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The West’s increasing reliance upon thermo- 
nuclear weapons was emphasized last year in a 
historic British White Paper on defense. Stating 
that it is economically impossible for Britain to 
be strong in both nuclear and conventional arma- 
ments, this report announced that over the next 
few years the British government would radi- 
cally reduce the size of its conventional arma- 
ments in order to develop more fully its atomic 
weapons. In this way, it concluded, Great Britain 
would make a “modest” contribution toward the 
security of the West. 

When this policy was announced, some serious 
questions about its implications were raised. The 
London Economist wondered if it really covered 
“all the reasonable political and military risks,” 
and decided it did not. The dilemma it seemed 
to pose—either atomic war or surrender—was too 
cruel. No area of maneuver was left for conven- 
tional response to a local aggression. Because, by 
making every decision one of all or nothing at all, 
a policy of total reliance upon total weapons ac- 
tually increases the chances of “limited” out- 

Perhaps it was in answer to such problems that 
a new Defense White Paper was issued by the 
British government last month. The new docu- 
ment has received remarkably little public atten- 
tion in this country, but it demands most serious 

ublic attention because it spells out, with horri- 
Eine explicitness, the implications of the 1957 

Mr. Duncan Sandys, the British Minister of 
Defense, says in the new Paper that Britain has 
a growing force of bombers which are now being 
equipped with megaton bombs and, in addition, 
will soon have intermediate range missiles. Con- 
ventional forces, at the same time, are continually 
being reduced. (All this by way of implementing 
the 1957 White Paper). And so, Mr. Sandys an- 
nounces, if the Soviet Union were to launch an 
attack on any Western nation with conventional 
forces only, the West would hit back with its 
strategic nuclear weapons. 

Thus, “logically,” almost academically, the 
doctrine of ultimate deterrence is set forth and 
adopted by this nation’s major ally. The Russian 
leaders have been warned: any “major attack” 
(whatever that may mean) against any “Western 
nation” (whatever that may include), even with 
conventional weapons, would mean _ thermo- 
nuclear reprisal against the Soviet Union. With 
such a fate in store for them, the White Paper 
seems to ask, would Russia’s leaders ever dare 
to attack? 

Obviously, the most grave issues, both strate- 
gic and moral, are involved here. British critics 
of Mr. Sandys’ document point out that, strate- 
gically, the doctrine of ultimate deterrence is 
dangerous bravado. 

The Socialist New Statesman, in an editorial 
titled “The Logic of Annihilation” argues: “If 
Mr. Sandys’ deterrent is employed, it will in- 
evitably lead to the extermination of life on these 
islands . . . No British Prime Minister could pos- 
sibly take such a decision. The strategy of the 
deterrent is a purely theoretical concept de- 
signed to meet a contingency which, the politi- 
cians believe, will never occur. But if it does, the 
deterrent will immediately be revealed for what 
it is: a bluff... And once the monumental bluff 
of the Great Deterrent were called, the West 
[lacking sufficient conventional forces] would 
have no alternatives but to accept a last-minute 
Munich settlement . . . Hence the political con- 
sequence of [this] defense policy is a foreign 
policy based on appeasement.” 

The Conservative Spectator makes a similar 
case: “The threat is empty: everybody, including 
Mr. Sandys, knows that H-bombs will not be 
launched from this country if a conventional war 
begins. But Mr. Khrushchev may not realize this 
.. « He may conceivably believe . . . that we 
really intend to hit back with strategic nuclear 
weapons if, say, war breaks out anywhere along 

MaRcH 1958 

the Curtain . . . If it should, [he] might feel 
that it would be wise to obliterate us before we 
decided whether or not to carry out the White 
Paper's policy.” 

Disturbing as the doctrine of ultimate deter- 
rence is from the standpoint of strategy, how- 
ever, it is infinitely more disturbing the 
standpoint of any recognizable morality. Strate- 
gically, the doctrine is at least debatable; morally, 
it is self-evidently pernicious. As baldly stated 
in the British White Paper, it represents a public 
abandonment by a Western government of any 
pretense to ethical sensitivity in defense policy. 
Here is an official endorsement of power di- 
vorced from moral concern. 

Moralists have only begun to reconsider their 
traditional teaching on the “just war” in relation 
to nuclear weapons of mass-destruction. But it is 
doubtful that they could justify the actual use 
of these weapons under any circumstances—even 
as a last-resort reply to thermonuclear attack. 
Because, however irrelevant much of the tradi- 

In the Magazines 

With the opening of the annual season for debate on 
foreign aid come two articles of especial interest, one 
by Barbara Ward in The New York Times Magazine 
of February 28, the other by Oscar Gass in the Feb- 
ruary issue of Commentary. Both writers marshall the 
impressive evidence of figures and statistics to sup- 
port their conviction that the U.S. record for foreign 
aid expenditures is far from what it should be, and 
that, unless there is immediate and total revision of 
our now short-sighted policy along the lines of some 
major, long-term effort, we shall fail to meet the de- 
mands of the present world crisis. 

In her article, “The Great Challenge Is Not the 
Sputniks,” Miss Ward sees the new situation as re- 
sulting from “the falling away of world trade in the 
wake of American business stagnation”—a situation 
further aggravated by Soviet initiative. “. . . The 
new conditions of 1958 might best be summed up by 
saying that, while the Russians have evolved a long- 
term economic strategy for the Asian fringe (and be- 
yond it, for the underdeveloped areas everywhere) 
the Western powers appear to have no general policy 
of any sort.” 

Mr. Gass’s report, “The United States and the 
Poorest Peoples,” is a closer look at the mismanage- 
ment, delusion and apathy that lie behind Washing- 

tional “just war” teaching may now be, one of 
its principles remains luminously clear, from the 
standpoint, even, of common sense. The princi- 
ple is this: even a defensive action, to be morally 
justifiable, must hold more promise of good than 
of evil. But what promise, except universal sui- 
cide, does any war fought with massive nuclear 
weapons hold? 

Agonizing problems are involved here, both 
for the moralist and the statesman. For both of 
them, the modern situation poses dilemmas that 
resist clear-cut answers. Given the fact of Soviet 
power, no responsible moralist can easily move 
from the summit of principle to the ground of 
practice and advocate that, here and now, the 
Western powers should unilaterally disarm. The 
practical consequences of this would likely be 
the world dominance of the Soviet Union. But 
no Western statesman, either, can responsibly 
embrace a strategy of naked power completely 
sundered from the moral imperatives of the civi- 
lized tradition. And this is what the doctrine of 
ultimate deterrence, now so casually but so omi- 
nously set forth in the 1958 British White Paper, 
seems to do. 

ton’s lack of policy. As an economic consultant to 
several of the needy countries, the author is in a posi- 
tion to lay open the entire record—of their side as 
well as ours—and his view is a realistic one. “With the 
best will in the world,” he writes, “a society like ours 
can effectively assist only countries with a national 
leadership which desires assistance and is prepared 
to bear the first responsibility for thinking, planning 
and organization. An underdeveloped country has to 
give its best to the task of its own development; then 
we can be helpful in a supporting role, and more in 
resources than personnel.” 

Kenneth Thompson, writing on “Moral and Politi- 
cal Aspects of the Present Crisis” in the February 17 
issue of Christianity and Crisis, explores our mood in 
the current phase of the Cold War, along with some 
of its causes and implications. He insists that we find 
some approach to policy which is neither “a severely 
military view of power” nor “a utopian moralism that 
offers few criteria for measuring the moral aspects of 
any problem,” and he calls for a revival of “the art of 
diplomatic conversations.” 


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An Age of Enthusiasm Seems to Have Passed 

William Pfaff 

It is difficult not to see elements of desperation and 
despair in much that is being said about the interna- 
tional situation. This is a time when events seem in 
the saddle; when attempts to control the technology 
of destruction seem all but hopeless; when American 
policies founded largely upon good will seem failing, 
and a major part of the world turns from us in dis- 
illusionment and often in hatred. 

The debate over our policy has deepened in recent 
months; and in what has been said it is possible to 
distinguish two kinds of comment. There is the evalu- 
ation of specific policies, often including remarks on 
our national temper and the fundamentals of our 
policy, but focussed upon issues, The Rockefeller and 
Gaither reports (the latter so far as it has been made 
known) deal with measures to be taken, rather than 
with the meaning of our policy itself. Then there 
have been statements which implicitly question our 
policy itself in its conception, style and execution. 

The most spectacular of the latter were the Reith 
Lectures, delivered over the BBC by George F. Ken- 
nan and published this month in this country by 
Harper's. These talks by the former American am- 
bassador to Moscow had an entirely unexpected im- 
pact on European opinion, and the positions argued 
by Mr. Kennan have found substantial support in this 
country as well as abroad. Much that he said has 
had currency before this, but it has not been given 
such an eloquent and comprehensive statement. 

At about the same time that Mr. Kennan was speak- 
ing to the British public, Dr. Robert Oppenheimer 
was publishing in Foreign Affairs (January) what he 
called “An Inward Look.” This was an analysis—not 
a very optimistic analysis—of the condition of our 
culture and the standards of our education. 

Dr. Oppenheimer wrote in the context of the inter- 
national crisis and his remarks raised very serious 
questions about the meaning of our policy, and par- 
ticularly about the quality of our government's intel- 
lectual response to a profoundly changing situation. 
In a way, Dr. Oppenheimer went more deeply than 
Mr. Kennan, for he defined a cultural problem to 

Mr. Pfaff is an American journalist who has reported 
frequently from Asia and the Middle East. 

which Kennan, in his lectures on the political state 
of the world, was implicitly responding. 

Mr. Kennan’s talks were quite specific. In addition 
to Soviet affairs, he dealt with Eastern Europe, the 
non-European world, the military situation, and 
NATO, and with general issues in the context of these 
concrete situations. But his proposals were tentative 
(“what I have tried to suggest here is not what gov- 
ernments should do, but what they should think 
about”) and the weight of his comment (and the 
reason for its reception) was a general critique. 

The interdependence of peoples—fostered by mod- 
ern communications—was once regarded as a hopeful 
thing, but is proving rather to be a very dangerous 
one. Little can happen in the relations of two states 
without the world feeling some repercussions. 
Weapons technology has so enlarged the disasters 
within our power to create that no one in the world 
can feel altogether secure. It has been argued that 
nuclear weapons have created a situation new in 
kind: “there is no alternative to peace” is the facile 
statement of it. 

Similarly, the development of communications has 
created an unprecedented political situation. There 
are new political and intellectual as well as military 
dimensions. Dr. Oppenheimer says, “It seems to me 
that both the variety and rate of change in our lives 
are likely to increase, that our knowledge will keep 
on growing, perhaps at a faster and faster rate, and 
that change itself will tend to be accelerated. In de- 
scribing this world, there will probably be no syn- 
opses to spare us the effort of detailed learning. I 
do not think it likely that we are in a brief interval 
of change and apparent disorder which will soon be 
ended. The cognitive problem seems to me unprece- 
dented in scope, one not put in this vast form to any 
earlier society, and one for which only the most 
general rules of behavior can be found in the past.” 

Mr. Kennan, in his lectures, makes an instinctually 
conservative response: in recommending a very wide 
political “disengagement” he would resist a trend that 
tends to drive political affairs beyond rational control. 

The second problem he raises is not unrelated. It 
is the place of non-rational elements in the creation 
and execution of foreign policy. “Non-rational ele- 
ments” is a heavy way to put it, but I mean to include 
ideology, morality and sentiment. Kennan’s strictures 
on morality in foreign policy were widely discussed 
at the time his Realities of American Foreign Policy 
was published. He has insisted that when he says 
“morality,” he means precisely that; that while he 
is no enemy of ethics, he has the gravest doubts about 
founding foreign policies on anything other than the 
pragmatic considerations of a nation’s self-interest. 

Sentiment and emotion have always had a role in 
policy, but the size of the role has been swollen by 
modern communications and, of course, by democ- 
racy. Toward totalitarian ideology, which has so 
corrupted modern politics, we can do little other than 
attempt to blunt and contain its irrationality. But to 
have irrational, or non-rational, elements playing a 
very large part in our own policy formulations is dis- 
turbing to a man like Kennan, who regards reason 
and pragmatism as the only safe foundation for a 
foreign policy. 

It was in the 1940s and ‘50s that the role of senti- 
ment in American foreign policy reached full-tide. 
Those were the days of the Atlantic Charter and the 
creation of the United Nations; of unconditional sur- 
render; of the liberal ascendancy in American politics. 

There were many parts to the mood of those times, 
sober and prudent elements as well as profoundly 
generous ones, but the dominant note was progres- 
sivist optimism—a conviction that evil could be lo- 
calized and stamped out, leaving “the good people” 
to live in peace. 

It was in this mood that contemporary American 
foreign policy had its origins. The policy was ver- 
satile. It posed a hard challenge—containment—to 
Soviet expansionism, and in Asia and the Middle 
East conducted a policy of deep involvement, of 
economic, technical and military aid intended to assist 
nations in constructing or re-constructing their econo- 
mies and improving the living conditions of their 

The policy succeeded in the first of the postwar 
years, Despite the American failures in dealing with 
the Chinese Communist revolution and the Palestin- 
ean dispute, the Asian belief in American good will 
and disinterestedness prevailed. We made a con- 
structive contribution to Asian interests, our reputa- 
tion was good, and our own interest in the stability 
of these nations was consequently served. 

Trouble, of course, was inevitable. Involvement 
cannot but carry with it rather serious frictions. But 


the trouble did not assume serious proportions until 
the 1950s. Since then it has multiplied until today 
the American situation in Asia and the Middle East is 
one which must dismay any American who visits the 

Generalizations are always vulnerable, but they can 
be suggestive, and I would propose these: The liberal 
Asian policy of the United States succeeded in the 
"40s because the optimistic vision of the policy was 
in large measure shared by the leaders and intellec- 
tuals of Asia, and the policy was confidently executed 
by the United States. There was a belief in the policy, 
its assumptions had the sympathy of influential 
Asians, and in practice it met the self-interest of 
Asian nations. Events, however, shake any system. 
The primary reason for the loss of efficacy of Ameri- 
can policy was an American loss of confidence in that 
policy. The critical event was the presidential elec- 
tion of 1952. 

James Reston once remarked that the postwar 
American alliance with Europe was in fact an alliance 
between European governments and the Democratic 
party. The Republican party, out of office for twenty 
years, assumed national power with no clearly formu- 
lated alternative to existing foreign policy, but with 
a distrust of the assumptions of that existing policy. 
The party had devoted a major part of its energy for 
two decades to criticism of the Democratic conduct 
of foreign affairs. It had a profound distrust of pro- 
gressivism, even though its own programs leaned 
heavily upon what was, in fact, the dominant Ameri- 
can mood. 

Those Republicans who enthusiastically supported 
international involvements made up a minority of the 
party, and while they sponsored and elected an “in- 
ternationalist” President, they did so only through a 
short-lived alliance with the remainder of the party. 
There is little point in reviewing the battles over the 
Korean truce, Senator McCarthy, foreign aid and the 
balanced budget. The result was that a visionary 
policy lost its élan. 

Mr. Dulles himself came from a background pro- 
foundly different from those of his Democratic prede- 
cessors. A religious man, he had little use for the 
clichés of progressivist optimism. A man whose life 
had been spent in international law and diplomacy, 
one of a family with a strong diplomatic tradition, 
he had a deep respect for the element of power in 
international affairs, and a distrust of programs which 
did not have their roots in the realities of power. A 
man with the sense to recognize the risks of domestic 
politics, he intended to maintain good relations with 
Congress and the public, even if, at times, this had to 
be done at the expense of policy. In place of the 
liberal vision, Mr. Dulles had a religiously-inspired 

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confidence in the success of the right and the true. 
This seems not unlike the liberal conviction, but it is 
not at all the same thing. 

The change in the management—and in the confi- 
dence—of our policy coincided with an inevitable 
loss of momentum in the policy’s workings. Interna- 
tional relationships were changing, and American 
policy, operating within the terms established in the 
1940s, failed to change with events. 

The most critical changes—influencing Asia—came 
in East Europe and the Soviet Union. Events un- 
settled the pattern which had been imposed upon 
Europe by Stalinism and the Western response to it. 
With the pattern disturbed, it became possible to 
speculate about fundamental change. The Soviet 
Union gave some encouragement to this speculation 
while, in its actions, it attempted to control if not to 
suppress change. Mr. Dulles would have had an easier 
career had developments in the East not made libera- 
tion a real issue. 

Stalin’s death, followed by a limited relaxation of 
terror throughout the bloc, the Twentieth Congress 
of the Soviet Communist Party and the signing of the 
Austrian treaty set off an intellectual and political 
ferment which climaxed in the 1956 “October events” 
in Poland and the Hungarian Revolution. The satel- 
lite peoples had regained the national consciousness 
and confidence which had been drained from them 
by the war and by Stalinist terror. They reasserted 
their identities against the alien forms and policies 
imposed by the Soviet occupation. 

American policy was unprepared for this. Some 
rapid adjustments were made to help the Poles ($193 
million in credits and loans and a relaxation of re- 
strictions on travel and trade). But for the Hun- 
garians, there was nothing beyond words. 

Discussion had, however, earlier begun in some 
Western circles of the possibility of exploiting the 
new situation in Eastern Europe. The principal con- 
tention was that the satellites had become, militarily 
and economically, more liability than advantage to 
the Soviet Union. Hence if the Soviet Union could 
be assured of their “friendly” neutrality—a territorial 
cushion against foreign land attack—the USSR might 
be willing to negotiate a kind of Finnish status for 
them and withdraw the Red Army. Military with- 
drawal is the essential first step in any kind of sig- 
nificant change for East Europe, and now—the pro- 
ponents of this argument said—there was at least 
some possibility that it might be negotiated. 

The plan was not given serious public recognition 
in Washington. The official position was that any 

Western military concession in Europe would have 
incalculable consequences upon the security of the 
West. Unspoken until late 1957 was the missile argu- 
ment: Soviet intercontinental missiles promised to 
bring the United States under danger of attack at a 
time when the West still would have only intermedi- 
ate range missiles requiring European or African 

(There is, of course, a more general argument 
against military disengagement, voiced mainly in 
Great Britain—most recently by Air Marshal Sir John 
Slessor and G. H. Hudson. It is that the stability of 
the world situation depends upon clearly-drawn 
frontiers, The examples of Korea and Berlin are 
mentioned as instances of trouble beginning in places 
where the interests of the two great powers were not 
explicitly defined. This argument contends that with- 
drawal from Eastern and Central Europe would bring 
a time of instability and rivalry that easily could in- 
volve the prestige of the major powers.) 

These are substantial arguments, but they failed 
to prove conclusive; limited military withdrawal 
which did not involve a complete American evacua- 
tion of the European continent, North Africa and 
Great Britain, remained within the area of specula- 
tion, but the United States refused to discuss it. 

The American refusal to explore the idea of dis- 
engagement has fed the restlessness of West Euro- 
peans and the disillusionment of the people of the 
East. That there are substantial arguments against the 
plan is irrelevant so long as the world is given the 
impression that American policy is not open to argu- 
ment. Appearance can be almost as damaging as 
reality. The silence on this issue has permitted the 
Soviet Union to reap very great propaganda advan- 
tages by ceaselessly advocating a plan that it may 
never have intended to fulfill. 

More general questions are suggested by the 
American policy failures in Asia and the Middle East. 
It would be foolish to argue that any policy could 
have given us a completely satisfactory relationship 
with the new Asian and Middle Eastern nations. The 
kind of nationalism found, for example, in Egypt, is 
almost surely too extravagant for any real accommo- 
dation to be possible. The factors of hysteria, dema- 
gogy and ambition are too strong here—as in the 
politics of some other Asian and Middle Eastern 
states—for anything but an uncertain and uneasy 
relationship, even if Communism did not complicate 

America’s Asian policy under Mr. Dulles has been 
to provide military assistance and alliance against 
Communist military aggression. It has proved an un- 


satisfactory program because Soviet, Chinese or satel- 
lite invasion is regarded as a threat only in Turkey, 
Iran, Formosa, South Korea and South Viet Nam. 
A somewhat larger number of Asian states have had 
experience with Communist subversion, supported 
from abroad, but few of these have thought it ad- 
vantageous to ally themselves with the United States. 
I do not think that it is unfair to say that a number 
of those Asian and African states which are allied 
with us have signed primarily because economic and 
military air was available for the signature, and be- 
cause the American link could be useful in disputes 
which were essentially unrelated to the Communist 

There is a serious question—raised by Mr. Kennan 
among others—as to how deeply we prudently can 
involve ourselves in the affairs of Asia. However, if 
we are to involve ourselves at all, we must, to be 
effective, deal with the real concerns of these govern- 
ments. Soviet invasion is not such a concern for most 
of the non-European world. If we define our interest 
in Asia as the stability of the area, we must concern 
ourselves with the regional and national causes of in- 
stability. An insistence upon defining problems in 
Cold War terms serves only to inflate problems to 
Cold War size, to the advantage, perhaps, of the 
governments involved, but to the disadvantage of 
the United States. 

The policy of alliances has been an expression of 
something more general—of a tendency to insist that 
nations declare themselves either for us or against us, 
an impatience expressed in Mr. Dulles’ remarks on 
the morality of neutralism. It has been paralleled by 
an exercise of power: we have made use of a policy 
of economic sanctions coupled with diplomatic rela- 
tions of bare politeness to pressure neutrals whose 
neutralism inclines Eastward. This use of power has 
much precedent. But to work it must be consistent, 
and Mr. Dulles has not been able to afford con- 
sistency. While he has disapproved of neutralism, he 
has cared very much about what happens to the 

I think it is true to say that the instinct that ani- 
mates Mr. Dulles’ policy is one of moral outrage at 
Communism and its works, and the essence of the 
policy itself has been to mobilize the world against 
Communism. There is little room in this scheme for 
those who do not wish to commit themselves. The 
effect is to enlarge the power division of the world. 

It is in this that we reach the central difference 
between Mr. Dulles’ policy and the criticism put for- 
ward by Mr. Kennan. It is a matter of the scope of 
the undertaking. Mr. Dulles shares the enthusiasm 

and confidence of the liberal ascendancy, and it is 
because he too is attempting to shape something— 
to make the world into something that today it is not. 
Mr. Kennan—the conservative—shrinks from such an 
undertaking, as he shrank from the liberal zeal for 
creating a world government a decade ago. He sees 
us as engaging ourselves in affairs which we cannot 
possibly control, at a time when the momentum of 
technology and propaganda works to drive events 
away from the rational control of governments. 

Kennan’s counsel, then, is disengagement: disen- 
gagement in Europe in the hope that the East Euro- 
peans will thus have some opportunity to work out 
their fate in an area where neither of the great powers 
is so significantly committed as to be compelled to 
interfere with force. He wants disengagement in 
Asia on grounds that our involvement is excessive, 
and is often undignified and unhelpful. He sees our 
engagement in Asia and the Middle East as inflaming 
and enlarging rather than limiting local troubles. 
Fundamentally, he asks a reduction of the present 
political polarization of the world. He would see the 
power blocs separated by many smaller powers, free 
to pursue their own interests without engaging the 
United States or Russia. He sees the world as a safer 
place when the two great powers will not be com- 
mitted by prestige or alliance to a role in virtually 
every dispute in the political world. 

This has been called neo-isolationism and it un- 
questionably has roots in the same instinctive distrust 
of visionary politics and in the same skepticism about 
an American ability to improve the world, that ani- 
mated some of the isolationism of the ’30s. To the 
degree that the American isolationist movement was 
a protest against enthusiasm in policy, it resembles 
the Kennan position; he wants no part of enthusiasm, 
whether it be liberal, reform or moral. But to call Mr. 
Kennan isolationist in any real definition is nonsense. 
If any name is to be pinned on his recommendations, 
it ought to be quietism, and that is, of course, a 
glancing definition. Mr. Kennan can be accused of 
the mood of quietism, not of the heresy. 

The mood corresponds to a significant element in 
the national temper today. There is a widespread 
sense both of frustration at what actually is happen- 
ing in the world and of disillusion with the failure 
of two decades of American enthusiasm to make the 
world measurably better than it was. This mood, 
however, has genuinely isolationist characteristics. 
Mr. Kennan makes a rationalist protest against action 
taken without a clear understanding of goals and 
implications. It would be irony indeed if his remarks 
were to encourage a withdrawal, a disengagement, 
equally innocent of understanding and comprehended 

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This is a Time for Choices to be Made 

James T. Farrell 

In the 1980s, it was predicted that in modern war- 
fare there would be no victor. The prediction was 
not really vindicated by the second World War. 
There were two major victors in that war, the United 
States and the Soviet Union. They won, not only at 
the expense of their enemies, but also of their allies 
and of neutrals. Alexis de Tocqueville’s great proph- 
ecy, that Russia and America seem “marked out by 
the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the 
globe,” was over-fulfilled. The world, for most prac- 
tical purposes, is divided into two opposed systems. 

It is irrelevant here whether the cause of the divi- 
sion is a law of history, the correctness of Marx’s 
eschatology, the revolutionary intentions of Lenin, 
or the simple realities of power. The world is divided. 
And no matter how benevolently we interpret Soviet 
proposals for “peaceful co-existence,” this division of 
the world into competitive systems is accepted by 
the Kremlin as part of its long-range strategy. 

“The Soviet leaders,” Milovan Dijilas writes in 
The New Class, “were fully aware of this process.” 
He once heard Stalin, “at an intimate party in 1945,” 
say that “in modern war, the victor will impose his 
system, which was not the case in past wars.” In the 
presence of Djjilas, in 1948, Stalin told Yugoslav and 
Bulgarian Communist leaders: “The Western powers 
will make a country of their own out of West Ger- 
many and we will make one of our own out of East 
Germany—this is inevitable.” 

In 1917, Lenin and Trotsky had foreseen this polar- 
ization of the world, but on the basis of Trotsky’s 
“theory of permanent revolution,” a theory consistent 
with orthodox Marxism. They were convinced that, 
if the revolution were to succeed in Russia, it would 
have to spread to the advanced countries where there 
was a “ripened” proletariat. Both men counted on, 
hoped for, and attempted to stimulate a revolution 
in Germany, because Germany was the key to Eu- 
rope. A successful German revolution, they believed, 
would result in a Communist Euro 

The early expectations of Lenin and Trotsky were 
not fulfilled. The Stalinist system soon began to 
evolve in the Soviet Union. In Germany, Hitler came 
to power, and his defeat was accomplished only 
through an alliance of the Soviet Union with the 

Mr. Farrell, the novelist and essayist, is former chair- 
man of The American Committee for Cultural Freedom. 

United States. The division of the world into the 
camps of two giant powers was thus achieved. 

Germany, the “key to Europe,” was broken. The 
Germans knew that they had been crushed, The 
bombed-out ruins of German cities, the snows of 
Russia, the awful concentration of American fire 
power, the memories of flaming houses, burning flesh 
in the night, the division and occupation of Germany 
—all this was different from the aftermath of the 
first World War. Just as France, after the Napoleonic 
defeat, could not regain the necessary élan and force 
to become master of Europe, neither could Germany 
now restore herself to repeat Hitler’s venture. The 
world balance of power had been irreversibly shifted. 
Western Europe was no longer a power center. It 
would, in fact, have disintegrated and, in one way or 
another, fallen into Communist hands, except for 
the Marshall Plan and the fact of American wealth 
and power behind the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 

NATO, it is true, has not achieved any real Euro- 
pean unity. Without either the power of the United 
States as its guarantor or the collapse of Communism 
and the escape to freedom of the satellites, West 
European unity probably never can be achieved. 

But the road to the unification of Europe by the 
Soviet Union would be opened if NATO finally dis- 
integrated. Because NATO is more than a military 
shield and would be, even if its defensive capability 
were far greater than is now the case. The people 
of Western Europe grope for a greater community. 
Their need for unity is profoundly psychological, 
and not merely dictated by economic, political and 

The German problem is still the key to Europe— 
but now in the context of a struggle between the 
United States and the Soviet Union which is of 
cosmic proportions and drama. 

Germany, however, is not the cause of tension; it 
is a symptom. The Kremlin needs and wants Western 
Europe and, today, it is as yet incapable of ruling 
Western Europe and of winning decisively in the 
under-industrialized world. If the future were to be 
one of “competitive coexistence,” then Moscow 
would almost certainly lose without Western Europe, 
and especially West Germany. And even if Russia 
could make a Carthage of America, it would then 
need Western Europe all the more. Remove Ameri- 
can production from the world and humanity would 
fall back a century or more. In any competition be- 
tween Russia and the West, the Soviet Union seems 
doomed to defeat if the intellectual, scientific, tech- 
nological and economic capacity of the United States 
and Western Europe are pooled. 

The Soviets know this. According to Richard Hot- 
telet, Khrushchev told Guy Mollet that he prefers 
17 million East Germans under his thumb to 70 mil- 
lion of them neutral. When he says that he seeks a 
competition of the two systems, he really means a 
competition between the Soviet Union and an iso- 


lated United States, with the remainder of the world 
subject to increasing Soviet pressure and blackmail. 
These are the only terms of victory, at least of easy 
victory, for the Soviets. Because, in spite of its scien- 
tific achievements, Russia cannot supply China, serve 
as big brother to Asia and Africa, and remain ahead 
in the military race if West Europe and the United 
States are allied and if, along with sufficient military 
capability to make war as horrible a death sentence 
for the Soviet Union and China as it would be for the 
United States and West Europe, the West, through 
NATO, organizes its competitive answer. The odds 
then would be too heavy for Khrushchev who, unlike 
Stalin, cannot afford a defeat. His continued leader- 
ship depends on continuing success. 

The failure to understand this situation is a major 
failure of Western leadership today. At its roots, this 
failure is the result of an incapacity to understand 
the real struggle, its scope and terms and its evolving 
strategy. Many Western leaders, especially in Eu- 
rope, misconceive the whole nature of the German 
question. They are still busily solving the problem 
of Hitler, and re-living their ideological youth, like 
old football players trying to play as they once did 
when they have loose tendons in their knees and 
their reflexes are going. 

Neutralize Germany and tensions would remain, 
with the United States facing virtual isolation, and 
with Western Europe, minus Germany, like a Euro- 
pean Israel, but without Israel’s vigor. The risk of 
war would remain for America and for Western Eu- 
rope. The choice for West European nations and 
Great Britain then would be between becoming a 
Finland, or, even worse, submitting to Communist 
servitude—or else the total annihilation of war. The 
danger of war is not based on a common border in 
Germany. Indonesia is potentially as major a source 
of tension as Germany. The entire world is now a 
source of tension. Khrushchev’s gamble is on the 
stupidity, inability to understand, fear of Communist 
blackmail, and lack of vision in the West. 

We all dread war, and with reason. But dread is 
not necessarily a sound basis of policy, and often 
it results in paralysis. Communism, evolving out of 
a movement to eradicate human misery and to lift 
mankind to a higher level of freedom, justice and 
material prosperity, has become a conspiracy against 
humanity, a war against mankind. The Kremlin has 
turned Clausevitz’s famous slogan upside down and 
practices peace as a continuation of war by another 
means, And as Karl von Clausevitz said, “Politics is 
the womb in which war is developed, in which its 
outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the 
qualities of living creatures in their embryos.” 

Tensions exist in politics, not in guns or even in 
missiles. And these tensions are world-wide. The 
danger of war exists now in world politics. And 


Khrushchev not only has decreed that these tensions 
will continue; he is continuing to foster them. He 
has told us his end in many different ways. His most 
simple announcement of this end is: “We will bury 
you.” It is with this announcement in mind that we 
must consider the future of the West. 

Many of the current proposals for United States 
“disengagement” in Europe through the creation of 
neutral zones—especially the creation of a “neutral” 
Germany—seem to me therefore an ultimate kind of 
utopianism—and, like most utopianisms, ultimately 
dangerous. There are no easy alternatives to the 
dread with which we have been living. The dread 
can be conquered, the final catastrophe averted, only 
through the painful recognition and ordering of 
power realities. 

There can be no “safe” areas in a thermonuclear 
world, least of all in Europe. There can be no pain- 
less peace made with men who know only the terror 
of Stalinist politics. We must negotiate and continue 
to negotiate, but in the full knowledge of what the 
stakes in Europe really are. 

“The triumph of bolshevism,” Lucien Lauriat wrote 
in his book From the Comintern to the Cominform, 
“will be the entire realization of the horrible and 
terrifying nightmare described by George Orwell.” 
When the Soviet leaders are convinced that the truth 
of this remark is realized both in the United States 
and in Europe, then a more realistic basis for nego- 
tiations will be possible. It is the failure of many in 
Europe to realize this truth—and their consequent 
retreat into dreams of “neutralism” between the two 
powers—that makes realistic, fruitful negotiation so 
difficult at this time. 

The best hope for peace and for the world seems 
to me, therefore, to continue to lie in the strength of 
the Western Alliance, not in the encouragement of 
dreams of “disengagement.” Because peace, if there 
is to be peace, can be built only upon realities. Our 
effort must be to make NATO not merely a military 
arm for the West, but the foundation of increasing 
unity—cultural, economic, political-among Western 
nations. Faced with the continuing power drive from 
the East, Western nations must either stand together 
or, one by one, fall. Should they fall, they would have 
only their own fear to blame. 

We must learn to live with a paradox. The awful 
truth is that there may be no hope for peace. Khru- 
shchev has announced that he will “bury” us, and we 
have no reason to doubt that he was here speaking 
as a Communist prophet. But if we take into full ac- 
count the direness of the world’s situation, if we do 
Khrushchev the honor of believing that he means 
what he says, then the slow, painful work of proving 
the Soviet leader wrong can go forward. Peace can 
be secured only by those who know how difficult, 
how painful, and how dangerous it is to attain. 

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‘‘Misplaced Morality’’ 

Chicago, Illinois 
Sir: I am writing to express my reaction to Volume 
1, No. 1 of Worldview. There were a good many 
good things in the old World Alliance News Letter, 
but now and then an article or editorial left me dis- 
turbed. I must say that the first issue of Worldview 
disturbs me considerably. 

To a large extent my uneasiness derives from what 
seems to me to be an impossible mixture of ethical 
considerations and political considerations in the 
magazine. It is not that I doubt that there is some 
workable combination of ethics and politics, but 
rather that the particular combinations made by your 
writers strike me as bad ones. Your writers are not 
uncritical of American foreign policy in many of its 
details, but they seem to be so basically committed 
to the use of force, and to the policy of maintaining 
a preponderant force, that their arguments about 
ethics are all conditioned by these basic commit- 

An example of this is the article by William Lee 
Miller, entitled “Misplaced Morality.” Mr. Miller 
seems to argue that there are whole areas of foreign 
policy in which it is not appropriate to raise ethical 
questions. So he says, “The right thing in politics is 
rarely done by the man who tries intentionally to 
do ‘right’.” 

While I would grant that there is something to his 
argument that Americans are too likely to expect 
things to be absolutely right, or absolutely wrong, 
yet the whole article is such a piece of sophistry 
that I get the impression that Mr. Miller could make 
the worse appear the better no matter what was the 
worse. In the end he seems to think he has made an 
ethical case for the “limited war” position of Kiss- 
inger, and indicates in his opinion that the real 
ethical test of the present will only be passed by 
those who will go along with the “unresolved contest, 
perhaps including sometimes limited military con- 
tests with the Communist world.” In other words, he 
appears to argue that the ethical man will work for 
little wars and avoid the big wars. 

Of course, Mr. Miller is not one of Worldview’s 
editors, but it seems to me that he has expressed that 
tone in the magazine which makes me uneasy. 

Then you print Will Herberg’s long review of 
Emest W. Lefever’s Ethics and United States For- 
eign Policy, in which Mr. Herberg says that “religious 
leaders, especially in America, are particularly prone 
to a delusive idealism.” He goes on to claim “that 
the best of our statesmen have shown a deeper un- 
derstanding of the actual relation of ethics and 

religion to politics than have most of the official 
spokesmen of religion.” Finally, he says, “It is this 
creative combination of religious insight and political 
realism that is the best resource in the present hour.” 
This may be a valid reflection of your editorial policy, 
and you may be right. But I would feel better about 
Worldview if at least one of its editors was a religious 
pacifist and was allowed to apply his own insight to 
some of the tortured arguments for “realism” that 
run through the magazine. And would not this be a 
fairer policy for The Church Peace Union, the maga- 
zine’s publisher? 

Basically, my objection to Worldview is that it 
seems prepared to espouse only one special theory of 
the relation between ethics and world affairs. 

Professor of Education, 
The University of Chicago 

Daytona Beach, Florida 
Sir: I subscribed to Worldview in the hope of 
finding a fresh approach to international affairs, par- 
ticularly from a religious point of view. To say that 
I am disappointed is an understatement. 

In your January issue, William Lee Miller begins 
his article on “Misplaced Morality” with a superior 
dismissal of the priest who spoke on the concept of 
“a just war.” But Mr. Miller ends his article with a 
suggestion that we may have to follow Kissinger’s 
concept of “limited war” with Russia. Limited to 
whom?—to the soldiers who fight and not to non- 
combatants, women and children? . . . Is it “moral- 
ism” to protest brutality and to question whether it 
is worth doing to “save America” from Communism? 
Mr. Miller writes of “drawing many lines” but gives 
no concrete suggestions. I think that for an ethical 
approach I shall have to depend on those whom too 
many present day theologians deprecatingly refer to 
as “secular” thinkers—on the “atheist” Bertrand Rus- 
sell and the “humanist” Walter Lippmann .. . 

Again, is it “realism” for Will Herberg, in his 
review of Ethics and U. S. Foreign Policy, to use the 
Dulles cliché of “the free world that is confronted . . . 
with a totalitarian enemy,” etc., without any analysis 
of the constituents of the two groups? “The free 
world”—including Spain and Franco, France and Al- 
geria, the Turkish dictatorship, King Saud, etc.? “The 
totalitarian enemy” without any breakdown of its 
constituents—all the people of Russia and China 
lumped together as “enemies”? Is this to be World- 
view’s “ethical” approach . . .? 



Religion and the Marxist Challenge: Two Views 

Communism and Christianity by 
Martin C. D’Arcy. Devin-Adair. 
242 pp. $4.00. 

by Quentin Lauer 

There can be little doubt that the 
majority of Christians in the 
world today are opposed to Com- 
munism—certainly to its practices, 
and for the most part to its 
theories, Behind opposition, how- 
ever, there must be conviction 
based on thought, or the opposi- 
tion is meaningless. Nor is the 
negativity of mere opposition 
sufficient; the Christian must seri- 
ously reflect on the positive as- 
pects of that which he proposes 
as a substitute. 

In an effort to remind Chris- 
tians once more of what both 
Christianity and Communism in- 
volve, M. C. D’Arcy, the English 
philosopher-theologian, has given 
us a very readable book, and in 
it he has drawn up an impressive 

As is to be expected, D’Arcy, 
the Jesuit, speaks with the accents 
of a Roman Catholic, but there 
seems little doubt that in doing 
so he speaks in behalf of most 
Christians. He accepts the author- 
ity of the Roman Catholic Church 
to present the authentic teaching 
of Christ. For the most part, how- 
ever, any Christian will recognize 
his own beliefs and convictions, 
especially in their opposition to 
the salvationism, the creed, and 
the morality of the Communist 
colossus. We might say, in fact, 
that Father D’Arcy is somewhat 
more successful in setting forth 
the common principles which are 
essential to all Christianity than 
he is in outlining the principles on 
which Communism is based. 

One becomes somewhat uneasy 
at the facility with which Father 
D’Arcy sums up the philosophy of 
Marx and Engels—above all, he is 
superficial and even inaccurate in 

Father Lauer, a priest of the Society 
of Jesus, teaches philosophy at Ford- 
ham University. 


presenting the thought of Marx’s 
great forerunner, Hegel. Coming 
to Lenin and Stalin he is decided- 
ly better, but he is unquestionably 
at his best in comparing contem- 
porary Communist ideology with 
the teachings of Christianity. Here 
the indictment of Communism 
loses nothing of its force nor its 

accuracy by being suffused with 
Christian charity for those who 
hope to create a better world on 
the basis of dialectic materialism. 

Most important is D’Arcy’s rec- 
ognition that Marx evolved more 
than a social theory which could 
be reconciled even with Christian 
thought. “Marx meant his view to 
be a complete answer to life and 
its problems, to be a philosophy 
which was complete in its truth 
and the fulcrum to change the 

Because it is this, and because 
it is essentially materialist and 
atheist in conception, no compro- 
mise with Christianity is possible. 
It is possible to sympathize with 
the over-all social ideals of Marx- 
ism; it is even possible to share 
its concern with the material 
needs of man on earth. But it is 
impossible to accept its dogma of 
a purely material dynamics of so- 
ciety or its studious exclusion of 
belief in God as even a tolerable 
course for man in his approach to 
the problems of life. The only 
conclusions which an unpreju- 
diced examination of the two po- 
sitions will permit is that, despite 
superficial similarity of aims, 
Christianity and Communism are 
diametrically opposed. 

The opposition between the two 
positions, however, should not be 
seen as that between a completely 
this-worldly and a completely 
other-worldly viewpoint. “Chris- 
tianity . . . claims that it can meet 
Marx on his own terms and offer 
a better program for civil life.” 
Christianity is by no means alien 
to man’s temporal concerns; rath- 
er, it is definitely “committed to 
this world, where God became in- 

carnate.” The whole of history 
since the Incarnation bears the 
signature of Christ, and there is 
no need that the temporal and the 
eternal should conflict. 

At the same time, it would be 
treason to Christianity to soft- 
pedal the supernatural, to ignore 
“the folly of the Cross.” The 
Christian is well aware of tem- 
poral concerns, but for him they 
are not ultimate; the finality of 
time is in eternity. Here he cannot 
agree with the Communist: 
“Whereas with Christianity the 
end is independent of time, Com- 
munism puts it at a future date.” 

Nor can he agree with the Com- 
munist’s willingness to sacrifice 
the present generation for a tem- 
poral utopia for some future gen- 
erations, precisely because he 
“assigns an imperishable reward 
to each single individual and gen- 
eration.” The Christian, of course, 
reco the value and the no- 
bility of self-sacrifice, but he sees 
it as intelligible only “if the cause 
fall within a large philosophy of 
life which inculcates other reasons 
and motives for living.” 

Christianity is not without a 
dialectic of history, but it cannot 
be a materialistic dialectic nor one 
in which the individual is destined 
to be swallowed up in the collec- 
tivity. Rather, it is a dialectic of 
“conscious and unconscious striv- 
ing toward a unity and order.” In 
such a dialectic, there is not only 
room, but a need, for tolerance, 
since only thus can both the com- 
mon good and individual freedom 
be safeguarded. 

It is true, of course, that too 
many Christians simply use reli- 
gion “to oil the machinery of the 
State,” to make of it a means to 
a temporal end, and an unworthy 
one at that. This, however, does 
not invalidate the claims of Chris- 
tianity. Rather, it puts upon Chris- 
tians the responsibility of living 
out the principles of charity and 
justice, which are not the “inven- 
tions of bourgeois capitalism” but 
the legacy of Christ, to whom all 
look as to their Lord and Master. 



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Theology Between Yesterday and To- 
morrow by Joseph L. Hromadka. 
The Westminster Press. 106 pp. 

When Joseph L. Hromadka, the 
distinguished theologian of the 
Czech Reformed Church, de- 
fended the Soviet action in Hun- 
gary in 1956, he caused much 
anguish among his friends in the 
West. Many who earlier had re- 
spected the integrity of his efforts 
to reach some understanding be- 
tween Christianity and Commu- 
nism now feared he had sacrificed 
his last claim to independence. 
By apologizing for one of the 
great crimes of modern history, 
he seemed to have made an ulti- 
mate surrender to the powers of 
the Soviet world. 

Earlier in 1956, Professor 
Hromadka had delivered a series 
of lectures in the University of 
Toronto. These lectures, now pub- 
lished under the title Theology 
Between Yesterday and Tomor- 
row, do not excuse this theolo- 
gian’s defense of the indefensible, 
but they explain, perhaps, what 
insights and principles, uncriti- 
cally applied, have trapped him in 
an impossible position. 

The basis of this position is 
paradoxical. This book makes 
clear that it is Hromadka’s con- 
cern for the independence of the 
Church which has made him an 
apologist for totalitarian regimes, 
that it is his thirsting after justice 
which has brought him to the de- 
fense of injustice. 

At the beginning of these lec- 
tures Professor Hromadka states 
convictions that provide the key to 
his thought and, one supposes, to 
his present career: 

“We are standing amidst deep 
and unprecedented changes in the 
very structure of human society 
. . . Our work in theology and 
the Church has been shaken to its 
very foundation ... We may... 
[pretend] that the turbulent up- 
heavals and revolutionary changes 
of the present humanity do not 
affect in any way the substance 
and function of theological work 
... And yet, it would be a fate- 
ful illusion to establish a bar- 
rier between theology and the 
world and to presume that a real 
theologian can possibly protect 
himself from the noise, tensions 
and peacelessness of the world.” 

For Christians, the “agonizing 
question of our time” is “what are 
we going to offer to the new so- 
ciety?” And “the new society,” this 
book takes for granted, is the 
Marxist society. 

“What is needed,” Hromadka 
writes, “is a sincere realization 
that—humanly speaking—the fu- 
ture of the Christian Church and 
theology depend on our courage 
to take the revolutionary changes 
in the east of Europe and in Asia 
as an opportunity to make a fresh 
beginning . . . [We must take] the 
present moment both as divine 
judgment and as a time of grace.” 

For a moment let us ignore 
the application Professor Hro- 
madka makes of his insights. The 

insights themselves are, in many 
instances, profound. Christianity, 
as he insists, is not an ideology; it 
transcends all ideologies. It is not 
committed to any one civilization; 
it speaks to every civilization and 
knows, essentially, neither time 
nor place. The passing of “Chris- 
tendom” must not be unduly 
mourned because “Christendom” 
was in many ways a counterfeit 
thing. And the age that is being 
born is a revolutionary age in 
which the Church must learn a 
new language to communicate its 
ancient truths. Theology—the 
Church—does stand perplexed “be- 
tween yesterday and tomorrow.” 

But the irony of Hromadka’s 
specific recommendations for “the 
new age” is suggested in his brief 
Preface. Here he quotes the open- 
ing line of Christianity’s ageless 
hymn: “Vexilla regis prodeunt”— 
“The standards of the king go 

They do indeed go forth—into 
new places and new times. But if 
the Word has any meaning for the 
affairs of men, Christianity’s ban- 
ners are not abjectly dipped be- 
fore the injustices of the world; 
they must not be carried in 
demonic crusades of the West or 
of the East. In his concern to res- 
cue the Church from too close an 
alliance with a “bourgeois” order 
that is passing, Professor Hro- 
madka would enslave it to a “new 
order” that negates both God and 
man. Whatever may be the future 
of Christianity, it cannot be this. 


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The American Earthquake 
by Edmund Wlison. Doubleday-Anchor Books. 676 pp. 

The crash of '29 is the earthquake of the title, in this col- 
lection of easays and occasional pieces written by the 
author over the last thirty-three years. The subject is 
public life in America, and Mr. Wilson’s treatment of It Is 
unfailingly absorbing. 

Radicals and Conservatives 
by Willlam M. McGovern and David S&S. Collier. Regnery. 
174 pp. $4.00. 

in a philosophical inquiry into the facets of liberalism, the 
authors attempt to identify and reconcile left and right 
wing elements within the larger structure of the demo- 
cratic tradition. 

A Seldier with the Arabs 
by Sir John Bagot Glubb. Harper. 458 pp. $6.00. 

Glubb Pasha writes of his long service with the Arab Le- 
gion In Jordan In a book which aptly conveys the turmoil 
of the Arab world, as well as an awareness of its political 

Reflections on America 
by Jacques Maritain. Scribner’s. 205 pp. $3.50. 

A warm appraisal of American traits and institutions by 

one of our most distinguished visitors, this book dispenses 
with the hostile clichés In favor of a balanced and pene- 
trating analysis. 

The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon 
by Ralph E. Lapp. Harper. 200 pp. $3.50 

The story of the Ili-fated Japanese fishing boat that suf- 
fered the radioactive effects of a U. S. nuclear bomb blast 

off Bikini in 1954, this book emerges as an effective Indict- 
ment of American top-level security methods. 

Vol. Ii: World Pr 
By Arthur Walworth. T adeeanlay Green. $15.00. 

Weedrew Wilson. Vol. |: ag Prophet. 436 pp. 
ophet. 439 

The author of this latest blography of Wilson has un-— 
earthed much new material. Of particular interest is the 
section In the second volume devoted to Wilson’s role in 
the Paris Peace Conference. 

The Economy of the American People: Progress, Problems, Pros- 

by Gerhard Colm and Theodore Geiger. National Plan- 
ning Assn. 168 pp. $2.00. 

The National Planning Association continues its admir 
able publications service with this survey of American 
living standards and productivity, which Is especially use- | 
ful as a reference guide in the present economic crisis. 


volume 1, no. 3 | March 1958 

WORLDVIEW, successor to the World Alliance News 
Letter, is published monthly by The Church Peace Union. 
Subscription: $2.00 per year. 

Address: 170 East 64th Street, New York 21, N. Y. 


A. William Loos 

William Clancy, Editor 
John R. Inman William J. Cook 

Editorial Assistant, Arlene Croce 

pak gem | in WORLDVIEW ronresent She views of the authors, 
not necessarily the position ef The Church Peace Union. 


170 East 64th Street 
New York 21, N. Y.