—December 1960

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een

di-
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ace
Na-

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the Organization remained not only uni-
versal in its membership but universal
in the conception pervading it, not of
factionalism, it was not likely to get
much further.

The Indian representative then came
to what he termed the most important
problem, disarmament, which India re-
garded only as a means to an end—the
avoidance of war. Whatever had been
the justification in the past for wars be-
tween nations or wars to end wars, today
there could be wars only in a global
sense, only to end the world. Therefore
the idea of total disarmament had be-
come an imperative necessity. Any lim-
itation of armaments which made large-
scale war possible was not an end in
itself. The world was not satisfied with
being told that more humane weapons
were being used. India stood foursquare
for the complete abandonment of all
weapons of mass destruction and speedy
progress toward their abolition.

Regarding the disarmament problem,
Mr. Krishna Menon said there were
large areas of agreement. In the resolu-
tion adopted unanimously at the four-
teenth session, there had been an agree-
ment on total and complete disarma-
ment. There had also been agreement
that disarmament should be carried out
in agreed stages and completed as rapid-
ly as possible within specified periods of
time. Furthermore, it was common
ground between the two sides that dis-
armament measures should be so bal-
anced that neither side at any time would
have any significant military advantage.
It had also been agreed that the imple-
mentation of the disarmament measures
should be carried out from beginning to
end under effective international control
through the establishment of an organi-
zation within the United Nations. And,
finally, it had been agreed that as the
disarmament steps were implemented
there should be an international force
within the United Nations for the main-
tenance of international peace and se-
curity.

Mr. Krishna Menon said that his Gov-
ernment believed that many of the dif-
ferences which had been much publicized
lacked substance when looked at in the
cold light of reason. However, it ap-
peared that disarmament negotiations
themselves had become a weapon in the
cold war, but there were increasing dan-
gers in delay, for the production of
weapons of mass destruction by a num-
ber of countries, and by smaller coun-
tries with lesser responsibilities and per-
haps with smaller quarrels, was increas-
ing, and in three or four years it might
be impossible to introduce controls or
inspection in the desired ways.

There was another fear, he continued,
for one of the possessing countries,
knowing that neither the Soviet Union
nor the United States would be likely to
precipitate a world war in the interests
of a particular local quarrel, might use
the weapon for purposes contrary to
those for which the Assembly stood.
The spread of those weapons, along
with the relevant technology, made it
dangerous even for the great powers
when they would no longer have the
control of the destructive processes that

UNR—December 1960

would be let loose. Therefore there would
have to be “complete totality”—total pro-
hibition and destruction of all existing
stocks—no halfway measures.

It was necessary to consider ways and
means to prevent a break or gap in the
disarmament discussions, the Defence
Minister continued. They had to be kept
going, but of course with the agreement
of the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion. If the Committee of Ten could con-
tinue, his delegation would be pleased;
but if not, there should be some change
or enlargement or replacement; or per-
haps the Assembly, because of the ten-
sion prevailing between the two sides,
could find a group of nations which
would be able to talk to them separately
pending the formation of a more con-
venient committee.

Therefore, said Mr. Krishna Menon, the
request of his delegation was that the
First Committee should definitely give
directives, instead of passing draft resolu-
tions put forward from one side or an-
other, amended or not, merely to avoid
greater harm. The Assembly had to take
greater responsibility.

“This applies to the Secretary-General
as to anybody else,” he added. “If the
Security Council passes a resolution, the
Security Council must support with cour-
age and actively the responsibility for
giving directions in regard to implemen-
tation, and not turn afterward and say
it was not implemented. It is open to the
Security Council to devise the machinery
as to how it should be carried out.”

By way of example, he said, the Dis-
armament Commission this time had to
give directions to whatever body there
was or make it clear to the great powers
that the first objective was the total
abolition of all arms, and the second
that disarmament should be accomplished
within measurable time—perhaps three
or four years,

Then it would be necessary, he con-
tinued, for the Assembly to formulate
some kind of code to become part of
international law whereby a surprise at-
tack by one country or another—and
not only the great powers—would be
regarded as a violent breach of inter-
national obligations.

He was not referring to a technique for
preventing a surprise attack, for, although
he thought that technical studies were nec-
essary, they had to be directed toward a
particular purpose; and the directive he
was suggesting would include the idea
that the preparation for surprise attack
or the threat of surprise attack as a
weapon for domination was against the
code of nations.

The directive also had to call for
speedy agreement on the termination of
test explosions; otherwise the spread of
nuclear weapons and the effects of ioniz-
ing radiation would vastly increase.

Mr. Krishna Menon charged that the
Disarmament Commission had defaulted
in its activity. Whatever the machinery
decided on for negotiations, and what-
ever the membership of the Disarmament
Commission itself, a directive had to
be given to the negotiating body, and it
had to make a report to the total Dis-
armament Commission within three or
four months so that the Commission

could call a session of the General As-
sembly to carry on with the work.

He concluded his statement by intro-
ducing the 28-power draft resolution
which the Assembly adopted unanimous-
ly later that day, appealing for coopera-
tion in the interests of peace and prog-
ress. (See UNITED NATIONS REVIEW for
November 1960, page 52.)

Second Congo
Progress Report

(Continued from page 36)

ly to the presence and activities of the
United Nations troops.

As for the future perspectives, if
the aNc can be brought under some
measure of control and other lawless
elements subdued, it may be possible
for normal political life to be reacti-
vated. This implies a free press and
radio and freedom of speech and
political association.

In the confused political situation
which prevails, the only two institu-
tions whose foundations still stand are
the office of the Chief of State and
the Parliament. If the minimum con-
ditions of non-interference and secu-
rity mentioned earlier could be estab-
lished, it would open the way to the
leaders of the country to seek peaceful
political solutions through the medium
of these two institutions.

The present situation, where the
political leaders of the country have
been reduced to virtual impotence,
combined with the threat of the im-
position of an _ extra-constitutional
régime, clearly points to the dangers
of continued party and factional strife.
The opportunity is beginning to un-
fold for a fresh start to be made for
achieving the unity and integrity of
the country so that all six provinces
may take their due share, on demo-
cratic lines, in the tasks that lie ahead.
If individual, party or factional inter-
ests are subordinated to the general
good, there is a chance of a single
government of conciliation, represent-
ing all the principal interests, emerg-
ing. The United Nations operation in
the Congo, for its part, has spared no
efforts for the preparation of the
ground and for the creation of the
necessary conditions which would
make fruitful political activity possi-
ble. This report may therefore con-
clude with the hope that, warned by
the experiences of the past and con-
scious of the still greater perils loom-
ing ahead, the leadership will rise to
the full stature of its great responsi-
bilities in the interest of the entire
Congolese nation, so that the 14 mil-
lion inhabitants of the country are
assured the possibility of leading their
lives in peace, in freedom and in
security.

DISARMAMENT: The Major Problem

(Continued from page 9)

Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia, later
joined by Ceylon, Guinea and Libya.

It was prefaced with an expression
of grave concern that, while negotia-
tions on disarmament had not yet
achieved satisfactory results, the arma-
ments race, particularly in the nuclear
and thermonuclear fields, had reached
a dangerous stage requiring all possible
precautionary measures “to protect
humanity and its civilization from the
hazard of nuclear and thermonuclear
catastrophe.”

It also recalled that the use of weap-
ons of mass destruction had been
prohibited in the past by international
declarations and binding agreements,
such as the Declaration of St. Peters-
burg of 1868, the Declaration of the
Brussels Conference of 1874, the con-
ventions of the Hague Peace Confer-
ences of 1899 and 1907, and the
Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which
the majority of nations were still
parties. And, it pointed out, the in-
discriminate suffering and destruction
resulting from the use of nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons would be even
greater than from the use of the weap-
ons which those international declara-
tions and agreements had declared to
be contrary to the laws of humanity
and a crime under international law.

The draft resolution therefore pro-
posed that the General Assembly
should make a four-part declaration
to the effect that the use of nuclear
and thermonuclear weapons (“js con-
trary to the spirit, letter and aims of
the United Nations and, as such, a
direct violation of the United Nations
Charter”; “would exceed even the
scope of war and cause indiscriminate
suffering and destruction to mankind
and its civilization and, as such, is
contrary to the rules of international
law and to the laws of humanity”;
and “is a war directed not against an
enemy or enemies alone, but also
agaifist mankind in general, since the
peoples of the world not involved in
such war will be subjected to all the
evils generated from the use of such
weapons.” The fourth part of the
declaration would be that “ahy state
using nuclear and _ thermonuclear
weapons is to be considered to violate
the Charter of the United Nations, to
act contrary to the laws of humanity
and to commit a crime against man-
kind and its civilization.”

Under the proposal, the Secretary-
General would ascertain the views of
member governments on the possibility
of convening a special conference for

signing a convention on the prohibi-
tion of the use of nuclear and thermo-
nuclear weapons for war purposes and
would report to the sixteenth session
of the Assembly.

Explaining the draft resolution, the
representative of Ethiopia, Ato Had-
dis Alemayehou, regarded it as clear,
straightforward and non-controversial.
The majority of states, including the
great powers, he said, were still parties
to the international instruments which
it cited, so that a declaration prohibit-
ing the use of weapons of mass de-
struction, such as the sponsors pro-
posed regarding nuclear and thermo-
nuclear weapons, would be only a re-
affirmation of their position for those
states.

The sponsors believed that the first
and second operative paragraphs
should be considered independently of
each other: thus, whether the con-
vention provided for in the second
paragraph was to be signed or not, the
declaration contained in the first para-
graph would remain unaffected.

“We did not think it necessary or
expedient,” he added, “to place a
time-limit, at this stage, for the sign-
ing of a convention. We thought that
it would perhaps be advisable to leave
the Secretary-General and the member
governments the question of choosing
the appropriate time for signing such
convention. My delegation believes
that a better and calmer political at-
mosphere than that prevailing today is
required for attempting such a deli-
cate and difficult task, and that the
declaration, if adopted, would help to
create such a calmer political at-
mosphere.”

The sponsors nevertheless believed
that, at a more propitious time, the
conclusion of a binding convention
prohibiting the use of nuclear and
thermonuclear energy for war pur-
poses and providing for its exclusive
use for peaceful purposes “is a neces-
sary condition for the survival of man-
kind and civilization and for a sure
victory of man over poverty, disease
and ignorance, and that it must there-
fore be kept alive on the agenda of
the General Assembly until its com-
pletion.” That was why a report by
the Secretary-General to the sixteenth
session was proposed.

The draft resolution, Mr. Alemaye-
hou observed, was in a category of
its own among the many draft resolu-
tions before the Committee. It did not
attempt to formulate guiding prin-
ciples for disarmament negotiations,

and it did not contain recommenda-
tions for the cessation of tests or for
the prohibition of the dissemination of
nuclear or thermonuclear weapons.
But it did contain positive declarations
by the Assembly intended to create
a more propitious political and psy-
chological climate necessary for the
negotiation and conclusion of binding
agreements in the various fields of
disarmament.

The production, testing and dis-
semination of nuclear and thermonu-
clear weapons had a single purpose—
the use of such weapons in war. But
if their use for war purposes was pro-
hibited, there was no point in produc-
ing them, in testing them or in dis-
seminating them. The proposed decla-
ration, therefore, he argued, should
facilitate agreements—in the negotia-
tions already undertaken and those
to be undertaken in the near future—
on the cessation of tests and on dis-
armament.

Despite criticism that the proposal
had no binding force and therefore
had doubtful practical value, Mr.
Alemayehou contended that if it was
adopted by the 99-member Assembly
and was backed by worldwide public
opinion, it would exert a tremendous
moral force which would be as effec-
tive as binding conventions. He there-
fore appealed for its unanimous adop-
tion.

Five Other) Proposals)

There were five other draft resolu-
tions on the subject of nuclear weap-
ons. One, sponsored by Poland, cov-
ered both the discontinuance of nu-
clear weapons tests and the prevention
of the wider dissemination of nuclear
weapons. Another, sponsored by Ire-
land, with Ghana, Japan, Mexico and
Morocco as co-sponsors, dealt only
with the dissemination of such weap-
ons; while two others dealt exclusively
with nuclear and thermonuclear tests.
One of these was sponsored by Au-
stria, India and Sweden, and the
other by 26 members—Afghanistan,
Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cyprus,
Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya,
Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia,
Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia,
Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Su-
dan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic,
Venezuela, Yemen and Yugoslavia. A
fifth draft resolution, sponsored by
Poland, proposed universal dissemina-
tion of information on the conse-
quences of a nuclear war.

Tests and Territorial Limits:
Poland’s Proposal

The Polish proposal on nuclear
weapons and tests put forth measures
which the sponsor contended would

UNR—December 1960

spc Pw emeuns Sw

os ee Ser oe ~~ mee ee yt Ss +

—an Le 2 2h

help to arrest the armaments race and
would create conditions favorable for
reaching agreement on implementing
general and complete disarmament.
Under it, the Assembly would call on
all states not to undertake any meas-
ures which could render the disarma-
ment negotiations more difficult.

It would call for successful con-
clusion of the negotiations on the ces-
sation of nuclear weapons tests and
for reaching a relevant agreement not
later than April 1, 1961. Failing that,
the problem should be immediately

submitted to the General Assembly at

a session especially convened for the

purpose. The Assembly would also re-

quest the powers possessing nuclear
weapons to refrain from conducting
nuclear tests until an agreement on
the cessation of such tests was reached.

The draft resolution then proposed

that the Assembly should call for a

territorial limitation on the most dan-

gerous types of weapons, to be im-

posed by the states themselves as fol-

lows:
states manufacturing and possessing
nuclear weapons should not partici-
‘\ pate in any form in the preparation
/ for the production of such weapons
| by other states and should not make
them accessible or deliver them to
other states;
states not possessing nuclear weap-
ons should refrain from accepting
them from other states and should
not initiate their manufacture or pre-
pare for it, either in their own territory
or in the territory of other states;

states should refrain from setting up
military bases in the territories of
foreign states and from introducing
into them and establishing there instal-
lations for missile and nuclear weap-
ons;

states where there are no foreign
military bases or foreign installations
for missile and nuclear weapons should
not permit their introduction or es-
tablishment;

states which do not possess their
own missile and nuclear installations
should refrain from establishing them,
and states which have only com-
menced construction of such instal-
lations should not proceed with it.

Jozef Winiewicz, of Poland, told
the Committee that all the proposed
measures were simple and could be
implemented immediately. Strictly
speaking, they were not measures of
disarmament, which should be dealt
with separately; their purpose was
merely to halt the arms race in order
to facilitate negotiations and to create
conditions favorable to the conclus-
ion of a disarmament agreement, just
as military operations had to be
Stopped prior to the conclusion of a

UNR—December 1960

peace treaty. The ultimate aim, of
course, should be general and com-
plete disarmament, for no half-meas-
ures such as the qualitative or quanti-
tative reduction of armaments could
create a lasting feeling of security or
prevent war, he declared.

Suspension of Tests:
Two Separate Proposals

India was a co-sponsor of both the
three-power and the 26-power draft
resolutions on the suspension of nu-
clear and thermonuclear tests. Both
proposals were substantially the same,
for they both urged “the states con-
cerned”—the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom and the United States—to
build on the progress already achieved
in their Geneva negotiations on sus-
pending such tests under international
control so that an early agreement
might be reached; to continue their
present voluntary suspension of such
tests; and to report to the Disarma-
ment Commission and to the General
Assembly the results of their negotia-
tions. The 26-power draft resolution
was somewhat broader, for it proposed
urging other states besides the nu-
clear powers concerned to refrain
from undertaking such tests.

V. K. Krishna Menon, of India, re-
minded the Committee that, although
considerable progress had been made
and the areas of disagreement had
been appreciably narrowed as a re-
sult of the protracted negotiations at
Geneva, there were still reasons for
apprehension, for whether nuclear tests
were carried out in the sky, on the
ground or underground, the fallout
they produced was harmful to man
in varying degrees.

The main differences, he said, con-
cerned the definition of the proposed
threshold in regard to underground
tests, the composition of the control
commission, the apparatus of adminis-
tration, and identification systems.
There was also serious disagreement
concerning the duration of the mora-
torium on underground tests. In view
of the advances that had been made,
however, there was no justification for
a resumption of explosions for pur-
poses of research, he declared.

India realized that an ideal agree-
ment was perhaps not immediately at-
tainable but believed that any resump-
tion of test explosions would be a
great setback to the cause of peace
and particularly to confidence. Any
progress toward the cessation of nu-
clear tests would be an important step
forward in the field of disarmament as
a whole. Because nuclear experimenta-
tion affected the population of the
whole world, it had become an inter-

national problem, not one merely of
national defence.

Dissemination of Weapons:
Five-Power Draft

The draft resolution sponsored
jointly by Ireland, Ghana, Japan,
Mexico and Morocco proposed tem-
porary and voluntary measures to
avoid aggravation of “the urgent dan-
ger that now exists that an increase
in the number of states possessing nu-
clear weapons may occur, aggravating
international tension and the difficulty
of maintaining world peace, and thus
rendering more difficult the attain-
ment of general disarmament agree-
ment.”

It noted with regret that the Ten-
Nation Disarmament Committee had
not found it possible to consider the
problem, and it stressed the necessity
of an international agreement, subject
to inspection and control, whereby the
powers producing nuclear weapons
would refrain from relinquishing con-
trol of such weapons to any nation not
possessing them and whereby powers
not possessing such weapons would
refrain from manufacturing them.

The specific measures which it pro-
posed the Assembly should call for
were:

all governments should make every
effort to achieve permanent agreement
on the prevention of the wider dis-
semination of nuclear weapons;

as a temporary and voluntary meas-
ure pending the negotiation of such a
permanent agreement, powers produc-
ing such weapons should refrain from
relinquishing control of them to any
nation not possessing them and from
transmitting to it the information
necessary for their manufacture;

on a similar temporary and volun-
tary basis, powers not possessing such
weapons should refrain from manu-
facturing them and from otherwise at-
tempting to acquire them.

Frank Aiken, of Ireland, told the
Committee that the first and most
urgent step to prevent deterioration of
the existing situation was to stop the
spread of nuclear weapons “now.”
The second step, he believed, was to
establish disarmed areas of law, such
as the Middle East, Central Europe,
Central West Africa and perhaps a
group of countries in South East Asia.

As for nuclear weapons, he said
that no legitimate interest of any
power, nuclear or non-nuclear, would
be served by the further dissemination
of such weapons. The present nuclear
powers had so much to lose and so
little to gain that none of them would
deliberately start a war which would
involve their own destruction. How-

\ a

ever, with every addition to the circle
of countries possessing those weap-
ons, the greater their danger of falling
into the hands of a power-drunk ma-
niac or a maniac seeking power.
Production of nuclear weapons was
becoming cheaper and more efficient,
and it would be more difficult for non-
nuclear governments to resist the de-
mands of their armies for nuclear
equipment; but the Irish delegation
was confident that if the nuclear
powers undertook not to give nuclear
weapons to non-nuclear powers, the
non-nuclear powers would reciprocate
by undertaking not to make them.

Information on Nuclear War:
Polish Draft Resolution

The preamble of the Polish draft
resolution on the universal dissemina-
tion of information on the conse-
quences of a nuclear war proposed
that the General Assembly should set
forth these considerations:

a nuclear war would threaten man-
kind with unprecedented destruction
and misery;

the main task of the United Nations
is to prevent armed conflicts in the
world, whether started deliberately or
not: therefore the United Nations
must find effective ways and means,
must undertake initiatives and must
exert efforts aimed at banning nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion, the use of which would turn the
world into ruins;

world public opinion, if acquainted
with the conclusions of authoritative
representatives of science, as well as
the attitude of peoples awakened to
the consequences of war could con-
stitute an important factor in bringing
about an agreement on general and
complete disarmament.

In order to understand as fully as
possible the consequences which a
modern war waged with nuclear weap-
ons might bring to nations and man-
kind, to civilization and to world
economy, and in order to make those
consequences known to all peoples,
particularly in the states which possess
nuclear weapons, the draft resolution
proposed the establishment of a com-
mittee of an unspecified number of
member governments, each of which
would designate one representative and
provide him with a team of consult-
ants specialized in the theory and prac-
tice of physics, chemistry, medicine
and technical sciences.

On the basis of the personal knowl-
edge of its members and the materials
available, as well as on the basis of
data provided by governments on their
own initiative, the committee would
prepare a report on the consequences
of the use of nuclear weapons, in

particular with regard to human life
and health and to the material and
cultural heritage of mankind.

The committee would be requested
to prepare its report by June 1, 1961,
and to transmit it for use to the gov-
ernments of all member states of the
United Nations, as well as to the organ
which would carry on disarmament
negotiations. Those governments would
be requested to publish the report in
their languages and to distribute it
widely by all possible means. The re-
port would be placed on the agenda
of the sixteenth session of the Assem-
bly for consideration.

Jozef Winiewicz, of Poland, told the
First Committee that the work of the
proposed committee would not mean
that new scientific research should be
undertaken, but simply that the re-
search so far conducted should be col-
lated and summed up. The committee
might be composed of 12 or 15 mem-
bers broadly representative of the
three main groups of countries in the
United Nations. He hoped the pro-
posal would find support, because the
work of the United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation had shown how valuable
a study on the consequences of a nu-
clear war could be.

Broadening of 10-Nation Group:
Soviet Draft Resolution

Early in the session the Soviet
Union submitted a proposal to
broaden the membership of the Ten-
Nation Disarmament Committee to in-
clude representatives of Ghana, India,
Indonesia, Mexico and the United
Arab Republic in addition to the rep-
resentatives of the existing members,
Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia,
France, Italy, Poland, Romania, the
USSR, the United Kingdom and the
United States.

It was that committee which, in the
Soviet Union’s view, should be as-
signed the task of drawing up a treaty
for general and complete disarmament.
Without representatives of states un-
committed to any bloc, Valerian Zorin
told the First Committee, the Com-
mittee of Ten could not be entrusted
with the negotiation of a treaty. The
problem was a matter of concern to
those states, and their views could
carry much weight. Therefore the ad-
dition of those five uncommitted states
would be in line with the principle of
fair representation of the three groups
of states in the world and with that of
geographical distribution.

For Assisting Negotiations:
Three-Power Proposal

Canada, Norway and Sweden jointly
sponsored a draft resolution recom-

mending immediate establishment by
the Disarmament Commission of an
ad hoc Committee on Disarmament,
to be composed of a limited number
of states which do not possess nuclear
weapons, selected on the basis of
equitable geographical distribution.

With the assistance of experts as
appropriate, the ad hoc Committee
would urgently examine ways and
means of assisting the resumption of
negotiations and facilitating the attain-
ment of the goal of general and com-
plete disarmament under effective in-
ternational control, on the basis of
available documentation, including the
records of the current session of the
General Assembly, with special refer-
ence to the important question of prin-
ciples which should guide disarma-
ment negotiations and the specific sug-
gestions by member states during the
current session of the Assembly with
regard to disarmament.

The ad hoc Committee would also
consult, as appropriate, with the four
Governments which established the
Ten-Nation Committee on Disarma-
ment—that is, France, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom and the
United States—and would be asked to
report to the Disarmament Commis-
sion not later than April 1, 1961.

Howard C. Green, of Canada, ex-
plained that the sponsors were not
seeking to endorse the position of any
one side but to ensure the restarting
of negotiations as soon as possible and
to facilitate the attainment of the goal
of general and complete disarmament
under effective international control.
They did not limit themselves to a
mere exhortation, but sought to
strengthen the influence of the United
Nations on the course of negotiations
by bringing the opinions of the middle
and small powers to bear. In the event
of a war, most of those powers would
be unable to escape nuclear bombard-
ment; therefore they were vitally in-
terested in the success of such negotia-
tions.

It was proposed also that the pre-
paratory steps should be taken at
once: the drift away from serious
talks and in the direction of sterile
propaganda debates had to be checked.
The basic. motives of the sponsors
were summed up in the words of the
preamble which indicated that they
were “disturbed” that disarmament
negotiations were not proceeding de-
spite agreement on the common goal
of general and complete disarmament.

The draft resolution reaffirmed the
continuing and ultimate responsibility
of the United Nations in the field of
disarmament, but, as Mr. Green
pointed out, took no particular stand
on what forum should be used for
negotiation, since that was a matter

UNR—December 1960

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on which the negotiators themselves
had to agree.

The proposal went on to express the
hope that every effort would be made
to achieve general and complete dis-
armament under effective international
control by the earliest possible con-
tinuation of international negotiations
in such a body as might be agreed on,
but the negotiators were asked to con-
sider the appointment of one or more
impartial officers to assist them in the
negotiations. That might be an im-
partial chairman, as Canada had sug-
gested, or, as some representatives had
proposed, an impartial vice-chairman
or rapporteur.

The success of the ad hoc Com-
mittee, Mr. Green believed, would de-
pend on the energy and earnestness
of the representatives and on the co-
operation which they received from
the negotiating group. There was no
question of expecting miracles but
rather of enabling the United Nations
to focus attention on the future of
negotiations. The joint draft resolu-
tion was in no way incompatible
with the other proposals before the
Committee, he contended.

Iceland’s Amendments

Iceland submitted amendments to
the joint draft resolution sponsored by
Canada, Norway and Sweden. The ef-
fect of the amendments would be that
the Assembly would hope that the
negotiations would be continued in the
Ten-Nation Committee on Disarma-
ment, under the chairmanship of the
Chairman of the Disarmament Com-
mission, with the assistance of a Vice-
Chairman and Rapporteur to be elect-
ed by the Disarmament Commission.
Those officers would have no vote in
the Ten-Nation Committee; their
duties would be limited to trying to
facilitate negotiations and the work of
the Ten-Nation Committee.

Thor Thors, of Iceland, explained
that the appointment of the three of-
ficers would make it unnecessary to
establish the proposed ad hoc Com-
mittee. He foresaw that such a com-
mittee, in order to satisfy considera-
tions of geographical distribution,
among others, would probably have
to comprise about 20 members. It
would run into endless debates, which
would only delay still further the re-
sumption of contacts between the
great powers, the only possible source
of practical results. The Committee of
Ten, which had been established by
the great powers themselves, was the
organ which should be set in motion
again as soon as possible.

The terms of reference proposed
for the ad hoc Committee in the three-
power draft resolution, he said, in-
cluding the submission of a report to

UNR—December 1960

Proposal for Expert Group to Study Effects
of Disarmament Adopted by Second Committee

fy expert study that would analyze
the economic and social effects of
disarmament has been proposed by the
General Assembly’s Second (Eco-
nomic and Financial) Committee. A
group of expert-consultants would pre-
pare the study on behalf of the Secre-
tary-General who would report the
findings to the Economic and Social
Council in the summer of 1962. A
draft resolution to that effect, original-
ly proposed by Pakistan and later
amended by Lebanon and the Philip-
pines, was approved in committee by
66 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.
The purpose of the study, as speci-
fied in the draft resolution, is to ex-
amine (1) the national economic and
social consequences of disarmament
in countries with different economic
systems and at different stages of eco-
nomic development; (2) the possible
development of structural imbalances

in national economies and the adop-
tion of possible corrective measures,
including expanded capital assistance;
(3) effects on world trade, and es-
pecially the trade of the poorer coun-
tries; (4) utilization of resources re-
leased by disarmament for the de-
velopment of poorer countries.
Pakistan’s representative, Wazir Ali,
in introducing the draft resolution,
said that a reduction of military ex-
penditures was certain to set in mo-
tion changes in domestic economies
and in world trade. Underdeveloped
countries, in particular, might be con-
cerned with a possible decline in the
demand for raw materials. A study of
the effects of disarmament might
therefore be of special importance to
the poorer countries. The study, he
said, should outline solutions for the
transitional period between wartime
(Continued on next page)

the Disarmament Commission not
later than April 1, 1961, should be
given to the three persons whose ap-
pointment was suggested in Iceland’s
amendments. It might be advisable, he
added, that the Vice-Chairman and the
Rapporteur should represent Africa
and Asia.

Panels of Experts:
United Kingdom Proposal

The United Kingdom sponsored a
proposal to establish panels of tech-
nical experts to examine the scientific,
technical and administrative aspects
of control and to submit a progress
report to the Disarmament Commis-
sion within six months.

They would be experts in the scien-
tific, military and administrative fields
and would report on the capabilities
and limitations of systems of inspec-
tion and control which would be ef-
fective and fair to all concerned in
relation to the following measures of
disarmament:

the cessation of the production of
fissile material for use in weapons and
the transfer of existing material to
peaceful purposes;

the preventing of the clandestine
storage of nuclear weapons and of fis-
sile material intended for use in weap-
ons;

measures to reduce the dangers of
surprise attack and war by miscalcula-
tion;

the reduction to agreed levels of
armed forces and armaments;

the progressive reduction and eli-
mination of weapons of mass destruc-
tion and their means of delivery;

the prevention of the manufacture
of chemical and biological weapons;

measures leading to the use of outer
space for peaceful purposes only.

David Ormsby-Gore, of the United
Kingdom, told the First Committee
that, in submitting that proposal, his
Government was not putting control
before disarmament. The highly tech-
nical matters involved could be studied
without prejudice to such questions as
the sequence of implementation of the
various disarmament measures, which
were matters for political negotiation.
Furthermore, such political negotia-
tions did not need to await the out-
come of the technical studies.

In the Ten-Nation Committee, he
pointed out, neither side would have
been able to say, if pressed, what its
proposals involved in terms of detailed
practical arrangements. And, inasmuch
as no state would be willing to com-
mit itself to any disarmament scheme
until it knew what was involved and
to what extent its security was safe-
guarded, preliminary technical studies
of a detailed nature were clearly es-
sential. His delegation had no set view
on the composition of the proposed
technical groups, although they obvi-
ously should include representatives
of the two principal military alliances.
There was also validity to the observa-
tion that other countries were also
deeply concerned and wished to make
a contribution.

Expert Group
(Continued from previous page)

and peacetime production. To be
fruitful, it should avoid raising con-
tentious issues.

The Pakistani proposal was sup-
ported by speakers from Eastern
Europe. Latin American delegates
favored the resolution but feared that
disarmament might not be achieved
and that the study would therefore
serve no useful purpose. Speakers
from western Europe had misgivings
about raising hopes that might not be
fulfilled. Eventually, all countries, in-
cluding the United States, indicated
their willingness to cooperate in the
study.

For Strengthening Activities
of Economic Commissions

A 25-nation proposal calling for the
strengthening of the activities of the
regional economic commissions of the
United Nations was adopted unani-
mously in the General Assembly’s
Economic and Financial Committee.
The Secretary-General would be asked
to make every effort to promote and
assist the effective functioning in par-
ticular of the secretariat of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa. The
other regional commissions are for
Asia and the Far East, Latin America
and Europe.

Member states would be asked to
give still stronger support to the re-
gional commissions which, as is point-
ed out, are playing an increasingly im-
portant role as focal centres for the
promotion of economic and social de-
velopment and as a meeting ground
for experts.

Portrait of Trygve Lie
Presented to United Nations

A portrait of Trygve Lie by the
Norwegian artist Harald Dal has been
presented to the United Nations by
ten Norwegian friends of Mr. Lie in
commemoration of his service as first
Secretary-General. Mr. Lie himself
was among those attending the cere-
mony in the executive office of Secre-
tary-General Dag Hammarskjold,
where the portrait is hung. Norway’s
permanent representative to the United
Nations, Sievert A. Nielsen, made the
presentation.

Mr. Hammarskjold told Mr. Lie
that the portrait “will, in the light of
my own experiences, always remind
me of all the difficulties you had to
encounter and to overcome in what,
on my arrival in New York in the
spring of 1953, you yourself called
‘the most impossible job in the world.’ ”

United Nations Digest

DATES - MEETINGS - DECISIONS: DOCUMENTS

SECURITY COUNCIL

Elections to International Court*

Meetings 909, 910
November 16, 17

Elected unanimously Sir Gerald Gray
Fitzmaurice, of United Kingdom, to fill
unexpired term of late Judge Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht, also of United Kingdom,
who died May 8, 1960; term expires Feb-
ruary 5, 1964;

Elected for 9-year term to replace five
judges whose terms expire February 5,
1961: Philip C. Jessup, United States (11
votes); Vladimir Koretsky, USSR (9
votes); Gaetano Morelli, Italy (7 votes);
Kotaro Tanaka, Japan (6 votes); Jose
Luis Bustamente y Rivero, Peru (10
* Elections to Court take place simultaneously

in General Assembly and Security Council
and require absolute majorities in both organs.

votes}. [Outgoing judges: Helge Klae-
stad, Norway, current President of Court;

Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan;
Green H. Hackworth, United States; En-
rique C. Armand-Ugon, Uruguay; Feodor
Kojevnikov, USSR.]

Documents: §/4457(A/4449) and Corr.
1; S/4474/Rev.1(A/4465/Rev.1) and
Add.1, 2; S/4479(A/4475) and Add.1;
S/4483/Rev.1(A/4477/Rev.1).

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