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The history of Western-Soviet relations is a his- 
‘tory of frustration, and the foreign ministers’ 
conference in Geneva has added one more foot- 
ote to it. The United States did not, of course, 
bring to the meeting much more than a weary 
expectation of inevitable deadlock, and neither, 
probably, did the Soviet Union. But the Western 
powers expected the Communists to pay at least 
some token price for a summit conference, and 
even this was not forthcoming. The ministers thus 
tecessed with their last condition, to all appear- 
ances, worse than their first. 

This dashing of even our minimal hopes has 
given new strength to those who see the present 
world struggle as a clear-cut battle between Good 
and Evil, in which no accommodation, no com- 

mise will ever be possible. These people 
Bi emce any attempt at negotiations with the 
Communist powers as a moral betrayal, and the 
“militant” anti-Communist press in this country, 
which seems to take positive delight in the break- 
down of diplomacy, is now hailing the stalemate 
at Geneva as “proof” that further attempts at 
Western-Soviet conciliation are folly. 

The complexities of the Berlin problem—the 
reasons why no real “progress” toward its solution 
could be hoped for among the foreign ministers 
have been fully, and diversely, explored by most 
of the nation’s foreign policy analysts. What con- 
cerns us here is the resurgence in this country of 
the spirit of “no negotiations at all.” This spirit 
in the long run could prove a greater danger for 
the United States and for the world than any 
number of Soviet ultimatums. 

Both West and East are playing the most dan- 
gerous game in history—the twentieth century 
game of nuclear roulette. The only chance of 
averting its consequences lies in the continuing 
Tespites of negotiation and contacts, no matter 

abortive these may seem. 

The moral obligation to negotiate was recently 



set forth by Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, Pro- 
Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of the Holy 
Office in the Vatican, during a visit to the United 
States. The Cardinal's words are especially signi- 
ficant since he is widely identified with the 
“right-wing” or “conservative” faction in the Ro- 
man Curia. 

“Would it do any good for the free nations of 
the world to isolate the Soviet Union?” Cardinal 
Ottaviani was asked in a public interview. His 
reply was unequivocal: “Absolutely not. Should 
the world isolate the Soviet regime, then it would 
consider itself under siege. The net effect of such 
action would be to revive its revolutionary Com- 
munist fervor.” 

The West, the Cardinal insisted, “must continue 
to negotiate,” and it must “leave the door open for 
the Soviets to enter the polity of nations.” And 
though the Western nations “must guard against 
any compromise or concession that would en- 
courage Soviet intransigence,” the most important 
task they face “is to keep contact—not to close 
the Soviet Union off.” 

The Cardinal's statement is a strong rebuke to 
those who too readily seize upon fresh evidence 
of Soviet inflexibility as an excuse for ending all 
attempts at accommodation, or who, callous to 
the consequences for the human race, urge some 
kind of “crusade” against the Soviet Union. Be- 
cause the developments in modern technology 
have left us with one overriding moral obliga- 
tion, an obligation we owe to the past and to the 
future as well as to ourselves—the obligation to 
avert the catastrophe of nuclear war. 

This obligation means that we must continue 
to negotiate and to explore, even when negotia- 
tion seems fruitless and exploration grows weari- 
some beyond bearing. It means that we must 
maintain and increase personal contacts, on the 
highest level possible, between the Soviet Union 
and the West, even when we find such contacts 
personally objectionable. The issues here involved 
far transcend matters of personal objection. 

volume 2 number 7 

in the magazines 

“The problem of nuclear disarmament overshadows ‘ 

every other aspect of the Cold War,” writes Rein- 
hold Niebuhr in the June 8 New Leader; “but its 
importance does not guarantee a solution.” Dr. 
Niebuhr reviews the record of fruitless East-West 
attempts to come to terms over the matter of in- 
spection, and concludes that Russian intransigence 
is not entirely to blame. We must admit that “many 
of our proposals were not meant to be accepted by 
the Russians. Indeed, we would have been em- 
barrassed if the proposals had been accepted... A 
fool-proof inspection system is a very dubious pos- 
sibility, even if ordinary good faith is presupposed.” 
Further, history shows that disarmament “is not the 
prelude but the consequence of relaxed international 
tensions.” The distribution of power among nations, 
Dr. Niebuhr suggests, is the real concern of a dis- 

armament conference: “If the Western governments - 

hold firm, and Moscow abandons its hope for an 
agreement on easy terms, then a ban may be 
achieved, provided it is felt to serve the interests 
of the existing weapons balance.” Dr. Niebuhr does 
not believe this will happen, but he does think there 
are “small consolations . . . in this dark hour of 
history,” not least among them the fact that we are 
beginning to compete in terms of guided missiles, 
rather than nuclear warheads, which at least removes 
the threat to unborn generations. 

The New York Times finds itself charged with 
violating the “old high standards of fearless, inde- 
pendent journalism.” The charge, made by Libera- 
tion in its June issue, centered about the Times’ 
admission on March 19 of having withheld advance 
information on Project Argus because “scientists 
associated with the government said they feared that 
prior announcements of the experiment might lead 
to protests that would enforce its cancellation.” 
Liberation accused the Times of concealing informa- 
tion from the people “for the precise purpose of 
keeping them from expressing their opinions on a 
political question.” In the face of denials and counter- 
accusations from Times editors, Liberation insists 
that “it is clear that . . . they concealed this informa- 
tion from the public apparently because they favored 
the continuation and extension of nuclear test ex- 


The unsolved problem of civil defense, according 
to several recent articles on the subject, is an in- 
creasingly crucial aspect of our nuclear policy. 
Norma Krause Herzfeld, writing in America for June 
18, draws together data that reveal the confusion, 
ignorance and apathy surrounding the matter. Ap- 


parently taking a cue from our official policy, which 
continues to rely solely on the nuclear deterrent to 
all-out attack, the prevailing sentiment of the civil 
population is an “all-or-nothing fatalism.” The public 
remains unaware, Mrs. Herzfeld writes, that “alter- 
natives do exist between the placid assumption that 
war is just too horrible to happen, and the fear that 
if it just should happen everybody will be wiped 
out.” She cites the RAND Corporation’s recent 
Study of Non-military Defense, which stated that 
adequate civil defense would itself be a deterrent 
to enemy attack. 

Mrs. Herzfeld notes further that, despite the 
Gaither and Rockefeller Reports (which called for 
the mass-scale construction of civilian shelters) and 
despite the widespread recognition that evacuation 
plans are now obsolete, the Government has failed 
to initiate protective measures for the civilian popu- 
lation—either by building public blast shelters or by 
distributing information to individual citizens who 
wished to build their own. 

The “do-it-yourself” method of home defense, 
which may be our resort if, as Mrs. Herzfeld’s article 
implies, there is to be no Federal program of civilian 
protection, is outlined by Ralph E. Lapp in the May 
issue of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Mr. Lapp 
presents a good amount of technical information on 
what we can expect (“megaton assumptions” is the 
term) in the event of enemy attack. Mr. Lapp agrees 
with the results of a public survey quoted by 
Mrs. Herzfeld when he remarks that “only the rara 
avis will go to the trouble and expense of building 
a blast shelter.” Therefore he limits himself to the 
steps the average citizen can take to protect himself 
and his family against the fallout that occurs after 
the primary impact of megaton weapons: “A tunnel 
dug in the cellar wall would provide excellent pro- 
tection. Stacking up bags of coal, sand, or containers 
of water in a corner of the basement would also re- 
duce the radiation dose.” 

According to Mr. Lapp’s estimates, it would be 
two or three days before survivors could “emerge 
from cramped quarters and enjoy more freedom in 
the basement”; one month before basement living 
could be abandoned. But not until the second year 
after attack would “return to ordinary life” be pos- 
sible. And what about the consumption of food 
grown on contaminated land? “Crop contamination,” 
Mr. Lapp admits, “poses a serious long-term prob 
lem and it is not clear whether a post-attack economy 
could support the kind of agriculture which could 
minimize the uptake of strontium-90 from the food 









It Represents a Challenge to Western Resources and Western Security 

William Persen 

In the past decade Africa has exploded. Where the 
next explosion will occur no one knows. It might 
be riots in Nyasaland or Dahomey, demonstrations 
in Brazzaville or Khartoum, assassination in Con- 
stantine. The dead African past of tribal discipline 
and subsistence-ignorance has been challenged by 
a civilization immeasurably more productive in 
satisfying the material and esthetic wants of its 
populace. The answer to the challenge is diffuse and 
uncontrolled. Like the expanding galaxies, the ideas 
that result from the bomb that the West has triggered 
in Africa are moving with tremendous speed in every 

Ten years ago, it appeared that Africa, except 
perhaps for its northern Arab tier, was still deeply 
immersed in its ancient ways, that it would be many 
years before the African peoples reacted to Western 
nationalism with their own nationalism. Today, this 
illusion has been smashed by the Africans’ search 
for freedom, freedom to control their own destiny, 
freedom to show that men of black skin are indeed 
the equal of men of white skin. 

Perhaps this psychological force, this insistence 
by Africans that they can do a better job of deciding 
what is best for themselves, is the greatest advantage 
that African leadership has. The race that the white 
man had used as his source of slaves and that he has 
persecuted and still persecutes is determined to 
show that it can labor and build, sacrifice and 

This psychological force may be greater than the 
comparable ones of the less racialized nationalisms 
of the peoples of Asia. This point is certainly argu- 
able, but the Africans do have one tremendous 
advantage over the Asiatic peoples—they do not 
have to divest themselves of entrenched cultural 
obstacles. They have had no ancient greatness with 
which to mask their present inequality. The cultural 
state of the Africans is so low that they are con- 
siderably more adaptable to the challenge of Western 
civilization than the Arab or the Indian. They do 
not have to defend their past. Their past has meant 
only the basic struggle with hunger, disease and the 
burning sun. 

Coupled with the psychological advantage—the 
requirement to prove their capability and their 


Mr. Persen is the Asian-African Editor of Business 

humanity— the lack of the cultural drag of past 
civilizations means that the African explosion will 
continue to move with a speed that no Asian state 
that has the slightest desire to maintain humanitarian 
values can match, 

But Africa is not a unity. It is a vast continent of 
diverse linguistic groups, of religious and cultural 
patterns, with three basic political-ethnic regions. 
The northern third is Arab and Muslim. The central 
band, usually called “Tropical Africa” is black, but 
split by a multiplicity of racial and language groups. 
It is partly Muslim, partly Christian, partly pagan. 
The South has more linguistic and religious unity, 
but not much more, and here the influence of the 
European colonial has more deeply impressed it- 
self. Here the European, by his very presence, 
serves both as a greater challenge for African self- 
improvement and greater hindrance to it because 
of the inevitable years of political struggle that will 
divert the drive for betterment into the drive for 

Each of the three main African areas is in turn 
split into differentiable areas. The Arab north has 
eastern and western halves, The eastern looks toward 
the other Arabic-speaking peoples of Southwest 
Asia. The western half, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia 
and Libya, is less tied to Arab nationalism and has 
its own unity of purpose. A specific difference be- 
tween the two regions is the attitude toward Israel: 
violently inimical in the East, comparatively non- 
commital in the West. Another is the attitude toward 

Tropical Africa is split into a patchwork of bud- 
ding states, but the basic factor is the legacy of 
the French versus the British or Belgian control. 
The same thing is true in the South where several 
varieties of British administration have tended to 
amalgamate or separate areas that might or might 
not have their present political form, if the British 
government had pursued different policies. And then 
there are the two huge Portuguese possessions: 
Angola and Mozambique, where Africans are held 
in virtual slavery. 

Each of these differentiable areas of Africa is in 
turn split deeply. The fact of a million Europeans 
(the majority non-French) in Algeria is too obvious 
for further comment. Even more serious are the 


splits in Tropical African regions. When Ghana 
became independent in 1957, the differences between 
the northern and southern Ghanaian peoples and 
aspirations caused violent outbreaks. These differ- 
ences—linguistic, economic, political and religious— 
are still, and will remain, a recurring problem of 
major dimensions, even in such a comparatively 
small country. 

Nigeria will become independent a year from 
this October, but the constitution of the Federation 
of Nigeria is an almost inconceivable patchwork 
attempting to maintain a unity of conflicting religions, 
language and tribal groupings. If Nigeria, the most 
populous country in Africa, can become a nation, 
the British drafters of the Nigerian constitution will 
have earned themselves a chapter in every future 
textbook of comparative constitutional history. 

The Cameroons, split between the British and the 
French after they had driven the Germans from it 
during the first world war, will also receive its 
independence in 1960. Like Nigeria, it also is split 
into diverse regional and ethnic patterns. The savan- 
nah North is populated by the Muslim Fulanis and 
a multiplicity of pagan tribes. The people of the 
forested South are predominantly of Bantu origin 
and, in great part, are Christianized. The adminis- 
trative system of the North is based on a series of 
traditional sultanates, although these local sultans 
have nowhere nearly as much power as the British 
permitted to the emirs of Northern Nigeria. The 
administrative system of the South is one based on 
centralized rule, limited only by democratically 
elected local councils. There are no political parties 
which are organized nationally. 

The internal diversity that is already straining 
Ghanaian polity and that will place on an inexpe- 
rienced leadership tremendous strains in Nigeria 
and the Cameroons next year is the same in every 
African state approaching independence. And as if 
this were not enough to discourage the sympathetic 
observer, as soon as independence is achieved a 
second political tension immediately comes into ex- 
istence—pan-Africanism. As in the Arab world, there 
is growing in black Africa a movement to unite all 
the continent south of the Sahara into a huge state 
of almost two hundred million people. This move- 
ment is opposed by all entrenched interests who 
would lose power and wealth if its ends were ac- 
complished. Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of 
Ghana has assumed the leadership of the unionist 
movement in West Africa, largely because his state 
was the first post-war African state south of the 
Sahara to receive independence and because Ghana 
is one of the richest states in Africa. But the leader- 
ship of nationalist movements can be maintained 
only if the leader can produce evidence that he can 
lead. As long as the conflict was between Ghana and 
French or British colonial administrations, Nkrumah 


needed no greater successes than meetings in Accra 
of independent African states or African nationalist 
organizations, supporting slogans and plans. 

In 1960, the area immediately to the west of 
Ghana, Togo, will also receive its independence. 
Nkrumah will be under tremendous pressure to 
unite Ghana and Togo. The Togo leadership has 
already expressed itself against such a union. The 
alternatives to Nkrumah are three: fail to secure 
union; conquer Togo through subversion or the use 
of force; or establish a “union” like the one between 
Ghana and Guinea, a word without substance that 
will “never to heaven go.” 

Each of these alternatives will involve other pow- 
ers. The Nigerian leadership has not exactly shown 
itself in favor of Nkrumah’s nationalism, partly on 
personal grounds. The Nigerians will not support a 
Ghana takeover in Togo. And neither will the 
French. Will a patchwork of conflicting pan-African- 
isms develop? Will this political conflict aid or injure 
the need to devote every ounce of African energy 

’ to education and economic improvement? 

The French African states have just experienced 
their third political change since the second world 
war: union of all French West Africa under close 
French control; division of the various regions but 
still under Parisian control; and, now, autonomy of 
the various areas in a “French Community”, which 
in reality keeps the power in the hands of the 
French government. But like the first two, the latest 
model has established political tensions that have 
resulted, or will result, in its change. French West 
African leadership is split into two major groups: 
one group led by Senghor of Senegal calls for the 
federation of the various “Republics” into larger 
political groupings that can better meet the chal- 
lenges of French control on the one hand and 
Nkrumah expansionism on the other; the second 
group, led by Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, 
calls for balkanization of West Africa into a plethora 
of semi-independent states, all closely tied to France. 

When the French Community came into existence 
this year, Senghor arranged a federation of four of 
the new “Republics”—Senegal, French Sudan, Volta 
and Dahomey. The powers of the federation, called 
Mali after a great African confederation of the past, 
were not defined. It crossed racial, religious and 
linguistic lines. It was united more by the desire to 
unite than anything else. The balkanizing leadership 
of the Ivory Coast immediately went into operation; 
Dahomey and Volta withdrew and decreed their 
desire for independence from Senghor’s variety of 
pan-Africanism. French West Africa is beset with 
political cross-currents that will grow in the future, 
particularly as these areas withdraw from the French 
Community as Guinea has withdrawn. 

Barring the development of forces not at present 
visible, West Africa is headed for a long period in 
which localism will struggle with pan-Africanism, 
in which energies will be diverted from the more 




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S2Ehae28 828 


important development priorities, in which Com- 
munist infiltration will be probing constantly for 

The situation is the same in the rest of Africa. 
Another example of rising political tension comes 
from the eastern part of Tropical Africa. Somalia 
will become independent next year. The United 
Kingdom has announced that it is willing to permit 
British Somaliland to join Somalia at some unspeci- 
fied later date. This will lead to conflict between 
Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden province, 
in which Ethiopia rules a practically pure Somali 
people. This conflict will involve Sudan and Egypt 
because both countries rely on Nile water, eighty- 
five per cent of which comes from the Ethiopian 
plateau, and because both desire to assure a weak 
Ethiopia that will be unable to interfere with their 
source of life, the Nile waters. 

In sum, Tropical Africa, outwardly a unity, is 
faced with a practically infinite list of political prob- 
lems that are growing. The solution of one usually 
creates another. These problems are a serious dis- 
advantage to African development. Whether African 
determination to bring political order out of the 
chaos that imperialism has so ably assisted will be 
sufficient to solve the many problems is questionable. 

And political problems are not the only ones that 
beset the leadership and peoples of Africa. While 
the fact of cultural backwardness can be viewed as 
an advantage in that there are fewer “bad” habits 
for the African peoples to overcome before acquiring 
the more productive aspects of Western civilization, 
backwardness is so great that the problem of educa- 
tion is tremendous. The cost of building schools, the 
time and funds required to train teachers, the fact 
that the concept of education is unknown to vast 
numbers of Africans—all amount to an overwhelm- 
ing problem, demanding the full energies of the 
pitifully small educated elite that has already 

But an even greater task will be that of economic 
development, utilizing the available resources in 
order to pay for their further utilization. Nowhere 
in Tropical Africa is there a developed transporta- 
tion and communication system. In relation to size, 
Africa has the fewest ports and paved roads, the 
least railroad mileage, and the shortest coastline. 
And despite the fact that it has the greatest hydro- 
electric possibilities in the world, there is not enough 
power anywhere and what power there is, in most 
cases, is much too expensive. There is also a serious 
shortage of government services: statistical and 
social information. Little capital is available for 
investment in the necessary roads, railroads, ports, 
bridges, power developments, and basic industries 
such as textiles and food processing. There is, in 
Many areas, a shortage of any kind of permanent 
labor; in all areas, a major shortage of skilled labor. 

These needs must be supplied, and the educational 
and political problems solved, at the same time. 

The situation is further complicated by the cutting 
up of Africa into units by European powers on the 
basis of who came first, rather than of economic 
interest. The transportation facilities that do exist 
are frequently—indeed, almost always—to be found 
in places that are less economical than they would 
be if the Europeans’ artificial borders had not been 
drawn in the first place. The most economical port 
to service the West African interior is Bathurst in 
British-controlled Gambia. But because most of the 
hinterland of Bathurst is controlled by the French, 
an altogether artificial transportation structure based 
on Dakar has been built. 

Similar artificial creations have been constructed 
all over Africa. The result is extremely high trans- 
port costs and exorbitant prices for goods at inland 
points. And because of a perpetual shortage of port 
facilities (in part due to the fact that politically- 
motivated construction of unnatural ports is required 
for each coastal area with a different flag), prices 
are already much higher than they should be at the 
coastal points. All these high prices have been eating 
away at what little wealth has so far been developed. 

Much of this basic development must be carried 
out before the vast iron, copper, bauxite, and man- 
ganese reserves can be brought into production. 
Ghana faces this very problem now in the Volta 
River Project. The suggestion that cheap power can 
be produced by damming the Volta River has been 
recently reiterated by a team of American engineers. 
But the power would be cheap only if it were used. 
Ghana has large bauxite reserves that, if developed, 
would use enough of the electricity to make the dam 
a worthwhile project. But the two projects must be 
carried out simultaneously. One without the other 
would be an impossible waste of capital resources. 
The Ghanaian government can no doubt finance the 
$300 million dam, but it cannot finance the alumi- 
num smelter. So far, no Western aluminum producer 
has shown a willingness to invest in the smelter. In 
the economic field, as in the social and educational 
areas, African leadership faces a formidable task. 

Where does the United States fit into the picture 
of a rapidly changing Africa? What should the 
American policy be toward the political entangle- 
ments of European powers with Africans, of Africans 
with each other? Should the United States interject 
American influence more forcefully in African eco- 
nomic development? 

These questions are easier to ask than to answer, 
but there is one great compelling consideration 
which requires that they be answered soon. Africa 
is the only continent where, by and large, the United 
States is not hated. Despite the dastardly history of 
our treatment of the Negro, the African still looks to 
the U.S. as his support against the continuance of 


foreign imperial control. He looks upon the U.S. as 
a bountiful helper in the war against disease, poverty 
and backwardness. He does not suspect that Ameri- 
can aid is merely a screen for economic imperialism, 
as most Asiatics do, nor does he think it a payment 
for political services rendered in the struggle against 
Communism. Anti-American feelings are fashionable 
so far only in the Arab north. 

The challenge thus becomes centered in what can 
be done by the United States government and by 
private Americans to keep Africa on the side of 
human rights and human dignity. Decisions must be 
taken quickly because Africa is moving quickly. In 
the area of politics, there are two questions: what 
should be U.S. policy regarding the European pow- 
ers and the African areas they control, and what 
should be our policy in the face of inevitable con- 
flicts among African peoples once they are free. In 
the first area, there has been a good deal of consis- 
tency: always support the status quo and oppose 
self-determination. In the case of Algeria, the United 
States has done nothing to help end the conflict. 
NATO arms from American factories continue to 
equip French divisions that fight in Algeria. But the 
State Department plays the ostrich and pretends 
that the continuation of the Algerian war—and it 
will continue until the Algerian people are free—is 
none of its business. 

The continuation of the war inexorably pushes 
the Algerians into Communist hands. It is amazing 
that after five years of revolution the Communists 
have not gained a more considerable foothold in the 
revolutionary movement. If the war is prolonged, 
the level of Communist influence in Algeria will 
increase. When it finally achieves independence, the 
Algerian government will be farther to the left than 
it would be if the war could be ended now. The war 
is also slowly but certainly alienating the black 
leadership to the south. Most of the African leaders 
consider the Algerian struggle no different from 
their own; indeed, it is a test case. 

The other political question that should concern 
us is that of internal African politics: will the United 
States do all in its power to help channel the force 
of pan-Africanism into schemes for the development 
of regional federations or unified states? The flow of 
U.S. economic assistance to Africa, practically non- 
existent except for rental payments to Morocco, 
Tunisia and Libya for military bases, must be in- 
creased. The numerous productive possibilities in 
transportation and power generation must receive as 
much assistance as possible. Because countries like 
the Sudan, Libya, and Ghana have refused Commu- 
nist assistance so far does not mean it will be refused 
forever. The Volta Dam in Ghana, the Souapiti Dam 
in Guinea, the Aswan Dam in Egypt (now in Com- 

munist hands) are typical examples of projects that 
should receive our greatest possible aid. 

An instance of irreparable American behavior oc- 
curred in our relations with Guinea. Two months 
ago, it became known that this new state received 
several thousand small arms for its police from 
Czechoslovakia. The Guinean leader, Sekou Toure, 
had previously asked the Liberian government 
(since there were no diplomatic relations between 
Washington and Conakry) to request such arms 
from the United States. Washington did nothing. 
The Communists offered arms and were accepted. 

Guinea has been independent since September 
1958. In May 1959 the United States finally named 
an ambassador to Guinea. Why did it take so long? 
Will the same mistake be repeated as each new 
African state becomes independent and is deluged 
with Soviet offers of assistance? 

It is the policy of the United States government 
to have no policy for any African area that is under 

. the control of a European power. If this continues 

to be our attitude, the West can look forward to 

‘growing Communist influence in Africa. Take the 

example of Kenya, a British-controlled region. It 
has local autonomy: the legislature is partly elected 
and partly nominated by the Governor, with the 
country’s six million Africans electing the same 
number of representatives as the sixty thousand 
whites. Of the thirty-two nominated members, five 
are Africans. Most of the fertile and well-watered 
farmlands have been taken away from the African 
farmers and reserved for white settlement. Because 
there has developed considerable opposition to the 
British regime, a “state of emergency” has been pro- 
claimed, meaning that the Governor can do practi- 
cally anything he wishes to maintain public order. 
Members of three tribal groups are not permitted 
to move out of their tribal areas without special 
permission. Because these actions are carried out by 
our ally, the United Kingdom, the U.S. sits idly by. 
Such behavior, or lack of it, is the surest way to 
turn pro-Americanism in Africa to anti-Americanism. 

What has been said for Kenya can be said for 
many other African regions. Tom Mboya, a young 
Kenyan leader, recently visited the United States to 
dramatize the plight of his country. In a speech in 
Washington he declared that, “if men of good will 
accept the inevitable and join with us to ease the 
pangs of transition, then we may build the kind of 
society in which violence is unnecessary and may 
gradually become an outmoded method of achieving 
objectives.” Mboya is one of the more important 
leaders of the new Africa. If the United States turns 
its back on moderate men of his thinking, there is 
not much probability that the present opportunity 
to aid and guide the future of the African continent 
will ever return. 






lear weapons 


Walter Millis 

As one of a non-religious (some of my friends might 
consider it an anti-religious) bent, it has always 
seemed to me impossibly difficult to deal with ques- 
tions of war and statecraft as moral problems. If 
we are thinking of “war” in the abstract, we are 
thinking of one of the ugly facts of life—an institu- 
tion which has characterized human society from 
time immemorial, and which, like many other ugly 
facts of life, is in itself morally neutral. Like pain, 
pestilence or natural disaster, it presents a problem 
to the moralist; but the moralist can say nothing to 
those involved in war’s agonies and cruel decisions. 

If we are talking about war in this abstract sense, 
it seems to me that only the absolute pacifists—those 
whom Father Murray too harshly describes as har- 
boring the “vulgar pacifism of sentimentalist and 
materialist inspiration”—are entitled to introduce the 
moral issue at all. It is their position that the organ- 
ized taking of human life is in itself so great an 
evil that no good which may be achieved by this 
means can render it a moral action. They make a 
moral issue of the institution of war itself (it must 
be admitted that a vast amount of history which is 
neither sentimental nor materialist tends to support 
them); and it seems to me that those unwilling to 
meet them on these high terms, those unable either 
to accept or refute their contention that all war is 
and of itself immoral, are forced to drop the whole 
moral argument to a lower plane. 

Unless we take our stand with the absolute paci- 
fist, we are compelled to accept war in the abstract 
as a fact of life. Confronting it, we can no longer 
appeal to a set of moral absolutes. The whole argu- 
ment shifts and tends to get lost in the sands and 
shoals of particular wars, particular circumstances, 
and the particular moral responsibilities carried by 
the individual in each of the many ways in which 
he is related to the social enterprise. It is clear that 
the aviators who dropped the atomic bomb on the 
defenseless women and children of Hiroshima, the 
statesmen who gave the orders that they should do 
it, and the publicists and politicians who created the 
“climate” in which the statesmen’s decision was 
made inevitable, all occupied different ethical posi- 

Mr. Millis is the author of Arms and Men and co- 
author of Arms and the State. 

tions and confronted different moral problems. If 
one accepts war of some kind, in some circum- 
stances, waged in some degree of savagery, as a 
moral enterprise, then one is involved in these com- 
plexities of individual moral responsibility. One 
cannot make the same answer to the individual con- 
scientious objector, taught to believe that the taking 
of life is inherently wrong, as one makes to the 
statesman, taught to believe that his highest duty is 
the conservation of the safety and interest of the 
people to whom he is responsible, or to the publicist 
who advocates war or warlike courses (in which it 
is improbable that he will either have to kill others 
or risk being killed himself) because he believes 
that war will serve some higher end of freedom or 

From these difficulties, which confront those who 
reject the position of the absolute pacifists, those 
who might be described as absolute bellicists offer 
a logical, if unattractive, way out. If the cause is 
just, war is not only licit but morally required; one 
not only may but must fight for the right, and it 
follows that any kind of horror or violence that 
carries some reasonable chance of victory and will 
more quickly terminate the struggle is morally ac- 
ceptable. This is the logic of the greater good. It 
was the logic of those who supported war against 
what seemed the positive evil of Nazi, Fascist and 
Japanese aggression; it was also the logic which led 
such patently ethical men as Truman, Stimson and 
their advisers to incinerate the innocent non-combat- 
ants of Hiroshima in the nuclear fires. As John 
Cogley observes, most of us still feel that the war 
on Nazism was a morally justified enterprise—it was 
better to have fought that evil, even at the price 
of a slaughter, than to have acquiesced in it. But 
many of us still feel qualms about the Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki bombs, and, indeed, about the equally 
terrible and indiscriminate Tokyo and Hamburg fire- 

We recoil from such consequences of the bellicist 
theory of the greater good, logical though they may 
be. And we recoil the more because all experience 
has taught us that no man (or nation) can be trusted 
unilaterally to determine what is the greater good; 
no man can be judge in his own cause; no nation in 
defending its right can be sure that it is not unjustly 
trampling upon the rights of others; in fighting for 
what is right against what is evil it cannot know 
that its values are universal values. It cannot even 
be sure that military victory will conserve even its 
own concept of the right—and a great deal of history 
suggests that this is seldom the actual result. In 
the absence of a supra-national or super-human 


authority which can not only ascertain but unam- 
biguously declare what is right and just in the affairs 
of nation-states, the bellicist theory (and I hope it 
is clear that I am thinking of bellicism in a just 
cause) offers us no exit from such contrasting dif- 
ficulties as those of Hiroshima or of our acceptance 
of war against Germany and Japan. 

For those unable to condemn organized war as 
always and in itself immoral, there is only one solu- 
tion. It is the solution adopted by Father Murray 
which, as Rabbi Schwarzschild points out, is no 
different in essence from that adopted by the ancient 
Jews and by all later heirs of the Judeo-Christian 
ethic. War is morally acceptable only under certain 
rigid limits—limits as to purpose, ends and means. 
Pope Pius XII (and Father Murray, who so tightly 
expounds his teaching) discerns limitations different 
from those which surrounded war in ancient Pale- 
stine, but the principle is the same. The case can be 
put by saying that the politician and publicist are 
justified in advocating war, the statesman is justified 
in accepting and waging war, and the soldier is justi- 
fied in the killing necessary to success, if the origins 
and conduct of the war fulfill certain conditions. 

The conditions are that it must be a just war, by 
the best lights available to those who participate in 
it. It must in addition be a defensive war; however 
just one’s claims against others, they are not to be 
asserted by an organized military effort to establish 
them; a defensive war to repress injustice is permis- 
sible, but an offensive war for the same purpose is 
not. (This seems to rule out a military effort by the 
West in support of the Hungarian revolution.) The 
defense must be efficacious, “undertaken with hope 
of success.” This limitation, particularly salient in 
the nuclear age, rules out suicidal last stands; but 
the application of this latter principle to nuclear 
weaponry, which appears to offer no hope of defen- 
sive success, only of revenge, is obscure. After these 
limitations on the purposes and ends of legitimate 
war, one comes to the crucial question of means. 
Father Murray offers the “principle of proportion.” 
Even grave injustices may not be repressed by dis- 
proportionate military means—by means, that is, 
which would do greater damage than the continua- 
tion of the injustice. 

However tight and sound the principles, they do 
not seem to help us much in our problem. The Pope 
was willing to consider the liceity of megaton war- 
fare “in the case in which it must be judged indis- 
pensable for self-defense.” But on the other hand, he 
rejected as “immoral” the use of megaton and bac- 
teriological warfare where it “entails such an exten- 
sion of the evil that it entirely escapes from the 


control of man.” We are faced with a situation in __ 

which any war seems likely to escape entirely from 
the control of man (and I believe that we have in 
fact been faced with this situation since 1914) and 
one in which the resort to nuclear weapons can 
never be “indispensable to self-defense”, since, so far 
as we know now, resort to the weapons can never 
promote defense. Maintaining them may do so, but 
using them can apparently promote nothing but a 
barren revenge and destruction. 

It is this paradox of the modern weapons which I 
feel Father Murray avoids. I am quite willing to 
accept the traditional position that war waged for 
righteous ends, with limited purposes and by limited 
means, with its unavoidable slaughter adjusted in 
correct proportion to the good which will be achieved 
by success, is a moral activity. Some of the terms 
are here rather hard to fill, but the rules or limits 

_ as defined seem to me acceptable, and I am not 

prepared to condemn the soldiers and sailors of, 
say, the eighteenth century, who did their bloody 
duty in an age in which this kind of rule and limit 
was both applicable and observed, as wicked or im- 
moral men. My difficulty is that the rules are no 
longer applicable. Neither Pope Pius XII nor Father 
Murray supplies me with an answer to the one 
rather stark question: Was it right or wrong to in- 
cinerate sixty thousand non-combatant men, women 
and children at Hiroshima? Was President Truman 
(who bore the ultimate responsibility) a wicked 
man; was he a good man mistakenly adopting a 
wicked course, or was he a good man adopting a 
course which was good, under all the circumstances? 
Father Murray’s argument does not tell me. His 
quotations from Pope Pius XII do not tell me; and 
if my conscience required me (as it does not) to 
accept the Pope as a final authority on morals, I still 
think I would be left in a situation of considerable 
bafflement. This is what I meant by saying at the 
outset that it has always been difficult for me to deal 
with issues of statecraft and war as moral issues. 
My own belief is that the issues which modern war 
raises before us will be settled on practical rather 
than moralistic terms. John Cogley has suggested 
that we are in fact facing the prospect of a world 
without war, and we will slowly adjust ourselves 
to a situation (it will by no means be an easy one) 
derived from pragmatic and not moralistic considera- 
tions. With this I agree, as it seems to me the only 
outcome short of total catastrophe. But if this is the 
outcome, it will be the moralists who will have to 
bring their views into accord with it. It will not 
come through the great society bringing its actions 
into accord with the teachings of the moralists. 




BA2sSeewr-BaeaR ke ko 

Nyack, New York 
Sir: Worldview is fond of the word “ambiguity” in 
international affairs. Unless I am mistaken, it seems 
to afford for you a moral blank check as an alterna- 
tive to the too rigorous absolutes of the Christian 

But what about the intra-national ambiguities 
within countries where tyranny rules? Surely there 
is no reason to soften our criticism of the lack of 
civil liberty in the Communist countries. But we 
should recognize two things. First, the fact that no 
matter how “hard” or “soft” the Soviet leaders may 
be at a given time, the people of the USSR are not 
now and never have been our enemies. Yet U.S. 
policy has never been directed toward means of 
removing or annihilating the leaders only; it has 
consistently developed methods for annihilating the 
very people we would rescue from the dictators. 

Second, the “softening” or liberalization of Soviet 
life during the past six years must be kept constantly 
in view. We must not lose our perspective. There is 
no reason for not applauding a man like Boris Paster- 
nak and protesting any censure of him by the Soviet 
State; indeed I have so applauded and protested. But 
in the same context we should note with gratitude 


New York, N.Y. 
Sir: I see that the Committee for Constitutional 
Government wants Worldview to apologize to Con- 
gress, on pain of being “indefinitely suspected of 
treason.” I couldn’t sleep last night for wondering 
what you are going to say in your letter of apology. 
(I assume you do not want to spend the rest of 
your life under suspicion of having some reserva- 
tions about letting everybody in the U.S. be killed 
for the sake of saving the U.S.) 

On the technicalities: I guess you would address 
identical letters to the Speaker of the House and the 
President of the Senate. And you would ask that the 
letters be entered in the Congressional Record. The 
letter could end with “Abjectly yours.” Now, with 
respect to what you would put between the opening 
and ending, I tried a couple of drafts but could 
not seem to make the sentences sound sufficiently 
humiliated and abject. This may be because I am 
an American citizen and a Christian, and those 


the mildness of the censure and compare it with the 
fate of men like Meyerhold and Babel. Likewise we 
should consider, for example, the fact that medical 
care is supplied free to everyone in the USSR, and 
that the USSR is training at least twice as many 
M.D.’s as is the U.S. 

You tend, I fear, to see Communism as so black 
that you can weigh it against nuclear annihilation. 
Even if we had to deal with the blackest of Soviet 
tyranny at its Stalinist nadir, there would at least 
remain some glimmer of a redemptive posssibility. 
A war with ABC weapons would extinguish that pos- 
sibility entirely. 

To be sure, there are penultimate choices to be 
made. But if the ultimate choice is between treason 
to the United States and treason to humanity before 
Almighty God, there may be some (count me among 
them!) who would choose treason to their nation- 
hood. Do you think you will be forgiven for slaying 
Russian children in their beds for the sake of Ameri- 
can liberties? Do you even think that those liberties 
could be preserved in any meaningful way in the 
nuclear holocaust? 



annoying documents, the New Testament and the 
U.S. Constitution, always insinuated themselves into 
my mind, just when I thought I had a good ringing 
sentence. Recalling Mayor La Guardia’s classic state- 
ment, I had as my opening sentence: “When World- 
view makes a mistake it’s a beaut.” 

On second thought, you might well ask Mr. Will- 
ford I. King to compose a letter for you. His letter 
should describe what the Congress did, what you 
said, and the reasons for believing you made an awful 
mistake. This would make interesting reading. 

On third thought, you could send a copy of the 
Bible and a copy of the Constitution to both houses 
of Congress, with a covering letter saying that these 
constitute your apology. But, on further thought, 
this does not seem adequate. 

I am going to stay awake one more night trying to 
help you and if a good letter does not form itself in 
my mind, I am going to forget the whole thing. 




The Devil’s Repertoire by Victor 
Gollancz. Doubleday. 192 pp. 

The Fearful Choice: A Debate on Nu- 
Clear Policy conducted by Philip 
Toynbee. Wayne State University 
Press. 112 pp. $2.50. 

Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare by 
Bertrand Russell. Simon and 
Schuster. 92 pp. $2.50. 

by Daniel M. Friedenberg 

Three books have recently ap- 
peared dealing with the possible 
ultimate consequences of nuclear 
warfare. All three are written by 
distinguished Englishmen who 
have been identified with left or 
liberal movements for most of 
their adult life and profess a 
united disdain for Communist 
ideology. The three authors are 
strongly affected by the knowl- 
edge that England, a small and 
heavily populated island, would 
suffer frightful damage in atomic 
warfare and the three again tend 
to equate the fate of their island 
with the fate of all civilized man- 
kind. As a consequence, though 
the authors have widely differing 
intellectual and religious atti- 
tudes, the books are united in a 
desire to negotiate disarmament 
to a much greater degree than 
any American writer of non- 
Communist sympathies would 

Starting with the book of least 
worth, The Devil's Repertoire by 
Victor Gollancz, we are con- 
fronted with a badly-written but 
passionate plea for pacifism, a 
pacifism induced by the brooding 
over what nuclear warfare would 
mean. The basis of Mr. Gollancz’s 
pacifism is theologic and, as such, 
beyond the scope of this review. 
In the practice of his convictions, 
the author suggests that England 
(and he hopes for the United 
Mr. Friedenberg writes on po- 
litical and cultural affairs for 
The New Republic, The Com- 
monweal, and other journals. 


Britain and the Bomb 

States as well) should give up its 
H-bombs and reject their use un- 
der any circumstances. He makes 
this suggestion with the full 
knowledge that Russia may take 
over the world as a result. Mr. 
Gollancz feels that life under 
Russia would be better than a 
nuclear war which he considers 
inevitable, thus rejecting the 
thesis that war can be avoided. 
“Under a Soviet occupation there 
would be life: a nuclear war 
would mean death: and the man 
who chooses death rather than life 
is a blasphemer.” 

Indeed, Mr. Gollancz goes so 
far as to indicate a justification 
for the occupation, since the Rus- 
sian gauleiters would learn Chris- 
tian brotherhood from the Eng- 
lish. “But under an occupation, 
which would require a large per- 
sonnel, we should be at personal 
grips with them: and, if we used 
the spiritual weapons of patience 
and courage and _ harmlessness 
and forgiveness and even love, 
we might find the enemy becom- 
ing a neighbor.” Presumably Mr. 
Gollancz draws his information 
from some slave camps in Siberia 
the rest of us are not familiar 

It is to the credit of Victor 
Gollancz that he follows to its 
ultimate conclusion the internal 
logic of his own position. For he 
affirms that any tyranny in peace 
is better than nuclear war. Going 
beyond that, he even questions 
whether the war against Hitler 
was justifiable, a war he defines 
solely as “six years of unspeakable 
devastation that brought death, 
mutilation, agony, madness, ha- 
tred, and corruption to million up- 
on million in a despairing world.” 
It is hard to believe that a man 
who escaped Belsen by accident of 
family emigration could thus and 
merely sum up World War II. It 
is equally difficult to believe that 
Hitler could have been won over 
to the Sermon on the Mount any 
more than Genghis Khan. For 

readers interested in an analysis 
of present world tensions, The 
Devil's Repertoire is worthless 
other than as an outstanding ex- 
ample of how the modern situa- 
tion can make a sensitive man re- 
nounce everything worthwhile in 
the face of a possible overwhelm- 
ing danger. 

The Fearful Choice consists of 
a thesis raised by Philip Toynbee 
followed by the comments of well- 
known Englishmen. Although Mr. 
Toynbee rejects the absolute 
pacifism of Victor Gollancz, his 
position in the practical sense is 
barely distinguishable. 

The debate is centered on Mr. 
Toynbee’s conviction that it is a 
“statistical certainty” that a mis- 
take will be made, if the present 
situation continues, and that mu- 
tual fear must lead to an acciden- 
tal war in the near future. “It 
would be wicked and pointless to 
launch a nuclear attack on Russia 
before we have been attacked; 
it would also be wicked and point- 
less to reciprocate after attack 
because only childish revenge 
would make millions of innocent 
Russians suffer the agony which 
Englishmen have already suf- 
fered.” We must therefore yield 
to the Russians. 

The logic employed by Philip 
Toynbee is similar to the old 
adage that heads I win and tails 
you lose. Russia is stronger in 
technical development and will 
remain stronger, we are informed 
ex cathedra. But if by the “mirac- 
ulous” the West becomes strong- 
er, this would be worse since the 
Russians are most intransigent 
when weak. Compounding this 
curious argument, we are in- 
formed that if we negotiate on 
their terms the Russians will not 
try to take advantage of us. If 
they do, he continues, better 
Soviet domination than inevitable 
nuclear warfare. 

That wisest and slyest of mor- 
tals, Bertrand Russell, has written 
the most intelligent analysis. In 

7 — Be —) 





Common Sense and Nuclear 
Warfare, Lord Russell attempts 
to find grounds of appeal to all 
sides, “on the analogy of sanitary 
measures against epidemics.” I]- 
lustrating the tremendous de- 
struction bound to occur by 
means of testimony in the United 
States, he searches for motives 
appealing to the common inter- 
ests of the rival parties. 

From this, he projects a pro- 
gram that may safely initiate 
moves toward concrete peace in 
“a number of stages.” The cessa- 
tion of mutual vituperation has 
already begun in his opinion; 
and, though not quoted, the pres- 
ent exchange of ballet companies 
and symphonic orchestras is in- 
deed a hopeful sign. The aboli- 
tion of nuclear testing would be 
the next step since both sides 
share equal concern in the poi- 
soning of the earth’s atmosphere. 
As Bertrand Russell points out, 
this would have collateral bene- 
fits, since “any agreement be- 
tween East and West about any- 
thing is to the good”, the prob- 
lem being to a large extent psy- 
chological. Following this, every 
endeavor would be made to agree 
that no nuclear weapons should 
be manufactured, a measure 
which could be enforced by in- 
spection without very great diffi- 

Up to this stage, Lord Russell 
feels agreement might well lie 
within the reach of possibility. 
The next giant step, destruction 
of the existing stocks of H-bombs, 
would then tell the story, because 
there could be no mutual agree- 
ment without an accompanying 
reduction of conventional forces. 
For, as the author states, “I doubt 
whether an agreement to this ef- 
fect will be concluded until there 
is a genuine readiness on both 
sides to renounce war as an in- 
strument of policy.” The ultimate 
thereafter, of course, would be an 
International Authority with the 
military power to enforce its de- 

To the American reviewer, 
sharing the American illusion of 

safety accorded by distance, 
much of the discussion in these 
books seems to border on hys- 
teria. But Englishmen, only three 
hours from Moscow by jet, un- 
doubtedly sense an — urgency 
which makes this reading salutary 
if only because it brings an 
awareness if Europe’s mood. Cer- 
tain omissions and confusions, 
however, should be corrected in 
order to bring the discussion into 
clearer focus. 

One cannot escape notice of 
the strong parochial feeling exist- 
ing throughout the three. books. 
It is accepted almost without ex- 
ception that England is the center 
of the universe and that Western 
society is identical with all civ- 
ilization. Only Joseph Grimond, 
M. P. avoids this egocentrism 
when stating in wry words: “The 
present situation is only thought 
‘unique’ because it is ‘God’s 
children’, the British, that are 
threatened . . . Nuclear war might 
finish mankind but it might just 
finish the British, Americans, and 
half the Russians. The Indians, 
Chinese, Africans, South Ameri- 
cans might be left—and left freed 
from Western madness.” 

This in turn involves another 
curious oversight, the place of 
China in the modern world. Lord 
Russell alone approaches this mo- 
mentous issue. It is implicit in any 
agreement to suspend nuclear 
testing that China should be a 
party. Not only could China de- 
velop her own bomb, free of all 
control, but Russia could use 
Chinese territory for testing. This 
seemingly obvious fact has been 
bypassed in all discussion in the 
same way American officials ju- 
ridically ignore the actual physical 
existence of China. 

The salient point is that the 
technical information to make nu- 
clear bombs is now known to the 
entire world. The United States 
had them in 1945, Russia in 1950, 
England in 1952, and France and 
China are rushing to join the Nu- 
clear Club. Within twenty years, 
countries like Egypt and Argen- 
tina will likewise manufacture 

them. Furthermore, countries go- 
ing through the first virulent 
stages of nationalism will be less 
inclined to weigh consequences 
to the same extent as more ma- 
ture nations. It is an axiom ‘of 
power politics that only equality 
produces respect, a condition 
reached by the United States and 
Russia. It may still be that Rus- 
sia could restrain China, as 
America might France; but once 
the many little nations possess 
nuclear weapons, the task of seri- 
ous negotiation will be very much 
more difficult. ;' 

Insofar as the immediate future 
is concerned, it seems to me that 
Messrs, Gollancz and Toynbee 
share a degree of intellectual ab- 
straction akin to that state of in- 
sanity known as disassociation. 
We should never lose sight of the 
fact that the Russians exhibit our 
same anxieties and, due to their 
recent war experiences, probably 
to a larger extent. A principal rea- 
son why we have not yet had 
war, and it is unlikely we will, is 
that Russia and America, because 
of their mutual anxieties, under- 
stand and respect each other's 
paramount zones of influence. 
Our action in Guatemala, our 
lack of action in Hungary and 
Suez clarified the world situation 
to a large extent. In effect, we 
chalked off East Europe in not 
supporting the Hungarian revolt 
and the Middle East in rejecting 
the Suez invasion. The Russians 
likewise know that we will not 
tolerate their action in West Eu- 
rope and the Americas. If we can 
clarify the remaining twilight 
zones. by patient negotiation 
(leaving both Germany and For- 
mosa independent—the American 
aim; but incapable of offensive 
warfare—the Russian aim), there 
is sound reason to believe nuclear 
disarmament would very soon re- 
sult. Patient, ever-careful patient 
negotiation, not abstract appeals 
to morality, religion and pacifism, 
is the only realistic road to that 
success which every moral, re- 
ligious and pacific man so ar- 
dently desires. 


Dream and Reality: Aspects of American Foreign Policy 
by Louis J. Halle. Harper. 327 pp. $5.00. 

A foremost interpreter of American foreign policy here takes 
the long view that American policy is inseparable from Ameri- 
can history, both as it reflects the structure of our national 
experience and as it illustrates the common historical fate of 
mankind—the eternal conflict between illusory hope and factual 

The Prerequisites for Peace 
by Norman Thomas. W. W. Norton. 189 pp. $2.95. 

Disengagement, disarmament, and the establishment of world 
order through the UN are not only necessary but possible, 
Mr. Thomas believes, and he presents a detailed outline of 
how we may achieve these ends on the basis of a "mutuality 
of interests" among the great powers. 

Protracted Conflict 

by Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, James E. Dougherty, 
Alvin J. Cottrell. Harper, 203 pp. $3.95. 

“The significance of Communism as a doctrine and a tech- 
nique of conflict" is revealed and explained by four members 
of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The authors analyze 
the purposes and principles that lie behind Communist strategy, 
its chief targets in the Cold War, and its methods of operation. 

The West in Crisis 
by James P. Warburg. Doubleday. 192 pp. $3.50. 

The crisis of the Western world, as Mr. Warburg sees if, 
derives not from the external threat of Communist imperialism 4 
but from the failures and weaknesses of Western policy which 
have rendered us so vulnerable to that threat: “not the enemy 
without, but the enemy within." : 

The Ecumenical Era in Church and Society 
Edited by Edward J. Jurji. Macmillan. 238 pp. $5.00. 

A symposium in honor of Dr. John A. Mackay, pioneer in the 
ecumenical movement, this volume brings together a number 
of essays by distinguished spokesmen of world Christianity 
on aspects of in relation to contemporary issues. 

- Foundations of the Responsible Society 

by Walter G. Muelder. Abingdon Press. 304 pp. $6.00. 

In the course of this investigation of Christian social ethics | 
in the various spheres of the law, the state, economic life, | 
work and vocation, the family, social welfare, and the world | 
community, Dr. Muelder analyzes some of the most profound | 
problems and tensions of modern society. 


volume 2,no.7 / July 1959 

WORLDVIEW is published monthly by The Church Peace Union. 
Subscription: $2.00 per year. 
Address: 170 East 64th Street, 

New York 21, N. Y. 

William Clancy, Editor 

A. William Loos John R. Inman William J. Cook 

Editorial Assistant, Arlene Croce 

Editorial Comment 
In the Magazines 
Africa in Transition 
William Persen 

War as a Moral Problem 
Walter Millis 

Britain and the Bomb by Daniel M. Friedenberg.. 10 
Current Reading 

Opinions expressed in WORLDVIEW are those of the authors, and 
not necessarily of The Church Peace Union. 

170 East 64th Street 
New York 21, N. Y.